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Executive Summary 
• Louisiana consistently ranks nearly last for health and smoking in the United States. 
• As of 2018, Louisiana had above average smoking prevalence for adults (20.5%) and youth 
(13.5% of high school and 3.8% for middle school students) in the United States (44th for 
adults). 
• The tobacco industry dominated Louisiana tobacco control policymaking during the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s. 
• The tobacco industry hired lobbyists that worked for state business associations, helping it 
forge strong alliances with the state business community. 
• Third party allies helped the tobacco industry block clean air laws, tobacco taxes and strong 
youth access laws while enacting industry-favored changes to tort law in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
• The tobacco industry, led by Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and the Tobacco Institute, gave 
state and local candidates in Louisiana nearly $2.2 million in 2019 dollars ($1.6 million 
current dollars) from 1983 to 2015. 
• From 1983 to 1999 Democrats received the majority of tobacco industry contributions; 
Republicans received greater contributions beginning in the 2003 election cycle as they 
increased their presence in the state legislature. 
• The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that businesses were liable for inherently dangerous 
products in 1986, prompting legislative efforts at tort reform by the state’s business 
community and the tobacco industry. 
• In 1988, the state business community and the tobacco industry secured legislation removing 
liability for harm caused by “inherently dangerous products.” 
• The tobacco industry developed and participated in the state business community’s Citizens 
Against Lawsuit Abuse Coalition in the 1990s to advance its tort reform objectives in 
Louisiana. 
• The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) created the Louisiana Tobacco 
Control Program (LTCP) in 1993. 
• DHH initially funded tobacco control activities using only federal grants, receiving no money 
for tobacco control activities from the state until it allocated $500,000 in Fiscal Year 2001 
from proceeds of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). 
• The tobacco industry helped prevent passage of 61 state clean indoor air bills between 1970 
and 1993. 
• Early state clean air bills were not comprehensive 100% smokefree policies, and generally 
sought to restricted or limited smoking in certain workplaces and locations.  Between 1970 
and 1991, all but 1 bill restricting smoking in the arena area of the Superdome failed. 
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•  Louisiana localities considered 16 ordinances and passed 8 between 1990 and 1992, mostly 
to limit smoking in local government buildings. Although local legislation in Louisiana was 
weak, the Tobacco Institute included it in a 22-state smoking restriction preemption plan. 
• In 1992 and 1993 the industry obtained weak statewide smoking accommodation legislation 
that permitted smoking in most workplaces; the 1993 legislation preempted local smoking 
restrictions.  
• Louisiana lawmakers only passed cigarette pack tax increases in 1984 and 1990 (5¢ and 4¢, 
to a total of 20¢) despite rolling budget crises in the 1980s and early 1990s; none of the 
money went to tobacco control. 
• In 1992, the Tobacco Institute helped repeal a local cigarette tax adopted by the City of New 
Orleans in 1984.  
• Louisiana was one of five states that still allowed tobacco product sales to minors until 1991, 
when the Legislature established 18 as the minimum age to purchase tobacco. 
• The federal government’s adoption of the 1992 Synar Amendment led Louisiana lawmakers 
to adopt youth access laws in 1994 that established a licensing and enforcement system for 
tobacco sellers with industry-friendly provisions and instituted preemption of local youth 
access laws in 1994. 
• Louisiana lawmakers passed legislation in 1995 that eliminated the state’s tobacco licensing 
system and required law enforcement to perform tobacco retail compliance checks, 
effectively preventing the state from enforcing youth access laws. 
• Poor youth access compliance jeopardized state funding under the Synar Amendment, which 
led the Legislature to adopt a new licensing and enforcement system for tobacco sellers in 
1997 that brought Louisiana from one of the highest violation rates of sales to minors to one 
of the lowest nationally by 1999.  
• Louisiana incorporated e-cigarettes into youth access laws for tobacco products in 2014. 
• In 1996, Louisiana became the sixth state of over 40 to sue the tobacco industry, part of a 
series of lawsuits by state attorneys general to recoup Medicaid funds lost treating tobacco-
related illnesses that culminated in the 1998 MSA. 
• Louisiana’s involvement caused Liggett and Myers to settle in 1996, providing states access 
to internal tobacco industry documents and information critical to enabling the MSA. 
• Louisiana Lawmakers placed approximately 70% of their state’s MSA settlement reward into 
a protected trust for health and education initiatives. 
• Louisiana securitized $2.4 billion of its first 25 years of MSA payments in 2001 for an 
upfront payment of $1.2 billion. 
• Health and tobacco control advocates secured a 12¢ increase to the cigarette tax in 2002 with 
dedicated funding for tobacco control that led to the creation of nonprofit tobacco control 
program The Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL). 
• LTCP and TFL aligned and integrated their programming from 2006-2010, bolstering their 
capabilities and effectiveness.  
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• Tobacco control advocates developed increased capacity and coordination in Louisiana, 
allowing them to partially repeal preemption of smokefree air laws covering workplaces and 
restaurants without alcohol licenses in 2003. 
• Passage of local ordinances built support for passage a statewide smokefree law in 2006 that 
prohibited smoking in most public places and workplaces and completely repealed 
preemption over local legislation. 
• Louisiana declined to the 49th highest cigarette tax rate nationwide until 2015, when a tax 
increase raised it to 36th that year; in 2016 it improved to 33rd until declining to 37th by 2020. 
• 28 cities and parishes adopted comprehensive, 100% smokefree laws between 2012 and 
January 2020 to cover exemptions in the 2006 Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act. 
• Local, state, and national organizations used multilevel campaigns and coalitions to secure 
comprehensive smoke-free legislation in New Orleans in 2015 and Baton Rouge in 2017. 
• Comprehensive smokefree laws protected only 27.9% of Louisianans as of 2020, much lower 
than the national average of 61.1%. 
• Tobacco control advocates lacked a powerful presence in Louisiana before the 1990s and 
2000s. The Louisiana Tobacco Control Program formed in 1993, the Coalition for a 
Tobacco-Free Louisiana in 2001 and Tobacco Free Living in 2004, gradually bolstering 
tobacco control presence, capacity, and efforts. 
• Tobacco control advocates established multilevel coalitions at the state and local levels to 
overturn pro-tobacco industry laws and secure tobacco control legislation to obtain effective 
statewide smoking restrictions and comprehensive local smoke-free laws despite strong 
business community opposition. 
• While smoking prevalence has declined in Louisiana because of concerted efforts by health 
and tobacco control proponents, the spread between Louisiana is growing.  
• Advocates need to continue aggressively pursuing tobacco control policies in order to reduce 
smoking prevalence at a faster pace and save lives. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
• Louisiana consistently ranks near the bottom for health, including smoking, in the United 
States. 
• As of 2018, Louisiana had above average smoking rates for adults (20.5%) and youth 
(12.3% of high school and 3.8% for middle school students) in the United States (44th for 
adults). 
• As of 2020, only 27.9% of Louisianans were protected by comprehensive smokefree laws 
• Louisiana’s cigarette tax rate was 49th in the country until tax increases in 2015 and 2016 
brought it to 33rd nationwide (37th as of 2020). 
• The tobacco industry dominated tobacco control policy battles during the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s, securing favorable bills and preventing adoption of meaningful public health 
legislation. 
• Tobacco control advocates secured effective tobacco control legislation in Louisiana by 
developing their presence, capacity and resources in the state. 
• Tobacco control forces’ policy victories are reducing tobacco use in Louisiana. 
 
Louisiana’s Poor Health and Smoking Outcomes 
 The State of Louisiana has struggled to maintain the wellbeing of its residents relative to 
other states. The United Health Foundation’s America’s Health Rankings of health and welfare 
in the United States consistently finds Louisiana is one of the worst states in terms of health 
outcomes, ranking it 50th in 2015, 49th in 2016, 49th in 2017, 48th in 2018, and 49th in 2019.1 
Louisiana’s poor health outcomes 
partially result from high tobacco 
smoking rates, with the United Health 
Foundation ranking Louisiana 46th for 
smoking in 2015, 43rd in 2016, 47th in 
2017, 48th in 2018, and 43rd in 2019.1  
Louisiana adults smoke at 
significantly higher rates than the rest of 
the United States. In 2018, the last year available for US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) Behavioral Risk Factors Surveillance System (BRFSS), 20.5% of adult 
Louisianans were current cigarette smokers (Figure 1.1). The State’s adult cigarette prevalence 
was higher than the 16.1% US average but about the same as the 21% prevalence rate for 
“Tobacco Nation,” the Truth Initiative’s designation for the 13 states with the highest smoking 
rates in the country.2 Louisiana’s high adult smoking rate ranked it the 6th highest among states 
as of 2020.3  
Louisiana’s adult cigarette use rate has been above the US average since 1994 (Figure 
1.1). While the state’s rate slowly decreased over time, it has also grown farther apart from the 
faster declining national average (Figure 1.1). Current electronic cigarette (e-cigarette) use was 
similar to the US as a whole for adults at 4.5% (Figure 1.1). 
America’s Health Rankings … consistently 
finds Louisiana is one of the worst states 
in terms of health outcomes, ranking it 
50th in 2015, 49th in 2016, 49th in 2017, 
48th, in 2018, and 49th in 2019. 
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Figure 1.1: (top) Current Cigarette and E-Cigarette Prevalence in Louisiana and the United States.4 (bottom) The difference between Louisiana 
and the US average grew over time for cigarettes. (There was a methods change to BRFSS in 2010 that created a new baseline for BRFSS 
results 2011-2018 that cannot be compared to previous BRFSS results.5) 
 
Louisiana youth also smoke at higher rates than the national average. In 2017, the last 
year of data available from the High School YRBS, 12.3% of high school students currently used 
cigarettes (Figure 1.2).6 Louisiana’s cigarette use rate among high school students was worse 
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than the national average that year, 8.8%. However, Louisiana high school smoking rates 
generally trended similar to the US high school smoking average over time. 
 
Figure 1.2: National and Louisiana Current Cigarette and E-Cigarette Use Rates Among High School Students6, 7 
*YRBS and Youth Tobacco Survey (YTS) are separately administered surveys with different methodologies.8, 9 
 
Current E-cigarette use in Louisiana was similar to traditional cigarette use, with 12.2% of high 
school students being active users in 2017 according to High School YRBS data.6 According to 
results from the 2019 National Youth Tobacco Survey, current e-cigarette use rates among high 
school students nationwide was 27.5% in 2020.10 
As smoking rates have declined in Louisiana, 
the share of its population protected by comprehensive 
smokefree laws covering workplaces, restaurants, and 
bars has grown. Louisiana did not have any 
comprehensive local laws until 2012, when Louisiana’s 
nonprofit tobacco control program, the Louisiana 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL), began 
running local campaigns to pass comprehensive 
ordinances. TFL, subsequently joined by national and state health and tobacco control 
organizations, would help secure 28 local smokefree laws by January 2020. Besides covering 
workplaces, restaurants and bars, all of Louisiana’s comprehensive local smokefree laws also 
prohibited smoking in casinos (We define “comprehensive smokefree laws” as including 
workplaces, restaurants, bars and casinos in Chapter 12). As of 2020, 27.9% of Louisianans were 
protected by comprehensive smokefree laws covering workplaces, restaurants and bars, less than 
the national population average of 61.1%.11 35 states safeguard more of the public from 
secondhand smoke, with 27 having comprehensive statewide laws to protect all of their residents 
and 8 states holding local laws that covered a greater share of their citizens than Louisiana.11 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
YRBS HS Cig La 17.6 17.6 21.8 12.1 12.3
YRBS HS Cig Nat 21.9 23 20 19.5 18.1 15.7 10.8 8.8
YTS HS Cig La 18.7 19.4 23.5 14.3 13.5
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As of 2020, 27.9% of 
Louisianans were protected 
by comprehensive smokefree 
laws … less than the national 
population average of 61.1%. 
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Louisiana was also below Tobacco Nation’s average, which had 45% of its population covered 
my smokefree laws as of June 2019.2  
Louisiana’s cigarette tax lagged most states until the mid-2010s. The state infrequently 
raised the tax per cigarette pack, failing to levy an increase after 1990 (20 cents) until 2000 
(Figure 1.3). Louisiana next raised its cigarette tax by 12-cents per pack in 2002, and then 
allowed its rate to stagnate at 34th and become the 2nd lowest in the country by 2014 (Chapter 
11). Two tax increases in 2015 (50-cents) and 2016 (22-cents) cumulatively established a $1.08 
rate per cigarette pack, 33rd highest in the country at the time of implementation. However, by 
January 2020 Louisiana dropped to having the 37th highest cigarette tax in the country, below 
the national average of $1.81 per pack.12 Louisiana’s $1.08 cigarette tax per pack in January 
2020 is nearly the same as Tobacco Nation’s average tax was in June 2019, which was $1.07 per 
pack.2 
 
Figure 1.3: Louisiana and the National Average Cigarette Tax Rate Per Pack over Time (Chapters 6 and 11).13 
 
Tobacco use inflicts major health and economic costs on Louisiana. Smoking causes 
approximately 7,200 deaths annually in the state14, 15 and 32.6% of all cancer deaths.15 Smoking-
linked illnesses also inflicted $1.9 billion in healthcare costs during 2009.14, 15 Louisiana would 
save $31.7 million in Medicaid funds the following year if it reduced absolute smoking 
prevalence by just 1%.16 
Tobacco Industry Presence in Louisiana 
 One reason for Louisiana’s poor health outcomes are the powerful business interests that 
dominate the state, in particular the tobacco industry. The tobacco industry has worked since the 
1970s to influence policy outcomes to its advantage in Louisiana, initially relying on its own 
employee activists (Chapter 2). During the 1980s and 1990s, the tobacco industry also used 
campaign contributions, influential and connected lobbyists, as well as alliances with other 
businesses and business associations to try to prevent meaningful tobacco control legislation. In 
1980 1984 1990 2000 2002 2015 2016 2019
Louisiana $0.11 $0.16 $0.20 $0.24 $0.36 $0.86 $1.08 $1.08
State Average $0.13 $0.16 $0.23 $0.42 $0.61 $1.60 $1.65 $1.81
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contrast to the tobacco industry, health and tobacco 
control advocates had a weak presence in Louisiana 
before the 2000s that could not counter the 
industry’s influence and resources.  
Tobacco industry interference negatively 
influenced Louisiana’s tobacco control policy 
outcomes in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. During that period, over 60 statewide smoking 
restriction bills died in the legislature because of tobacco industry opposition. In addition, 
statewide smoker accommodation laws, which establish weak restrictions supported by the 
industry that permit smoking indoors and are designed to prevent adoption of stronger smokefree 
legislation,17 passed in Louisiana in 1992 and 1993 (Chapter 5). The laws failed to protect 
Louisianans from secondhand smoke and preempted stronger local smoking restrictions for over 
ten years.  
The tobacco industry hampered public health progress in other policy spheres besides 
smoking restrictions. The industry aggressively lobbied against tobacco tax increases in the 
1980s and 1990s, preventing most legislation from passing despite Louisiana chronically 
suffering from budget crises (Chapter 6). Louisiana lawmakers adopted a weak minimum age of 
sale law in 1991 secretly supported by the tobacco industry, which tied it to the Tobacco 
Institute’s ineffective voluntary regulation program “It’s the Law” (Chapter 7). The tobacco 
industry also helped the state business community convince Louisiana Lawmakers to pass 
product liability protections in the 1980s and 1990s that shielded tobacco companies from 
liability for harm caused by their products and made it more difficult to sustain lawsuits against 
them (Chapter 8). Efforts by tobacco control supporters to pass any meaningful tobacco control 
legislation repeatedly failed amid opposition from the tobacco industry, state lawmakers friendly 
to it, and the state business community (Chapters 5, 6, and 7). 
The Development of Tobacco Control in Louisiana 
 Health and tobacco control advocates were slow to establish a presence in Louisiana 
effective enough to counter tobacco industry influence, which contributed to the poor tobacco 
control legislative outcomes in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Only medical professionals, 
advocates and health voluntaries promoted tobacco control in the state during the 1970s and 
1980s. The state did not form a tobacco control program until 1993, when it created the 
Louisiana Tobacco Control Program (LTCP) under its Department of Health and Hospitals 
(DHH) using funding from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (Chapter 4). 
LTCP relied entirely on limited federal money until the state began providing $500,000 annually 
to the program in fiscal year 2001 from its Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) proceeds, 
which resulted from state litigation against the major cigarette companies (Chapter 9). 
  Tobacco control programs and advocates secured another tobacco control program for 
Louisiana by developing their presence and capacity in the state. LTCP helped create a network 
of tobacco control grassroots advocates and advocacy groups to denormalize tobacco use as well 
as generate public support for tobacco control (Chapter 4). While LTCP established a tobacco 
control base in Louisiana, state and national health advocates and voluntaries reformed an earlier 
Tobacco industry interference 
negatively influenced Louisiana’s 
tobacco control policy outcomes 
in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
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coalition, the Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana (CTFLA) in 2001 to advance tobacco 
control policies in the state (Chapter 4). The coalition then helped secure a tobacco tax increase 
in 2002 with dedicated funding for tobacco control programming not administered by the state 
(Chapter 11). Health and tobacco control advocates and voluntaries maintained CTFLA and their 
partnerships to coordinate future policy campaigns.  
Although tobacco control funding was well below CDC recommended best practice 
levels,18  the 2002 tax increase with dedicated tax funds led to the creation of nonprofit tobacco 
control program the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL) that conducted 
additional tobacco control initiatives and provided more resources to the state (Chapter 4). TFL, 
similar to LTCP, would also lead grassroots development programs that created tobacco control 
advocates and increased support for tobacco control initiatives in Louisiana. TFL’s formation as 
a nonprofit also allowed it to engage in advocacy and policy campaigns and participate in 
advocate coalitions. 
 LTCP and TFL did not initially coordinate their activities. The devastation of Hurricane 
Katrina caused the programs to align their efforts with Emory University’s Tobacco Technical 
Assistance Consortium (TTAC) from 2006-2010 to enable greater synergy and efficiency 
between them. LTCP and TFL subsequently coordinated and collaborated on some programming 
after streamlining with TTAC’s assistance. The development of tobacco control’s presence and 
capacity in Louisiana enabled it to overcome industry interference and advance public health in 
Louisiana. 
Tobacco Control Capacity Improvements Lead to Public Health Policy Victories  
The creation of LTCP, the development of the CTFLA coalition and ties between its 
members, the formation of TFL and its ability to engage in policy advocacy, and the alignment 
of LTCP and TFL’s programming led to passage of increasingly stronger tobacco control 
legislation in the 2000s and 2010s in Louisiana. LTCP fostered a grassroots network of tobacco 
control advocates and backers in Louisiana to support the advancement of tobacco control 
policies in Louisiana (Chapter 4). State and national partners of CTFLA used the coalition to 
help pass the 12-cent cigarette tax increase in 2002 that spurred TFL’s creation in 2004 and 
provided more resources for tobacco control efforts in Louisiana (Chapter 11). CTFLA then led a 
policy campaign that partially repealed state preemption of local smoking restrictions in 2003 
and a campaign that secured a statewide smokefree law and fully eliminated preemption in 2006, 
overturning the ineffective accommodation laws the tobacco industry helped install in 1992 and 
1993 (Chapter 10). TFL later administered local campaigns to pass comprehensive smokefree 
ordinances covering bars and casinos starting in 2012, when statewide smokefree efforts stalled 
(Chapter 12). TFL secured numerous ordinances, and with assistance from state and national 
partners from CTFLA, ran effective policy campaigns to obtain comprehensive smokefree laws 
in New Orleans (2015) and Baton Rouge in 2017. CTFLA partners and TFL also formed a 
coalition to help secure the cigarette tax increases in 2015 and 2016 that brought Louisiana’s 
cigarette tax from 49th in the country to at that time the 33rd highest nationwide (Chapter 11). 
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Conclusion 
The formation of CTFLA, a strong 
coalition of national and state health 
advocates and voluntaries, and TFL’s ability 
as a nonprofit to engage in advocacy and 
policy coalitions, enabled policy victories in 
the 2000s and 2010s that reduced tobacco 
use in Louisiana, albeit slowly. From 2006 to 
2010, the time period that Louisiana’s 
statewide smoking restriction law was 
adopted, cigarette taxes stagnated and local 
comprehensive smokefree ordinance 
campaigns had not started, the state’s adult smoker rate only declined from 23.4% to 22.1% 
overall (Figure 1.1). Adult smoking prevalence experienced greater decline in Louisiana between 
2011 and 2015, from 25.7% to 21.9% (Figure 1.1.). During that time, tobacco control forces 
obtained comprehensive smokefree laws in major metropolitan areas as well as small towns and 
secured the first state cigarette tax since 2002 in 2015 (Figure 1.3). However, adult cigarette 
smoking began increasing in 2016 despite passage of another cigarette tax hike that year (Figure 
1.3), and by 2017 increased to 23.1% (Figure 1.1). In 2018, as smoking rates declined again 
nationally and advocates continued securing additional local smokefree laws in Louisiana, the 
state’s smoking rate declined to its lowest point in the 2010s, 20.5%, but remained above the 
national average.  
While advocates have helped decrease overall adult smoking rates in Louisiana, the state 
is increasingly falling behind the rest of the United States. During the 1990s, Louisiana’s 
smoking rate ranged between 2.9% to 0.8% higher than the national average (Figure 1.1). The 
difference between Louisiana’s adult smoking rate and the US smoking average gradually 
worsened, peaking at 6.0% higher than the national average in 2017 until settling at 4.4% higher 
in 2018, the last year of data available. The data indicates tobacco control forces operating in 
Louisiana need to take aggressive action on smokefree policies and programming for Louisiana 
to lower smoking as fast or faster than the nation’s decline. 
High school smoking rates in Louisiana declined erratically compared to adult smoking 
according to High School YRBS data (Figure 1.2). After the state’s smoking restriction law 
passed in 2006, youth smoking hovered at 17.6% between 2007-2009, below the national 
average. However, smoking rates among Louisiana high school students increased to 21.8%, 
above the national average of 18.1%, by 2011. Louisiana high school smoking rates fell to 12.1% 
in 2013, as tobacco control advocates began securing comprehensive local ordinances and helped 
pass a 2013 law that required higher education institutions to implement smokefree policies 
(Chapter 12). High school smoking rates remained around 12% in Louisiana as of 2017, despite 
additional local smokefree ordinances and two statewide cigarette tax increases passing 
(Chapters 11, 12). 
The formation of CTFLA, a strong 
coalition of national and state health 
advocates and voluntaries, and TFL’s 
ability as a nonprofit to engage in 
advocacy and policy coalitions, 
enabled policy victories in the 2000s 
and 2010s that reduced tobacco use 
in Louisiana, albeit slowly. 
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Louisiana’s tobacco control experience demonstrates that tobacco control capacity and 
coalition building are critical to overturning tobacco industry laws, countering industry 
interference, and securing effective legislation to advance public health despite limited funding 
and resources, a strong industry presence and a business-friendly state government. Tobacco 
control advocates, programs and organizations effort’ have reduced smoking in Louisiana. 
However significant improvements in tobacco control policy remain necessary to reduce the 
state’s high smoking rates among adults and youth as well as lower the health and economic 
costs that burden Louisiana as a result. 
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Chapter 2: Tobacco Industry Political Organization and 
Presence in Louisiana 
 
• The tobacco industry had a strong political presence and impact in Louisiana. 
• The tobacco industry retains lobbyists that previously worked for state business 
associations, helping to establish strong alliances with other business associations. 
• Third party allies fought on behalf of the industry to block clean air regulation, tobacco 
taxes, and industry favored changes to tort law primarily in the 1980s and 1990s. 
• The Louisiana Restaurant Association and the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association 
participated in voluntary tobacco industry programs to avoid clean indoor air laws and 
strong youth sales restrictions during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Louisiana’s tobacco control history in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s is similar to 
other states, with excise tax increases and attempts to secure clean air legislation opposed by a 
well-organized tobacco industry. The tobacco industry weakened or defeated tobacco control 
policy through extensive lobbying of state and local lawmakers, campaign contributions, 
coalition building, and, when needed, helping create and use front groups such as Citizens 
Against Lawsuit Abuse (Chapter 8). The Tobacco Institute, the major cigarette companies’ 
political and public relations arm based in Washington, D.C., led political efforts in Louisiana, 
supplemented by efforts from individual cigarette manufacturers, most notably Philip Morris.  
 
During the 1970s the tobacco industry, 
including businesses ranging from manufacturers to 
wholesalers, relied on employees to monitor and 
oppose adverse legislation in Louisiana as part of its 
nationwide Tobacco Action Network.1, 2 In addition, 
the tobacco industry collaborated with third party 
allies and formed front groups to oppose tobacco 
control efforts throughout the United States. Third 
party allies in Louisiana included The Louisiana 
Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributors Association (LWTCDA), the Louisiana Restaurant 
Association (LRA), Wholesale Grocers Association, the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association,3, 4 
and Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI). Tobacco industry lobbyists, 
discussed later in this chapter, previously worked for some of these state-based associations and 
aided the tobacco companies’ efforts to collaborate with them. Extensive tobacco industry 
lobbying and coalition building in Louisiana hindered progress on tobacco control for decades in 
the state. 
 
Tobacco Industry Trade Organizations 
 
Three national tobacco trade associations were active in Louisiana since at least the 
1980s: the Tobacco Merchants Association (TMA) in the early 1980s, the Tobacco Institute (TI), 
and Tobacco Tax Council (TTC).  
 
Extensive tobacco industry 
lobbying and coalition 
building in Louisiana would 
hinder progress on tobacco 
control for decades in the 
state. 
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Tobacco Merchants Association 
 
At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, major tobacco manufacturers developed the 
Tobacco Merchants Association to collect and analyze legislative reports and governmental 
records in the United States.5, 6 In 1982, the TMA produced a quarterly review of the anti-
tobacco legislative situation in all the states and distributed it to its members, which included 
nearly all tobacco companies, distributors, wholesalers and retailers. Because it was a 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit educational organization, The Tobacco Merchant’s Association did not directly lobby 
or engage in policymaking. Instead, the TMA produced research the industry and its allied 
organizations could use to respond to legislative developments at the federal, state, and local 
levels.  
 
The Tobacco Institute 
 
As it did nationally and in other states, the Washington, D.C.-based Tobacco Institute, a 
trade and lobbying association for the US tobacco industry, coordinated political and public 
relations efforts in Louisiana on behalf of the tobacco industry. The Tobacco Institute formed in 
1958 as the tobacco industry's political arm.7 To advance the industry’s position on health and 
economic issues, Tobacco Institute representatives lobbied politicians, attended legislative 
hearings, and functioned as a unified voice for tobacco companies (RJ Reynolds (RJR), Philip 
Morris (PM), Brown & Williamson (BW), Liggett & Meyers (LM), the United States Tobacco 
Co. (USTC), and six smaller companies) for 40 years. The Tobacco Institute operated until early 
1999,8 when the organization disbanded as required by settlements of several state lawsuits as 
well as the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, which settled the lawsuits of 46 states, D.C., and 
5 territories against the 5 major tobacco companies.9 In particular, the Tobacco Institute’s State 
Activities Division dealt with state, parish (county), and municipal activities to defeat or promote 
legislation in accordance with member companies’ interests. In Louisiana and other states, the 
State Activities Division mission was to "maintain relations with state, county, and municipal 
legislative leaders; journalists; and key personnel in the health and education fields in their areas 
[of expertise]."10 
In 1982, the Tobacco Institute increased its annual national budget by 38% to $21.9 
million ($57.8 million in 2018 dollars) to pay for lobbyists, enhance public relations, and to 
monitor federal, state, and local legislative developments that threatened the industry. The 
increased budget covered the Tobacco Institute's Administrative Division, Federal Relations 
Division, Public Relations Division, State Activities Division, and Scientific Affairs Division. 
The State Activities Division received a 14% budget increase from 1981 ($435,800 or $1.25 
million in 2018 dollars) giving it a budget of $5.9 million, or approximately 27% of the Tobacco 
Institute’s total budget in 1982. The increase in funding for the State Activities Division covered 
the "start-up costs and expansion into 10 southeastern states," including Louisiana.11 
Important Tobacco Institute personnel oversaw and managed the industry’s legislative 
and political activity in Louisiana (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Tobacco Institute Key Personnel   
Position Year Person 
Tobacco Institute President 1981-1997 Samuel Chicolte12 
1978-1983 Jack Kelly 
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Senior Vice President of the State 
Activities Division 
1982-1988 Roger Mozingo13 
1989-1996 Kurt Malmgren14 
1995-1998 Patrick Donoho15 
Regional Vice President 1983-1991 Ronald Morris16 
1991-1992 David Hooper 
1992-1995 Weldon Denman17 
1995-1996 Ronald Morris17 
1996-1998 Gary Anderson18-20 
Senior Vice President Southern 
Sector 
1983-1986 Hurst Marshall21, 22 
1987-1992 George Minshew 23, 24 
1992-1993 Ronald Morris23 
State Activities Division Regional 
Director 
1982 Ronald Morris16 
1982-1984 John Hightower25 
1985-1988 Jack Shoemaker26 
1989-1991 Patrick McWhorter27 
Senior Vice President of Legislative 
Support/Administration 
 
Vice President of State Activities 
Unknown 
 
 
1984-198728 
William Cannell29 
Regional Director of Government 
Affairs 
Unknown Unknown 
Director of Legislative Information Unknown  Cathey Yoe 
Director of Communications Unknown Walter Woodson 
Manager of Legislative Issues Unknown Paula Duhaime 
Director of Economic Issues Unknown William Orzechowski 
Manager of Public Affairs 1980 Dan Alverson30 
Louisiana and Southern Texas State 
Director 
1980 Paul S. Harris30 
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Figure 2.1: Tobacco Institute State Activities Division Organizational Chart, September 199031 
 
The Tobacco Tax Council 
 
The Tobacco Tax Council (TTC) was an industry trade organization developed in 1949 
by tobacco manufacturers to analyze state legislative affairs, in particular tobacco tax proposals. 
Membership overlapped between the Tobacco Institute and TTC, which led the two 
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organizations to work together on state activities on tobacco taxes throughout the 1960s and 
1970s until TTC merged into the Tobacco Institute in 1982.  
 
 
During Phase I of the merger (Figure 2.2), the Tobacco Institute handled state public 
smoking issues whereas Tobacco Tax Council employees were in charge of state taxation issues. 
During Phase II, the Tobacco Tax Council was absorbed into the Tobacco Institute’s State 
Activities Division. Following the merger, the Tobacco Institute State Activities Division 
reorganized its national leadership to consist of the Tobacco Institute President, along with a 
national manager for State Taxation Issues and a manager for State Public Smoking Issues. Four 
regional vice presidents reported to the national managers, with area directors, lobbyists, and 
legislative consultants for individual states reporting to them.33 
 
Figure 2.2:  Phases I and II of the Plan to Absorb the TTC into TI, December 31, 198132 
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Tobacco Action Network 
 
In 1977, the Tobacco Institute (TI) realized it 
needed a grassroots network to compete with the 
emerging grassroots nonsmokers' rights movement.34 
In 1978, TI and the major cigarette companies 
developed the Tobacco Action Network (TAN) for use 
in states with more active tobacco control movements 
and in states considered to be of “relative importance… 
in terms of support required at the federal level.”34 
Nationally, TAN consisted of tobacco growers, 
manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and vendors and other allied organizations.1, 2, 35 TAN 
advanced tobacco industry political interests by soliciting local volunteers to attend meetings, 
testify, circulate petitions, and contact the media.36 
 In a 1978 Tobacco Action Program Manual Philip Morris circulated to its employees to 
educate them on TAN and encourage their participation in the initiative, the company outlines 
TAN's political goal as, "…to bring together and coordinate all segments of the tobacco family – 
growers, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and venders –  as well as our allies."2 The 
structure of TAN consisted of a state director who strategically coordinated efforts with the 
Tobacco Institute, TI's state legislative counsel and the state TAN advisory committee and. TAN 
informed its members of the emerging political and legislative threats to the industry and 
requested that members mobilize accordingly.  
 
 
 By the end of 1980, TAN had spread from 18 to 41 states. In 1980, Louisiana became one 
of 21 states that TAN strategically targeted. The industry established an office in Austin, Texas 
and appointed Paul S. Harris as the Southern Texas and Louisiana TAN Director. In Louisiana, 
TAN announced that the "Pelican State Turns TAN" when its enrollment reached 146 members 
in February 1980.38 That year, TAN mobilized against the Louisiana Indoor Clean Air Act (SB 
 
Figure 2.3: TAN Tri-State Area Newsletter (February 1981)37 
TAN advanced tobacco 
industry political interests by 
soliciting local volunteers to 
attend meetings, testify, 
circulate petitions, and 
contact the media. 
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292) at a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, with four of its members and one 
volunteer appearing to oppose the bill39 (Chapter 5). 
 
 By 1980, TAN created a Louisiana TAN Advisory Committee. TAN formed the 
committee to organize state TI offices and TAN volunteers, and to help member organizations 
enroll and mobilize new volunteers.39 In 1980, TAN Advisory Committee Members consisted 
mainly of employees from tobacco manufacturers and wholesalers (Table 2.2).39 The tobacco 
industry provided financial support to its allied organizations including yearly membership fees. 
The network of tobacco manufacturers in Louisiana grew in 1981, and TAN recognized the 
efforts of its volunteer "grassroots" coalition in increasing TAN enrollment in its February 1981 
newsletter.37 By February 1981, TAN's membership in Louisiana had increased from 141 to 
1,001 members largely due to the TAN Enrollment Drive, with a majority of the new members 
coming from the City of New Orleans. According to a TAN newsletter by South Texas and 
Louisiana State Director Paul Harris and North Texas and Oklahoma State Director Terry 
Frakes, in 1981 Louisiana was a "TAN paradise" for the Tobacco Institute and its allies.40 
 
Table 2.2: Louisiana TAN Advisory Committee Members, 198039, 41 
Member Organization 
Lance Jones Philip Morris 
Jim Fouts Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Bill Long  Liggett & Myers 
John Fitterer Mr. J's Tobacco House (Shreveport) 
Joe G. Wood Tobacco Institute 
Paul Harris TAN Director 
Dan Alverson/John Hightower (1981) TI Southwest Area Director 
Barbara Easley Louisiana Wholesale Grocers Association  
Jack Pender TAN Committee Representative  
Al Saldinger Lorillard  
 
On June 25, 1981 the Tobacco Action Network mobilized to defeat Senate Bill 689. SB 
689 prohibited smoking in the New Orleans Superdome and other indoor sports arenas with a 
capacity of 40,000 or greater.42 TAN sent letters and telegrams opposing the bill43 (Chapter 6). In 
1982, TAN also wrote letters against tobacco tax increase bill HB 526 (Chapter 7) and smoking 
restrictions bill HB 411 (Chapter 6).43 
 
In 1982, Harris left his position as TAN State Director for Louisiana. The Tobacco 
Institute replaced him with John Hightower, who ran the Tobacco Action Network for Louisiana, 
Arkansas, and Mississippi. In 1983, TI Area Director Hightower established a TAN state office 
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana within walking distance of the state capitol. In 1984, TAN activists 
called legislators and industry allies to oppose smoking restrictions for the New Orleans 
Superdome (Chapter 6).44 TAN served as an active industry presence throughout the 1980s, with 
Louisiana still holding 451 network members in 1988.45 In 1988, TI Regional Vice President 
Ronald Morris mobilized Louisiana TAN activists to oppose a 6-cent per cigarette pack tax 
increase (Chapter 7), requesting members to write and call their state legislators.46 In 1989, 
Tobacco Institute State Activities Division Regional Director Jack Shoemaker recruited TAN 
activists to oppose a local smokefree ordinance passed in the city of Lake Charles.47 
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We did not find evidence of TAN mobilizing in Louisiana after 1989. 
 
Tobacco Industry Lobbyists 
 
Weak State Laws on Lobbying Disclosure  
 
As of July 2019, Louisiana State laws on lobbying disclosure, the Legislative Branch 
Lobbyist Disclosure Act (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:50 et seq.) and the Executive Branch 
Lobbyist Disclosure Act (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:71 et seq.), provide general information on 
the amount the tobacco industry spends on lobbying in Louisiana. Specifically, disclosure laws 
in Louisiana required that registered lobbyists report expenditures for gifts, payment of money, 
or anything of monetary value to public officials. Reporting of expenditures for travel, lodging, 
meals, and entertainment was not required.  
 
Lobbying activity reports do not include exact compensation from an individual client. 
Compensation paid to lobbyists by clients is required to be reported as a category range (e.g. 
$50,000-$99,999) rather than an actual amount.48-50 Lobbyists report lobbying on subject matters 
from “tobacco industry” to “environmental quality, conservation, and wildlife preservation” but 
are not required to distinguish between lobbying activity paid for by individual clients.  Before 
2009, Louisiana law required lobbyists to disclose that they received financial compensation 
from a client but did not make them provide any monetary amount or range, preventing an 
adequate accounting of tobacco industry payments to its representatives in the state.51 Beginning 
in 2009, lobbyists were required to disclose monetary amounts in ranges.49-51 
 
Payments to Lobbyists in Louisiana 
 
Internal documents released as a result of legal settlements and judgements has made 
many of the industry’s internal records on lobbying expenditures available at the UCSF Truth 
Tobacco Documents Library (https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco) (Table 2.3). 
These documents demonstrate that the tobacco industry’s lobby in Louisiana has consisted of 
powerful and experienced legislative counsel hired by TI as well as by Philip Morris and RJ 
Reynolds. 
 
  The Louisiana Ethics Administration Program database contains lobbyist reports 
beginning in 2009 (Louisiana law did not require lobbyists to disclose any compensation amount 
until 2009 51). The program discloses payments received by lobbyists from their clients in ranges 
and not specific amounts (i.e. instead of showing a total $57,000 received by a lobbyist in one 
year from a tobacco company, the amount is displayed as $50,000-$99,000). A search of tobacco 
trade associations, companies, and businesses found that only Altria/Philip Morris (Philip Morris 
changed its name to Altria in 200352) and RJ Reynolds have employed lobbyists in Louisiana 
since 2009 (Table 2.4).
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Table 2.3: Early Tobacco Industry Payments to Louisiana Lobbyists by Organization in Actual Dollars11, 53-84 
Company Tobacco Institute RJ Reynolds Philip Morris 
Lobbyist Jack 
Pender 
Joe 
Wood 
Guidry 
Haras, 
inc. 
Unidentified 
Local 
Council 
John Koch** Blache, 
Perkins 
and Koch 
Cecil J. 
Blache 
Randy 
Haynie / 
Haynie and 
Associates 
David 
Tatman 
1980 18,500*+          
1981 18,500*+ 16,000*         
1982 21,000 18000*         
1983 21,000* 20000*         
1984 21,000* 23000*         
1985 - 26000*         
1986 - 26000         
1987 - 28,000         
1988 - 30,000  25,000       
1989 - 32,000  25,000  10,555 120,000  72,000*  
1990 - 47,000 25,000*   5,000* 60,000*  77,000*  
1991 - 48,000 25,000    69,315    
1992 - 48,000 25,000    66,000*    
1993  53,000 25,000    68,000*  180,000  
1994  50,000*       180,000  
1995  53,000*       180,000*  
1996     49,000*    200,000*  
1997     70,000*   84,000   
1998     70,000*   72,000 248,000* 60,000 
1999        66,667 250,000*  
2000        80,000 223,000*  
2001        84,000 223,000* 60,000 
Total           
*Budgeted, expected, forecasted or requested. 
**John Koch worked for the Tobacco Institute and RJ Reynolds at different times. 
+Comes from Tobacco Tax Council. 
 
The tobacco industry may have spent as much as $2,855,969 on lobbyists between 2009 
and 2017 (Table 2.4). 
 
Philip Morris/Altria (which we refer to collectively as PM) spent the most money on 
lobbyists, with much of the money going to the Haynie family (Table 2.4). Philip Morris spent at 
most $2,405,987 on lobbyists from 2009-2017, while it spent at most $449,982 on representation 
as Altria during that period (Table 2.4). PM Lobbyist Randy Haynie worked to oppose 
comprehensive clean air laws and tobacco tax increases for Philip Morris since the 1980s 
(Chapters 5, 6). He also advanced tort reform for the company during that time (Chapter 8). PM 
paid lobbyists from the Haynie family from $50,000-$99,000 annually during 2009-2017. All 
other industry payments to lobbyists by PM and RJR were under $25,000 annually from 2009 to 
2017 (Table 2.4). Known payments did not seem correlated with specific legislative efforts 
affecting the industry from 2009-2017. 
 
Tobacco company lobbyists with multiple clients could indirectly pressure candidates in 
need of campaign contributions to support policies the industry favored. In a 2016 interview for
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Table 2.4: Payments to Louisiana Lobbyists by the Tobacco Industry85 (Based on Upper Bounds of Payment Ranges) 
Company Lobbyist 1983-
2008 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Philip 
Morris / 
Altria 
Randy 
Haynie 
Unknown 50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
450,000 – 
891,000 
Ryan 
Haynie 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
50,000-
99,000 
450,000 – 
891,000 
David 
Tatman 
-- 25,000-
49,999 
 
25,000-
49,999 
 
25,000-
49,999 
 
25,000-
49,999 
 
25,000-
49,999 
 
25,000-
49,999 
 
25,000-
49,999 
 
25,000-
49,999 
 
200,000 – 
399,992 
Robert 
Donaldson 
-- -- -- -- 24,999 
or lower 
24,999 
or lower 
24,999 
or lower 
24,999 
or lower 
24,999 
or lower 
124,995 or 
lower 
Dayna 
Haynie 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 50,000-
99,000 
 
50,000 – 
99,000 
RJ 
Reynolds 
CJ Blache -- -- -- 24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
149,994 or 
lower 
John Koch -- -- -- 24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
149,994 or 
lower 
Christian 
Rhodes 
-- -- -- 24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
24,999 
or lower 
 
149,994 or 
lower 
Total $2,855,969 
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this report, former Louisiana Public Health Institute policy manager and lobbyist Eric Vicks said: 
 
They [tobacco company lobbyists] had a lot of clients, so there’s lots of reasons to 
talk to them…if you have clients that are giving money, every time we 
[lawmakers] see CJ Blache [an RJ Reynolds Lobbyist], you know, we have to 
think about his issues. And tobacco is one of them, so we [as lawmakers] have to 
be supportive of tobacco, because even though he may have given us [lawmakers] 
money from another entity … we have to look at it in terms of ‘If we piss him off 
on this one, we’re pissing him off on everything.86 
 
While lobbyists for the tobacco industry have contributed to candidates in Louisiana, it is 
not possible to determine if the tobacco industry funneled donations through lobbyists, or if 
lobbyists made individual contributions in support of industry political objectives. 
 
Tobacco Institute Lobbyists 
 
John Hightower  
  
In 1982, TTC and TI hired the former lobbyist for Georgia Pacific in Louisiana, John 
Hightower, as Area Director.  Hightower was responsible for lobbying and advocacy activities in 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas. Prior to working for the Tobacco Institute, Hightower was 
a member of the Louisiana Business and Industry (LABI), Louisiana Chamber of Commerce, 
Louisiana Restaurant Association (LRA), and the Louisiana Public Affairs Research Council; the 
Tobacco Institute realized early on that Hightower's contacts "will be useful to our [TI's] 
efforts."87 Hightower oversaw the activities of two primary industry lobbyists in the state, Jack 
Pender and Joe Wood. 
 
Joe Wood 
 
Joe Wood, the first female lobbyist in Louisiana,88 worked as a lobbyist on tobacco issues 
from 1978 until 1995. She started as an association director for the Louisiana Wholesale 
Distributors Association.89, 90 In 1979 the Tobacco Institute paid Joe Wood $7000 to lobby on its 
behalf, which she requested be instead given to the Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy 
Distributors Association (LWTCDA).91 Joe Wood concurrently lobbied for TI and LWTCDA 
until 1983, when she dropped her LWTCDA affiliation. Wood kept TI informed about state and 
local activity and lobbied on tobacco taxes, clean indoor air, and tort reform. By the early 1980s 
Joe Wood took on more responsibilities as a tobacco industry lobbyist and worked as TI's lead 
Louisiana legislative counsel when TI and TTC merged in 1982. She became the primary 
lobbyist for the Tobacco Institute in 1985 when Ronald Morris, TI Regional Vice President, did 
not renew Jack Pender's contract. Wood worked with TI until 1995, the same year state 
investigators named her as a possible source of illegal gift contributions in subpoenas to 
legislators.92, 93 Joe Wood continued to lobby for other industries and business associations, and 
was recognized by the Louisiana Legislature in 2015 after lobbying state lawmakers for fifty-one 
years.94 Joe Wood changed her name to Joe Wood Guidry when she married95 by May 1983 (the 
first time we see her referred to as Joe Wood Guidry in the tobacco documents),96 and changed 
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her name again to Joe Wood Berry by August 198997, 98 when she re-wed. Name changes are 
reflected in our discussion of her throughout this report. 
 
Jack Pender 
 
Jack Pender worked as a lobbyist on behalf of the Tobacco Tax Council in 1980.53 Pender 
subsequently contracted with the Tobacco Institute in 1982 after the TTC merged with it. While 
working for the tobacco industry during the 1982 legislative session, Pender lobbied against 
state-level bills to increase tobacco taxes and restrict smoking in public.99-101 In 1994, Pender 
unsuccessfully lobbied against a local tobacco tax ordinance adopted in New Orleans102 (Chapter 
6). Pender’s contract with the TI was not renewed in 1985.103, 104 However, TI continued to list 
him in annual budget reports.58 
 
David Hooper 
 
 Individual tobacco companies also hired contract 
lobbyists and lobbying firms in Louisiana starting in the 
mid-1980s. Previously the Texas Restaurant 
Association’s Legislative Director during the 1980s,105 
in 1991 David Hooper served as Tobacco Institute 
Regional Vice President of Region IX (Louisiana and 
Texas) when TI restructured its State Activities Division 
and field operations,106 where he guided lobbyists and 
actively worked with industry allies.107, 108 
 
In Louisiana, Hooper was instrumental in 
securing tobacco industry representation and influence 
over the Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALA) 
coalition created by the Louisiana Association of 
Business and Industry (LABI), which was started to 
protect and extend “tort reform” legislation guarding 
companies from product liability108(Chapter 8). 
Although LABI started the Louisiana chapter, CALA 
was a tobacco industry front nationally and in most 
states. The tobacco industry provided CALA Chapters substantial funding and used the public 
relations firm APCO to establish numerous CALA chapters.109-111 However, LABI created its 
own CALA chapter in Louisiana after the business association and TI disagreed on terms of 
cooperation. The tobacco industry heavily supported the Louisiana CALA after coming to an 
arrangement with LABI that secured an industry favored chairman for the CALA and four seats 
out of thirteen for tobacco representatives on its steering committee.108 Hooper left his position 
in late 1992 and was replaced by former Texas Restaurant Association Legislative Director 
Weldon Denman, who served as TI Regional Vice President until late 1993.112, 113 Denman later 
became a Regional Coordinator of the Gulf Border area for Philip Morris.114 
 
 
Hooper was instrumental in 
securing tobacco industry 
representation and influence 
over the Citizens Against 
Lawsuit Abuse (CALA) 
coalition created by the 
Louisiana Association of 
Business and Industry (LABI), 
which was started to protect 
and extend “tort reform” 
legislation guarding 
companies from product 
liability. 
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Michael O’Keefe  
 
In the late 1980s, Michael O'Keefe began working with the Tobacco Institute as a local 
lobbyist for the New Orleans area. O'Keefe’s law firm, O'Keefe, O'Keefe, and Bernstein, was 
centrally located on Canal Street in New Orleans, close to the New Orleans City Council 
building. He was a Democratic state senator representing New Orleans from 1960 to 1983 and 
president of the Louisiana State Senate from 1976 to 1983 until the state convicted O’Keefe on 
two counts of obstruction of justice, forcing him out of office.115 In 1990, O'Keefe lobbied the 
New Orleans City Council to oppose its Sales Consumption Act to enact taxes on cigarettes and 
tobacco products116-118(Chapter 6). In July 1993, Tobacco Institute Regional Vice President 
Weldon Denman requested that Morris, TI Southern Sector Vice President, seriously consider 
Michael O'Keefe an "unnecessary expense" because, with help from the Tobacco Institute, the 
Louisiana Legislature had passed preemption over local smoking restrictions during the regular 
legislative session (Chapter 5).119In addition, the local tobacco tax he was helping the industry 
fight in New Orleans was waiting for a state Supreme Court decision and thus in a quiet period 
(Chapter 6).119As a result, the Tobacco Institute reduced the amount it paid O'Keefe from 
$25,000 in 1993 to $10,000 in 1994.64 
 
Philip Morris Lobbyists 
 
Randy Haynie  
 
Randy Haynie formed Haynie and Associates in 1980 after serving as an aide for 
Louisiana state senator and gubernatorial candidate Edgar “Sonny” Mouton. Haynie’s 
relationship to the tobacco industry appears in 1986, when Covington and Burling, the 
Washington, D.C.-based law firm that worked for the tobacco industry on regulatory and 
political matters, hired his firm to assist with tort reform.120 Philip Morris began contracting with 
Haynie directly during the 1989 Louisiana regular session.121 Besides lobbying for the tobacco 
industry, Haynie served in numerous organizations and committees, including LABI’s trade and 
tourism council and steering committees dedicated to liability reform, unemployment 
compensation, and worker’s compensation.122  He also served on the Louisiana Lobbying 
Commission, two Louisiana Democratic Party committees, and served as the Chamber of 
Commerce’s vice president of state and national affairs.122 Randy’s son, Ryan Haynie, joined 
Haynie and Associates in 2003 and became a registered lobbyist for Altria in 2009.123 As of 
2020, Haynie and Associates still represented Philip Morris (Altria).123, 124    
 
 Jack Dillard  
 
Jack Dillard was a Texas lobbyist for Philip Morris from 1992 to 1995 and also acted as 
PM’s Texas Government Affairs division Director.125 He also served as Philip Morris’ Regional 
Director of Government Affairs for Louisiana and Texas from 1992126 until at least 2002 or 
2003.127, 128In Louisiana, Dillard helped win passage of clean air preemption laws in 1993129 
(Chapter 5) and unsuccessfully fought against a cigarette tax increase in 2000 (Chapter 11).130 In 
1995, Dillard led efforts to generate letters and comments from business and legislative allies in 
opposition to national legislation giving the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority 
to regulate tobacco products.131 As Philip Morris’ Regional Director in Louisiana, Dillard 
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encouraged businesses to adopt voluntary youth access restrictions to avoid regulation, and 
oversaw the Philip Morris Accommodation Program meant to prevent clean air regulations in the 
hospitality and service industries.131-134 In Texas, Dillard worked to advance the tobacco 
industry’s policy objectives regarding clean air, tort reform, and youth access legislation.131 
 
David Tatman 
 
David Tatman was initially the Louisiana State Coordinator for the Field Action Team 
Campaign launched by Philip Morris in 1997.135Before working for Philip Morris, he was 
Political Director of the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association,135 an organization that fought 
against the tobacco industry’s pursuit of  tort reform legislation in the late 1980s-early 1990s. 
The Campaign worked to maintain the original 1996 “global settlement” between the state 
attorneys general and tobacco companies in which the companies accepted some restrictions on 
marketing and paid the states money in exchange for de facto immunity from lawsuits,136 and 
pushed Congress to adopt the deal into law.137  Campaign staffers were to develop diverse 
industry coalitions within each state that could mobilize to advocate on behalf of the tobacco 
industry’s objectives. In the end, the effort fell apart, setting the stage for the Master Settlement 
Agreement in 1998 (Chapter 9). Tatman continued working for the Philip Morris (PM) Field 
Action Team as its Louisiana State Coordinator, meeting with representatives from medical and 
business associations in the state to gauge their support for PM’s version of FDA regulatory 
authority over tobacco.138, 139 He also represented US Tobacco at least once in 2002.140 In 2017, 
David Tatman’s firm, The Tatman Group, listed Altria (formerly Philip Morris) as a client.141 
The site no longer listed clients as of 2019. Tatman was also serving as executive director of the 
Louisiana Association of Wholesalers, which lists Altria and RJR as major sponsors and 
numerous other tobacco companies as members.142, 143 
 
RJ Reynolds Lobbyists 
 
Cecil J. Blache 
 
Cecil J. Blache began working with the tobacco industry in 1986, when Covington & 
Burling retained his firm Blache, Haynie & Koch to assist industry tort reform efforts in 
Louisiana.120 Beginning in 1988, Blache represented Reynolds America in Louisiana.144, 145 
Blache has significant ties to Louisiana’s state government, having served as Assistant Secretary 
of Labor over Employment Security at the Louisiana Department of Labor and acted as chief 
legal counsel for the Louisiana House Labor Committee. As of 2018 he sat on the board of the 
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry146 (LABI), where he had served since at least 
1989.147 Blache’s relationship with LABI started by 1986, when he acted as the association’s 
attorney. In 1987, he represented LABI on the Louisiana House Special Committee on Liability 
Insurance where he pushed for a revision of state product liability laws.148, 149 Besides his work 
with LABI, Blache has also sat on the boards of Liberty Bank and Trust, Gulf Coast Bidco, the 
Black Economic Development Corporation, the River City Jazz Coalition, WWOZ Radio, and 
the Louisiana Cultural Economy Foundation.150 CJ Blache’s lobbying firm, Roedel Parsons 
Koch Blache Balhoff & McCollister, continued to represent RJ Reynolds in 2019.151 
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John Koch 
 
John Koch’s relationship to the tobacco industry first appears in 1986, when Covington & 
Burling paid his firm Blache, Haynie & Koch (the same Blache that represents RJR and same 
Haynie that represents PM), to assist industry tort reform efforts in Louisiana.120 Koch lobbied 
directly for RJ Reynolds from at least 1989152 until 1996, when he stopped working for the 
company to replace Joe Wood as the Tobacco Institute’s lobbyist.153, 154 Koch served as TI's 
legislative counsel until the organization was dismantled in 199865, 154 as part of the Master 
Settlement Agreement’s terms. After 1998, Koch returned to lobbying for Reynolds America in 
Louisiana. Prior to 1990, Koch was the lead lobbyist for the Louisiana Association of Business 
and Industry, a key tobacco industry ally, and served as a staff attorney for the Louisiana 
Department of Justice.155  In 1990, Koch helped form Roedel Parsons, the same firm Blache is a 
partner of, that represents RJ Reynolds and other high profile clients in the Louisiana 
Legislature.156 
 
The Tobacco Family 
 
 TI and the tobacco companies focused on recruiting allied 
organizations in Louisiana beginning in the 1970s with the 
Tobacco Action Network (TAN) to fight adverse legislation and 
support industry objectives. As in other states, the tobacco 
companies garnered support from tobacco distributors and 
wholesalers but did not pursue tobacco farmers as allies in 
Louisiana.  
 
Tobacco Distributors 
  
The Tobacco Institute and tobacco companies focused on gaining support from tobacco 
wholesalers, distributors and vendors in Louisiana since at least 1979, when they first formed a 
relationship with the Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributors Association.91  By 
1988, TI considered the LWTCDA, the Vending Machine Operators of Louisiana, and the 
Louisiana Wholesalers' Association to be among its strongest and most effective allies.157 
Between 1982 and 1999, the TI contributed at least $77,000 to the Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco 
and Candy Distributors Association and $2,575 to the Louisiana Wholesale Grocers' Association.  
 
Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributors Association  
 
TI started working with the Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributors 
Association (LWTCDA) in 1979, when Joe Wood represented both organizations as a lobbyist.91 
Wood left the LWTCDA for TI in 1983, but the two organizations continued collaborating under 
the guidance of Wood’s friend, lobbyist Sarah Whalen.   
 
On December 22, 1983, TI President Samuel D. Chicolte sent Whalen, LWTCA's new 
executive director, a memorandum detailing a proposed agreement between the Tobacco Institute 
and LWTCA to assist TI’s 1984 efforts in Louisiana for quarterly payments of $5,000.159 
The Tobacco Institute and 
tobacco companies focused 
on gaining support from 
tobacco wholesalers, 
distributors and vendors in 
Louisiana since at least 1979. 
 49 
 
Chicolte requested that the LWTCA assist TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris as well as TI 
legislative Counsel Joe Wood Guidry and Jack Pender, to maximize the effectiveness of Tobacco 
Institute state programs. In addition, Chilcote requested that Tobacco Institute officials be 
present for LWTCA board meetings and LWTCA convention. At the time, the tobacco industry 
was facing legislation to increase tobacco taxes, restrict advertising, and mandate self-
extinguishing cigarettes at the federal, state and local level. During the 1983 legislative session, 
Louisiana lawmakers considered smoking restriction legislation (one bill of which passed; 
Chapter 5) and one cigarette tax increase bill.160 The LWTCA received at least $77,500 from TI 
between 1982 and 1994 (Table 2.5) for  collaboration on ”joint legislative goals” such as 
preventing tobacco tax increases, opposing restrictions on smoking and advertising, and 
opposing legislation requiring self-extinguishing cigarettes.161 LWTCA worked with TI in the 
1980s and 1990s to defeat several clean indoor air (Chapter 5) and cigarette tax proposals 
(Chapter 6). While serving as LWTCDA's Executive Director, Sarah Whalen appeared alongside 
Joe Wood Guidry in the media while they lobbied against clean indoor air legislation in 1988162 
and proposed tobacco tax increases in 1989 and 1990.163, 164 LWTCDA also received $1,000 
from Brown and Williamson in 1994 for its Legislative Educational Fund.165  
 
Table 2.5: Known Tobacco Institute Contributions to Third Party Distributor Organizations, 1982-199856, 62, 63, 65, 
158 
 Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and 
Candy Distributors Association 
(LWTCDA) 
Vending Machine 
Operators of Louisiana 
(VMOL) 
Louisiana Wholesale 
Grocers’ Association 
(LWGA) 
Total 
1981 $16,000*   $16,000 
1982     
1983     
1984 $5,000   $5,000 
1985     
1986 $7,000   $7,000 
1987 $8,000    
1988   $500 $500 
1989 $8,000  $500 $8,500 
1990 $8,000  $500 $8,500 
1991 $10,000  $1,000 $11,000 
1992 $5,000   $5,000 
1993 $5,500   $5,500 
1994 $5,000   $5,000 
1995  $100  $100 
1996  $100  $100 
1997  $100  $100 
Total $77,000 $300 $2,575 $79,800 
Note: these numbers reflect the data available in the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library and may not 
reflect all the contributions to these or other ally organizations.  
*$16,000 consisted of payment to Joe Wood Guidry for lobbying, who was then a representative for LWTCDA. 
  
Additionally, TI supported the LWTCDA’s annual Legislative Golf Tournament held in 
Baton Rouge.166 In a 1991 letter Whalen told TI that the tournament sought to "raise funds for 
our [LWTCDA’s] Legislative program and to provide you [tobacco wholesalers and 
manufacturers] with the opportunity to become better acquainted with your Legislator."166 The 
golf tournament was complimentary for legislators, who were awarded "with great prizes" and 
“goodie bags” filled with advertising specialty items (hats, lighters, shirts) and tobacco product 
 50 
 
samples. LWTCDA sold sponsorships at the golf tournament, charging organizations and 
companies $1,000 to sponsor a hole, $700 to sponsor prizes, and $500 to participate.166, 167 TI 
sponsored the tournament for $1,000 every year between 1989 and 1992168, 169 and for $5,500 in 
1993,170 the year the legislature preempted local smoking restrictions (Chapter 5). In 1997, RJ 
Reynolds also contributed to the LWTCDA’s tournament, sponsoring a hole for $1,000 and 
providing another $500 to the event to help fund it.171 The Smokeless Tobacco Council also 
sponsored a hole at the LWTCDA’s tournament, although we do not know which year.172 
 
LWTCDA worked with the tobacco industry throughout the 1990s under different names 
as the association rebranded itself. The association participated in the tobacco industry’s We 
Card program,173 an ineffective “youth smoking prevention” program that the tobacco industry 
used to displace more effective government programs intended to prevent illegal sales of 
cigarettes to minors.174 LWTCDA Executive Director Sarah Whalen assisted tobacco industry 
efforts to defeat proposed federal youth access restrictions in 1993 (Chapter 5).175 Whalen also 
helped Philip Morris USA’s Field Action Team oppose a federal tax increase in 1998.176 In 
addition, she pressured Louisiana lawmakers to oppose a possible federal lawsuit against the 
tobacco companies in 1999.114, 177 LWTCDA also lobbied against state-level bills to increase the 
cigarette tax (Chapter 6) and to repeal preemption over local smokefree laws in 2001 (Chapter 
10).178-180After 2001, Whalen and LWTCDA no longer appear to have lobbied against tobacco 
control regulation on behalf of the industry. 
 
Louisiana Association of Wholesalers 
 
Another distributor organization affiliated with the tobacco industry is the Louisiana 
Association of Wholesalers (LAW), which was established in 1941. In 2018, the Louisiana 
Association of Wholesalers listed RJ Reynolds, Swedish Match, Republic Tobacco (an Illinois-
based tobacco and tobacco accessories distributor),181 and Altria (Philip Morris) as associate 
members.143 In 2010, LAW recognized Altria and RJ Reynolds as sponsors who donated over 
$5,000 a year.182 LAW also identified Altria, RJ Reynolds, and Santa Fe Natural Tobacco 
Company (owned by Reynolds American since 2001183) as major sponsors in 2015.184 
 
The Louisiana Association of Wholesalers opposed state tobacco tax increases in 2009 
and 2011 (Chapter 11) and in 2014 joined the Freedom to Choose Coalition created to oppose a 
comprehensive smokefree ordinance in New Orleans (Chapter 12).185-187 LAW’s  Executive 
Director as of 2019 was David Tatman, a former State Coordinator for the PM Field Action 
Team in Louisiana and a lobbyist whose firm The Tatman Group represents Altria.142, 188, 189 
Tatman continued to lead The Tatman Group while serving as LAW Executive Director, and 
employees from his firm also worked for the trade association.190, 191 
  
Tobacco Farmers 
 
Unlike in other tobacco growing states, the tobacco industry does not appear to have 
mobilized tobacco farmers in Louisiana. Tobacco farmers in the United States were longtime 
political allies of the tobacco industry until the Master Settlement Agreement and a tobacco 
buyout program in the late 1990s fractured their relationship.192 During the 1980s, tobacco 
farmers in Louisiana grew perique tobacco (a less common tobacco type not used in mass-
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produced, major brand cigarettes193), which they sold to Asian and European markets.194 A 1985 
analysis by the Tobacco Institute determined less than 10 tobacco growers operated in Louisiana 
and that they had little influence on state legislation. Indeed, by 1992 only two perique farmers 
continued to operate in Louisiana.195 The industry viewed the wholesale and vending segments to 
be more engaged in tobacco industry political efforts.194 Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company 
began producing a perique blend cigarette in 2000, saving perique tobacco’s last “full-scale” 
farm, which was based in Louisiana, from potential closure.193 
 
Third Party Business Allies 
 
Due to its low credibility with the public, the 
tobacco industry works through third parties – legitimate 
organizations that promote the tobacco industry’s policy 
positions without publicly acknowledging that they are 
working with and for the tobacco industry – to advance 
the tobacco industry’s policy objectives.196-199 For 
decades the hospitality industry134, 200(restaurant, bar, 
hotel and motel associations), unions,201  and chambers 
of commerce202 have been used to promote the tobacco 
industry’s policy objectives while minimizing its 
visibility in the political process. In Louisiana, primary 
third party allies of the tobacco industry included the 
Louisiana Restaurant Association (LRA), Louisiana 
Hotel-Motel Association, and the Louisiana Association 
of Business and Industry. 
 
The Tobacco Institute started cultivating allies 
among business associations outside of tobacco in 
Louisiana beginning in the early 1980s (Table 2.6). In 1984, TI Regional Vice President Ronald 
Morris identified the Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation (a general agricultural association), 
LABI, and the Louisiana Retailers’ Association as potential industry allies.203 A February 1985 
memorandum from TI Senior Vice President Hurst Marshall to TI Regional vice presidents and 
regional directors of the State Activities Division listed additional allies: the Baton Rouge 
Chamber of Commerce, the Louisiana Convenience and Neighborhood Food Store Association, 
Table 2.6: Leaders of Louisiana Organizations Allied with the Tobacco Industry in 1984 and 1985203, 205 
Organization Leader 
Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce Bill Little 
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry Ed Steimel 
Louisiana Wholesale Grocers' Association Barbara Easley  
Louisiana Tobacco and Candy Dealers Association Sarah Whalen 
Vending Machine Operators of Louisiana Alan Kronenberg 
 Louisiana Municipal Association Charles Pascua 
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana Mark Drennan 
Louisiana Retail Association Nick Perez  
Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation James Graugnard  
Louisiana Convenience and Neighborhood Food Store 
Association 
-- 
Due to its low credibility with 
the public, the tobacco 
industry works through third 
parties – legitimate 
organizations that promote 
the tobacco industry’s policy 
positions without publicly 
acknowledging that they are 
working with and for the 
tobacco industry – to 
advance the tobacco 
industry’s policy objectives. 
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the Louisiana Municipal Association, as well as nonprofit policy research and government 
watchdog the Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana.204, 205 
 
Louisiana Retailers Association 
 
The tobacco industry relied on multiple retailer organizations to advance its political 
objectives in Louisiana. The Louisiana Retailers Association, which represents various types of 
vendors, began opposing tobacco control bills in 1982 and supported the tobacco industry’s 
political efforts as recently as 2014. In 1988, TI considered the Louisiana Retail Association one 
of its two least effective allies.157 Nevertheless, TI continued working with the Louisiana 
Retailers Association and its president Nick Perez throughout the 1980s and 1990s to oppose 
smokefree laws (Chapter 5) and tobacco tax bills (Chapter 6).206 In 1991, the Louisiana Retailers 
Association cosponsored the Tobacco Institute’s voluntary “It’s the Law” program207 designed to 
prevent strong youth sales laws and enforcement, as well as improve the industry’s public 
image.174, 208 In 1992, the Louisiana Retailers Association supported a lawsuit209-211  that 
overturned a local tobacco tax passed by the City of New Orleans (Chapter 6).206, 212 The lawsuit 
received financial assistance from the tobacco industry.213 The Louisiana Retailers Association 
also contributed to and participated in the Louisiana CALA during the 1990s, which the tobacco 
industry supported to advance its tort reform efforts (Chapter 8).214   
 
 Other retail groups the industry considered allies were the Louisiana Wholesale Grocers' 
Association (LWGA) and the Vending Machine Operators of Louisiana (VMOL). In an undated 
and uncredited grassroots resources evaluation from the Tobacco Institute’s records, the tobacco 
industry considered LWGA and VMOL as two of its four most effective coalition members 
alongside LWTCDA and Louisiana Restaurant Association.157 Louisiana Wholesale Grocers' 
Association’s executive director Barbara Easley, an active TAN volunteer, participated in 
industry voluntary programs such as “It’s the Law,” sent her organization’s members to a 1989 
town hall in Lafayette to defend against local smoking restrictions, and opposed state and federal 
tobacco taxes in the 1980s and 1990s.39, 100, 215-217 
 
Louisiana Restaurant Association  
 
The Louisiana Restaurant Association (LRA) was an ardent ally of the tobacco industry. 
The association supported industry positions on local and state smoking restrictions218 (Chapters 
5, 10, 12) and fought a local tobacco tax proposed in New Orleans during 1984 (Chapter 6). The 
tobacco industry contributed to LRA as early as 1983,219 and by 1984 recognized the trade group 
as an ally220 that was part of the “Tobacco Family.”221 The Tobacco Institute supported the 
association via membership fees and sponsoring association events.222 After the Tobacco 
Institute paid its annual membership fees to LRA in January 1986 LRA Executive Vice President 
Jim Funk thanked TI Regional Director Ron Morris for the contribution, stating that “the LRA 
belongs to you, so please do not hesitate to call us if we can ever assist you in any way.”223 That 
year, TI considered LRA one of the four strongest restaurant associations in the nation.222 
 
The Louisiana Restaurant Association participated in industry-created smoking 
accommodation programs. The tobacco industry recruited state and national restaurant 
associations worldwide to participate in accommodation programs designed to prevent adoption 
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and implementation of effective clean air restrictions.134 In 1985, TI collaborated with the 
National Restaurant Association to disseminate smoking accommodation program information 
and materials that the industry had developed.224 After receiving a letter from the National 
Restaurant Association, the LRA contacted TI to express interest in its voluntary program and 
request 8,000 "Smokers are Welcome Here Tent Cards."225, 226 LRA also distributed brochures 
and materials from TI’s “Fair Policy” accommodation program  to its members after editing and 
changing some with TI assistance.226 Fair Policy brochures instructed participants on how to 
establish “equitable” smoking and nonsmoking sections, and program signage stated “Smokers 
are welcome here.”227 Fair Policy program materials credited state restaurant associations for the 
program and did not mention TI.227 
 
LRA also participated in the Tobacco Institute’s “It’s the Law” Program in 1991 (Chapter 
7),229 a program created to deter adoption of strong youth access laws and prevent effective 
enforcement of existing laws via voluntary self-regulation.174, 208 LRA joined “It’s the Law” 
because many restaurants sold tobacco products.230 
 
 The decades-long effort by the Louisiana Restaurant Association to support the tobacco 
industry’s policy priorities continued through the 2000s. LRA participated in Philip Morris’ 
Accommodation Program during the 1990s and 2000s.231, 232 In 2001, the LRA helped defeat SB 
427, a bill repealing preemption over local smoking restrictions (Chapter 10). In 2003 the LRA 
unsuccessfully fought SB 901 to partially repeal local smoking preemption, including over 
restaurants (Chapter 10).233, 234 LRA also opposed and failed to prevent passage of SB 742, a 
statewide clean air bill in 2006 that prohibited smoking in restaurants and most other public 
places (Chapter 10).235 
 
 LRA continued to assist the tobacco industry despite changes in its leadership. In 2010, 
LRA President and CEO Jim Funk retired and was replaced by Stan Harris.236 However, LRA 
remained an active ally of the tobacco industry. In 2014 and 2015, LRA joined with the Freedom 
to Choose Coalition to oppose a comprehensive local smokefree ordinance in New Orleans 
despite state law already prohibiting restaurants from allowing smoking (Chapter 12).  
 
 
Figure 2.4.  Louisiana Restaurant Association Statement Opposing Smoking Restrictions (Date Unknown)228 
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Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association  
  
The Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association, similar to the LRA, has a long history of 
collaboration with Big Tobacco. The tobacco industry established its connection with the 
Louisiana Hotel and Motel Association in 1986, when Tobacco Institute lobbyist Joe Wood 
Guidry recruited the trade group’s executive vice president, Bill Langkopp, to support and 
implement the Fair Policy smoking accommodation program in motels and hotels237  (Figure 2.5) 
On April 7, 1986, the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association board approved the program. TI 
provided the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association with Fair Policy program materials that featured 
the hospitality association’s logo.238 Fair Policy program materials also stated the initiative was 
“A voluntary program of the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association” without mentioning the 
Tobacco Institute’s involvement.239-242 
 
 
Figure 2.5: A Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association brochure for the Fair Policy Program241 
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The Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association also participated in Philip Morris’ own initiative, 
the Accommodation Program, starting in 1995.243 Accommodation Program directories from 
1997 and 1999 continued to list the association.244, 245 
 
Like the Louisiana Restaurant Association, the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association 
participated in the Tobacco Institute’s “It’s the Law” initiative. The Association sponsored the 
program and distributed its materials to members.246, 247 TI listed the association as a member of 
its “It’s the Law” voluntary youth access program in letters to state legislators touting the 
tobacco industry’s (nominal) opposition to youth smoking and support for a 1991 youth access 
law setting 18 as the minimum age of purchase for tobacco products in Louisiana (Chapter 7).248-
250 The Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association participated in a 1991 TI press conference  to 
promote the “It’s the Law” program in Louisiana251 and partook in the program until at least 
1993.252 
 
The tobacco industry considered recruiting the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association to help 
it resist federal regulation. A document from Philip Morris’ records identified the Association as 
a potential ally for a national letter writing campaign against proposed OSHA regulations in 
1994 (the document also listed the Louisiana Restaurant Association, Louisiana Retailers 
Association, Louisiana Association of Business and Industry, the LWTCDA, and others as allies 
for the campaign).253(OSHA had proposed rules to restrict smoking in workplaces to improve 
indoor air quality, which the tobacco industry mobilized to oppose.254)  We found no evidence 
that the Association wrote OSHA.253 
 
Besides participating in voluntary programs, the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association 
collaborated with the tobacco industry to oppose smoking restriction legislation (Chapter 5). In 
1988, the Tobacco Institute offered the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association $12,000 to help retain 
lobbyist Jerry Mckernan255 so that he could assist TI’s efforts to prevent smoking restrictions in 
Louisiana.255 The Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association last opposed smoking restrictions in 2001, 
campaigning against local preemption repeal bills HB 1073 and SB 427179, 235, 236(Chapter 10).  
 
In 2001, the Association successfully lobbied against HB1073 and another preemption 
repeal bill, SB 427 (Chapter 10).177, 178, 251-254, 256-258 Joe Wood Berry, TI’s lobbyist in Louisiana 
until 1995, fought HB 1073 as a lobbyist for the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association.259  HB 1073 
was withdrawn by its sponsor Representative Hunt Downer (R-Houma) after the tobacco 
industry and its allies secured an amendment on the House Floor prohibiting local governments 
from restricting smoking in bars and restaurants.260 SB 427, which was not amended to prohibit 
local smoking restrictions over bars and restaurants, died in the House Commerce Committee 
amidst opposition from the  Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association and the LRA.261 Following work 
to defeat HB 1073 and SB 427, we found no more efforts by the Louisiana Hotel-Motel 
Association to aid the tobacco industry.  
 
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry  
 
 The Louisiana Association of Business and Industry was initially one of the tobacco 
industry’s weaker allies in Louisiana. The first known contact between the tobacco industry and 
LABI occurred in 1984, when TI implored LABI to oppose a proposed local tobacco tax in New 
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Orleans (Chapter 6).262 The Tobacco Institute became a member of LABI as early as 1985.194 In 
1986, TI asked LABI to help it create a smoking accommodation brochure.263 LABI did not 
agree to help the Tobacco Institute develop brochures, but offered to connect TI with Louisiana 
businesses having trouble with smoking policies. The tobacco industry initially considered LABI 
as one of its two weakest allies in Louisiana.157 
 
Business community efforts to secure tort reform 
legislation in Louisiana transformed LABI into one of 
the tobacco industry’s strongest and most active allies in 
the state (Chapter 8). The tobacco industry began 
assisting LABI’s efforts to advance tort legislation in 
1988, helping the association secure SB 684 to limit 
manufacturers’ liability for “inherently dangerous” 
products.264 LABI lobbyists involved in tort reform, CJ 
Blache, Randy Haynie, and John Koch, subsequently 
became key lobbyists for RJ Reynolds, Philip Morris, 
and the Tobacco Institute in Louisiana during the late 
1980s. LABI later formed a Citizens Against Lawsuit 
Abuse coalition with tobacco industry assistance in 1992111, 265, 266 that advanced the business 
community’s tort reform objectives in the state (Chapter 8).111, 266 The Louisiana Association of 
Business and Industry’s collaboration with the tobacco industry on tort reform continued until at 
least 2000 (Chapter 8).267-269 
 
The Beer Industry League 
 
 The Beer Industry League of Louisiana (BILL) first collaborated with the tobacco 
industry in 1983, when its lobbyist George Brown helped TI fight an excise tax increase on 
cigarettes (Chapter 6).270 A July 1989 document from TI’s records later listed Brown as a reserve 
lobbyist for the tobacco industry.271 Brown was regarded as one of the best lobbyists in 
Louisiana according to a 1998 New York Times Magazine article found in the tobacco industry 
documents library.272 Brown’s organization, BILL, participated in the Louisiana Coalition 
Against Regressive Taxation,273 which was  part of a nationwide program the industry tried 
using274 to prevent federal tobacco taxes.274, 275 In August 1994, George Brown, then BILL’s 
Executive Director, sent a letter to Attorney General Richard Ieyoub (D)  requesting that he not 
file a lawsuit against the major tobacco companies to recoup state Medicaid costs (Chapter 9).276  
Ieyoub ultimately took legal action against the tobacco industry and helped secure the Master 
Settlement Agreement (Chapter 9).  
 
  In the late 1990s Philip Morris planned to strengthen its relationships with BILL and 
distributors of Miller Brewing Company products (which was owned by PM at the time),277 but 
we did not find evidence of completed work by the tobacco industry to bolster these ties.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The tobacco industry used its employees and lobbyists, as well as the state’s business 
community, to block unfavorable legislation and secure weak tobacco control bills protecting its 
Business community efforts 
to secure tort reform 
legislation in Louisiana 
transformed LABI into one of 
the tobacco industry’s 
strongest and most active 
allies in the state. 
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interests in Louisiana. Starting in the 1970s, the Tobacco Institute and tobacco companies used 
the Tobacco Action Network to have their employees follow and oppose harmful legislation in 
Louisiana. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the tobacco industry hired influential lobbyists 
with strong ties to the state’s business community to advocate on its behalf. Using existing ties 
between its representatives, as well as shared policy objectives, the tobacco industry developed 
relationships with powerful state-based business associations such as the Louisiana Wholesale 
Tobacco and Candy Distributors Association, the Louisiana Restaurant Association, the 
Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association and Louisiana Association of Business and Industry. 
Effective lobbying and coalition-development allowed the tobacco industry to prevent the 
adoption of clean air laws, secure weak smoking accommodation legislation preempting local 
smokefree restrictions (Chapter 5), prevent significant tax increases (Chapter 6), and obtain bills 
limiting the major tobacco companies’ liability for harm caused by their products (Chapter 8). 
The tobacco industry dominated legislative battles in Louisiana until the early 2000s, when 
tobacco control and health advocates began to improve their capabilities, obtained funding 
(Chapter 11) in 2002, and unified their initiatives starting in the mid-2000s (Chapter 4). 
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Chapter 3: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions 
 
• The tobacco industry contributed almost $2.2 million in 2019 dollars ($1.6 million 
current dollars) to state and local candidates through 1983 to 2015 election cycles. 
• Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and the Tobacco Institute provided the most contributions to 
candidates and parties. 
• Beginning with the 1995 election cycle, state-level campaign contributions from the 
tobacco industry expanded from key legislators to most lawmakers 
• Peak years for campaign contributions coincided with critical tobacco control policy 
activity. 
• From the 1983 to 1999 cycles Democrats received more contributions than Republicans, 
but Republicans began receiving more contributions as they increased their presence in 
the legislature and ultimately secured control of the House and Senate in 2011. 
 
The tobacco industry and its allies contributed frequently to legislators, constitutional 
officers (state executive officials), and political parties in Louisiana. The Tobacco Institute made 
its first known campaign contributions to Louisiana state lawmakers in 1982 and steadily 
increased its donations until its dissolution in 1999 as a result of the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA) that settled lawsuits brought by state attorneys general against the major 
cigarette companies and their affiliated organizations to recoup Medicaid funds lost treating 
tobacco related illnesses (Chapter 9).1-4 Before the Tobacco Institute folded it made the most 
donations among tobacco industry entities. Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds gave the second and 
third most contributions from the tobacco industry to Louisiana lawmakers from 1982-1999 
(Figure 3.2). Following the dissolution of the Tobacco Institute, among tobacco interests, Philip 
Morris and RJ Reynolds provided the most campaign contributions to Louisiana lawmakers and 
elected officials. The tobacco industry also financed and hosted events for legislators to garner 
support for industry policy goals.  
 
Data Sources 
  
 Louisiana holds elections for Governor, most state offices, and the legislature every four 
years in off years from the Presidential Election.5 We present Louisiana contribution data in 
four-year election cycles. Contributions we report from the tobacco industry come from major 
tobacco companies, tobacco trade associations, and various other national and state-based 
tobacco-related associations, distributors, retailers, and wholesalers (Table 3.1). 
 
Donations by lobbyists to political candidates and parties are not included as tobacco 
industry contributions in our findings, since it is impossible to determine if contributions were 
personal, made for another client, or on behalf of a tobacco company. 
 
We collected contribution data using previously secret tobacco industry documents 
available at the UCSF Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library (TTIDL, 
https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/) and Follow the Money (FTM, 
https://www.followthemoney.org/), a contribution database administered by the National 
Institute on Money in Politics (NIMP). Contribution data found in the industry documents 
spanned from the 1983 to 1995 election cycles and came from the Tobacco Institute, Philip 
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Morris/Altria, and RJ Reynolds. Contribution data from internal documents for the 1983 to 1999 
election cycles may be incomplete because of gaps in years found or not available in the Truth 
Tobacco Industry Documents Library. In 1982,8, 9 1984-1988,1 and 1991-19931, 10 only campaign 
contributions from the Tobacco Institute were discovered. Years with contributions found for 
Philip Morris were 1983,11 1990,12 1995,13 and 1996.14 RJ Reynolds contribution records were 
found for 1989,15 1995,16 1997,17 and 1998.18 These years are not referenced as election years, 
but as individual years the industry listed making a contribution. We used the Follow the Money 
database to collect contribution data for all available election cycles, 1999 through 2015 that 
NIMP collects from reports filed with The Louisiana Board of Ethics.19-22 
 
A comparison of data from internal documents found in the Truth Tobacco Industry 
Documents Library and Follow the Money revealed substantial differences between 
contributions made and reported in 1999 (Table 3.2), the one year of overlap. Follow the Money 
reported more contributions than we identified in the industry documents for Philip Morris/Altria 
and RJ Reynolds and less for the Tobacco Institute. These results suggest that our tabulation of 
contributions before 1999, based on donations reported in the industry documents, might 
understate contributions from Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds. They also may understate 
contributions from the Tobacco Institute. 
 
Table 3.1: Donors Considered “Tobacco Industry Contributions”6, 7 
Tobacco Companies Philip Morris 
RJ Reynolds 
Lorillard 
Brown and Williamson 
Swedish Match 
Swisher International 
Trade Associations Tobacco Institute 
Cigar Association of America 
International Premium Cigar and Pipe Retailers Association 
Louisiana Wholesale Food and Tobacco Association 
Distributors, Retailers, and other Entities Conwood Co 
Crescent City Cigar Shop 
Dixie Cigarettes 
General Cigar Company 
Lee Dee Wholesale Distributing Company 
New Orleans Cigar Co 
Philips Wholesale Candy and Tobacco 
Roberts Cigar and Tobacco Co 
Shop Rite / Tobacco Plus 
SJN Enterprises 
Smokers Paradise 
Super Tobacco Discounters Inc 
The Tobacco Rack 
The Tobacco Shak 
The Tobacco Stop 
Tobacco Warehouse 
Xcaliber International 
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In sum, 1983-1995 cycles rely solely on tobacco industry documents while 1999-2015 
rely on NIMP data, except for the use of TTIDL records for Tobacco Institute contributions 
made during the 1999 election cycle. 
 
Contribution Limits and Restrictions in Louisiana 
 
Louisiana first adopted campaign contribution laws restricting the amount individuals, 
corporations, labor organizations, and political committees may donate to candidates and their 
committees for any specific election campaign (i.e., primary or general) in 1980.25  The limit 
depends on the office being pursued and applies separately to primary and general election 
cycles (Table 3.3).25  
 
Political committees, defined by Louisiana law as containing over 250 members that each 
contributed a minimum of $50 to the political committee the prior year, are permitted to make 
larger contributions to Louisiana candidates or their committees.25 There are no limits on 
contributions from Democratic, Republican, or other political parties to candidates.25 
 
Overall State-Level Contributions from the Tobacco Industry 
 
 The Tobacco Institute (TI) made its first known campaign contributions to Louisiana 
lawmakers in 1982, giving $6,800 total to members of the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
Committee, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the House Health and Welfare 
Committee.8  The Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs and House Ways and Means Committees 
regularly considered tobacco tax legislation (Chapter 6), and the House Health and Welfare 
Committee handled smokefree legislation (Chapter 5). 
 
From the 1983 to 2015 election cycles, tobacco companies, trade organizations and other 
tobacco industry entities contributed $2,191,543 in 2019 dollars ($1,562,117 current dollars) to 
candidates and political parties in Louisiana (Figure 3.1).  
 
Contributions peaked in Louisiana during election cycles containing legislative and 
political activity adverse to tobacco industry interests. After the industry made its first known 
contributions in the early 1980s, donations climbed each cycle until reaching their highest point, 
$438,155 in 2019 dollars (Figure 3.1), during the 1999 cycle. In 1998, the 46 States’ Attorney 
Generals, including Louisiana, executed the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the major 
tobacco companies (Chapter 9).4 The MSA resulted from multiple lawsuits filed against the 
tobacco industry by state attorneys general to recover state Medicaid funds lost treating tobacco-
related illnesses and secure limitations on tobacco industry marketing directed at youth (Chapter 
9).29 While the Attorney General negotiated the settlement, the payments were to the State of 
Table 3.2: Differences in Campaign Contribution Records between the Follow The Money Database and Tobacco 
Industry Documents for the 1999 Election Cycle14, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24 
 PM / Altria RJ Reynolds Tobacco Institute 
Follow the Money $156,850 $61,750 $21,550 
Tobacco Industry 
Documents $60,000 $49,000 $43,900 
*Includes special and nonstandard elections held during the main election cycle. 
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Louisiana, so it was up to the Louisiana Legislature to allocate the money (Chapter 9). Public 
health advocates pushed with minor success for a portion of settlement payments to go towards 
tobacco control programming (Chapter 9). While the MSA prohibited participating tobacco 
companies or their lobbyists from influencing settlement fund allocation, it did not prohibit 
campaign contributions.30  
 
Campaign contributions from the tobacco industry reached their second highest level, 
$351,141 in 2019 dollars, in the 2007 election cycle. In 2005, during the 2007 election cycle, 
Governor Kathleen Blanco (D) unsuccessfully pursued a cigarette tax increase to provide higher 
salaries to public educators (Chapter11). The following year, tobacco control advocates fully 
repealed preemption over local smoking restrictions and achieved a statewide clean air law 
despite strong tobacco industry opposition (Chapter 10).  
 
Contributions reached their third highest point in 2011, when the tobacco industry 
provided political candidates and parties $334,077. In that election cycle, Governor Bobby 
Table 3.3: Campaign Contribution Limits Per Cycle by Office Type as of 201725, 26 
Category Candidate Types Individual/ Organization Political 
Committee 
Major Governor $5,000 $10,000 
Lieutenant Governor 
Secretary of State 
Attorney General 
State Treasurer 
Commissioner of Agriculture 
Commissioner of Insurance 
Superintendent of Education 
Public Service Commissioner 
State Supreme Court Justice 
Appeals Court judge 
District court judge in a parish with a population over 
450,000 
Any office in a district with a population equal to or greater 
than 250,000 
District State Legislature $2,500 $5,000 
Parish public offices 
Public offices elected by multiple parishes 
Public offices in districts with a population over 35,000 
Public offices in parish or city with municipal population 
equal to or greater than 300,000 
District court judges 
Governing authority or board positions presiding over a 
municipality with a population equal to or greater than 
225,000 
Other Elected in district with population equal to or under 35,000 
Non-parishwide office 
Office types not covered by Major or District Office 
Descriptions 
$1,000 $2,000 
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Jindal’s administration and the Louisiana Republican Party resisted efforts in 2009 and 2011 to 
increase tobacco taxes (Chapter 11). 
 
 
Tobacco Industry Spending by Organization 
 
Among tobacco businesses and trade associations, Philip Morris donated the most money 
to political candidates and parties in Louisiana from 1983 to 2015 (Figures 3.2A-B). 
    
Figure 3.1: Total contributions made by the tobacco industry during each election cycle from 1983-20151, 6-8, 10-13, 
15, 16, 23, 24, 27, 28  
*Tobacco industry contributions were initially small and targeted at influential legislators. As the tobacco 
industry faced greater regulatory threats and lawsuits it increased donations to state lawmakers and elected 
officials.  
 
**1983-1995 cycles rely solely on tobacco industry documents, while 1999-2015 rely on NIMP data, except for 
the use of TTIDL records for Tobacco Institute contributions made during the 1999 election cycle.1, 6-8, 10-13, 15, 16, 
23, 24, 27, 28 
***Local contributions are only included in 1983-1999 from tobacco documents. FTM does not provide 
contributions to candidates for local office in Louisiana. 
 
****RJR reported in one source that it made $5000 in political contributions and $20,000 in tort [reform] 
contributions, for a total of $25,000 in overall contributions. The total $25,000 is included in our campaign 
contribution data.15 
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Figures 3.2A-B: Proportion of total contributions made during 1983-2015 election cycles by tobacco companies and associations1, 6-
13, 15, 16, 23, 24, 27, 28 
*1983-1995 figures are from the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents while year’s 1999-2018 are NIMP figures, except for the 
Tobacco Institute figure in 1999 which is TTID. 
**Other includes the Cigar Association of America, Brown & Williamson, Conwood Co, Crescent City Cigar Shop, Dixie Cigarettes, 
General Cigar Company, International Premium Cigar and Pipe Retailers Association, Lee Dee Wholesale Distributing Company, 
Lorillard, Louisiana Wholesale Food and Tobacco Association, New Orleans Cigar Co, Philips Wholesale Candy and Tobacco, 
Roberts Cigar and Tobacco Co, Shop Rite/Tobacco Plus, SJN Enterprises, Smokers Paradise and offshoots, Super Tobacco 
Discounters Inc, Swedish Match, Swisher International, The Tobacco Rack, The Tobacco Shak, Tobacco Stop, Tobacco Warehouse, 
Xcaliber International. 
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Philip Morris spent $ 1,314,999 in 2019 dollars 
from the 1983 election cycle through 2015, 60% of 
tobacco industry contributions (Figure 3.2B). The 
Tobacco Institute, the largest contributor from 1983 to 
1995, gave $419,474 in 2019 dollars, or 19% of 
industry donations, before its dissolution in 1998 
(Figure 3.2B). RJ Reynolds spent $334,403 in 2019 
dollars on candidates, committees, and political parties, 
15% of donations and the third most given among the 
tobacco industry (Figure 3.2B). Brown & Williamson, 
Lorillard, Swedish Match, Swisher International, along with local tobacco business and trade 
organizations, contributed approximately $122,667 in 2019 dollars (Figure 3.2B). 
 
Contributions to Legislative Candidates 
 
The Louisiana Legislature, which consists of 105 House members and 39 Senators at a 
given time,31 has accepted at least $1,277,179 in 2019 dollars ($895,159 current dollars) in 
tobacco industry campaign contributions from the 1983 election cycle (the first donations being 
made in 1982) through the 2015 election cycle. The amount of campaign contributions given to 
Louisiana legislators is likely higher, since RJR and PM internal documents found from 1983 to 
1995 mostly reported total donations and not individual recipients. Lawmakers in leadership 
positions or on committees that considered tobacco legislation received a greater share of 
tobacco industry contributions than other Louisiana legislators. (Table 3.4). 
Senator John Alario (R-Westwego), who joined the legislature in 1972,35 received the 
most contributions from the tobacco industry (Table 3.4). Alario was House Speaker from 1984-
1988 and from 1992-1996.36 After becoming a Republican in 2010 (Table 3.4), Alario was 
elected Senate President in 201237, a position he held until January 202038 (Term limits forced 
him out of office following the Fall 2019 election.36, 39). Alario served as Speaker when the 
tobacco industry successfully pushed weak smoking accommodation legislation that preempted 
local clean air laws stronger than the state’s in 1993 (Chapter 5) and chaired the House Ways and 
Means Committee, House Appropriations Committee, Senate Commerce Committee, and Senate 
Finance Committee. (The House Ways and Means Committee considers tobacco tax legislation, 
Chapters 5 and 6.36)  
Top campaign contribution recipients generally sat on important committees. Senator 
John Smith (R-Leesville),40 who sat on the Senate Finance Committee (2008-2009), Senate 
Commerce Committee (2011-2015), and Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee (2012-
2015),41 received the second highest amount of contributions among legislators (Table 3.4). 
Other legislators among the top ten recipients of industry contributions served as chairpersons, 
vice chairpersons, or members on Commerce, Finance, and Health and Welfare Committees 
(Table 3.4), all committees that dealt with tobacco legislation.  
These findings are limited by our inability to determine how Philip Morris and RJ 
Reynolds allotted contributions to legislators from 1983-1995. Most PM and RJR donations 
 
The Tobacco Institute, the 
largest contributor from 1983 
to 1995, gave $419,474 in 
2019 dollars, or 19% of 
industry donations, before its 
dissolution in 1998. 
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Table 3.4: All-Time Top 10 Recipients of Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions in Current Dollars, 1983-2015 Election 
Cycles1, 6, 8-13, 15, 16, 23, 24, 32-34 
Legend: D- Democrat, R- Republican, H- House, S- Senate 
Name Party Office 
 
Notable Leadership Position Total 
Amount 
Received 
John Alario** 
D H 
 
Ways and Means Vice Chair, 1976-1978; Ways and Means 
Chair, 1978-1983, 1996-1999; Speaker of the House, 1984-
1988, 1992-1996; Appropriations Chair, 2004-2008 
Senate President 2012-Present 
Chairman of Joint Legislative Committee on Budget; Joint 
Legislative Committee on Capital Outlay 
$16,325 R (2010) S 
 
John R. Smith 
R H 
 Commerce Chairman, 2010-2011; Commerce Vice Chair, 2015-Present; Agriculture Chair, 
2008-Present; Commerce chair, 2010-2013; Revenue and 
Fiscal Affairs Chair, 2012-Present 
10,150 S 
Daniel R. Martiny 
D H 
 Environment Vice Chair, 1997-1999; Judiciary Vice Chair, 
1999; Administration of Criminal Justice Chair, 2000-2008; 
Senate Majority Leader, 2012-2020 
Commerce Chair, 2012 -Present 
$10,150 S 
 
Billy Montgomery** 
D 
 
H 
 
-- $9,550 R (2006) 
Bryant Hammett D H  
Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee, 2000-
2006 9,300 
James Cain    $9,050 
John Travis D H  -- $8,600 
Joe McPherson    7,950 
Ron Landry 
D S 
 
Transportation Chairman, 2008-2012; 
Health and Welfare chair, 2008-2012; 
Judiciary C chair, 2008-2012; 
Retirement chair, 2008-2012 
7,800 
Francis Heitmeier  
D H Senate Finance Chairman, 2008-2012; 
Senate Joint Legislative Committee Chairman, 2008-2012; 
Commerce Chair, 2008-2012; Transportation Chair, 2008-
2012 
$7,650 
S 
Total  $96,525 
*Election Cycles from 1983-1995 use TTID documents. 1999-2015 election cycles rely on NIMP Database, except for 
Tobacco Institute contributions during the 1999 election cycle, which used TTID documents. 
**Switched parties. 
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found in internal documents reported contributions to Louisiana lawmakers in total amounts and 
not by individual. As a result, other lawmakers may have received greater contributions from the 
industry than those listed. 
From 1999 to 2016, only 38 legislators had not accepted campaign contributions from the 
tobacco industry; 308 accepted contributions (Table 3.5). 
 
Table 3.5: Legislators Who Did Not Accept Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions from 1999-201542-80 6, 81 
Name Party Office  Year First Elected  Years Served by Start of 2015 Cycle 
Karen Carter Peterson Democrat Senate 1999 (House) 16* 
Albert Franklin Democrat House 2007 8 
Marcus Hunter Democrat House 2011 4 
Randal Gaines Democrat House 2011 4* 
Alfred Williams Democrat House 2011 3 
Edward James Democrat House 2011 4 
Ebony Woodruff Democrat House 2013 2 
Joe Bouie Democrat House 2013 2* 
Jeff Hall Democratic House 2015 - 
Sam Jenkins Democrat House 2015 -* 
Lawrence Bagley  Republican House 2015 -* 
Mike Johnson Republican House 2015 -* 
Dodie Horton Republican House 2015 -* 
Jack Mcfarland Republican House 2015 -* 
Stephen Dwight Republican House 2015 - 
Mark Abraham Republican House 2015 -* 
Julie Emerson Republican House 2015 -* 
Dustin Miller Democrat House 2015 -* 
Phillip DeVillier Republican House 2015 -* 
Jean-Paul Coussan Republican House 2015 -* 
Jerome Zeringue Republican House 2015 -* 
Tanner Magee Republican House 2015 -* 
Tony Bacala Republican House 2015 -* 
Chad Brown Democrat House 2015 -* 
C. Denise Marcelle Democrat House 2015 - 
Rick Edmonds Republican House 2015 -* 
Paula Davis Republican House 2015 -* 
Malinda White Democrat House 2015 -* 
Rodney Lyons, SR. Democrat House 2015 -* 
Stephanie Hilferty Republican House 2015 -* 
Jimmy Harris Democrat House 2015 -* 
John Bagneris Democrat House 2015 - 
Gary Carter, Jr. Democrat House 2015 -* 
Sharon Hewitt Republican Senate 2015 - 
Beth Mizell Republican Senate 2015 -* 
Jay Luneau Democrat Senate 2015 -* 
Ryan Gatti Republican Senate 2015 -* 
John Milkovich Democrat Senate 2015 -* 
*Lawmakers that received campaign contributions for the 2019 election cycle. The campaign contribution analysis in this report 
covers the 1983-2015 election cycles. Campaign contribution data for the 2019 election cycle was released too late to include in 
our report’s analysis.82 
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The only lawmaker elected before 1999 that we could determine did not receive tobacco 
industry contributions through the 2015 election cycle was Senator Karen Carter Peterson (D-
New Orleans), who became a Representative in 1999 and was continuing to serve in the 
legislature as of 2020 (She received an industry contribution in the 2019 cycle, Table 3.5). While 
Speaker Pro Tempore of the State House in 2009,83 Peterson sponsored two unsuccessful bills to 
increase cigarette taxes with political support from national health voluntaries and the Coalition 
for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana (Chapter 11).84-86 Restricted by a 12-year term limit in each 
legislative chamber, Peterson moved to the Senate in 2011. Representative Albert Franklin held 
office the second longest without receiving an industry contribution, taking office in 2008 and 
continuing to serve as of 2020. Franklin voted to increase tobacco taxes in 2009 and 2011 but did 
not introduce or cosponsor any tobacco control legislation.87, 88 After Franklin, five lawmakers 
elected in 2011 and two lawmakers elected in 2013 reported no contributions from the tobacco 
industry (Table 3.5). The 28 other legislators that did not receive tobacco industry donations 
were freshman lawmakers elected to their first terms in 2015. Of the lawmakers that did not 
receive campaign contributions in 2015, 11 were Democrats and 17 were Republicans.  
 
Contributions to Statewide Offices 
 
Governor 
 
 The tobacco industry contributed $94,350 to 
gubernatorial candidates from 1991 to 2015, $74,850 of 
which went to Republicans (Table 3.6). We did not find 
contributions to gubernatorial candidates for earlier 
election cycles (Table 3.6)   
 
Governor Bobby Jindal (R) received $27,500 in 
contributions from the tobacco industry over three 
election cycles (2003, 2007, 2011), the most of any 
gubernatorial candidate. The industry first gave Jindal 
$2,500 for an unsuccessful bid for governor in 2003 
against Democrat Kathleen Blanco, the acting lieutenant 
governor. Before seeking office in 2003, Jindal 
suggested that healthcare costs from smoking-related 
diseases justified increased tobacco taxes in a 1997 
article he published while he was serving as the secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health 
and Hospitals (DHH) from 1996-1998.89, 90 He later served as an assistant secretary at the US 
Department of Health and Human Services from 2001-2003.91 In his 1997 article, Jindal argued 
that higher tobacco taxes allowed smokers to contribute to the healthcare system more 
proportionally to their burden on it and justified giving them equal medical treatment as 
nonsmokers.90 
 
Despite his past support for tobacco tax increases, the tobacco industry provided Jindal 
$15,000 for his successful 2007 run for governor and $10,000 for his 2011 reelection campaign 
(Table 3.6). As governor, Jindal fought tobacco tax increases in 2009 and 2011 and vetoed a 4-
cent cigarette tax renewal in 2011 (Chapter11). The same year, Jindal proposed reallocating all 
Before seeking office in 2003, 
Jindal suggested that 
healthcare costs from 
smoking-related diseases 
justified increased tobacco 
taxes in a 1997 article he 
published while he was 
serving as the secretary of 
the Louisiana Department of 
Health and Hospitals …. 
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monies from the MSA-funded Millennium trust to cover the Taylor Opportunity Program for 
Students92, 93 (a popular college scholarship program) and fix Louisiana’s budget deficit without 
making tax increases (Chapter 9)94  
 
Republican Governor Murphy Foster secured the second-most industry contributions to a 
gubernatorial candidate, receiving $27,100 during the 1995 and 1999 election cycles (Table 3.6). 
Foster received $22,100 of his industry contributions during the 1999 election cycle, when 
Louisiana lawmakers allocated MSA funds (Chapter 9) (Table 3.6).  
 
 The Only Democratic gubernatorial candidate to receive over $10,000 in campaign 
contributions from the tobacco industry was Kathleen Blanco. She received the contributions for 
her successful 2003 campaign against Republican gubernatorial candidates Bobby Jindal and 
state lawmaker Hunt Downer (who was defeated during the primary election) (Table 3.6).95 Each 
candidate received tobacco industry donations that election cycle, but Blanco took the lion’s 
share. Nevertheless, in 2005 Blanco pursued HB 157, a tobacco tax increase, to provide public 
teachers a salary increase (Chapter 11). Governor Blanco’s legislation failed due to tobacco 
industry and Republican Party opposition. She chose not to seek reelection in 2007. 
 
Lieutenant Governor 
 
The tobacco industry contributed to campaigns for Lieutenant Governor, with the bulk of 
contributions going toward Democrats and incumbents. Candidates for Lt. Governor raised a 
total of $9,600 from the tobacco industry from 1987 to 2015, with Democrats receiving $6,600 
and Republicans $3000 (Table 3.7).  
In 2003, the tobacco industry contributed $1000 to Republican candidate Melinda 
Schwegmann, five times the $200 it contributed to her Democratic opponent Mitch Landrieu. 
The industry had reason to limit contributions to Landrieu, who had sponsored and passed 
tobacco tax increase bill HB 157 in 2002 (Chapter 11). That legislation raised Louisiana’s 
Table 3.6: Tobacco Industry Contributions to Gubernatorial Candidates in Current Dollars, 1983-20156, 13 
Year Recipient Party Result Contribution in Election Cycle 
1983 None Found -- -- -- 
1987 None Found -- -- -- 
1991 WJ Tauzin D Lost $2,500 
1995 Murphy Foster R Won $5,000 
1999  Murphy Foster R Won $22,100 
2003 
Kathleen Blanco D Won $11,000 
Hunt Downer R Lost $1,500 
Bobby Jindal R Lost $2,500 
2007 
John Georges I Lost $8,750 
Bobby Jindal R Won $15,000 
Walter Boasso D Lost $1000 
2011 Bobby Jindal R Won $10,000 
2015 
John Bel Edwards D Won $5,000 
David Vitter R Lost $10,000 
Total $94,350 
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cigarette tax 12 cents per pack and dedicated 2 of the 12 cents to forming and funding a nonprofit 
tobacco control program that became The Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living 
(Chapters 4 and 11). In addition, during 2003 tobacco control advocates partially repealed 
statewide preemption over local smoking restrictions that prevented the adoption of effective 
smokefree laws at the municipal level since 1993 (Chapters 5, 10). Later, the industry donated 
$3,500 to Landrieu for his unsuccessful reelection campaign in 2007 against Gary Beard 
(Republican), the greatest amount given to any Lieutenant Governor candidate (Table 3.7).  
Attorney General 
 
 The tobacco industry contributed a total of $21,073 to candidates running for Attorney 
General from the 1995 to the 2015 election cycles (Table 3.8). The tobacco industry favored 
Republican candidates, providing $13,473 in donations to Republicans and only $7,600 in 
donations to Democrats (Table 3.8). We found no contributions in the 1983, 1987, and 1991 
election cycles (Table 3.8).  
 
The industry contributed $2,550 to Democrat Richard Ieyoub during the 1995 election 
cycle, the first contribution found to an attorney general candidate (Table 3.8). In 1994, Ieyoub 
Table 3.7: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Lieutenant Governor Candidates in Current 
Dollars, 1983-20156, 13 
Year Recipient Party Result Amount Received 
1983 None Found -- -- -- 
1987 Robert Freeman D Won $400 
1991 None Found -- -- -- 
1995 Kathleen Blanco D Won $2,500 
1999 None Found -- -- -- 
2003 Mitch Landrieu D Won $200 Melinda Schwegmann R Lost $1,000 
2007 Gary Beard R Won $1,000 Mitch Landrieu D Lost $3,500 
2011 Jay Dardenne R Won $1,000 
2015 None Found -- -- -- 
Total $9,600 
Table 3.8: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Attorneys General Candidates in Current Dollars, 1983-
20156, 13 
Year Recipient Party Result Amount Received 
1983 None Found -- -- -- 
1987 None Found -- -- -- 
1991 None Found -- -- -- 
1995 Richard Ieyoub D Won $2,500 
1999 Richard Ieyoub D Won $100 
2003 Suzanne Terrell R Lost $2,500 
2007 Charles Foti D Lost $5,000 
2011 James (Buddy) Caldwell 
R Won $2,500 
2015 
James (Buddy) 
Caldwell 
R Lost $5,000 
Jeff Landry R Won $3,473 
Total $21,073 
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filed the sixth lawsuit against the tobacco industry to recover Medicaid funds used for treating 
tobacco-related illnesses (Chapter 9). The lawsuit sustained state litigation against the tobacco 
companies and ultimately helped secure the MSA. After Ieyoub’s litigation against the tobacco 
companies, the industry gave him only $100 for his 1999 reelection campaign (Table 3.8).  
 
During the 2003 election cycle, when lawmakers considered legislation to repeal 
preemption over local smoking restrictions and to increase tobacco taxes, the tobacco industry 
gave Republican Attorney General Candidate Suzanne Terrell $2,500 (Table 3.8). Terrell lost to 
Democrat Charles Foti, who did not receive tobacco industry donations.  
 
During the 2007 election cycle, when health advocates pursued preemption repeal and a 
statewide clean air law (Chapter 10), the tobacco industry contributed $5,000 to Foti for his 
failed reelection campaign. Foti lost his 2007 reelection campaign to fellow Democrat and 
district attorney James "Buddy" Caldwell, who did not receive tobacco industry contributions for 
that race. Caldwell subsequently accepted $2,500 pursuing reelection in 2011, a time when 
Governor Jindal was attempting to reallocate Millennium Trust funds and lawmakers considered 
tobacco tax increases (Chapter 11). We could not determine if Caldwell, a state district court 
judge at the time,96 played any role in Jindal’s attempt to reallocate settlement funds or in tax 
legislation efforts. Caldwell sought reelection to attorney general as a Republican in 2015 and 
received another $5,000 in industry contributions. He lost to fellow Republican Jeff Landry, who 
received $3,473 from tobacco interests. Louisiana was enduring a budget crisis in 2015 that 
prompted health advocates and the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living to form a 
coalition and successfully pursue tobacco tax increases (Chapter 11). 
 
Other Statewide Offices 
 
 The tobacco industry also contributed to candidates running for Commissioner of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Elections Commissioner, Insurance Commissioner, Secretary of State, 
and Treasurer by at least the 1999 election cycle (Table 3.9). We did not find evidence that they 
contributed to these offices before the 1999 election cycle, although it is possible they did. Out of 
all elected positions in Louisiana, Public Service Commissioners are the only office not voted 
upon in Louisiana’s standard off-year election cycles. As stated previously, in 1999 before the 
fall election, Louisiana lawmakers allocated funds from the Master Settlement Agreement 
(Chapter 9). In 2003 and 2006 health advocates repealed preemption and obtained a statewide 
clean air law (Chapter 10). In addition, during the 2011 cycle, Governor Jindal attempted to 
reallocate MSA funds and tobacco control advocates sought legislation to increase tobacco taxes 
(Chapter 11). 
Judicial Candidates 
  
In 1998, 2009, and 2012, judicial candidates reported receiving tobacco industry 
contributions (Table 3.10).   
 
Republican Charles Cusimano received $1000 from RJ Reynolds in 1998 for his 
campaign against incumbent Democrat Pascal Calogero to become Chief Justice of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court.97, 98 Cusimano received an endorsement and funding from industry ally the 
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI)97 which wanted to remove Calogero due 
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to his unfavorable rulings against businesses.97 RJR lobbyist CJ Blache, who had also worked for 
LABI, recommended RJR contribute to Cusimano.24 RJR State Government Relations Senior 
Director Joe Murray III sent a letter to Cusimano informing him RJR gave the contribution 
because of his “support of our country’s free-market system [that] will create job opportunities 
for the citizens of Louisiana.”24 Calogero was supported by trial lawyers,97 whose Louisiana 
Trial Lawyers Association had fought against the tobacco industry and its allies’ preservation 
and pursuit of tort reform laws in the 1980s and 1990s (Chapter 8). Cusimano lost the primary 
election, receiving 42% of the vote to Calogero’s 49%. Cusimano qualified for a runoff election 
but decided to drop out, forfeiting the seat to Calogero.98, 99 
 
District Court Judge Marcus Clark received $2,500 from local tobacco retailers for his 
successful 2009 campaign to join the Louisiana Supreme Court (Table 3.10).100 Clark did not 
receive contributions from any major tobacco companies. Clark accused his opponent Jimmy 
Faircloth, an attorney who had been counsel for Governor Bobby Jindal, of being a trial 
lawyer100, 101 (Faircloth stated he was a member of the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association on 
Table 3.9: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Political Offices (without term-limits) in Current 
Dollars, 1999-20156 
Position Year Recipient Party Result Amount  
Commissioner 
of Agriculture 
and Forestry 
2003 Bob Odom D Won $1,000 
2007 Bob Odom D Withdrew $3,200 
2011 Mike Strain R Mid-cycle $4,500 
 
Elections 
Commissioner 
1999 Jerry Fowler D Lost $500 
Suzanne Haik 
Terrell 
R Won $100 
 
Public Service 
Commission 
     
2004 Lambert Boissiere III 
D Won $500 
 2012 Erich Ponti R Lost $1,000 
 
Secretary of 
State 
1999 W Fox 
McKeithen 
R Won $500 
2003 W Fox McKeithen 
R Won $1,500 
2011 Jim Tucker R Lost $1,900 
 
Treasurer 
 1999 
Ken Duncan D Lost $500 
John Kennedy D Won $1,900 
2003 John Kennedy D (2003)/R (2007) 
Won $500 
2007 John Kennedy D (2003)/R (2007) 
Won $5,500 
Table 3.10: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Judicial Candidates, 1998-20126, 24 
Year Recipient Party Office Result Contribution 
Amount 
1998 Charles Cusimano R Louisiana Supreme Court Withdrew $500 
2009 Marcus Clark R Louisiana Supreme Court Won $2500 
2012 John Conery R Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third 
Circuit  
Won $500 
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his website at the time.100) Trial lawyers had opposed tobacco industry tort reform efforts in the 
1980s and 1990s and became a target of industry tort campaigns and the industry-funded tort 
reform group Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse (Chapter 8). Local tobacco retailers donated 
another $3,000 to Clark’s successful reelection campaign in 2016 (Table 3.10). 
 
In 2012, Republican John Conery received tobacco industry contributions for an 
unopposed run to join the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal (Table 3.10).102, 103 Before 
securing a seat on the appeals court, from 1995 to 2012 Conery served as a judge on the 
Louisiana 16th Judicial District Court,104, 105 hearing criminal, civil, and juvenile cases.106 Conery 
was an active and prominent member of multiple judicial organizations, having been a president 
of the Louisiana District Judges Association,105 a chair on the Association Committee on 
Professionalism at the Louisiana State Bar Association from 2003-2004, a founding member and 
president of the Teche, Louisiana chapter of the American Inns of Court, a member of the 
Steering Committee for the Center for Elders and the Courts at the National Center for State 
Courts104 from 2005 and active as of 2019107, and a member of the American Judicial 
Association Board of Governors.104  After his election to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, 
Conery served as president of the American Judges Association until 2015.108 We do not know 
how these roles relate to the tobacco industry or why it donated to Conery, but his career 
indicates that he is influential in the judicial community. 
 
In 2018, Republican State Senator Jonathan Perry (R-Kaplan) successfully sought 
election to an empty seat on the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal.109 Altria provided 
Perry $500 for the campaign.22 We did not find evidence he sponsored or played any major roles 
on legislation favorable to the tobacco industry. 
 
Campaign Contributions and Term Limits 
 
  In the early 1990s, 21 states, including 
Louisiana, enacted term limits that generally 
restricted lawmakers to 6 to 8 years of legislative 
service in any office.110 Proponents of electoral 
reform envisioned term limits preventing career 
politicians and reducing political corruption by 
introducing new participants and ideas to the political 
process, while also increasing representation for 
people of color and women.111 States with term limits 
saw a reduced proportion of contributions to 
legislative leadership and legislative committee 
members, and lower amounts in average donation 
size, perhaps because donors were spreading 
contributions to more lawmakers.110, 112   
 
Louisiana implemented term limits in 1995, constraining state lawmakers to three terms 
of four years in each legislative chamber. (After reaching their term limit, legislators could seek 
election to another chamber or elected office.) The long times people may serve, coupled with 
the ability to switch legislative chambers or seek election to a constitutional office (e.g., Lt. 
… the implementation of 
term limits in Louisiana in 
1995 coincided with an 
expansion of contributions to 
more members of the state 
legislature, with the tobacco 
industry nearly doubling the 
percentage of legislators it 
contributed to compared to 
the past election cycle. 
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Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General), still allowed influential lawmakers to serve for 
decades.113 Consistent with the general trend,110, 112 the implementation of term limits in 
Louisiana in 1995 coincided with an expansion of contributions to more members of the state 
legislature, with the tobacco industry nearly doubling the percentage of legislators it contributed 
to compared to the past election cycle (Figure 3.3).  
 
 
In addition to the effects of term limits, tobacco industry campaign contributions in 
Louisiana may also have increased in 1995 and subsequent election cycles because of increased 
industry-related political activity in response to health advocates’ growing efforts to implement 
tobacco control policies in the state. In particular, the industry may have spread contributions to 
more lawmakers during the 1995 election period because of efforts to pass preemptive smoking 
accommodation legislation in 1992 and 1993 (Chapter 5) and advance its tort reform agenda that 
cycle (Chapter 8). In following cycles, lawmakers allocated MSA funds (1999; Chapter 9), 
considered preemption repeal and a statewide clean air law (2003 and 2007; Chapter 10), and 
opposed tobacco tax increases (2009, 2011, 2015; Chapter 11).  
 
One limitation in determining the effect of term limits in Louisiana is a lack of 
information on tobacco industry contributions from 1983-1991. For the 1983-1991 cycles, we 
did not find information from Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds listing individual lawmakers that 
received campaign contributions, meaning a higher percentage of the legislature might have 
taken contributions than reported here. 
 
Contributions and Party Affiliation 
 
When Democrats controlled the Legislature (as they had since Reconstruction following 
the Civil War114) the tobacco industry contributed more to Democratic candidates and party 
committees, but the industry increasingly shifted donations to Republicans as their party gained 
power and ultimately took control of the legislature in 2011 (Figure 3.4A-B).31, 115, 116 The 
  
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Campaign Contributions to State Lawmakers from 1983-20151, 6, 8, 9, 13, 22, 23 
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tobacco industry first contributed more to 
Republicans during the 2003 election cycle, when 
Democrats started losing seats in the legislature. 
Industry contributions to Republicans peaked in 
2011 when the party seized control of the House 
and Senate31 and Republican Governor Bobby 
Jindal was running for reelection. In 2009, during 
the 2011 election cycle, lawmakers rejected 
legislation to increase tobacco taxes (Chapter 11). 
In 2011, tobacco control advocates sought a 
tobacco tax increase that the Louisiana 
Republican Party opposed with an advertising 
campaign (Chapter 11). We did not find evidence 
that the tobacco industry funded the media 
campaign, but that and the multiple tax increase attempts could explain the rise in industry 
contributions to Republicans.  
Most contributions went to legislative candidates between the 1983 and 1995 election 
cycles (Figure 3.5A-B). Beginning in 1999 and lasting through 2015, Democratic and 
Republican political parties and party committees received more contributions from the tobacco 
industry than their respective legislators. Political parties, which can receive $100,000 per cycle 
from individuals, entities and PACs, are able to contribute to candidates without restrictions in 
Louisiana.25, 117 
 
Industry Sponsorships 
 
The tobacco industry hosts and sponsors events to win support from politicians.  In 
Louisiana, the Tobacco Institute sponsored a dinner for lawmakers to gain access to key political 
leaders. In May 1984, TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris spent $2,457 to host a dinner for 
Senate President Samuel Nunez as part of Legislative Day activities at the World’s Fair in 
Louisiana (Table 3.11).118-120 During a special legislative session in March 1984, the tobacco 
industry had failed to block legislation raising the cigarette tax 5 cents per pack.121 Two of the 
five cents, or $12 million annually, was dedicated to funding Louisiana’s Cancer and Lung Trust 
Fund 122 (Chapter 6). The trust was established to fund studies on tobacco-related illnesses,123 but 
had no source of revenue until the 1984 special session increase. Since 1980, the tobacco 
industry had successfully opposed legislation allocating any tax revenue to the trust (Chapter 6). 
Morris hosted the dinner for Nunez and other politicians while state lawmakers considered 
various legislation to reduce or eliminate funding to the trust.118, 119, 124 Following the dinner, 
Louisiana legislators adopted legislation that lowered dedicated revenue to the trust fund from 
$12 million to $1 million annually (Chapter 6).125  
 
During the 1992 legislative session the tobacco industry participated in the "Donkey 
Romp" Golf Tournament put on by the House Democratic Campaign Committee.126 The 
Tobacco Institute contributed $1,600 to the event.126 During the 1993 legislative session, the 
Tobacco Institute successfully lobbied two “accommodation” laws passed by the legislature that 
permitted smoking sections in workplaces and completely preempted local clean air laws for ten 
years (Chapter 5).  
When Democrats controlled the 
Legislature the tobacco industry 
contributed more to Democratic 
candidates and party committees, 
but the industry increasingly 
shifted donations to Republicans 
as their party gained power and 
ultimately took control of the 
legislature in 2011. 
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Conclusion 
 
The tobacco industry provided Louisiana officials and lawmakers campaign contributions 
to help protect against adverse legislation and advance its political agenda in Louisiana. Starting 
in 1982, the tobacco industry gave contributions to Louisiana legislators on key committees for 
tax and smokefree legislation. As the political landscape and legislation became increasingly 
adverse, the tobacco industry spread contributions to more legislative candidates, party 
committees, and constitutional office candidates. Term limits may have also contributed to the 
dispersion of contributions to more lawmakers over time. Contributions peaked in election cycles 
featuring legislation to allocate funds from the Master Settlement Agreement, increase tobacco 
taxes, and increase smokefree protections. The tobacco industry spent its highest amount during 
the 1999 election cycle, donating $$438,155 in 2019 dollars to politicians and parties while 
legislators allocated Master Settlement Agreement monies.127 Industry contributions reached 
their second highest level at $351,141 in 2019 dollars during the 2007 election cycle as health 
advocates repealed preemption over local smoking restrictions and secured a statewide clean air 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Tobacco Industry Contributions from 1983-2015 Based on Party Affiliation of Recipient1, 6-9, 13, 23, 24 
*Figures consist of contributions to all legislative candidates, constitutional office (executive or judicial) 
candidates, and party committees. 
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law. Tobacco industry contributions peaked at $334,077 in 2019 dollars during the 2011 election 
cycle, as lawmakers considered multiple bills to increase tobacco taxes. 
 
Contributions favored Democrats in early years when they controlled the Louisiana 
Legislature. As Republicans gained power, the tobacco industry increased the amount of money 
it contributed to Republicans. Industry contributions to the Republican Party and Republican 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Allocation of Tobacco Industry Contributions from 1983-2015 (A) Among Candidates for Constitutional Offices 
(Executive Branch Offices and Judicial Positions) and (B) Legislative Seats, as well as Party Committees1, 6-9, 13, 23, 24 
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candidates peaked and began surpassing 
donations to Democrats in 2003, as 
Republicans began taking more seats in the 
Louisiana Legislature.  
 
 Although not always successful in 
preventing adverse legislative outcomes, the 
use of campaign contributions by the 
tobacco industry helped delay progress on 
tobacco prevention and health program 
funding, increasing tobacco taxes, and 
adopting public-health oriented smoking 
restrictions. 
 
 
  
Table 3.11: Attendees at Senate President Dinner and 
Reception for Senate President Nunez, 1984120 
Name Affiliation 
Allen Bares State Senate 
Charles Barham State Senate 
Thomas Casey State Senate 
Oswald Decuir State Senate 
Hank Lauricella State Senate 
Bill McCloud State Senate 
Elwyn Nicholson State Senate; Chairman Health & 
Welfare 
Cecil Picard State Senate 
Samuel Nunez State Senate President 
John Saunders State Senate 
Lawson Swearinger State Senate 
Michael Baer Senate Secretary  
William Jefferson State Senate 
Sarah Whalen Executive Director, Louisiana 
Wholesale Tobacco and Candy 
Distributors 
Bobby Freeman Lt. Governor 
Kenny Curley State Trooper 
Ron Morris (and 
wife) 
TI Regional Vice President 
Unknown State Trooper 
Unknown State Trooper 
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Chapter 4: Tobacco Control Programs in Louisiana 
 
• The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) created the Louisiana Tobacco 
Control Program (LTCP) in 1993. 
• The DHH initially relied on federal grants to fund tobacco control activities, receiving no 
money for tobacco control activities from the state until it received a minimal amount from 
MSA funds (Chapter 9). 
• In 2004 at the urging of health advocates, Louisiana formed an independent nonprofit 
tobacco control program, the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL), funded by 
a dedicated tobacco tax passed in 2002. 
• Originally operating independently, the LTCP and TFL began aligning and integrating 
programming in 2006 following budget constraints and the devastation of Hurricane Katrina.  
 
Comprehensive tobacco control programs are effective interventions to limit tobacco use 
and associated health effects.1 Minnesota created the first state-run tobacco control program in 
1986, which was defunded in 1993.2 California has had the longest continuously running state 
tobacco control program, which started in 1989 after voters adopted Proposition 99 in 1988 to 
increase the state’s tobacco tax and dedicate a portion of revenue for tobacco control.3 Louisiana 
created its state tobacco control program in 1993.  
Health organizations and medical officials initially led advocacy efforts against tobacco 
in Louisiana beginning in the 1970s (Chapter 5). By 1986, the DHH offered structural and 
technical assistance to localities looking to implement smoking cessation programming or other 
health initiatives.4 In 1987 the DHH instituted smoking restrictions in its facilities, allowing 
smoking in rooms disconnected from the building’s air conditioning system that had adequate 
ventilation.5 In 1990 the DHH’s Office of Public Health helped create the Louisiana Smoking or 
Health Coalition in collaboration with national and state voluntary health organizations as well 
as the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund.6 The DHH Office of Public Health conducted and 
published a study in 1992 finding cigarettes responsible for $1 billion in economic loss to the 
state and the cause of death of 8,300 Louisianans annually.7 The DHH established a dedicated 
tobacco control program in 1993, after receiving a grant from the US Centers from Disease 
Control and Prevention to form one. 
The Department of Health and Hospitals forms the Louisiana Tobacco Control Program 
 
The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) did not use its own funds to 
establish a tobacco control program but engaged in tobacco control activities using CDC funds 
before forming a program in 1993. Starting in the late 1980s the DHH entered cooperative 
agreements with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), primarily to build 
tobacco control coalitions with the intention of preventing tobacco use and generating awareness 
about the harmful effects of secondhand smoke.8 According to former DHH Tobacco Control 
Program director Diane Hargrove-Jupiter (formerly named Hargrove-Roberson) in a 2019 
interview for this report: 
The main thing they [the CDC] wanted us to do was build coalitions, get people to 
really come together to form tobacco control activities…To get people aware of 
how dangerous tobacco was, and [with] a lot of the focus on youth. And it was 
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really tobacco control or tobacco use prevention….I can remember us [the DHH] 
starting out, you know, kind of focusing on restaurants that were tobacco-free, 
getting people to know that secondhand smoke was very dangerous, you know, 
those kind of things.8 
The DHH received at least two cooperative 
agreements, the first likely providing the 
department $11,000 and the second probably 
$22,000 according to Hargrove-Jupiter. As part of 
the agreements the CDC provided training to DHH 
staff. DHH distributed funds from the cooperative 
agreement and awarded a portion of them as mini 
grants to communities for tobacco control. Because 
initial mini-grants were only $500, large nonprofits 
did not seek the funds, and instead, small minority 
communities generally applied for and used the money. Hargrove-Jupiter credited the mini-
grants for the CDC subsequently issuing an Impact Grant to the DHH, which the department 
used to establish its own program in 1993:  
We started the little mini-grant thing and the CDC loved it. That’s how we got the 
big Impact grant because they loved the idea, and saw how much we got 
from…small, little mini-grants.8 
The Department of Health and Hospitals formed the Louisiana Tobacco Control Program 
(LTCP) in 1993 after it received a grant from the CDC to develop its tobacco control efforts.9, 10 
The CDC offered the grant as part of its Initiatives to Mobilize for the Prevention and Control of 
Tobacco Use (IMPACT) program.9 The IMPACT program awarded small planning grants to 14 
states and the District of Columbia that lacked the needed structure to establish a tobacco control 
program, and larger core awards to 19 states (including Louisiana) that had a basic framework 
for a tobacco control program.9 The 32 states that the CDC provided IMPACT grants were those 
not selected to participate in the National Cancer Institute’s 1991 American Stop Smoking 
Intervention Study (ASSIST) program to evaluate the effectiveness of tobacco control advocacy 
to form tobacco control programs.11, 12  
To receive funding from the IMPACT program, DHH entered into a five-year 
cooperative agreement with the CDC. According to a biennial report to the US Congress on 
tobacco control activities from 1992-1993 by the CDC Office on Smoking and Health, that 
required: 
• Assisting and supporting local communities to mobilize tobacco prevention 
and control efforts, ensuring inclusiveness, diversity, and broad participation 
• Monitoring changes in tobacco-related behaviors, vital statistics, public 
opinion, policy, and environmental change, through a state-based surveillance 
system. 
• Assessing program performance, through an evaluation plan developed with 
CDC 
• Conducting tobacco prevention and control campaigns in cooperation with 
CDC 
The Department of Health and 
Hospitals formed the Louisiana 
Tobacco Control Program in 1993 
after it received a grant from the 
CDC to develop its tobacco 
control efforts.  
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• Developing resources, including a state-based resource center and an 800 toll-
free number, to provide information and training on effective tobacco 
prevention and control strategies.9 
 
The IMPACT program also required participating states to work with the CDC on national 
tobacco control campaigns.9  
Structure of the Louisiana Tobacco Control Program 
 
 The DHH had engaged in limited tobacco control work before the IMPACT grant but did 
not have an official tobacco control program. In 1993, the same year it received IMPACT funds, 
the DHH Office of Public Health (OPH) created the Tobacco Control Project under its Chronic 
Disease Control Program.13 By 1994, the DHH employed five full time staff and one part time 
employee for tobacco control efforts.14 Prior to receipt of the CDC IMPACT grant in 1993, the 
DHH had just one employee dedicated to tobacco control.14  That was Gladys Simmons, who 
served as Tobacco Control Coordinator at the DHH’s OPH.13 Diane Hargrove-Jupiter, who had 
been the Administrator of Health Communications at DHH,15 became Director of the new 
tobacco control program.8 
Early Programs and Focus  
 
 In 1993, the Chronic Disease Prevention Program (CDCP), overseen by the Office of 
Public Health in the Louisiana DHH, implemented the Nicotine Patch Distribution Project to 
distribute 60,000 donated nicotine replacement therapy patches from an unknown source free of 
charge for smokers attempting to quit.16, 17 The initiative used a survey to screen applicants for 
inclusion and required participants to volunteer at schools, health organizations, and medical 
facilities to receive their patches throughout a six week course of treatment.17 We could not find 
who inspired the program or who donated the nicotine patches it used.    
The Chronic Disease Control Program administered the Youth Tobacco Prevention 
Program (YTTP) at an unknown date “to educate and empower adolescents and communities on 
the hazards associated with tobacco use, so that they can make informed decisions to adopt 
smoke-free lifestyles and take action to protect their right to live in a tobacco-free 
environment.”18 Officials planned to use the YTPP to host conventions and trainings to assist and 
inform tobacco control efforts, develop and disseminate information and materials regarding 
tobacco, perform educational and community interventions, and send surveys to tobacco vendors 
to increase their awareness of how tobacco advertising influences minors. According to a Youth 
Tobacco Prevention Program brochure, the CDC also planned to form a state coalition to 
“address issues of youth tobacco prevention, countering tobacco advertisements, and promoting 
community education.”18  
 The DHH also requested materials from the Tobacco Institute’s We Card program19, 20 
and ultimately joined the program.20 Formed in 1995, We Card was the tobacco industry’s 
voluntary program nominally dedicated towards halting illegal sales of tobacco products to 
minors that the industry designed to deter adoption and enforcement of effective sales 
restrictions on tobacco products.21 We do not know why the DHH participated in the We Card 
program. 
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In 1997, the DHH conducted a months-long media and enforcement campaign designed 
to improve retailer compliance with minimum age of purchase laws brought about by the Synar 
Amendment,22 a federal law that tied state substance abuse grants to improving enforcement of 
minimum purchase age laws for tobacco products.  Prior to the effort, the DHH determined 
Louisiana retailers had a 73% 22, 23 violation rate of minimum age laws, risking $8 million in 
federal funds if the state did not lower infractions by 20% in four years (Chapter 7).22 The DHH 
campaign included compliance checks,24 print, radio, and television advertisements, as well as a 
letter to retailers by Louisiana’s governor,23  Murphy (Mike) Foster (R). The campaign helped 
reduced merchant violation rates 50% by February 1998.23 LTCP hosted a Youth Tobacco 
Prevention Summit in 2000.25 The LTCP also began providing free access to a tobacco quit-line 
starting in 2000 using $250,000 in funds from the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). The 
MSA was a settlement between state attorneys general and the tobacco companies after the 
former filed lawsuits to recover state Medicaid funding lost treating tobacco related illnesses 
(Chapter 9). The quitline was administered by the American Lung Association of Louisiana.26 
 
The LTCP also awarded grants to communities and groups to generate public support for 
tobacco prevention and spread awareness of the harm caused by tobacco products, similar to 
when the DHH engaged in cooperative agreements with the CDC before receiving its Impact 
Grant. The grants awarded by LTCP expanded from $500 to approximately $5000 at their 
height.8 Besides small communities, the LTCP awarded grants to the American Cancer Society, 
American Heart Association, American Lung Association and Girl Scouts among others.8 The 
grant program experienced funding issues but proved successful because of the dedication of 
grant recipients according to Diane Hargrove-Jupiter in a 2019 interview for this report: 
 
There were times when we would award grants and then we had to go back in the 
middle of the year to say, “well, we don’t have this money,” or “we can’t do it,” 
you know, if money was taken back or something like that. And they [grant 
recipients] would still do every deliverable plus more in their contract.8 
 
The LTCP grants to communities and other groups built a foundation for future tobacco control 
policy coalitions in 2003, 2006, and beyond (Chapters 10, 11 and 12).  
 
The LTCP Research and Evaluation Center  
 
The DHH’s Office of Public Health created the Louisiana Tobacco Control Program’s 
Research and Evaluation Center (LTCP-REC) in 1998 using CDC funds to evaluate and assist 
state-run tobacco control efforts in Louisiana.27 The LTCP-REC served as a resource center for 
tobacco control officials, medical providers, and the public.27 It used community outreach as well 
as telephone contacts to provide prevention information and cessation information and referrals. 
The LTCP-REC also provided information on pending bills and model policy for tobacco 
control, educational materials on tobacco, aid to health communication campaigns regarding 
tobacco, and technical assistance for planning, administering, and implementing community 
interventions.27 
The LTCP-REC conducted research as well as tobacco use prevention interventions using 
money, materials, programming, and partnerships with national government agencies and health 
voluntaries. It created targeted anti-tobacco messaging for African American Adults 18 to 24 
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years of age by holding focus groups with the Substance Abuse and Mental health Services 
Administration’s Center for Substance Abuse Prevention.27 The LTCP-REC also used an 
American Lung Association program “Teens Against Tobacco Use” as a school-based 
intervention to prevent tobacco use.27 The American Lung Association later sponsored the 
“Teens Against Tobacco Use Program, allowing the LTCP-REC to grow the program.27 We do 
not know when LTCP-REC stopped operating. 
Difficulties with the LTCP  
 
In 2002 tobacco control advocates 
formed the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Living (TFL), a nonprofit tobacco control 
program outside of the state government, 
because of technical, racial and political 
difficulties between them and the DHH’s 
Louisiana Tobacco Control Program. In a 2014 
interview for this report, former Coalition for a 
Tobacco-Free Louisiana Chairman Dr. Charles 
Brown, whose coalition advocated for tobacco 
control legislation and funding, stated that 
health advocates and lawmakers perceived the 
LTCP as “inept.”28 DHH officials had told 
former Secretary of Health Bobby Jindal that 
they did not need additional money for tobacco control although the agency had no dedicated 
state funds for such programming.28 At the time, lawmakers were considering how to use funds 
awarded to Louisiana from the MSA (Chapter 9). Governor Mike Foster (R) had recruited Jindal 
to provide recommendations for allocating Louisiana’s MSA money (Chapter 9). Dr. Brown 
recalled a conversation with Jindal about the LTCP rejecting tobacco control funding in a 2014 
interview for this report:  
 
Believe it or not, there were some people in the state health department that told 
Jindal they didn't need any more money. I told him what the facts were. He says, 
"Well, I don't understand. You're telling me that tobacco's such a terrible thing 
here. I get this stuff from the state health department. They can't do anything with 
it." I said… they don't know what they're talking about. It's the biggest health 
problem in the state. It's the biggest health problem in the world.28 
 
LTCP and advocates experienced tensions because of leadership and racial issues. 
According to LPHI CEO and former DHH Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Office of Public 
Health Joe Kimbrell in a 2014 interview for this report, advocates had a difficult relationship 
with LTCP Director Diane Hargrove-Jupiter: 
 
Diane used to report to me too, but when I was at the state health department. 
Diane [the LTCP director] was a bit of a control freak, and didn’t make 
coordination between them [tobacco control advocates] and us [the DHH and 
LTCP] the easiest thing in those early years.29 
 
In 2002 tobacco control advocates 
formed the Louisiana Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Living, a nonprofit 
tobacco control program outside of 
the state government, because of 
technical, racial and political 
difficulties between them and the 
DHH’s Louisiana Tobacco Control 
Program. 
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LTCP Director Hargrove-Jupiter did not recall having tensions with tobacco control advocates 
and felt she had a good relationship with them.8 She believed tension might have occurred 
between higher level staff at DHH and advocates, noting that one DHH secretary had a poor 
relationship with Kimbrell and did not want to issue grants to LPHI, the nonprofit he started after 
leaving the state agency. Hargrove-Jupiter reasoned in a 2019 interview for this report that her 
strong dedication to tobacco control might have upset advocates and created tensions through 
underlying racial dynamics: 
 
I was very passionate about this. And when people would tell me, “Well you have 
to do it this way, and you’re not going to get it done,” and I said, “Oh yes, I’m 
going to get it done,” I don’t think a lot of people had really witnessed or worked 
with somebody like that before. It was just, I think, people had never 
worked…with passionate people before. And you tend to work with people who 
are going to work with you. But you know you have to work with people who are 
not going to work with you—but when you start gathering those who will it just 
upsets the other race a lot.8 
 
Racial animosity limited the Louisiana Tobacco Control Program’s and tobacco control 
advocates’ relationship.  In a 2014 interview for this report, Dr. Charles Brown claimed that an 
unspecified LTCP official had used race to maintain her position and that the LTCP had failed to 
adequately help white Louisianans: 
 
They've got a lady there that has played the race card over and over and over 
again in order to stay in the position who hasn't got a clue as to how to run a 
tobacco control program unless you're black. I said most of the people that smoke 
in the state are white... But I said, you know, you can't do business that way. 
You've got to do it all over the state and you've got to do it for everybody.28 
 
In a 2019 interview for this report, Hargrove-Jupiter pushed back against claims her program 
was racially biased, reasoning that many communities besides minority communities avoided the 
small grants her department initially awarded: 
 
When you’re providing $500 little mini grants to different communities 
throughout the state, you’re not going to get very large nonprofits applying for 
that…. We only gave at first little $500 mini grants to little, small communities to 
try to do something, those were minority communities. Those other communities 
wouldn’t even take the time to do that….And maybe they say it because I was 
black, this is what we did. But I don’t see it that way.8 
 
We do not know if Brown’s sentiments regarding race were shared with other tobacco control 
advocates or DHH/LTCP officials at the time. During a 2014 interview for this report former 
TFL Director Rosalind Bello noted racial tension between the LTCP and TFL when they later 
aligned programming, possibly from their staffs’ racial composition: 
 
…I think there was a lot of history that we stepped into not really knowing what 
was going on. I think that there was even a lot of racial tensions that were there 
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because it seemed like at face value the state program was run by African 
Americans and the TFL program was run by white people.30  
  
Although not specified as a reason for pursuing a new tobacco control program in 2002, 
fear of meddling in DHH’s tobacco control programming by the government may have provided 
an incentive for the creation of a program not controlled by the state government. The governor 
determines leadership at the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals.31 Those appointees 
in turn place likeminded persons into other agency positions.31 The presence of governor-
appointed leaders in the DHH could influence the focus and priorities of the DHH.31 
 
Political influence from the Governor’s administration combined with technical 
difficulties and unstable funding, limited tobacco control efforts by the LTCP.31 Hargrove-
Jupiter stated in a 2019 interview for this report that “depending on who the governor was we 
weren’t allowed to do some things…we weren’t allowed to do best practices. That hindered our 
effort.”8 Hargrove-Jupiter also recalled LTCP contracts being awarded to grantees and then 
rescinded, and contracts either not being approved at the end of the year or not until the last day 
of their time period.8 Contracts would be delayed because of disagreements within DHH and the 
state on how to proceed with initiatives and more. According to Hargrove-Jupiter in a 2019 
interview for this report:  
 
That was one of my major difficulties. I couldn’t get our contract grants and 
contracts people in Baton Rouge to approve my contracts in enough time. I had to 
go back and forth, back and forth, go through a committee of people and they’re 
asking you why do you want to have this.8 
 
She added that: 
 
People don’t like you or they perceive that you’re not doing something, or 
somebody at the state level may have just said hold it back. You know, it was a 
lot of stuff like that. I just had to deal with it a majority of the time.8 
 
Former LTCP Program Manager Tiffany Netters (2007-2011)32 discussed how the Jindal 
Administration prioritized projects at the DHH and let others languish in a 2014 interview for 
this report: 
 
Administrative barriers, contract review committees sitting on peoples' desks...the 
system is set up for failure…the perception is that state workers don’t do 
anything, right? Like, they just sit around and—there’s nothing for you to 
do…they [leadership] set up processes where you can’t do anything. But if it’s a 
priority, you can see things—it’s very clear what things are priorities [of the 
Governor’s administration] and what aren’t because those things will move and 
there will be a lot of attention on it.31 
 
The technical, racial and political problems faced by the LTCP drove advocates and lawmakers 
to establish a new tobacco control program funded but not controlled by the state. 
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The LTCP’s failure to use the minimal MSA settlement money it received for tobacco 
control also strained tensions with health advocates. In Louisiana’s fiscal year 1999 budget, state 
lawmakers ultimately allocated $3 million out of $199 million in initial MSA payments to the 
DHH for tobacco control programming (Chapter 9). The DHH had secured the funding and 
developed a tobacco control plan for its use with assistance from the CTFLA. However, the 
DHH announced a $126 million deficit in December 2000 that resulted in a legislative committee 
forbidding the agency from implementing new initiatives and causing most of the $3 million for 
tobacco control programs to be reallocated.33 The DHH had not started the approval process for 
the tobacco control program despite CTFLA Chairman Brown’s urging, causing him to publicly 
chastise the agency for its inaction and blame them for the funding loss. Afterwards the DHH’s 
LTCP supposedly received $500,000 yearly for tobacco control.34 LTCP Director Diane 
Hargrove-Jupiter did not recall the state ever providing MSA funds to the LTCP in her 2019 
interview for this report.8 
 
A Second Tobacco Control Program: Formation of the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Living 
 
Advocates and Lawmakers Seek Funds for the LTCP in 2002 
 
 In 2002, inadequate tobacco control funding, programmatic issues at the LTCP, and 
difficulties between the agency and health advocates led Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana 
Chairman Charles Brown, health and 
tobacco control advocates, and Louisiana 
lawmakers to seek state funding for tobacco 
control programming outside of the 
Louisiana DHH (Figure 4.1). In a 2013 
interview for this report, CTFLA Chairman 
Brown recalled previously being instructed 
by an unnamed person to not obtain funding 
for the DHH because the LTCP was 
ineffective: 
 
I was told not to sponsor any legislation or get involved in passing any legislation 
[where] the money went through the Department of Health [and Hospitals] 
because they couldn't do it. They were inept…I was told not to promote any 
monies for the state tobacco control program because they did not know how to 
spend the money.35 
 
Dr. Brown also recalled that friendly lawmakers would not support funding going to the LTCP: 
 
I was told by several legislators that they would not under any circumstances 
appropriate any money for tobacco control to the state health department because 
they were inept.28 
 
Although Dr. Brown, health advocates, and lawmakers did not want to provide money to 
the LTCP, they wanted to avoid putting new revenue for tobacco control into the state general  
“I was told by several legislators that 
they would not under any 
circumstances appropriate any money 
for tobacco control to the state health 
department because they were inept.”  
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fund. According to former Louisiana Office of Public Health Deputy Assistant Secretary (1978-
2000) and LPHI CEO (2000-2018)36 Joe Kimbrell in a 2014 interview for this report, health 
advocates feared lawmakers would not allocate new funds to tobacco control: 
 
There was already a coalition, and it was that coalition and us that had been out 
there lobbying for it and I think Dr. Brown and others felt strongly that it 
[cigarette tax increase] wasn’t going to go to the state and risk getting chopped, 
because the state had never put any money into tobacco before.29 
 
 To secure revenue specifically for new tobacco control programming, tobacco control 
proponents collaborated with lawmakers, university officials and health advocates to push HB 
157 in 2002 (Chapter 11). HB 157 was a 12 cent cigarette tax increase sponsored by 
Representative Mitch Landrieu (D-New Orleans) mainly to fund a new cancer research center in 
New Orleans that would be jointly administered by LSU and Tulane University, but also 
allocated revenue towards tobacco control and other initiatives (Chapter 10). Later titled the 
Louisiana Cancer Research Consortium, the center was to improve cancer research and cancer-
related health care in Louisiana.28, 37 The center’s creation was mandated by SB 73, a bill 
sponsored by Senator John Hainkel (R-New Orleans) that passed earlier in the year but did not 
establish funding. 
 
Tobacco control advocates ultimately passed HB 157 despite efforts by the tobacco 
industry and Louisiana’s business community to defeat the bill, securing the first meaningful 
state funding for tobacco control in Louisiana (Chapter 11). As adopted, HB 157 increased the 
cigarette tax 12 cents per pack (Chapter 11). Tobacco control advocates secured 2 cents of the 
tax per pack for the Louisiana Cancer Research Consortium to develop and implement tobacco 
control programming (Chapter 11). Of the remaining 10 cents, HB 157 allocated 1 cent to the 
LSU Agricultural Center (and $1 million of that dedication to the Southern University 
Agricultural Research and Extension Service), 2 cents towards LSU’s Health Sciences Center in 
Shreveport, 1 cent to the DHH’s Office of Addictive Disorders, 1 cent to the DARE drug 
prevention program, and 2 cents to the state police.28, 38  
 
Figure 4.1: Timeline Depicting the Formation of The Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living 
Act 19 is adopted, 
requiring creation of 
nonprofit tobacco 
control program by 
LCRC
06/18/2002
The LCRC Board 
Establishes the TPCP  
Steering Committee 
to guide program 
formation
2002 or 2003
TPCP Steering 
Committee 
Recommends 
program design and 
recommends that 
LPHI administer the 
tobacco control 
program
The TPCP Steering 
Committee creates 
a Scientific Advisory 
Committee, to assist 
program 
development
LCRC executes 
three-year contract 
with LPHI
07/21/2003
LPHI launches the 
Louisiana Campaign 
for Tobacco-Free 
Living
03/23/2004
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After House Bill 157 passed, Brown received a letter he characterized as "very blistering" 
from Department of Health and Hospitals Undersecretary Jerry Phillips.39 As Brown recalled in a 
2014 interview for this report:  
 
I get this letter from the state health department telling me that I am a turncoat. 
Saying I am dishonest. That I have stolen from the state health department. I've 
done all these things because I took their money away.39 
 
The exchange was another instance of animosity between the LTCP and tobacco control 
advocates, which would manifest between the state’s program and the new nonprofit tobacco 
control program. Animosity persisted between the two programs until they began aligning their 
programming in late 2006, when a lack of resources and a desire for positive change wrought by 
Hurricane Katrina drove the two programs to reconcile.  
 
Forming a Nonprofit Tobacco Control Program  
 
With the Louisiana Cancer Research Consortium assigned responsibility over a new 
tobacco control program by the Tobacco Tax Healthcare Act, the LCRC Board formed the 
Tobacco Prevention and Cessation Program Steering Committee (TPCP) in either 2002 or 2003 
to guide program formation40 (Figure 4.1). According to the LCRC’s Annual Report from 2003, 
the LCRC Board formed the TPCP to achieve two objectives: 
 
The first was to create a framework for a tobacco use prevention and cessation 
program. The second was to supervise the implementation and administration of 
this program. The goal of TPCP is to develop and implement a high quality 
tobacco prevention and cessation program consistent with the best practices in 
tobacco control.40 
 
In choosing members of the Steering Committee, the LCRC Board invited public health 
researchers, public health officials, medical officials, and nonprofit health advocates from across 
the state to reflect Louisiana's diversity (Table 4.1).  
 
 In 2003, the TPCP created a Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) of experts from 
outside Louisiana to assist with program design and plans (Table 4.2). The TPCP and the TPCP 
SAC had their first joint meeting in early 2004.  
The Tobacco Prevention and Cessation Program Steering Committee began designing 
and establishing budgeting for implementation of the new tobacco control program in early 2003 
with assistance from the Louisiana Public Health Institute40 (LPHI had been formed in 1997 by 
DHH OPH Undersecretary Joe Kimbrell as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit with the mission of improving 
public health after the Louisiana Legislature passed a resolution supporting its creation.29, 41). 
From January 1, 2003 to June 30, 2003, LPHI also helped the TPCP design and maintain tobacco 
program modules .40  
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Chairman Dr. Charles Brown, and members Dr. Elizabeth Fontham, LPHI CEO Joseph 
Kimbrell, and DHH State Health Officer Jimmy Guidry sought to have the Louisiana Public 
Health Institute (LPHI) administer the program instead of the LCRC. In a 2014 interview for  
this report, Brown recalled recommending that LPHI administer the new tobacco control 
program: 
Table 4.1: TPCP Steering Committee Membership and Professional Expertise as of December 31, 
200340 
Charles L. Brown, Jr., MD (Chair) 
 
Professor of Clinical Public Health 
Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center 
Vladimir Appeaning, PhD 
 
Director of Special Projects & Community Rel. 
Asst. Prof., Grambling State University 
Denise Bottcher, BA 
 
Representative for Louisiana University System, The 
Bottcher Group 
Michael K. Butler, MD, MHA, CPE Chief Medical Officer, Health Care Services Division 
Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center 
Theodore B. Callier 
 
Assistant Vice President, Research and Sponsored 
Programs 
Dillard University 
Tom Farley, MD, MPH 
 
Professor and Department Chair 
Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical 
Medicine 
Elizabeth T. H. Fontham, PhD Professor and Chairman, School of Public Health 
Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center 
Donna Nola Ganey 
 
Assistant Superintendent 
State Department of Education 
Jimmy Guidry, M. D. 
 
State Health Officer / Medical Director 
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals 
Carolyn Johnson, Ph. D., N.C.C., L.P.C. 
 
Clinical Associate Professor 
Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical 
Medicine 
Kathleen Kennedy, Pharm D 
 
Associate Dean, College of Pharmacy 
Xavier University of Louisiana 
Jerry W. McLarty, PhD 
 
Professor of Medicine & Director, Cancer Prevention 
and Control 
Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center-
Shreveport 
Robyn Merrick, MPA, BS 
 
Director, Public Affairs, Southern University System 
President’s Office 
Tom Houston, MD (Ex Officio)* 
 
TPCP Director & Jim Finks Chair 
Louisiana Public Health Institute & 
Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center 
Sarah Moody Thomas, Ph. D. (Ex-Officio)* 
 
Professor Stanley S. Scott Cancer Center 
Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center 
Joseph D. Kimbrell, MA, LCSW (Ex-
Officio)* 
 
Chief Executive Officer, Louisiana Public Health 
Institute 
Rachel Shada, MHR, BA (Ex-Officio)* 
 
Associate Director of Tobacco Programs, Louisiana 
Public Health Institute 
*Became officials of TFL or worked at LPHI. 
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I made a proposal to the Louisiana Cancer Research Consortium as to how we 
ought to do this. And I made two recommendations. First recommendation I made 
to the Louisiana Cancer Research Consortium was this tobacco control program 
(TFL), which is basically the outline of what we're doing now.  
 
I said the second thing is that because of the fact that it needs to be non-
provincial, it needs to be statewide. Neither of the two schools (LSU and Tulane) 
have an infrastructure that can do this. I recommend that it be done by the 
Louisiana Public Health Institute. And they approved. So that's how all that got 
started.28  
 
The TPCP Steering Committee recommended to the LCRC Board that the Louisiana 
Public Health Institute (LPHI) administer the new Louisiana Tobacco Prevention and Cessation 
Program (LTPCP) through a three-year renewable contract with the LCRC,40 which was 
executed on July 21, 2003 .28 
 
In Louisiana, state law prohibited the legislature from appropriating money to a non-state 
organization, preventing LPHI from directly receiving Tobacco Tax Healthcare Fund revenue 
dedicated to tobacco control programming.28 To allocate the specified 2 cents from the Tobacco 
Tax Healthcare Fund (HB 157) to the new tobacco control program, dedicated monies went 
through Louisiana State University to the nonprofit Louisiana Cancer Research Consortium that 
LSU jointly administered with Tulane University (Figure 4.2).28  
In late July 2003, LPHI selected Rachel Shada to act as its Associate Director for 
Tobacco Programs. Before becoming associate director, Shada had helped develop the formal 
working arrangement between LCRC and LPHI and designed budgeting for the new tobacco 
control program.40  
Table 4.2: Scientific Advisory Committee in 200340 
John Pierce, PhD Sam Walton Professor for Cancer Research University of California, San 
Diego Cancer Center 
K. Michael Cummings, PhD, MPH Chair, Department of Health Behavior 
Division of Cancer Prevention and Population Sciences Roswell Park 
Cancer Institute 
Greg Connolly, DMD, MPH Professor, Harvard University School of Public Health (former Director 
of the Mass. State Tobacco Control Program) 
Colleen Stevens 
 
Director of Media Services, Tobacco Control Branch California 
Department of Health Services 
Sherri Watson-Hyde, MPH Director, National African American Tobacco Control Network 
Karla Sneegas, MPH 
 
Director, Indiana Tobacco Prevention and Cessation Program 
Brick Lancaster, MPH 
 
Chief, Program Services Branch, Office on Smoking and Health, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta GA 
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The LTPCP Steering Committee and LPHI 
later appointed Dr. Thomas Houston to lead the new 
tobacco control program on October 1, 2003.42 
Houston had been the national director of Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation SmokeLess States 
National Tobacco Policy Initiative since 1993. 
Houston had moved to Louisiana after being 
recruited by the Louisiana State University Health 
Sciences Center School (LSUHSC) to join the LSU 
faculty as the Jim Finks Chair in Health Promotion 
at the School of Public Health.  
Kimbrell (LPHI), Brown (LSUHSC), and LCRC President/CEO Steve Moye, (LCRC), 
capitalized on having Houston close to New Orleans by offering him the directorship of the 
LTPCP. The 2003 LPHI press release announcing that Dr. Houston would head the LTPCP 
highlighted how the hire strengthened LPHI and LSU’s relationship:  
LPHI and LSU identified an opportunity for synergy and partnership in bringing 
someone of Dr. Houston’s caliber to Louisiana to serve as a leader in health 
promotion and tobacco control. This is the first of many similar partnerships 
between LTPCP and the program partners across the state.42 
The Louisiana Public Health Institute branded the LTPCP as the Louisiana Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Living (TFL) and launched the program on March 23, 2004. LPHI staff ran 
administered statewide implementation and evaluation of the nonprofit program.43 As it became 
more established, TFL facilitated  statewide coordination of existing tobacco control initiatives, 
gave funding for innovative community programming for tobacco control, implemented a 
statewide media campaign, administered a state hospital system cessation program, and provided 
 
Figure 4.2: Flow of Tobacco Tax Revenue to TFL28 
Treasury 
Department
•Treasury Department provides the 2 cents dedicated to forming and 
implementing a tobacco control program from the Tobacco Tax 
Healthcare Fund to Louisiana State University
Louisiana State 
University
•Louisiana State University provides the 2 cents to the LCRC, a nonprofit 
jointly established by LSU and  Tulane University
Louisiana Cancer 
Research Center
•The LCRC provides the 2 cents to the Louisiana Public Health Institute 
through a contract to develop and administer a tobacco control program
Louisiana Public 
Health Institute
•LPHI uses the 2 cents to fund and administer the Louisiana Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Living
The Louisiana Public Health 
Institute branded the LTPCP 
as the Louisiana Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Living and 
launched the program on 
March 23, 2004 
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monitoring and evaluation of tobacco program impacts and outcomes.43 TFL became the largest 
funded program within LPHI for many years.29  
 
Structure of Tobacco-Free Living  
 
The LTPCP Steering committee and TFL staff designed TFL using the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Best Practices for Tobacco Control Programs, August 
1999 report.44, 45 The LTPCP Steering Committee and TFL employees established program 
coordination, community initiatives and statewide coordination, media campaigns, quit programs 
in public hospitals, and program monitoring and evaluation as TFL’s five components.44 During 
his first year as Program Director, Houston expected that an average $7.5 million annually from 
the Tobacco Tax Healthcare Fund (the associated tax generated $45 million in FY 2003, Chapter 
11)   would be spent on "tobacco cessation programs, education and grants to parishes for 
community-based programs that address specific needs"46 across Louisiana.  
 
As part of the LCRC, TFL resided in New Orleans. Dr. Charles Brown and LPHI CEO 
Joe Kimbrell sought to prevent TFL from becoming a provincially focused program in New 
Orleans by placing regional coordinators in the DHH’s nine Office of Public Health (OPH) 
offices.29, 35, 44 The OPH did not oversee the DHH’s LTCP, which had a contentious relationship 
with Brown and other tobacco control advocates. Kimbrell asked Sharon G. Howard, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the DHH’s Office of Public Health, if the OPH would house TFL regional 
coordinators in their district offices (Figure 4.3 and Table 4.3).29  Howard had previously worked 
with him at DHH, and became the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Office of Public Health in 
2003 after Kimbrell vacated that position to develop LPHI. Howard accepted Kimbrell’s 
proposal,29 conserving funds for community programs and local activities.29 TFL had recruited 
and placed nine regional coordinators in DHH Office of Public Health offices by February 
2005.44 
 
TFL’s centralized leadership and regional coordinators designed and implemented 
tobacco control programming across Louisiana. TFL leadership guided coordinator activities and 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Louisiana's Regional Districts47 
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led state and local tobacco policy campaigns, while Regional Coordinators planned and 
implemented regional tobacco control activities. TFL promoted regional coordinators to 
Regional Managers in 2012,48 providing them greater autonomy over decision-making and 
policy advocacy within their areas (Table 4.4).  TFL delegation of political advocacy to Regional 
Managers resulted in policy successes, including smokefree ordinances in Monroe, West 
Monroe, and Ouachita Parish (Chapter 13). 
 
Tobacco Control Programming in 
Louisiana Following Creation of TFL 
 
TFL and the DHH’s LTCP initially 
did not coordinate tobacco control efforts. 
Previous animosity between prominent 
TFL backers and DHH officials, as well as 
dedication of Tobacco Tax Healthcare Act 
funds to TFL instead of the LTCP, resulted 
in lingering tensions and animosity 
between the two programs.  
 
LTCP Programming 
 
The LTCP launched its Breathe 
Easy Bayou campaign in 2003 to inform 
Louisianans about the harmful effects of secondhand smoke and encourage tobacco users to 
smoke away from others.50 LTCP created the initiative after focus groups found the public 
considered secondhand smoke an annoyance but was largely unaware of its negative health 
impacts.50 Modeled on CDC Best Practices, the initiative operated on a $250,000 budget and ran 
newspaper and radio advertisements imploring tobacco users to segregate themselves from 
others when smoking.50 Campaign messaging attacked secondhand smoke but not tobacco users, 
and did not advocate for secondhand smoke restrictions or policies.  We could not determine the 
end date or success of the Breathe Easy Bayou campaign.  
 
The LTCP continued awarding community grants as it had done since its inception in 
2003. LTCP used the program to teach advocacy and education practices to their grantees.51 
Table 4.3: Regional District Offices and Parishes Served  
1 Jefferson Parishes, Orleans, Plaquemines and Saint Bernard 
2 Ascension, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberville, Livingston, Pointe Coupee, West Baton Rouge 
and West Feliciana Parishes 
3 Assumption, Lafourche, Saint Charles, Saint James, Saint John and Terrebonne Parishes 
4 Acadia, Evangeline, Iberia, Lafayette, Saint Landry, St. Martin, Saint Mary and Vermilion Parishes 
5 Allen, Beauregard, Calcasieu, Cameron and Jefferson Davis Parishes 
6 Avoyelles, Catahoula, Concordia, Grant, LaSalle, Natchitoches, Rapides, Sabine, Winn and Vernon 
Parishes 
7 Bossier, Bienville, Caddo, Claiborne, DeSoto, Red River and Webster Parishes 
8 Caldwell, East Carroll, Franklin, Jackson, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, Ouachita, Richland, Tensas, 
Union and West Carroll Parishes 
9 Saint Tammany, Saint Helena, Tangipahoa and Washington Parishes, 
Table 4.4: TFL Staff Leadership Structure Following 2012 
Staffing Expansion48, 49 
Position Location 
Director  New Orleans 
Associate Director New Orleans 
Cessation Coordinator New Orleans 
Communications Manager New Orleans 
Program Coordinators (2), Youth and 
Young Adults 
New Orleans 
TFL Regional Manager 1 New Orleans 
TFL Regional Manager 2 Baton Rouge 
TFL Regional Manager 3 Thibodaux   
TFL Regional Manager 4 Lafayette 
TFL Regional Manager 5 Lake Charles 
TFL Regional Manager 6 Alexandria  
TFL Regional Manager 7 Shreveport 
TFL Regional Manager 8 Monroe 
TFL Regional Manager 9 Mandeville 
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Grants were given to both city-based and rural community groups, creating a tobacco control 
base in rural areas where health voluntaries, which were generally based in cities, were usually 
underrepresented.51 
 
LPHI and TFL approached LTCP grant recipients and taught them about political 
outreach to elected officials using the advocacy and educational foundations created by the 
DHH’s program.51 According to LTCP Director Diane Hargrove-Jupiter in a 2019 interview for 
this report, her department’s community grant program provided a model for TFL’s future 
community grant efforts: 
 
LPHI and TFL seemed to get together when a lot of the groundwork had already 
been established by us. And it made it so much easier for them to come in, you 
know, and look at what was done that worked and didn't work for us. And then, 
you know, they were -- they came…on the ground running because they saw 
when it happened…all those years prior with us.8 
 
In a 2019 interview for this report, LPHI Policy Manager Eric Vicks credited the DHH and 
Hargrove-Jupiter’s efforts on community programs for enabling the formation of a tobacco 
control coalition that partially repealed smoking preemption in 2003 and secured state-level 
clean air law that fully lifted preemption and protected public health in 2006 (Chapter 10): 
 
When I came on board, I was told we had a statewide coalition. And what that 
really was is that we had health voluntary leadership who brought it in, and they 
had statewide networks, but we didn’t have a coalition. So I had to go out and try 
to find organizations that were supportive and then find out what the buy in would 
be for working with us on the preemption repeal….and her [Hargrove-Jupiter] 
having fully-formed organization[s] was extremely influential in allowing us to 
move forward quickly.51 
 
Vicks claimed that repealing preemption of local smoking restrictions would have taken longer if 
the community groups developed by the LTCP’s grant programs had not existed.51 
 
TFL Programming 
 
Communities of Color Network 
 
Louisiana has a large African-American 
population, and by the mid-late 2000s had the 
second highest rate of African American smokers 
among states.52 In 2004 TFL created the 
Communities of Color Network (CoC) in 
partnership with the Louisiana Tobacco Control 
Program and the Southern University Agricultural 
Research and Extension Center (SUAREC) as a 
grassroots advocacy initiative to combat tobacco-
related health inequalities in minority 
“LPHI and TFL seemed to get 
together when a lot of the 
groundwork had already been 
established by us. And it made it 
so much easier for them to come 
in, you know, and look at what 
was done that worked and didn't 
work for us.”  
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communities.44, 53, 54  Participation in tobacco control efforts by Southern University had been 
required in the Tobacco Tax Healthcare Act, the legislation mandating the creation of tobacco 
control programming in 2002 (Chapter 11).54 In 2004, two CoC programs were started at 
Grambling State University and at Southern University in Baton Rouge.44 The Communities of 
Color network responsibilities later included developing and fortifying clean air policies in 
minority communities.54 One of TFL’s first programs, the CoC network remained active as of 
2020 operating in 43 parishes across Louisiana.54   
Health Communications Campaign 
 
TFL launched its first health communications campaign in 2004 using television and 
radio advertisements to educate the public on the dangers of tobacco products and secondhand 
smoke, and to promote cessation.55 The campaign aired television and radio ads for three months 
starting on March 29, 2004 in the Baton Rouge, Lafayette, New Orleans, and Shreveport 
markets. In the second half of 2004, television and radio ads expanded onto programming for 
collegiate and professional sports.55 The ads increased quitline use during the campaign’s run.55 
Louisiana Public Hospital Cessation Program 
 
In 2005, before aligning programming with LTCP, TFL implemented the Louisiana 
Public Hospital Cessation Program (LPHCP) to evaluate and establish cessation services within 
the state’s ten public hospitals.56 The system handled 70% of uninsured Louisianans, whom TFL 
expected were suffering more from chronic illnesses and higher rates of tobacco use.56 TFL 
conducted a survey in January 2005 of 780 patients to determine their overall prevalence, 
smoking behavior, and desire to quit to develop effective cessation services.56 TFL also surveyed 
public hospitals to determine their cessation service capacity.56  These data indicated that 
hospitals in the LPHCP needed cessation services staff, and shaped the quit assistance offered to 
patients at those medical facilities.56 
As part of LPHCO, TFL hired eleven tobacco cessation employees across nine of 
Louisiana’s public hospitals to offer quit assistance to patients.56 Cessation aid provided by 
LPHCP cessation workers included tobacco use assessment, nicotine replacement therapy, and 
counseling. LPHCP also tailored interventions to reach patients serving prison sentences or 
suffering from diabetes, lung cancer, HIV, or cardiac disease. Five participating hospitals offered 
standardized cessation assistance, while three provided “service delivery procedures” according 
to a 2004-2005 Annual Report from TFL. It appears that TFL and LSU’s Tobacco Control 
Initiative replaced the LPHCP in Louisiana’s public hospital system by 2006.57 
State Quitline 
  
TFL provided a free quitline for Louisianans from April 2004 to June 2005 via a contract 
with the American Lung Association (ALA) and promoted its use in the TFL media campaign56 
(The LTCP had previously provided Louisianans access to a tobacco quitline in 2001 via a 
contract with the American Lung Association.58) TFL subsequently issued a request for 
proposals to find a new quitline provider, and selected the American Cancer Society to replace 
the ALA beginning in June 2005.56  
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Rivals to Allies: Programmatic Alignment of LTCP and TFL  
 
Leadership Changes at LTCP 
  
In 2004 or 2005, the DHH transferred LTCP Director Diane Hargrove-Jupiter to its 
department handling emergency preparedness.8 The transfer happened after she had spent over a 
decade working in tobacco control on behalf of the state. In a 2019 interview for this report, 
Hargrove-Jupiter partially blamed her close ties to the LTCP’s community grant recipients for 
her forced transfer at the DHH: 
I just felt like they felt that I had too much community control, that the partners 
trusted me too much. Anything that I said you know – because even in applying 
for money from other groups, they would call me and say “Diane, is this a good 
thing to do? You know, what do you think about this?” And depending on what I 
said they would move. And I think administration had gotten wind of that…they 
actually moved me out of my position because of that.8 
 
Hargrove-Jupiter also blamed politics for her ouster, saying that her desire to pursue policies and 
programming not desired by the state administration at the time, as well as politicians’ 
receptiveness to tobacco industry contributions, made her a target for removal.8  She stated in a 
2019 interview for this report: 
They were trying all kinds of ways to stop me on preemption [smoking restriction 
preemption repeal, Chapter 10], you know. It leaves a whole lot of things we [the 
LTCP] couldn’t do. And you know, I kept saying “Well, that’s the best practice. 
We’ve got to focus on youth.” And so I’m telling you it depends on who the 
governor was. And they were taking a lot of money from tobacco lobbyists and 
stuff like that. So when your own group is telling you not to do something the best 
thing to do was just to quiet me.8 
Hargrove-Jupiter’s transition occurred before LTCP and TFL attempted to merge programming, 
removing a polarizing figurehead for some tobacco control advocates from the alignment 
process. 
Hurricane Katrina Catalyzes Change 
  
 In 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated Louisiana.59 The federal government’s slow 
response coupled with an unreliable and unstable levee system heightened the severity of 
damage in the hurricane’s aftermath.60 Hurricane Katrina caused over $100 billion in damage,60 
displaced over 1 million Gulf Coast residents,61  and killed 1,100-1,800 people across the Gulf  
Coast region,62, 63 including 986 Louisianans. Approximately 80% of TFL’s home city, New 
Orleans, flooded.61   
 On August 28, 2005, then- New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin ordered an emergency 
evacuation of New Orleans.60 As a result, members of LPHI’s  tobacco control program 
evacuated.30 According to TFL Community Program Manager Rosalind Bello in a 2014 
interview for this report, “almost all the top leadership for the entire organization [LPHI] sort of 
got dispersed. People evacuated out. Some people evacuated to Ohio, to Atlanta, to other places, 
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and then just decided to stay.”30 In particular, TFL Director Tom Houston and LPHI Deputy 
Director Delmonte Jefferson resigned and left Louisiana to live in Ohio and Georgia.   
Displacement of LPHI personnel by Hurricane Katrina left a leadership vacuum that 
allowed Rosalind Bello and Ashley Ross to assume key leadership positions in TFL. Originally 
hired as a Program Coordinator for LPHI’s Make Yours a Fresh Start Family program in August 
2005, Bello became the Community Program Manager for TFL that oversaw regional 
coordinators.30, 64 Ashley Ross, who LPHI hired only months after Hurricane Katrina,30 became 
the Director for Tobacco-Free Living in 2006.64  
During a 2013 interview for this report with LTCP program director Brandi Bourgeois, 
she revealed how the challenging situation created by Hurricane Katrina benefitted tobacco 
control efforts in Louisiana:   
[Hurricane] Katrina was the vehicle of change that the state needed in order to 
revamp tobacco [control] efforts in the state. It was the primary reason for the 
programmatic alignment process with LTCP and TFL. It has made tobacco 
[control] efforts more comprehensive and collaborative.65 
In a 2014 interview for this report, TFL Community Program Manager Rosalind Bello 
reasoned that TFL’s new personnel allowed for a change in the program’s antagonistic 
relationship with LTCP: 
There was just kind of this natural attrition. But at the same time I think that was 
really good in a way. It was beneficial because… there were some challenges, 
relationship barriers that had developed prior to the storm [Hurricane Katrina] that 
existed a little bit after the storm but were able to be worked through with new 
people in place.30 
Staffing changes at LPHI and its tobacco control 
program cleared a path for initial efforts between TFL 
and LTCP to align programming. After Hurricane 
Katrina devastated Louisiana and its state government’s 
resources in 2005, new and remaining TFL and LTCP 
officials maximized limited and broadly distributed 
tobacco control resources by programmatically aligning. 
LTCP and TFL Align Programming 
 
In 2006, health officials decided to help TFL and 
LTCP overcome major programmatic, logistic, and 
funding challenges created by Hurricane Katrina and 
bolster tobacco control in Louisiana by aligning the two 
programs’ efforts.66 Previously, TFL and LTCP worked 
separately from one another other and did not effectively communicate.66 The LTCP and TFL 
viewed programmatic alignment as a method to reduce weaknesses and increase program reach 
and effectiveness.66   
 
In 2006, health officials 
decided to help TFL and LTCP 
overcome major 
programmatic, logistic, and 
funding challenges created by 
Hurricane Katrina and bolster 
tobacco control in Louisiana 
by aligning the two programs’ 
efforts.  
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 Lingering tensions between TFL and LTCP threatened programmatic alignment. In a 
2014 interview for this report, Rosalind Bello recalled experiencing the strain between TFL and 
the LTCP and the process of overcoming it when she started as the Program Manager of regional 
coordinators (since 2012 known as regional managers) at TFL in 2006.30  She stated that TFL 
staff appeared to be predominantly white while LTCP staff seemed to be primarily African 
American, causing “racial tension.” Bello reasoned the differences in racial composition made 
grant recipients, who were primarily African American, suspicious of TFL and felt previous TFL 
leadership had not adequately developed trust with the grantees. She also claimed there had been 
past issues between the programs that new TFL staff were not aware off.  
 
Tiffany Netters, who was an LTCP Program Manager from 2007-201132 also recalled 
tension between LTCP and TFL in a 2014 interview for this report: 
 
I know when I came in…my second day on the job was a group meeting between 
DHH and LPHI TFL to work better together. There was lots of tension, there was 
name-calling; it was a nightmare, and I felt like I was birthed into that.31  
To overcome animosity and improve tobacco control in Louisiana, at LTCP’s initiative,67 
in 2006 LTCP and TFL hired the Emory University Tobacco Technical Assistance Consortium 
(TTAC)  to mediate discussion and collaboration on strategic planning across programs.68 
TTAC, led by its consultant Deborah Morris, helped the programs develop a joint evaluation 
plan including “agreed upon long-term, intermediate and short-term outcome objectives that 
allow for both programs to work towards common [but not equal] targets for all four program 
goals.”68  
Programmatic alignment came in a three-phases grounded in CDC 2007 Best Practices 
guidelines for state tobacco control programs.66, 69 During the first phase from December 2006 to 
September 2007, the LTCP and TFL coordinated programming and developed similar anti-
tobacco messaging. According to Tiffany Netters in a 2014 interview for this report, the 
vulnerability of the LTCP to politics influenced decision making during the program alignment 
process: 
Working with TTAC, looking at the programs and projects that were best 
practices and some of the things that we can implement, we would look at each 
thing and say, will TFL fund it wholly, will we divide the cost, or will the state do 
that? 
At one point we got to a place where because the governor and our administration 
was so heavy down upon us of not getting to the advocacy — there were new 
policies pushed down about what we could and could not say — we [LTCP] said, 
well, they like cessation, so the tobacco control program will work on the 
cessation delivery, the health care part.31 
To assist programmatic alignment, TFL and LTCP participated in Communities of 
Excellence Plus Model trainings by TTAC.70 The program consists of three trainings designed to 
strengthen local-level work by tobacco control programs.71 The first training in September 2009 
taught attendees how to jointly develop a regional tobacco control policy plan, bolster regional 
policies to change attitudes towards tobacco use, and to discern methods to engage communities 
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in tobacco control efforts.  The second training in March 2010 sought to educate participants on 
group techniques to influence policy, utilization of power analyses to guide policy campaigns, 
and determine methods to increase participation in tobacco control efforts by coalition members. 
We did not find information on the third Communities of Excellence training during 
programmatic alignment.  
The final structure of TFL and LTCP’s 
alignment resulted from a combination of financial 
and political factors, as well as the recognition by 
those involved in the planning process of each 
program’s strengths and weaknesses. TFL assumed 
responsibility for community engagement programs, 
community policy advocacy programs, tobacco policy 
advocacy, and statewide tobacco projects, while the 
LTCP focused on public education.72 TFL’s regional 
subcommittees oversaw local programming by LTCP 
and TFL grant recipients.72 TFL and LTCP 
collaborated on cessation and health communications, 
forming the joint cessation services brand Quit With 
Us LA and jointly funding the state’s quitline. TFL administered separate advocacy campaigns to 
influence state and local tobacco control policy. 
According to Carrie Monica, TFL Policy Manager from 2007 to 2012, in a 2014 
interview for this report: 
You know, TFL, because it received this substantial amount of resources through 
the tobacco tax, had the ability to do a little bit more in terms of staffing and 
programmatic initiatives than the Tobacco Prevention and Control program 
[LTCP] under the Department of Health and Hospitals. 
And so we also realized, though, that there were things that they were doing 
really, really well, and there were things that we were doing really, really well, 
and it just naturally made sense for us to play a role in a little bit more than it did 
for them. Because at the end of the day, they're a department under government. 
They still take their direction from their head and from, quite frankly, the 
[political] leadership in the state. 
So it made sense for us [TFL] to -- if there was something we felt strongly about 
as a coalition [tobacco control and health advocates, health voluntaries], we could 
work closely with the coalition in a way that maybe they couldn't half of the time. 
And so we were able to find this really great balance, and alignment, a natural fit 
for their resources and for what their capacity was. And based on their own 
limitations, too.73 
LTCP and TFL were maintaining the strategy developed with assistance from TTAC and 
aligning and coordinating their programming as of 2020. Program alignment and coordination 
strengthened the ability of tobacco control officials and advocates to impact the public despite a 
poor history of funding for tobacco control programs in Louisiana.  
The final structure of TFL and 
LTCP’s alignment resulted from 
a combination of financial and 
political factors, as well as the 
recognition by those involved 
in the planning process of each 
program’s strengths and 
weaknesses. 
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Funding and Expenditures for Tobacco Control Programs in Louisiana 
 
Despite generating millions in revenue from tobacco products and the MSA annually, 
Louisiana has dedicated little of that money to tobacco control programming. From 1993 (the 
start of the LTCP) to 2001, before passage of the Tobacco Tax Healthcare Act, Louisiana 
received between $72 million to $92 million annually in cigarette tax revenue, none of which 
went to tobacco control programming. Beginning in 1999, Louisiana began receiving over $100 
million annually in MSA payments (Table 4.5). While a portion of money from MSA generated 
funds went to health programming, minimal amounts went to tobacco control (Chapter 9). 
Louisiana lawmakers dedicated approximately $500,000 to the LTCP in 2001 (Chapter 9) and 
possibly that amount in subsequent years (Chapter 9), although former LTCP Director Diane 
Hargrove-Jupiter does not recall her program receiving said money.8 Cigarette tax revenue 
increased significantly After the Tobacco Tax Healthcare Act passed in 2002 (Chapter 11) and 
increased the rate per pack by 12¢ (from 24¢ to 36¢; Table 4.5). A 2¢ tobacco control dedication 
in that tax led to TFL’s formation and its continued financing, providing the first significant and 
recurring state dedication for tobacco control programming in Louisiana (Chapter 11). 
Louisiana’s cigarette tax would later increase in 2015 (from 36¢ to 86¢) and 2016 (from 86¢ to 
$1.08 a pack) but none of the new revenue went towards tobacco control (Chapter 11).  
 
Despite increasing revenues, Louisiana failed to 
improve tobacco control spending and fell drastically 
short of funding targets specified in the CDC’s 1999, 
2007 and 2014 Best Practices for Comprehensive 
Tobacco Control Programs reports (Table 4.6). 
 
We relied on the CDC State Tobacco Activities 
Tracking and Evaluation System (STATE) database to 
retrieve funding information for LTCP and TFL since 
we were unable to obtain financial records from either 
program. Before passage of the Tobacco Tax Healthcare 
Act in 2002, funding for tobacco control programs in 
Louisiana came almost entirely from the federal 
government (Table 4.7).  
 
Initial funds provided for tobacco use prevention and cessation activities were low, with 
DHH receiving tobacco control funding no greater than $250,000 from 1994-1998 through 
cooperative agreements and grants for the LTCP and tobacco control activities (Table 4.7) From 
1999-2002 Louisiana received between $1.2 million and $1.9 million annually for tobacco 
control, except for $5.1 million in 2000. After Louisiana lawmakers adopted the Tobacco Tax 
Healthcare Act in 2002, tobacco control programs received $9 to $12.5 million annually in total 
federal, state and third-party funding from 2003-2016 (Table 4.7). During that time, all federal 
funds went to the LTCP while practically all state funds (in particular the recurring 2¢ tax 
dedication from the Tobacco Tax Healthcare Act) went to TFL 
 
Periodic funding also came from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, although we do 
not know which programs received the funds and in what years (Table 4.7). We are unable to  
From 1993 (the start of the 
LTCP) to 2001, before 
passage of the Tobacco Tax 
Healthcare Act, Louisiana 
received between $72 million 
to $92 million annually in 
cigarette tax revenue, none 
of which went to tobacco 
control programming. 
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Table 4.5: Tobacco Generated Revenues in Louisiana and State Dedications to Tobacco Control (Chapter 6)(Chapter 11)74-81 
Fiscal 
Year 
Tax Increases Cigarette Tax 
Revenue**+ 
Total 
Tobacco 
Taxes**# 
Percentage 
of 
Cigarette 
Tax as Part 
of Total 
Tax 
MSA*** Total 
Revenue 
Generated 
in 
millions* 
Total State 
Funds 
Appropriated 
for Tobacco 
Control in 
Millions** 
To
ba
cc
o 
Ta
x 
Ra
te
s B
ef
or
e 
19
90
 
Cigarettes: 16¢ per pack 
Cigars Invoiced at $120 or 
Less Per 1000 by 
Producer: 8% of Invoice 
Price 
Cigars Invoiced at $120 or 
More Per 1000 by 
Producer: 20% of Invoice 
Price 
Loose Leaf: 33% of 
Invoice Price 
Smokeless: None 
Nicotine E-fluid: None 
1990 Cigarette tax increase (by 4¢, to 
20¢ per pack) 
$72,032,677 -- -- -- $72.0 0 
1991 -- $87,348,058 -- -- -- $87.3 0 
1992 -- $91,292,885 -- -- -- $91.3 0 
1993 -- $89,290,089 -- -- -- $89.3 0 
1994 -- $89,130,616 -- -- -- $89.1 0 
1995 -- $90,984,645 -- -- -- $91.0 0 
1996 -- $93,307,155 -- -- -- $93.3 0 
1997 -- $91,444,720 -- -- -- $91.4 0 
1998 -- $89,524,589 $87,198107 103% -- $87.2 0 
1999 -- $87,825,340 $85,440,744 103% $104,189,880 $189.6 0 
2000 Cigarette tax increase (by 4¢, to 
24 ¢ per pack). Smokeless Tax 
adopted (20% of invoice price). 
$92,298,895 $89,643730 
103% 
$129,755,834 $219.4 $4.0 
2001 - $83,853,634 $96,582,533 87% $136,986,551 $233.6 $0.5 
2002 Cigarette tax increase (by 12¢, 
to 36¢ per pack) 
$103,986,444 $128,520,949 
80% 
$156,228,530 $284.7 $0.5 
2003 -- $117,925,428 $112,753,725 92% $130,737,533 $243.5 $8.0 
2004 -- $138,379,626 $145,582,290 95% $141,771,636 $287.4 $10.7 
2005 -- $147,663,445 $149,131,187 99% $143,779,092 $292.9 $11.3 
2006 -- $125,960,220 $137,750,588 91% $131,547,670 $269.3 $8.0 
2007 -- $133,781,330 $147,729,802 91% $136,903,584 $284.6 $8.0 
2008 -- $135,854,712 $146,251,276 93% $160,626,242 $306.9 $7.7 
2009 -- $131,009,400 $147,169,358 89% $175,503,257 $322.7 $7.6 
2010 -- $120,075,428 $136,515,428 88% $146,822,830 $283.3 $7.8 
2011 -- $128,614,885 $142,792,640 90% $138,518,654 $281.3 $9.0 
2012 -- $118,425,474 $135,698,482 87% $141,240,460 $276.9 $9.0 
2013 -- $121,234,140 $135,632,847 89% $211,047,094 $346.7 $7.2 
2014 -- $108,343,080 $143,100,904 76% $139,957,190 $283.1 $8.0 
2015 Cigarette tax increase (by 50 ¢, 
to 86 ¢ per pack). Nicotine E-
fluid tax adopted (5 ¢ per ml) 
$123,468,732 $153,954,237 80% $139,124,016 $293.1 $6.8 
2016 Cigarette tax increase (by 22¢, 
to $1.08 per pack) 
$223,492,940 $252,743,465 88% $137,487,046 $390.2 $7.0 
2017 -- $291,204,720 $314,188,309 93% $141,267,295 $455.5 -- 
2018 -- $271,025,460 $296,153,731 92% $155,071,165 $451.2 -- 
2019 -- -- -- -- $150,472,753 -- -- 
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*FY 1990-1997 use Orzechowski and Walker gross cigarette tax revenue figures from dataset provided by the CDC, and MSA 
payments for totals since data from the Louisiana Department of Revenue was not available. FY 1998-2018 Use Louisiana Department 
of Revenue data and MSA payments for totals and exclude Orzechowski and Walker data.  
**Reported in fiscal years ending June 30. 
***Payments as of April 2019. 
+Uses Orzechowski and Walker Dataset. 
#Uses collections reported by Louisiana Department of Revenue. 
Table 4.6: Minimum, Recommended, and Upper Level Spending Levels for Comprehensive Tobacco Control 
Programs according to CDC82-84 
 Minimum 
Funding 
Suggested Funding Upper Funding 
1999 CDC Best Practices 
Recommendations 
$27.1 million -- $71.4 million 
2007 CDC Best Practices 
Recommendations 
$38.2 million $53.5 million $84.1 million 
2014 CDC Best Practices 
Recommendations 
$41.8 million $59.6 million -- 
Table 4.7: Tobacco Control Program Funding in Louisiana by Source for Years Available76 
Fiscal Year Federal State Robert Wood 
Johnson 
Foundation 
Total in Millions 
1991 0 0 -- 0 
1992 0 0 -- 0 
1993 0 0 -- 0 
1994 $178,261 0 0 $0.2 
1995 $175,740 0 0 $0.2 
1996 $186,740 0 0 $0.2 
1997 $186,316 0 0 $0.2 
1998 $250,000 0 0 $0.3 
1999 $1,205,522 0 0 $1.2 
2000 $1,140,677 $4,000,000 0 $5.1 
2001 $1,140,677 $460,000 $23,718 $1.6 
2002 $1,140,677 $500,000 $284,616 $1.9 
2003 $1,140,677 $8,000,000 $284,616 $9.4 
2004 $1,118,381 $10,700,000 $284,616 $12.1 
2005 $1,126,859 $11,300,000 $23,718 $12.5 
2006 $1,274,928 $8,000,000 0 $9.3 
2007 $1,240,978 $7,966,912 0 $9.2 
2008 $1,878,031 $7,700,000 0 $9.6 
2009 $907,922 $7,600,000 $50,000 $8.6 
2010 $1,164,617 $7,800,000 $93,214 $9.1 
2011 $1,875,950 $9,000,000 0 $10.9 
2012 $2,262,690 $9,040,571 0 $11.3 
2013 $1,839,767 $7,170,101 0 $9.0 
2014 $1,647,702 $8,000,000 0 $9.6 
2015 $1,915,975 $6,800,000 0 $8.7 
2016 $1,677,188 $7,000,000 0 $8.7 
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distinguish exactly how much LTCP and TFL each received in state money and Robert Wood 
Johnson grants since the CDC STATE database provides combined totals and does not 
distinguish between the finances of the tobacco control programs. Average funding for tobacco 
control programs in Louisiana remained drastically below85 CDC 2014 Best Practices 
Table 4.8: CDC Best Practices for Tobacco Control Programs Core Components82 
  
State and Community 
Interventions 
State and local policy and program initiatives designed to prevent tobacco use. 
Health Communications Statewide earned and paid media efforts to prevent tobacco use and highlight 
cessation services.  
Cessation Incorporating cessation services and interventions into healthcare services and 
systems, bolstering state quitlines, and increasing insurance coverage for 
cessation services.  
Surveillance and Evaluation Surveilling public health impacts, behavior, and perceptions to determine the 
effectiveness of tobacco control program efforts. Evaluating program 
implementation and results to improve effectiveness. 
Administration and 
Management 
Adequate tobacco control program staffing and infrastructure. 
Table 4.9: Combined Tobacco Control Program Expenditures in Millions According to CDC Best Practices for 
Tobacco Control Program Components Compared to Suggested Spending Amount for Years Available69, 83, 84, 
86 
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CDC 2007 Best 
Practices Suggested 
Amount 
 
-- $22.8 $6.8 $16.9 $4.7 $2.3 $53.
5 
-- 
LTCP and TFL 
Combined Spending 
FY 2008 $3.2 $2.9 $1.7 $0.8 $0.9 $9.5 17.8% 
FY 2009 $2.7 $2.5 $1.5 $0.7 $0.7 $8.0 15% 
FY 2010 $3.1 $3.1 $1.2 $0.7 $1.2 $9.3 17.4% 
FY 2011 $3.8 $3.4 $1.9 $0.7 $1.4 $11.
2 
20.8% 
FY 2012 $3.3 $2.6 $1.5 $0.6 $1.1 $9.1 17% 
FY 2013 $3.5 $2.1 $1.7 $0.9 $1.2 $9.3 17.5% 
CDC 2014 Best 
Practices Suggested 
Amount 
-- $19.5 $8.1 $24.2 $5.2 $2.6 $59.
6 
-- 
LTCP and TFL 
Combined Spending 
FY 2014 $3.2 $1.9 $1.5 $0.9 $0.9 $8.5 15.8% 
FY 2015 $3.3 $2.0 $1.6 $1.1 $0.8 $8.7 14.7% 
FY 2016 $3.4 $2.1 $1.6 $0.9 $0.9 $8.8 14.8% 
*2008-2014 are based on CDC Best Practices Recommendations for Tobacco Control Programs from 2007. FY 
2015 and 2016 are based on CDC’s 2014 Best Practices Recommendations. 
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Recommendations for implementing comprehensive 
tobacco control programs, which suggests Louisiana 
dedicate a minimum of $41.8 million.82 
 
Similar to funding information, we used the 
CDC State System to evaluate the combined 
expenditures of LTCP and TFL according to core 
components of the CDC’s Best Practices (Table 4.9). 
The CDC only provides data for 2008-2016 and does 
not distinguish between spending by LTCP and TFL 
(Table 4.9). Except for 2010, the tobacco control programs combined spent the most annually on 
state and community interventions. The programs spent the second most on health 
communications, followed by cessation services. Combined, LTCP and TFL spent the second 
least on administration and management, followed by surveillance and evaluation. Except for FY 
2011, the programs failed to breach 20% of their recommended spending target each year 
according to CDC Best Practices. 
Tobacco Control Programming During and After Programmatic Alignment 
 
During and after programmatic alignment, the LTCP and TFL developed complementary 
tobacco control initiatives, some they administered jointly. Regarding state and community 
interventions, the LTCP primarily awarded grants for youth prevention initiatives implemented 
in public schools, but also co-sponsored non-school youth events with TFL. LTCP administered 
youth prevention programs that included policy advocacy. TFL awarded community advocacy 
grants to run youth, college aged, and adult prevention and policy advocacy programs.  Both 
programs collaborated on apolitical media campaigns focusing on education and cessation 
messaging, with TFL separately implementing advocacy and policy promotional efforts. LTCP 
and TFL also implemented joint and independent cessation initiatives. Regional subcommittees 
featuring TFL and LTCP grantees are overseen by TFL.72   
LTCP Prevention and Advocacy Programs 
 
Louisiana Tobacco-Free Schools Initiative 
  
The LTCP launched the Louisiana Tobacco-Free Schools program in 2006 to secure 
tobacco-free policies in schools and reduce youth tobacco use.87 LTCP created the program after 
the State Legislature passed the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act and prohibited smoking in 
primary and secondary schools in all school facilities, school property, and school buses.88 
According to the LTCP’s 2012-2013 Annual Report, the program relied on a seven part plan 
consisting of “policy, instruction, curriculum, training, family involvement, cessation and 
evaluation” modeled on CDC Guidelines for School Health Programs.87  The LTCP funded 
statewide grantees that mobilized local schools to adopt tobacco-free campus policies.89 The 
LTCP collaborated with hospital grant recipients, Southwest Louisiana AHEC, the Louisiana 
Department of Education, and other entities to educate target audiences and secure tobacco-free 
policies for school districts. In addition, the LTCP also prepared a manual for school 
administrators on the beneficial effects of smokefree policies in schools.87 In 2013, the Louisiana 
Tobacco Control Program expected to secure tobacco-free policies in all Louisiana school 
During and after 
programmatic alignment, the 
LTCP and TFL developed 
complementary tobacco 
control initiatives, some they 
administered jointly. 
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districts by March 2015.87  In 2017, Louisiana lawmakers passed HB 531 by Representative 
Frank Hoffman (R-West Monroe) to eliminate smoking areas on  primary and secondary school 
campuses and prohibit use of any tobacco product or electronic nicotine devices on school 
property.90 To help schools observe stricter tobacco-free requirements, the Louisiana Department 
of Health (rebranded from DHH) produced a sample memo for school officials to use regarding 
the policy change as well as a model tobacco-free policy for implementation.91 
Tobacco-Related Health Disparities Coalition 
 
LTCP formed the Tobacco-Related Health Disparities Coalition in 2007 to promote and 
implement a plan to mitigate health inequalities linked to tobacco.88, 92The coalition originated 
from a task force created by the LTCP using a CDC Office of Smoking or Health grant in 2006 
that developed a plan to address tobacco health disparities. Coalition membership consisted of 
task force participants that formulated the health disparities plan.92 The Health Disparities 
Coalition intended to partner with LTCP and TFL to inform people on the plan, write grants, 
collaborate with plan supporters, engage communities, groups, and special populations, help 
associated media campaigns, and promote tobacco control efforts, spread tobacco control facts as 
well as implement the task force plan.92   
The Louisiana Tobacco-Related Health Disparities Coalition sought to address 
“socioeconomic status, cultural characteristics, acculturation, stress, targeted advertising, and 
varying capacities of communities to mount effective tobacco control initiatives,” according to 
the LTCP’s 2010 annual report.93 
The Coalition approached and worked with state boards and community colleges, 
daycares, health facilities, schools, Medicaid, and mothers to try and secure tobacco-free zones.93 
In addition, during 2010 the Health Disparities Coalition also developed a 2013-2015 plan to 
mitigate tobacco-related health disparities in Louisiana.93  
We did not find evidence that the Tobacco-Related Health Disparities Coalition was 
active after 2010.   
Tobacco-Free Health Care Project 
 
The Tobacco-Free Health Care Project was a three-year LTCP initiative that started in 
fiscal year 2011-2012 that provided grants to healthcare facilities for them to advance CDC-
OSH’s four core goals87 of tobacco use prevention, cessation, finding and remedying tobacco-
related disparities, and stopping secondhand smoke exposure.94 In particular, the program has 
pursued tobacco-free policies in health care facilities and schools.87 The program awarded 
competitive grants to Ochsner Health System, the Women and Children’s Hospital, CHRISTUS 
Health Shreveport-Bossier, and St. Francis Medical Center. The Project improved grant 
recipients’ collaborations and ties with Louisiana communities, which the LTCP credited for 
effective tobacco cessation education efforts, attainment of tobacco-free ordinances and 
workplace policies, and lessons on “tobacco intervention” according to a 2012-2013 LTCP 
report.87   
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Tobacco-Free Healthcare Facilities 
 
The Tobacco-Free Healthcare Facilities program is an LTCP initiative to secure tobacco-
free policies in all health care buildings and campuses in Louisiana.87 60 health care facilities 
adopted tobacco-free policies by FY 2013.  
Schools Putting Prevention to Work 
 
 The Louisiana Tobacco Control Program jointly administered the Schools Putting 
Prevention to Work (SPPW) program with the Department of Education and Louisiana School 
Boards Association in 2011. The SPPW program received funding from the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act’s Communities Putting Prevention to Work initiative,95 grants offered by 
the US Department of Health and Human Services96 as part of federal government-led recovery 
efforts following the 2008 economic recession.95 The LTCP and its SPPW partners developed a 
multifaceted program targeting tobacco control, nutrition, obesity, and exercise. Tobacco control 
components of SPPW consisted of a radio campaign informing pregnant smokers of the negative 
health effects of smoking during pregnancy and educating them about free cessation services.95 
In addition, the SPPW program gave technical support to 27 (of 69) school districts and split a 
$17,000 grant between them to develop health policies promoting tobacco-free schools. Because 
of the SPPW program, over 150 pregnant smokers used the state quitline, more than doubling 
female use of the service.95 In addition, 25 school districts implemented tobacco-free policies as 
part of a larger wellness policy.95, 97 
Well-Ahead 
 
Well Ahead was an initiative launched in the 
DHH by Governor Bobby Jindal and DHH Secretary 
Kathy Kliebert in April 2014.98 Well Ahead is overseen 
by the Department of Health’s Bureau of Chronic 
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, and houses 
the state’s tobacco program.99 
The Wellspot initiative intends to inspire 
organizations to adopt policies beneficial to public 
health, including instituting smoke or tobacco-free 
policies.98 Participating organizations receive a 
Wellspot designation of 1, 2, or 3, a 1 meaning all 
Wellspot standards for their workplace type have been reached while a 3 means a low amount. 
Four benchmarks relate to tobacco: One requires a comprehensive smokefree policy, another a 
comprehensive tobacco-free policy, the third, “promotion of the Louisiana Tobacco Quitline” or 
other entities that offer cessation assistance, and the fourth inclusion of tobacco quit assistance in 
employee insurance coverage100 (Table 4.10).  
 
 
The Wellspot initiative 
intends to inspire 
organizations to adopt 
policies beneficial to public 
health, including instituting 
smoke or tobacco-free 
policies.  
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TFL Prevention and Advocacy Programs 
 
The Louisiana Tobacco-Free College Initiative 
 
 TFL formed The Louisiana Tobacco-Free College Initiative with the Louisiana Office 
for Addictive Disorders and the Louisiana Higher Education Coalition in 2007 to make higher 
education institutions smokefree 101 and to develop a college network that promoted student 
cessation and countered tobacco industry marketing.102, 103 In the program’s first year, fourteen 
Louisiana colleges joined and received grants for anti-tobacco events and internal policy 
efforts.102  
Participating institutions included Loyola University, Southeastern Louisiana University, 
Tulane University, Our Lady of the Lake College, and the University of Louisiana-Lafayette.102 
The Tobacco-Free College Initiative inspired Our Lady of the Lake College to adopt the first 
tobacco-free policy among higher education institutions in Louisiana during fiscal year 2007-
2008.102  Three other colleges passed tobacco policies that year. The Louisiana Tobacco-Free 
College Initiative subsequently helped create the Fresh Campus Campaign with advertising 
agency Rescue Social Change Group in FY 2008.102 In 2013, Louisiana Lawmakers adopted 
legislation requiring all public higher education institutions to enact smokefree policies (Chapter 
12).101 We do not know if or when the Louisiana Tobacco-Free College Initiative ended.  
Defy Project 
  
TFL started the Defy Project in 2007 to expose tobacco industry targeting of youth as 
well as to increase youth participation in tobacco control.52, 104 Originally called the Defy the 
Lies initiative, TFL Program Manager Rosalind Bello and TFL Director Ashley Ross developed 
the program to be a policy-oriented initiative that engaged youth in tobacco control. According 
to Bello in a 2014 interview for this report:  
We needed to have something very pointed, something that the youth could do 
that would help to be part of the social norm change on a community level. So we 
had worked with some local people before in trying to do some youth advocacy 
trainings…but we wanted something with more structure to it.  
So we went with Rescue Social Change group to help us with Defy the Lies and 
we went through several iterations with them about models that did or did not 
work in Louisiana.30 
Table 4.10: Well-Ahead Wellspot Requirements for Smoking and tobacco by Place and Wellspot Level100 
 3 (weakest) 2  1 (Strongest) 
Child Care Centers Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free 
Colleges and Universities Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free 
Faith Organizations None Smokefree Tobacco-Free 
Healthcare Facilities Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free 
Hospitals Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free 
Restaurants None Smokefree Policy Tobacco-Free 
Schools Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free 
Worksites* Smokefree Tobacco-Free Tobacco-Free 
*Has an optional benchmark for providing employee insurance coverage for tobacco cessation. 
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TFL administered the Defy initiative by awarding community grants to organizations that 
followed TFL-developed program guidelines to train youth to advocate against tobacco point of 
sale advertisements, and to educate and employ youth to monitor and record data on point of sale 
advertising.104, 105 Participating youth visited businesses randomly chosen by TFL to conduct 
surveys on point of sale advertising that included questions regarding targeting youth.105 In 
addition, participants engaged in letter writing to Louisiana newspapers and government 
officials, lobbied state and local officials to support youth access restrictions,52 and spoke at town 
halls.105 In 2017, Defy participants also held school rallies and events to promote Kick Butts 
Day.106   
TFL replaced Project Defy with another program, Next Era, in 2017.107 Although TFL 
implied that Project Defy had helped successful efforts to secure smokefree college campuses, 
pass local smokefree ordinances, and secure a tobacco tax increase, the nonprofit stated that 
frequent youth tobacco use rates still remained high in Louisiana among junior high and high 
school students. TFL claimed Next Era brought “…a modernized and strengthened approach to 
youth engagement in Louisiana.”107 Next Era would cultivate youth tobacco control advocates by 
collaborating with student organizations and clubs to provide participants advocacy training and 
opportunities to meet influential persons and attend conferences. The program initially planned 
to offer students community service hours and scholarships for participation. 
Fresh Campus Campaign 
 
TFL and the Louisiana Tobacco-Free College Initiative created the Fresh Campus 
Campaign with assistance from the Rescue Social Change Group in fiscal year 2008-2009. TFL 
had previously sought to promote smoking restrictions and defend against tobacco industry 
marketing to college students by forming the Louisiana Tobacco-Free College Initiative in 2007, 
a coalition effort that subsequently helped implement the Fresh Campus Campaign. The Fresh 
Campus Campaign sought to secure tobacco-free policies and promote cessation services on 
campuses at technical, two-year, and four-year colleges.102, 108  
TFL awarded community advocacy grants to universities with existing or newly formed 
student organizations led by a Fresh Campus coordinator to pursue tobacco-free campus policies, 
monitor enforcement of existing tobacco-free policies, promote existing cessation services on 
campus, and obtain cessation services on campuses.108, 109 Fresh Campus groups were required to 
host meetings, join Fresh Campus conference calls, attend meetings of the Healthy Community 
Coalition Tobacco sub-committee (a statewide health coalition), and to hold an event for least 
two of the four following national action days each year:  
• Great American Smokeout 
• Through with Chew 
• Kick Butts Day 
• World No Tobacco Day103 
 
The Fresh Campus Campaign followed TFL’s responsibilities delineated during programmatic 
alignment, focusing on community capacity building and mobilization, as well as policy 
advocacy. 
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 In 2013, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act 
211, requiring public institutions of higher education to 
adopt smokefree policies by August 1, 2014 (Chapter 
12).101 Fresh Campus teams continued to operate, 
assisting colleges and universities in adopting tobacco-
free policies. During 2013-2014 TFL published and 
disseminated a toolkit to higher education institutions 
with information and guidelines for adopting and 
enforcing smokefree and tobacco-free policies for 
campuses.110  
TFL still ran the Fresh Campus Campaign as 
part of its community advocacy grants program in 
2016.111 Open to trade colleges and traditional higher education institutions, the program sought 
to promote cessation services for students and employees, highlight the necessity of tobacco-free 
policies on campuses, and lower secondhand smoke exposure. TFL did not list the Fresh Campus 
Campaign as an active initiative that year,112 possibly because the program had achieved most of 
its objectives and become unnecessary.  
Next Era 
 
Next Era is a high school-based prevention and policy advocacy program created by TFL 
in 2017.113, 114 The program trains students to host events, deliver presentations, attend 
conferences, and meet with state officials, city councilors, and school board members to advance 
Next Era’s tobacco control campaigns.114 Next Era offers a maximum $1,700 to clubs that apply 
and join the program, and rewarded participating students with points redeemable for various 
prizes.114 TFL and LPHI contracted with San Diego media firm Rescue Agency to manage the 
initiative.114 
Jointly Administered Prevention and Advocacy Programs 
 
Youth Summit  
  
The Youth Summit started in 2008 as a joint effort between the LTCP, TFL, and 
Louisiana Youth Prevention Services to educate students on tobacco industry marketing 
practices and to have attendees generate state-level policy suggestions for tobacco control.102 The 
Youth Summit became an annual event, with youth ages 11-17 attending to discuss “ways to 
change behavior as it relates to tobacco use, learn about the negative effects of tobacco, and gain 
the knowledge and tools to promote change in their communities.”70 Since 2009, participation 
increased from 70 youth to 224 by 2011.70  The fifth Youth Summit, held in 2012 with the goal 
of educating youth on industry marketing practices, local and school policy engagement, and 
accessibility of tobacco products to minors, had approximately 400 student attendees and was 
sponsored by the LTCP, TFL, the American Legacy Foundation, Dillard University, and a local 
radio station.87, 115    
We did not find evidence of LTCP and TFL holding statewide youth summits after 2012. 
However, the Rapides Foundation annually hosted regional Youth Summits in Central Louisiana 
The Fresh Campus Campaign 
followed TFL’s responsibilities 
delineated during 
programmatic alignment, 
focusing on community 
capacity building and 
mobilization, as well as policy 
advocacy. 
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through 2019 inspired by the LTCP and TFL summits.116, 117 The Rapides Summits included 
tobacco prevention but were generalized to also include other behaviors.118  
LTCP and TFL Health Communications Programs after Alignment 
 
Quit With Us, LA 
 
The LTCP and TFL established Quit With Us, LA in 2007 as the collective brand for 
some cessation services and initiatives.87, 93 The campaign is administered by the LTCP, in 
accordance with its focus on cessation established during programmatic alignment with TFL. 
According to a 2010 LTCP annual report: 
The LTCP staff maintains a system of initiative-specific communication plans 
based on target audiences, effective media vehicles, activity objectives, and 
specific messages.93 
Quit With Us, LA initially conducted outreach via partnerships and websites to medical 
providers, poor and rural Louisianans, minors, African Americans, and community activists.93 In 
addition, Quit With Us, LA utilized social media87, 93 to provide cessation information and 
education on tobacco use’s negative health impacts.87  
 Quit With Us, LA maintained a website that acted as a portal for the state’s quitline, 
various cessation services offered by LTCP and TFL,93  and information and access to other 
national and state quit resources.87 In addition, the website provided information on Louisiana 
cessation initiatives and collaborations such as Fax-To-Quit, with details and contact info for 
joining said programs.87 Quit With Us, LA was still active in 2020. 
Let’s Be Totally Clear / Healthier Air for All 
 
The “Let’s Be Totally Clear” campaign started as prevention and education-focused ads 
on secondhand smoke harms but became increasingly policy and advocacy-focused over time. 
TFL rolled out television, radio, and outdoor advertisements in 2007 for a new media campaign 
titled “Let’s Be Totally Clear.” Co-sponsored by LTCP, the campaign sought to educate 
Louisianans on the harmful effects of secondhand smoke.52 TFL and LTCP had modeled their 
program components on CDC Best Practices, which called for using health communications,69 
and established that both tobacco control groups would engage in media outreach during 
programmatic alignment. The media campaign utilized personal accounts of Louisiana citizens 
adversely affected by tobacco smoke in advertisements.52 The ads did not call for smoking 
restrictions. However, according to TFL’s 2007-2008 annual report, campaign billboard ads 
displayed secondhand smoke facts that “research indicated would affect personal or political 
action.”52 
TFL Reboots Let’s Be Totally Clear into Policy Advocacy Effort  
 
“Let’s Be Totally Clear” morphed into a political advocacy initiative for comprehensive 
local clean air laws (Chapter 12) in 2010, when TFL rebooted the campaign without LTCP 
sponsorship. TFL relaunched the “Let’s Be Totally Clear” media campaign to highlight 
employee exposure to secondhand smoke in bars and casinos and advocate for protecting 
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workers in those workplaces.119 The 2006 Louisiana 
Smoke-Free Air Act had made most workplaces in the 
state smokefree, but exempted bars and casinos 
(Chapter 9).119 TFL revived the campaign and 
reoriented its messaging and focus after receiving 
suggestions from its Scientific Advisory Committee and 
comments from musicians, bar employees, and casino 
employees wanting clean air protections.119  
TFL placed advertisements featuring bar 
employees, casino workers, and musicians telling their 
experiences working in smoke-filled environments.119 
The campaign highlighted that smoking remained legal 
in Louisiana bars and casinos, that said businesses exposed employees to harmful secondhand 
smoke, and asserted that workers in those environments should have safe workplaces.119 The 
“Let’s Be Totally Clear” ads featured an “Equal Air for All” tagline.119 The inherent political 
advocacy message of the ads may be a reason the LTCP did not co-sponsor the campaign. 
The “Let’s Be Totally Clear” campaign used social media and its campaign website to 
promote venues with smoke free policies119 to provide them free publicity and demonstrate that 
smokefree policies did not harm businesses. TFL determined the campaign increased public 
opposition to smoking in bars and casinos, generated backing for smokefree gambling 
establishments, and curried support for stronger clean air laws.119 
In 2012, TFL rebranded “Let’s Be Totally Clear” to “Healthier Air For All” to make 
messaging more relatable to the general public. According to TFL Communications and Policy 
Manager Lauren Conrad in a 2016 interview for this report, the rebranding was in response to a 
loss of message effectiveness: 
At first we were able to move the needle considerably, pointing out that, yes, 
Louisiana is smokefree, and it was a big win getting restaurants to go smokefree. 
But there is still a huge group of people that are being left out. So then we [TFL] 
ran the campaign for so long pointing this out, that then we were getting negative 
feedback, well, why don't you care about the patrons that go into these 
establishments?  
Which is why we had to change strategy again and say it's Healthier for All. 
Smokefree is Healthier for All, not just the bar employees and the casino 
employees and musicians. It's healthier for the patrons. It's healthier for the people 
that want to listen to the music. And so it was interesting…what moved the needle 
so much before, we then had to pull back on that because then everybody else was 
getting offended that we weren't talking about them.120 
TFL ran multiple sub-campaigns with different messaging under the “Healthier Air For All” 
banner. TFL ran a smaller campaign titled “______Stinks” in the early 2010s to link health 
problems and annoyances such as the odor of secondhand smoke created by tobacco use. The 
Healthier Air For All website encouraged visitors to enter into a prompt what “stinks” about 
TFL relaunched the “Let’s Be 
Totally Clear” media 
campaign to highlight 
employee exposure to 
secondhand smoke in bars 
and casinos and advocate for 
protecting workers in bars 
and casinos.  
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tobacco and provided links containing information on issues and problems related to secondhand 
smoke.121 
Using its “Healthier Air for All” theme, TFL created customized local advertising 
campaigns to generate public awareness and support for proposed and recently adopted local 
clean air laws. Local media campaigns ran in Alexandria (2011), Hamilton (2015), New Orleans 
(2015), Monroe (2013), West Monroe (2013), Ouachita Parish (2013), and Sulphur.122 
Advertisements for Alexandria utilized Christmas and New Year’s holiday themes before and 
after a successful clean air policy campaign in 2011 that prohibited smoking in bars and casinos 
(Chapter 12).122 Ads run in the city after Alexandria adopted a comprehensive clean air 
ordinance alerted the public to the legislation’s implementation date, and tied smoking 
restrictions to winning at gambling or a refreshment accompanying drinks at a bar.122 TFL aired 
practically identical advertisements in Monroe, West Monroe, and Ouachita Parish after local 
lawmakers in those areas adopted comprehensive clean air ordinances covering bars and casinos 
in 2013 (Chapter 12).122 Advertisements run for New Orleans, Hammond, and Sulphur during 
clean air policy campaigns highlighted the lack of secondhand smoke protection for performers, 
bar employees, and casino employees.122 A New Orleans ad circulated after the city adopted a 
comprehensive smokefree ordinance (Chapter 12) maintained focus on protecting performers and 
workers at bars and casinos.122 TFL’s use of localized media campaigns helped secure 
comprehensive clean air legislation, most prominently New Orleans comprehensive clean air 
ordinance in 2015 (Chapter 12). 
In 2015 TFL began sub-branding local policy ads as “Join the Movement” under the 
“Healthier Air for All” brand. TFL created the theme to generate awareness of the negative 
health impacts of secondhand smoke, highlight smokefree events and businesses, promote the 
advancement of clean air ordinances and policies in Louisiana, and encourage public 
participation in ongoing smokefree efforts.123 According to Communications and Tobacco Policy 
Manager Lauren Conrad in a 2016 interview for this report, the theme proved popular: 
The Join the Movement campaign was a very successful campaign. And it wound 
up being right when an ordinance was being launched. Part of our metrics for that 
campaign was how were people going to respond to this. And one of the council 
members, Join the Movement, became her tagline. She was one of our 
champions…We didn't feed that to her, but that's what she started using…  So 
Join the Movement has been able to get some legs far beyond our expectations, 
and we're [TFL] still using Join the Movement because it caught on as well as it 
did.120 
TFL continued to pursue and support policy change at the local level using the “Healthier Air 
For All” brand and social justice themes, providing information on a campaign website for 
complying with local clean air laws in cities and parishes that passed ordinances, a program it 
was continuing to maintain and develop in 2020.  
 
TFL Engages in its First Dedicated Media Campaign Targeting African Americans 
  
TFL first launched its African American Male Cessation Initiative in 2014124 to mitigate 
the disproportionately high tobacco use rate and low quitline utilization among African 
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American males in Louisiana.120, 125 According to TFL Communications and Tobacco Policy 
Manager Lauren Conrad in a 2016 interview for this report:  
African American males in Louisiana have 
been identified as a group that has a high 
propensity of smoking and a very low call 
[rate] to the quit line. In fact, this group 
doesn't even know that the quit line exists. 
So, the first iteration of this campaign was to 
hyper target this demographic.120  
In 2011, nearly 35% of African Americans in 
Louisiana smoked compared to approximately 28% 
of white Louisianans.124 African Americans also has 
a higher quit attempt rate and failure rate compared 
to whites, and comprised under 15% of calls to the 
State’s tobacco quitline.124 TFL learned from a Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Louisiana Tobacco 
Quitline Stakeholder Report that white women, and African American women smokers contacted 
Louisiana’s quit line more than African American males despite smoking prevalence being 
higher among the latter. The discovery spawned 12 focus groups across the state of current and 
former African American smokers that determined most came from poor neighborhoods and 
lacked knowledge of free quit assistance provided by Louisiana. To bolster quit service use by 
African American men and address tobacco-related disparities, TFL implemented the African 
American Male Cessation Initiative. 
The African American Male Cessation Initiative in late 2014-early 2015 consisted of 
media and grassroots advocacy components. TFL implemented a media campaign in FY 2015 
featuring ads from the CDC’s Tips From Former Smokers ad campaign,126 to educate its target 
audience of the negative health effects of tobacco use and generate awareness of the state 
quitline.120, 125, 126 Advertisements appeared on television, radio, print, billboards,124 and bus 
shelters in Alexandria, Baton Rouge, Monroe, New Orleans, and Shreveport from late December 
2014 through February 15, 2015.120, 126  TFL jointly implemented the African American Male 
Cessation Initiative’s grassroots component with the Communities of Color Network 127 and the 
LSU School of Public Health New Orleans’ Tobacco Control Initiative.126 As a result, African 
American males had the highest successful quit rates at the 30-day mark (34.3%) compared to all 
quitline users (28.5%) in Fiscal Year 2013-2014.124 
Louisiana still had high tobacco use rates among African American residents after the 
campaign. An unidentified survey in 2015 still found that 28.2% of male African American 
Louisianans smoke, more than any other gender or race in the state.127 Male African American 
smokers in Louisiana also consumed 1.2 times more cigarettes than their white counterparts, had 
a 27% higher rate of being diagnosed with lung cancer than the national average, and a 32% 
greater mortality rate than African American males nationally.127  In a 2016 survey of 
Louisianans, only 14.2% of male African Americans are aware of quitline services, compared to 
24.5% of female African Americans, 20.2% of white males, and 36.1% of white females.127  
In 2017, TFL administered additional African Male Cessation Initiative campaigns. The 
campaigns targeting people 35-59 years of age that consisted of radio spots, informational 
“African American males in 
Louisiana have been 
identified as a group that has 
a high propensity of smoking 
and a very low call [rate] to 
the quit line. In fact, this 
group doesn't even know 
that the quit line exists.”  
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material, education by medical professional, and billboards.128 Administered in Baton Rouge and 
Shreveport during the spring, and New Orleans during the summer of that year, the campaigns 
found different promotional efforts more effective than others depending on city (Table 4.11). 
 
LTCP and TFL Cessation Programs after Programmatic Alignment 
 
Tobacco Quitline  
  
During programmatic alignment in fiscal year 2009-2010, LTCP and TFL integrated their 
quitline efforts. The LTCP and TFL provided the Louisiana Tobacco Quitline to anyone over age 
13 free cessation assistance.129 Jointly funded by the programs, the quitline operates 24 hours a 
day and is available in 150 languages.129 Trained counselors assisted smokers willing to quit in 
30 days by helping them create a cessation plan and by offering nicotine replacement therapy 
when funds were available. The quitline also provided participants a cessation assistance kit by 
mail and informed them of local quit programs. The Louisiana Tobacco Quitline continued to be 
jointly administered by LTCP and TFL as of 2020.129  
Fax-To-Quit 
 
The Fax-To-Quit Program encouraged medical professionals to engage their patients 
regarding their smoking and direct them to the state’s quitline for assistance with cessation.87 
Funded by the LTCP and TFL, the program trained medical professionals to use the Public 
Health Service Clinical Practice Guidelines in Treating Tobacco Use.87 According to LTCP 
program director Brandi Bourgeois in a 2013 interview for this report:  
 
Our healthcare provider arm of our Quitline. Providers are trained in this program 
and then implement it into their clinics/hospitals.  The concept is easy, providers 
intervene with patients using the 5 As [Ask, Advise, Assess, Assist, and 
Arrange]130. If the patient is ready to quit (defined as within 30 days131) they fill 
out the fax to quit form and it’s sent off to the Quitline vendor. Quitline vendor 
then proactively calls the patient back to begin their counseling sessions.65 
 
Following outreach by the quitline to the smoker, the quitline service sent a Participant Outcome 
Report to the place of referral to retain in records.131 The reply fax provided information for 
medical records about whether the participant was contacted regarding cessation, whether 
services were accepted, and disclosed if any program or nicotine therapy replacement was 
chosen.132 As of 2018, the Fax-To-Quit program continued to be offered through Quit With Us, 
LA, a joint collaboration on cessation services of the LTCP and the TFL.131 
Table 4.11: Percentage of Respondents That Recalled Cessation Services via Format128 
 Baton Rouge Shreveport New Orleans 
Radio 30% 37% Survey Data Not Yet 
Released Informational Material N/A 25% 
Education by Medical 
Professional 
28% N/A 
Billboards 29% 44% 
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Louisiana Tobacco Control Initiative   
  
The Tobacco Control Initiative (TCI) is an 
intervention and cessation program administered in 
Louisiana’s healthcare system by LSU Health – New 
Orleans School of Public Health since 2004.133 Funded 
by LPHI/TFL via contract, the Tobacco Control 
Initiative was designed based on US Public Health 
Services tobacco use treatment guidelines.133 Continued throughout and after TFL’s 
programmatic alignment with LTCP, TCI uses a systems based approach to “standardized 
identification and treatment of tobacco users within the LSU health care system.”70 In particular, 
TCI seeks to lower tobacco use rates among patients in the LSU public hospital system.70  
Participating clinics and Hospitals monitored for patients that were current tobacco users 
(used in past 30 days) and recommended they quit tobacco.134 In addition, Tobacco Control 
Initiative employees at each facility offered cessation services to identified patients.133 Program 
components include individual and group counseling, state quitline and Smoking Cessation Trust 
referrals, “self-help materials”, and “cessation medication” according to the Louisiana Tobacco 
Control Initiative’s webpage. The project also includes self-evaluations by the Tobacco Control 
Initiative to strengthen its efforts, and conduct research to advance public health. The Tobacco 
Control Initiative initially worked to evaluate and provide cessation services in the Louisiana 
Public Hospital system.57 TCI also created a standardized cessation database in 2006.57 The 
LTCP collaborated with TCI in 2010 to use the Fax-To-Quit program to reach rural and lower 
economic status Louisianans.93 In 2011, the Tobacco Control Initiative utilized a systematic and 
standardized approach that caused eight LSU-run public hospitals to adopt electronic 
identification/documentation systems.70 That same year, TCI reoriented focus to advance 
hospital policies mandating ongoing medical provider training on cessation assistance and 
services that half of Louisiana’s ten public hospitals adopted.70 As of  2018, the Tobacco Control 
Initiative had given tobacco consumption and dependence treatment training to more than 10,000 
healthcare providers, has advised more than 9,000 smokers on quitting, and recommended 
Louisiana’s quitline and Smoking Cessation Trust (SCT) to over 10,000 smokers.133 
Louisiana Tobacco Cessation Consortium 
 
The Louisiana Tobacco Cessation Consortium initially began as the Quitline Consortium 
in 2005, a joint project of TFL and the LTCP before programmatic integration that was designed 
to synchronize cessation programs amongst various medical providers, the tobacco control 
programs, and other organizations.56 After Hurricane Katrina devastated Louisiana in 2005, in 
2006  LTCP and TFL likely continued the initiative as the Louisiana Tobacco Cessation 
Consortium.57 The Louisiana Tobacco Cessation Consortium (LTCC) formed to improve 
relationships and coordinate tobacco control efforts between the LTCP, TFL, healthcare 
providers, nonprofits, health care organizations, and researchers on tobacco control efforts. The 
LTCC also focuses on increasing awareness of tobacco control programs and services, in 
particular for cessation,93 and disseminates information on national and state cessation efforts 
from LTCP.135 LTCC membership after Hurricane Katrina consisted of  LTCP, TFL, the 
American Cancer Society, American Lung Association, American Heart Association, the North 
American Quitline Consortium, and the Louisiana Cancer Control Partnership.57 
In particular, TCI seeks to 
lower tobacco use rates 
among patients in the LSU 
public hospital system.  
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H.E.A.L. Initiative 
 
LTCP started Project Help Empower All of Louisiana (Project HEAL)93 in 2008 to help 
hospitals adopt 100% tobacco-free campus policies.70 As the project continued, LTCP 
established a manual available online and in print with a 12 month plan to guide Louisiana 
hospital administrations in implementing tobacco-free campus policies.136 The guidelines 
advised hospitals to adopt tobacco-free policies to deter staff, patients, and visitors from smoking 
on their premises with the end goal of influencing long-term cessation.137 As of 2020, 
information and publications from the HEAL Initiative continued  to be offered through Quit 
With Us, LA, the joint cessation services program run by the LTCP and TFL.138  
 
Evaluation and Data Collection Methods of the LTCP Following Alignment 
 
The Louisiana Tobacco Control Program collected data for surveillance and evaluation of 
tobacco use and tobacco control in Louisiana from various surveys. LTCP primarily utilized 
CDC Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) survey data to monitor and analyze 
program strategies and determine program efficiency.87, 139  In addition to BRFSS,  LTCP used 
public data from the CDC National Youth Tobacco Survey (NYTS), National Adult Tobacco 
Survey (NATS) and the surveillance system of the CDC Smoking-Attributable Mortality, 
Morbidity, and Economic Costs (SAMMEC) report.87, 93 To guide tobacco control programming 
for minors, in Fiscal Year 2007/2008, the LTCP administered the Youth Tobacco Survey and 
Youth Risk Behavior Survey in Louisiana with the Louisiana Department of Education.102} The 
surveys had last been conducted in 2000. The LTCP and DEO received assistance from TFL. 
The LTCP also used data from the Louisiana DHH’s Louisiana Pregnancy Risk Assessment 
Monitoring System (LaPRAMS)93 that provides state-specific data for planning and assessing 
health programs and for describing maternal experiences that may contribute to maternal and 
infant health.140 LaPRAMS formed at the DHH in 1987 to understand the slowing rate of infant 
mortality reductions in Louisiana.140 As of 2018, DHH was using LaPRAMS data partly to 
determine and report the percentage of pregnant women that smoke during their third 
trimester.140 
The LTCP also relied on data from the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (CTFK)139 and 
the North American Quitline Consortium’s Minimal Data Set (MDS).87 We do not know the data 
sets LTCP used from CTFK.  The MDS data set helps determine quitline quality and 
effectiveness, as well as the usefulness of cessation methods and interventions.141 MDS launched 
in 2005, using funding from the CDC, NCI, Health Canada, and health voluntaries.141 
Evaluation and Data Collection Methods of TFL 
 
TFL hires research firms, conducts polls, and uses data from government-run surveys to 
inform its efforts and guide programming. The program hired Market Dynamics Research 
Group, Inc. (MDRG) in 2004 to hold focus groups and determine messaging for an advertising 
campaign held in Spring 2005.56 MDRG performed pre and post surveys around the Spring 2005 
media campaign and found that awareness of TFL increased two-fold, that respondents recalled 
messaging on the negative effects secondhand smoke, and that they were likelier to accept facts 
on secondhand smoke and take action to circumvent exposure.56 TFL hired MDRG again in 2008 
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and 2010 to evaluate the reach and effectiveness of its “Let’s Be Totally Clear” media 
campaigns.52, 70 
To inform prevention and cessation programming, beginning in FY 2008 TFL began 
biannually administering the Adult Tobacco Survey (ATS), a statewide phone poll of adults in 
Louisiana, to observe patterns and instruct its work on tobacco prevention and control.52 TFL 
also assisted the LTCP and Louisiana Department of Education with conducting the YRBS and 
YTS in FY 2008.52 Additionally, TFL relied on data from BRFSS70 and YTS.142 
To promote state and local policy initiatives and defend against attacks by policy 
opponents, TFL conducts and releases its own research.142 TFL has produced opinion surveys on 
proposed clean air legislation, as well as research on the economic effects of clean air policies, 
air quality in establishments after smokefree laws passed compared to air quality beforehand, the 
health impacts of tobacco use and exposure, as well as the targeting of minors and minorities by 
point of sale advertising and location.142 
State and Regional Allies of LTCP and TFL 
 
Area Health Education Centers 
 
The LSU School of Medicine in New Orleans established Louisiana Area Health 
Education Centers (AHEC) using a 1988 grant from the federal government’s Area Health 
Education Center program.143 Louisiana AHECs worked to mitigate healthcare employee 
scarcity in rural and underserved places, generate student interest in healthcare careers, and hone 
the skills of medical practitioners by offering health services in their areas of operation.144 Four 
regional AHECs (North, Central, Southeast, Southwest) operated in Louisiana during 2018 using 
funds from cooperative agreements with the LSU School of Medicine – New Orleans.143  
 
Two of Louisiana’s AHECs, the Southwest Louisiana AHEC and Central Louisiana 
AHEC, conducted school and community-based tobacco control education, prevention, clean air 
policy formulation, and cessation initiatives.145-147 The Southwestern Louisiana AHEC and 
Central AHEC received grants from the Rapides Foundation in 2010 to help businesses develop 
and implement clean air policies and administer the school tobacco prevention initiative Tar 
Wars on behalf of the funding organization.147 In addition, the Southwestern Louisiana AHEC 
assisted hospitals with developing tobacco-free policies as part of the LTPC’s  Project HEAL in 
2010.148 Besides prevention, education, cessation, and workplace policy initiatives, Southwest 
Louisiana AHEC engaged in a 2005 campaign to secure a local, limited smokefree policy for the 
city of Lafayette.146 The Lafayette campaign was part of local legislative efforts by health and 
tobacco control advocates across Louisiana to generate support for a strong statewide clean air 
law that fully repealed preemption over local control (Chapter 10). The Lafayette ordinance 
passed in 2005 and advocates later secured a strong statewide clean air law ending preemption in 
2006 (Chapter 10). 
 
The Southeast Louisiana AHEC and North Louisiana AHEC engaged in tobacco control 
to a lesser degree. The Southeast Louisiana AHEC administered the Tar Wars program.149 We 
found evidence of tobacco control expenditures by North Louisiana AHEC in 2012, but could 
not determine how the center used the money.150 
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Rapides Foundation   
 
The Rapides Foundation 
is a health nonprofit that formed 
in 1994151 to serve nine parishes 
in central Louisiana (Figure 
4.4).117 The foundation was 
created when nonprofit 
healthcare provider the Rapides 
Regional Medical Center entered 
a joint venture with healthcare 
company Columbia/HCA, sold 
its brand and operating assets to 
healthcare provider Central 
Louisiana Healthcare Systems 
Partnership (retaining 26% interest of the Rapides medical system), and became a grant 
organization.153 The Center transitioned into the Rapides Foundation to ensure adequate medical 
and health care in Central Louisiana and insure the area’s wellbeing in the face of adverse market 
forces. The Foundation started with a $140 million endowment154 made using funds from the 
sale of the Rapides Regional Medical Center.117 
 
Operating exclusively on the endowment, the 
Rapides Foundation provides grants and conducts 
programming for community economic improvement, health, 
and education initiatives.117 As part of its health efforts, the 
Foundation has funded and orchestrated tobacco control 
work in Central Louisiana.117  
 
The Rapides Foundation engaged in tobacco control 
after its board analyzed BRFSS and YRBS data from 2005 
during 2006 and found many deaths were attributable to 
tobacco related illnesses such as cancer and heart disease.117 
According to Rapides Foundation Programs and 
Communications Director Annette Beuchler in a 2013 
interview for this report: 
 
In '06, when our board looked at the data, of course tobacco statistics were one of 
the top things, and when you look at the eight causes of death, or whatever, 
everything relates back to heart disease, cancer. Everything relates back to 
tobacco use or obesity. So this is why our board chose to work in tobacco 
prevention.117 
 
Foundation officials also determined that residents in the regions it serviced were not 
knowledgeable on tobacco use’s harmful effects.117 Dr. Thom Farley, an issue expert for 
Rapides, analyzed the data after the board scrutinized the information and recommended the 
Foundation focus on prevention and supporting healthy lifestyle behaviors.117  
Allen 
 
Avoyelles 
Catahoula 
Grant 
LaSalle 
Natchitoches 
Rapides 
Vernon 
Winn 
Figure 4.4: Parishes Served by the Rapides Foundation152 
The Rapides Foundation 
engaged in tobacco control 
after its board analyzed 
BRFSS and YRBS data from 
2005 during 2006 and found 
many deaths were 
attributable to tobacco 
related illnesses such as 
cancer and heart disease.  
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As a result, in 2007, the Rapides Foundation reached out to the Tobacco Technical 
Assistance Consortium at Emory University for assistance forming a tobacco control plan.117 
Rapides sought TTAC for aid since that organization was helping the CDC form a tobacco 
prevention plan, had appeared at multiple conferences covering tobacco control, and recognized 
differences in urban and rural communities.117 The Rapides Foundation and TTAC established 
encouraging adult cessation and youth tobacco prevention in covered regions as program 
priorities. Rapides and TTAC developed a five-year plan consisting of initiatives and grants to 
stimulate community engagement, encouraged medical providers to recommend tobacco-using 
patients quit, and counter marketing. The Rapides Foundation added smokefree air as another 
program goal. Rapides contacted LTCP and TFL to ensure they were not copying ongoing 
initiatives, to guarantee it and TTAC’s plan for tobacco prevention programming was 
complimentary to their ongoing work and would not drive them out of the region. 
 
The Rapides Foundation has maintained contact and collaborated with LTCP and TFL on 
a variety of tobacco control initiatives. In 2008, the Foundation helped LTCP with events they 
held in central Louisiana for a statewide, sports-oriented tobacco-free initiative called the 
Louisiana Tobacco-Free Sports Statewide Program they organized with the New Orleans Saints, 
a team in the National Football League.117, 155 The sports program intended to highlight sports 
and exercise as alternatives to smoking.155 
 
The Foundation also participated in a statewide tobacco advocacy focused Youth Summit 
organized by LTCP and TFL at an unknown point. LTCP, TFL and Louisiana Youth Prevention 
Services began the annual summits in 2008 to inform student leadership about tobacco industry 
marketing practices and generate policy suggestions for the state.102 The Rapides Foundation 
subsequently organized regional Youth Summits, and broadened them to also focus on non-
tobacco issues in 2013117 and continued to do so in 2018.156 
 
The Rapides Foundation implemented a tobacco control and prevention plan crafted with 
TTAC in 2008.117 Community engagement grants primarily went to Area Health Education 
Centers (AHEC) operating in parishes serviced by the Rapides Foundation.117 Central Louisiana 
AHEC (eight foundation regions) and Southwestern Louisiana AHEC (one foundation region) 
both received grants to host Kick Butts Day and Great American Smokeout events.117 CLAHEC 
also received funding to organize a regional Youth Summit inspired by LTCP and TFL’s 
statewide Youth Summit117 (which the Rapides Foundation originally participated in with the 
programs), and CLAHEC and Southwest Louisiana AHEC were awarded grants to implement a 
school tobacco prevention education initiative titled Tar Wars.147 The programs were part of the 
Rapides Foundation’s objective to improve health in its home region.  
 
The Rapides Foundation has run tobacco counter-marketing campaigns from 2008 to at 
least 2018. Campaigns used Centers for Disease Control and Prevention tobacco ads, National 
Alliance for Tobacco Cessation ads, Truth Initiative ads, and Rick Bender ads for counter-
marketing efforts.117, 157 Rick Bender is an advocate that discusses his experience with oral 
cancer caused by using smokeless tobacco. The Foundation complimented Bender’s 
advertisements by arranging for him to talk at junior and senior high schools.117 In 2010, the 
Rapides Foundation ran its own “Faces of Tobacco” advertising campaign that featured people 
 119 
 
who died from tobacco use, were harmed by tobacco use, and those who lost loved ones to 
tobacco-related illnesses.158 Rick Bender also participated in that campaign. Foundation ads aired 
on radio, television, social media, and billboards.117 The foundation spent approximately $1 
million per year in 2008 and 2009, and subsequently dropped annual funding to $800,000, and 
then $700,000 per year by 2014.117 The Rapides Foundation continued to air tobacco counter 
marketing ads in 2018.159 
 
Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana 
 
Health and tobacco control advocates established the Coalition for a Tobacco-Free 
Louisiana by 1999160 to inform and lobby lawmakers on tobacco control policy.93, 161 CTFLA 
reorganized under the Louisiana Public Health Institute in 2001 and operated using a Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation grant given to the institute that year. By August 2003 CTFLA 
received additional funding from The American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, 
the American Lung Association of Louisiana, and the Office of Public Health at the Louisiana 
DHH.162 The coalition grew to 30 partners by June 2004 (Table 4.12).  
CTFLA aided passage of the Tobacco Tax Healthcare Act in 2002 that helped create TFL 
(Chapter 11), secured partial preemption repeal over local clean air restrictions in 2003, and 
helped obtain a statewide clean air law prohibiting smoking in most public places besides bars 
and casinos in 2006 that also fully repealed 
preemption (Chapter 10). 
Over time, CTFLA membership consisted of 
the American Cancer Society, American Lung  
Association, American Heart Association, LTCP, 
TFL, The Rapides Foundation, LSU Health Sciences 
Center Tobacco Control Initiative (TCI), and other 
state-based partners. The LTCP sent staff members to 
serve as representatives in the CTFLA beginning in 
2003.139, 161 TFL, who’s administrating organization 
LPHI hosted CTFLA, would later partner and work 
alongside coalition members after it formed in 2004 
(Chapters 10-12). 
 
Opposition to the Coalition and its policy 
objectives from Governor Jindal and his 
administration in the late 2000s resulted in LTCP ending participation in the CTFLA sometime 
between 2011 and 2013.139, 161 According to LPHI CEO Joseph Kimbrell in a 2016 interview for 
this report: 
The state health department…there have been times when they couldn’t play 
much of an advocacy role, just particularly during the Jindal administration years. 
They’ll be able probably now [in 2016] to be a lot more assertive or be a lot more 
vocal about any kind of tobacco issue at this point. But there’ve been years in 
there where that was tough.10 
The CTFLA aided passage of 
the Tobacco Tax Healthcare 
Act in 2002 that helped 
create TFL, secured 
preemption repeal over local 
clean air restrictions in 2003, 
and helped obtain a 
statewide clean air law 
prohibiting smoking in most 
public places .… 
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After LTCP discontinued participation in CTFLA efforts, the state program maintained contact 
with the coalition to keep informed on policy advocacy efforts.87 CTFLA was last active in 2018, 
when it unsuccessfully pushed for comprehensive statewide smokefree bill HB881 (Chapter 12).  
Louisiana Tobacco-Related Health Disparities Collaborative 
 
The Louisiana Primary Care Association and the Louisiana DHH’s Chronic Diseases 
Prevention and Control Program formed the Louisiana Tobacco-Related Health Disparities 
Collaborative to bolster outcomes for patients with cardiovascular disease and diabetes at health 
centers.93 LTCP worked with the Louisiana Tobacco-Related Health Disparities Collaborative 
from 2009 to 2018.93 The Louisiana Health Disparities Collaborative consisted of LTCP, the 
Louisiana Primary Care Association, and the Chronic Disease Prevention and Control Program 
of the DHH. The collaborative trained medical staff to offer cessation services and track tobacco 
use by patients.93 LTCP also incorporated its Fax-to-Quit LA and Project HEAL programs into 
the Louisiana Health Disparities Collaborative.93 
 
Table 4.12: Early CTFLA Membership in June 2004163 
Donor Members American Cancer Society 
American Heart Association 
American Lung Association 
American Medical Association 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
Louisiana Department of Hospitals Office of Public Health* 
Standard Members Aneurysm Outreach, Inc. 
Better Breathers Club of Central Louisiana 
BlueCross Blue Shield of Louisiana 
Cancer Association of Greater New Orleans 
Environmental and Health Council of Central Louisiana 
Gibsland Youth Community Resource Center 
Girl Scouts of S.E. Louisiana 
Healthy Lifestyle Choices 
Louisiana Academy of Family Physicians Foundation 
Louisiana Cancer Control Partnership 
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Addictive Disorders 
Louisiana Department of Hospitals Office of Public* Health Tobacco Control Program 
Louisiana Department of Justice 
Louisiana Health Care Review, Inc. 
Louisiana State Medical Society 
LSU Health Sciences Center 
Mary Bird Perkins Cancer Center 
No Smoking Environment Coalition of Greater New Orleans 
North Louisiana AHEC 
Peers Against Tobacco 
Southwest Louisiana AHEC 
Tangipahoa Alcohol and Drug Abuse Council 
Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine 
United Way of Northeast Louisiana 
*Counted as one entity instead of two. 
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Smoking Cessation Trust 
  
The Smoking Cessation Trust (SCT) is a 
free quit program available to Louisianans that 
initiated smoking before September 1, 1988.164, 165 
The Trust formed in 2011 and started providing 
cessation assistance in 2012 166 after the class action 
lawsuit Scott v. American Tobacco Co, a case filed in 1996 against major tobacco companies, 
received a final ruling in 2011.165, 166 The decision mandated the formation of a 10 year quit 
program funded by the tobacco companies that used fact-based cessation methods.166 Program 
architects designed the Smoking Cessation Trust using the US Public Health Service’s guideline, 
Treating Tobacco Use and Dependence: 2008 Update.166 The program consists of health 
organization interventions, quit lines, quit programs, and compensation for any medication and 
nicotine replacement therapy used to aid cessation.166 
Smokers must apply and be approved to participate in the Smoking Cessation Trust 
program.165 Over 200,000 Louisianans qualify for cessation services from SCT,164 and by late 
June 2014, 17,109 state residents were program members.166 Participants receive free assistance 
for their first two quit attempts each year, and according to the Smoking Cessation Trust website, 
choose between “phone support/coaching, physician assistance, group cessation counseling, &/or 
medications.”165 Over 20 health providers participate and provide services for SCT as of 
December 2019. The SCT offers qualifying persons quit coaches and other quitline services, and 
nicotine replacement therapy via LTCP and TFL’s joint quit line.87, 167 The Smoking Cessation 
Trust ends in 2022.165  
The Louisiana Healthy Communities Coalition 
  
The Louisiana Healthy Communities Coalition is a nine-member network of regional 
coalitions dedicated to improving overall health in the state, including reducing smoking rates.168 
A leadership council and an advisory board consisting of health voluntary representatives and 
public health officials guide the coalition’s efforts (Table 4.13).169  
LHCC initially formed in 2004 as a smaller Regional Comprehensive Cancer Coalition 
(RCCC) to bolster community cancer screenings, as well as cancer and tobacco prevention 
education.169 According to LHCC, RCCC coalitions formed a Tobacco Subcommittee that acted 
as a “…stand-alone coalition that expanded the RCCC’s tobacco prevention education efforts to 
include local, regional, and statewide tobacco control policy, systems and environmental 
changes.”169  RCCC and TSC coalitions merged in September 2013 into the 9-member network 
of regional coalitions known as the LHCC169 as of 2020.  
TFL collaborates with four of the nine regional coalitions to reduce smoking rates in 
some areas or secure smokefree policies in others.170 Fresh Campus and Defy groups, part of 
TFL’s Community Advocacy Grant programs, have also participated in Healthy Communities 
Coalitions.170 TFL was participating in the Louisiana Healthy Communities Coalition as of 2018. 
TFL, the Department of Health’s Well-Ahead program (the public-facing brand of the Louisiana 
Department of Health’s Bureau of Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, which 
oversees the state tobacco control program) and the Louisiana Cancer Prevention and Control 
Programs give the LHCC resources and steer its efforts.171 
Table 4.13: Membership of Louisiana Healthy 
Communities Coalition Leadership Council169 
Louisiana Comprehensive Cancer Control 
Program 
Louisiana Public Health Institute 
DHH Health Promotion Team 
American Cancer Society 
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Conclusion  
  
Louisiana’s tobacco control programming and capabilities were limited in scope and 
effectiveness from the late 1970s until the creation of TFL in 2004. Tobacco control advocates 
initiated tobacco control efforts in Louisiana in the late 1970s. The DHH implemented and 
participated in tobacco control initiatives by the mid-1980s but did not have a dedicated program 
until a CDC STATE Impact grant allowed the agency to form the LTCP in 1993. LTCP received 
little to no funding and relied on CDC grants to operate. Programmatic issues at the LTCP and 
strained relations with the program caused tobacco control advocates to seek the creation and 
funding of a new tobacco control program in 2002. Advocates succeeded in passing a tobacco 
tax that dedicated 2 cents of revenue towards tobacco control initiatives (Chapter 11) through the 
LCRC, which led to the launch of TFL in 2004. The tax increased state spending on tobacco 
control between approximately $7 million to $9 million annually, remaining drastically below 
levels recommended by the CDC’s 1999 Best Practices for Tobacco Control report.45 Poor 
relations between the advocates behind TFL and the LTCP initially prevented the two programs 
from significantly cooperating or aligning their work. The devastation caused by Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 as well as limited resources caused the tobacco control programs to undergo 
programmatic alignment guided by TTAC from 2006-2010. Alignment allowed LTCP and TFL 
to streamline their programming, develop complimentary plans, focuses and initiatives based on 
their abilities, and allowed them to jointly offer cessation assistance. Although routinely 
underfunded compared to CDC 2014 Best Practices Recommendations, the LTCP and TFL have 
developed and implemented effective community intervention programs, health communications 
and cessation services. The programs have also collaborated with other nonprofits, health 
organizations, and tobacco cessation groups in Louisiana to advance tobacco control efforts. 
Louisiana saw significant improvement in tobacco control programing and secured significant 
tobacco control legislation at the state and local levels by 2020. 
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Chapter 5: Early Clean Air Efforts and Preemption (1970-
1993) 
 
• The tobacco industry’s powerful presence in the Louisiana state legislature helped block 61 
clean indoor air bills from passing between 1970 and 1993. 
• Most attempts at clean air legislation were not comprehensive policies, instead seeking to 
eliminate smoking in specific workplaces and facilities. 
• Most local control ordinances were weak or limited in scope. 
• As the tobacco industry faced a wave of local smoking control ordinances, it changed 
strategy and pursued accommodation and preemption laws in Louisiana in the State 
Legislature. 
• In 1993, the industry obtained smoking accommodation legislation at the state level, 
preempting local control for the next ten years. 
 
Early Efforts at Clean Air Legislation 
 
Efforts to regulate smoking in Louisiana started in 1970, becoming more frequent as 
years passed. As attempts to secure clean air legislation increased, the Louisiana Legislature 
remained hostile to any form of smoking restriction, with 61 of 68 attempts to pass statewide 
restrictions on smoking failing from 1970 to 1993 
(excluding resolutions, which did not result in smoking 
policy changes, Table 5.1).1 Early bills were generally 
limited in scope, seeking to prohibit smoking in the 
Superdome, elevators, public and government buildings, 
schools, and medical facilities. Despite the weak 
restrictions of most proposed clean air legislation, only 
one bill (excluding resolutions) that prohibited smoking 
in the arena area of the Superdome and did not require 
enforcement entered law before 1992 (Table 5.1). Most 
legislation introduced in Louisiana from 1970-1993 
died in their initial committee of referral, either from adjournment or being deferred. In 
Louisiana, prefiled bills are assigned to a committee by the presiding officer of each chamber.2 
Bills introduced in the House during a session are referred to a committee by the House Speaker, 
but their decision can be reversed and assignment changed by a majority vote of representatives. 
The Senate assigns bills introduced during the session via motion. Bills must be relevant to the 
committee they are assigned. Initial committee assignments are important as legislation can be 
repeatedly contained and /or killed by unfriendly committees for years, as seen with smoking 
restriction bills in Louisiana.  
Legislative efforts to restrict smoking in Louisiana began in the 1970s at the state level. 
Lawmakers during that time fruitlessly introduced bills seeking to restrict smoking in public 
places and public transit. In addition, one legislator unsuccessfully attempted multiple times to 
restrict smoking at a major New Orleans sports stadium, The Superdome. Smoking restriction 
bills introduced during the 1970s died without consideration upon adjournment or in their initial  
Most legislation introduced in 
Louisiana from 1970-1993 
died in their initial committee 
of referral, either from 
adjournment or being 
deferred. 
 124 
 
Table 5.1: Timeline of Clean Air Legislation Attempted at the State Level  
Bill / 
Resolution 
Sponsor Year Locations Covered  Outcome 
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HB 1293 Graham 1970           +   Defeated  
HB 1116 Fowler 1975 +             Withdrawn 
HB 647 Waller 1976 +             Died with adjournment 
HB 648 Waller 1976          +    Died with adjournment 
SB 209 Casey 1977     +         Died with adjournment 
SB 583 Casey 1978     +         Died with adjournment in 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
SB 392 Casey 1979     +         Died with adjournment in 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
SRES6 Casey 1979         +     Died with adjournment 
SB 292 Casey 1980              Defeated in Senate 
Commerce Committee  
SB 162 Casey 1980     +         Died with Adjournment in 
Senate Commerce 
Committee 
SCRES 
154 
Hudson 1980            +  Adopted 
SB 689 Casey 1981     +         Withdrawn 
HB 1512 Lancaster 1981     +         Withdrawn 
SRES3 O’Keefe 1981         +     Unknown 
HB 411 Johnson 1982 +             Defeated in House Health 
and Welfare Committee 
HB 1161 Johnson 1983 +      + +  + +   Defeated in House Health 
and Welfare Committee 
HB 569 Hudson 1983          +    Died with adjournment in 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
HB 1042 Johnson 1984       +       Defeated in House Health 
and Welfare Committee 
HB 535 Johnson 1985       +       Defeated on House Floor 
HB 767 Kenneth 1985   +           Died with adjournment in 
House Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 116 Nicholson 1985        +      Defeated in Senate Health 
and Welfare Committee 
HB 1047 Lancaster 1986     +         Adopted 
SB 309 Johnson 1986 +             Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 683 Hollis 1986          +    Died with adjournment in 
House Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SR 15 Johnson 1986       +       Adopted 
SB 586 Johnson 1987              Defeated in Senate Health 
and Welfare Committee 
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Table 5.1: Timeline of Clean Air Legislation Attempted at the State Level  
Bill / 
Resolution 
Sponsor Year Locations Covered  Outcome 
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SB 594 Johnson 1987  +            Defeated in Senate Health 
and Welfare Committee 
SCR173 Johnson 1987              Died with adjournment in 
Senate Labor Relations 
Committee 
HB 1156 Forster 1988        +      Died with adjournment in 
House Health and Welfare 
Committee 
HB 1814 Lancaster 1988  +            Died with adjournment in 
House Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 545 Johnson 1988       +       Defeated in Senate Health 
and Welfare Committee 
SB 546 Johnson 1988       +       Defeated in Senate Health 
and Welfare Committee 
SR 16 Johnson 1988            +  Adopted 
HB 159 Lalonde 1989      + + +      Died with adjournment in 
House Natural Resources 
Committee 
HCSR 17  1989            +  Adopted 
SB 154 Johnson 1989       +       Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 155 Johnson 1989  +            Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 801 Johnson 1989  +            Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 802 Johnson 1989       +       Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 818 McPherso
n 
1989       +       Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 870 Johnson 1989       +        Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SR 8 Johnson 1989            +  Adopted 
HB 217 Jackson 1990       +       Died with adjournment on 
the Senate Floor 
HB 397 Lalonde 1990      + + +      Defeated in House Health 
and Welfare Committee 
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HB 571 Lancaster 1990      +        Defeated in House 
Education Committee 
HB 924 Carrier 1990      + + +      Died with adjournment in 
House Health and Welfare 
Committee 
HB 1423 Hand 1990  +            Defeated in House Health 
and Welfare Committee 
SB 816 Johnson 1990  +            Defeated in Senate 
Commerce Committee 
SB 826 Johnson 1990       +       Died with adjournment in 
Senate Commerce 
Committee 
SB 835 Johnson 1990 + +            Died with adjournment in 
Senate Commerce 
Committee 
HB 567 Lalonde 1991       +       Defeated on House floor 
HB 1292 Jackson 1991       +      + Passed; Vetoed by Governor 
SB 230 Johnson 1991  +            Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 240 Johnson 1991       +       Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 243 Johnson 1991  +     +       Defeated on House floor 
SB 729 Ullo 1991        +      Defeated on House Floor 
HB 286 Hand 1992  +            Defeated on House floor  
HB 732 Forster 1992        +      Died with adjournment on 
Senate Floor 
HB 1572 Ellington 1992   +           Withdrawn 
HB 1625 Lalonde 1992  + +     +      Died with adjournment in 
House Health and Welfare 
Committee 
HB 1626 Lalonde 1992  +     +       Defeated on House floor  
HB 1632 Lalonde 1992  +            Died with adjournment in 
House Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 163 Johnson 1992       + +      Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 165 Johnson 1992 +*      +       Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
HB 1176 Ellington 1992      +        Adopted 
SB 147 Fields 1992      +        Adopted 
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SB 164 Johnson 1992       +       Adopted 
SB 539 Dardenne 1992        +      Adopted 
HB 1080 Travis 1993 +  +       + +  + Died with adjournment in 
House Health and Welfare 
Committee 
HB 1086 Travis 1993       +      + Died with adjournment in 
House Health and Welfare 
Committee 
HB 1469 Chaisson 1993 +          +   Died with adjournment in 
House Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 147 Johnson 1993       +       Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 150 Johnson 1993 +      + +  + +   Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 539 Brinkhaus 1993 +             Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
SB 767 Landry 1993       +      + Adopted 
SB 768 Landry 1993 +  + +
*
* 
    + + +  + Adopted 
*Cultural Venues only. 
**Exempted venues that made over 50% of gross receipts selling alcohol from smoking restrictions. 
 
committee. 1978 marked the introduction of local smoking restrictions in Louisiana, when the 
New Orleans City Council also rejected an ordinance to restrict smoking in the Superdome. The 
tobacco industry opposed few bills during the 1970s according to our research but mobilized its 
employees to lobby against state legislation and sent representatives to oppose the New Orleans 
ordinance. 
Attempts to pass smoking restriction legislation at the state level increased during the 
1980s. The tobacco industry successfully countered smoking restriction bills by mobilizing 
employee lobbying groups such as the Tobacco Action Network (TAN) and by having its 
representatives oppose bills alongside figures from third party allies. A growing local regulatory 
effort by tobacco control advocates across the nation in the 1980s led the tobacco industry to 
consider altering its legislative strategy in Louisiana. In a 1987 report evaluating potential states 
for preemption campaigns, the Tobacco Institute noted that tobacco control advocates in 
Louisiana had supported state-level smokefree bills but not local measures.3 In contrast to the 23 
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attempts made in the Louisiana State legislature by June 1987, only 9 local governments had 
debated local smoking restrictions (Table 5.14), most seeking to prohibit smoking in city council 
chambers.3 Still, in 1987 the Tobacco Institute considered pursuing preemption of local 
legislation in Louisiana as part of a nationwide plan to block the emerging local movement for 
smoking restrictions.3 Preemption prohibits local governments from enacting laws stronger than 
state laws on a given policy issue. 
The Tobacco Institute did not plan or mobilize to preempt local control in Louisiana until 
1989, when tobacco control advocates became increasingly active at the state level and more 
cities considered or adopted clean air ordinances across the nation.4 The Tobacco Institute 
unsuccessfully tried to pass smoker’s rights legislation containing preemption in Louisiana in 
1990 with HB 217,5 and in 1991 with HB 1292.6 Both bills mandated smoking sections in 
workplaces, in line with the Tobacco Institute’s goal of protecting purported smokers’ rights and 
“prohibiting all discrimination of smokers in … employment practices.”7 The Tobacco Institute 
(TI) ultimately pushed lawmakers to pass two smokers’ rights bills preempting local control in 
Louisiana in 1993, the Louisiana Office Clean Indoor Air Act (SB 767) and the Louisiana Clean 
Indoor Air Act (SB 768). Both laws created a ten-year period of total statewide preemption over 
local clean air regulations until health advocates secured legislation partially repealing 
preemption in 2003. 
Early Attempts at State Clean Air Legislation: 1970-1976 
  
The first state clean air legislation introduced in the Louisiana Legislature was HB 1293, 
submitted by Representative Graham in 1970.8, 9 HB 1293 prohibited smoking on buses traveling 
routes going 10 or more miles past the “corporate limits of any municipality.”8 The bill did not 
pass.8  
 Tobacco industry documents reveal that Representative Fowler proposed Louisiana’s 
second smoking restriction bill, HB 1116, during the 1975 session. The legislation prohibited 
smoking in public places, defined as any location that members from two different families 
might encounter one another except for private residences, hospitality venues, and federal 
property.10, 11 Representative Fowler withdrew HB 116 on June 20, 1975 after failing to secure 
support for the bill.10, 12  
 In 1976 Representative Waller introduced two clean air bills, HB 647 and HB 648. HB 
647 outlawed smoking in public restrooms and public entertainment establishments, while HB 
648 barred smoking in elevators.13 Both bills died with adjournment.13, 14 
Major Clean Air Efforts Manifest to Regulate Smoking at the Superdome 
  
In 1975, a group of nonsmoking Louisianans filed a class action lawsuit against the 
Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District in the US District Court for Eastern Louisiana in a bid 
to prohibit smoking at the Superdome.15 The Superdome, a stadium located in New Orleans, 
opened in 1975 and became home to professional football team the New Orleans Saints and 
various events. In the lawsuit, Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, 418 F. 
Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), plaintiffs claimed that nonsmokers had a basic right to clean air and 
asserted that stadium officials exposed event attendees unwillingly to harmful secondhand smoke 
by permitting tobacco use.16 In September 1976, the federal district court ruled against the 
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plaintiffs,17 holding that no constitutionally protected right had been violated and that legislators 
could resolve the issue.16  
 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
lower court's decision in August 1978. The court noted 
that state and city lawmakers could restrict smoking in 
the Superdome.16 The US Supreme Court subsequently 
refused an appeal to hear the case.  
 After the Gasper lawsuit was filed and 
subsequently dismissed in District Court, state and local 
lawmakers introduced legislation in 1977 to restrict 
smoking at the Superdome. Senator Thomas A. Casey 
(D-New Orleans) introduced SB 209 to prohibit 
smoking in indoor stadiums or sport facilities with seating capacity at or over 40,000.18 Senator 
Casey submitted SB 209 after receiving “many complaints from so many people going to the 
Superdome that it finally got to the point that I [he] did introduce legislation.”19 Similar to 
previous clean air bills, SB 209 died upon adjournment.20 
The New Orleans City Council Considers Restricting Smoking in the Superdome 
  
Around the same time, the New Orleans City Council proposed an ordinance to prohibit 
smoking in the Superdome.21  
 The tobacco industry mobilized its staff and employees from allied companies to oppose 
the ordinance. Philip Morris sales employees lobbied city councilmembers,21 and volunteers 
from the Philip Morris Tobacco Action Program (TAP) attended City Council meetings and 
wrote letters to councilmembers.21 Philip Morris started TAP to supplement efforts Tobacco 
Action Network effforts by providing Phillip Morris workers with alerts regarding developing 
political issues, industry talking points, and instructions on advocating for the tobacco 
companies.22 The New Orleans City Council voted against adopting the Superdome smoking 
restriction ordinance.21 
Casey Continues to Pursue Stadium Legislation in 1978 
 
Despite failed efforts to limit smoking at the Superdome in 1977, the arena remained a 
focal point of state and local clean air legislation the following year. At the state level, Senator 
Casey introduced SB 583 on May 1, 1978, to outlaw smoking and possession of tobacco 
products in stadiums and indoor sports facilities with a seating capacity above 40,000 people.23 
The bill died in the Senate Judiciary Committee without a hearing.23, 24   
Local Activity in 1978 
 
In 1978, the New Orleans City Council considered the first broad clean air ordinance in 
Louisiana. Submitted on February 21 by Councilman Joseph Giarrusso, Ordinance 7315 
prohibited smoking in public elementary and secondary schools (except areas inaccessible to 
youth), buses, restaurants, retail stores, general businesses, display areas in museums, health care 
facilities (except in smoking rooms or employee-only areas), auditoriums, meeting rooms, at 
Senator Casey submitted SB 
209 after receiving “many 
complaints from so many 
people going to the 
Superdome that it finally got 
to the point that I [he] did 
introduce legislation.”  
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public meetings, and seating areas at the Superdome and other indoor arenas.25 Bars, tobacco 
retailers, businesses being used for private functions, and contained offices used solely by 
smokers were excluded from restrictions.25 The measure assigned enforcement of smoking 
restrictions to business management and owners25, 26 and provided the New Orleans Department 
of Health power to ensure compliance by businesses.25 Individual violations faced a $25 fine.25 
The New Orleans City Council held a meeting to vote on Ordinance 7315 on March 2. At 
the request of TI, Brown and Williamson tobacco company sent sales representatives to oppose 
Ordinance 7315 at the hearing.27 Allied business representatives attending to oppose Ordinance 
7315 were Frank Fry of the Louisiana Restaurant Association (LRA), Howard Goodman of the 
New Orleans Hotel-Motel Association, as well as an unknown number of restaurant owners and 
hotel managers.28 The LRA and Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association developed into strong allies 
of the tobacco industry (Chapter 2). Orleans Parish Schoolboard member Rose Mary Loving also 
opposed the ordinance.28 We do not know if the tobacco industry recruited Loving to appear. 
Opponents argued against smoking restrictions, claiming businesses faced economic 
harm and asserting that proprietors should be allowed to serve customers as they desired.28 LRA 
representative Fry testified, “We are in the business of service, not enforcement.”28 New Orleans 
Hotel-Motel Association’s Goodman also testified that the ordinance would put city businesses 
at a competitive disadvantage with establishments in nearby towns and parishes not covered by 
clean air regulations.28 Schoolboard member Loving stated that Orleans Parish schools had 
already designated smoking areas for students that had parent approval to smoke, and claimed 
the ordinance economically harmed the New Orleans education system since the legislation 
required financially-strapped schools to make costly (but unspecified) changes.28 
Arguments from Ordinance 7315 supporters focused on protecting public health. The 
most prominent supporter at the hearing was Dr. Alton Oschner, one of the first US physicians or 
scientists to highlight the dangers of cigarettes. Oschner published a paper in 1939 that 
determined smoking had negative health consequences and founded the Oschner Clinic, which 
participated in later tobacco control coalitions.29 Oschner told Councilmembers that secondhand 
smoke could harm bystanders and that exposure was dangerous for people afflicted with 
cardiovascular or respiratory disease.28 Attorney Jacob Meyer also testified in support of 
Ordinance 7315, contesting Councilmember Brod Bagert’s argument that the measure infringed 
on smokers’ and business owners’ rights by asserting that governments were responsible for 
ensuring the welfare of their people.28 In addition to Oschner and Meyer, Councilman Giarrusso 
had tried to recruit Joseph Califano, then the Secretary of the US Department of Health 
Education and Welfare who actively opposed the tobacco industry, to attend the meeting.28 
Califano did not accept the invitation.28 
The City Council voted 6-1 against Ordinance 7315,26, 28 with only its sponsor 
Councilman Giarrusso voting in favor. Following the failed vote, Councilmember Frank Friedler 
Jr. proposed a resolution requesting businesses voluntarily establish no-smoking areas that 
particularly encouraged restaurant participation.28 The resolution passed in a 5-2 decision, with 
Councilmembers Joseph DiRosa and Giarrusso voting against because the legislation had no 
legal force.28 A week later, Ben Fontaine of the American Lung Association of Louisiana (and 
the affiliated Nonsmokers’ Rights Council) criticized Councilmembers that voted against 
Ordinance 7315 in a public statement.26, 28 We do not know what role the American Lung 
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Association of Louisiana or the Nonsmokers’ Rights Council played in efforts to pass 
Giarrusso’s ordinance. 
Councilmember Giarrusso made another attempt that year to pass clean air restrictions, 
introducing Ordinance 7498 to prohibit smoking and tobacco possession in seating areas of all 
arenas with a seating capacity surpassing 20,000 people, affecting most notably the 
Superdome.30 Upon the advice of its local counsel, TI requested in a legislative bulletin that 
tobacco companies recruit three or four additional tobacco company staff to attend the August 17 
hearing for the ordinance.30 TI asked that the employees watch as members of the public and not 
reveal their employment by the tobacco industry. In one memo, TI official L. Gordon directly 
asked Lorillard Division Manager of Field Sales in New Orleans, A.C. Saldinger, to send three 
or four staff “…to show that  there are interested citizens at the hearing.”31 The letter asked 
Saldinger and his employees to avoid revealing they were tobacco company staff.31 
At the hearing, the New Orleans City Council deferred action on the ordinance due to an 
opinion provided by Louisiana’s Attorney General stating that the measure violated state law.30, 
32 Giarrusso had also asked the New Orleans City Attorney to issue an opinion on his ordinance’s 
legality.30 Assistant City Attorney Jackson McNeely issued an opinion concurring that 
Giarrusso’s ordinance violated Louisiana state law because local governments were preempted 
from regulating the state government, and the Superdome operated under the authority of the 
Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, a state agency.32 
As a result of the opinions from the Louisiana Attorney General and the New Orleans 
Assistant City Attorney, Councilman Giarrusso delayed the second hearing for Ordinance 7498 
until September 21, then again until October 5, 1978.30, 33 When the City Council considered the 
ordinance, members split 3 to 3, defeating it.33 Instead, the New Orleans City Council 
unanimously passed a resolution on October 12 imploring Governor Edwin Edwards (D) to 
impose smoking restrictions on the Superdome.33 The Tobacco Institute was not prepared to 
oppose the resolution since it was not listed on the City Council Meeting agenda.33 TI considered 
the resolution ineffectual and benign since it had no legal effect, yet reasoned it gave 
Councilman Giarrusso a reprieve from constituent pressure for smoking restrictions.33  
While attempts to impose clean air laws floundered in New Orleans, efforts continued at 
the state level. 
1979: Casey tries for the Superdome again with SB 392 
 
Senator Casey repeatedly pursued Superdome smoking restriction legislation. He 
proposed SB 392 on April 25, 1979 to prevent smoking in the Superdome.34 Similar to 1978’s 
SB 583, SB 392 went to the Senate Judiciary Committee and died without a hearing.34, 35 Casey 
also proposed Senate Resolution (SR) 6 in April 1979 to bar smoking in Senate Committee 
rooms.34 The resolution also died with adjournment.34  
Casey renewed efforts to restrict smoking in the Superdome in 1980. He submitted SB 
162 to prohibit smoking in any indoor stadium or sports facility seating 40,000 or more 
persons.36 In an interview regarding SB 162 with the Times-Picayune, Senator Casey admitted to 
not aggressively pursuing his past Superdome legislation because Superdome officials previously 
assured him they would install proper ventilation systems and would regularly display a courtesy 
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“no smoking” message on the scoreboard.19 The bill died in the Senate Commerce Committee 
without a hearing.36   
 
1980: SB 292 “Louisiana Indoor Clean Air Act” Defeated by the Tobacco Industry  
 
While Senator Casey introduced Superdome legislation, he and clean air proponents 
focused their energy on another bill Casey introduced on April 30, 1980, the Louisiana Clean 
Indoor Air Act (SB 292). According to TI’s records, SB 292 restricted smoking “in places of 
work, retail stores, public transportation, schools, healthcare facilities, auditoriums, arenas, 
public meeting rooms, theaters and concert halls, museums, and art galleries.”36 SB 292 also 
allowed restaurants able to seat more than fifty people to restrict smoking. SB 292 was assigned 
to the Senate Commerce Committee.36 SB 292 marked the first time a comprehensive clean air 
law was attempted at the state level since 1975. SB 292 received support from the Louisiana 
Lung Association.37, 38  In an interview with the Times-Picayune on his clean air legislative 
efforts in May 1980, Casey stated that he would “make a very concerted effort to get the Lung 
Association bill passed” that year.19  
 
The Tobacco Institute and its allies mobilized to defeat the Louisiana Clean Indoor Air 
Act. In 1980, TI was already in the southeastern states through its Tobacco Action Network 
(TAN) and Tobacco Tax Council (TTC) (Chapter 2). Senior Vice President of the TI State 
Activities Division in Washington DC and National TAN Director, Jack Kelly,39 circulated an 
action alert on May 19, 1980, calling for “TAN member company volunteers … along from 
other industry segments, to attend the Commerce Committee Hearing on S 292 … once a date 
for the hearing was established.”40 By the end of February 1980, 146 members had enrolled in 
TAN in Louisiana, creating a pool of allies for the industry to utilize.41 Kelly requested that TAN 
corporate coordinators immediately activate TAN members to attend the committee hearing for 
SB 292 in advance of a set date with him or Roger Mozingo, a TI Vice President and the 
Southern Region Director of Field Activities,41 so TAN participants could rally on short notice.40 
Despite preparing for immediate activation, TI failed to mobilize TAN members for SB 292’s 
first hearing. 
 
The Senate Commerce Committee considered 
SB 292 on June 12, 1980, the first time smoking 
restriction legislation received a hearing.42 We do not 
know if the tobacco industry appeared publicly at the 
first hearing. Committee members added multiple 
amendments, including one removing the prohibition on 
smoking in shopping centers, then scheduled another 
hearing, which occurred on June 18.43  
 
TI mobilized its TAN network for the second hearing. TI Southwest Area Manager Dan 
Alverson and TAN Director Paul Harrison coordinated the effort to bring in sales staff.42  TAN 
reported being "well represented”  at the hearing, with TI legislative counsel Joe Wood serving 
as the primary witness against SB 292.28, 38 Members from the TAN Advisory Committee of 
Louisiana, which consisted of Section Sales Manager Lance Jones of Philip Morris, New Orleans 
Division Manager Jim Fouts of Brown and Williamson, Bill Long of Liggett and Meyers, and 
The Senate Commerce 
Committee considered SB 
292 on June 12, 1980, the 
first time smoking restriction 
legislation received a hearing.  
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John Fitterer, the owner of Mr. J's Tobacco House in Monroe, Louisiana, as well as eight Philip 
Morris sales representatives attended the hearing.38, 42, 44-46 Third-party organizations also 
appeared at the hearing to protest SB 292, including officials from the Louisiana Healthcare 
Association (a business organization of nursing homes), the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association, 
and the Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco Distributors Association.28 Barbara Easley, Executive 
Director of the Louisiana Wholesale Grocers Association and a TAN volunteer, and Campanello, 
a representative of the Louisiana Restaurant Association identified only by his last name in 
tobacco industry documents, also attended.38, 42  
 
At the hearing, opponents argued that increasing regulation on businesses would be 
economically damaging. TI Legislative Counsel Joe Wood argued businesses should be allowed 
to meet public desire and demand without regulatory interference.28 Tobacco wholesalers  
claimed that SB 292 would cause them economic harm.28 Restaurant Association representative 
Campanello also spoke against SB 292 at the Commerce Committee hearing, but we do not 
know what he said.42 
 
In contrast, tobacco control advocates argued that SB 292 deserved passage because of 
the health dangers of secondhand smoke. Speaking on behalf of the American Lung Association, 
Ben Fontaine asserted that studies demonstrated nonsmokers faced increased health 
consequences from secondhand smoke exposure compared to actual smokers, and as a result 
deserved clean air.28 
 
The Committee defeated SB 292 by a vote of 4 to 3 (Table 5.2).47, 48 After the vote, 
Committee Chair Theodore Hickey voiced concern that SB 292 would force businesses to 
criminalize their clientele.28  
 
After failing to pass SB 
292, Senator Casey continued 
pursuing clean air regulations. 
He announced his intention to 
convince the legislature to 
establish a legislative 
committee to investigate 
smoking restrictions before the 
1981 legislative session.28  
Despite voting against Casey’s 
SB 292, on June 24, 1980, fellow committee member Thomas Hudson submitted Senate 
Concurrent Resolution (SCRES) 154 to the Senate Commerce Committee36 for the Senate and 
House Commerce Committees to form a joint committee to research the potential for barring 
smoking in public places.36 SCRES 154 passed the Senate Commerce Committee and received 
approval by the full Senate on July 2.36, 43 After receiving favorable reporting from the House 
Commerce Committee as well as the House and Governmental Affairs Committee, the House 
adopted SCRES 154 on July 12, 1980.36, 43 We found no evidence that tobacco industry members 
in Louisiana attempted to prevent SCRES 154 from being passed by the Legislature, allowing for 
the committee to deliver any findings it made during the 1981 session.49   
 
Table 5.2: Senate Commerce Committee Membership and Vote 
Regarding SB 29228 
Member Vote  
Theodore Hickey (Chairman) (D-New 
Orleans) 
No 
Thomas Hudson (D-Baton Rouge) No 
Allen Bares (D-Lafayette Yes 
William McLeod (D-Lake Charles) No 
Lawson Swearingen (D-Monroe) Yes 
Thomas Casey (D-New Orleans) Yes 
Joe Sevario (D-Baton Rouge) No 
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A Tobacco Control Ally is Elected to the House of Representatives  
 
In 1980, Jon Johnson (D-New Orleans) was elected to the Louisiana House of 
Representatives. In 1982 he began introducing tobacco control legislation for smoking 
restrictions, advertising bans, and designating tobacco as a cause of death on Louisiana death 
certificates. Johnson pursued tobacco control legislation until he lost his reelection bid for the 
Senate in 2003.50 
 
Johnson Pursues HB 411 
 
On April 20, 1982, Representative Johnson introduced House Bill 411 to prohibit 
smoking in all state buildings and offices, restaurants that seat fifty or more people, public 
arenas, and public places (retail stores, buses, educational institutions, nursing homes, hospitals, 
theaters, museums, and galleries). HB 411 was similar to Senator Casey's S392 and S292 which 
the industry defeated in 1979 and 1980.   
 
The tobacco industry successfully blocked HB 411 in the House Health and Welfare 
committee using its lobbyists and TAN volunteers. TAN sent out an action alert ten days after 
Johnson filed the bill describing it and providing instructions on how to oppose it. TI’s State 
Activities Policy Committee worked to get TAN volunteers to write letters opposing HB 411 to 
representatives as well as senators if the bill passed the House.51 A May 1982 internal industry 
document from a file of Louisiana TAN documents showed that TAN Members received 
standard industry talking points: 
 
1. No reliable [emphasis in original] scientific evidence exists to support the 
assumption that incidental exposure to ambient tobacco smoke is harmful to the 
health of nonsmokers.  
 
2. The bill is so vague and confusing that it is difficult to determine just where a 
person can or cannot smoke.  
 
3. Taxpayers' money should not be wasted by passing unenforceable laws that do 
more harm than good.  
 
4. The answer to the public smoking issue lies in mutual courtesy on the part of 
smokers and nonsmokers. Common courtesy, not punitive legislation, is the 
answer.  
 
5. If restaurant owners and other establishments catering to the public want to 
generate goodwill and increase business, they will offer what the public demands 
without a law to tell them what to do.  
 
6. The tolerance and accommodation needed to resolve minor everyday 
aggravations cannot – and should not – be legislated. 
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7. It will cost scarce tax dollars for the state to 
comply with the provisions of the bill by 
requiring the posting of signs and the use of 
government employees to implement the law. 
 
8. Laws that attempt to restrict or segregate 
smokers in public places are of such low priority 
that they receive little or no attention by those charged with enforcement.  
 
9. Small businesses have enough to worry about with adding addition, 
unnecessary state regulations.52  
 
The House Health and Welfare Committee considered HB 411 on May 28, 1982, voting 
8-3 to defer and virtually kill the bill.53 While it mobilized TAN volunteers to write state 
legislators, TI did not ask them to attend the committee hearing.54 
 
Johnson continued to introduce similar legislation in every session up until 1992 when 
the state passed its limited Louisiana Clean Air Indoor Act.  
 
The Tobacco Industry Prepares for an Increase in Adverse Legislation  
 
The smoking restriction legislation discussed above, combined with legislation to fund a 
tumor registry and increase tobacco taxes (Chapter 6), caused the tobacco industry to consider 
stronger defensive efforts in Louisiana. The onslaught of legislation prompted TI to identify 
Louisiana as a growing regulatory battleground, with TI Vice President and Director of Field 
Activities Roger Mozingo reporting to industry officials that 
1983 was expected to “be a bastard year.”55   
 
During the summer of 1982, after that year’s legislative 
session ended, TI made its first campaign contributions57 to 
members of critical policy committees for tobacco. Recipients 
included five representatives on the House Health and Welfare 
Committee, which regularly considered smoking restriction 
legislation (Table 5.3 and Chapter 3).55, 58 Mozingo reported to 
industry officials that the contributions “were very well 
received and should do a great deal to help strengthen our 
position.”55   
 
Industry Defends Against Smokefree Legislation during 
the 1983 Session 
 
 State lawmakers introduced five tobacco control bills 
during 1983. Two bills in the regular legislative session 
created an annual report on lung cancer in Louisiana, another 
two set smoking restrictions, and one submitted in a special 
Table 5.3: 1982 Campaign Contributions to 
House Health and Welfare Committee Members 
during Summer 1982 (Chapter 3)56  
Member Contribution Amount 
George C. Connor Jr. -- 
Louis Wood Jenkins -- 
R. Adley $400 
Alexander -- 
Bajoie -- 
Bopp -- 
Brady -- 
Carson -- 
Cusimano -- 
Dastugue -- 
D’Gerolamo $500 
Alphonse Jackson $500 
John Johnson -- 
Kember $400 
Lowenthal $500 
Lynn -- 
Watermeier -- 
Total $2,300 
The onslaught of legislation 
prompted TI to identify 
Louisiana as a growing 
regulatory battleground …. 
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legislative session raised the tax on cigarette packs from 11 to 16 cents (Chapter 6).59 None of 
the legislation passed. 
 
Of the two smokefree bills, Representative Jon Johnson sponsored the more 
comprehensive one. On May 2, 1980, he introduced HB 1161, the Louisiana Smoking 
Regulation Act, which prohibited smoking in any facilities owned or operated by the government 
and restricted smoking in museums, auditoriums, theaters, educational institutions, elevators, and 
public areas of healthcare facilities.59 On May 20, the House Health and Welfare Committee 
voted 8-7 to kill the bill.59  
 
The other smoking restriction bill, SB 569 by Senator Thomas Hudson, was also 
introduced on May 2, 1983. The bill merely prohibited smoking in public elevators.59 It died in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee without consideration.59  
 
Johnson tries again in 1984 
 
In 1984, Representative Jon Johnson made another unsuccessful attempt to pass smoking 
restriction legislation. He introduced HB 1042 at the end of April 1984 to restrict smoking in 
public places and in areas of government buildings open to the public.60 HB 1042 was assigned 
to the House Health and Welfare Committee, which effectively killed the bill by voting 7-3 to 
defer consideration on June 22, 1984. We do not know if the tobacco industry actively opposed 
the legislation, or if health advocates supported it. 
 
Tobacco Control Forces Become More Prominent 
 
As Representative Johnson continued efforts to restrict smoking, the tobacco industry 
identified him as a prominent tobacco control advocate in Louisiana. Johnson was the only 
Louisiana lawmaker listed in a 1985 internal Philip Morris document listing “anti-tobacco 
legislators” in 36 states.61 (Louisiana and thirteen other states had one legislator identified as 
anti-tobacco, while 14 states had none at all.) States with more active legislators included 
California (4) Connecticut (4), Hawaii (6), Massachusetts (15), New Jersey (3), New York (4), 
Pennsylvania (4), and Rhode Island (4) .61 At the end of 1985, TI’s political analysis of 
Louisiana still identified Johnson as a prominent tobacco control legislator in the state.62 
 
TI recognized that health voluntaries were becoming more active and a stronger threat in 
Louisiana by the end of 1985. The American Cancer Society (ACS), American Lung Association 
(ALA), and the American Heart Association (AHA) collaborated that year to run a media 
campaign towards a million Louisianans on the importance of tobacco warning labels as tobacco 
packages with warning labels mandated by the US Surgeon General came out.62 According to a 
December 1985 political analysis of Louisiana by RJ Reynolds, the company had considered the 
health voluntaries weak in prior years. However, RJ Reynolds believed that assistance from the 
state’s medical society, the Louisiana Medical Association, had strengthened the nonprofits.62 
Even so, RJ Reynolds believed that legislative committees were industry friendly and would 
defeat the health voluntaries’ legislative agenda.62 
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Johnson’s Continued Effort to Pass Smoking Restrictions, 1985 
 
 Representative Johnson introduced HB 535 on April 15, 1985, to prohibit smoking in all 
government owned or operated facilities (federal, state, and local), elevators, public 
conveyances,  healthcare facilities, and museums.63, 64 HB 535 was referred to the House Health 
and Welfare Committee, of which Johnson was a member, on April 22.65 
 
The House Health and Welfare Committee debated HB 535 on June 7, 1985, where TI 
lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry (formerly Joe Wood, Chapter 2) worked to kill the bill.While 
testifying, Guidry identified herself as a representative of her clients, the Louisiana Hotel 
Association and the Louisiana Wholesale Distributors Association.65 According to a narrative 
report by Guidry on Louisiana’s 1985 legislative session from TI’s records, she avoided 
identifying herself as a TI lobbyist at Health and 
Welfare Committee hearings on clean air legislation to 
make it appear there was local support for the 
industry’s legislative agenda: 
 
I have not testified against the bill in Health 
and Welfare for the last 3 years as representing 
the Tobacco Institute, but I testify representing 
the La. Wholesale Distributors and the La. 
Hotel Assoc. This primarily being so it looks 
more like “home folks” are opposed than “big 
out-of-staters”.65 
 
Joe Wood Guidry expected HB 535 to die in 
committee on a 6-6 split vote, but the meeting lasted 
over six hours and a pro-industry committee member 
had to leave before the vote.65 Fearing the committee 
might report HB 535 favorably, Guidry attempted to 
end the session by having committee member attendance drop below a quorum through 
unspecified means. However, the committee’s Vice Chair, Representative Mary Landrieu,66 
called for a vote to approve HB 535 before there was no longer a quorum. Landrieu’s move 
forced Guidry to unsuccessfully try and bring back pro-tobacco committee members to the 
meeting before the committee cast a decision.65 With six members absent, the Health and 
Welfare Committee voted 4-3 to pass HB 535.64 The bill became the first smoking restriction 
legislation reported favorably from the House Health and Welfare Committee.65  
 
After HB 535 survived the committee hearing, the House of Representatives held 
a contentious vote on the bill on June 24, 1985. While on the floor, representatives 
successfully added amendments adding the Superdome and legislative committee rooms 
and chambers to smoking restrictions.64 Unsuccessful proposed changes to HB 535 
included exemptions for elected officials from smoking restrictions and increases to the 
bill’s fines.64   
 
“I have not testified against 
the bill in Health and Welfare 
for the last 3 years as 
representing the Tobacco 
Institute, but I testify 
representing the La. 
Wholesale Distributors and 
the La. Hotel Assoc. This 
primarily being so it looks 
more like ‘home folks’ are 
opposed than ‘big out-of-
staters’.”  
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The tobacco industry’s legislative allies prevented 
HB 535 from passing through the House. Joe Wood Guidry 
reported that the tobacco industry’s friends in the house were 
dogged in their opposition to the bill, with eight lawmakers 
supporting the industry’s interests during floor debate (Table 
5.4).65 Guidry also reported that six members of the 
Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus “stayed with us” and 
opposed the bill despite criticism from HB 535’s legislative 
proponents during debate (Table 5.4).65 The industry 
defeated HB 535 in a 57-40 vote.67 Afterwards, 
Representative Jon Johnson told the press, “Louisiana has the 
highest lung cancer rate in the nation, and if the Legislature 
were seriously concerned about public health, it would 
approve the bill.”68 
 
Johnson Moves to the Senate, Giving the Industry a Win 
 
In 1985, Representative Jon Johnson was elected to the Senate. According to a December 
1985 political analysis of Louisiana from RJ Reynolds’ records, Johnson’s switch to the Senate 
strengthened the tobacco industry’s political position in the House Health and Welfare 
Committee:  
 
This year one of the main proponents of anti-smoking legislation, Representative 
Jon Johnson of New Orleans, won the race for the Senate. This was good for us 
because the vacant space on the House Health and Welfare Committee has been 
filled by a friend of ours, Representative Louis Jetson.62 
 
 On April 21, 1986, shortly after joining the Louisiana Senate, Johnson introduced SB 309 
to restrict smoking in government buildings, public transportation vehicles, educational and 
healthcare facilities, auditoriums, museums, and elevators.70 SB 309 exempted stadiums from 
restrictions. The bill originally was set to be heard in the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee, but on April 24 was re-referred to the Senate Health and Welfare Committee.70  
 
The Senate Health and Welfare Committee had members friendly to the tobacco 
companies that accepted industry contributions. TI’s December 1985 Louisiana political analysis 
referred to Joe McPherson, a recent appointment to the Senate Health and Welfare Committee, as 
“our friend.”62 Five of the seven committee members had also accepted campaign contributions 
from the tobacco industry (Table 5.5).71 Committee member Ron Landry later sponsored two 
industry-backed laws that instituted preemption over local control, detailed later in this chapter. 
 
At the June 2 hearing, the committee deferred action on SB 309 indefinitely, killing the 
bill.72, 73  
 
The health voluntaries did not cause the problems that TI expected. TI found that while 
the health organizations desired “non-smokers rights legislation …during 1986 the health 
Table 5.4: Legislators Who 
Spoke on Behalf of Tobacco 
Position at HB 535 Vote on 
the House Floor65 69 
Robert Adley 
Diane Bajoie* 
Harry Benoit 
Bruce Bolin 
Joe Delpit* 
Jimmy Dimos 
Alphonse Jackson* 
 Raymond Jetson* 
 Clyde Kimball 
 Ralph Miller 
Arthur Anthony Morrell* 
Willie Singleton* 
*Member of the Louisiana 
Legislative Black Caucus. 
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organizations were relatively quiet”74 It does not appear that health voluntaries participated in the 
effort to pass SB 309.  
 
Superdome Legislation Passes in 1986 
 
On May 1, 1986, Representative Charles Lancaster Jr. (R-Metarie) introduced HB 1047 
to restrict smoking in the Superdome stadium but 
“allow smoking in all areas of the Louisiana Superdome 
except the arena.”75 Lancaster had received $300 in 
campaign contributions from the tobacco industry 
during the 1983 election cycle.76 Senators and tobacco 
control supporters Casey and Johnson cosponsored HB 1047.77 In contrast to earlier Superdome 
legislation, Lancaster’s bill7 moved through the House Health and Welfare Committee, the 
House Floor, and the Senate Health and Welfare Committee without amendments.78 
 
 On the Senate floor, Senators Armand Brinkhaus (D-Sunset) and Gerry Hinton (D-
Slidell) proposed amendments to prohibit alcohol and chewing tobacco in an effort to kill the 
bill. After Brinkhaus argued, "You don't want me to smoke -- I don't want you to drink," his 
amendment was defeated 27 to 8.79, 80 Hinton's amendment to prohibit chewing tobacco or any 
other tobacco product was defeated 25 to 10.80 Brinkhaus subsequently motioned to delay a vote 
on the bill, which was defeated 26 to 9.80 The Senate passed HB 1047 in a 30 to 5 vote,80 and 
Governor Edwards signed it into law on July 2, 1986.72 We did not find evidence that the 
tobacco industry mobilized against HB 1047 or that the health groups mobilized to support it.    
 
 Superdome officials sought to avoid implementing the law. The Domed Stadium 
Commission, which holds authority over the Superdome, requested that State Attorney General 
William Guste Jr. determine the law’s constitutionality.81 In a newspaper interview, Superdome 
General Manager Cliff Wallace indicated concerns of conflict occurring from enforcing HB 
1047, stating, “Our staff at the Superdome and the police detail assigned to the building have told 
me they feel there may be mayhem if they try to eject smokers.”82  
 
The Commission subsequently withdrew the request, deciding instead to hold a public 
hearing over enforcement of HB 1047.81 HB 1047 provided enforcement responsibilities to the 
Commission but did not mandate any penalties, causing the Commission to seek public opinion 
on whether to remove offenders from the stadium.81 It is not clear whether the Domed Stadium 
Commission actually held a hearing to determine penalties for HB 1047, or if they enforced the 
new smoking restrictions. 
 
Table 5.5: Tobacco Institute Campaign Contributions to Senate Health and Welfare Members in 198671 
Member Party District Contribution Total in 1986 
Jon Johnson D New Orleans $0 
Elwyn Nicholson D Marrero $0 
Gerry Hinton D Slidell $500 
Mike Cross D Baton Rouge $500 
Ron Landry D La Place $500 
Joe McPherson D Alexandria $500 
Gregory Tarver D Shreveport $500 
"You don't want me to smoke 
-- I don't want you to drink."  
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New Problems Begin to Surface for the Tobacco Industry 
 
In 1986, US Surgeon General C. Everett Koop released his report The Health 
Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke83 that concluded involuntary smoking 
(secondhand smoke) caused lung cancer in healthy nonsmokers, lung problems for children, and 
that “the simple separation of smokers and nonsmokers within the same airspace may reduce, but 
does not eliminate, the exposure of nonsmokers to environmental tobacco smoke.” The tobacco 
industry attacked Koop’s intentions after the report was released, and asserted the document was 
more a political product than a scientific one.84 The report substantially accelerated the 
discussion of smoking restrictions nationwide and shifted the discussion from separate 
nonsmoking and smoking sections and the right of personal choice to greater protections for 
nonsmokers.84 
 
Legislation also appeared nationwide to secure warning labels on products with 
components that caused cancer. In November 1986, California voters passed Proposition 65, the 
Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, which required manufacturers to 
include warnings for any chemical known by the State of California to cause cancer or 
reproductive toxicity.85 In 1988, the tobacco industry would see an effort to enact similar 
legislation in Louisiana. 
 
Tobacco Industry Kills Two More Statewide Clean Air Bills from Johnson in 1987 
 
On February 27, 1987, US Surgeon General C. Everett Koop gave the keynote lecture at 
a symposium sponsored by the Oschner Medical Institutions in New Orleans highlighting recent 
conclusions in his Surgeon General’s report on the dangers of secondhand smoke. 86 He 
advocated that over the next several years anti-smoking efforts focus on creating smokefree 
workplaces.86 Koop asserted at the symposium that, “As both a physician and a public health 
official, it is my judgment that the time for delay is past. Measures to protect the public health 
are required now.”  
 
 While evidence mounted that secondhand smoke was dangerous, Senator Jon Johnson 
introduced two smoking restriction bills on May 4, 1987, SB 586 and SB 594. SB 586 prohibited 
smoking in elevators, auditoriums, healthcare facilities, educational facilities, and publicly-
owned buildings, but exempted prisons, military bases, bars, restaurants, hotels, and stadiums 
from restrictions with fines ranging from $25 to $50 for violations.87 SB 594 required employers 
to provide smokefree conditions satisfactory to requesting staff, even if doing so required 
prohibiting smoking in a workplace entirely.87 Both bills went to the Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee for initial consideration.  
 
 The tobacco industry worked to block SB 586 and SB 594 in the Senate Health and 
Welfare Committee. At a hearing for both bills, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry argued that the 
evidence of harm from secondhand smoke was inconclusive.87 Sarah Whalen, Executive Director 
of the Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributors Association, also testified against 
the bills.87 TI Vice President Ron Morris considered her a regular ally who “responds quickly to 
our request for legislative support.88 Whalen testified that the arguments for Johnson’s bills were 
emotional and lacked scientific support.87 On June 8, 1987, the Senate Health and Welfare 
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Committee voted to defer action 4 to 1 for SB 586 and 5 to 1 for SB 594, with Johnson the only 
dissenter,87, 89 killing both bills. 
 
New Orleans Attempts another Clean Air Ordinance in 1987 
 
Since the unsuccessful attempt to pass a clean air ordinance in New Orleans in 1978, 
there had been a minimal amount of activity on local smoking restrictions in Louisiana. Baton 
Rouge passed a local clean air ordinance in 1982 prohibiting smoking in public spaces of the 
Centraplex Arena, followed in 1984 by an administrative order in Hammond and an ordinance in 
Pineville restricting smoking in public meeting rooms.60, 90, 91 In 1985, the city of Walker failed 
to pass an ordinance, and Bossier adopted a resolution prohibiting smoking in city council 
chambers to preserve new carpeting that had been installed.92, 93 
 
Unlike the generally weak smoking restrictions pursued locally in Louisiana after 1978, 
in 1987 New Orleans City Councilmember Joe Giarrusso introduced a moderate clean air 
ordinance that triggered significant tobacco industry opposition. On April 1, Giarrusso, a former 
heavy smoker,94 held a press conference announcing his intention to introduce a clean air 
ordinance and a tax ordinance raising the local rate on all tobacco products from 10% to 27.5% 
of sales price (Chapter 6). Giarrusso was supported by New Orleans American Cancer Society 
President James Quinn and other ACS officials at the press conference.94  
 
Introduced on April 7, the New Orleans Clean Indoor Air Ordinance required employers 
to develop smoking policies that met the preferences of nonsmoking workers, including 
prohibiting smoking if necessary.95 The ordinance also prohibited smoking in public schools 
(except for employee-only areas), public transportation, elevators, seating sections of indoor 
sports facilities, cinemas and performance arts venues, libraries, public spaces of grocery stores, 
healthcare facilities (with exceptions for smoking rooms and employee-only areas), public 
meetings, and unspecified public places.95 The ordinance exempted private events, bars, tobacco 
retail stores, offices where all employees smoke, state-owned property, and public establishments 
granted approval by the Director of Health to allow smoking. Enforcement was assigned to the 
New Orleans Police Department, with penalties being a $25 fine.95   
 
TI readied to fight Councilmember Giarrusso’s two ordinances. Initially, TI considered 
using its lobbyist, Joe Wood Guidry, but instead hired public relations firm Haras Incorporated 
on her recommendation.96 In a memo to Hurst Marshall, TI Regional VP Ron Morris noted that 
Haras employed Michael O’Keefe, a “former president of the Louisiana Senate…active in New 
Orleans Politics” who “control(s) some [unspecified] large blocks of votes.”96 TI also developed 
a coalition to defeat Giarrusso’s ordinances, including Sarah Whalen of Louisiana Wholesale 
Tobacco, Bill Langkopp of the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association, and Jim Funk of the 
Louisiana Restaurant Association, among others.96  
 
  Preparing to fight the smoking and tax ordinances, Haras conducted public opinion 
research in New Orleans, including assessing the city’s economic state, the condition of local 
tobacco retailers, and the measures’ effects on the tourism economy.97 Haras believed it could 
defeat Giarrusso’s ordinances by highlighting the alleged negative economic impacts it would 
have on the city.97  
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 Haras realized that defeating the ordinances would not be simple because 
Councilmember Giarrusso had “an intense personal interest” in passing the measures, making 
other councilmembers less receptive to outright blocking them.97 Giarrusso’s fervent desire for 
tobacco control prompted Haras to avoid communicating with or inciting him.97  
 
On May 7, Haras reported to TI Regional VP Ron Morris that it would educate New 
Orleans city councilmembers on “the problems the ordinances would create” by recruiting local 
citizens to appear at hearings and contact the City Council to oppose the ordinances.97  By then 
Haras had contacted each councilmember (other than Giarrusso) multiple times, with other allies 
also reaching out to oppose the measures. By the hearing for the ordinances, all six 
councilmembers besides Giarrusso told Haras they opposed the ordinance. 
 
Haras also contacted third-party allies TI had already contacted, the Louisiana Retail 
Food Dealers Association and the New Orleans Retail Grocers Association, to have them attend 
the hearing for the measures.97 At the hearing, Haras would provide a position paper against the 
regulations to their representatives. 
    
 TI recruited members of the Louisiana business community to help it oppose the 
ordinance at the hearing.98 Haras representative Norris Fitzmorris and TI’s Jack Shoemaker 
contacted industry and small business organizations to increase opposition, with the former 
securing support from the Louisiana Hotel-Motel association and the Louisiana Restaurant 
Association.98 
 
 At the May 7, 1987 hearing, around 150 members of the business community appeared to 
oppose the clean air ordinance, with more than 30 asking to provide comment.98 Those that 
testified against the ordinance included Haras’ Fitzmorris,99 who spoke on behalf of TI and the 
Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association, Sarah Whalen for tobacco wholesalers, an unidentified 
representative for K-Pauls Restaurant, and Tex Stevens and Marie Jackson, who represented 
different African-American business organizations.98 We do not know which people or health 
voluntaries spoke in support of the ordinance at the hearing. Both ordinances were defeated. 
(Table 5.6)  
 
Following the hearing, TI prepared for another smoking restriction ordinance in New 
Orleans.98 In a letter to TI VP for State Activities Hurst Marshall regarding the outcome of 
Giarrusso’s ordinances, TI Regional VP Ron Morris expected Giarruso try again due to his 
“rather fervent and malicious attacks on our industry.”98 Later in 1987 Giarrusso would  again 
Table 5.6: New Orleans City Council Vote for Giarrusso’s Ordinances 98 
Councilmember Clean Air Ordinance Tax Ordinance 
Boissiere No No 
Early No No 
Giarrusso Yes Yes 
Jackson Yes No 
Singleton No No 
Taylor Yes No 
Wilson No No 
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pursue a tobacco tax increase (Chapter 6); he saved his next attempt at smoking restrictions for 
the following year.100  
 
Tobacco Industry Evaluates Feasibility of Local Preemption  
 
By 1985, the Tobacco Institute began an aggressive nationwide campaign to enact state 
laws (known as “preemption” laws) that prevented cities and counties from passing clean indoor 
air laws.101 Even though TI observed that “local legislative problems have generally been 
confined to New Orleans and are not expected to present difficulties,”102 it evaluated Louisiana 
for implementation of a statewide preemption law in 
1987.103 TI realized it and wholesaler associations 
would have to be the primary drivers of preemption 
because allied organizations, including the Louisiana 
Restaurant Association, the Louisiana Hotel-Motel 
Association, Louisiana Association of Business and 
Industry, Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy 
Distributors, and the Louisiana Grocers Association, 
were seen as strong allies but unlikely to engage in 
“critical” efforts to pass a preemption law.102 TI 
weighed including the Louisiana Municipal League and 
Association of Parishes in efforts to pass preemptive 
legislation, but had no strategy for convincing them to 
participate.  
 
 TI considered Louisiana’s political landscape and reasoned that comprehensive clean 
indoor air legislation was unlikely to pass at the state level.103 TI felt that a strong anti-tobacco 
collective was operating at the state level in Louisiana and in New Orleans.103 However, the only 
legislation that had passed by 1987 was an inconsequential 1986 bill with no enforcement 
requirements that prohibited smoking in part of the Superdome72 and a bill restricting smoking in 
elevators 103  (We could not find this legislation.)  In addition, some cities had considered 
smoking restrictions but mostly limited legislative efforts to prohibiting smoking in council 
chambers.103 In the end, TI found that Louisiana was not an immediate threat and recommended 
that the Institute “hold the line this year and survey the potential for change on a pro-active or a 
defensive effort after the November election.”103 
 
Health Voluntaries Promote Clean Air Policies for Schools in late-1987 
  
During fall 1987, the American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, and 
American Lung Association participated in a Tobacco Free Environment Workshop organized 
by the National School Board Association in New Orleans to promote prohibiting tobacco in 
schools.104 The event convinced East Baton Rouge Schoolboard member Maudine Ault105 to 
pursue a ban on all tobacco products in school vehicles, facilities and campuses in tandem with 
an anti-tobacco educational campaign targeting students.104 The East Baton Rouge school district 
already prohibited tobacco use by students, but did not prevent employee use.104  
 Following the workshop, Ault, with assistance from fellow school board member Robert 
Meador, pursued a prohibition on all tobacco use in Baton Rouge school vehicles, facilities, and 
TI found that Louisiana was 
not an immediate threat and 
recommended that the 
Institute “hold the line this 
year and survey the potential 
for change on a pro-active or 
a defensive effort after the 
November election.”  
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campuses.106 The East Baton Rouge School District’s Instructional Services Committee (Ault 
was a member and Meador was chairman)107 debated whether the panel should request the 
school board implement a no-tobacco policy at a meeting on November 10, 1987. ACS, AHA, 
and ALA representatives attended the hearing accompanied by other supporters of the policy. 
We did not find evidence of industry opposition at the meeting. The committee requested the 
East Baton Rouge School Board conduct a survey on staff opinions towards prohibiting tobacco 
use on school property.107 The board adopted a smoking restriction policy on May 19, 1988, 
prohibiting smoking in school facilities and school property (including school transportation).105 
The policy also mandated the creation of designated smoking areas in school buildings as long as 
they did not affect nonsmokers’ rights, were not visible to students, and enough space existed in 
the structure. Smoking policies would be decided by employees and administration vote at 
schools lacking existing smoking sections. 
California Proposition 65 and Smoking in Louisiana  
 
In 1985, California voters passed Proposition 65, a 1986 ballot initiative that forbade 
contaminating water resources with chemicals that caused reproductive harm, birth defects, or 
cancer, and required businesses to notify customers about their exposure to those substances.108 
In 1987, Louisiana lawmakers introduced but failed to pass similar legislation.109  
 
On April 11, 1988, with funding from the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the 
Louisiana Chemical Manufacturers Association, the Louisiana Association of Business and 
Industry (LABI) and Louisiana State University110 hosted an "Environmental Carcinogens and 
Health Risks" conference in Baton Rouge to address concerns about toxic chemicals with the 
media and legislators.111 LABI opposed environmental regulation modeled on Proposition 65112 
and the event was meant to educate the media and politicians on the effects of Proposition 65 in 
California as well as potential contaminant problems within Louisiana.113, 114 LABI expected 
100-150 people to attend the conference, including members of the Natural Resource 
Committees in the Louisiana Legislature, legislative staff, officials from Louisiana trade 
associations, and media representatives. An unidentified TI lobbyist and others113, 115 from 
Covington and Burling, a Washington DC-based law firm that helped the tobacco industry (and 
other industries) manage a wide range of scientific regulatory issues, attended the conference. 
 
Presentations at the conference focused more on 
lifestyle factors that caused cancer. Environmental 
groups criticized the presentations for attributing the 
high cancer rates in Louisiana to lifestyle rather than 
chemical exposure.116 One presentation, “Causes of 
Cancer in Louisiana,” by Dr. Pelayo Correa from the 
LSU Medical Center,114, 117 stated that smoking 
seriously contributed to cancer rates in the state, with one slide reading, “If you are not doing 
something drastic about smoking, you are not serious about cancer control.”117 
 
A panel featuring government officials and legislators, including Senate Health and 
Welfare Committee chairman Mike Cross (D-Baker), provided comments following the 
conference presentations.114 Cross said that existing laws and regulations were not properly 
implemented because of limited funding, and argued that securing new laws only duplicated 
“If you are not doing 
something drastic about 
smoking, you are not serious 
about cancer control.”  
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those ineffective existing ones.118 Later in that year’s legislative session, Senator Cross abstained 
from voting on two clean air bills by Senator Johnson when they were heard in his Committee, 
effectively killing the legislation. 
 
Johnson Attempts to Pass Smoking Restrictions for the Ninth Time in 1988 
 
During the 1988 legislative session, Senator Jon Johnson introduced SB 545 to prohibit 
smoking in public areas of state and local government buildings, educational facilities, public 
meeting rooms, the display areas of museums and art galleries, public elevators, and auditoriums. 
Designated smoking areas were permitted in public transit, healthcare facilities, private offices, 
restaurants and bars, taxis and limousines, outdoor sports complexes, and correctional 
facilities.119  
 
Johnson also introduced SB 546 to compel employers to adopt policies to protect 
nonsmokers from secondhand smoke. The bill gave priority to nonsmokers’ preferences with 
implementing regulations to be developed by the Louisiana Department of Health and 
Hospitals.119 
 
Members of Louisiana’s medical and public health community spoke in support of SB 
545 at a Senate Health and Welfare Committee hearing on June 6, 1988. Dr. Elizabeth Fontham 
of the LSU Medical School, Ben Fontaine of the American Lung Association, and Louis 
Trachtman and other Louisiana Health Officers120 testified. Dr. Fontham told committee 
members about the elevated lung cancer risk for nonsmokers married to smokers and argued that 
clean air legislation was needed to protect nonsmokers because they were “exposed without 
choice.”120 Fontaine echoed Fontham’s testimony, arguing that SB 545 protected nonsmokers 
from secondhand smoke. Louisiana Health Officer Louis Trachtman reinforced both Fontham 
and Fontaine’s arguments, telling the Committee that 5,526 people in Louisiana died in 1986 
from conditions attributable to smoking.120  
 
Experienced lobbyists testified on behalf of the tobacco industry. Tobacco Institute and 
Louisiana Tobacco Wholesalers Association lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry and Louisiana Tobacco 
Wholesalers Association official Sarah Whalen120 testified against SB 545. Guidry asserted that 
enforcing smoking restrictions and putting up proper signage would be costly for the state.120  
Responding to questions from committee member Cleo Fields, Guidry asserted she was not 
convinced that smoking was harmful or caused cancer.120 Whalen warned that SB 545 “set a 
precedent for government intrusion.”120 
 
After listening to the testimony, the committee voted to delay debate on SB 545.  
Consideration of SB 546 was also delayed until a second meeting was held for both bills on June 
13, 1988.121 (However, SB 546 would actually receive a hearing later in session.)  At the hearing, 
proponents of SB 545 continued to make the case for passing clean air legislation. Sponsor Jon 
Johnson argued that smoking had negative economic and health effects, and Jean Craig of the 
Louisiana Tumor Registry testified that smoking was the leading cause of cancer.122 TI lobbyist 
Joe Wood Guidry argued that SB 545 carried enforcement costs and that the high cancer rate in 
Louisiana was not attributable to smoking.122  As in the past, the Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee deferred action indefinitely on SB 545, killing it (Table 5.7).   
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Seeing that SB 545 and SB 546 were going nowhere at the Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee, on June 13, 1988 Johnson introduced Senate Resolution 13 to bring both bills 
directly to the Senate floor for immediate consideration by the full Senate.119, 124 Senators 
rejected SR13 twice on June 13, 1988, voting 22 to 10 against it.   
 
Subsequently, on June 16, Johnson introduced Senate Resolution 16 to instruct the Senate 
Health and Welfare Committee to conduct at least three public hearings to study the impact of 
smoking on health, welfare, safety, comfort, environment, and economics on Louisiana residents, 
with a final report and additional recommendations to be delivered to the Senate by March 30, 
1989.119 The original resolution required that the public hearings take place in Shreveport, Baton 
Rouge, and New Orleans but the final version did not include this requirement.119  
 
SR 16 was referred to the Senate Health and Welfare Committee, which held a hearing on 
both SR 16 and SB 546 on June 27, 1988.119 SB 546 was heard first and failed to make it out of 
Committee because members of the panel split on separate votes to defer the bill, report the bill 
favorably, and report the bill negatively.119 SR16 survived the meeting, making it back to the 
Senate Floor with limited amendments and was adopted on June 28, 1988.119 As passed, the 
resolution required the committee to hold three meetings to study smoking’s effects on 
Louisianans. Before amendments, the meetings were required to be held in Baton Rouge, New 
Orleans, and Shreveport. The resolution tasked the committee with subsequently producing an 
interim report by December 20, 1988 and a final report, with any policy suggestions, for the 
State Senate by March 30, 1989.119 The resolution required the committee to invite the US 
Surgeon General to the hearings. SR 16’s passage led the Senate Health and Welfare Committee 
to hold public hearings regarding smoking in November and December.119 
 
Hearings Resulting from Senate Resolution 16 
 
In November and December 1987, the Senate Health and Welfare Committee held the 
three public meetings on the effects of smoking on Louisianans required by SR 16. Originally, 
SR 16 mandated that the meetings take place in Shreveport, Baton Rouge, and New Orleans, but 
because the provision was removed,119 all three hearings took place in New Orleans, 
Table 5.7: Senate Health and Welfare Committee Member Votes for SB 545 120, 122, 123 
Representative Party and District Voted to Defer at 
June 6 Hearing 
Voted to Defer at 
June 13 Hearing 
Contributions 
from 
Tobacco 
Industry in 
Previous 
Election 
Cycles (1983 
and 1987) 
Mike Cross (Chairman) D-Baker Abstained Abstained $900 
Ben Bagert D-New Orleans No Absent -- 
Cleo Fields D-Baton Rouge No No -- 
Gerry Hinton R-Slidell Yes Absent $1000 
Ron Landry D-LaPlace Yes Yes $900 
Joe McPherson D-Alexandria Yes Yes $1000 
Richard Neeson D-Shreveport Yes Absent -- 
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significantly limiting public exposure to testimony on the health risks of smoking and 
secondhand smoke.119  
 
The first hearing on November 15 only took 
testimony from state officials.125 State epidemiologist 
Joyce Mathison cited mortality statistics related to 
smoking in Louisiana and Brobson Lutz, Director of the 
New Orleans Department of Health, testified that it took 
multiple efforts to pass a clean air ordinance in New 
Orleans that year due to restaurant industry opposition 
powered by TI.126  
 
At the second hearing on December 8, 1988,119 the tobacco industry had TI advisor Larry 
Holcomb of Holcomb Environmental Services,127 private physician and TI consultant 128 Dr. 
David Weeks, and Air Conditioning and Ventilations Associates Atlantic (ACVA) representative 
Peter Binnie appear at the hearing to oppose secondhand smoke restrictions.129, 130  The industry 
used Holcomb and Weeks to argue that better ventilation was the “solution” to secondhand 
smoke throughout the country.131-134 AVCA, which was rebranded Healthy Buildings 
International in 1989, also produced surveys and studies, attended legislative hearings, and 
engaged in promotional tours asserting that poor indoor air ventilation harmed health and not 
secondhand smoke. During the second hearing, Holcomb testified that secondhand smoke did not 
cause cancer, and that findings on the health effects of secondhand smoke by the Surgeon 
General lacked a strong basis.130, 135 Weeks argued that CDC findings showing Louisiana had 
five times the average rate of lung cancer cases compared to other states was potentially caused 
by statistical errors. Weeks admitted there was a correlation between smoking and lung cancer 
but did not state that a connection existed with secondhand smoke.  
 
TI expected and prepared for an increased amount of smoking restriction legislation 
during the 1989 session.136 In particular, TI expected clean air legislation from the Senate Health 
and Welfare Committee, which planned to convene in January 1989 to draft a bill based on the 
information gathered in the SR 16 hearings.137 
 
Other attempts to Pass State Clean Air Regulation  
  
Besides Senator Johnson’s clean air efforts, Representative Charles Lancaster (R-
Metairie) introduced HB 1814, the counterpart to Johnson’s SB 546, on May 2, 1988.119 HB 
1814 restricted smoking in office workplaces and required that employers adopt policies to 
protect nonsmokers, with nonsmokers’ policy desires taking priority in accordance with 
regulations to be developed and enforced by the Department of Health and Hospitals.119 HB 
1814 was scheduled for a hearing by the House Health and Welfare Committee on June 7, 1988, 
but died without consideration.136  
 
 Representative Gary Forster (R-New Orleans), the vice chair of the House Health and 
Welfare Committee,138 introduced HB 1156 on May 2, 1988 to restrict smoking in hospitals 
except in patient rooms with consent of the patient and doctor.119 The bill went to the House 
Health and Welfare Committee where it died without a hearing.119 
The industry used Holcomb 
and Weeks to argue that 
better ventilation was the 
“solution” to secondhand 
smoke throughout the 
country.  
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New Orleans Considers another Clean Air Ordinance in 1988 
 
In May 1988 the Tobacco Institute learned that, as expected, Councilmember Joe 
Giarrusso planned to reintroduce his New Orleans Clean Indoor Air Ordinance.127 Norris 
Fitzmorris of New Orleans public relations firm Haras, Inc. reported to TI after the City Council 
voted on the 1988 legislation that October:  
 
As you will recall, after the May 1987 ‘defeat,’ I told you of my several 
conversations with Giarrusso and of his determination to keep coming back 
AGAIN and AGAIN until he was successful![emphasis in original]139  
 
 The measure barred smoking in elevators, public restrooms, libraries and schools, cinema 
foyers, lines in public areas, and public transit. In addition, the ordinance restricted smoking in 
office workplaces that had over 15 employees or businesses that had more than 100 customers 
daily, required smoking and nonsmoking sections for restaurants with over 50 seats, and allowed 
hospitals to prohibit patients from smoking in semi-private and private rooms.140 Initial 
violations faced a $100 fine, followed by a $200 fine for second infractions and $300 fines for 
any additional offenses.141  
 
While pursuing clean air legislation in 1988, Giarrusso also pursued a “Tobacco 
Consumption Privilege Tax” to levy a 20% sales tax, nominally a consumption tax for the 
privilege of using a tobacco product, on any tobacco product purchased in New Orleans.142, 143 
The industry fought the tax as it opposed the Councilmember’s clean air bill (Chapter 6).144  
 
TI had AVCA’s Simon Turner and Larry Holcomb of Holcomb Environmental Services 
appear at the city council hearing to speak against smoking restrictions.127 Both speakers arrived 
to testify on September 15 only to find Giarrusso’s legislation had been deferred, a tactic TI 
believed Giarrusso had used to wait until he had secured enough votes for passage.  Turner and 
Holcomb testified at a later hearing held on October 20. TI also contacted businesses and 
industry association allies to form a coalition to oppose Giarrusso’s ordinance127 and expected to 
secure a 4 to 3 vote against passage.139 
 
While TI mustered forces against the ordinance, Giarrusso continued efforts to persuade 
fellow councilmembers to change their votes.127 Giarrusso, joined by the New Orleans Health 
Director, the Chief Epidemiologist of Louisiana, and 40 supporters, picketed three popular 
restaurants over their smoking policies a week before the October 20, 1988 hearing.139, 145 
Councilmember Giarrusso informed the press about the event, securing free publicity on 
television of the protest that increased awareness of the smokefree effort.127 
 
The New Orleans City Council considered Giarrusso’s ordinance on October 20, 1988,146 
with proponents and opponents appearing in full force.127 Clean air proponents brought fifteen 
children ranging from 10 to 15 years old to speak at hearing.127, 139 A mixture of business 
associations and paid consultants represented the tobacco industry’s position, beginning with 
industry consultants Larry Holcomb and Simon Turner.139, 147 Giarrusso questioned Holcomb’s 
presentation at the hearing by noting that Holcomb was not a medical doctor and “disagreed with 
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the Surgeon General and so-called reputable doctors all over the world.”147 According to 
Fitzmorris’ summary of the hearing for TI officials, 
Holcomb and Turner’s presentations had been 
ineffective, and “fell on deaf ears.”139 State-based 
business associations spoke next, with Executive 
Director Jim Funk of the Louisiana Restaurant 
Association and David Blitch of the New Orleans 
Restaurant Association opposing the ordinance.139, 
147 Superdome official Bob Johnson also spoke against the ordinance.139 
  
Before the hearing began, Giarrusso told Fitzmorris that he had the votes to pass the 
ordinance.147 As discussion began to close, Fitzmorris learned from industry-aligned 
councilmember Mike Early that Councilmember James Singleton, who had voted against 
smoking restrictions the previous year, was going to vote for Giarrusso’s ordinance.139 In his 
report to TI, Fitzmorris claimed he realized who Giarrusso convinced to become a fourth vote for 
the clean air ordinance: 
 
As the testimony and debate drew near to an end, I got the word from one of our 
supporters, Councilman Early that it ‘appeared’ Councilman Singleton was going to 
switch and vote in favor of the ordinance. And, if that happened, the thinking was 
Lambert Boissiere would also vote ‘yes.’ 
 
With that pronouncement we knew who the fourth (or switch) vote was and why 
Giarrusso had been so confident of victory.139 
 
Councilmembers voted 5 to 2 to adopt the ordinance (Table 5.8).127, 139 The measure took effect 
on January 1, 1989, becoming the first major local clean air law in Louisiana.  
 
Further Attempts to Restrict Smoking Defeated by the Tobacco Industry at the State Level 
in 1989 
 
Lalonde Pursues Smoking Restrictions in the House 
 
In 1989, members of the House and Senate introduced legislation to restrict indoor 
smoking. Representative Raymond LaLonde (D-Sunset) introduced HB 159 on April 17, 1989 to 
restrict smoking and the use of tobacco products in public schools, hospitals, and state 
government buildings.149 HB 159 was the sole tobacco-related bill in the House and died in the 
Natural Resources Committee without consideration.149 Representative Lalonde submitted House 
Committee Study Resolution 17 the same day as HB 159 to request the House and Senate 
Committees on Health and Welfare study the effects of smoking on the health of Louisianans, 
the impact of smoking in public schools, hospitals, and buildings, and provide regulatory 
recommendations to the legislature before the 1990 regular session.149 Lawmakers approved 
HCSR 17 on July 4, 1989. However, TI did not expect an interim committee to review the issue 
until January 1990.149 
Before the hearing began, 
Giarrusso told Fitzmorris that 
he had the votes to pass the 
ordinance.  
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Johnson Continues his Smokefree Crusade in the Senate 
  
Senator Johnson introduced SB 154 and SB 155 to restrict smoking on April 17, 1989. 
SB 154 prohibited smoking in public access areas of government buildings and other public 
areas, but permitted those in charge of health care facilities or private for-hire transportation to 
designate smoking areas that were of equal size and quality as nonsmoking areas.149 Penalties for 
violations by smokers would be $25 for the first offense and $50 for additional offenses. SB 155 
required businesses to adopt policies that prioritized nonsmoking employees, including entirely 
prohibiting smoking if necessary.149 Both bills were sent to the Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee where they died without action.   
 
 On May 1, 1989, Johnson introduced three additional clean air bills. Two of those bills, 
SB 801 and SB 802 were identical to SB 155 and SB154, which were stalled in the Senate 
Health and Welfare Committee.149 Both bills also went to the Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee where no action was taken.150 
 
 The third proposal Johnson introduced on May 1 included industry language. SB 870 
restricted smoking in government buildings and required smoking and nonsmoking areas, 35% 
and 65% of the building respectively, with adequate ventilation systems installed and maintained 
during office hours. SB 870 went to the Senate Health and Welfare Committee and died with 
adjournment.149  
 
Senate Bill 818: An Industry Friend Introduces Smoking Restriction Bill  
  
Since the Senate Health and Welfare Committee agreed to introduce legislation based on 
the study of smoking issues from 1988's Senate Resolution 16, committee member151 Joe 
McPherson (D-Alexandria) and four additional sponsors introduced SB 818 on April 9, 1989.149 
TI’s strategic analysis of Louisiana had previously identified McPherson as a friend.62 Similar in 
language to Johnson’s SB 870, SB 818 did not mandate nonsmoking areas, but merely permitted 
department secretaries in the state government to designate smoking and nonsmoking areas in 
state government offices based on the ratio of smokers and nonsmokers in the building. SB 870 
also required that “adequate ventilation systems” be installed and maintained during working 
hours, and that smoking and nonsmoking areas be equal in accommodation quality with smokers 
subject to fines of $25 to $50 for violations.149, 152 Despite this pro-industry language, SB 818 
died in the Senate Health and Welfare Committee without consideration.150 
 
Table 5.8: New Orleans City Council Vote for Giarrusso’s Clean Air Ordinance Votes98, 127, 139, 148 
Councilmember 1987  1988  
Lambert Boissiere No Yes 
Mike Early No No 
Joseph (Joe) Giarrusso Yes Yes 
Johnny Jackson Yes Yes 
James Singleton No Yes 
Dorothy Mae Taylor Yes Yes 
Peggy Wilson No No 
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 Senator Johnson’s five clean air bills died with adjournment on July 5, 1989. He 
introduced Senate Resolution 8 the same day,149 for consideration during a special legislative 
session predominantly focused on tax legislation.153 SR 8 instructed the Senate Health and 
Welfare Committee to again study the effects of smoking on the health of residents of Louisiana, 
with initial findings to be reported to the Senate on December 30, 1989, and a full report 
complete with recommendations on March 30, 1990.149 The Senate adopted Resolution 8 on July 
10, 1989.149 Once again, the Louisiana legislature passed a resolution investigating clean air 
policies but failed to secure any smokefree laws. 
 
 In late August, after the close of the 1989 legislative session, Gray Robertson and Simon 
Turner visited Baton Rouge and New Orleans as part of their ACVA Atlantic Media Tour. The 
tour received attention from the press; the media conducted eleven interviews and communicated 
the pro-industry message "very effectively." The tobacco industry wanted to make sure that 
Louisiana political officials and the public understood the "importance" of ventilation systems to 
satisfy the needs of both smokers and nonsmokers going into the regular session in 1990.154 
 
Health Voluntaries Promote a Clean Air Ordinance for the Baton Rouge Area 
  
In October 1989, Metro City Councilmember Jay Dardenne introduced a local ordinance 
titled the Clean Indoor Air Act155 to restrict smoking in the city of Baton Rouge and East Baton 
Rouge Parish.156 According to the Baton Rouge newspaper The Advocate, the measure 
“prohibited smoking in ‘all enclosed areas of public places including, but not limited to’ city-
parish government buildings, schools, libraries, museums, galleries, theaters, auditoriums, 
hospitals, sports arenas, bowling alleys, convention halls, public rest rooms, elevators, public 
transportation facilities, and all public transportation vehicles.”156 Restaurants with fewer than 50 
seats, one half of mall corridors, retail establishments unable to hold 150 customers, businesses 
staffing under 15 people, clubs, “private meetings rooms,” and recreation centers were excluded. 
Ordinance enforcement relied on complaints to fire inspectors and police officers with violations 
carrying a $100 fine.156 
 
 At the Metro Council’s Finance and Executive Committee hearing for the Clean Indoor 
Air Act on October 18, 1989, the American Lung Association, TI-contracted scientists, and 
business proprietors sparred over the ordinance.155 ALA local chapter chairman Madeline Luther 
testified that individuals with allergies and respiratory illnesses were adversely affected by 
secondhand smoke and that the public needed safeguarding from exposure.155 TI sent scientists 
who promoted the industry’s ventilation “solutions”, Dr. Larry Holcomb of Holcomb 
Environmental Consulting and Walt Decker, to dispute the need for smoking restrictions. 
Holcomb argued that a year of secondhand smoke exposure in buildings amounted to consuming 
under half a cigarette and that secondhand smoke composed a fraction of indoor air 
contaminants. Decker asserted that concrete proof that secondhand smoke caused disease was 
lacking.155 Both claimed that their employment by TI did not influence their statements. In 
addition to Holcomb and Decker, proprietors argued the ordinance created excessive government 
regulation on businesses. The Finance and Executive Committee sent the measure to the Metro 
Council without a recommendation. 
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The Metro City Council considered Dardenne’s ordinance on October 25, 1989.157 At the 
hearing, Dardenne submitted a third, weakened version of his ordinance designed to overcome 
political opposition by permitting smoking spaces that afforded nonsmokers “reasonably” clean 
air and by allowing smoking in private offices. Dardenne also removed a provision requiring 
places to at minimum make 50 percent of enclosed spaces smokefree sections. Dardenne also 
eliminated a requirement that businesses create smokefree areas for their nonsmoking employees 
to the greatest extent possible.157  
 
At the hearing, health voluntaries and the local medical community testified for the 
ordinance while one councilmember and restaurant establishments opposed it.157 ALA of 
Louisiana Executive Director Ben Fontaine testified that secondhand smoke caused a fifth of 
lung cancer deaths in nonsmokers, and public health employees and representatives from AHA 
and the East Baton Rouge Parish Medical Society testified that Dardenne’s measure protected 
“non-smokers from the ill effects of second-hand smoke.” Two restaurant owners testified that 
smoking restrictions were excessive government regulation. Another Councilmember, Buddy 
Wilson, introduced a weaker ordinance to compete with Dardenne’s legislation. After hearing 
comments and debating smoking restrictions, the City Council postponed action so that members 
could analyze the latest version of Dardenne’s ordinance. 
 
After the hearing, councilmembers received calls from the public opposing the 
measure.158 In an article from The Advocate, Dardenne claimed the callers contacted him out of 
concerns seemingly based on misinformation after a 
tobacco company sent an action alert to smoker’s rights’ 
advocates. Prior to the blitz of negative calls, Dardenne 
told to The Advocate that the public supported his 
ordinance.   
 
 The Metro City Council unanimously adopted 
Dardenne’s weakened ordinance on November 8, 
1989.159 As passed, the Clean Indoor Air Act prohibited 
smoking in enclosed facilities that city, parish, or city and parish agencies resided in or owned, 
enclosed spaces of voting places, galleries, museums, convention halls, libraries, hospitals 
(besides patient rooms), auditoriums, theaters, schools, arenas, restrooms, and elevators.159 
Smoking areas were permitted that allowed nonsmokers “to conduct normal activity in a 
reasonably smoke-free environment.”159 Enclosed, private offices were exempt. The ordinance 
mandated a $100 fine for smoking violations and required signage for smoking and smokefree 
spaces. At the same meeting, the Council approved a resolution asking businesses to implement 
the tobacco industry’s recommended policy of voluntarily restricting smoking to assigned spaces 
with ventilation. The weakened state of the ordinance led Councilmember Dardenne to call it the 
“Semi-Clean Indoor Air Act.”159   
  
The weakened state of the 
ordinance led 
Councilmember Dardenne to 
call it the “Semi-Clean Indoor 
Air Act.”   
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Louisiana Office Workplace Clean Air Act Defeated by Tobacco Industry Efforts  
 
The Industry Prepares for a Tough Legislative Session 
 
In February 1990, two months before the 1990 Legislative Session started on April 19, TI 
Regional Vice President Ron Morris wrote TI Southern Sector Vice President George Minshew 
regarding campaign contributions to key members of the Louisiana legislature suggested by 
lobbyist Joe Wood Berry (formerly Joe Wood Guidry (Chapter 2) (Table 5.9).160, 161 Berry 
argued the contributions were needed to prevent a tax increase during the 1990 legislative 
session 160 Berry requested TI provide $19,000 in campaign contributions to Louisiana 
legislators. TI decided to contribute $15,600,160 some to members of the Senate and House 
Health and Welfare Committees where smokefree bills generally died.160 Besides TI, RJ 
Reynolds made campaign contributions and Philip Morris planned to give $25,000 (Chapter 
3).160 
 
Smoke Free Legislation during the 1990 Session 
 
Johnson Pursues Legislation 
  
Tobacco control champion Senator Jon Johnson introduced Senate Bills 816, 826, and 
835 to restrict smoking on April 30, 1990. SB 816 and SB 826 were narrow in scope, restricting 
smoking in workplaces and in state and local government offices respectively.162 Johnson’s third 
bill, SB 835, more broadly prohibited smoking in auditoriums, hospitals, health facilities, 
educational facilities, museums, display areas of private museums, galleries, libraries, 
courthouses, government offices, elevators, and public areas of government buildings. Managers 
of state government buildings and property could request a waiver from the State Health Officer 
to avoid implementing smoking restrictions and instead establish smoking areas. The bill 
exempted office areas closed to the public, bars, restaurants, military facilities, hallways and 
lobbies of hotels and motels, correctional facilities, public transit, limousines, taxis, as well as 
outdoor stadiums and arenas. SB 835 required places covered by smoking restrictions to post 
“No Smoking” signs. Offending smokers faced $25 to $50 fines.  
 
  Instead of being sent to the Senate Health and Welfare Committee, the bills were 
sent to the Senate Commerce Committee. In late February 1990, before the start of the legislative 
session, TI had given a $400 contribution to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Lawson 
Swearingen (D-Monroe).163 Swearingen also served on the Senate’s Business, Finance, and 
Judiciary Committees,163 and had received a $500 contribution from TI in 1988.164 Before the 
start of the session, Senator Swearingen wrote TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris thanking 
him for this February contribution: 
 
I am looking forward to the upcoming session and working together to meet the 
challenges which lie ahead. 
 I would like to take this means to commend Joe Wood [Berry] for the 
outstanding job she does in representing your company. I have known Joe for 
many years, and she is a very knowledgeable and energetic lady, whom it is a 
pleasure to work with.  
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Table 5.9: 1990 TI Campaign Contributions to Key Members of the Legislature160 
Name Party Chamber Committee/s Contribution Comments from the Tobacco 
Institute 
John Alario D House Identified by TI as a Floor Leader $500 “Floor leader opposing Governors 
package.” 
Glenn Ansardi D House Health and Welfare  $500 None 
Diana Bajoie D House Health and Welfare $500 None 
Harry Beniot D House Ways and Means $500 None 
Bruce Bolin D House Chair Natural Resources  $500 None 
Emile Bruneau R House Chair Governmental Affairs $500 None 
N.J. Damico D House Business $500 “Good person on floor” 
John Diez D House Vice Chairman Judiciary  $500 “Good person on floor” 
Irma Muse Dixon D House Governmental Affairs; Municipal, 
Parochial, and Cultural Affairs 
$500 “Black lady Rep. from New 
Orleans” 
Gary Forster R House Ways and Means; Health and 
Welfare 
$500 None 
Carl Gunter D House Municipal, Parochial and Cultural 
Affairs 
$500 “Floor fighter” 
Buster Guzzardo D House N/A $500 “Member of 8 man caucus” 
Melvin Irvin D House Ways & Means $500 None 
Alphonse Jackson D House Chair of House Health & Welfare $500 None 
Clyde Kimball D House Natural Resources $500 ”Walks the floor with us” 
Mike McClearly D House N/A $500 “Always stuck with us” 
Billy Montgomery D House Ways & Means $500 None 
Willie Singleton D House Chair Judiciary Committee  $500 “Always a friend on health & 
welfare” 
Art Sour R House Ways & Means $500 None 
Joe Toomy D House Municipal, Parochial and Cultural 
Affairs 
$500 “Was on Ways & Means and was 
always a friend” 
John Travis D House  $500 “Always our fighter on the floor” 
Steve Theriot D House Ways & Means; Health & Welfare $500 None 
Bobby Waddell D House Chairman of Civil Law $500 “Our friend” 
Thommy Warner D House N/A $500 “Our friend”  
Mike Cross D Senate Chairman of Health & Welfare $500 None 
Gerry Hinton R Senate Health & Welfare $500 “Smoker” 
Ron Landry D Senate Health & Welfare $500 None 
Joe McPherson D Senate Vice Chairman Health & Welfare $500   
Richard Neeson D Senate Health & Welfare $1000 None 
Cleo Fields D Senate Health & Welfare; Local and 
Municipal Affairs 
$500 None 
Don Kelly D Senate Chairman Judiciary; Finance; Floor 
Leader 
$1000 ”Strongest Sen.” 
Sammy Nunez D Senate President Pro Tempore  $500 “Former Pres. [of Senate] and 
always friend” 
Cecil Pichard  D Senate Chairman Governmental Affairs $500 None 
Benjamin 
Rayburn 
D Senate Chairman of Finance  $500 None 
Lawson 
Swearingen  
D Senate Chairman of Commerce; Finance  $500 None 
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Whenever I can be of assistance, please feel free to call upon me.165  
 
Senate Bills 816, 826, and 835 were deferred multiple times and died in committee.162 
Other Bills  
  
Senator Johnson was not the only legislator pursuing clean air legislation to run into 
opposition from tobacco industry-funded committee members. Representative Raymond 
LaLonde (D-Sunset) introduced HB 397 on April 17, 1990 to prohibit smoking and the use of 
tobacco products in public schools, hospitals and workplaces.162 The bill made the Department of 
Health and Hospitals responsible for implementation and enforcement.162 HB 397 was referred to 
the House Health and Welfare Committee, where at a hearing on May 24, 1990 it was tabled in a 
7 to 4 vote, killing it.162, 166   
 
Representative Kernan Hand (R-Kenner) 
introduced HB 1423 on April 30, 1990 to restrict 
smoking in office workplaces and require employers to 
adopt workplace smoking policies.162 The bill made the 
Department of Health and Hospitals responsible for 
adopting implementing regulations necessary for 
enforcement. HB 1423 was also referred to the House 
Health and Welfare Committee, where it was heard 
alongside Representative Lalonde’s HB 397 and 
Jackson’s HB 217 on May 24, 1990.162, 166 At the 
hearing, TI and the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association 
publicly opposed the bill.167 HB 1423 died without further consideration after a 6 to 3 
vote deferring action.162, 167 
 
The Health and Welfare Committee Endorses Industry-Supported Bill in 1990  
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a nationwide rise in community-level approaches to 
controlling the tobacco epidemic by enacting smokefree ordinances and age restriction laws.168 
The tobacco industry responded by pushing state legislators to adopt weak statewide laws 
preempting local governments from regulating tobacco,168, 169 sometimes even repealing existing  
ordinances.168 The tobacco companies supported weak preemptive statewide smoking laws that 
purported to protect people from secondhand smoke exposure by mandating separate smoking 
sections and air filtration systems.168  
 
 Since the beginning of 1988, 8 local governments in Louisiana attempted to pass 
ordinances or resolutions restricting smoking with at least 7 passing that mostly restricted 
smoking on local government property (Table 5.14). In 1990, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry told 
TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris that taxes were the main focus of the regular legislative 
session because Governor Edward Roemer (R) sought a large tax package (Chapter 6). Although 
tax increases became TI’s primary concern in 1990, it identified Louisiana as a target for 
pursuing smokefree preemption legislation.170  
 
“Anti-tobacco activists have 
continued to gain strength in 
the state legislature during 
the past two years. Major 
cities have passed, and other 
cities are considering, local 
restrictions on public / 
private smoking.”  
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The tobacco industry found Louisiana’s smokefree advocacy climate increasingly 
challenging as it prepared for the 1990 legislative session. An October 1989 TI strategy proposal 
for the 1990 Louisiana legislative session observed: 
 
Anti-tobacco activists have continued to gain strength in the state legislature during the 
past two years. Major cities have passed, and other cities are considering, local 
restrictions on public / private smoking.171 
 
As late as October 1989, TI worked to find important lawmakers to serve as sponsors of a bill 
to preempt localities from adopting smoking restrictions and to preserve smokers’ rights.170 In its 
October 1989 Louisiana strategy proposal, TI stated it needed to create a grassroots movement, 
arrange a business coalition, and compile professional witnesses to defend and promote smokers’ 
rights: 
 
• Mass mobilization documenting abuse of smokers’ rights. 
• Expert witnesses on smokers’ rights. 
• Back-up counsel to strengthen coalition efforts. 
• Conduct search to find smokers whose rights have been abused and persuade 
them to testify before legislative committees. 
• Use expert ETS [environmental tobacco smoke, what the tobacco industry called 
secondhand smoke] and IAQ [indoor air quality] witnesses to brief lawmakers, 
allies and the media. Develop favorable op-ed pieces from these experts, and from 
local experts. 
• Work to develop a coalition with business and labor groups, using ‘Smoking in 
the Workplace” seminars to build support from the membership of those groups. 
• With member company assistance, develop grassroots mail programs to focus on 
specific legislators’ home districts. Schedule these grassroots efforts and seminars 
to coincide with the movement of the legislation.170  
 
TI drafted legislation for the 1990 legislative session to “protect” smokers’ rights in 
public places and preempt local government’s authority to impose restrictions,170 and hoped to 
secure sponsorship from important legislators.172 TI ultimately recruited Representative 
Alphonse Jackson, Chair of the House Health and Welfare Committee, to sponsor its preemption 
bill.173 
 
The Industry Pursues Preemption Amidst Tax Battles  
   
On April 17, 1990 Representative Alphonse Jackson introduced HB 217 to mandate the 
creation of smoking and nonsmoking areas of equal quality in all areas of state and local 
government buildings except for at public hospitals, school board facilities, higher education 
institutions and health clinics.162 The bill also preempted all local clean air restrictions, including 
those already adopted.162 HB 217 was referred to the House Health and Welfare Committee.162  
 
 The tobacco industry splintered on how to handle HB 217 because of a battle against a 
cigarette tax increase it was also waging in Louisiana that year (Chapter 6). For the past three 
years Governor Ed “Buddy” Roemer (R) had unsuccessfully tried increasing cigarette taxes and 
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was trying again in 1990.174 As a result, TI and Philip Morris sought to pass HB 217 while it and 
other tobacco industry members opposed tax bill HB 944, generating tension between 
partners.175 At an April 26 meeting of tobacco industry representatives, Philip Morris lobbyist 
Betsy Giles and RJ Reynolds lobbyist CJ Blache disagreed on pursuing preemptive smokers’ 
rights legislation. According to a May 18, 1990 memo from TI Regional VP Ron Morris to TI 
Regional Director176 Pat McWhorter on legislative efforts in Louisiana: 
 
RJR is hesitant to do anything for fear that it might interfere with our activities on 
tax issues, and of course Philip Morris staff is under a great deal of pressure to 
move those proactive [preemption] bills in committee.175 
 
TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry believed HB 944 could be defeated and HB 217 could be passed 
simultaneously.175  
 
In mid-May, before the Health and Welfare Committee considered HB 217, Joe Wood 
Berry met with bill sponsor Alphonse Jackson when they determined that HB 217 faced 
resistance from cities since it robbed them of authority.175 To maintain unity amongst tobacco 
industry staff and determine if HB 217 was politically viable, Berry and Philip Morris lobbyist 
Randy Haynie decided to meet with city council members and police juries (the equivalent of a 
county board in Louisiana’s parish system) to ascertain their stance on HB 217.175 We do not 
know the results of Joe Wood Berry’s and Haynie’s meetings with local lawmakers, but industry 
efforts to pass HB 217 continued. 
 
The House Health and Welfare Committee considered HB 217 on May 24, 1990, where 
Committee Chair and bill sponsor Alphonse Jackson and TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry made little 
effort to hide the tobacco industry’s involvement with HB 217.162 Berry testified the tobacco 
industry did not oppose Jackson’s bill, asserting that state agencies had been making smokers 
indulge outside, and “now they must provide a room for us.”167 Committee members amended 
HB 217 to prohibit smoking in lobbies, restrooms and other publicly used areas of state and local 
government buildings,162 and then reported the bill favorably by a vote of 9 to 2 to the House 
Floor.162  
 
 The House considered HB 217 on June 7. Representatives amended the bill to exempt 
local ordinances that were adopted by July 1,1990 from preemption.162 They then passed HB 217 
67 to 24, sending the bill to the Senate, where it was referred to the Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee. 
 
 The Senate Health and Welfare Committee heard HB 217 on June 25, 1990.162 
Representatives of the Louisiana Medical Society, the Department of Health and Hospitals, and 
Action on Smoking or Health, as well as the Louisiana Municipal Association (LMA) testified 
against the bill.177 LMA opposed HB 217 because it wanted the exemption for existing local 
ordinances extended until October 1, 1990, in addition to an exemption from preemption for 
small city halls.178 TI had a difficult time "maintaining a quorum to get HB 217 out of 
committee, but succeeded in getting the bill favorably reported to the full Senate without 
amendments.177, 178  
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 TI feared the Louisiana Municipal Association’s opposition to HB 217 could hinder its 
passage and considered compromising with the organization. Notes from TI records on HB 217 
following its Senate committee hearing said, “No way to pass bill w/out [sic] municipal League’s 
OK. Question: do we compromise… or do we kill the bill?”178 
 
 As the tobacco industry considered how to 
handle HB 217 amid opposition from the Louisiana 
Municipal Association, LMA Deputy Director Gordon 
King and City of Lafayette representative Sterling 
LeJune approached Philip Morris lobbyist Randy 
Haynie and TI State Activities Division Regional 
director Pat McWhorter (Chapter 2) to propose a 
compromise.179 King and Lejeune planned to kill the 
bill in the Senate unless the grandfather date for local 
ordinances extended to October 1, 1990.179 In addition, 
King and LeJune wanted small city halls to be exempted from HB 217’s preemption.178, 179  TI 
knew that without approval from the LMA, passing HB 217 would be impossible.178 As a result, 
Tobacco Institute Southern Sector Vice President George Minshew approved extending the 
grandfather date for preemption to September 1, 1990 and exempting city halls smaller than 
1,200 square feet from needing designated smoking rooms.179 Joe Wood Berry continued 
negotiating a compromise on HB 217 with Gordon and Lejune after Minshew accepted those 
minor concessions.179 
 
HB 217 reached the Senate Floor on July 9, 1990.162 During consideration, Senator Jon 
Johnson secured an amendment eliminating the preemption clause from the bill.180 According to 
TI lobbyist Pat McWhorter in a July 24, 1990 memo to TI Regional VP Ron Morris, “our friends 
were so confused over our support of smoking restrictions that they allowed Senator Johnson to 
amend the preemption clause out of the bill.”180 After Johnson stripped preemption from HB 
217, TI had Representative Jackson kill the bill162, 177 by returning it to calendar.180   
 
After HB 217 died, TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris explained to TI Vice 
President George Minshew that the industry's efforts to pass a preemption bill failed in the final 
days of the 1990 regular session because its Senate allies did not want to pass a smoking 
restriction law.181 Although unsuccessful during the 1990 legislative session, TI continued 
pursuing proactive preemption legislation the following year.  
 
All other smoking restriction bills introduced during the 1990 legislative session died in 
their initial committees.  
 
The Industry Pursues Preemption Again in 1991 
  
The Tobacco Institute believed the 1991 regular session was an ideal time to pursue 
industry bills because it did not have to worry about tax proposals in 1991.182 At the time, no 
fiscal bills could be enacted during regular sessions in odd-numbered years under Louisiana law. 
In addition, the industry had also compromised on a 4-cent per pack cigarette tax increase during 
the 1990 regular session (Chapter 6), which TI believed would help their effort to secure 
“Our friends were so 
confused over our support of 
smoking restrictions that they 
allowed Senator Johnson to 
amend the preemption 
clause out of the bill.”  
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preemption in 1991.182 While their political analysis of Louisiana predicted opposition from 
tobacco control advocates and the Louisiana Medical Association, it anticipated "no major 
problems" securing “…anti-discrimination and guaranteed smoking accommodation….” bills in 
1991.182 
 
TI lobbyists recommended pursuing a bill to require establishments restricting smoking 
create indoor smoking sections.182 TI decided to pursue legislation in line with this suggestion, 
deciding to secure designated indoor spaces for smoking rather than an overt preemption bill as 
they had attempted with HB 217.183 An April 30, 1991 letter from TI Regional Director Pat 
McWhorter to Regional Vice President Ron Morris, stated, “As we previously agreed, rather 
than again attempting passage of a preemption bill, we are pursuing passage of a bill 
guaranteeing smoker accommodation.”183 In April, TI again enlisted Representative Alphonse 
Jackson (D-Shreveport) to sponsor industry-developed accommodation legislation. TI recruited 
RJR lobbyist C.J. Blache to craft the bill. 
 
Representative Jackson submitted HB 1292 on April 29, 1991 to institute smoking 
accommodation policies in government buildings. According to TI’s 1991 Legislative Report, 
HB 1292 required state and local government workplaces to prohibit smoking except for in a 
required smoking section of “adequate space.” HB 1292 also preempted local control of smoking 
in government workplaces, but allowed ordinances enacted by July 1, 1991 to stand.184  
 
HB 1292 was referred to the House Health and Welfare Committee, which held a hearing 
on May 22, 1991. Committee members amended HB 1292 to extend the grandfather date for 
preemption to October 1, 1991, to adjust punishments for smoking in smokefree sections, and to 
remove signage requirements .184 The committee then sent the bill to the House floor.  
 
 The House considered HB 1292 on May 30, 1991,184 with Representative John Travis (D-
Jackson)185 handling the bill for Jackson. The bill was amended to lift the requirement that 
designated smoking areas in government buildings be “adequate” and to move enforcement 
responsibility to the Department of Health and Hospitals.184 In addition, Representative 
Raymond Lalonde (D-Sunset), who sponsored legislation during the 1991 regular session to ban 
cigarette and smokeless tobacco sales to minors186, 187 with industry assistance (Chapter 7),183 
secured an amendment prohibiting primary workspaces from being established as smoking 
sections.184, 185 After amendments, House members voted 74 to 16 to approve HB 1292 and send 
the bill to the Senate.184, 185 
  
 The Senate Health and Welfare Committee considered HB 1292 on June 12, 1991.184 
During consideration, committee members shifted enforcement authority from the Department of 
Health and Hospitals to state agency heads and further extended the grandfather date from 
October 1, 1991 to January 1, 1992.184 The committee then reported HB 1292 favorably to the 
Senate floor, which unanimously passed it on June 28, 1991 and sent it to Governor Roemer for 
his signature.184  
 
On July 22, 1991, Governor Roemer vetoed HB 1292. TI reported that the veto was on 
the grounds that the bill “appears to infringe on the right of the local government in the exercise 
of freedom of choice on the subject of smoking in public buildings. [Governor Roemer] was 
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particularly concerned about the availability of space in 
buildings owned and/or leased by smaller political 
subdivisions.”184 When the governor rejected the bill, 
he also noted that the legislation appeared to guarantee 
the right to smoke indoors and that this bill would 
force already smokefree public buildings to set aside 
smoking areas. Roemer vetoed HB 1292 a year after a 
bitter fight to pass tobacco taxes during a state budget 
crisis that saw the tobacco companies allow a 4-cent 
increase per cigarette pack instead of the Governor’s 
desired 10-cent increase (Chapter 6). Prior to 1990, the 
tobacco industry had frustrated Governor Roemer by avoiding tobacco tax increases for three 
years despite Louisiana facing an ongoing budget crisis (Chapter 6).  
  
Johnson and Lalonde Continue to Pursue Clean Indoor Air Bills in 1991   
  
While the tobacco industry pushed accommodation laws with preemption, pro-health 
lawmakers submitted smoking restriction legislation that failed to gain traction during the 
legislative session .  
 
One of the legislators that sought smoking restriction legislation was Representative 
Raymond Lalonde (D-Sunset). On April 17, 1991, he introduced HB 567 to limit tobacco use in 
facilities with state agencies to designated areas. According to an April 30, 1991 memo by TI 
lobbyist Pat McWhorter, Lalonde initially sought to prohibit smoking in facilities with state 
agencies, but weakened HB 567 after being contacted by the tobacco industry: 
 
Representative Lalonde has introduced two pieces of legislation affecting us. One 
which we intend to attempt to dovetail our smoker accommodation bill with, 
prohibits smoking in public buildings housing state agencies only. However, at 
our request, he has specifically mandated indoor areas be provided in all state 
facilities for smokers.183 
 
HB 567 set a fine of no more than $100 for tobacco users who violated the law. The bill required 
Administration Commissioner Dennis Stine to create and enforce rules for smoking sections.184, 
188 Unlike HB 1292, HB 567 did not preempt local legislation. Th bill was referred to the House 
Appropriations Committee.184 
 
Besides submitting HB 567 in 1991, Lalonde introduced a bill to establish 18 years as the 
minimum age of sale or purchase for tobacco products and legislation to make smokers liable for 
harm caused by their secondhand smoke emissions (Chapter 7).183, 184 Lalonde had introduced 
tobacco control legislation since 1988, when he first submitted bills to set a minimum age 
requirement for tobacco products (Chapter 7) and to restrict smoking in government buildings. 
At the beginning of the 1991 legislative session, Louisiana had no minimum age requirement for 
purchasing tobacco products.189 Lawmakers had passed a minimum age law in 1915, but 
repealed it in 1942 because the rule was ambiguous and not enforced.189, 190  Lalonde also 
considered introducing a bill that mandated skull and cross bones images be placed on state tax 
TI reported that the veto was 
on the grounds that the bill 
“appears to infringe on the 
right of the local government 
in the exercise of freedom of 
choice on the subject of 
smoking in public buildings.”  
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stamps for tobacco products.183 Even so, he was not opposed to cooperating with the tobacco 
industry. In 1991, Lalonde welcomed TI’s assistance in passing a minimum age law (Chapter 
7).183 During a meeting, TI Regional Director Patrick McWhorter, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry 
and Philip Morris lobbyist Randy Haynie also convinced Lalonde not to pursue his skull and 
cross bones bill.183 
 
Lalonde cooperated with TI on the language of HB 567, his clean air bill.183 HB 567 
initially prohibited smoking in public buildings used by state agencies, but the Tobacco Institute 
aimed to “dovetail” Lalonde’s bill with HB 1292, its preemptive smoker accommodation bill.183 
TI persuaded Lalonde to include designated indoor smoking areas in the bill’s language, 
weakening the legislation before it was introduced in April.183, 184   
  
The House Appropriations Committee heard HB 567 on June 11, 1991, where it was  
amended to require suitable smoking sections and exclude unspecified state-owned buildings, 
then favorably reported to the floor by a 6-4 vote.184, 191  On June 21, 1991, representatives voted 
49-47 to approve HB 567, falling short of the required 53 votes for passage in that chamber.184, 
192 Although Lalonde received approval to return HB 567 for consideration, the bill died without 
another hearing.184   
  
Besides Representative Lalonde’s legislation in the House, Senator Jon Johnson 
introduced three complimentary bills, SB 230, 240, and 243 on April 22, 1991. 184 SB 230 
required private offices to observe smoking and nonsmoking workers’ smoking restriction policy 
desires, with nonsmokers taking priority. SB 240 required smoking and nonsmoking areas, set at 
35% and 65% of the workspace respectively, in state and local government offices. SB 240 also 
preempted restrictions in government owned facilities.184 SB 243 outlawed “…smoking in public 
areas of state and local government buildings” according to TI’s 1991 Legislative Report.184 
Johnson’s three bills were referred to the Senate Health and Welfare Committee. 
 
 Johnson’s legislation was scheduled for a hearing before the Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee on June 3, 1991. However, SB 230 and SB 240 died on adjournment without 
consideration.184 Legislators amended SB 243 to require state and local government facilities 
have a minimum of one ventilated smoking room and to prohibit smoking in elevators, 
healthcare establishments (excluding patient rooms), and private museum and gallery exhibition 
spaces. In addition, legislators amended SB 243 to preempt stricter local laws passed after 
January 1, 1992 and sent it to the Senate Floor. On June 10, 1991 the Senate passed SB 243 
unanimously and sent it to the House.184   
  
 The House Health and Welfare Committee heard SB 243 on June 20, 1991.184 During 
consideration Representative Eugene Eason (D-Springhill) argued against the bill, claiming 
smoking restrictions should be handled by local governments.193 After making unknown 
amendments, the committee sent SB 243 to the Floor where it died without a vote.184 
  
Louisiana Passes Four Clean Indoor Air Laws in 1992 with Tobacco Industry Help 
 
Before the start of the 1992 legislative session, public health advocates organized the 
Louisiana Coalition on Smoking or Health (LCSH) in late March to aggressively pursue tobacco 
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control legislation. The coalition consisted of 60 organizations and was led by Cary 
Kuhlmann,194 the Executive Director of the Orleans Parish Medical Society.195 The coalition 
sought to increase the state cigarette tax, increase funding for tobacco disease research and 
education, and permit the State of Louisiana to sue the tobacco industry to recoup healthcare 
costs of treating state hospital patients suffering from tobacco-related illnesses .194, 196  
The Coalition partnered with Representative 
Raymond Lalonde and Senator Jon Johnson to push for 
statewide smokefree restrictions.194 At the time, LCSH 
did not know that Representative Lalonde had 
collaborated with the tobacco industry on minimum age 
bill HB 19 since they assisted him privately to avoid 
upsetting some of his proponents (Chapter 7). It is 
doubtful that tobacco control advocates were aware 
Lalonde had weakened his 1991 smoking restriction bill 
HB 567 at the tobacco industry’s request.  
In total, Louisiana legislators offered twelve 
bills to restrict smoking during the 1992 legislative 
session (Table 5.10). LSCH-backed lawmakers Representative Lalonde and Senator Johnson 
each introduced 3 bills to restrict indoor and public smoking. Lalonde submitted House bills 
1625, 1626, and 1632, and Johnson proposed Senate Bills 163, 164, and 165 (Table 5.10).197 
(There were also several other bills introduced by other legislators; Table 5.10.) Lalonde’s HB 
1625 mandated smoking sections in select businesses if owners decided not to ban smoking, and 
prohibited smoking in other places such as school campuses. Lalonde’s HB 1626 barred smoking 
in public spaces and offices of buildings used or owned by the state, while HB 1632 outlawed 
smoking in enclosed workplaces staffed by more than one person unless all employees were 
located in a general work area and were smokers. Senator Johnson’s SB 163 barred smoking in 
select establishments as well as buildings used or owned by state and local governments.  SB 164 
required business owners to set smoking policies meeting nonsmoking employees’ preferences 
and SB 165 mandated smoking sections in state and local government offices. Although Johnson 
acted as a legislative champion for the CTFLA, TI identified SB 165 as tobacco industry 
legislation in its 1993 Strategic Plan for Louisiana.198 None of Johnson’s bills other than SB 164 
passed out of committee. Representative Lalonde’s and Senator Johnson’s bills were referred to 
the Health and Welfare Committees in their respective chambers. 
Only Lalonde’s HB 1629 and Johnson’s SB 164 received hearings.197 Lalonde’s HB 1625 
and HB 1632 were scheduled for a hearing on May 21 but Lalonde delayed them, preventing 
their consideration that session.197 Johnson’s SB 163 and SB 165 never had hearings and also 
died with adjournment.197 
The Senate Health and Welfare Committee significantly altered SB 164 at its May 18, 
1992 hearing. The Committee amended Johnson’s bill to remove the requirement that 
workplaces prohibit smoking if that policy was desired by nonsmoking employees, instead 
mandating the creation of a smoking policy amenable to both smoking and nonsmoking 
workers.197 The Committee also amended SB 164 to exclude workplaces with less than 25 full 
time employees from the policy requirement. Other amendments mandated smoking areas in 
government buildings except for judicial buildings and the state legislature, and changed the  
LCSH did not know that 
Representative Lalonde had 
collaborated with the 
tobacco industry on 
minimum age bill HB 19 since 
they assisted him privately to 
avoid upsetting some of his 
proponents. 
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Table 5.10: Smoking Restriction Legislation as Introduced for the 1992 Legislative Session 197, 199 
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Defeated on House 
floor (56-40) 
Forster HB 
732 
4/07/9
2 
     + +      +      Died with 
adjournment on 
Senate Floor 
Ellington HB 
1176 
4/12/9
2 
   +   +            Adopted* 
Ellington HB 
1572 
4/16/9
2 
 +      +   +        Withdrawn 
Lalonde HB 
1625 
4/13/9
2 
+  + + + +  + +   +   +     Died with 
adjournment in 
House Health and 
Welfare Committee 
Lalonde HB 
1626 
4/13/9
2 
+      +   +
*
* 
        Defeated on House 
floor (40-60) 
Lalonde HB 
1632 
4/13/9
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 +     +   +     +    Died with 
adjournment in 
House Health and 
Welfare Committee 
Fields 
(For 
Governor) 
SB 
147 
3/30/9
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   +   +   +       +
# 
+
# 
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Johnson SB 
163 
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Dardenne SB 
539 
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2 
     +       +      Adopted* 
*Significantly amended before passage. 
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implementation date of SB 164 to January 1, 1993.197 Following consideration of SB 164, 
committee members reported the bill favorably to the Senate Floor. 
Despite significant weakening of SB 164 in committee, LSCH continued supporting the 
bill. Interviewed by the Baton Rouge newspaper The Advocate, coalition spokesperson Taylor 
Caffery stated the bill was “a step forward” because it established smoking policies where many 
people were exposed to secondhand smoke.200 On May 19, the  Senate changed the effective date 
of the bill to three months after adoption and voted 34 to 3 to send SB 164 to the House.197SB 
164 was heard by the House Health and Welfare Committee on May 26, 1992, where 
Representative Melissa Flournoy (D-Shreveport) successfully proposed an amendment 
eliminating exemptions for judicial buildings and the state legislature.197, 201 (SB 164 sponsor 
Johnson feared the amendment would prevent the bill from passing due to opposition from 
legislators who smoked.) After the committee adopted Flournoy’s amendment it sent SB 164 to 
the House Floor. 
Representatives considered SB 164 on June 4, 1992.197 LSCH legislative ally Lalonde 
defended SB 164’s smoking restrictions, arguing that “There’s places for everything…I got a 
right to have sex, I’m married, but I don’t do it in the House Committee room.”202 Representative 
John Travis (D-LaPlace), who accepted the most campaign contributions from TI that year 
($500203, 204) opposed SB 164, arguing that private businesses could impose smoking restrictions. 
Travis also asserted that SB 164 would cause economic harm by reducing workplace 
productivity, including at the state legislature.202 Representative Robert Adley (D-Bossier City) 
proposed another amendment to again excluding legislative facilities from SB 164.202  Lalonde 
argued against the change, stating it was unfair for legislators to not be subject to a law they 
imposed.202 Representatives voted 49 to 49 on Adley’s amendment, defeating it.202 The House 
then voted 66 to 33 to approve the bill, sending it back to the Senate.202 
The Senate voted 37 to 0 on June 9 to reject the House’s amendments, sending the bill to 
a conference committee. The committee consisted of four smokers and two nonsmokers, 
including Representative Travis, who had tried repeatedly to block SB 164. The Conference 
Committee removed the House Health and Welfare 
Committee amendment that had added legislative 
and judicial buildings to the bill.197, 205  Both houses 
approved the conference version of SB 164 on June 
22, the last day of the regular legislative session, 
and Governor Edwin Edwards signed it on July 14, 
1992.197  
As adopted, SB 164 mandated the creation 
of smoking policies fairly accommodating smokers 
and nonsmokers in offices with more than 25 full-
time employees, not including homes or private 
**Smoking sections could be created in areas that did not cause nonsmokers to encounter secondhand smoke. 
#Allows local schoolboards to set penalties for violating smoking restrictions. 
~Prohibits smoking in public spaces of gov. owned or operated buildings, exhibitions in galleries and museums. 
^Provides enforcement to Department of Health and Hospitals. 
As adopted, SB 164 
mandated smoking policies 
fairly accommodating 
smokers and nonsmokers in 
offices with more than 25 
full-time employees, not 
including homes or private 
offices.  
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offices.197 The bill did not require workplaces to adopt policies necessitating construction or 
costs to implement. SB 164 also forbade smoking in state government agency facilities. 
However, state agencies had to create smoking areas if asked by an employee unless they were 
judicial, legislative, healthcare, or educational facilities. The bill required the Department of 
Health and Hospitals to develop “reasonable” enforcement rules.  
Outcome of other Legislation during the 1992 Session 
 
Representative Raymond Lalonde’s HB 1626 received less attention from the tobacco 
industry and proved easier for it to defeat. As introduced, HB 1626 limited smoking in the 
offices and public areas of state-owned and operated facilities.197 On May 21, 1992, the House 
Health and Welfare Committee amended HB 1626 to change which facilities were affected by 
smoking restrictions, then sent the bill to the House floor on a 5 to 3 vote.   
HB 1626 was debated by the House on May 27, 1991. TI had been tracking HB 1626 and 
planned to weaken or kill the bill on the floor.206 During consideration, Representative John 
Travis proposed amending the bill to prohibit smoking in casinos and at cockfights to implicitly 
target Lalonde, who was a proponent of legalizing gambling in Louisiana and had fought efforts 
to outlaw cockfighting because his base enjoyed the activity.201 House Speaker John Alario 
found the amendment unrelated and blocked it. Failing to sabotage HB 1626, Travis argued the 
bill would lead to the state government developing strict rules and to employees being fired for 
violating smoking restrictions. The House then voted 60 to 40 to kill HB 1626.197 
The Louisiana Legislature passed three more clean air bills in 1992: SB 147, introduced 
by Senator Cleo Fields (D-Baton Rouge) on behalf of Governor Edwards, HB 1176 introduced 
by Representative Noble Ellington (D-Winnsboro), and SB 539 by Representative Jay 
Dardenne.207 SB 147 and HB 1176 were nearly identical upon introduction, with both prohibiting 
smoking in public schools, school campuses, and school vehicles (while carrying students).197 As 
introduced, SB 539 prohibited smoking in enclosed hospital spaces except for inpatient rooms if 
other patients consented and a physician ordered the exception.  
TI closely watched SB 147 and HB 1176, preparing to get their labor organization allies 
“to amend/oppose based on collective bargaining.”208 SB 147 was introduced on March 30, 
1992, and HB 1176 on April 12, 1992. Both were referred to education committees. At their 
initial hearings, both bills were amended to permit school administrators to establish smoking 
areas for their workers.197 The Senate Health and Welfare Committee also amended SB 147 to 
permit indoor and outdoor smoking areas and allow school boards to create penalties for 
violating smoking restrictions. Both bills survived their committees and passed to the floor for 
additional consideration. TI continued to monitor SB 147 and HB 1176 as they progressed.208 
The House Education Committee amended SB 147 on May 28, 1992 to require smoking areas 
for employees and to permit smoking in outdoor school stadiums.197 Both chambers ultimately 
passed weakened versions of SB 147 and HB 1176. Governor Edwards signed SB 147 into law 
on May 20, 1992 and HB 1176 on July 6, 1992.197   
As passed, SB 147 prohibited smoking on all elementary and secondary school property 
and school buses, except for outdoor or indoor areas designated for smoking by school 
administrators. Indoor smoking areas had to be separated from nonsmoking sections and have 
ventilation systems that lowered secondhand smoke exposure in smokefree areas. SB 147 also 
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permitted smoking in “outdoor school stadiums.” Penalties for smoking restriction violations 
could be developed by school boards. SB 147 entered effect immediately. HB 1176 restricted 
smoking in public elementary and secondary schools and school vehicles carrying students. The 
bill also allowed school administrators to establish smoking sections. The law entered effect 
August 21, 1992. After the bills passed, it appears smoking was prohibited on school buses only 
when students were present. 
SB 539 passed the Louisiana State Legislature and entered law after an amendment the 
tobacco industry desired was attached to the bill.209 Initially intended to allow smoking only in 
patient rooms in limited circumstances,209 the tobacco industry sought to change the bill to 
permit designated smoking areas.210 Although we did not find evidence that the tobacco industry 
actually mobilized, TI planned to use coalition allies and smokers’ rights groups to pressure for 
the change.210 SB 539 ultimately passed through the legislature with near unanimous support 
after it was amended in the Senate Health and Welfare Committee to permit hospitals to 
designate smoking areas in spaces with good ventilation.209 
The Tobacco Control Industry Secures Preemption in 1993  
 
From 1990 through 1992, 16 local governments considered clean air ordinances, with at 
least 8 adopting them (Table 5.11). Most local ordinances focused on restricting smoking on 
government owned or leased property. However, ordinances in Lafayette, Shreveport, and 
Mandeville included partial restrictions on public venues or restaurants (with accommodation 
and exemptions). Even though local clean air ordinances in Louisiana remained limited in scope, 
TI included Louisiana in a 22-state plan to secure legislation preempting local ordinances in 
1993.211 
Tobacco Industry Prepares for 1993 Legislative Sessions 
  
To secure preemption in 1993, TI considered reviving its 1991 accommodation 
legislation, HB 1292.198 The bill had passed both houses in 1991 but was vetoed by then-
Governor Roemer.198 According to TI’s 1993 Strategic Plan for Louisiana, “The LA team is 
reviewing HB 1292 and SB 165 [identified as an industry bill by TI] to assess their current 
applicability [to Louisiana] and any revisions we may wish to make.”198 SB 165, the 1992 bill by 
Senator Jon Johnson that mandated smoking sections in the offices of state and local 
governments, never received consideration.209 
TI developed a multifaceted legislative strategy for convincing allied lawmakers to pass 
preemptive accommodation legislation. The Institute’s 1993 Strategic Plan remarked that 
industry-friendly lawmakers in Louisiana personally disliked smoking restrictions and restricting 
local control, creating a hurdle for the industry: 
Two fundamental problems exist re this issue in LA: our floor leaders are extremely 
resistant to any form of restriction on their smoking, and these same floor leaders are very 
reluctant to impose preemptions on local government. Our [the Tobacco Institute] task is 
to convince them that it is in everyone’s best interest to do so.198  
To help secure preemption legislation, TI sought to obtain support from unspecified “industry 
floor leaders,” select a legislative sponsor, and choose the committee to first handle the bill.198 TI 
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felt that Governor Edwin Edwards (D), who replaced Governor Roemer in 1992, was more likely 
to sign their legislation.198, 211 
TI recruited Senator Ron Landry (D-LaPlace) to sponsor preemption legislation during 
the 1993 legislative session. Landry accepted at least $2,600 tobacco industry contributions from 
1983 to 1993, the year he introduced the industry’s bill (Chapter 3). Landry had also helped 
block clean air bills in the Senate Health and Welfare Committee, and in 1991 castigated 
lawmakers for not passing TI’s accommodation and preemption bill HB 1292.123, 213 
Landry introduced SB 767 and SB 768 on April 12, 1993,214 the former to institute 
smoker accommodation policies in government workplaces and the latter to establish smoking 
accommodation policies in public places. SB 767 mandated that state, parish, and local 
government offices establish designated smoking rooms for workers if permitted by fire safety 
and lease requirements, and preempted stronger local ordinances adopted after August 15, 1993. 
SB 767 excluded health and educational facilities, as well as building spaces used by the state 
judicial branch from smoking section requirements. SB 768 forbade smoking in public transit, 
childcare centers, elevators, and places the Louisiana fire marshal deemed dangerous. The bill 
also required establishment of smoking areas in public places, allowed restaurants to adjust 
Table 5.11: Local Clean Air Attempts from 1990 until 1992 184, 197, 212 
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Outcome 
Baker 1990       R     Adopted 
Houma Parish 1990       R     Adopted 
Jefferson Davis 
Parish 
1990           + Adopted 
Terrebone 1990            Adopted 
Lafayette 1991 P P R
S 
      R  Defeated 
Lafourche 1991       RS     Adopted 
Merryville 1991       P     Unknown 
Shreveport 1991 P
* 
R
S 
R
S 
E
* 
RS  RS     Died 
Thibodaux 1991       P     Adopted 
Berwick 1992       RS     Adopted 
Eunice 1992       P **     Adopted 
Lafayette 1992       RS     Adopted 
Mandeville 1992   R
S 
        Adopted 
Merryville 1992       P     Unknown 
Ponchatoula 1992       P     Defeated 
Vivian 1992       RS     Adopted 
P: Prohibited    R: Restricted (not complete prohibition)    S: Permitted or required designated smoking areas   E: Exempt    
*Exempted bars, hospitality rooms, and retail stores that held less than 150 people at a time. 
**Exempted local jail and police department. 
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smoking and nonsmoking section sizes based on consumer preference, and exempted gambling 
facilities (including horse races) and businesses that generated over half their earnings from 
alcohol sales. SB 768 permitted creation of smoking areas on each level of public places, 
allowed taxi and limousine drivers to declare their vehicle as smoking or nonsmoking, and 
exempted state legislative “meeting areas" from restrictions. Most important, SB 768 preempted 
local ordinances adopted on or after September 1, 1993.  
 TI anticipated they may “have to battle the Medical Society and other non-tobacco 
groups” during the 1991 legislative session.182 While the tobacco industry prepared to push for 
SB 767 and SB 768, health groups were attempting to push clean indoor air laws that would 
protect public health.198 However, no public health-oriented clean air bill materialized as a 
significant threat, and TI’s strategic plan for the 1993 legislative session did not include a 
strategy to address tobacco control advocate opposition.   
TI ruminated on whether tobacco control champions Representative Raymond Lalonde 
and Senator Jon Johnson would pursue smoking restriction bills during the 1993 session and 
considered how to deter the lawmakers from introducing legislation. According to TI’s 1993 
Strategic Plan: 
The passage of SB 164 by Sen. Johnson, who has also sponsored many of the 
other anti-tobacco bills in the past, may be enough to satisfy him. The LA Team is 
to follow-up with the senator and his staff to see if we can prevent the automatic 
reintroduction of his [legislative] package. Rep. Lalonde will most likely continue 
his crusade. The LA Team is to meet with him in advance of the session to 
determine his concerns and attempt to work a compromise if possible.198 
Although the industry collaborated with Lalonde numerous times and favored Johnson’s SB 165 
in 1992, TI saw the lawmakers as health advocates instead of allies.198 Johnson ultimately 
submitted two clean air bills featuring preemption, SB 147 to require smoking sections in “local 
government offices” and SB 150 to outlaw smoking in galleries, museums, state and local 
government facilities, and elevators.214 Meanwhile, Lalonde introduced legislation to give the 
state a cause of action to sue tobacco companies for harm caused by tobacco products and to 
make smokers liable for harm caused to others by their tobacco use.214  
Lawmakers introduced 8 smoking restriction bills during the 1993 legislative session. 
Only Representative Landry’s SB 767 and SB 768 received hearings. Other bills introduced 
during the session, including Johnson’s SB 147 and SB 150, died in the House Health and 
Welfare Committee (Table 5.12). 
The Preemptive Louisiana Clean Indoor Air Act of 1993  
 
Senator Landry’s SB 767 and SB 768 were referred to the Senate Local and Municipal 
Affairs Committee,215 which heard both bills on May 2, 1993.214 Bill sponsor Ron Landry, along 
with TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry, attended the meeting.216 (Landry was not a Senate Local and 
Municipal Affairs Committee member.) During the hearing tobacco control champion and 
committee member Jon Johnson called SB 767 an effort to preempt local control, and argued 
against approving the industry-supported bill:  
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States are moving in the direction of trying to address the needs and concerns of 
non-smokers to a greater extent than trying to accommodate smokers – and this 
bill does just the opposite.216   
TI lobbyist Berry responded that SB 767 treated smokers fairly: 
You see people out on the street smoking…they have no place inside the building to 
smoke.216  
 The committee amended SB 767 to extend the grandfather clause for local ordinances exempted 
from preemption to September 1, 1993,214, 217 then voted 3 to 2 to report SB 767 to the Senate 
Floor.217  
During the same committee hearing, bill sponsor Landry asserted SB 768 intended to 
treat smokers fairly. He stated “It’s a matter of fairness. I pass by state buildings and I see people 
standing out in the cold to smoke. We just want to give them a little space inside.”217 Despite 
Landry’s assertion, Senator Donald Cravins Jr. (D-Arnaudville) proposed an amendment 
prohibiting smoking in Senate committees and the Senate chamber, which was defeated 4 to 3.217 
(SB 768, as introduced, exempted meeting areas of the legislature from smoking restrictions.214, 
217) Senator Johnson also introduced an amendment to remove the exemption for legislative areas 
that the committee defeated.216 Following amendments, Cravins, Johnson, and Ewing voted as a 
majority against the bill.217 However, Committee Chairman Willie Crain deadlocked the 
committee by voting in favor of SB 768 (Table 5.13).217 
Table 5.12: Clean Air Legislation Introduced during the 1993 Session214 
 Author Locations Covered Outcome 
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HB 1080 Travis +  +      + + + Died in House Health and 
Welfare Committee 
HB 1086 Travis      +     + Died in House Health and 
Welfare Committee 
HB 1469 Chaisson +         +  Died in House Health and 
Welfare Committee 
SB 147 Johnson      +      Died in House Health and 
Welfare Committee 
SB 150 Johnson +     + +  + +  Died in House Health and 
Welfare Committee 
SB 539 Brinkhaus +           Died in Senate Health and 
Welfare Committee 
SB 767 Landry      +     + Adopted 
SB 768 Landry   + -    + + + + Adopted 
+ Enacts provisions / Restrictions | - Exempts 
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The tie vote delayed SB 768 from being reported to the Senate floor. The Senate Local 
and Municipal Affairs Committee held another meeting on SB 768 three days later on May 6, 
1993. Committee members adopted amendments excluding some places affected by existing 
smoking restrictions, extended the grandfather clause for local ordinances from October 1 to 
September 1, 1993, and then sent the bill to the Senate Floor.214  
Reported favorably before SB 768, SB 767 received consideration by the Senate first on 
May 3, 1993. Senator Donald Cravins Jr. successfully amended the bill to establish smoking and 
nonsmoking sections in the legislature.218 The Senate then approved SB 767 in a 28 to 9 vote and 
sent it to the House.214, 218 
The House Municipal, Parochial and Cultural Affairs Committee considered SB 767 on 
May 14, 1993, and sent it to the House floor without changes.214   
The Senate considered SB 768 five days later on May 19, 1993, amending it to include 
state legislative buildings and taxis in smoking restrictions. As introduced, SB 768 had exempted 
state legislative “meeting areas” from smoking restrictions and allowed taxi and limo drivers to 
designate their vehicles as smoking or nonsmoking.214 Senators also amended SB 768 to allow 
smoking in childcare establishments when children were not present. Before the amendment, 
smoking in childcare establishments was completely prohibited.214 After making changes to SB 
768, Senators voted 32 to 6 to send SB 768 to the House.214, 219 
The House Health and Welfare Committee further weakened SB 768. At a hearing on 
May 25, 1993, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry and Philip Morris lobbyist Randy Haynie defended 
the bill.220 Berry argued SB 768 provided owners freedom to regulate their property as they 
desired.221 The Louisiana State Medical Society testified against SB 768, with its lobbyist Sharon 
Knight arguing it robbed local governments of their right to impose smoking restrictions.221 The 
committee ignored Knight’s testimony, adopted amendments eliminating smoking restrictions in 
public school buildings and allowing smoking rooms on “each floor of a public place,” and then 
reported SB 768 to the House floor on a 6 to 2 vote.214, 221  
 Representatives debated SB 768 on the House floor on June 2, 1993.222 During 
consideration, SB 768’s handler in the House, Representative Mike McCleary (D-Baker), 
asserted the bill preserved owner choice over property. Representatives Jerry Thomas (D-
Bogalusa), Hunt Downer (D-Houma), and Joseph Accardo (D-LaPlace) spoke against SB 768, 
arguing it harmed local governing rights. Accardo secured an amendment to SB 768 on the 
House Floor permitting state lawmakers to designate smoking sections in legislative buildings. 
As introduced, SB 768 excluded meeting areas of the state legislature from smoking 
restrictions.214 The new amendment required state lawmakers to establish smoking sections in 
Table 5.13: Senate Local and Municipal Affairs Committee Vote on SB 767123, 217 
Representative Area SB 767 Vote SB 768 Vote 
Willie Crain (Chairman) D-Monroe  Yes 
Dennis Bagneris D-New Orleans Yes Yes 
Craig Romero D-New Iberia Yes Yes 
Jon Johnson D-New Orleans No No 
Donald Cravins Jr. D-Arnaudville Yes No 
Randy Ewing D-Quitman No No 
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legislative facilities if the bill passed. The House then passed SB 768 by a 63-34 vote.222 Five 
days later, the House approved SB 767 by 56 to 44, sending the bill back to the Senate for 
approval of final amendments.214 
 The Senate reconsidered SB 768 with House amendments on June 4.214 Senator Cravins, 
supported by Senators Ewing and Johnson, unsuccessfully attempted to send SB 768 to a 
conference committee to secure an amendment prohibiting state lawmakers from smoking in 
most areas of the state legislature.223 SB 768, which was amended by Representative Accardo on 
the House Floor to remove exemptions on smoking in legislative meeting areas and allow state 
lawmakers to designate smoking areas, would further restrict smoking by legislators if sent to 
Conference and altered as desired by Senator Cravins. After defeating that proposal, senators 
voted 26 to 11 to adopt SB 768.  
On June 9 Senators approved Landry’s other industry bill, SB 767.214 Governor Edwards 
signed SB 768 on June 10 and SB 767 on June 14, 1993. Together, the two bills prohibited 
smoking in elevators, public transportation vehicles, and childcare facilities (when children were 
present), and required designated smoking rooms in government offices, public places, and 
restaurants.214 The laws allowed for any establishment deriving more than 50% of its income 
from alcohol to permit indoor smoking and exempted meeting areas of the legislative branch, 
gaming and horse racing facilities, and taxis from smoking restrictions. The Louisiana Office 
Indoor Clean Air Act (SB 767) preempted local smoking restriction legislation covering 
workplaces, and the Louisiana Clean Indoor Air Act (SB 768) preempted local measures limiting 
smoking in public places on or after September 1, 1993.214  
Last Chance to Pass Local Smoking Restrictions in 1993 
 
 After the adoption of SB 767 and SB 768 in 
mid-June, local governments had through August 
31, 1993 to adopt smoking restriction ordinances 
that would not be preempted by state law. 
Community leaders and health advocates 
scrambled to secure ordinances before the 
deadline.214 In 1993 alone, 43 local governments 
considered ordinances and 40 passed them (Table 
5.14).214 Louisiana localities considered 78 
ordinances total between 1978 and 1993 
(excluding a smoking restrictions repeal by 
Jefferson Davis Parish), adopting at least 61 into 
law. 
 
The ALA of Louisiana was the most active in local smokefree efforts following the 
adoption of SB 767 and SB 768, including providing model ordinances to local governments.228 
In the Parishes of Jefferson and St. Charles, the ALA lobbied local officials to enact ordinances 
before the preemption deadline.224 According to ALA of Louisiana Executive Director Ben 
Fontaine in a 1993 article from The Times-Picayune, “We’ve [the ALA of Louisiana] been on a 
merry-go round for the last 30 days.”224 
 
The Louisiana Office Indoor Clean 
Air Act (SB 767) preempted local 
smoking restriction legislation 
covering workplaces, and the 
Louisiana Clean Indoor Air Act (SB 
768) preempted local measures 
limiting smoking in public places 
on or after September 1, 1993.  
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Other health voluntaries and smokefree advocates waged smaller efforts to secure local 
smoking restrictions. American Cancer Society local chapter President Mary Clemence 
Devereux unsuccessfully testified to the St. Tammany Parish Police Jury (equivalent to a county 
board) that it should remove smoking restriction exemptions for a bar and some other rooms in 
parish facilities.229 An unidentified organization also provided St. Charles Parish representatives 
information on secondhand smoke’s harmful effects, but failed to convince lawmakers to pass an 
ordinance.230 We did not find evidence that other health voluntaries or advocates pressured other 
local governments to adopt smokefree ordinances before the preemption deadline. In Jefferson 
Parish (and possibly others), the local business community opposed a proposed local ordinance. 
Regarding the Jefferson Parish ordinance, the Louisiana Restaurant Association argued the 
government should not interfere in business decisions.224 
 
Conclusion  
 
Initial attempts at pursuing clean air regulations in Louisiana failed due to a powerful 
tobacco industry presence with strong ties to members of the legislature. Weak voluntary health 
organizations and lack of consistent tobacco control advocacy were no match for the tobacco 
industry, generally leaving pro-health legislators fighting for smoking restrictions with limited 
external support. The tobacco industry, along with their legislative and business allies, blocked 
most of the 61 smoking restriction bills that failed to pass between 1970 and 1993. In 1992 and 
1993, the industry secured 5 pro-industry smoking accommodation laws and instituted state 
preemption of local smoking ordinances. 
The tobacco industry’s strategy evolved in the late 1980s and early 1990s because of an 
increasingly adverse political climate across the nation. This is reflected in the 1986 Surgeon 
Generals’ Report,83 which identified secondhand smoke as a cause of cancer and respiratory 
problems in infants and children and highlighted the fact that separate smoking and nonsmoking 
sections did not protect nonsmokers from secondhand smoke, coupled with a growing local 
control movement nationwide. Following its national strategy,231 the tobacco industry started 
pursuing accommodation laws and preemption in Louisiana instead of blocking all smoking 
restriction legislation. 
Although the presence and sophistication of tobacco control supporters increased over 
time in Louisiana, it was not enough to prevent the tobacco industry from achieving its policy 
objectives. The tobacco industry almost succeeded in enacting preemption with HB 1292 in 
1991, but the Governor vetoed it on the grounds that it removed local governments’ authority to 
regulate indoor air. In the 1992 legislative session, the state legislature passed three industry-
backed “clean indoor air” laws that established smoking accommodation policies in workplaces 
and most state workplaces, and prohibited smoking on elementary and secondary school property 
except for in designated smoking areas. In the 1993 session, the tobacco industry won passage of 
SB 767 and SB 768, which contained preemption clauses that stalled all local smokefree efforts 
for ten years until tobacco control advocates managed to partially overturn preemption in 2003 
(Chapter 10). 
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Table 5.14: Local Ordinances in Louisiana25, 26, 34, 60, 67, 72, 89, 119, 150, 162, 184, 197, 214, 224-227 
P: Prohibited    R: Restricted (not complete prohibition)    S: Permitted or required designated smoking areas   E: Exempt  L: Applies 
only to select room / building / buildings. U: Unspecified whether prohibition or restriction. Q: Required adoption of smoking policies. 
City Year Locations Covered Ordinance 
Allows 
Adoption of 
Law Stronger 
Than State’s 
Enforcement Outcome 
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New Orleans 1978  P P
* 
P E R
S 
R
S 
 R
S 
  P  New Orleans 
Department of 
Health 
Defeated 
Monroe 1979  R             Unknown 
Baton Rouge 1981         R
S 
     Adopted 
Baton Rouge  1982      R
S 
        Adopted 
Baton Rouge 1983           P
L 
   Defeated 
Unknown 1984               Unknown 
Unknown 1984               Unknown 
Bossier City 1985        R
L 
     $100 max 
initial fine, 
$200 max 
additional 
fines 
Adopted 
Shreveport 1985            R   Unknown 
Walker 1985        R
L 
      Adopted 
Shreveport 1986            R   Died 
New Orleans 1987  R
S 
R
S 
R
S 
         New Orleans 
Police 
Department 
enforced 
smoking 
violations. $25 
fine 
Defeated 
Caddo 1988        P       Unknown 
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New Orleans 1988  P R
S 
R
S 
 P P  P   P  Established 
$50-$300 
penalties 
Adopted 
Plaquemine 1988  P
# 
            Adopted 
Shreveport 1988    Q    R       Adopted 
Baton Rouge 1989  U  U   U  U   U   Adopted 
Caddo 1989        R       Adopted 
Lafayette 1989        R
S 
      Adopted 
Lake Charles  1989  P R
S 
P
# 
 P P  P  P P   Adopted 
Baker 1990        R       Adopted 
Houma 1990        R       Adopted 
Jefferson 
Davis  
1990               Repealed 
existing 
restrictions 
Terrebone 1990        R
S 
      Adopted 
Lafayette 1991  P P R
S 
       R   Defeated 
Lafourche 1991        R
S 
      Adopted 
Merryville 1991        P       Unknown 
Shreveport 1991 E P R
S 
R
S 
E R
S 
 R
S 
      Died 
Thibodaux 1991        P       Adopted 
Berwick 1992        R
S 
      Adopted 
Eunice 1992        P
# 
      Adopted 
Lafayette 1992        R
S 
      Adopted 
Mandeville 1992    R
S 
          Adopted 
Merryville 1992        P       Unknown 
Ponchatoula 1992        P       Defeated 
Vivian 1992        R
S 
      Adopted 
Alexandria 1993        P       Adopted 
Bastrop 1993        P       Adopted 
Beauregard 
Parish 
1993        R
S 
      Adopted 
Bogalusa 1993        P       Adopted 
Bossier 1993  P
^ 
P
^ 
P
^ 
          Defeated 
Calcasieu 
Parish 
1993  P  R
S 
          Adopted 
Catahoula 
Parish 
1993 E P R
S 
R
S 
E P P     P   Adopted 
Clairborne 
Parish 
1993        R
S 
      Adopted 
Covington 1993        P
^ 
      Adopted 
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Deridder 1993        P       Adopted 
Evangeline 
Parish 
1993        P       Adopted 
Gonzales 1993        P       Adopted 
Grand Coteau 1993        P       Adopted 
Iberville 1993        P
L 
      Adopted 
Iowa 1993        R
S 
      Adopted 
Jefferson 
Davis Parish$ 
1993 E P P E E P  L P P  P   Adopted 
Jonesboro 1993        P       Adopted 
Jonesville 1993        P       Adopted 
La Salle Parish 1993        P       Adopted 
Leesville 1993        P       Adopted 
Lincoln Parish 1993        P
# 
      Adopted 
Madison 
Parish 
1993        P
L 
      Defeated 
Morehouse 
Parish 
1993        P       Adopted 
New Orleans 1993        P     Permits 
adoption of 
stronger 
policies at 
public and 
private places 
Provides 
enforcement 
for private 
policies and 
public places 
Adopted 
Oak Grove 1993        P       Adopted 
Olla 1993        P       Adopted 
Ouachita 
Parish 
1993        R
S 
      Adopted 
Port Allen 1993        P       Adopted 
Rapides Parish 1993         
P
# 
      Adopted 
Rayne 1993        P       Adopted 
Ruston 1993        P      Provides 
enforcement 
for voluntary 
smoking 
restrictions 
Adopted 
Sabine Parish 1993        P       Adopted 
Slidell 1993        P
# 
      Adopted 
St. Bernard 1993        P
# 
      Adopted 
St. Charles 
Parish 
1993  P
^ 
 P
^ 
 P^  P
^ 
      Defeated 
St. James 1993          
R
S 
      Adopted 
St. Landry 1993        R
S 
      Adopted 
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St. Martinville 1993        L
R
S 
      Adopted 
St. Tammany 1993        P
# 
      Adopted 
Sulphur 1993 E R
S 
R
S 
R
S 
E  R
S 
 R
S 
 P    Adopted 
Union Parish 1993        P
# 
      Adopted 
Ville Platte 1993               Adopted 
Walker 1993        P
L 
    Yes  Adopted 
*Weak resolution. Encourages nonsmoking accommodation. 
**Contains exemptions. 
^Listed as “ban/restrict” in industry documents. 
#Exempts or simply restricts smoking at certain specific locations. 
$Combination of multiple resolutions and bills in one year. 
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Chapter 6: Early Tobacco Taxes (1980 to 1999) 
 
• Louisiana lawmakers only passed tobacco tax increases in 1984 and 1990 despite recurring 
budget crises throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. 
• The Tobacco Institute and tobacco companies directly collaborated with friendly state and 
local lawmakers to weaken and defeat tax legislation.  
• In 1992, the Tobacco Institute successfully pushed for the repeal of a local cigarette tax 
adopted by New Orleans in late 1984.  
 
Tobacco taxes are an effective strategy for preventing tobacco product initiation and 
reducing consumption.1 In the United States, the most widely employed tobacco tax is the 
cigarette excise tax that is levied on each pack of cigarettes.2 As of April 2020, cigarettes were 
taxed at $1.01 per pack at the federal level, while states and some localities impose varying 
excise taxes.3 
Louisiana proved mostly averse to tobacco tax increases throughout the 20th century, 
particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, despite regular budget crises then. The Legislature 
passed one of the first tobacco taxes in the country in 1926, but Louisiana lawmakers repealed 
that law in 1928.4 Louisiana made few additional tobacco tax increases before 1980, raising its 
cigarette tax per pack to 8¢ before 19505 and increasing it another 3¢ cents in 1974.6 Starting in 
1980, when health advocates sought to raise tobacco taxes to fund the Louisiana Cancer and 
Lung Trust Fund, the tobacco industry aggressively fought them. The industry successfully 
resisted tax increases until 1984, when during a state budget crisis (caused by Louisiana’s 
reliance on revenue from a faltering oil industry) the tobacco industry failed to prevent a 5¢ per 
pack tax on cigarettes, bringing Louisiana’s total tax to 16¢. Although budget crises remained a 
perpetual problem, the tobacco industry staved off additional tax increases until another 4¢ per 
pack cigarette tax increase passed in 1990. Louisiana tobacco taxes then stagnated until 2000. 
Louisiana’s dearth of increases likely resulted from the tobacco industry’s heavy lobbying 
against tax increases from 1980 to 1999 and the health community’s ineffective action on the 
issue. Louisiana did not adopt another tobacco tax until 2000, when health and tobacco control 
advocates jointly fought for tax increase legislation (Chapter 11). 
 The tobacco industry also fought local taxes during the 1980s and 1990s, initially with 
less success. The City of New Orleans passed a 5% of sales price tobacco tax in 1984 over 
resistance from the Tobacco Institute (TI), the major cigarette companies’ lobbying arm at the 
time. Despite tobacco industry efforts to have the tax repealed and prevent additional increases in 
the city, New Orleans raised its tobacco tax to 10% in 1986 and 20% in 1988. The tobacco 
industry ultimately managed to have the tobacco tax repealed in 1992 via a lawsuit filed by its 
allies. Its allies would prevent another attempt to revive the tax with a lawsuit in 1993. 
 
Legislative Rules around Tax Increases in Louisiana 
 
State-level taxes in Louisiana, including those on tobacco products, must originate in the 
House Ways and Means Committee. The House and Senate can amend the amount of the tax and 
make other changes. In 1974, the Louisiana public ratified a new state constitution that 
prohibited consideration of tax legislation in odd-numbered years,7 limiting consideration of 
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those bills to regular sessions in even years and special sessions. State lawmakers subsequently 
adopted Act 1041 in 1993, a constitutional amendment, to only allow proposal of tax increases 
during regular sessions in odd-numbered years or special sessions.8 All tax increases in 
Louisiana need approval by a two-thirds vote of each chamber.9   
Tobacco Tax Efforts Pre-1980s Provide Limited Revenue 
 
Louisiana considered and passed a limited amount of tobacco tax legislation before the 
1980s. The state instituted its 
first tobacco tax in 1926,6 the 
ninth to do so,10 with Act 197. 
Act 197 levied a 10% sales tax 
on cigarettes, cigars, and loose 
tobacco with revenue going to 
public schools.4 However, in 
1928 state lawmakers repealed 
the tax.4 According to a document found in RJ Reynolds’ records, Louisiana’s State Education 
Superintendent supported eliminating the tax because it was “unsatisfactory and it seems 
impossible of proper enforcement.”4 Louisiana would raise its cigarette excise tax to 8¢ per pack 
by 1950, among the highest in the United States during that time.5 A 3¢ increase per pack in 
1970, the next and last increase before the 1980s, brought the total tax rate to 11¢ per cigarette 
pack (Table 6.1).  
Tobacco Industry Prevents Tax Increases 1980-1984 
 
Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund: 1980 
 
In 1980, state lawmakers, health advocates and medical researchers, including Alton 
Oschner of the Oschner Foundation Hospital in New Orleans, pursued the first tobacco tax 
increase in Louisiana to dedicate funding towards tobacco control. HB 1651, introduced on May 
5, 1980 by Representative Leo Watermeier (D-New Orleans) and cosponsor Quentin Dastugue 
(D-Metairie), raised the cigarette tax 1¢ per pack from 
11¢ to 12¢ to create a new Louisiana Cancer and Lung 
Trust Fund.11-14 The new Trust’s board 14 would allocate 
the Fund’s money towards “research into smoking-
related diseases.”13 In addition, HB 1651 dedicated 17% 
of cigarette tax increase revenue to the state’s existing 
cancer registry.15 At the time, Louisiana had the highest 
cancer mortality rate in the country, but received the 
38th most cancer research funding among states from the 
federal government and other unspecified sources 
combined.14 The tobacco industry expected HB 1651 to 
raise cigarette tax revenue collected in 1981 by Louisiana from a projected $65.3 million to 
$70.7 million.16  
 
A similar bill introduced the same day as HB 1651, HB 1763 by Representative Mary 
Landrieu (D-New Orleans), funded cancer research by rededicating some existing tobacco tax 
Table 6.1: Excise Tax Per Cigarette Pack in Louisiana Through 19975, 6 
Year Adopted Amount Increase Total 
Pre-1950 8¢ 8¢ 
1970 3¢ 11¢ 
1984 5¢ 16¢ 
1990 4¢ 20¢ 
In 1980, state lawmakers, 
health advocates and medical 
researchers … pursued the 
first tobacco tax increase in 
Louisiana to dedicate funding 
towards tobacco control. 
 179 
 
revenue.17 HB 1763 never received consideration and died at the end of the 1980 legislative 
session. 
 
On May 13, 1980, TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris sent Louisiana attorney Jack 
Pender a list of talking points to oppose HB 1651.16 Morris’ letter asserted the bill did “not take 
into consideration the needs and rights of the more than one million Louisiana residents who 
smoke cigarets [sic]” and included 7 talking points as well as numerous facts and assertions to 
back them up, including the following:  
 
• More than 31 percent of what Louisiana residents pay for a pack of cigarets 
[sic] goes to the federal and state governments in the form of taxes. 
• Cigarets [sic] already generate 2.6 percent of the state's total revenue. 
• Average household effective buying income in Louisiana is $14,489. Under 
the current tax rate the average household with two smokers is required to pay 
$153.30 a year or 1.1% of its income for the pleasure of smoking. If this same 
family makes only $5,000 a year, 3.1% of its income goes for cigaret [sic] 
taxes. 
• Over 20 percent of Louisiana's households have incomes of less than $5,000 
annually.16 
 
Talking points in Morris’ letter also used traditional industry arguments that tobacco tax 
increases were unfair and regressive18-20: 
 
• Louisiana cigaret [sic] taxes are inequitable. They discriminate against the 
more than one million consumers who prefer to smoke. They are regressive 
because they tax heavily a product which comprises larger portion of poor 
consumers’ budgets than those of more affluent consumers. 
• Since the percentage of income devoted to consuming cigarets [sic] falls as 
income rises, Louisiana cigarette taxes are levied at higher effective rates on 
the poor than on the more affluent.16 
 
Morris’ letter also provided talking points and assertions to bolster his claim that a cigarette tax 
increase economically harmed businesses, reduced the competitiveness of Louisiana businesses 
with nearby Mississippi retailers, and lowered state revenue.16 
  
On May 16, 1980, TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris sent TI Vice President Roger 
Mozingo a copy of HB1651 and informed him that a TI lobbyist was handling the bill.21 
 
Health voluntaries and health practitioners supported HB 1651. The American Lung 
Association15 backed HB 1651, as did Alton Oschner of the Ochsner Foundation Hospital in 
New Orleans.14 We do not know if the American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, 
or other organizations advocated for HB 1651.  
  
The 1980 regular session ended on July 15, 1980, giving HB 1651 a month to pass the 
House and Senate.22 At a June 18, 1980 meeting of Louisiana Tobacco Action Network (TAN) 
officials, TI Public Affairs Manager23 Dan Alverson informed attendees that HB 1651 would 
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likely pass the House Ways and Means Committee but fail to pass the legislature before the 
session ended.24  
 
The House Ways and Means Committee considered HB 1651 on June 23, 1980. Tobacco 
sellers opposed the bill at the hearing, while Dr. Alton Ochsner supported it for its public health 
benefits. We do not know arguments used against HB 1651 during consideration. Oschner told 
the committee HB 1651’s revenue was needed because of shrinking research funding from the 
federal government and other sources.14 One of the first scientists to highlight the link between 
smoking and lung cancer, Ochsner testified that smoking caused 96% of lung cancer deaths.14 He 
also implied that filters did not protect smokers from harm, asserting they merely “help sell more 
cigarettes.” Ochsner argued to the committee that the tax most assisted those paying it, 
smokers.14  
 
House Ways and Means Committee members resisted raising taxes on cigarettes to fund 
the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund. During the hearing, chairman John Alario (D-
Westwego) suggested state funding from the general 
budget and other revenue sources could be used for the 
Trust. Committee members voted 9-5 against the bill.14    
 
The House Ways and Means Committee held 
another hearing for HB 1651 on June 25, 1980.22 During 
consideration, committee members removed the 1¢ 
cigarette tax increase from the bill, eliminating 
dedicated funding to start or sustain the program.22 
According to American Lung Association (ALA) 
Executive Director W. Findley Raymond in an October 
5, 1980 letter to The Times-Picayune, tobacco industry 
representatives influenced committee members to strip 
the tax increase from HB 1651:  
 
The pressures put on the House Ways and Means Committee by the tobacco 
lobby were effective, and the bill had to be completely rewritten to call for 
funding through the general appropriations legislation.15 
 
As amended, HB 1651 established the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund to provide money 
for tobacco-related disease research as well as to oversee the work of the Louisiana Tumor 
Registry but did not provide the Fund a revenue source. The Committee then reported HB 1651 
to the House Floor. 
 
HB 1651 progressed through the legislature without lawmakers attaching a dedicated 
funding source. During consideration of HB 1651 by the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Joe 
Tiemann (D-Metairie) unsuccessfully offered an amendment to establish a funding system and to 
give the account $150,000 to establish a grant application process.15 Governor David Treen (R) 
signed HB 1651 into law on August 1, 1980, creating an unfunded Louisiana Cancer and Lung 
Trust Fund to fund tobacco-related disease research.22 
 
As amended, HB 1651 
established the Louisiana 
Cancer and Lung Trust Fund 
to provide money for 
tobacco-related disease 
research as well as to oversee 
the work of the Louisiana 
Tumor Registry but without a 
revenue source. 
 181 
 
 After the adoption of HB 1651, the American Lung Association pressured state officials 
to dedicate money to the new fund and called public attention to its absent funding. On 
September 3,1980, ALA Executive Director W. Raymond sent a letter to Louisiana Department 
of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) Secretary George Fischer regarding the secretary’s 
plans to fund the Trust’s panel.15 Raymond subsequently published a letter in New Orleans 
newspaper The Times-Picayune on October 5 calling attention to the Trust’s lack of funding.15 
The letter castigated “petty bureaucrats who handle the budget” for not funding the Trust and 
registry.15 Raymond’s letter also attacked DHHR staff for failing to inform lawmakers of the 
state’s existing tumor registry lacking stable funding in coming years and revealed that DHHR 
Secretary Fischer failed to respond to the ALA’s September 3 letter concerning funding the 
Trust’s Board. 
 
1982: Louisiana: One of the "Hot Spots" in the Southeastern Region 
 
TI faced multiple tax increase threats in Louisiana during the 1982 legislative session. 
Lawmakers introduced HB526, HB1353, and HB806 to raise the state’s cigarette tax and 
dedicate revenue to the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund. HB 1353 and HB 806 
temporarily increased the cigarette tax by 4¢ to 15¢ per pack. HB 526, introduced by 
Representative Joe Delpit (D-Baton Rouge) on April 22, 1982, presented the greatest threat to 
the industry. Titled the Cigarette Tax Aid Fund, HB 526 raised the cigarette tax from 11¢ to 21¢ 
per pack and dedicated revenue towards local governments (50%), the Louisiana Cancer and 
Lung Trust Fund (25%), and the state’s Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Prevention, Education, 
Treatment, and Research Fund (25%).25 State lawmakers also submitted HB 554 to reallocate 
revenue from the existing cigarette pack tax.26 TI Senior Vice President of State Activities Jack 
Kelly warned the State Activities Policy Committee on April 30, 1982 he expected the Louisiana 
Municipal League to support HB 526 since local governments received revenue from the bill.25  
HB 526, HB 1353, HB 806, and HB 554 went to the House Ways and Means Committee for 
initial consideration. 
 
TI mobilized Tobacco Action Network volunteers to oppose HB 526 and other proposed 
tobacco tax increases during the 1982 session.25 TI Senior Vice President of State Activities,27 
Jack Kelly, sent an Action Request to the State Activities Policy Committee on April 30, 1982 
asking them to have volunteers write letters to Louisiana legislators against the tobacco tax 
increase legislation, in particular HB 526.25 TAN State Director Terry Frakes subsequently sent a 
message to Louisiana TAN members requesting they ask lawmakers to oppose HB 526: 
 
If you agree that this legislation is unwise and detrimental to the entire industry, 
please write immediately to your state representative expressing your opposition 
to such tax increases and encouraging a “NO” vote on this bill.28 
 
The message provided the names and addresses of state representatives along with talking points 
for volunteers to use in correspondence against HB 526.28 A list of talking points, likely from 
Terry Frakes’ message to TAN members, mainly cast the cigarette tax increase as regressive, 
unfair to smokers, and bad fiscal policy. 
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The House Ways and Means Committee blocked the tobacco tax increase and 
reallocation bills introduced in 1982. Committee members considered House Bills 526, 806, and 
1353 on June 1, 1982. At the hearing, the committee voted 7-1 and 10-4 respectively to defer HB 
526 and HB 806.29 HB 1353’s sponsor, Representative Edward D’Gerolamo (D-Kenner), 
withdrew his bill before committee members deferred it.30 HB 526, HB 806, and HB 1353 died 
upon adjournment without further consideration. HB 554, the cigarette tax reallocation bill also 
sent to the House Ways and Means Committee, never received a hearing.29  
 
Tobacco Institute Prepares for 1983 Legislative Session 
 
In 1982, TI considered strengthening its presence in state legislatures by giving campaign 
contributions to state lawmakers.31 According to a May 20, 1982 document probably from TI, 
“the [tobacco] industry ha[d] a virtually nonexistent record of campaign contributions in most 
states.”31 The document explained contributions were needed to help TI officials and lobbyists 
involved in state efforts as well as to foster long-term relationships with government officials and 
lawmakers. The document reasoned "longer term relationships would accrue to the industry as 
former state level friends move up to federal elected offices."31  
 
TI expected Louisiana to have a difficult legislative climate in 1983 because of adverse 
bills in 1982 and a slump afflicting the state’s energy sector. According to a November 22, 1982 
memo from TI Vice President Roger Mozingo to TI Communications Committee member Hugh 
Foley, RJR State Public Affairs Manager Larry Bewley, Lorillard Senior Associate General 
Counsel James Cherry, Philip Morris Director of Public Affairs J. Bernard Robinson, and Brown 
and Williams Corporate Counsel J. Kendrick Wells on Louisiana’s political climate, “Louisiana 
is shaping up to [be] one of the ‘hot spots’ in the Southeast Region.”32 Mozingo expected “1983 
will be a bastard year” featuring clean air, tobacco tax, and sampling restriction bills.32 He 
anticipated lawmakers introducing more 
cigarette tax increase bills than other types 
of tobacco control legislation, and estimated 
the tax legislation had neutral odds of 
passage. Louisiana lawmakers faced a $38 
million budget shortfall caused by 
reductions in gas and oil production33 that 
Mozingo reasoned made cigarettes a target 
for tax increases.32 In addition, he expected 
an unidentified New Orleans Medical Group 
(likely the Oschner Foundation) to support legislation providing money to the Louisiana Cancer 
and Lung Trust, which still lacked funding. Louisiana Governor Dave Treen (R) planned to hold 
a special session in January 1983 that lawmakers might use to introduce legislation raising taxes 
on cigarettes, alcohol, and gasoline. However, Mozingo expected key members of the House 
Ways and Means Committee would be hostile towards raising taxes during a special session.32 
 
As part of defensive preparations for the 1983 legislative session, TI made its first 
campaign contributions in Louisiana to members of legislative committees that handled tax and 
smoking restriction legislation. TI lobbyists Joe Wood and Jack Pender advised Mozingo that 
contributions would “be important and pay extra dividends”34 in a non-election year and put TI 
TI lobbyists Joe Wood Guidry and Jack 
Pender advised Mozingo contributions 
would “be important and pay extra 
dividends” in a non-election year and 
put TI in a good position to combat 
expected 1983 cigarette tax proposals.  
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in a good position to combat expected 1983 cigarette tax proposals.32 As a result, TI distributed 
campaign contributions to five members of the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee, 
the House Ways and Means Committee, and the House Health and Welfare Committee in the 
summer or fall of 1982 (Table 6.2).34, 35 TI VP Morris reported the campaign contributions "were 
very well received and should do a great deal to help strengthen our position."32 
 
 
 TI identified grocers and wholesalers as primary allies in preventing tobacco tax 
increases.32 Mozingo also reasoned that the TI’s new Area Director, John Hightower, might 
generate support from Louisiana’s business community because of his membership and 
connections to the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI), Louisiana Restaurant 
Association (LRA), Louisiana Chamber of Commerce, Public Affairs Research Council of 
Louisiana, and other organizations.32 Most of those associations later became tobacco industry 
allies (Chapter 2). 
 
TI reasoned there may be local government resistance towards a tobacco tax increase. 
Mozingo believed the Louisiana League of Municipalities might oppose a tobacco tax increase if 
revenue did not go to local governments.32  
 
State legislators pursued only one cigarette tax increase bill during the January 1983 
special session convened by Governor Treen that the tobacco industry managed to “head off.”36  
 
Governor Treen Pursues a Cigarette Tax Increase during the 1983 Second Special Session 
 
Governor Treen called a second special session from December 7 to 17, 1983 to resolve 
Louisiana’s ongoing budget shortfall, which the tobacco industry believed ranged from $220-
$550 million.37 The Session was Treen’s last attempt to address the budget deficit after losing his 
reelection campaign to former governor Edwin Edwards (D) that year. Treen asked lawmakers to 
increase the cigarette tax increase by 5¢ per pack (to 16¢),38 prompting TI representatives to 
lobby state lawmakers, in particular members of the House Ways and Means Committee, against 
the rate hike.38 
Table 6.2: First Tobacco Institute Campaign Contributions to Key Legislative Leadership in 198234  
Name Party Chamber Committee  Amount 
O. Decuir D S Revenue & Fiscal Affairs $400 
C. Barham D S Revenue & Fiscal Affairs $400 
H.E. Braden  D S Revenue & Fiscal Affairs $400 
T.H. Hudson D S Revenue & Fiscal Affairs $500 
C. Newman D S Revenue & Fiscal Affairs $400 
R. Adley D H Health &Welfare $400 
B.J. D'Gerolamo D H Health &Welfare $500 
A. Jackson D H Health &Welfare $500 
H.J. Kember D H Health &Welfare $400 
M. Lowenthal D H Health &Welfare $500 
J. Alario Jr.  D H Chairman Ways & Means $500 
B.C. Bruneau, Jr.  D H Ways& Means $500 
C. Gunter, Jr.  D H Ways& Means $400 
M.J. Hebert  D H Ways& Means $400 
C.W. Kimball D H Ways& Means $500 
Total $6800 
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Representative Edward D’Gerolamo (D-Kenner) introduced HB 8 on December 7, 1983 
to increase the cigarette tax by 5¢ to 16¢ per pack. D’Gerolamo’s bill was part Governor Treen’s 
legislative package for that special session.39  The House Ways and Means Committee 
considered HB 8 and other bills from Treen’s package on December 8, 1983. Members debated 
but did not vote on HB 8, effectively killing the legislation.39  
 
Instead of increasing cigarette taxes to address Louisiana’s budget deficit, the state 
legislature decreased personal exemptions under the state income tax.40 Partly as a result, the 
state continued to face a $250 to $500 million state deficit after the 1983 legislative session.37  
The budget crisis continued and lawmakers repeatedly targeted tobacco products for tax 
increases in subsequent legislative sessions. 
   
Ongoing Budget Shortfalls Lead to Tobacco Tax Increase 
 
The oil market collapsed in 1984, reducing energy sector tax revenues33 and pressuring 
lawmakers to find other income sources.41, 42 Louisiana and two other states (Oklahoma and 
Texas) had relied on tax revenue generated by oil and natural gas.33 According to a 1985 State by 
State Analysis from TI, “As prices for oil and gas increased, Louisiana coffers filled. More and 
more social programs were begun, but for all the rapid growth and wealth, no secondary or 
ancillary industrial complex was developed.”43 As a result, Louisiana’s revenue was significantly 
impacted. 
 
To address Louisiana’s budget crisis44 and secure revenue for new initiatives,45 newly 
elected Governor Edwin Edwards (D) held a weeklong special session in March 1984 in which 
he proposed a $1.1 billion legislative package that increased taxes on gasoline, liquor, sales, 
income, cigarettes,46 and other sources.45  
 
The cigarette tax bill, HB 18 by Representative Raymond Laborde (D-Marksville), raised 
the cigarette tax from 11¢ to 16¢ per pack and had an index provision that adjusted the tax rate 
yearly based on the consumer price index starting July 1, 1985.46, 47 The bill would become 
effective July 1, 1984 if adopted.  
 
The House Ways and Means Committee considered HB 18 on March 20, 1984. At the 
hearing, Committee members amended HB 18 to eliminate the index component. According to a 
March 21, 1984 memo from TI VP Hurst Marshall to RJR Government Relations Vice President 
W.E. Ainsworth, Lorillard VP James Cherry, Liggett CEO and President Kinsley Dey, Jr., 
Brown and Williamson Senior Vice President Ernst Pepples, and Philip Morris Vice President 
and Director of Corporate Affairs Stanley Scott, TI lobbyists persuaded the committee to remove 
the provision.47 TI’s 1985 State-By-State Analysis also claimed TI officials had managed “to 
convince Louisiana’s governor not to use ‘a percent of value tax.’”43 Following the amendment, 
House Ways and Means Committee members voted 15-1 to pass HB 18.46 
 
Representatives debated HB 18 on March 21, 1984. They amended the bill to dedicate 2¢ 
of the tax increase to the unfunded Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund for cancer research 
(expected to generate about $11.6 million for the Fund) in a 67-27 vote.46, 48 The House 
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subsequently sent HB 18 to the Senate on an 87-14 vote.46 We did not find evidence of tobacco 
industry representatives or health advocates lobbying lawmakers while HB 18 was on the House 
Floor. 
  
The Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee considered HB 18 on March 22, 
1984.48 Before the hearing, TI heard lawmakers might pursue both favorable and adverse 
amendments to the bill.48 During the meeting, Committee members adopted an amendment 
permitting the state Department of Revenue and Taxation secretary to give tobacco wholesalers 
in neighboring states with Louisiana clients a 6% discount on tax stamps for filing accurate, 
monthly reports to the agency regarding not yet-taxed tobacco product sales.49 The tax discount 
matched and could not exceed the discount provided to Louisiana-based tobacco wholesalers.49 
The committee also considered imposing taxes on other tobacco products in HB 18, but TI 
lobbyists persuaded members against attaching them to the bill.48 We did not find evidence of 
health advocates or other groups advocating for the amendments. The Committee passed the bill 
7-1.48  
  
HB 18 traveled through the remainder of the legislative process without changes to its 
cigarette tax increase or revenue dedications. Senators considered and approved HB 18 in a 35-4 
vote on March 23, after revising language regarding tax stamps and out-of-state tobacco retailers 
operating in Louisiana.46, 50 The House concurred with Senate changes and sent HB 18 to 
Governor Edwards, who signed it into law on March 27.46  
 
Effective on July 1, 1984, HB 18 raised the cigarette tax from 11¢ to 16¢ per pack and 
allocated 2¢  per pack to the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund.46 The Louisiana 
Constitution required lawmakers to annually appropriate the 2¢ in revenue because it forbade 
automatically assigning funds.51 Including the trust funding astonished TI Area Director John 
Hightower, who ruminated in a March 27, 1984 memo to TI VP Ron Morris that “there is some 
questions as to the constitutionality of such a provision.”48 The 2¢ dedication was the first 
assigned revenue for the Trust since its inception in 1980. 
   
The Tobacco Industry Defunds the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund: 1984  
 
The Legislature met for the 1984 regular session on April 16, during which 
Representative Raymond Laborde (D-Marksville) and Senator Nat Kiefer (D-New Orleans) 
proposed bills limiting use of or eliminating funding for the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust 
Fund (LCLTF). Representative Laborde introduced HB 1273 to restrict allocation of cigarette tax 
revenue to the LCLTF.46 Its companion, SB 639 by Senator Kiefer, reduced LCLTF funding 
from the cigarette tax increase from $11.6 million to $500,000 annually.52 Representative 
Laborde and Senator Kiefer also introduced HB 1274 and SB 838 to completely eliminate HB 
18’s allocation to the LCLTF.46 TI favored HB 1273, HB 1274, and SB 838, perhaps because 
they limited or removed funding for health research unfavorable to the tobacco industry, but took 
no position on SB 639 (although it was a companion to HB 1273).53  
 
Tobacco tax legislation introduced during the 1984 legislation mostly failed, with only 
SB 639 passing. HB 1273 and HB 1274 died without consideration in the House Ways and 
Means Committee.46 The Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee heard SB 838 on June 4, 
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1984 and amended it to cut the funds dedicated to the LCLTF from $11 million to $1 million 
annually. The Committee never passed SB 838 after amending it, instead killing it.46   
 
The legislature adopted SB 639 after amending 
it to provide more money to the LCLTF than the 
legislation initially intended. The Senate altered the bill 
to limit annual allocations to the LCLTF to $1 million 
instead of the $500,000 first proposed in the bill, still 
drastically lower than the existing $11.6 million (2¢ per 
cigarette pack) annual dedication it sought to reduce.43, 
46, 52 After passing through the legislature, Governor 
Edwards signed SB 639 into law on July 20, 1984 
(Public Law 84-876).54 Adoption of the bill decreased 
funding to the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund 
from approximately $11.6 million to a fixed $1 million yearly,55 a 91% loss for cancer research. 
We did not find evidence of health advocates or tobacco industry representatives lobbying 
lawmakers on SB 639. 
 
The Nation Sees a Rise in Cigarette Tax Proposals in 1986  
 
Louisiana Reckons with a Budget Shortfall and Broken Economy 
 
Louisiana faced a severe budget deficit and bad economy at the end of 1985. TI 
determined that Governor Edwards’ $1 billion tax package from 1984 had brought in lower than 
expected revenue.43 According to a 1985 analysis of Louisiana from TI records, “The state will 
face a deficit in 1986. The revenue shortage will cause a decrease in government services, a 
general increase in taxes, or both. The State and its cities, especially New Orleans, are suffering 
from high unemployment, a restrictive tax base, and a totally stagnant economy.”43  As a result, 
TI anticipated demand for taxes to grow.43 However, TI officials thought that if expected 
legislation to legalize gambling in New Orleans and create a state lottery passed in 1986, the 
tobacco industry faced reduced threats of a tax increase.43 Despite Louisiana’s estimated $800 
million budget shortfall56 TI considered it a "Priority 3" (low priority) state for cigarette tax 
increase threats in 1986.57 
 
TI also learned that Governor Edwin Edward’s Economic Development Committee made 
a suggestion in late 1985 to impose ad valorem taxes on tobacco and other goods instead of 
excise taxes, a threat it monitored.43 Ad Valorem taxes are based on an item’s worth, one 
example being a sales tax.58 
 
Tobacco Tax Legislation Introduced in 1986 
 
Lawmakers introduced 75 cigarette tax increase bills in 34 states during 1986.59 State 
lawmakers introduced 12 bills in Louisiana in that year’s regular session to increase, change, or 
institute new tobacco taxes, increase the taxation authority of local governments via rolling paper 
taxes, or decrease tobacco stamp discounts for retailers (Table 6.3). TI identified three particular 
tax bills of interest in a May 15, 1986 Stateline Special Report to its Policy Committee: HB 574, 
Adoption of the bill 
decreased funding to the 
Louisiana Cancer and Lung 
Trust Fund from 
approximately $11.6 million 
to a fixed $1 million yearly, a 
91% loss for cancer research. 
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HB 2076, and HB 2097.60 Introduced by Representative William Sumlin (D-Ruston), HB 574 
raised the cigarette tax from 16¢ to 28¢ per pack59 and put the revenue towards wages for state 
employees and educators (Table 6.3).61 HB 2076 and 2097 by Representative Hainkel altered the 
cigarette excise tax to 32% of their invoice price.59 
 
HB 574 received support from Louisiana’s academic, medical, and scientific 
population.62 Louisiana State University doctors and professors Robert Beazley and Pelayo 
Correa published a letter in the Baton Rouge Advocate supporting increasing the state’s cigarette 
tax that was cosigned by approximately 80 medical staff from Louisiana medical facilities and 
hospitals.62 The letter listed the negative economic impacts of tobacco from an assessment on 
tobacco-caused costs conducted for the House Ways and Means Committee by the Louisiana 
Legislature’s Office of Technology Assessment.62 In addition, Beazley and Correa highlighted 
the addictiveness of nicotine and health consequences of smoking for both users and non-users. 
The letter promoted American Medical Association policy positions on tobacco and asserted 
Louisiana needed tougher tobacco control laws: 
 
The American Medical Association has adopted a strong anti-tobacco national 
policy which includes a ban on all kinds of advertising and a 32-cent tax per pack 
of cigarettes. Louisiana’s tobacco-related health problems are bigger than in other 
states, and we need stronger measures. A tax of one dollar per pack in Louisiana 
seems to us appropriate, non-discriminatory and will benefit the state and each of 
its citizens.62 
 
We did not find any evidence that academic, health, or science advocates advocated on behalf of 
HB 2076, HB 2097, or other bills besides HB 574 introduced during the 1986 legislative session. 
 
In the first month of the 1986 legislative session, The TI State Activities Division did not 
consider HB 574, HB 2076 or HB 2097 (Table 6.3) significant threats.60 Of those bills, only HB 
574 received consideration and the tobacco industry lobbied against it. 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee considered HB 574 on May 27, 1986.59 During 
the hearing, HB 574 sponsor William. Sumlin asserted to Committee members that tax increase 
revenue would provide pay raises to state employees, teachers, and other educators, who were 
leaving Louisiana because of poor earnings and five years of wage stagnation.56 Sumlin asserted 
that HB 574 was “a ‘logical, socially acceptable tax.’”56  Identifying herself as a tobacco 
wholesale lobbyist (Chapter 5), TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry (formerly Joe Wood, Chapter 2) 
complained that the state cigarette tax had risen by 5¢ only two years before and that the federal 
cigarette tax had also recently increased by 8¢.56 Guidry asserted that federal and state taxes 
(combined with state sales taxes) contributed 16¢ each to the average total cost of 91¢ per 
cigarette pack.56 Representative Murra Hebert (D-Houma) also spoke against HB 574, 
expressing concern over providing a salary raise using a cigarette tax increase56 fearing that the 
shrinking smoking population would provide less revenue over time.56 The House Ways and 
Means Committee voted 14-2 to defer HB 574, killing it.56, 59  
 
After 1986, Louisiana lawmakers did not consider tobacco tax legislation until 1988. 
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Table 6.3: Tobacco Tax Legislation Introduced in Louisiana for the 1986 legislative session59 
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Outcome 
HB 558 Leach          +  Died with adjournment on House 
Floor 
HB 574 Sumlin + 12¢          Killed by deferral in Committee 
HB 980 Hainkel         +   Died with adjournment 
HB 1145 Ackal         +   Killed by deferral in Committee 
HB 1146 Unknown           + Killed by deferral in Committee 
HB** 1187 Ripoll     + 10% of on 
rolling 
papers 
     Died after conference committee 
HB 1782 Ackal       +     Died with adjournment 
HB 2076 Hainkel   + 32% of 
invoice 
       Died with adjournment 
HB 2097 Hainkel   + 32% of 
invoice 
       Died with adjournment 
HB 2152 Deano       +     Died with adjournment 
SB 874 Lauricella         +   Died in Senate Committee after 
unfavorable report 
HB 78* Bella       +     Died with adjournment 
HB 99* Ripoll, 
Izon, 
    + 25% on 
packages 
of rolling 
papers 
     Died waiting for Senate 
confirmation of House 
amendments 
HB 169* Scott          +  Died with adjournment 
HB 524 Dastugue       + +    Died with adjournment 
*Introduced during a December special session 
**Heavily amended from original 
 189 
 
Tobacco Industry Braces for Tobacco Tax Legislation in March 1988 Special Session to 
Deal with another Budget Deficit  
 
 TI determined by late 1987 that Louisiana lawmakers would hold multiple sessions in 1988 
to address the state’s budget problems.63 Bracing for tobacco tax increase legislation, in early 
1988 TI Regional VP Ron Morris asked TI Legislative Issues Manager64 Paula Duhaime to 
develop arguments against an expected bill to raise the cigarette tax per pack by 3¢.65 On January 
25, 1988, Duhaime sent Morris a list of counterarguments including information “on the 
importance of the tobacco industry to Louisiana” and bulletins on a 3¢ cigarette tax increase’s 
effects.66 Other arguments TI planned to use included that existing Louisiana cigarette and sales 
taxes were regressive, and that a federal cigarette tax increase in 1982 and Louisiana’s cigarette 
tax increase in 1984 had contributed to a 15% decline in pack sales (likely by early 1988), that a 
3¢ increase harmed tax revenue from sales and income taxes and might reduce cigarette pack 
purchases by 12.9 million, that a tax increase reduced 
revenue for tobacco retailers and merchants, and 
increase smuggling.67 The TI also noted that Louisiana 
did not have a property tax or a high income tax, which 
generated approximately 2 percent and 30 percent of tax 
revenue respectively for other states.67 TI also asserted 
that tobacco sales in Louisiana, predominantly 
cigarettes, generated $600 million in sales during 1985 
and provided 8,600 Louisianans income in 1983,68 
stating: 
 
• More than $21 million to almost 900 
wholesale employees and proprietors who distributed and stored products,  
• more than $40 million to approximately 3,400 managers and clerks who sell 
tobacco products at retail, and 
•  $88 million to over 4,300 employees in the industries that supply the tobacco 
sector.68 
 
On February 25, 1988, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry notified TI that Representative Don 
Kennard (D-East Baton Rouge) intended to introduce a bill to increase Louisiana’s tobacco tax 
from 16¢ to 24¢ per pack.69 Believed to be supported by newly elected Governor Ed “Buddy” 
Roemer (D), the planned legislation divided revenue evenly between the General Fund, an eye 
health 70  “education [and] prevention program”69 and local governments.69 Guidry also informed 
TI that Governor Roemer’s administration was considering introducing legislation during the 
planned special session to increase the tobacco tax by 5¢.69 According to TI employee Sarah 
Davis in a February 25, 1988 memo regarding the potential bills, TI‘s Guidry began “working on 
35-45 votes against taxes” before their introduction.69  
  
 On February 26, Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributor’s Association 
Executive Director Sarah Whalen, an industry ally and frequent lobbying partner (Chapter 2), 
informed TI that neither Representative Kennard nor Governor Roemer supported his anticipated 
legislation. Whalen told the Institute that “he [Kennard] does not plan to push bill. He indicated 
he was being forced to introduce bill by eye care committee.”71 Governor Roemer did not 
… Duhaime sent Morris a list 
of counterarguments 
including information “on the 
importance of the tobacco 
industry to Louisiana” and 
bulletins on a 3¢ cigarette tax 
increase’s effects.  
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support Kennard’s legislation because he wanted its revenue dedicated to the state’s general fund 
instead of the eye health and prevention committee and local governments.71 
 
On March 15, 1988 Governor Roemer issued an executive order to address Louisiana’s 
budget shortfall for FY 1987-88 during a special session that month.72 Despite expectations at TI 
that Representative Kennard and other Louisiana lawmakers would introduce tobacco tax 
increase legislation that session, no bills were introduced until the regular session in April or the 
additional special session in October.73 
 
Tobacco Industry Defends Against Tobacco Tax Increases during an Additional 1988 
Special Session to Raise Revenue 
 
Tobacco Taxes Fail During the 1988 Regular Session 
 
Louisiana lawmakers introduced 4 tobacco tax bills during the 1988 regular legislation 
session (Table 6.4). Except for HB 1909, all died without consideration or after being deferred in 
committee (Table 6.4).73 HB 1909 established a Recreation and Parks District for St. Tammany 
Parish and granted its Board of Commissioners permission to levy a 25¢ tax on cigarette rolling 
papers to fund operations.73 We did not find evidence the tobacco industry actively opposed HB 
1909. 
 
Special Session to Deal with the $780 Million Budget Deficit in 1988 
 
In July 1988, Governor Roemer announced plans to hold a special session in August or 
September dedicated to tax reform74 to address Louisiana’s $750 million budget shortfall,75 but 
in early August delayed the special session to October.76 Roemer developed a comprehensive tax 
proposal for the session that the House Ways and Means Committee would informally consider 
in September.76  
 
In late August or early September 1988, Governor Roemer revealed his tax proposal to 
the public.77 The plan levied a state property tax for the first time in Louisiana and lowered those 
that qualified for a homestead tax exemption from people owning houses worth no more than 
$75,000 to those with houses worth no more than $25,000. The proposal also reduced the state 
sales tax and increased the private passenger auto licensing fee from $3 to $10. In addition, the 
plan would raise Louisiana’s cigarette tax from 16 to 22¢ per pack and levy a tax on smokeless 
tobacco of 20% of invoice price, the first time the state would tax smokeless tobacco.78 On 
September 2, 1988, Louisiana Restaurant Association President Nick Perez sent an overview of 
the tax plan to TI and other large businesses.77 
 
Governor Roemer gave his tax proposal to the House Ways and Means committee for 
review on September 16, 1988, which began hearings on September 20.79 During and after the 
hearings, committee members and lawmakers disagreed with various portions of Roemer’s plan80 
and announced their intention to offer amendments.81, 82 However, we did not find evidence that 
legislators opposed to the initial plan sought to change the tobacco taxes it contained. 
 
 191 
 
As the Committee considered Governor Roemer’s plan, he issued an official 
proclamation on September 26, 1988 announcing an extraordinary legislative session to consider 
tax bills83 to address Louisiana’s budget shortfall.84 The session was set to begin October 2 and 
end October 25, 1988.  
 
Tobacco Industry Braces for Tax Threats  
 
On September 26, as the House Ways and Means Committee conducted preliminary 
hearings for Roemer’s legislative package, TI’s Sarah Davis obtained smoking and tax facts for 
TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry. She reported to Guidry that 1.1 million (of 3.2 million) 
Louisianans smoked, that the national cigarette excise tax average was 18.3¢ and the southern 
average was 13.8¢, and that Louisiana “merchants, retailers and wholesalers, will lose about $7.5 
million if the tax increase is passed.”85 
 
The tobacco industry mobilized grassroots opposition to the impending tobacco tax 
increases in Roemer’s plan. TI Vice President Ron Morris sent a letter to TAN members on 
September 29, 1988 asking them to notify their state legislators that they opposed the cigarette 
tax increase.75 The letter included contact information for recipients’ representative and Senator, 
general phone numbers for the House and Senate, and “a fact sheet on the impact of such a tax 
Table 6.4: Tax Increase Legislation Introduced during the 1988 Regular Session73 
Bill Sponsor Cigarette 
Tax 
Increase 
 
Tax Increase 
on Other 
Tobacco 
Products 
 
Tax Increase on 
Cigarette Rolling 
Papers 
Allocation Outcome 
HB 269* Kennard 9¢   1¢ to Louisiana Cancer 
and Lung Trust Fund. 
Eight¢ divided equally 
between municipalities, a 
new Comprehensive 
Health Education and 
Disease Prevention Fund, 
and General Fund. 
Unsuccessful 
(method of 
failure 
unknown) 
HB 1194    25¢ per rolling 
paper pack 
 Died with 
adjournment 
HB 1752   20% of invoice 
tax on all 
tobacco 
products 
besides 
cigarettes** 
  Died with 
adjournment 
HB 1909**    25¢ per rolling 
paper pack 
Authorized St. Tammany 
Parish Recreation and 
Parks District to levy 25¢ 
tax on cigarette rolling 
paper packs. 
Adopted 
*Implementation dependent upon other bill passing that created Comprehensive Health Education and Disease Prevention 
Fund. 
**Created new parks and recreation district, and allowed its board to impose tax to fund operations. 
*** For cigars, HB1194 increased the tax from 8% to 20% the invoice price, for smoking tobacco decreased the tax from 33% 
to 20%. First tax on smokeless tobacco. 
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increase.”75 The next day RJR circulated an action 
alert focusing on state lawmakers to an unidentified 
and otherwise undescribed “50,000 partisans” to 
mobilize them against the cigarette tax increase.86  
 
Governor Roemer’s Tax Increase Proposals  
 
On October 2, 1988 House Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Ron Gomez (D-Lafayette) 
introduced the governor's tax reform proposal as 
House Bill 2, which included a 6¢ per pack cigarette 
tax increase.87 The House Ways and Means Committee heard the bill on October 10, when the 
tobacco industry convinced members to reduce the cigarette tax increase to 4¢ and lower the tax 
on other tobacco products from 20% of invoice price to 10%.88  After making amendments, the 
Committee then reported HB 2 favorably to the House Floor.  
 
The House considered HB 2 on October 14, when Representative Gomez offered an 
amendment to return the cigarette tax increase to itsoriginal 6¢.89 The House rejected the 
amendment 57 to 37, prompting Representative Gomez to subsequently exclaim “my 
congratulations to the tobacco industry” during the debate. The House then voted 55 to 47 
against adopting HB 2. 
 
 We could not identify any activities by pro-tax forces to support the bill. 
 
Although Louisiana lawmakers defeated HB 2, the tobacco industry still considered the 
bill “a serious threat for the remainder of this year.”90 
 
Four days after the House defeated it, on October 19, 1988, Representative Gomez 
reintroduced an altered form of Governor Roemer’s HB 2 as House Bill 21.91 HB 21 featured the 
4¢ per pack cigarette tax increase amended into HB 2 by the House Ways and Means 
Committee.91 HB 21 was reported favorably out of the House Ways and Means Committee, and 
on October 21, passed from the House Floor without amendments by a 71-32 vote. In a statement 
to the Baton Rouge Advocate, Governor Roemer credited HB 21’s passage through the House to 
“a process of education” on the comprehensive tax plan.92 We did not locate evidence of bill 
opponents or proponents lobbying lawmakers in either chamber. 
 
The Senate directed HB 21 to the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee for a 
hearing on October 22, where its members added $320 million in sales and personal income 
taxes partly to address cuts made in the House,93 then reported HB 21 to the Senate Floor.91, 94  
  
On the Senate Floor, Senator Don Kelley (D- Natchitoches) secured an amendment tying 
HB 21 to the passage of House Bill 1, the state appropriations bill, specifically to an unspecified 
constitutional amendment included in that legislation.91 If the constitutional amendment in HB 1 
failed to pass, HB 21 would not be enacted into law.91 After adopting Kelley’s amendment, 
Senators voted 22-16 to adopt HB 21, four under the required two-thirds majority to pass tax 
legislation.95 
… RJR circulated an action 
alert focusing on state 
lawmakers to an unidentified 
and otherwise undescribed 
“50,000 partisans” to 
mobilize them against the 
cigarette tax increase.  
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Senators reconsidered and passed HB 21 on October 26, sending it back to the House for 
approval of  the Senate’s amendments.91 The House rejected  Senate amendments, sending HB 
21 to conference committee, which killed both HB 21 and HB 1.91 The tobacco industry once 
again avoided a tax increase on its products. Without a solution to Louisiana’s budget deficit, the 
governor planned to call another special session.95  
 
Roemer Pursues Tobacco Tax Increases: 1989 
 
The Tobacco Industry Braces for a Special Session to Address Ongoing Budget Issues 
  
In early February 1989, the tobacco industry learned through its allies that Governor 
Roemer would likely call a special session for February 20 to pass tax legislation and resolve 
Louisiana’s ongoing budget shortfall.96 TI VP Ron Morris revealed in a February 6, 1989 
memorandum to Philip Morris lobbyist Betsy LaMond97, 98 and RJR State Government Relations 
Director Larry Bewley99 that TI expected a bill to raise the cigarette tax per pack by 4 to 6¢.96 
Although TI’s Morris believed the tobacco industry had a strong lobbying team in Louisiana, he 
argued for taking extra measures to defend against the legislation: 
 
We have a good crew of lobbyists presently working on this issue. However, we 
need to fortify their efforts by initiating some grass roots effort of our own. Larry 
[Bewley] has agreed to notify R.J.R. smokers. Betsy, may we count on you to do 
the same? Please give me a call so that we may coordinate our efforts on this 
issue. 
 
A second thought we should cover in the near future. We have retained Haras, 
Inc. in New Orleans, which includes the services of Mike O’Keefe and Norris 
Fitsmorris [sic]. Both of you have mentioned the possibility of back-up 
lobbyists.96 
 
Morris recommended that they meet in New Orleans to see how RJR and Philip Morris 
could participate in efforts against tax increase legislation.96 RJR later reported that they 
contacted at least 67,278 smokers with action alerts from the tobacco industry (likely RJR) about 
the impending cigarette tax increase.100 TI estimated a 4¢ tax increase would lower cigarette 
pack sales (unspecified but likely annually) by 20,495,380 in Louisiana, reduce retailer and 
distributor profits by $4.9 million, and reduce government revenue by $1,396,964.101 The 
Institute determined that a 6¢ tax increase reduced the amount of cigarette packs sold by 
30,590,120, cost retailers $7.2 million in profits, and eliminate $2,085, 022 in tax revenue. In 
addition, TI predicted a 4¢ increase would cause a 20.9 million reduction in gross receipts and a 
6¢ increase a $36.7 million loss. 
 
Governor Convenes a Special Session  
  
On February 10, 1989, Governor Roemer announced a 6¢ per pack cigarette tax increase 
as part of his developing legislative package for the special session later that month.102  If 
adopted, Louisiana’s tax rate per pack would rise from 16¢ to 22¢ and provide another $24 
 194 
 
million in annual revenue.102 The New Orleans Times-Picayune reported that Roemer planned to 
allocate $16 million in yearly revenue from the tax towards the state’s general fund and $8 
million towards the Pennington Biomedical Research Center at Louisiana State University and 
hospitals in Shreveport and New Orleans for “cancer, medical and nutritional research.”102 The 
Times-Picayune reported that Roemer reasoned dedicating new cigarette tax revenue to health 
research would make state lawmakers likelier to adopt the increase: 
 
I don’t think we can get to the 22[¢] without doing that.  
 
We have three or four parishes in the top 10 in cancer (rates in the ntion)…we’ve got a 
number of budding medical-type installations. Why don’t we fund them? I think the 
Legislature likes that idea.102 
 
The Governor asserted that he did not intend to increase taxes on additional tobacco products in 
his legislative package.102  
 
Governor Roemer convened the special tax reform session on February 22, 1989.103 His 
legislative tax package, HB 2, was introduced by Representative Ron Gomez the same day.104 
Among its multiple tax increases, HB 2 raised the cigarette tax from 16¢ to 22¢ and dedicated 2¢ 
of the increase to the Cancer and Medical Trust Fund.104 Despite Roemer’s earlier claim he 
would not alter taxes on other tobacco products, HB 2 set a tax on all non-cigarette tobacco 
goods at 10% of invoice cost, which increased taxes on some tobacco products and reduced them 
for others104 (Table 6.5). 
 
 
If HB 2 passed, enactment of its tax changes depended on another bill, HB 1, being 
adopted.104 HB 1 included a constitutional amendment that  would require subsequent voter 
approval to enter the law if legislators adopted the bill.104 We were unable to determine the 
proposed constitutional amendment HB 2 was tied to. If voters rejected HB 1, HB 2’s tax 
provisions would not enter effect. HB 2 went to the House Ways and Means Committee for 
initial consideration during the special session.104 The bills featured the same 4¢ per pack 
cigarette tax increase as HB 21 and the committee-amended version of HB 2 that failed during 
the October 1988 special session.  
 
Coalition for a Healthier Louisiana Mobilizes to Support Tax Increase  
 
The Coalition for a Healthier Louisiana, consisting of more than 30 health organizations 
and agencies,106, 107 held a press conference on February 23, 1989 to promote the 6¢ tax increase 
in Governor Roemer’s HB 2.107 Roemer told attendees at the press conference he periodically 
smoked but had recently stopped before the special session.106 The governor asserted the 
Table 6.5: Existing Tobacco Tax Rates in 1989 and Proposed Changes in HB 2 and HB 54104, 105 
Tobacco Product Existing Tax Rate Tax Rate Proposed in HB 2 and HB 54 
Cigarettes 16¢ per pack 22¢ per pack 
Cigars ($120 per 1000 cigars at most) 8 % of invoice 10% of invoice 
Cigars (More than $120 per 1000 cigars) 20% of invoice 10% of invoice 
Loose Leaf Tobacco 33% of invoice 10% of invoice 
Smokeless No tax 10% of invoice 
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cigarette tax increase brought Louisiana to the average rate among southern states, addressed one 
of myriad sources causing health problems in Louisiana, and provided money for cancer 
research.106  In addition, Roemer revealed he anticipated and planned to support youth access and 
smoking restrictions legislation later that year. The Coalition’s spokesperson, Michael Martin, 
stated that Louisiana had the nation’s highest lung cancer rate at the presser. Martin explained to 
attendees that resulting health costs and reduced work output from smoking-related diseases cost 
Louisiana $1 billion annually. In addition, Martin stated that cigarette use among those aged 18 
to 25-years old dropped by 14% with each 10% tax increase.  
 
HB 2 in the House 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee considered HB 2’s cigarette tax increase on 
February 24, 1989.108 Members of Governor Roemer’s administration and health voluntary 
representatives attended the hearing to support the cigarette tax while industry lobbyists appeared 
to oppose it.  
 
Before the hearing, 13 of 19 members of the 
House Ways and Means Committee had accepted 
$18,650 from the Adam and Reese and BHK PACs 
(Table 6.6), two political action committees the Baton 
Rouge Advocate found were connected to the tobacco 
industry.108 New Orleans law firm Adam and Reese’s 
government relations division established the Adams 
and Reese PAC and Philip Morris lobbyist Randy 
Haynie and RJR lobbyists CJ Blache and Johnny Koch 
established the BHK PAC. In an internal document 
from January 1987, Philip Morris identified BHK as RJ 
Reynold’s firm in Louisiana.109 TI and tobacco companies had worked with Adams and Reese 
during the latter half of the 1980s to advance its tort reform agenda in Louisiana (Chapter 8). 
Brown and Williamson, Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and RJ Reynolds Nabisco (RJR’s food 
company) contributed over $80,000 to the Adam and Reese PAC before the House Ways and 
Means Committee hearing, while Brown and Williamson and RJ Reynolds Nabisco contributed 
over $160,000 to the BHK PAC. In 1987 Philip Morris-owned Miller Brewing contributed 
$20,000. According to The Advocate, in late 1987 and 1988, Haynie, Blache, and Koch provided 
state legislators $21,000 in campaign contributions from the BHK PAC and took almost $20,000 
in 1988 to pay themselves for their work. The last contribution to BHK PAC found by The 
Advocate was a $21,000 donation from RJR in 1988. The timing of the Adams and Reese PAC 
contributions is not known. All BHK PAC contributions were in 1988.108 The tobacco industry 
also made direct contributions to some lawmakers on the House Ways and Means Committee in 
1988 and 1989 (Chapter 3). 
 
During the House Ways and Means Committee hearing for HB 2, government officials 
and health advocates argued that the health and financial burdens tobacco caused in Louisiana 
justified the bill’s cigarette tax increase. The Governor’s Chief of Staff Steve Cochran defended 
the need for funding the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund using a cigarette tax increase, 
asserting to committee members that moving from Kansas to Louisiana reduced a person’s life 
Before the hearing, 13 of 19 
members of the House Ways 
and Means Committee 
accepted $18,650 from the 
Adam and Reese and BHK 
PACs, two political action 
committees … connected to 
the tobacco industry.  
 196 
 
expectancy by four years.108 American Lung Association of Louisiana Executive Director Ben 
Fontaine also championed dedicating cigarette tax revenue to the LCLTF, telling the committee 
that the tobacco industry was highly profitable while Louisiana lost $1 billion (unspecified if 
overall or annually) addressing the health effects of smoking and resulting economic harms.108  
 
Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributor Executive Director Sarah Whalen 
argued against the tax at the hearing. She claimed that the state’s cigarette tax rate placed “an 
unfair burden on low income consumers” and that it was already high.108 The House Ways and 
Means Committee took a different route than desired by health or tobacco interests. 
 
 The Committee considered multiple amendments that ultimately lowered HB 2’s tobacco 
tax increase and eliminated its funding dedication to the LCLTF. Committee members approved 
an amendment by Representative Alan Ater (D-Ferriday) to reduce the cigarette tax increase 
from 6¢ to 4¢ per pack and eliminate the funding dedication to the LCLTF on a 10-9 vote (Table 
6.6).108 Representative Melvin Irvin Jr (D-Gonzales) subsequently proposed an amendment to 
raise the cigarette tax from 4 to 5¢ and allocate resulting revenue to Louisiana’s general fund. 
The Committee voted 11-6 to adopt the amendment (Table 6.6).108 The Committee then delayed 
approving HB 2 until a few days after considering its tobacco tax provisions.104, 110 
 
The House considered HB 2 on February 28, 1989.104 During debate, Representative Al 
Ater secured an amendment111 to lower the cigarette tax increase from 5¢ to 4¢ per pack and 
provide funding from 1¢ of the increase to “biomedical research.”104 The oil industry and other 
special interests reduced or altered other taxes  in HB 2, lowering the total revenue the bill 
generated by $60-$70 million (unspecified, but likely annually).111 Representatives subsequently 
voted 64-40 to pass the bill, short of the 70 required to pass tax legislation in Louisiana.111 In 
coverage by the Baton Rouge Advocate, Governor Roemer’s Chief of Staff Steve Cochran 
observed, “We lost it through the tobacco lobby, the oil lobby and the special interests that have 
always run the Louisiana Legislature.”111 Similarly, Governor Roemer told The Advocate that, 
“We had a clear consensus. What happened in the last few hours is that special interests derailed 
the train because of a few bags in the caboose.”111 Likewise, Roemer told The Times-Picayune: 
 
The lobbyists got to them (House members)….Look, money talks, lunches talk, 
lobbying talks. 
 
It’s time for somebody in this state to call it like it is. The special interests are 
now running the Legislature to the disadvantage of the people and the state.112 
 
Roemer announced that he would ask representatives to reconsider HB 2 and pass the bill, 
threatening to reduce the state budget by $700 million and cancel a later special session for tax 
legislation.111, 113  He attended a joint legislative session on March 1 to implore lawmakers to 
reconsider and approve HB 2, arguing that failure to pass the bill would force spending cuts to 
education and healthcare. He also threatened to tie legislators’ names to any spending 
reductions.113 
 
Representatives brought HB 2 back to the House Floor for reconsideration114 at Governor 
Roemer’s request.115 HB 2 sponsor Ron Gomez secured an amendment to increase multiple taxes 
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previously reduced in the House, including raising the cigarette tax from 4¢ back to 5¢, with the 
money allocated to the state general fund, not biomedical research.114  The House voted 74-28 to 
pass HB 2.114 
 
HB 2 in the Senate 
 
The Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee considered HB 2 on March 2, 1989. 
Philip Morris lobbyist Randy Haynie, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry, LWTCDA lobbyist Sarah 
Whalen, and RJ Reynolds lobbyists CJ Blache and Johnny Koch all appeared to oppose the 
bill.112 E.L. Henry, a previous Speaker of the House, also attended to lobby on behalf of TI.112 
Senator Jon Johnson (D-New Orleans) offered an amendment to raise the cigarette tax increase 
from 5¢ to 6¢ and dedicate the extra penny per pack to the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust 
Table 6.6: PAC Contributions to House Ways and Means Committee Members from Adam and Reese PAC and BHK 
PAC and Their Votes on HB 2 Amendments108  
Committee 
Member 
Party and 
Place 
Contributions 
from Adam and 
Reese PAC 
Contributions 
from BHK 
PAC 
Total 
Tobacco 
Industry 
Contributions 
Vote to Reduce 
Cigarette Pack 
Tax to 4¢ 
Vote to 
Increase 
Pack Tax 
to 5¢ 
Ron Gomez 
(Chairman) 
D-Lafayette 0 0 0 No Yes 
Charles Lancaster 
Jr. (Vice 
Chairman) 
R-Metairie 0 0 0 Yes Yes 
John Alario D-
Westwego 
0 $1,300 $1,300 Yes Yes 
Rodney 
Alexander 
D-Jonesboro 0 $500 $500 Yes No 
Al Ater D-Ferriday 0 $500 $500 Yes No 
Odon Bacque Jr I-Lafayette $1000 $4,500 $5,500 No Yes 
Harry Benoit D-Breaux 
Bridge 
0 $500 $500 No -- 
Garey Forster R-New 
Orleans 
$1000 $500 $1,500 Yes No 
Kernan Hand R-Kenner 0 $500 $500 Yes No 
Melvin Irvin D-Gonzales $1,500 $1,800 $2,300 No Yes 
Billy 
Montgomery 
D-Haughton 0 $500 $500 Yes No 
Sean Reilly D-Baton 
Rogue 
$500 $300 $800 No Yes 
Jim St. Raymond R-New 
Orleans 
$2,000 $500 $2,500 Yes Yes 
Art Sour R-
Shreveport 
0 $250 $250 Yes No 
Steve J Theriot D-Marrero 0 $1000 $1000 Yes  
Wilford Carter D-Lake 
Charles 
0 0 0 No Yes 
Irma Muse Dixon D-New 
Orleans 
0 0 0 No Yes 
Melvin Holden D-Baton 
Rouge 
0 0 0 No Yes 
Virgil Orr D-Ruston 0 0 0 No Yes 
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Fund Board112 which was adopted on a 6-1 vote.116 Johnsons’ amendment prompted tobacco 
industry representatives to aggressively work in the background to reverse the vote.112  
 
While the hearing continued, industry lobbyists formed an agreement with a Louisiana 
State University lobbyist to reduce the cigarette tax increase and eliminate funding for the 
Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund (LCLTF) in exchange for 1¢ per pack going to LSU’s 
Pennington Biomedical Research Center via a new Biomedical Research Fund.112 LSU lobbyists 
subsequently convinced two committee members to change their votes and oppose the tobacco 
tax increase. Tobacco industry representatives also located an unnamed senator they considered a 
friend on the committee that missed the earlier vote on Johnson’s amendment, and had him 
attend to vote against it.112  
 
 Committee member Ken Osterberger (R-
Baton Rouge) subsequently introduced an 
amendment lowering the cigarette tax increase to 
5¢ and eliminating the 1¢ dedication to the 
Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust in favor of a 1¢ 
dedication to the Pennington Biomedical Research 
Center.112, 116 The 3 votes secured by LSU and 
tobacco industry lobbyists created a 4-4 tie amongt 
committee members on the amendment. The 
Committee’s chairman broke the tie, voting to 
reduce the tax. Committee members subsequently 
adopted an amendment eliminating the 1¢ 
dedication to the Pennington Biomedical Research 
Center.112 After the committee stripped funding for 
LSU, the New Orleans Times Picayune quoted Senator Johnson saying that university lobbyists 
had been fooled by industry representatives: 
 
(LSU) cut a deal with the tobacco people to dedicate one of those pennies (to the 
Pennington Center). LSU went for the fake-out and lost the whole deal. That was 
all the tobacco industry wanted. They (LSU) screwed themselves out of four or 
five million dollars.112 
 
The Times-Picayune also reported that tobacco industry lobbyists had provided committee 
members campaign contributions through unnamed political action committees.112 After 
amendments, the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee approved HB 2 and sent it to the 
Senate Floor.117  
 
The Senate started debating HB 2 on March 3 and considered changes to the bill’s 
cigarette tax increase on March 6.117 According to TI records117 and news coverage by The 
Advocate,118 an unnamed senator proposed amending HB 2 to increase the cigarette tax increase 
from 5 to 10¢. According to The Advocate, tobacco industry representatives vigorously lobbied 
against the amendment, defeating it.118 After the amendment failed,  Senator Larry Bankston (D-
Baton Rouge) proposed an amendment for Governor Roemer’s administration to raise the tax 
increase from 5 to 6¢ and dedicate revenue from the extra penny towards health research.118 The 
“(LSU) cut a deal with the tobacco 
people to dedicate one of those 
pennies (to the Pennington 
Center). LSU went for the fake-
out and lost the whole deal. That 
was all the tobacco industry 
wanted. They (LSU) screwed 
themselves out of four or five 
million dollars.”  
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amendment did not specify cancer research as a funding target, although its sponsor stated 
money would go to cancer research efforts.118 According to The Advocate, the tobacco industry 
strongly opposed use of the term cancer in cigarette tax revenue allocations, possibly why 
Bankston did not specify cancer research as a funding priority in his proposal.118 The 39-member 
Senate adopted the amendment 26-10,118 then voted 24-12 to approve HB 2, 2 votes below the 
two-thirds (total) threshold required to pass tax legislation.119  
 
The Senate reconsidered HB 2 on March 7. Two legislators absent for the previous vote 
attended,120 increasing the odds the bill could meet the two-thirds threshold to pass tax 
legislation. One of the Senators that missed the first vote, J.E. Jumonville (D-Ventress), secured 
an amendment raising the money dedicated to health research from 1 to 2¢ per pack.120 He and 
other Senators then voted 26-12 to approve HB 2, reaching the two-thirds threshold for 
passage.120  
 
 The same day Senators passed HB 2, the House approved the Senate’s changes and 
delivered the bill to Governor Roemer.121 HB 2 raised the cigarette tax by 6¢ (from 16 to 22¢ per 
pack) with 2¢ per pack going towards a “Cancer and Medical Trust Fund ” and 4¢ to the state 
general fund.121 The bill also set a 10% of invoice cost tax on all other tobacco products.121 
Roemer signed HB 2, making it law if Louisianans approved its enabling constitutional 
amendment, HB 1,122 in an April 29 election.120 
 
The Tobacco Industry Sits out the Election 
 
The tobacco industry expected strong public and political resistance to HB 1 and HB 2. 
On March 9 1989, two days after Governor Roemer signed HB 2, TI Regional Vice President 
Ron Morris sent a memo to TI Senior Southern Sector Vice President George Minshew 
regarding industry handling of the bill and its enabling measure HB 1, which was on the ballot 
for voter approval.123 Morris reported that the tax increases created by HB 1 and HB 2 would 
face public opposition from groups created to oppose the measure and the State Republican 
Party. In addition, State Representative David Duke, a controversial white supremacist,124 
planned a tour to denounce HB 2, shadowing the Governor’s statewide efforts to promote the 
bill.122, 123  
 
In his March 9, 1989 memo, Morris expressed fear of political reprisals for opposing the 
tax proposal, either through adverse legislation or public castigation by Governor Roemer if 
voters defeated the tax. According to Morris, the governor had “already set the stage to blame the 
gasoline and tobacco industries for killing his tax package.”123 He was also concerned that 
manipulating a constitutional amendment might prompt legislative attacks against the tobacco 
industry, stating “We must be aware of open retaliation, i.e. smoking restrictions, Bolin’s bill or 
some other negative effort, if we are discovered meddling with this constitutional 
amendment.”123  Morris stated that surveys showed 75% to 80% of Louisiana voters opposed the 
tax package, which needed voter approval since it was a constitutional amendment.   
 
Tobacco industry lobbyists besides Philip Morris’ felt they should monitor HB 1 during 
the election season instead of actively opposing it. To that end, Morris encouraged Philip Morris 
lobbyist Betsy LaMond to postpone “a smoker’s newsletter writing campaign because of the 
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potential long term negative effect on our industry in Louisiana,” and recommended to him that 
the tobacco industry evaluate the election while considering actions.123 In a March 28 memo to 
RJR State Government Relations Director Larry Bewley and Philip Morris lobbyist Betsy 
Lamond, TI’s Morris listed the pitfalls of publicly opposing HB 1:  
 
The governor is promising swift retaliation against lobbyists, trade associations 
and businesses who oppose him. We must consider that and the fact that we have 
a regular session, plus the probability of another special session if the April 29 
vote negates the governor tax reform.97 
 
He also noted that Governor Roemer was aggressively recruiting allies to promote the tax and 
threatening opponents to deter them from actively opposing it: 
 
The governor has his people working on various 
associations and organizations to support his 
package. He has been taking swings at some 
lobbyists, perhaps to the extent of attempting to 
block renewal of some contracts.97 
 
The Louisiana Association of Business and 
Industry (LABI), a tobacco industry ally and politically 
powerful trade group, strongly backed the ballot 
proposal.97 Morris revealed that Representative Alario, 
a key legislative leader and previous House Speaker, 
sought to discuss Roemer’s legislative package with 
tobacco industry members.97 To determine how to 
proceed on Roemer’s ballot proposal, Morris recommended holding a meeting with 
Representative John Alario, tobacco industry representatives and other interested groups on 
either April 4 or April 6, 1989.97 We did not find evidence that the meeting occurred, or that the 
tobacco industry worked to defeat Roemer’s tax package at the polls. 
 
 Louisianans rejected the tax package on April 29, 1989. 55% of voters opposed HB 1, 
blocking the 6¢ per pack cigarette tax increase and the 10% of invoice cost tax on other tobacco 
products.125, 126 As a result, the tobacco industry expected tax increase legislation during the 
upcoming regular session.126 
 
Tobacco Tax Increase Legislation in 1989  
 
The 1989 Regular Session 
  
Louisiana lawmakers introduced one bill regarding tobacco tax allocation during the 
1989 regular session. On April 24, 1989 Representative Quentin Dastugue (R-Metairie) 
introduced HB 465 to reallocate 2¢ per pack of the existing cigarette tax rate towards a new 
Alton Oschner Cancer Research Trust Fund his legislation would also establish.121 The bill died 
at adjournment without consideration.127 The same day HB 465 expired, Governor Roemer 
“The governor has his people 
working on various 
associations and 
organizations to support his 
package. He has been taking 
swings at some lobbyists, 
perhaps to the extent of 
attempting to block renewal 
of some contracts.”  
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convened a special session to consider a legislative package that included tobacco tax 
increases.127 
 
Roemer Pursues a Cigarette Tax Increase in a One Day Special Session 
 
On May 17, 1989, the Governor’s administration announced that Roemer was developing 
a new tax package similar to HB 2 for a special session tentatively scheduled to begin June 12, 
1989.128 Lawmakers met with the governor two days later to discuss his legislative package, 
including a cigarette tax increase to provide cities revenue.129 On May 22, Governor Roemer 
officially announced his tax package, which included increasing the cigarette tax by 6¢ per 
pack.103, 130 
 
After Roemer’s announcement, RJ Reynolds contacted Louisiana outdoor advertising 
agencies in late May via phone and mailers to stand against the cigarette tax increase.131 RJR 
also used a mailing to recruit retailers to oppose the tax hike.131 According to an RJR 
Government Relations Status Report dated July 12, the company “generated over 134,500 letters 
and 10,700 phone calls” against Roemer’s tax package during the regular legislative session and 
second special session.132 
 
On June 5, Governor Buddy Roemer revealed a $358 million tax package to Louisiana 
lawmakers that included the 6¢ increase per pack to the cigarette tax. His administration 
developed the package in anticipation of a special session he planned to convene the next week if 
the current session adjourned.133 However, the special session would not occur until early July, 
giving the tobacco industry time to prepare for the legislative package and its cigarette tax 
increase. 
 
The tobacco industry continued efforts against the 6¢ cigarette tax proposal up to the 
special session. Philip Morris lobbyist Betsy Lemond drafted a letter for public circulation (we 
do not know if it was published) using standard industry arguments that the tax unfairly targeted 
smokers since they already paid extra taxes by purchasing tobacco products.134 The letter also 
claimed that excise taxes were regressive and disproportionately affected the poor, asserting 
“Louisiana’s economically disadvantaged pay nine times more of their total income in cigarette 
taxes than the wealthy pay.”134 It also argued the tax increase could possibly cost Louisiana 400 
jobs, increase smuggling, and harm businesses by driving Louisianan smokers to buy cigarettes 
in neighboring states. 
 
On July 3, at the end of the regular session and two days before the special session, 
lawmakers approved a 1-year extension of $350 million in temporary sales taxes.135 State 
lawmakers argued the extension reduced the need for new revenue sources, and informed The 
Advocate that the legislature did not wish to consider additional tax legislation, felt ambivalent 
towards Roemer’s legislative package, and asserted it likely would not pass during the special 
session.136 However, some lawmakers were concerned the extension, passed during an odd-year 
regular session, was vulnerable to legal challenge since it was a fiscal act, which were generally 
limited to consideration during special sessions or even-year regular sessions. Louisiana’s 
constitution only allowed tax legislation in odd-numbered years or special sessions at the time. 
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As a result, Representative John Alario (D-Westwego) suggested lawmakers continue with the 
coming special session and use it to approve the extension. 
 
 Although lawmakers approved a tax extension and expressed skepticism over his 
legislative efforts, Governor Roemer still convened a special session from July 5 to July 10, 1989 
to consider tax legislation.103 On July 9, Louisiana lawmakers used the special session to 
overwhelmingly approve the temporary tax extension passed during the 1990 regular session .137  
 
Lawmakers considered other tax bills, including tobacco taxes, during the session. 
Representative Randy Roach (D-Lake Charles)138 introduced HB 54, that, like HB 2, raised the 
cigarette tax per pack from 16¢ to 22¢ and levied a 10% tax on invoice cost for other tobacco 
goods117 (Table 6.5). HB 54 allocated revenue from 4¢ of the increase to the state general fund 
and 2¢ towards “cancer and cardio-pulmonary disease research, prevention and treatment and to 
biomedical research,” effective October 1, 1989.117  
 
 The House Ways and Means Committee considered HB 54 on July 6, 1989. Tobacco 
industry lobbyists attended the hearing to oppose HB 54.138 We did not find evidence that health 
or tobacco control advocates appeared in support of the bill. Although HB 54 was part of 
Governor Roemer’s legislative package, we did not find evidence he lobbied or pressured the 
House Ways and Means Committee to pass the bill. Despite announcing the cigarette tax 
increase before the second special session, Roemer had avoided further promotion of HB 54 
because of the exhaustive nature of the special session, its short length, and his desire to push 
other unspecified initiatives.139 
 
  During committee discussion of HB 54, Representative Sean Reilly (D-Baton Rouge) 
secured an amendment to reduce the cigarette tax increase from 6¢ to 2¢ per pack (to 18¢ total) 
and dedicate all revenue to cardiopulmonary research grants for university programs, a portion of 
which the Pennington Biomedical Center was likely to receive.138  Representative Reilly had 
proposed the change to Governor Roemer at a meeting on July 5 and convinced him to back it, 
telling The Advocate that, “He [Roemer] realizes he made a commitment to the Pennington 
Center.”139 After committee members adopted Reilly’s amendment, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry 
(formerly Joe Wood Guidry, Chapter 2)  attacked the change during the hearing, asserting that 
Louisiana State University would provide funding to the Pennington Biomedical Center if it was 
an effective program. Berry also argued the amendment’s revenue allocation ran contrary to 
efforts by the Roemer administration to seek “undedicated funds.” Representative Roach, HB 
54’s sponsor, defended the 2¢ increase, stating that 26 states had a cigarette tax of 18¢ per 
pack.138 The House Ways and Means Committee voted 11-7 to defer the bill (Table 6.7), ending 
cigarette tax increase efforts for the session. 
 
Raising the Cigarette Tax: 1990 
 
Louisiana’s Budget Woes Continue 
 
Louisiana remained plagued by a severe budget shortfall following Louisiana’s 1989 
legislative session because lawmakers had repeatedly rejected Governor Roemer’s efforts to 
secure tax increases and address the deficit.140 According to a State Tax Plan from TI Records, 
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the tobacco industry discovered that Roemer’s advisors had recommended a new legislative 
strategy to the governor: 
 
He [Roemer] has been ineffective with the legislature thus far, but in recent weeks 
we have been told that his advisors are suggesting a new plan of attack. It is now 
possible that the Governor will attempt to pass, as a single shot, additional 
cigarette taxes in order to fund cancer and nutritional research at the Pennington 
Center of LSU.140 
 
The tobacco industry determined it had to defend against the expected cigarette tax 
legislation in upcoming legislative sessions despite doubting Roemer’s ability to pass it. In an 
uncredited and undated document from TI’s records, an employee stated, “we continue to be 
skeptical of the Governor’s ability to ‘get his act together,’ but feel we must be prepared for this 
possibility.”140 
 
The tobacco industry readied to oppose tax legislation during the 1990 legislative session 
as early as August 1989. TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris met with TI lobbyist Joe Wood 
Berry to discuss probable tax bills in the upcoming session.141 According to an August 17, 1989 
memorandum from Morris to Philip Morris lobbyist Betsy LaMond, Berry recommended 
deterring a tax increase by having tobacco company-owned140 “food companies” make grants to 
the Pennington Center.141 An undated State Tax Plan from TI’s records asserted that grants to the 
Center “would remove some of the Governor’s advantage in our [the tobacco industry’s] 
fight.”140 The State Tax Plan proposed additional tactics to defeat Roemer’s expected cigarette 
tax legislation:  
 
• Develop a paper for use with legislature on tax issues, written preferably by a 
local economist, under the supervision of The [Tobacco] Institute's economist.  
• Develop favorable op-ed pieces by our local economist where possible. 
Table 6.7: House Ways and Means Committee Vote to Defer HB 54138   
Committee member For Deferral Against Deferral 
John Alario (D-Westwego) +  
Rodney Alexander (D-Quitman) +  
Al Ater (D-Ferriday) +  
Odon Bacque (I-Lafayette)  + 
Harry Benoit (D-Breaux Bridge +  
Wilford Carter (D-Lake Charles) +  
Garey Forster (R-New Orleans) +  
Ron Gomez (D-Lafayette)  + 
Kernan “Skip” Hand (R-Kenner) +  
Melvin “Kip” Holden (D-Baton Rouge)  + 
Melvin Irvin (D-Donaldson) +  
Charles Lancaster (R-Metairie)  + 
Billy Montgomery (D-Haughton)  + 
Irma Muse-Dixon (D-New Orleans)  + 
Virgil Orr (D-Ruston)  + 
Jim St. Raymond (R-New Orleans) +  
Art Sour (R-Shreveport) +  
Steve Theriot (D-Marrero) +  
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• Build a coalition effort, working especially to garner the support of retail 
groups and tobacco wholesalers.  
• Develop grassroots mail program through wholesalers and company "smoker 
lists" to supplement direct personal contacts of coalition lobbyists, focusing on 
specific legislators' home districts. Grassroots mail program will only be used 
if we know positively that the Governor intends to introduce such legislation.  
• Persuade member companies to direct their food subsidiaries to make standing 
grants to the Pennington Center at L.S.U.  
• Develop resources for testimony, if needed, by local smokers, tobacco 
distributors and retail merchants.  
• Possible back-up counsel to strengthen our relationship with legislative 
leadership.140 
 
Industry fears of tobacco tax increase legislation materialized in the 1990 session. 
 
Governor Roemer Reveals New Plan to Secure Tobacco Tax Increase 
  
On January 18, 1990, the administrator of the Louisiana’s142 drug and alcohol abuse 
prevention program I-Care, Bill Noonan, wrote Governor Roemer asking that he pursue a 6¢ 
tobacco tax increase bill that year to fund drug prevention and health initiatives.143 Noonan 
pointed to Illinois seeking a 39¢ per pack tax and Texas increasing its cigarette tax to 26¢ per 
pack in his letter to Roemer. Roemer responded on January 24 that he backed an increase, 
finding it appropriate that smokers help pay for expenses incurred by society from their tobacco 
consumption.143 Noonan revealed his correspondence with the Governor in a February 13, 1990 
article in The Advocate in which he asserted the legislation was passable and that the resulting 
increase would prevent tobacco use and assist cessation.143 
 
 Roemer announced at a February 14 press conference that he sought a cigarette tax 
increase of an undetermined amount to fund health care, cancer research, and drug prevention 
initiatives.144, 145 The tobacco industry expected Governor Roemer to propose increasing the 
cigarette tax by 20¢ per pack.142 In a February 20 memo, TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris 
informed TI Senior State Activities VP Kurt Malmgren that the industry was “working our 
committees to block this tax effort” so it could pursue preemptive smoking accommodation 
legislation146, 147 (Chapter 5).   
 
Tobacco Industry Evaluates How to Oppose Tax Increase Legislation 
 
TI, Philip Morris, and RJ Reynolds considered providing campaign contributions to key 
Louisiana lawmakers to prevent the impending cigarette tax increase (Table 6.8).  On February 
27, 1990, TI Regional VP Ron Morris forwarded a message from TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry to 
TI Vice President George Minshew detailing the necessity of contributions in Louisiana that 
year:   
 
Ron it is important that we have these contributions prior to April 16, 1990, which 
is the beginning of the regular legislative session…I need all of these 
contributions to stop taxes….148 
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Lobbyists from TI, RJ Reynolds, and Philip Morris 
developed the list;149 TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry 
asked for $19,000 in contributions, but TI planned to 
approve between $12,800–$15,600 to important 
legislators (Table 6.8).148 Morris noted that Philip 
Morris also budgeted $25,000 for Louisiana campaign 
contributions and that RJR had not used any of its 1990 
campaign contribution budget and was making 
donations using its 1989 allotment.149 We did not find 
the final amount of campaign contributions the tobacco 
industry provided to state lawmakers to help defeat 
anticipated tax legislation during 1990, or when they were sent. 
 
The Tobacco Industry Considers Forming a Politically Left-wing Anti-Tax Coalition  
 
TI considered using a coalition in Louisiana to oppose cigarette tax increase legislation. 
In a February 28, 1990 memo, TI employees Martin Gleason and Susan Stuntz notified TI 
Managing Director of State Legislative Activities150 Walter Woodson150 that an unnamed 
department of Louisiana’s government that covered public employees was receptive to forming a 
“tax justice coalition” with help from TI’s Labor Management Committee (LMC).151  
  
TI created the LMC using five industry labor unions in 1984, as part of a multi-year 
campaign to oppose cigarette tax increases on the federal and state level using progressive 
groups.20 According to a 2009 journal article Building Alliances in Unlikely Places: Progressive 
Allies and the Tobacco Institute’s Coalition Strategy on Cigarette Excise Taxes, the Institute 
sought assistance from progressive organizations despite their having incongruent political 
agendas and views: 
 
…to provide early warnings of legislative tax initiatives, help tobacco industry 
lobbyists gain access to legislators who were not industry allies, demonstrate 
constituent support for protobacco [sic] votes, and testify on the industry’s 
behalf.20  
 
Industry officials initially used donations and regressive taxation arguments to gain the 
backing of progressive organizations with limited success. Creation of the LMC aided 
recruitment by obscuring the industry’s involvement in collaborative anti-tax efforts, shielding 
progressive organizations from possible negative publicity.20 The tobacco industry used the LMC 
to discretely fund allied progressive organizations and provide them an official structure to 
discuss labor policy efforts. Use of donations, regressive taxation arguments, and the LMC 
allowed the tobacco industry to form a partnership with Citizens for Tax Justice, a prominent 
progressive tax organization with national clout, and other groups. 
 
In a March 5, 1990 memorandum, Woodson asked TI Regional VPs Paul Jacobson152 and 
Ron Morris if they wanted to use an industry program to determine the possibility of employing  
 
Ron it is important that we 
have these contributions 
prior to April 16, 1990, which 
in the beginning of the 
regular legislative session…I 
need all of these 
contributions to stop taxes …. 
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Table 6.8: 1990 Requests by Joe Wood Berry for Tobacco Institute Campaign Contributions to Key Members of the 
Legislature148 
Name Party Chamber Committee/s Contribution Industry Comments  
John Alario D House Floor Leader* $500 “Floorleader opposing 
Governors package” 
Glenn Ansardi D House Health and Welfare  $500 N/A 
Diana Bajoie D House Health and Welfare $500 N/A 
Harry Benoit D House Ways and Means $500 N/A 
Bruce Bolin D House Chair Natural 
Resources  
$500 Member of leadership 
Emile Bruneau R House Chair Governmental 
Affairs 
$500 Member of leadership 
N.J. Damico D House Business $500 “Good person on floor” 
John Diez D House Vice Chairman 
Judiciary  
$500 “Good person on floor” 
Irma Muse Dixon D House Governmental Affairs; 
Municipal, Parochial, 
and Cultural Affairs 
$500 “Black lady Rep. from 
[New] Orleans” 
Gary Forster R House Ways and Means; 
Health and Welfare 
$500 N/A 
Carl Gunter D  House Municipal, Parochial 
and Cultural Affairs 
$500 “Floor fighter” 
Buster Guzzardo D House N/A $500 “Member of 8 man 
caucus” 
Melvin Irvin D House Ways & Means $500 N/A 
Alphonse Jackson D House Chair of House Health 
& Welfare 
$500 N/A 
Clyde Kimball D House Natural Resources $500 “Walks the floor for us 
always” 
Mike McClearly D House N/A $500 “Always stuck with us” 
Billy Montgomery D House Ways & Means $500 N/A 
Willie Singleton D House Chair Judiciary 
Committee  
$500 “Always a friend on 
health & welfare” 
Art Sour R House   Ways & Means $500  
Joe Toomy D House Municipal, Parochial 
and Cultural Affairs 
$500 “Was on Ways & Means 
& was always a friend” 
John Travis D  House  $500 “Always our fighter on 
the floor” 
Steve Theriot D House Ways & Means; 
Health & Welfare 
$500 N/A 
Bobby Waddell D House Chairman of Civil 
Law 
$500 “Chairman of Civil Law 
and our friend” 
Thommy Warner D House N/A $500 “Our friend” 
Mike Cross D Senate Chairman of Health & 
Welfare 
$500 N/A 
Gerry Hinton R Senate Health & Welfare $500 “Smoker” 
Ron Landry D Senate Health & Welfare $500 N/A 
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a progressive group to oppose excise taxes in Louisiana and two other states.153 According to 
Woodson: 
 
Basically, David Wilhem [of Citizens for Tax Justice] sends a team into the state 
to check the feasibility of setting up or bolstering an existing liberal / left tax 
coalition that would be willing to include our tax goals with its tax reform goals. 
The coalitions are not anti-tax, but can be worked with to steer them toward 
progressive tax alternatives. 
 
We are talking about – usually – very liberal coalitions. TI would have to remain 
in the background, but let me know if you’re interested.153 
 
We did not find evidence that a progressive anti-tax coalition developed in Louisiana to oppose 
tobacco tax proposals during the 1990 regular session.  
 
Governor Roemer Officially Announces Tobacco Tax Legislation 
 
Similar to past years, Governor Roemer planned to pursue a tax increase package in 
1990. Roemer’s 1990 tax proposal, which included a cigarette tax increase154 like his previous 
efforts, sought to generate over $600 million in revenue.155 Announcing his intention to pursue a 
tax package on March 7, Roemer revealed he sought to raise the cigarette tax per pack by 6¢ 
(from 16¢ to 22¢)154 to generate an additional $31 million that would be equally divided between 
the state and local governments.154 
 
 The same day Roemer announced his legislative package, the Consensus Committee for 
Louisiana’s Future, a group composed of 13 people from state business and policy associations 
including LABI, the Louisiana AFL-CIO, and the Louisiana Public Affairs Research Council, 
produced a tax reform report.156 Developed over six months, the report suggested increasing 
Joe McPherson D Senate Vice Chairman Health 
& Welfare 
$500  N/A 
Richard Neeson D Senate Health & Welfare $1000 N/A 
Cleo Fields D Senate Health & Welfare; 
Local and Municipal 
Affairs  
$500 N/A 
Don Kelly D Senate Chairman Judiciary; 
Finance; Floor 
Leader* 
$1000 “Strongest Sen.” 
Sammy Nunez D Senate President Pro 
Tempore  
$500 “Former Pres. & always 
friend” 
Cecil Picard  D Senate Chairman 
Governmental Affairs 
$500 N/A 
Benjamin Rayburn D Senate Chairman Finance  $500 N/A 
Lawson Swearingen  D Senate Chairman, Commerce 
and Finance    
$500 N/A 
*Considered a floor leader by the tobacco industry 
 208 
 
tobacco taxes and allocating more tobacco tax revenue to local governments. Roemer supported 
many suggestions from the Committee, whose majority of members agreed with his tax reform 
objectives.156 Committee members from the Louisiana AFL-CIO and LABI, a strong tobacco 
industry ally (Chapters 2) did not sign the tax recommendations. 
 
Tobacco Tax Bills in the 1990 Session 
 
In April 1990, Louisiana lawmakers introduced 8 tobacco tax increase bills, 1 tobacco tax 
decrease bill, 2 bills reallocating existing tobacco tax revenue, and 1 bill allowing dedication of 
cigarette tax revenue (Table 6.9).157 Five157 were introduced by House Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Raymond Laborde, “a Roemer floor leader” according to the Times-
Picayune,158 as part of the Governor’s legislative package (Table 6.9). Two other bills, HB 1468 
and HB 1939, did not include tobacco taxes upon introduction but were later amended to 
increase them (Table 6.10).157 
 
The Tobacco Industry Defends Against HB 944 
 
The industry’s initial defensive efforts targeted HB 944, which was part of Governor 
Roemer’s legislative package.159 Representative Raymond Laborde (D-Marksville) introduced 
HB 944 (Table 6.9) on April 25, 1990 to increase the cigarette tax by 10¢ per pack and dedicate 
half the revenue to city governments.157   
 
On April 26, 1990, TI lobbyist 
Joe Wood Berry, TI Regional Director160 
Pat McWhorter, TI tax expert Bill 
Orzechowski, Philip Morris lobbyists 
Betsy Guiles and Randy Haynie, RJR 
lobbyist CJ Blache, and Louisiana 
Wholesale Tobacco and Candy 
Distributors Association (LWTCDA) 
Executive Director Sarah Whalen met in 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana161 to discuss 
how to pass proactive smoking 
accommodation legislation and defend 
against tax increase bills (Chapter 5). Joe 
Wood Berry believed the industry could defend against tobacco tax increases and pursue 
accommodation legislation (to block local clean indoor air laws) simultaneously (Chapter 5).162 
Philip Morris lobbyists felt accommodation legislation should be prioritized, while Blache 
relayed that RJR thought representatives should focus on defeating tax threats. Since HB 944 and 
the smoking accommodation legislation pursued by the industry, HB 217, both affected local 
governments, Berry and Haynie planned to meet with elected municipal officials and learn their 
opinion on the accommodation bill to decide whether the industry should push it amidst tax 
increase threats. 
  
The House Ways and Means Committee considered HB 944 on May 15, 1990.155 At the  
Joe Wood Berry believed the industry 
could defend against tobacco tax increases 
and pursue accommodation legislation (to 
block local clean indoor air laws) 
simultaneously, while Philip Morris 
lobbyists felt accommodation legislation 
should be prioritized and Blache relayed 
that RJR thought representatives should 
focus on defeating tax threats.  
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Table 6.9: Tax Increase Legislation as Introduced during the 1990 Regular Session 157 
Bill Sponsor 
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 Original OTP Rate Amount Allocation Other Outcome 
HB 944 Laborde +  
10¢ 
     50% towards parish 
and municipal 
governments, 50% 
to state general fund  
 Negatively Reported 
by House 
Committee. Died 
upon adjournment 
HB 945 Laborde +  +   Cigars (low price) – 
8% of invoice price 
Cigars - 28% 
of invoice cost 
  Died with 
adjournment 
Cigars (high price) – 
20% of invoice price 
HB 946 Laborde +     Smokeless - None Smokeless – 
28% of invoice 
price 
  Killed in House 
HB 947 Laborde et al +   +  Loose Leaf – 33% of 
manufacturer’s 
invoice price 
28% of 
manufacturer’s 
invoice price 
  Died with 
adjournment 
HB 948 Laborde +  + +  Cigars (low) -  20% 
of invoice price 
28% of invoice 
price for all 
OTP 
  Died on House Floor 
Cigars (high) – 20% 
of invoice price 
Smokeless - none 
Loose leaf – 33% of 
manufacturer’s  
invoice price 
HB 1337 Jackson     +   $1 million in 
cigarette tax 
revenue towards 
new Cancer and 
Lung Trust Fund 
Unstated amount 
towards 
incorporated local 
 Died with 
adjournment 
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governments and 
five parishes with 
unincorporated 
cities 
HB 1438 Copelin     +   Unstated amount 
towards 
incorporated local 
governments and 
five parishes with 
unincorporated 
cities 
 Died with 
adjournment 
HB 1943 Thomas   
1¢ 
     Dedicated towards 
establishing new 
Louisiana Cancer 
and Lung Trust 
Fund 
 Killed in House 
Committee 
HB 2214 Laborde et al   
4¢ 
     General Fund  Killed on House 
Floor 
SB 713 Bagneris         Permits 
dedication 
of 
cigarette 
tax 
revenue** 
Died with 
adjournment 
SCR 136 Nunez         Implored 
congress 
to not 
raise 
taxes on 
tobacco 
or other 
select 
goods 
Adopted 
**Existing law prohibited tax revenue dedications. 
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Table 6.10 Non-Tobacco Tax Bills Converted into Tobacco Tax Legislation157 
 Initial 
Focus 
Tobacco Tax Amendment Where 
adopted 
Outcome 
HB 1468 Sales Tax Levied 5% of retail price tax on 
all tobacco products* 
Senate 
Floor 
Amendment 
stripped in 
Conference. 
Bill 
subsequently 
killed. 
HB 1939 Rental car 
taxes 
Raised cigarette tax per pack by 
4¢ (20¢ total) 
Senate 
Floor 
Adopted 
*Tobacco Institute 1990 Legislative Report defines retail price “…as price charged 
retailer by wholesaler plus 20 percent.”157  
 
hearing, the Louisiana Municipal Association supported the bill while a TI representative, a TI-
contracted tax expert, and legislators opposed it. Louisiana Municipal Association official 
Charles Pasqua asserted that cities had historically relied on revenue from tobacco taxes and 
encouraged the committee to approve HB 944. Committee members asserted Roemer’s 
administration had dedicated the cigarette tax increase to municipalities to gain their support 
passing HB 944, with Representative Melvin Irvin (D-Gonzales) claiming the state would 
repurpose the tax in later years and deprive cities of funding.155 HB 944 sponsor Laborde, the 
Ways and Means Committee chairman,163 replied that the bill was included in Roemer’s 
legislative package to assist municipalities, not to earn their support for the Governor’s total tax 
proposal.155 Later during the hearing, Representative Irvin unsuccessfully proposed an 
amendment to reduce HB 944’s cigarette tax increase to 5¢ per pack. 155 Representative Charles 
Lancaster (R-Metairie) offered an amendment to strip dedicated funding for municipalities from 
HB 944 that the committee rejected.155 TI’s Orzechowski, as well as a professor and economist 
from Louisiana’s Nicholls State University162  he recruited,164 Morris Coats,164 testified against 
HB 944.162 (TI paid Coats $1,607 for his testimony.165) After hearing comments on HB 944 and 
considering amendments, supporters determined they could not secure a favorable  
committee recommendation for the bill.162 Representative Don Bacque (I-Lafayette166) motioned 
to send HB 944 to the Floor without a recommendation to keep it alive but was countered by a 
motion to assign the bill an unfavorable report from Representative Art Sour (R-Shreveport). The 
Committee approved Sour’s motion 10-7 and assigned HB 944 a negative recommendation, 
nearly killing it. 
 
 To return HB 944 to the legislative calendar after its defeat, Laborde and allied 
lawmakers called an unsuccessful floor vote on May 16 to reject the House Ways and Means 
Committee’s unfavorable recommendation.162 According to a May 18 memo from TI Regional 
Activities Director Pat McWhorter to TI Regional VP Ron Morris, the motion failed to secure 
the 53 votes necessary to pass because of industry lobbying. 
 
On May 20, Representative Laborde and other lawmakers pursued another motion 
returning HB 944 to the legislative calendar so they could overturn the House Ways and Means 
Committee’s unfavorable report of the bill.167 TI expected Representative John Alario, a former 
House Speaker,168 to kill the second reconsideration motion.167 According to TI Regional 
Activities Director McWhorter in a July 24, 1990 memo to Morris, Alario was the “leader of our 
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[tobacco industry] coalition in the House.”169 Governor Roemer had removed Alario from the 
Speaker role in 1988 and he formed a legislative bloc with other lawmakers to oppose Governor 
Roemer’s agenda, including tax increases.170  
 
McWhorter reported that unidentified legislators distracted Representative Alario, 
keeping him from appearing to stand against the May 20 reconsideration motion for HB 944.167 
House Speaker Jimmy Dimos (D-Monroe) brought the motion to return HB 944 to calendar 
while Alario was detained, and it passed with 53 votes.167 
 
To reduce pressure on lawmakers from municipalities seeking the revenue HB 944 
provided them, Representative Alario developed an amendment for another bill to increase the 
hazardous waste tax and provide resulting funds to local governments.167 According to 
McWhorter in a May 21 memo to Morris:   
 
Most of the political heat legislators are feeling on the cigarette tax is coming from 
mayors, and it is felt that this move could relieve some of that pressure.167   
 
Alario planned to offer the amendment on either May 21 or May 22 to unspecified compromise 
legislation,167 and did so on May 21,171 reducing pressure on lawmakers to pass HB 944.163, 171 
Ultimately, supportive legislators failed to secure enough votes to approve reconsideration of HB 
944.163 TI lobbyists  dismissed offers from lawmakers to propose a reduced the cigarette tax 
increase of 2-4¢ per pack.163 HB 944 died without additional consideration upon adjournment.157 
 
Other 1990 Tobacco Tax Legislation Stalls in the Legislature 
 
After House Bill 944 failed, TI monitored five bills it considered vulnerable to having 
cigarette tax increases attached,162 as well as five tobacco tax bills (HB 945, 946, 947, 948, and 
1943) during the 1990 regular session (Table 6.9). 
 
Although the tobacco industry expected HB 946 and HB 948 to receive consideration 
first, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Laborde gave HB 1943 an earlier hearing on 
June 12, 1990.172 As introduced by Representative Jerry Thomas (D-Bogalusa), HB 1943 raised 
the cigarette tax per pack by 1¢ and dedicated the approximately $4.1 million173 in expected 
revenue to cancer education and research through a new Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund 
established by the bill (Table 6.9).157, 172 At the hearing, Dr. Jay Brooks, a Baton Rouge 
Oncologist, testified in support of HB 1943 while LWTCDA lobbyist Sarah Whalen and TI 
lobbyist Joe Wood Berry testified against it.173 Brooks testified that most cancer deaths in 
Louisiana resulted from lung cancer and that lung cancer would cause more fatalities in 1990 
than deaths from the total AIDS epidemic. Brooks asserted that HB 1943’s tax revenue provided 
money to educate Louisianans about lung cancer and provided Louisiana researchers, who 
struggled to secure federal research awards, funding to improve lung cancer research. Opposing 
the bill, LWTCDA’s Whalen testified that taxes should not increase on tobacco products since 
their sales annually decreased. TI’s Berry also spoke, asserting to the committee that HB 1943 
unfairly targeted 28% of Louisianans that smoked. She also stated lawmakers should secure 
cancer research funding through the House Appropriations Committee if money was needed. 
Besides industry lobbyists, House Ways and Means Committee member Melvin Holden attacked 
 213 
 
the bill during the hearing, insinuating that the chemical industry, not just cigarettes, caused 
cancer. The committee then voted 7-5 to approve a motion from Representative John Alario to 
defer the bill.173 According to the Baton Rouge 
Advocate, after the deferral vote HB 1943 sponsor Jerry 
Thomas explained that committee members killed the 
bill to prevent lawmakers from attaching tobacco tax 
increases: 
 
The feedback I got is that some didn’t want any 
tax bill out to possibly be used as a vehicle for 
other tax measures to be added. We have a 
cancer problem in this state, and we need money 
to research it….The tobacco lobbyists have 
demonstrated quite a bit of influence in the 
Legislature. The incidence of cancer in this state 
should also be a powerful lobbyist.173 
 
Following the deferment of HB 1943 on June 12, TI worked to defeat HB 1438 before an 
expected hearing before the House Appropriations Committee on June 19.163 Introduced by 
Representative Sherman Copelin to reallocate existing cigarette tax revenue to municipalities, the 
tobacco industry feared that Governor Roemer’s administration would amend a tobacco tax 
increase into the bill.163 As a result, the tobacco industry tried postponing the House 
Appropriation Committee’s consideration of HB 1438.163 HB 1438 ultimately died at the end of 
the legislative session without consideration.157 
 
 TI also expected House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Laborde to bring HB 
948, his bill that set a 28% of invoice price tax on cigars, smokeless, and loose leaf tobacco 
(Table 6.9) up for committee consideration on June 19.163 In a June 18 memo to TI Regional VP 
Ron Morris, TI Regional Director160 Pat McWhorter revealed he heard Laborde planned to attach 
a 10¢ or other tax increase per cigarette pack to HB 948 during the hearing. TI lobbyist Joe 
Wood Berry determined that five House Ways and Means committee members had not taken a 
position on HB 948 while 12 others were split for and against, leading her to give the bill a 50% 
chance of passing. Tobacco industry representatives lobbied unsure committee members to bottle 
the bill up in committee.  
 
 The House Ways and Means Committee considered Laborde’s HB 946 and HB 948 on 
June 19.174 Governor Roemer appeared at the hearing to privately lobby committee members and 
urge them to adopt both bills, but did not  publicly testify.175 We did not find evidence that 
tobacco control proponents or tobacco industry lobbyists spoke at the hearing. Committee 
members and industry allies John Alario and Al Ater were not present at the hearing’s start to 
oppose tobacco tax increase legislation.176 The Ways and Means Committee voted 9-2 to reduce 
HB 946’s smokeless tobacco tax from 28% to 10% of invoice price.175, 177 Committee members 
also swapped HB 948 with a substitute bill, HB 2114, during the hearing.178 HB 2114 replaced 
the tobacco taxes in HB 948 with a cigarette tax increase of 10¢ per pack.176 The Committee then 
cut the tax increase to 5¢ per pack on an 8-3 vote175 and dedicated 20% of the revenue towards 
the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund.176 According to a June 26 memo from McWhorter to 
“We have a cancer problem 
in this state, and we need 
money to research it …. The 
tobacco lobbyists have 
demonstrated quite a bit of 
influence in the Legislature. 
The incidence of cancer in 
this state should also be a 
powerful lobbyist.”  
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Morris, HB 946 and HB 948 sponsor Laborde permitted tax reduction amendments to pass the 
bills through committee and planned to raise the cigarette tax increase again: 
 
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Raymond Laborde personally told me on 
Tuesday [June 19, 1990] that he had allowed these two bills to be amended, only 
so he could get them out of committee. At that time he firmly stated that he would 
attempt to raise the cigarette tax hike back to 10 cents.176 
 
After the committee amended both bills, Representative Alario arrived to vote on the legislation. 
The committee voted 7-5 to pass HB 946 and 10-5 to send HB 2114 to the House Floor.176, 178 
McWhorter later complained in his June 26 memo that Representative Alario was not present to 
attack the bills during the hearing, and that Representative Al Ater had missed the meeting and 
votes altogether.176 
 
  Before HB 946 and HB 2114 were debated on the Floor, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry 
determined by June 20 that the industry had secured 36 votes against the tobacco tax legislation, 
excluding three from the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus who were susceptible to pressure 
by Governor Roemer.176 The 36 votes prevented HB 946 and HB 2114 from receiving the 70 
votes necessary to pass tax legislation in the House.  
 
 On June 20, House Speaker Jimmy Dimos moved to calendar HB 946 and HB 2114 for 
consideration.176 Representative Peppi Bruneau protested the motion for the tobacco industry but 
failed to prevent its approval.176 
 
The House brought HB 948 and HB 2114 to the Floor for consideration on June 
21, 1990,176 where representative and tobacco industry ally John Travis (D-Jackson) 
aggressively attacked the bills. According to The Times-Picayune, during debate Travis 
asserted the bills targeted “the little old average income guy out there who pays all the 
taxes”179 and attacked the bills for raising taxes on Louisianans as they faced other tax 
increases from that legislative session: “We passed sales tax and removed sales tax 
exemptions, passed gasoline taxes. You know who’s going to pay that? The same guy 
that’s going to pay the tobacco tax.”180 He also attacked HB 2114’s revenue dedication to 
the Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund as unfair to the tobacco companies, stating 
lawmakers were “picking on one industry.”180 Travis asserted that other industries caused 
cancer, pointing to increased incidents near chemical factories, and argued that industry 
should also compensate the state as a result.  
 
Lawmakers in support of HB 946 and HB 2114 countered Representative Travis’ 
arguments and attacked legislators opposed to the tax increases. Representative Jerry 
Thomas (D-Bogalusa) disputed Travis’ argument, asserting that almost all of Louisiana’s 
urban regions had greater lung cancer rates than the national average and that researchers 
determined smoking factored into 85-90% of the state’s lung cancer incidents. Other 
proponents of HB 946 and HB 2114 chastised opposed lawmakers during consideration. 
Representative Carl Crane (R-Baton Rouge) asked how they could justify increasing 
food, utility and sales taxes but not tobacco taxes. Representative Laborde argued tobacco 
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tax increases were needed to fund the $8.6 billion 
budget already approved by lawmakers.180 
According to The Times-Picayune, Laborde used 
the fact that the budget included wage increases for 
Louisiana government employees to attack 
opponents of the bills, stating “You tell the state 
employees they won’t get a raise because you 
wouldn’t vote for a tobacco tax.”179 In addition,  Representative Ralph Miller (D-Norco) 
claimed during consideration of HB 946 and HB 2114 that lawmakers opposed HB 946 
and HB 2114 because of the tobacco industry’s influence. According to coverage from 
Baton Rouge newspaper The Advocate, he asserted “There’s no excuse for voting against 
this tax but the tobacco lobby.”180 Representative Carl Gunter (D-Pineville) insinuated 
lawmakers also opposed the bills because they disliked Governor Roemer.180 Roemer 
floor leader Representative Robert Adley (D-Bossier City) stated that polling showed 
78% of Louisianans backed the tobacco tax increases. Adley also asserted that lawmakers 
would struggle to justify not passing the bills to their constituents, especially after 
previously failing legislation to raise alcohol taxes.  
 
 Following debate, representatives voted 53-47 to pass HB 946 and 55-45 to pass HB 
2114,179, 180 both short of the two-thirds amount needed to pass tax legislation. Governor Roemer 
partially blamed the failure of both bills on the tobacco industry, saying “They [tobacco industry 
representatives] are there night and day…they have a powerful, persistent lobby.”180 
 
Because HB 946 and HB 2114 both cleared a 52 vote threshold allowing reconsideration, 
the tobacco industry prepared to defend against the bills a second time on the House Floor.176 In 
a June 26 memo, McWhorter asserted that the industry needed to contain HB 946 and HB 2114 
in the House because the Senate might pass the tobacco taxes, possibly in strengthened forms: 
 
It is imperative that we defeat these bills; keeping them out of the Senate. Our 
friends in the Senate are under a great deal of pressure to produce new revenue, 
and would most assuredly pass a cigarette tax increase in any range from five 
cents up as high as 20 cents, according to some lobbyists.176 
 
As a result, the tobacco industry worked to prevent HB 946 and HB 2114 from being 
reconsidered by the House.181 Industry lobbyists prevented additional debate of HB 946, killing 
it, but other legislation featuring tobacco tax increases were considered by legislators.157 
 
Tobacco Institute Considers Using Tax Sheets in Other States Because of Impact in Louisiana 
  
TI partially credited successful defensive efforts around tobacco tax bills to Nicholls 
State University professor Morris Coats, who had testified against the increases. On June 26, 
1990, Woodson reported that “McWhorter said the credibility that native-son Coats brought to 
the scene was instrumental in stopping (so far) the tax hike. He said Coats made the 
difference.”164  In addition to testifying against HB 944 at its House Ways and Means Committee 
hearing, Coats had given a sheet of anti-tobacco tax statistics, developed using data from TI tax 
researcher Bill Orzechowski, to Louisiana legislators and, likely, the media.164 The information 
“They [tobacco industry 
representatives] are there 
night and day … they have a 
powerful, persistent lobby.”  
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sheet claimed that Texas smokers would purchase cigarettes in Louisiana because Louisiana’s 
lower tax provided them $2.50 savings per carton and generated almost $10 million in 
revenue.164 Coats argued that cigarette taxes were regressive, asking, “Why should Louisiana 
hurt its low and middle class citizens with a cigarette tax increase of 5 or 10 cents a pack when it 
can sit back and reap its cross border windfall.”164 
 
As a result of Coat’s value in fighting the tax increase in Louisiana, and the low $200 
cost TI paid him for the fact sheet, Woodson asked Stuntz if TI could pay 60 economists around 
the country to develop and disseminate similar anti-tax materials in all the states.164 We do not 
know if TI adopted Woodson’s proposal. 
 
Alario Introduces Alternative Tax Bills to Roemer’s Legislative Package 
  
Towards June’s closing, tobacco industry ally Representative John Alario and other 
lawmakers had successfully prevented most of Governor Roemer’s tax package from passing.182 
According to a June 29 article from the New Orleans Times-Picayune: 
 
[Alario] joined with Republicans and other anti-Roemer Democrats to bottle up 
most of Roemer’s program. Much of it was revived in the Senate by amending 
other House-passed bills, but Roemer will need votes from Alario’s “contra” 
faction to get the two-thirds House majority of 70 votes needed to approve the 
amended bills.182 
 
Escalating efforts against Roemer’s agenda, Alario introduced a $406 million legislative package 
of tax bills on June 28 with fellow House Ways and Means Committee member Steve Theriot 
(D-Marrero) to offer as an alternative to the Governor’s $580 million package.182 Their package 
levied taxes on natural gas and hazardous waste and renewed sales taxes on utilities and 
groceries, but did not increase or establish taxes on any tobacco products.182  Later in the session, 
immediately after lawmakers killed a cigarette tax increase bill, Roemer-allied Representative 
Robert Adley (D-Bossier City) blamed Alario and Theriot’s package for hindering progress on 
tax legislation.183 
 
New Tax Threat to the Tobacco Industry: HB 1468 
  
While tobacco industry representatives prevented reconsideration of HB 946 and HB 
2114, on June 29, 1990 Senators approved amendments from Senator Don Kelly184 (D-
Natchitoches) to sales tax bill HB 1468 that added taxes on gambling activities, tobacco 
products, alcohol, and other goods.157, 185 The amendments levied a a 5% of retail price sales tax 
on all tobacco product types,157 generating an estimated $20 million in revenue (Table 6.10).185   
 
After Senators adopted Kelly’s proposal, Senator J.E. Jumonville offered an amendment 
to dedicate $4 million of the tobacco tax proceeds towards cancer research because smoking and 
cancer were correlated.185 Jumonville claimed that even allocating $50 million for research was 
an inadequate amount. Senators ultimately voted 23-13 against Jumonville’s amendment.   
 
 217 
 
Adding tobacco taxes to HB 1468 spurred immediate tobacco industry lobbying against 
the bill.181 In a July 5 memo to Morris, McWhorter claimed, “Our lobbying corps did a masterful 
job despite the fact that all means of contacting Senators was cut off.”181 The Senate voted 24-12 
to pass HB 1468,184 under the two-thirds vote threshold to pass tax legislation.181, 185 Senator 
Kelly subsequently convinced two industry allied lawmakers to change positions,  allowing HB 
1468 to pass in a second, 26-10 vote, returning it to the House for concurrence with Senate 
changes.181, 184  
 
TI did not plan to kill HB 1468 but intended to remove its tobacco tax increases.181 TI 
sought to prevent HB 1468’s defeat from increasing pressure to pass HB 946 and HB 2114 
through the House to the Senate, where TI felt legislators were more receptive to adopting tax 
legislation. In a July 5 memo to Morris, McWhorter reported that the alcohol industry intended 
to kill HB 1468 on the House Floor to eliminate alcohol tax increases also added to the bill by 
the Senate, and that tobacco industry efforts to contain HB 946 and HB 2114 might be harmed if 
the alcohol industry convinced representatives to suspend debate on HB 1468.181 
 
Lawmakers Pressure Tobacco Industry to Capitulate on Tax Increase 
 
Louisiana’s legislative leadership pressed the tobacco industry to permit a cigarette tax 
increase as the 1990 session neared its close on July 9.169 On July 3, Senate President Sammy 
Nunez (D-Chalmette186) contacted TI Regional VP Ron Morris and requested that the tobacco 
industry allow compromise tax increase legislation to pass. Morris arranged a meeting with 
Senator Nunez and key lawmakers to discuss the proposal on July 5 in Baton Rouge.169 Before 
meeting with legislative leadership on July 5, Ron Morris, Pat McWhorter, and Joe Wood Berry 
discussed defensive efforts against tobacco tax increase bills with industry ally Representative 
John Alario (D-Jefferson Parish), who advised TI that “local media” had generated pressure on 
lawmakers to adopt “sin taxes,” making it hard to maintain House votes against tobacco tax 
increases.169 Alario believed the tobacco companies could limit the tax increase to 4¢ by 
cooperating with Roemer’s legislative leadership in the House, and asked that he be allowed to 
give them the industry’s offer.169 
 
 After talking with Representative Alario,  Morris, McWhorter and Berry met Senate 
President Sam Nunez and Senate Majority Leader Bill Jefferson on July 5 to discuss a tobacco 
tax increase.169 Nunez and Jefferson attacked the tobacco industry for resisting tax increases and 
insinuated it could face a greater rate hike if it failed to cooperate with the Roemer 
administration; McWhorter reported: 
 
The bottom line of their conversation was that virtually all industries, except for 
ourselves and alcohol, had agreed to some tax increase, and that if we did not work a 
compromise, we would be vulnerable to a situation similar to that in Texas during a 
special session immediately following the regular session.169 
 
At the time, Texas legislators were in their fourth special session of 1990 and considering 
legislation to raise state taxes on tobacco products, including increasing the cigarette tax from 
26¢ to 41¢ per pack.187, 188  
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On the same day Senate President Nunez and 
Jefferson met, Nunez, joined by Senator Don Kelly, 
took Morris and Berry to discuss a tobacco tax increase 
compromise with Governor Ed Roemer and his 
Commissioner of Administration Dennis Stine.  
Representative Robert Adley, a Roemer floor leader, 
had pushed Nunez to organize the second meeting. TI 
State Activities Director McWhorter skipped the 
meeting to assuage upset tobacco lobbyists.169 In his 
July 24, 1990 memorandum to Morris, McWhorter 
summarized the meeting:  
 
The Governor expressed his great displeasure at 
the fact that we [the tobacco industry] have 
beaten his every effort to pass cigarette tax increases for the last three years. He 
also stated his determination to force a tax increase on us. You [Ron Morris] and 
Joe [Wood Berry] told him and Nunez that any deal would have to include a 
commitment for passage and signing of our two proactive bills, SB 521 [smoker’s 
rights, workplace discrimination] and HB 217 [guaranteed smoking 
accommodation and preemption; Chapter 5)], as well as some solution to our 
problems with the New Orleans [efforts to increase its tobacco] tax [discussed 
below]. No one had a problem with the proactive bills, but all said they would 
have to speak with [New Orleans] Mayor Bartholemy before committing to 
legislation affecting the city. The Mayor was out of the country at that time.  
 
The Governor continued insisting on getting a 10-cent increase in the cigarette tax 
as he had originally proposed, with no dedications.169 
 
Commissioner of Administration Dennis Stine weakened Governor Roemer’s position during the 
meeting by informing him the state did not need a 10¢ cigarette tax increase, leading Roemer to 
subsequently argue for an 8¢ increase.169 The meeting closed without an agreement on taxes 
between Roemer, Louisiana lawmakers and TI officials.  
 
Following talks with Roemer and his allies, Morris, McWhorter, and Berry met again 
with Senate President Nunez and Senator William Jefferson (D-New Orleans) on July 5 to 
discuss a tobacco tax compromise.169 TI agreed to permit a cigarette tax increase of 4¢ per pack 
in return for the passage of its smokers’ rights bill SB 521 and accommodation bill HB 217 
(Chapter 5). As part of the deal, Senator Jefferson would discuss tobacco industry-developed 
legislation rendering New Orleans’s cigarette tax illegal with the city’s mayor, Sydney 
Barthelemy.  
 
Throughout the July 5 negotiations with Roemer and his legislative leadership, TI 
officials successfully opposed adding a tax on smokeless products as a favor to wholesalers as 
well as Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributors Association Executive Director  
Sarah Whalen.169 According to McWhorter, “We [TI] did this not only to protect our members in 
“The Governor expressed his 
great displeasure at the fact 
that we [the tobacco 
industry] have beaten his 
every effort to pass cigarette 
tax increases for the last 
three years. He also stated 
his determination to force a 
tax increase on us.”  
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that area [wholesalers and distributors], but to repay their lobbyist, Sarah Whalen, for her 
assistance and friendship throughout the process.”169 
 
 Despite reaching a cigarette tax compromise of 4¢ with Senators Nunez and Jefferson, on 
July 6, Roemer’s legislative allies and leaders pressed TI officials to accept a 5¢ per pack 
cigarette tax increase.169 TI representatives resisted the pressure and convinced lawmakers to 
strip the tobacco tax hikes in HB 1468.169  
 
That day the House reconsidered HB 1468.189 We did not find evidence of lobbying by 
health proponents or tobacco industry representatives during debate of the bill. On the Floor, 
Roemer ally Representative Raymond Laborde asked legislators to reject Senate amendments to 
the bill, and members voted 99-3 against Senate changes, sending HB 1468 to a conference 
committee.189 HB 1468 ultimately died upon adjournment. Following House rejection of Senate 
changes to HB 1468, legislative leaders gathered on July 7 to determine a course of action on 
tobacco and other taxes.169  
 
HB 2114 Craters in the House 
 
While Louisiana’s legislative leadership met to decide on tax proposals, Representative 
Raymond Laborde brought HB 2114, the 5¢ per pack cigarette tax increase that tobacco industry 
representatives had contained in the House, to the Floor for reconsideration.169 Laborde told 
representative he revived HB 2114 to cover part of the state’s shortfall from that year’s 
appropriations bill.183 Legislators who supported HB 2114 asserted that the tobacco industry 
backed the bill and chastised lawmakers for opposing a tobacco tax increase. McWhorter 
reported to Morris that “Administration floor leaders incensed many House members, telling 
them that we had agreed to accept a 5-cent increase.”169 In addition, Representative Raymond 
Lalonde, who collaborated with the tobacco industry on clean air (Chapter 5) and youth access 
(Chapter 7) legislation, chided legislators during debate for increasing taxes on milk but not 
tobacco.183  
 
Representative Alario opposed HB 2114 on the House Floor. He unsuccessfully offered 
an amendment to reallocate revenue from the state general fund to municipalities.169 At the time, 
Alario was pushing his alternative tax package in opposition to that offered by Governor 
Roemer.168 McWhorter reported to Morris that the failure of Alario’s amendment made the 
lawmaker “determined to defeat the proposal.”   
 
Representatives voted 69-35 to pass HB 2114,157 one vote below the two-thirds threshold 
to pass tax legislation. McWhorter credited the near-passage of HB 2114 to “mixed signals and 
confusion.”169 Representative Robert Adley, a Roemer floor leader,190 blamed the death of HB 
2114, as well as the legislature’s inability to address the budget deficit on Alario and backers of 
his alternative tax package, saying “This is a serious, serious game being played here. They 
[Alario and his allies] all came here wanting to fund some enhancements, but they have played 
themselves into a position where they can’t get to them.”183 Alario ally Representative Elias 
Ackal (D-New Iberia) blamed HB 2114’s failure on the Roemer Administration trying to raise 
the cigarette tax before a planned meeting with tobacco industry representatives to develop a 
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compromise increase.183 The defeat of HB 2114 eliminated obvious bills to increase cigarette 
taxes.169   
 
A Compromise Cigarette Tax Increase is Passed 
  
After Representatives killed HB 2114, TI Regional VP Ron Morris and TI State 
Activities Director Pat McWhorter met Senators Donald Kelly and William Jefferson for dinner 
and informed them that a tobacco tax increase could be attached to HB 1939.169 According to 
McWhorter, TI officials sought to secure the 4¢ cigarette tax increase to prevent higher tax hikes 
in the future: 
 
While I have no doubt that our lobbying corps could have continued to defeat the 
Governor’s tax proposals, I am also confident that he would have brought the 
Legislature back into special session almost immediately and made yet another 
attempt at us. If this had been done, I have no doubt that they would have tied us 
directly to higher education at 10 or 15 cents. We could not have defeated this 
type of attack.169   
 
As passed by the House, HB 1939 levied a 3% excise tax on automobile rentals (Table 6.10). 
Kelly and Jefferson agreed to attach a 4¢ per pack cigarette tax increase to HB 1939 the next 
day, during Senate debate of the bill on July 8.169 Jefferson’s amendment was approved 30-8 on 
that day, adding a 4¢ increase matching the amount he and Senate President Nunez previously 
agreed to with TI Officials.169 Senators then voted 29-8 to adopt HB 1939 and returned the bill to 
the House for approval of Senate alterations.190 
 
 Representatives reviewed Senate changes to HB 1939 the same day Senators amended 
and returned the bill to the House. During consideration of HB 1939, Representative John Travis, 
an industry ally who voted against other tobacco tax increase legislation in the 1990 session, 
praised the industry for supporting the bill according to The Advocate, exclaiming “They [the 
tobacco industry] are in wholehearted support of it the 4¢ cigarette tax increase] and want to 
make a contribution like everybody else.”191 Despite Travis’ claims, to avoid a greater cigarette 
tax increase tobacco industry lobbyists convinced representatives to reject efforts by Roemer’s 
House leadership to send HB 1939 to a conference committee. According to McWhorter, “The 
Governor’s people wanted to make one more attempt at forcing at least a 5-cent increase in the 
conference committee. It could well have ended up as high as 8¢ or 10¢.”169   
 
Representatives ignored Roemer’s floor leaders and voted 82-21 to adopt Senate 
amendments to HB 1939, sending the bill to the Governor for approval.191 Governor Roemer 
signed HB 1939 into law on July 13, 1990, raising the cigarette tax from 16¢ to 20¢ per pack 
effective August 1, 1990.157 
 
 Aftermath of the Cigarette Tax Increase Compromise with the Tobacco Institute  
 
Even though the tobacco industry allowed adoption of HB 1939 at the end of the 1990 
session, it failed to pass its accommodation bill HB 217 and its smokers’ rights bill SB 521.169 
The tobacco industry had HB 217 pulled from consideration after legislators removed language 
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preempting local smoking restrictions stronger than state law169 (Chapter 5). McWhorter blamed 
“protracted tax battles for SB 521 running out of time and failing to pass.”169 
 
Even so, McWhorter argued that TI’s decision to allow a 4¢ cigarette tax increase 
improved Louisiana’s political landscape for the industry: 
 
[W]e have built up a great amount 
of goodwill with legislative 
leadership by agreeing to 
compromise. With the monumental 
debacle being created by the 
Roemer Administration, we both 
agree that the Louisiana legislature 
will soon break free of the 
Governor’s control and begin 
electing their own leadership. Our 
friends are the ones who will be 
wielding that power. By choosing 
to make our deal with legislative 
leadership rather then [sic] the 
Administration, we strengthened 
their position and strengthened our position as well for several years to come.169  
 
Before the 1991 legislative session, an undated and uncredited document in TI’s records 
determined that Governor Roemer might again target the tobacco industry for a tax increase 
since it had not permitted a bigger tax hike.192 However, the author believed that the 1990 
compromise would prevent Roemer from securing a tax increase and help the tobacco industry 
advance its legislative agenda: 
 
Our lobbying corps is in the process of meeting with leadership to make sure their 
commitment to leave us alone remains firm. We built up a tremendous amount of 
goodwill by allowing the 4-cent increase to pass, and this should help us both 
against the Governor on taxes and in passing our proactive proposals. 
 
We expect to pass both anti-discrimination and some form of guaranteed smoker 
accommodation measures during the regular session. With the absence of tax 
measures, we should have no major problems with these proposals.192 
 
The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 prohibited consideration of tax bills during regular sessions 
in odd years, although tax legislation could be introduced in a special session.7 The tobacco 
industry secured its desired preemptive clean air legislation in 1992 and 1993 (Chapter 5) and 
avoided additional tax increases. In 1993, the Louisiana State Legislature adopted and had 
approved by the public a constitutional amendment that limited consideration of tax legislation to 
odd-year regular sessions and special sessions,8 switching consideration of tax bills from even-
years as originally mandated by the 1974 state constitution.7 
[W]e have built up a great amount of 
goodwill with legislative leadership by 
agreeing to compromise. With the 
monumental debacle being created by 
the Roemer Administration, we both 
agree that the Louisiana legislature will 
soon break free of the Governor’s 
control and begin electing their own 
leadership. Our friends are the ones who 
will be wielding that power.  
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Tobacco Tax Efforts after the Industry’s Compromise: 1991-1999 
 
From 1991 through 1999 Louisiana lawmakers introduced at least 31 tobacco tax bills 
and one tobacco tax resolution (Table 6.11). Only three bills allowing local governments to levy 
taxes on cigarette rolling papers, HB 2032 in 1992, HB 1070 in 1993, and HB 111 in 1994, 
passed. The other bills mainly died with adjournment (Table 6.11). 
 
Louisiana’s political environment became friendlier to the tobacco industry’s policy 
agenda, in particular taxes, after 1990. In late 1991, Governor and industry foe Buddy Roemer 
lost reelection to Governor Edwin Edwards (D),212 who would not propose tobacco tax increases 
during his term from 1992-1996. Tobacco industry allies in the legislature also secured critical 
leadership and committee positions that handled tobacco tax legislation. Representative John 
Alario, instrumental to 1990 defensive efforts against tax increase legislation, served as House 
Speaker from 1992-1996.213 In addition, leadership positions on the House Ways and Means 
Committee, where most tobacco tax legislation went, moved to lawmakers allied to Alario or 
friendly to the industry. Representative Steve Theriot, who in 1990 developed an alternative tax 
package with Alario to compete against Governor Roemer’s legislative package, became 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee from 1992-1995.213 Representative Sean 
Reilly served from 1992-1995 as Vice Chair of the committee.213 Reilly had vocally opposed and 
rejected most tobacco tax increase legislation offered in 1990.213 After 1990, Louisiana did not 
increase tobacco taxes until 2000 (Chapter 11). 
 
The New Orleans Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax  
 
In contrast to most states, 214 Louisiana allows local governments to levy excise taxes,214 
and since 1994 has permitted local governments to 
establish taxes on cigarette papers (Table 6.11).196, 214   
 
The New Orleans City Council adopted 
Louisiana’s first local tobacco tax in 1984 when the 
city expected a $45 million budget shortfall the next 
year.215 To address the deficit, New Orleans Mayor 
Ernest Morial216 announced a legislative package on 
August 2, 1984 featuring $245.3–249.3 million in fee increases and taxes.216 The plan included a 
5% sales tax215 on tobacco products called the Tobacco Consumption Tax.216 Mayor Morial 
organized seven public hearings to discuss his proposed tax package.215 
 
On August 2, 1984, the same day Mayor Ernest Morial announced his tax package, New 
Orleans City Councilmember Joe Giarrusso introduced an ordinance to the New Orleans City 
Council to levy a 5% tax on all tobacco products.217  
 
Tobacco Institute Opposition to the Consumption Tax  
 
After Mayor Morial announced his tax package, TI monitored efforts to promote the 
legislation. TI noted that Morial’s first two public tax package hearings in August had low  
The New Orleans City Council 
adopted Louisiana’s first local 
tobacco tax in 1984 when the 
city expected a $45 million 
budget shortfall the next year.  
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Table 6.11: Tobacco Tax Rates after 1990 Session and Tax Increase Legislation Defeated or Adopted in Legislative Years 1991-1999****193-211 
Tax Rates After 1990 Session 
Cigarettes Cigars Invoiced at $120 Per Thousand or 
Under 
Cigars Invoiced Above $120 Per Thousand Smokeless Loose Leaf 
20¢ per pack 
Cigars invoiced at $120 
per thousand or under –  
Cigars invoiced above 
$120 per thousand  
Smokeless - None 
Loose leaf –  
8% invoice price 20% invoice price None 33% invoice price 
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HB 557 Copelin,    +    Reallocates 8¢ of cigarette tax per pack to 
municipalities and parishes lacking incorporated 
municipalities. 
 Died upon adjournment 
****1991-1997 cover bills reported by the tobacco industry as tax bills. 1998-1999 are bills we determined are applicable from the Louisiana State Legislature legislative database. 
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HB 371 Copelin, 
Johnson, 
Morial, 
   +  21¢  Reallocates tobacco tax revenue to parishes without 
unincorporated municipalities and incorporated 
municipalities. 
 Died upon adjournment 
HB 713 Lalonde  + +    21¢ 39.7% of 
invoice 
price on 
all 
tobacco 
products 
  Deferred by House 
Ways and Means 
Committee 
HB 
1653 
Roach, 
Holden, 
Landrieu 
+     2¢  2¢ per pack to new Cancer and Medical Trust Fund 
for use in “research, prevention and treatment 
programs.” 
 Died upon adjournment 
HB 
1662* 
Roach, 
Holden, 
Landrieu 
 +     Smokeless 
tobacco - 
2% of 
invoice 
price** 
  Died upon adjournment 
HB 
1835 
Roach, 
Holden, 
Landrieu 
        Eliminate all state taxes on 
July 1, 1997 unless 
lawmakers reapproved them. 
Died upon adjournment 
HB 
2032 
Travis   +    Up to 25¢ 
per pack 
Law enforcement. Permitted only St Tammany, 
Feliciana, West Feliciana, 
Tangipahoa, Livingston and 
St. Helena to levy tax. 
Adopted 
SB 857 Johnson, 
Morial, 
 
       Reallocates tobacco tax revenue to parishes without 
unincorporated municipalities and incorporated 
based on population. 
 Died upon adjournment 
Existing Taxes on tobacco products 
Cigarettes – 20¢ per pack 
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Cigars invoiced at $120 per thousand or under – 8% invoice price 
Cigars invoiced above $120 per thousand – 20% invoice price 
Smokeless - None 
Loose leaf – 33% invoice price 
*Constitutional amendment requiring voter approval. 
**Sunsetted on December 31, 1997 if adopted. 
****1991-1997 cover bills reported by the tobacco industry as tax bills. 1998-1999 are bills we determined are applicable from the Louisiana State Legislature legislative database. 
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HB 135 Copelin, 
Sherman 
Nunez, Sam 
etc. 
+     4¢    Died awaiting 
consideration on House 
Floor 
HB 142 Landrieu, +     4¢  No hard dedication. Planned for 
spending on higher education. 
 Died upon adjournment 
HB 
2011 
Thomas,   +  +  Allowed Washington 
Parish to levy tax up to 
25¢. 
Unspecified.  Died awaiting 
consideration on Senate 
Floor 
HB 
1070 
Rayburn   +  +  Allowed Washington 
Parish to levy tax up to 
25¢. 
Law Enforcement.  Adopted 
Existing Taxes on tobacco products 
Cigarettes – 20¢ per pack 
Cigars invoiced at $120 per thousand or under – 8% invoice price 
Cigars invoiced above $120 per thousand – 20% invoice price 
Smokeless - None 
Loose leaf – 33% invoice price 
****1991-1997 cover bills reported by the tobacco industry as tax bills. 1998-1999 are bills we determined are applicable from the Louisiana State Legislature legislative database. 
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  1994 Legislation 
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HB 111 Farrar,    +  +  Up to $1.25 per pack  o Any local government up to 25¢ for 
law enforcement.* 
o Any parish up to $1.25 for DARE 
drug prevention programs. 
o Orleans parish up to $1.00 for the 
New Orleans Rec. Dept. 
 
 Adopted 
HB 218 Roach  +     Cigars - 20% excise tax 
 
Smokeless – 10% 
excise tax 
  Died upon adjournment 
SB 16 Barro +     20¢ Doubled existing rates 
for other tobacco 
products 
  Withdrawn 
Existing Taxes on tobacco products 
Cigarettes – 20¢ per pack 
Cigars invoiced at $120 per thousand or under – 8% invoice price 
Cigars invoiced above $120 per thousand – 20% invoice price 
Smokeless - None 
Loose leaf – 33% invoice price 
*Washington Parish may dedicate 25¢ to city and not law enforcement. 
****1991-1997 cover bills reported by the tobacco industry as tax bills. 1998-1999 are bills we determined are applicable from the Louisiana State Legislature legislative database. 
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1995 Legislation 
No Tobacco Tax Legislation Introduced 
1996 Legislation 
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HB 17 Faucheux + +    2¢ -Cigars invoiced at 
$120 per thousand or 
under – 24% invoice 
price 
-Cigars invoiced above 
$120 per thousand – 
60% invoice price 
-Loose leaf – 99% 
invoice price 
  Killed in House Ways 
and Means Committee 
(officially died upon 
adjournment) 
HB 52 Chaisson +     10¢    Killed in House Ways 
and Means Committee 
(officially died upon 
adjournment) 
HB 55 Faucheux  +     Smokeless – 95% of 
invoice  
  Killed in House Ways 
and Means Committee 
(officially died upon 
adjournment) 
HB 100 Thomas +     10¢  All proceeds to State owned or 
administered acute care hospitals. 
 Killed in House Ways 
and Means Committee 
(officially died upon 
adjournment) 
HB 125 Faucheux         99% of price tax on all 
tobacco accessories.* 
Killed in House Ways 
and Means Committee 
(officially died upon 
adjournment) 
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HB 133    +  +  Up to $2.50 per pack Required parishes to dedicate at least 
50% to DARE programs.** 
Leftover revenue to fund recreation. 
 Killed in House Ways 
and Means Committee  
Existing Taxes on tobacco products 
Cigarettes – 20¢ per pack 
Cigars invoiced at $120 per thousand or under – 8% invoice price 
Cigars invoiced above $120 per thousand – 20% invoice price 
Smokeless - None 
Loose leaf – 33% invoice price 
*tobacco accessories defined as lighters, match boxes, or matchbook. 
**Washington and St. Tammany Parishes excepted. 
****1991-1997 cover bills reported by the tobacco industry as tax bills. 1998-1999 are bills we determined are applicable from the Louisiana State Legislature legislative database. 
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HCR13
8 
Unknown         Tasks Louisiana Dept. of 
Revenue and Taxation with 
overseeing tobacco sales by 
Native American tribes. 
Unknown*** 
Existing Taxes on tobacco products 
Cigarettes – 20¢ per pack 
Cigars invoiced at $120 per thousand or under – 8% invoice price 
Cigars invoiced above $120 per thousand – 20% invoice price 
Smokeless - None 
Loose leaf – 33% invoice price 
***Source only states that the resolution passed the Senate. 
****1991-1997 cover bills reported by the tobacco industry as tax bills. 1998-1999 are bills we determined are applicable from the Louisiana State Legislature legislative database. 
 229 
 
1998 Legislation 
Bi
ll 
Sp
on
so
r 
C
ig
ar
et
te
 T
ax
 In
cr
ea
se
 
O
TP
 T
ax
 In
cr
ea
se
  
C
ig
ar
et
te
 P
ap
er
 T
ax
 In
cr
ea
se
 
R
ea
llo
ca
te
s E
xi
st
in
g 
To
ba
cc
o 
Ta
x 
Lo
ca
l T
ax
 
 In
cr
ea
se
 P
er
 C
ig
ar
et
te
 P
ac
k 
(2
0¢
) 
O
TP
 / 
Pa
pe
rs
 In
cr
ea
se
 A
m
ou
nt
 
A
llo
ca
tio
n 
    O
th
er
 
O
ut
co
m
e 
HB 102 Faucheux +     40¢  Intended to fund prevention, treatment, 
research, and educational 
programming for maternal health, 
cardiopulmonary disease and cancer 
at academic health centers and public 
hospitals. 
 Died upon adjournment 
HB 156 Faucheux +     70¢  Intended to fund prevention, treatment, 
research, and educational 
programming for maternal health, 
cardiopulmonary disease and cancer 
at academic health centers and public 
hospitals. 
 Died upon adjournment 
HB 172 Faucheux +     70¢  Deposits funds in new Tobacco Tax 
Fund. Requires dedication of revenue 
generated by fund: 
• First $50 million 
o 25% to Louisiana Tobacco 
Control Center for anti-tobacco 
media campaigns in each 
parish. 
o 32% to fund prevention 
education for doctors at 
medical schools. 
o 35% to LSU Medical Center 
Health Care Services Division 
hospitals. 
o 8% to Louisiana Cancer and 
Lung Trust Fund. 
 Died upon adjournment 
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• Next $75 million for educator wage 
increases. 
• Next $20 million for police, deputy 
sheriff and firefighter wage 
increases. 
• Next $50 million to be spent 
according to first $50 million. 
• Additional Funds deposited in 
General Fund. 
HB 194 Glover + +    40¢ -Cigars invoiced at 
$120 per thousand or 
under – 24% invoice 
price 
-Cigars invoiced above 
$120 per thousand – 
60% invoice price 
-Loose leaf – 99% 
invoice price 
  Died upon adjournment 
HB 237 Pratt  +     Establishes 39.7% 
smokeless tobacco tax 
rate. 
  Killed on the House 
Floor 
HB 242 Pratt  +     Establishes a tax rate for 
all cigars of 39.7% of 
invoice price. 
 
  Died upon adjournment 
SB 94 Hainkel         Extends potential tobacco 
stamp discount no more than 
6% to all wholesalers 
instead of those in 
neighboring states. 
Died upon adjournment 
Existing Taxes on tobacco products 
Cigarettes – 20¢ per pack 
Cigars invoiced at $120 per thousand or under – 8% invoice price 
Cigars invoiced above $120 per thousand – 20% invoice price 
Smokeless - None 
Loose leaf – 33% invoice price 
 
****1991-1997 cover bills reported by the tobacco industry as tax bills. 1998-1999 are bills we determined are applicable from the Louisiana State Legislature legislative database. 
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HB 86 Salter         Lowers threshold to qualify 
as tobacco wholesaler from 
50% of total tobacco sales 
going to third party tobacco 
retailers to 15%. 
Died upon adjournment 
HB 
1455 
Bruneau         Adds manufacturers that sell 
50% of their total tobacco 
products to retailers to the 
definition of wholesaler. 
Permits sale of cigarette tax 
stamps to dealers based 
outside of Louisiana and 
eliminated reciprocity 
requirement for neighboring 
states. 
Died upon adjournment 
HB 
2210 
Ansardi         Creates two types of 
Wholesaler classifications, 
Class A and Class B. 
Increases permit fees for 
both class types from 
original wholesaler permit 
fee. 
Died upon adjournment 
SB 
1088 
Bean         Creates two types of 
Wholesaler classifications, 
Class A and Class B. Makes 
Tobacconist part of Class B 
definition. Establishes $250 
permit fees for both classes. 
Requires cigarettes be sold 
in packs of at least 20. 
Died with adjournment 
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Existing Taxes on tobacco products 
Cigarettes – 20¢ per pack 
Cigars invoiced at $120 per thousand or under – 8% invoice price 
Cigars invoiced above $120 per thousand – 20% invoice price 
Smokeless - None 
Loose leaf – 33% invoice price 
****1991-1997 cover bills reported by the tobacco industry as tax bills. 1998-1999 are bills we determined are applicable from the Louisiana State Legislature legislative database. 
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attendance.215 TI representatives reached out directly to key businesspeople, manufacturers, and 
wholesalers in August about the tobacco tax’s likelihood of passage and  indirectly 
communicated with the New Orleans City Attorney and City Councilmembers.215 According to 
TI Regional Director John Hightower in an August 27 memo to TI Regional VP Ron Morris, TI 
also made limited, indirect outreach to “black leaders and groups” through multiple people, 
including New Orleans Councilmember Sidney Barthelemy, who taught at  Xavier University218 
(an HBCU). TI conducted outreach to African American leaders despite its lobbyist Jack Pender 
intimating to the Institute that African American leadership in the area was unclear.215 
 
TI officials did not initially consider the New Orleans tax proposal a threat. Regional 
Director John Hightower reported to Morris in his August 27, 1984 memo, “Thus far our 
contacts have led us to believe that this [tax package] is not a serious threat as it relates to the 
tobacco tax. Through various sources we feel that if things do change we will get good early 
warnings.”215  Hightower learned through a secondary source that the New Orleans City 
Attorney did not consider the tobacco tax likely to pass.215 TI lobbyist Jack Pender also indirectly 
asked two unnamed city councilmembers, one possibly Councilmember Mike Early, if the 
tobacco tax was a threat.215 TI officials believed that Mayor Morial mainly sought to change 
earnings taxes.215 TI lobbyist Jack Pender predicted that 3 of the 7 New Orleans City 
Councilmembers (Sidney Barthelemy, Lambert Boissiere and Bryan Wagner215, 219) would likely 
oppose the tobacco tax increase.215 
 
Besides believing Morial’s tobacco tax package was unlikely to pass because local 
elected officials held little support or enthusiasm for the plan, TI also felt the proposal faced 
constitutional and legislative hurdles that made its adoption less of a possibility.215 According to 
TI’s Hightower: 
 
Several of these tax proposals may have serious constitutional problems. The 
tobacco tax falls into this category. If it is to be classed as a sales or use tax then it 
must go back to the legislature for approval prior to an election by the people. 
Jack and I each feel that there are big question marks in this regard.215 
 
TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry received differing advice that the tobacco tax was constitutional.215 
 
 Although TI considered Mayor Morial’s proposal an insignificant threat, by late August it 
anticipated observing City Councilmembers’ positions on the tobacco tax as well as mobilizing 
allies to oppose any introduced ordinance. In late August, TI Regional Director Hightower 
suggested: 
 
We should continue to quietly, but quickly probe to find out for certain how these 
councilmen might vote if indeed they had to consider this tax.  
 
This should be done as discretely as possible utilizing our contacts that know 
these people the best. If we get bad news on the count then it may be time to see 
the problem councilmen directly.215 
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If councilmembers introduced an ordinance, Hightower planned to activate allied groups to 
oppose the legislation215 He also expected TI to issue an action alert to Tobacco Action Network 
volunteers if a councilmember submitted an ordinance.   
 
TI notified legislative counsel and officials from the tobacco companies of the potential 
New Orleans tobacco tax measure by September 6, 1984 but felt the tobacco tax was not a 
danger to the industry and unlikely to pass.220 
 
TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry determined more 
support existed for a local tobacco tax than expected by 
the industry during that September. She contacted an 
associate at the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce on 
September 20, 1984 about the Tobacco Consumption 
Tax.221 The informant told Guidry that the New Orleans 
City Council was inclined to pass the Tobacco 
Consumption Tax ordinance if it and other measures 
developed from Morial’s August tax proposal were 
debated again.221 According to Guidry, to change 
councilmembers’ attitudes towards the tobacco tax 
increase the tobacco industry needed “local persons in 
the tobacco industry [to] present good evidence as to the 
fact that the tax will hurt the local tobacco businesses, 
and not just the smokers.”221 Guidry’s associate claimed 
that the New Orleans City Council would allow tax increase ordinances to die if local voters 
approved an earnings tax proposal to levy a 1% tax on yearly income surpassing $5,200 in the 
upcoming November election.222 
 
 During Joe Wood Guidry’s September 20, 1984 conversation with a New Orleans 
Chamber of Commerce insider, she learned the business association had planned a meeting for 
the tobacco industry to provide arguments against the Tobacco Consumption Tax; she reported 
to TI Regional VP Ron Morris: 
 
I [Joe Wood Guidry] called my friend with the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce after 
we [TI Regional VP Ron Morris] hung up talking. She said that the committee with her 
sub-committee was this afternoon, for the purpose of letting the tobacco industry make 
their “pitch” as to how the New Orleans tobacco tax would hurt the industry and not just 
the smoker.221 
 
The source informed Guidry that the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce had no members from 
the area that were tobacco wholesalers. Guidry subsequently asked Tracy Hutchins,221 a 
Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributors’ Association official, a New Orleans 
Chamber of Commerce member, and a principal at tobacco wholesaler U. Koen & Company223 if 
she could help the industry oppose the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax ordinance at the 
meetings.221 Hutchins told Guidry she would notify “New Orleans Wholesalers of the situation” 
and attend the September 20 or following Chamber of Commerce meeting.221 In mid-late 
… to change councilmembers’ 
attitudes towards the 
tobacco tax increase, the 
tobacco industry needed 
“local persons in the tobacco 
industry [to] present good 
evidence as to the fact that 
the tax will hurt the local 
tobacco businesses, and not 
just the smokers.”  
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September, Guidry recruited New Orleans tobacco wholesalers to join the Chamber of 
Commerce.224 
 
On September 20, 1984, TAN Regional Director John Hightower appeared at a New 
Orleans Area Chamber of Commerce Government Affairs Committee meeting with Louisiana 
tobacco wholesaler and chamber member Tracy Hutchins to oppose the Tobacco Consumption 
Tax.223 During the meeting, Hightower and Hutchins argued the Tobacco Consumption Tax was 
unfair since the federal cigarette tax had increased 8¢ per pack in 1983 and the state cigarette tax 
by 5¢ earlier in 1984. They also claimed the tobacco tax would generate less than expected 
revenue by prompting illegal cigarette sales and lost 
purchases to nearby areas with lower tobacco tax rates 
and that the tobacco tax disproportionately harmed poor 
Louisianans, was regressive, and possibly 
unconstitutional. We did not find evidence that health 
advocates appeared at the meeting to support the tax 
proposal. The Government Affairs Committee did not 
take a position on the tax at its September 20 
meeting.223  
 
In late September 1984, TI lobbyist Joe Wood 
Guidry asked the tobacco industry to mobilize its 
employees to pressure the New Orleans City Council to 
oppose the Tobacco Consumption Tax ordinance.224 
Guidry asked that tobacco company staff living in New 
Orleans send New Orleans Mayor Morial and the City Council letters against the tax increase.224 
She also requested information and campaign contributions she could use to influence New 
Orleans City Councilmembers. Guidry specifically urged the tobacco industry to make the 
biggest campaign donation it could to Councilmember Barthelemy, who was running for Mayor 
of New Orleans in the November election; saying “We need to make good friends with Sidney 
[Barthelemy] since he will still have his vote on the Council, and Councilman Boissiere will also 
vote with him.”224 Guidry also requested materials regarding the problems of implementing a 
local tax and the impacts said tax had on “local tobacco industries” to share with 
Councilmembers Barthelemy and Boissiere. She suggested that TI lobbyist Jack Pender needed 
the same information to provide to his “contacts” and recommended having Pender lobby 
Councilmember Early and another unspecified councilmember.224  
 
In early October 1984, TI Legislative Issues Manager Paula Duhaime developed a policy 
paper opposing the New Orleans Tobacco Consumption Tax to provide lawmakers. Developed 
after conversing with Hightower,225 the sheet asserted that the tobacco tax increases negatively 
impacted prices and harmed poor smokers.225 Duhaime sent the policy paper to Hightower on 
October 11, 1984 for him to provide to an unidentified committee.225 
 
Although TI prepared to defend against the Tobacco Consumption Tax, it still considered 
the measure a minor threat in mid-October, expecting that the New Orleans City Council would 
not consider a tobacco tax increase unless voters vetoed the earnings tax in the November 6 
election.226  
Guidry asked that tobacco 
company staff living in New 
Orleans send New Orleans 
Mayor Morial and the City 
Council letters against the tax 
increase. She also requested 
information and campaign 
contributions she could use 
to influence New Orleans City 
Councilmembers. 
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Hightower sent a letter on October 19, 1984 to New Orleans and the River Region 
Chamber of Commerce’s East New Orleans Council Chairman Mike Brill asking his 
organization to oppose the Tobacco Consumption Tax ordinance.223 The letter recounted 
Hightower and Louisiana wholesaler Tracy Hutchins’ appearance at the Chamber’s Government 
Affairs Committee meeting on September 20, and their arguments that the tobacco tax increase 
was possibly unconstitutional, regressive, would spur crime and possibly drive business out of 
the city. 
 
On Election Day, November 6, 1984, New Orleans voters rejected the 1% earnings tax 
placed on the ballot by the city.222 The defeat increased pressure on the New Orleans City 
Council to pass the Tobacco Consumption Tax. 
 
Tobacco Industry Explores Defensive Efforts after New Orleans Rejects Earnings Tax 
 
After voters rejected the earnings tax proposal, TI representatives renewed 
communication with New Orleans City Councilmembers and tobacco wholesalers to monitor the 
likelihood of the Tobacco Consumption Tax passing.222 TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry 
communicated with Councilmember Sidney Barthelemy and multiple tobacco wholesalers, while 
TI Regional Director John Hightower corresponded with TI lobbyist Jack Pender, two 
unidentified councilmembers, and wholesalers.222 Councilmembers informed TI representatives 
that the City Council would probably not pursue the Tobacco Consumption Tax and instead 
make budget cuts and renew an expiring 1% sales tax to address New Orleans’ $60 million 
budget deficit.222 New Orleans Councilmembers and wholesalers told Guidry, Hightower and 
Pender that if any activity on the tobacco tax increase happened, it would not be before 
November 29, 1984.222 
 
The New Orleans City Council convened to weigh tax increase ordinances on November 
8227 and 15, 1984227 without voting on the Tobacco Consumption Tax.227 
 
New Orleans City Councilmember Bryan Wagner subsequently contacted Hightower on 
November 16, 1984 and informed him that the council was considering the tobacco tax.228 
Wagner “urged us [TI] to crank up any contacts program that we had in mind. I immediately 
contacted you [TI Regional VP Ron Morris] and started making phone calls to people in New 
Orleans urging contact with their councilmen.”228 Hightower contacted City Councilmembers 
and government staff, tobacco company officials, business associations, and wholesalers to 
convince them to oppose the ordinance229 (Table 6.12). 
 
The New Orleans City Council held a special meeting on November 23 and debated a 
resolution asking councilmembers to decide upon the Tobacco Consumption Tax.228 Hightower 
attended, testifying228 that the measure financially saddled families with smokers and was 
regressive.229 We do not know if health proponents testified in support of the measure at the 
hearing. Despite Hightower’s testimony, Councilmembers voted 4-2 to approve the motion and 
debate the Tobacco Consumption Tax at a later hearing. 
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On November 26, Hightower, TI Vice President Marshall Hurst, and Morris decided to 
employ New Orleans lobbyist Tom Spradley to assist ongoing lobbying efforts with 
councilmembers against the tax by TI lobbyists Guidry and Pender.228 Spradley immediately 
started lobbying against the ordinance on November 27.228 TI determined by November 28 that 
Table 6.12: List of People and Their Affiliations Contacted by Tobacco Institute Regional Director John 
Hightower to Oppose the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax229, 230 
Tom Spradley Tobacco Institute 
Sarah Whalen Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco Distributors Association 
Jim Funk Louisiana Restaurant Association 
DeAnn Johnson New Orleans Chamber of Commerce 
Nance Guenther New Orleans Chamber of Commerce 
Joe Traglino Traglino Tobacco (Wholesaler) 
Herb Kramer President- New Orleans Retail Grocers’ Association 
Grocery store owner 
Mark Zuppardo Louisiana Retail Grocers’ Association 
Barbara Easley  Louisiana Wholesale Grocers’ Association 
Roy Amedee Winn Dixie Company (Grocer) 
Tracy Hutchins U. Koen & Company (Wholesaler) 
Alan Kronenberg TAC Member 
Vending business 
Jimmy House Wholesaler and Vending Business 
 
Sandy Kutner The Tobacco House (Retailer)* 
Lance Jones Philip Morris 
Kirstie Thompson Philip Morris 
John Spampneto Philip Morris 
Jim Paddock Philip Morris 
Rod Sommer RJ Reynolds 
Cliff Pennell RJ Reynolds 
Karl Knottlowsky RJ Reynolds 
Ben Somerau Brown and Williamson 
Tom Toudeau Brown and Williamson 
Jerry Whorton Lorillard 
Janice Rhodes Liggett and Myers 
George Blue Southland Corporation lobbyist 
Rhaul Guillame City Councilmember Sidney Barthelemy backer 
Sherry McConnell K&B Drug Stores lobbyist 
Clark Cosse Louisiana Association of Business and Industry 
lobbyist 
Sidney Barthelemy New Orleans City Councilmember 
Lambert Boissiere New Orleans City Councilmember 
Mike Early New Orleans City Councilmember 
Joseph Giarrusso New Orleans City Councilmember 
Wayne Babovitch New Orleans City Councilmember 
Bryan Wagner New Orleans City Councilmember 
James Singleton New Orleans City Councilmember 
Lee Siegel City Clerk of New Orleans City Council 
Jack McNeely City of New Orleans Lobbyist 
Lennie Simmins [sic] City of New Orleans Lobbyist 
Gerard Pelias Wholesaler and distributor 
*Talked to employees as well 
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the New Orleans City Council would vote 4-2 or 4-3 to pass the tax on November 29 and started 
considering lobbying the mayor to veto it.228  
 
Before the New Orleans City Council met on November 29, New Orleans City Attorney 
Salvador Anzelmo issued an opinion that the Tobacco Consumption Tax ordinance was 
unconstitutional without voter approval.228, 231 State law required approval from the state 
legislature or constituents to pass any sales or consumption tax greater than 3%.232  
 
The City Council considered Ordinance No. 10,167 MCS232 (We identify legislation in 
this section by ordinance number or ordinance calendar number. We specify when using a 
calendar number), the Tobacco Consumption Tax, on November 29, 1984217, 229 and weighed 
amendments to address constitutional problems the City Attorney raised, and then went into 
executive session with him to discuss changes.228 
 
Hightower reported to Morris that councilmembers weighed a proposal from TI lobbyist 
Joe Wood Guidry to make the tax impermanent during their executive session: 
 
A suggestion by our counsel, Joe Wood [Guidry], that the tax be made temporary 
in exchange for our efforts at the state level to try to get state money for the city, 
was apparently mulled over by the members of the council during that meeting 
also.228 
 
After the executive session, the New Orleans City Council proposed amendments altering 
the language and scope of Ordinance No. 10,167 MCS but did not change the 5% sales tax levied 
on tobacco products. One amendment changed the tax from a Tobacco Consumption Tax to a 
Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax233  to avoid a conflict with Louisiana law that required local 
governments to obtain state legislative or constituent approval if they levied a consumption, use, 
or sales tax over 3%.232, 234 The change nominally levied the tax on the consumption of tobacco 
and not its sale, although the tax was a percentage of price and applied at sale on purchases made 
in Orleans Parish. Another amendment increased the breadth of Ordinance No. 10,167 MCS s 
coverage partly to justify it as a consumption privilege tax, requiring taxes to be paid on tobacco 
products used in Orleans Parish that were not purchased there. People that consumed tobacco in 
New Orleans that purchased it outside the parish would send money owed to the city with (to be 
determined) appropriate forms.233 Despite TI’s public objections, the City Council adopted the 
amendments. 
 
After the City Council amended the Tobacco Consumption Tax to become the Tobacco 
Consumption Privilege Tax, Hightower testified against it at the November 29 hearing,228 saying: 
 
Naturally we here today, representing all facets of the tobacco industry are 
extremely distressed that you chose to go to our products again for your needs. 
The 142,000 smokers of this city will undoubtedly regret that choice too. As I 
stated the other day, the [addition] of this extra five-percent will mean an annual 
tax burden on the average family with two average smokers of an additional 
$55.00 
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Taxes of this sort are regressive in nature and do hit low income people the 
hardest. The product has already absorbed a hefty increase in the last six months 
due to the state excise tax increase.229 
 
Hightower also argued tax revenue would decline as smokers made cigarette purchases in nearby 
parishes to avoid costs. In contrast to the tobacco industry’s opposition, we did not find any 
evidence that health advocates provided 
comments supporting the ordinance at the 
meeting. 
 
The New Orleans City Council 
ultimately adopted the Tobacco Consumption 
Privilege Tax but indicated its willingness to 
repeal the increase if other revenue alternatives 
were discovered. Councilmembers voted 4-3 to 
adopt the ordinance and send it to Mayor Morial 
for approval.228 Councilmember Barthelemy 
then proposed Resolution R-84-474 at the 
November 29 meeting, which stated the City 
Council’s intent to repeal the Tobacco 
Consumption Privilege Tax when adequate state 
funding became available for New Orleans’ government.235 He included a request that TI help 
find funds from the state to replace revenue from the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax: 
 
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, 
That the Council hereby signifies its intent to repeal this tax provided that other 
revenue measures are made available by the state legislative in its next session. 
 
Be It Further Resolved That the Council Hereby Request the assistance of the 
Tobacco Institute in attaining the aforementioned legislative relief.235 
  
The Council unanimously approved the resolution.229  
 
Following the November 29, 1984 City Council meeting, TI representatives sought the 
mayor’s veto of the tax229 or another means to repeal the measure.236 TI lobbyists asked 
associates to call “the Mayor’s office urging veto.” 228 Meanwhile, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry 
sought an alternative state revenue source to satisfy Councilmember Barthelemy’s resolution to 
replace the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax.236 
 
 Despite tobacco industry hopes, Mayor Morial never vetoed the ordinance. According to 
a December 13 memo from TI Regional Director John Hightower to TI Regional VP Ron 
Morris: 
 
The feeling [among tobacco industry personnel] was that the Mayor would veto 
the bill and the Council would be able to sustain the veto by a 4–to –2 vote, but 
“Be it resolved by the Council of the 
City of New Orleans that the Council 
hereby signifies its intent to repeal 
this tax provided that other revenue 
measures are made available by the 
state legislative in its next session. 
Be It Further Resolved That the 
Council Hereby Request the assistance 
of the Tobacco Institute in attaining 
the aforementioned legislative relief.”  
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this never occurred. For some reason, surely based on reasons only the Mayor 
knows, he did not sign it.236 
 
Morial’s office returned Ordinance No. 10,167 MCS to the City Council on December 6, 1984 
without signature or veto and the tax entered effect without mayoral approval 10 days later on 
December 9, 1984.237 Effective January 1, 1985 with collection beginning that March, the 
Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax instituted a 5% of price tax on all tobacco products238 for 
the privilege to consume them in New Orleans (a sales tax in all but name). 
 
The Tobacco Industry Considers Options for Repealing the Tobacco Consumption 
Privilege Tax in 1985 
  
As the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax entered effect, TI considered ways to 
retaliate against New Orleans and or repeal the law. In a December 13, 1984 memo, TI Regional 
Director John Hightower stated that TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry discovered the state could 
likely claim the city’s tobacco tax revenue: 
 
Joe Wood [Guidry] was working in Baton Rouge to investigate state money or 
some means of replacement money for the tobacco tax as per the pledge made in 
the resolution passed pursuant to the passage of the tobacco tax. She has gotten 
some rather positive signs that without legislation the Louisiana Department of 
Revenue can indeed collect the sales tax from New Orleans. While this is a long 
way from being reality, it will be pursued. 236 
 
Mayor Ernest “Dutch” Morial blocked this effort. A November 22, 1985 memo from TI 
Regional VP Ron Moore to TI VP Hurst Marshall reported that: 
 
Our lobbyist, Joe Wood Guidry, made several attempts to work with the State 
Revenue Department on this proposal. Each time she was thwarted by Mayor 
Morial’s aides. They want to handle the sales tax collection locally.239 
 
TI also considered filing a lawsuit against the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax.236 Hightower 
as well as TI lobbyists Joe Wood Guidry, Tom Spradley and Jack Pender investigated the 
feasibility of a lawsuit against the measure as did TI’s Washington DC-based law firm 
Covington and Burling.231  Both Covington and Burling and New Orleans law firm Stone, 
Pigman believed a lawsuit would fail.240 As a result,  on February 4, 1985 TI Vice President of 
State Activities Division Roger Mozingo sent a memorandum to Stanley S. Scott, VP and 
Director of Corporate Affairs for Philip Morris and four other industry inside lawyers (W.E. 
Ainsworth, James R. Cherry, Donald E. Mott, Guy L. Smith, and J. Kendrick Wells) stating the 
industry would not file a lawsuit against the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax.241 
 
Industry Contributes to City Councilmember Barthelemy To Bolster Tax Repeal Efforts  
 
On November 22, 1985 TI Regional VP Ron Morris sent a memo to TI VP Hurst 
Marshall asking TI to make a campaign contribution to New Orleans City Councilmember 
Sidney Barthelemy’s mayoral campaign.239 TI had considered contributing to Barthelemy since 
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December 1984, the month the New Orleans tax passed. Morris asserted in his November 22, 
1985 memo that helping Barthelemy win his election might help the tobacco industry’s efforts 
against the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax: 
 
If Barthelemey is elected mayor, we will have a 
good chance at completion of this effort [to 
eliminate the Tobacco Consumption Privilege 
Tax]. We can get the State Revenue Department 
to collect and rebate New Orleans sales tax…. 
Second and most important, we will have a 
chance to repeal the New Orleans tax.239 
 
Morris planned to meet Barthelemy and talk about his 
mayoral campaign on December 3, 1985.239 On January 
21, 1986, TI provided a $500 contribution to 
Barthelemy,242, 243 who was elected the Mayor of New 
Orleans on March 1, 1986.244  
 
New Orleans Increases its Tobacco Tax in 1986  
 
The City of New Orleans had a $24 million budget shortfall in June 1986245 that the City 
had to address before the standard year’s end.246 In addition, state spending cuts were expected to 
cost the city $25 million, $10 million of which resulted from the State Legislature reallocating 
state tobacco tax revenue previously dedicated to local governments.245  
 
The budget crisis led city government to develop a package of tax legislation to generate 
new revenue.247 Possibly as part of the package, New Orleans City Councilmember Peggy 
Wilson248 introduced Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS232 on July 10, 1986,  to raise the Tobacco 
Consumption Privilege Tax  from the 5% of price tax on tobacco products set in 1984 to 10%.249 
TI Regional VP Ron Morris blamed New Orleans Chief Administrative Officer Kurt Steiner for 
the tobacco tax increase.250 
 
Tobacco Institute Moves to Block Ordinance No. 11,527  
 
The New Orleans City Council planned to discuss Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS232 on 
August 7, 1986.248 TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry and TI Regional VP Ron Morris, in New 
Orleans for the National Conference of State Legislatures, learned that Councilmembers would 
consider the measure that night while dining with state lawmakers, and abruptly left for City Hall 
to oppose it. Guidry’s husband,251 former state representative and lobbyist Jesse Guidry and 
Philip Morris lobbyist Carl Johnson treated the legislators to the meal in their stead.248 Guidry 
persuaded Mayor Sidney Barthelemy to have the City Council postpone consideration of the 
ordinance that same day.248 She reported to the TI that: 
 
I called on Mayor Barthelemy, begging him not to put this tobacco increase on 
while all of the tobacco manufacturers were in town spending quarter of a million 
dollars or more on the National Conference of State Legislators [sic]. The mayor, 
“If Barthelemey is elected 
mayor, we will have a good 
chance at completion of this 
effort. We can get the State 
Revenue Department to 
collect and rebate New 
Orleans sales tax …. Second 
and most important, we will 
have a chance to repeal the 
New Orleans tax.”  
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out of friendship for me, got the Council to delay voting on the matter at that 
time.248 
 
Councilmembers delayed consideration of the ordinance until August 21.247  
 
On August 8, TI Vice President Roger Mozingo, and TI Regional VP Ron Morris asked 
Joe Wood Guidry and her lobbyist husband Jesse Guidry who should lobby against Ordinance 
No. 11,527 MCS .248 The Guidry’s recommended that their lobbying firm Joe Wood & 
Associates handle the measure.248 TI agreed to pay Guidry $10,000 to fight the tax in New 
Orleans. 248  
 
On August 13-15, 1986, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry met with New Orleans City 
Councilmember Dorothy Mae Taylor and Assistant Chief Administrative Officer Lennie 
Simmons to discuss the revenue impact of the 1984 Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax and 
Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS.248 Simmons told Guidry that the 1984 tax would generate $1.6 to 
1.8 million for New Orleans in 1986 and predicted that Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS would 
provide another half million that year. Joe Wood Guidry also probed lawmakers on their views 
about increasing the tax:  
 
On August 13, Joe Wood Guidry met Councilmember Johnny Jackson, who had 
served as a state representative alongside Jesse Guidry.248 She also discussed the 
ordinance with Councilmembers Taylor and Bossier,248 all of whom viewed the 
tax increase as unavoidable but “told us they would see what they could do to 
help. However, the funds were so short for 1987 that everything was needed that 
they could think of.”248 
 
TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry recruited State Representatives Sherman Copelin and 
Republican Caucus leader, Peppi Bruneau to lobby against passing Ordinance No. 11,527 
MCS.248 Guidry claimed Representative Bruneau successfully pressured Councilmember Peggy 
Wilson to delay her bill.248 
 
Preparing for the August 21 City Council meeting, the week of August 15 Morris 
provided TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry arguments against the measure.252 The talking points 
asserted the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax in 1984 did not meet revenue expectations set 
by supporters and had reduced New Orleans’s cigarette sales and tobacco tax returns, that  the 
increase was regressive since it placed another tax burden on New Orleanais who had a “buying 
income” 21% lower than the state average, that the tax increase would cause city residents to 
seek decreased prices and buy cigarettes in neighboring areas, and that a 6¢ increase per cigarette 
pack made New Orleans’ overall federal, state, and local tax burden on cigarettes the third 
highest nationally behind Chicago and New York.252 
 
At the August 21, 1986 meeting councilmembers again deferred action on Ordinance No. 
11,527 MCS.248, 253 Joe Wood Guidry reported, “We…met again with the mayor. He said he 
would try to keep hands off, and on the 21st he postponed hearing again until October 16.”248 
Guidry continued lobbying councilmembers to oppose the measure during the delay.253   
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After the City Council delayed action on Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS, TI’s Joe Wood 
Guidry and unidentified local tobacco wholesalers attempted to show city officials that a tobacco 
tax increase was unnecessary because existing tobacco tax revenue was under-collected. Guidry, 
Louisiana wholesalers, and possibly other tobacco lobbyists met with New Orleans Chief 
Administrative Officer Kurt Steiner, Mayor Barthelemy, and city employees on August 26, 
1986248, 254 to educate them on how to better collect existing tobacco taxes.248 The lobbyists 
likely advocated for implementation of $2-3 identification tags on cigarette vending machines to 
track them and obtain taxes due, which Guidry mentions in a letter she sent to Mayor Barthelemy 
discussed later in this section.255 
 
In early September 1986, Joe Wood Guidry met with tobacco distributor Joe Quagliano, 
City Councilmembers Boissiere, Jackson and Taylor, and grocery chain owner John 
Schwegmann to recruit tobacco retailers to oppose Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS. Retailers 
rejected the request, fearing insurance costs and property taxes might increase as a result.248   
 
On September 3, 1986, the Office of Mayor Sidney Barthelemy sent TI VP Roger 
Mozingo a letter regarding the City of New Orleans’ financial crisis and plans to resolve it.256 
Barthelemy stated that state and federal shared funding cuts to New Orleans had given the city a 
$30 million budget shortfall. To close the deficit, the City Council passed a $195 property 
service charge that required voter approval in a September 27, 1986 election.256 Barthelemy 
asked TI to contribute to a newly-formed nonprofit Citizens for New Orleans that was 
campaigning for the tax ahead of the election.256 We do not know if TI provided money to 
Citizens for New Orleans or assisted efforts to pass the property service charge.  
 
TI believed New Orleans City Councilmembers were likelier to pass Ordinance No. 
11,527 MCS if voters rejected the property tax at the ballot.253 Institute representatives had 
secured multiple votes from New Orleans City Councilmembers against Ordinance No. 11,527 
MCS by the week of September 15, but feared the property service charge’s defeat would cause 
councilmembers to break their promises and approve the tobacco tax:  
 
Presently we have votes pledged to kill the cigarette consumption tax increase. 
We are awaiting the outcome of the September 27 referendum on property taxes. 
The outcome of the referendum may alter our pledges position. 253 
 
Voters rejected the Property Service Charge in the September 27 election.253    
 
In early October 1986, TI worked with Philip Morris representative Carl Johnson and 
local distributors to lobby against Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS (Table 6.13).253 
 
Joe Wood Guidry, her husband Jesse Guidry, Quagliano, and Whalen met Mayor Sidney 
Barthelemy the week of October 8 to gauge his stance on the ordinance.253 Barthelemy informed 
Table 6.13: Business Community Members Assisting Tobacco Institute Against Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS253 
Name Affiliation 
Carl Johnson Philip Morris 
Sarah Whalen Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco Distributors 
Tracy Hutchins U. Koen & Company (wholesaler) 
Joe Quagliano Quagliano Distributors 
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them he had no position on Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS  and intended to let Councilmembers 
decide its fate.253 The lobbyists subsequently met with New Orleans City Councilmembers 
Boissiere, Jackson, Singleton and Taylor on October 8 to persuade them to oppose the 
measure.253 By October 8, tobacco industry representatives and allies had already received 
assurances from Councilmembers Mike Early and Joe Giarrusso that they would vote against the 
ordinance.253 Guidry and Morris reported that Quagliano also planned to raise money and give 
in-kind contributions to councilmembers to earn their support: 
 
Joe is planning a fund raiser and has set aside a hotel suite for Councilman Taylor 
for the Southern-Rambling game. Quagliano has agreed to furnish a case of 
cigarettes for a Jackson fund raiser. We continue in our efforts to dissuade the 
Council members from passing the cigarette tax increase.253 
 
Tobacco representatives and distributors also 
received lobbying assistance from current and former 
state lawmakers, who urged councilmembers to oppose 
the ordinance.248, 253 On October 8, Morris reported that 
“Council member Peggy Wilson has been talked to by 
Representatives [Peppi] Bruneau and John Hainkel. In 
addition, former State Senator Mike O’Keefe has 
offered to assist Joe in her efforts to convince council 
members to the failing of the tax.”253  
 
Philip Morris initiated a contact drive to pressure 
the City Council against adopting Ordinance No. 11,527 
MCS.253 The company expected to instigate 75 calls and 
200 letters to each councilmember. Philip Morris’ drive led TI’s Morris to recommend that TI 
activate its New Orleans “tobacco folks” to pressure councilmembers against the ordinance.  
 
 In October, to bolster business community opposition to Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS, the 
tobacco industry and its allies continued recruiting other businesses to oppose it.248, 253 Philip 
Morris representative Carl Johnson pursued the local Miller Beer Distributorship.253 (At the time 
Philip Morris owned Miller Beer.257)  In addition, Joe Quagliano248 of Quagliano Distributors 
tried to recruit grocery store company Schwegmann to oppose the ordinance.253 We do not know 
if they convinced Schwegmann to help. Surprisingly, the local Chamber of Commerce rejected 
requests from the industry and its allies to help oppose the measure.253 We do not know why.  
 
Budget Realities Begin to Dominate the Discussion 
  
The budget shortfall severely impacted City of New Orleans officials and staff as the City 
Council considered revenue sources to alleviate its remaining $10 million shortfall in October246 
and the tobacco industry worked to avoid further taxes. By October 6, Councilmembers had 
required city offices to close 3 days a week instead of 2, lay off 205 employees, reduce the pay 
of remaining staff 20% and constrain them to 4-day work weeks.246 Councilmembers and Mayor 
Barthelemy also lowered their own salaries 20%.246 246 
 
“Presently we have votes 
pledged to kill the cigarette 
consumption tax increase. 
We are awaiting the outcome 
of the September 27 
referendum on property 
taxes. The outcome of the 
referendum may alter our 
pledges position.”  
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 Despite these extreme measures, on October 19 the City Council voted to delay 
consideration of Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS and other non-tobacco measures until November 
5.248, 258 According to Joe Wood Guidry, the “City Council deferred action on tobacco tax until 
next regular council meeting to see if they could find anything else.”248 The postponed 
legislation included a new measure258 by Councilmember Singleton255 to levy a $10 licensing fee 
on all types of vending machines,258 which also concerned the tobacco industry since it sold 
products through cigarette vending machines. 
 
 TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry wrote Mayor Barthelemy on October 20 urging him not to 
let the city’s Chief Administrative Officer Kurt Steiner incorporate revenue from the 1984 
Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax, Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS, or a proposed $10 tax on all 
types of vending machines by Councilmember Singleton, in the 1987 budget.255 Guidry attached 
a fact sheet regarding New Orleans’ 1985 tobacco consumption and smoking rates and asserted 
in her letter that 1985 sales data showed  New Orleans should collect $3.2 million in 1986 
instead of the $1.6 million forecasted by Assistant Chief Administrative Officer Lenny Simmons. 
She insinuated that the city had not collected Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax revenue from 
cigarette vending machines and should pursue the earnings before levying additional taxes.  
Identifying herself as a Louisiana wholesaler (Guidry previously lobbied for LWTCDA, Chapter 
2), Guidry stated she and other local merchants determined and recommended to New Orleans 
Director of Finance Paul Mitchell and city tax collector259 Joan Buttigig in August 1986 that 
New Orleans should require cigarette vending machine owners to buy $2-3 ID tags for their 
machines to strengthen the city’s collection of Tobacco Consumption Privilege Taxes.255 
According to Guidry in her October 20 letter, imposition of new tobacco and vending taxes while 
the city under-collected the 1984 Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax punished undeserving tax-
paying businesses: 
 
[T]o add another 5% when you are only collecting 50% of the existing 5% 
[consumption privilege tax on tobacco products] is really totally unfair on those 
retailers presently paying the tax – instead of improving on your collection 
methods you only double up on the people who are being honest and fair to the 
city and not even attempting to catch those who are not paying their share of the 
tax.255 
 
Since tobacco products had a consumption privilege tax, Guidry suggested to Mayor Barthelemy 
that the ordinance levying a $10 tax on all vending machines be changed to impose a lower $3 
tax on cigarette vending machines.255 She asserted that improved Tobacco Consumption 
Privilege Tax collection would provide New Orleans an additional $1.8 million in revenue. 
Despite Guidry’s letter Steiner included revenue from Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS in the City of 
New Orleans’ 1987 budget plans.250 
 
On October 31, 1986, as the expected November 5 City Council meeting to discuss 
Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS and other tax legislation neared, Morris sent a letter to TI VP Hurst 
Marshall describing councilmembers’ positions on the tobacco tax.250 Morris expected 
Councilmembers Giarrusso, Early, Taylor, Jackson and Singleton to oppose Ordinance No. 
11,527 MCS, and Councilmember Wilson to support it, with Councilmember Boissiere’s 
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position unknown. Morris reasoned that securing Barthelemy’s support or maintaining his 
neutrality was critical to retaining councilmember 
votes against the measure:  
 
The real key to the success or defeat of our 
efforts lies with Mayor Sidney Barthelemy. 
Sidney claims he will not push this tax. 
However, as I just stated, it has reappeared. 
If the Mayor changes his position from 
neutral, our pledges [to oppose the tax] will 
have the potential to melt away.250 
 
Guidry planned to keep lobbying Councilmembers 
to reject the ordinance and to meet Mayor 
Barthelemy to persuade him to oppose it before the 
November 5 City Council meeting.250  
 
TI also entertained an offer of assistance 
lobbying the city council from a New Orleans Fire Fighters Association member identified as 
Mr. Sanchez.250 In early October, New Orleans firefighters had unsuccessfully fought funding 
cuts by city councilmembers.246 According to Morris’ letter, Sanchez intimated he could help 
lobbying efforts with the City Council.250 We do not know the details of the assistance offered by 
Sanchez, or if the Institute accepted it. 
 
 At the November 5, 1986 meeting, councilmembers again delayed consideration of 
Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS 260 and all other tax increase legislation until November 19.261  
 
 Before bringing Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS for consideration at the November 19 
hearing, the City Council held multiple meetings not open to the public that were attended by TI 
lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry and unidentified tobacco representatives on November 10 through 13, 
and two budget committee hearings attended by LWTCDA lobbyist Sarah Whalen on November 
17 and 18.248 According to Joe Wood Guidry in a December 12, 1986 memo, councilmembers 
and Mayor Barthelemy struggled to find a revenue source besides a tobacco tax increase to fund 
emergency services:  
 
Everything was tied into the budget and the council members were trying to 
figure how not to vote for the tobacco tax and not lose the fire stations that had 
been closed as well as the 32 policemen that were to be laid off. Mayor 
Barthelemy came and told us that he didn’t want to, but he couldn’t find anything 
else that would raise $2 million.248 
 
Although unable to find a revenue source to replace Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS, the New 
Orleans City Council again deferred consideration of the measure and other tax increase 
legislation at the November 19 meeting.248 Councilmembers postponed action until December 1, 
1986, the last day they could legally reconcile New Orleans’ budget deficit.262   
 
“The real key to the success 
or defeat of our efforts lies 
with Mayor Sidney 
Barthelemy. Sidney claims he 
will not push this tax. 
However, as I just stated, it 
has reappeared. If the Mayor 
changes his position from 
neutral, our pledges [to 
oppose the tax] will have the 
potential to melt away.”  
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On November 19, Mayor Barthelemy reiterated to TI’s Joe Wood Guidry that he needed 
the $2 million generated by Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS to address New Orleans’ budget deficit, 
but asked how the city government could assist the industry.248 He, Joe Wood Guidry, and City 
Councilmembers conversed repeatedly before the December 1 hearing to discuss the measure.248 
Unable to avoid the tobacco tax hike, they decided to insert a provision into Ordinance No. 
11,527 MCS that repealed the increase if an already passed earnings tax survived a court 
challenge.248, 263 The mayor also promised his support in repealing the ordinance’s tax increase if 
the tobacco industry secured funds for New Orleans during “special legislative sessions” 
according to Joe Wood Guidry.248 
 
On December 1, the City Council considered Ordinance No. 11,527 MCS and amended it 
to add an automatic repeal if a separately-adopted earnings tax survived court challenges, then 
passed the ordinance.263 Mayor Barthelemy signed the measure into law, raising the Tobacco 
Consumption Privilege Tax from 5% to 10% of sales price on all tobacco products effective 
January 1, 1987.263 
 
Giarrusso Attempts to Increase the Consumption Privilege Tax in 1987 
 
After the New Orleans City Council doubled the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax in 
1986 from 5% to 10%, Councilman John Giarrusso introduced Ordinance Calendar No. 13,957 
on April 2, 1987 to raise the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax from 10% to 27.5%, which 
would raise $5-6 million annually that could provide city workers a 5% wage increase.264, 265 A 
former smoker, Giarrusso introduced the measure the day after announcing a clean air ordinance 
he was submitting with support from the American Cancer Society265 (Chapter 5).  
 
The tobacco industry mounted a heavy campaign against the tax. Shortly after Giarrusso 
revealed his tobacco legislation, TI hired the New Orleans public relations firm Haras, Inc. to 
oppose the tax and smokefree measures.266 A member of the firm, Michael O’Keefe, previously 
served as Senate President in the Louisiana Legislature.266 Haras, Inc. lobbyist Norris Fitzmorris 
proved instrumental in efforts against Ordinance Calendar No. 13,957. Philip Morris worked 
with Louisiana-based Imperial Trading Company Inc to oppose the ordinance.267 
 
The week of April 27, 1987, TI Legislative Issues Manager Paula Duhaime developed 
talking points for Fitzmorris to use against Ordinance Calendar No. 13,957 and sent it to him 
after TI Regional VP Ron Morris approved the sheet.268  On May 1, 1987, Fitzmorris sent a letter 
to New Orleans City Council President Dorothy Mae Taylor asking to provide comments against 
Giarrusso’s tax and smokefree ordinances to councilmembers since he accidentally missed an 
April 23 public meeting on the measures.269 We do not know if Councilmember Taylor granted 
Fitzmorris’ request. 
 
The tobacco industry and its allies rallied the New Orleans business community in early 
May to oppose both ordinances at a May 7 hearing.270 From May 4 until the day of the City 
Council meeting, Fitzmorris lobbied business groups to oppose at least the clean air measure.270 
In addition, TI Regional Director Jack Shoemaker visited New Orleans to recruit supporters on 
May 5 and May 6.270, 271 
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The New Orleans City Council considered Ordinance Calendar No. 13,957 and 
Giarrusso’s smokefree legislation on May 7.270 Around 150 members of the business community 
appeared to oppose the measures, with over 30 planning to provide testimony to the Council.270 
In a May 11 memo to TI VP Hurst Marshall, TI Regional VP Ron Morris observed, “Jack’s 
[Shoemaker] last minute follow-up brought company representatives in to help swell the 
audience. He was also helpful in alerting the small grocers.”270 Fitzmorris provided information 
at the hearing to people who signed up to speak against either ordinance.270 Health advocates 
also appeared to support the measures.270 
 
The City Council considered other issues for seven hours during the hearing, causing 
opponents and proponents of the tobacco tax and smokefree ordinances to leave before they were 
considered. Far fewer people testified than planned, with six people speaking against the tobacco 
measures (Table 6.14). After testimony, the New Orleans City Council rejected Ordinance 
Calendar No. 13,957 in a 6-1 vote, with only Councilmember Giarrusso, the ordinance’s sponsor, 
voting for it.270 Councilmembers also rejected Giarrusso’s smokefree ordinance (Chapter 5). 
 
The day after the City Council hearing, Fitzmorris wrote Councilmembers Lambert 
Boissiere272 and Dorothy Mae Taylor273 thanking them for their votes against Giarrusso’s 
ordinances. The letters asserted that the tax and smoking restrictions would have harmed small 
businesses in New Orleans.  
 
Haras lobbyist Norris Fitzmorris attempted to keep allies active after the hearing. On May 
11, Fitzmorris sent a memorandum to unspecified recipients thanking those that opposed 
Ordinance Calendar No. 13,957 and the smokefree bill saying, “many people put forth a 
concerted effort we were able to make our case/ gain the Council's respect and convince the 
individual members that our position, at this time/ was the right one.”274 He recommended that 
memorandum recipients continue observing legislative efforts by the City Council. In addition, 
Fitzmorris suggested letter recipients send Councilmembers letters of appreciation for their votes 
on Giarrusso’s ordinances and urged them to develop rapports with them.274   
 
TI paid Haras, Inc. $25,000 for its April and May 1987 efforts to defeat Ordinance 
Calendar No. 13,957 and Giarrusso’s clean air ordinance (Chapter 5).275 Although TI initially 
agreed to pay Haras only $10,000, it paid an additional $10,000 for counsel that Philip Morris 
originally promised to pay and another $5,000 for other expenses.275 
 
 Despite TI’s success in preventing Ordinance Calendar No. 13,957, it received criticism 
over its efforts against the bill from Executive VP John D. Georges of Imperial Trading 
Company Inc., a 
Louisiana distributor.276 
In a May 11, 1987 letter 
to Philip Morris 
Government Affairs VP 
Guy Smith, Georges 
claimed that Philip 
Morris was the cause of 
Table 6.14: Speakers Against Giarrusso Tobacco Measures at the May 7 Hearing 
and their affiliation according to TI270 
Person Organization 
Norris Fitzmorris TI / unspecified hotel and motel Association 
K-Pauls Restaurant ”Small restauranteur” 
Tex Stevens ”Black business people” 
Marie Jackson ”Small black grocer organization” 
Sarah Whalen “Tobacco distributors” 
Francis Faler* New Orleans Retail Grocers’ Association 
Arthur Richard* ”Small grocer” 
*Testified on Tobacco Tax only 
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the measure’s defeat, partly because the company listened to his advice. In addition, Georges 
stated: 
 
May I suggest that in the future, we take an intelligent approach to dealings with 
the very things that challenge our livelihoods. 
 
The Tobacco Institute is very affective [sic] in dealing with national and state 
legislative matters. The solution to dealing with municipalities still needs to be 
produced.276 
 
Giarrusso Attempts to Pass Tax Increase in Summer 1987 
 
 Councilmember John Giarrusso introduced a weaker version of his April 1987 tobacco 
tax proposal at a June 18, 1987 City Council meeting. The legislation increased the Tobacco 
Consumption Privilege Tax from 10 percent to 14 percent.277, 278 The City Council promptly 
rejected it in a 4-1 vote that day.278 
 
TI credited Haras, Inc.’s efforts earlier in the year for ordinance’s defeat. According to a 
June 29 memo from TI Regional VP Ron Morris to TI VP Hurst Marshall: 
 
Haras, Inc. established an effective network to tell our story to the city council 
members. An ongoing program of communications is required to keep this 
network alive. They have agreed to provide such a service to us.277 
 
Morris asked Hurst to pay Haras, Inc. $10,000 to represent TI for the rest of 1987.277 He also 
asked that TI retain the firm for $20,000 in 1988, believing it was smarter to keep their services 
ongoing instead of expending unnecessary funds to mobilize for a crisis.277 We did not find 
evidence that Hurst agreed to Morris’ specific request, but TI contracted Haras, Inc’s services in 
1988.  
  
New Orleans Consumption Privilege Tax Increased by Ten Percent in 1988  
 
On January 21, 1988 New Orleans Councilman Giarrusso submitted Ordinance Calendar  
No. 14,595 to increase the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax on all tobacco products in 
Orleans Parish from 10% to 20% (New Orleans is a city-parish).279 The measure required people 
that bought tobacco products outside of Orleans Parish that consumed them in the city to pay the 
consumption privilege tax279, 280, likely to give it greater legal muster as a consumption privilege 
tax. 
 
Political and legislative efforts around Ordinance Calendar No. 14,595 began in the fall 
of 1988. The New Orleans City Council had delayed consideration of Ordinance No 14,595 and 
other bills until later that year because of a hurricane that impacted the city.281 As a result, the 
ordinance and another smokefree air bill (Chapter 5) by Giarrusso were not scheduled for 
consideration until October 6, 1988.281 
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Tobacco Institute Makes Campaign 
Contributions to the New Orleans City 
Council before Discovering 
Giarrusso’s Ordinance 
 
In early September 1988, TI 
provided campaign contributions to 
four New Orleans City 
Councilmembers. Morris reported to TI 
Southern Sector Senior VP George 
Minshew that the Councilmembers 
requested the funds and asked they be discreetly given: 
 
Four New Orleans City Council members (Peggy Wilson, James Singleton, Mike 
Early and Lambert Boissiere) have indicated they would like to have our 
contributions and have requested we run them through this PAC [Council for 
Effective Government]. This keeps our name out of the press as contributors and 
maintains propriety and compliance with Louisiana law.282   
 
TI Regional VP Morris made a $500 contribution request for each councilmember (Table 6.15) 
almost one month prior to them voting on Giarrusso’s ordinance.282   
 
The New Orleans City Council Rejects Ordinance Calendar No. 14,595 in October 1988 
 
New Orleans faced a $19 million budget deficit by late September. In an undated TI 
Flash, lobbyist Norris Fitzmorris informed unknown recipients that Councilmember Giarrusso 
would likely promote Ordinance Calendar No. 14,595 as a method to generate $3.8 million for 
the city.280 Fitzmorris worried that the deficit might induce some City Councilmembers to 
support Giarrusso’s measure, and urged recipients to inform Councilmembers of their opposition 
to the tax increase.  
 
TI Regional Director Jack Shoemaker and TI tax expert Bill Orzechowski traveled to 
New Orleans to fight Ordinance Calendar No. 14,595.288 They engaged Dr. Dwight Lee, a 
Georgetown University economist who assisted the tobacco industry with economic impact 
reports,289 to help argue against Giarrusso’s measure.288 Before the hearing, Lee refined prepared 
Table 6.15: Tobacco Institute Campaign Contributions to Local Level Legislators in New Orleans from 1986-
1992)283-287 
Recipient Position Party 1986 1988 1990 1992 
Sidney Barthelemy Mayor D $500    
Peggy Wilson City Council R  $500 $500  
James Singleton City Council D  $500 $500 $500 
Mike Early City Council D  $500 $500  
Lambert Boissiere City Council D  $500 $500 $500 
Dorothy Mae Taylor City Councilmember 
at Large 
D   $500  
Johnny Jackson City Council D   $500 $500 
Jacquelyn Clarkson City Council D   $750 $500 
“Four New Orleans City Council members … 
have indicated they would like to have our 
contributions and have requested we run 
them through this PAC. This keeps our 
name out of the press as contributors and 
maintains propriety and compliance with 
Louisiana law.”  
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comments he developed for the hearing using information from New Orleans wholesalers about 
the effects of a local tax increase on cigarette sales in the city and neighboring regions.288 
 
The New Orleans City Council considered Ordinance Calendar No. 14,595 on October 6, 
1988.288 Mayor Sidney Barthelemy, despite showing past sympathy for the tobacco industry on 
taxes, endorsed the tax as a way to address New Orleans $20 million deficit that year and wanted 
the tax to remain in place for several years so the city could secure a loan to address the deficit.  
Shoemaker reported: 
 
His plan was that this cigarette tax would bring in about $3.75 million a year for 
10 years. He hopes that once the tax is passed, the city would be able to borrow 
some $20 million and pay that loan back over the next 10 years with the proceeds 
from this tax.288 
 
After Mayor Barthelemy opened debate, Giarrusso argued that 10 states had a lower tax rate than 
Louisiana, 34 states higher ones and 6 the same (he did not specify if he meant cigarettes or all 
tobacco products).288 The conversation following Giarrusso’s statement revolved around New 
Orleans’ need for funding from the proposed tobacco tax increase, with Councilmembers 
complaining that the state had not worked with the city to address its funding issues.288 
 
After the Mayor and Councilmembers finished discussing Ordinance Calendar No. 
14,595, Dr. Dwight Lee and TI’s local counsel Norris Fitzmorris testified against the 
legislation.288 In an October 11, 1988 memorandum from Jack Shoemaker to Ron Morris, 
Shoemaker described Lee’s testimony:  
 
In a low-keyed approach to the problem, Dr. Dwight Lee indicated that a raise in 
taxes would not necessarily bring in more revenue. He stated that with the rising 
price of cigarettes in New Orleans, smokers would travel to other parishes to 
make their cigarette, as well as other purchases. He also indicated the regressivity 
of the tax and its affect [sic] on the lower income and poor.290 
 
Shoemaker thought Dr. Lee’s testimony resonated with councilmembers, stating “It was apparent 
that several of them had taken Dwight Lee’s remarks to heart, for they repeatedly quoted 
him.”288 Following Lee, Haras Inc. lobbyist Norris Fitzmorris argued that the tax increase 
harmed local businesses.288 We did not find evidence that other opponents or proponents of 
Ordinance Calendar No. 14,595 testified at the hearing.  
 
After further discussion, the New Orleans City Council voted 5-2 to reject 
Ordinance Calendar No. 14,595.288 TI anticipated future attempts to pass the ordinance 
that year, and asked lobbyist Norris Fitzmorris to inform it of any developments.288 
 
Councilmembers Pass Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax Increase in December 1988 
 
Shortly after the New Orleans City Council defeated Ordinance Calendar No 14,595, 
Giarrusso introduced it as Ordinance No. 12,906 MCS232 on October 20, 1988 that again 
increased the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax from 10% to 20% of price and taxed products 
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consumed in Orleans Parish that were purchased in outside jurisdictions, but added a sunset 
clause so the tax would take effect January 1, 1989 and expire on January 1, 1992.291, 292 
 
TI expected another tobacco tax ordinance to be introduced in New Orleans by December 
9, 1988 since the City’s deficit remained and had worsened to $25 million.293 Indeed, New 
Orleans City Councilmember and Budget Committee Chairman James Singleton previously 
recommended a tobacco tax increase to help address the City’s deficit after a two month analysis. 
On December 14, the New Orleans City Council scheduled Ordinance No. 12,906 MCS for 
consideration on December 15.292 
 
The City Councilmembers unanimously passed 
Ordinance No. 12,906 MCS at on December 15.232, 294  
In a December 23, 1988 memo recapping the hearing, 
TI local counsel and lobbyist Norris Fitzmorris claimed 
that only the measure’s sponsor, Joe Giarrusso, and 
councilmembers Singleton and Jackson initially 
favored Ordinance No. 12,906 MCS, but that the 
Council grudgingly adopted the measure believing it 
the most politically palatable method to help address 
New Orleans’ deficit.294 In addition, Councilmembers 
approved the tax to maintain essential city services.294 
According to Fitzmorris in a December 23, 1988 memo 
to TI Regional VP Ron Morris: 
 
This tax increase has been a long time in coming and would never have passed if 
the city were not in such /dire/financial circumstances. In this instance the vote 
came after several of the Council members decided it was the least objectionable 
tax to the largest group (smokers). While reluctant to vote “yes” the city 
administration’s plea for funds (for necessities … Courts. Police, etc) was so 
compelling they went with it.294 
 
Councilmember Taylor backed Ordinance No. 12,906 MCS upon its consideration at the 
hearing.294 Boissiere, a strong supporter of  Barthelemy, supported it after pressure from the 
Mayor to pass it.294 Although against the tobacco tax, Councilmembers Early and Wilson voted 
for the ordinance so they could reject a proposed service tax without repercussions to their 
image. According to Fitzmorris’ December 23 memo, “It was one of those ‘no way out’ 
situations.”294 
 
Mayor Barthelemy signed Ordinance No. 12,906 MCS on December 20, 1988 to increase 
New Orleans Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax from 10% to 20% from January 1, 1989 until 
January 1, 1992.291 Tobacco products not purchased in New Orleans that were consumed in its 
jurisdiction were also subject to the tax. The increase made New Orleans’ tobacco tax the highest 
local cigarette tax in the United States according to a TI document from February 1989.295 
 
 
“… the vote came after several 
of the Council members 
decided it was the least 
objectionable tax to the 
largest group (smokers). While 
reluctant to vote “yes” the city 
administration’s plea for funds 
(for necessities … Courts. 
Police, etc) was so compelling 
they went with it.”  
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Tobacco Industry Overturns the New Orleans Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax  
 
Consideration of Legal Challenge to Tax Begins in 1989 
  
In 1989, TI and tobacco companies investigated methods to eliminate New Orleans’ 
Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax. In late April, TI contracted O’Keefe, O’Keefe and 
Bernstein (the law firm employing Haras, Inc.’s Michael O’Keefe and Norris Fitzmorris) to 
study the tax’s legality.296 In early June the lawyers determined a court challenge may be 
successful.296, 297 According to a June 20, 1989 memorandum from TI Regional VP Ron Morris 
to RJR State Government Relations Director Larry Bewley, PM's Betsy LeMond, TI Vice 
President George Minshew, and U.S. Tobacco Company's (Swisher) Joe Augustus: 
 
As per our discussions, the study on the consumption tax has been completed. The 
results are favorable. Michael O’Keefe [of TI’s New Orleans lobbying firm 
Haras, Inc.] feels we have valid reason to pursue a legal overturn of this tax law. 
If we are successful in court, we will eliminate the tax rather than show them 
[New Orleans City Council] a legal way to pursue it.297 
 
TI, Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and the US Tobacco Company planned to provide $700 each for 
a court challenge.297 O’Keefe, O’Keefe and Bernstein would challenge the Tobacco 
Consumption Privilege Tax for the industry in court.297 Morris stated that “O’Keefe, O’Keefe & 
Bernstein have counsel and plaintiff standing ready when we are able to pursue this matter in the 
courts.”297 However, the tobacco industry did not submit a claim in 1989. 
 
Tobacco Industry Takes Multi-Pronged Approach to Eliminate New Orleans’ Tax in 1990 
 
The tobacco industry prepared an attack against the New Orleans’ Tobacco Consumption 
Privilege Tax entering into 1990. On January 22, 1990, TI’s Regional Vice President sent a letter 
to Haras, Inc. lobbyist Michael O'Keefe affirming the industry's interest in pursuing the repeal of 
the retail sales consumption tax in New Orleans.298 In the correspondence, Morris referenced 
claims made in a December 1989 letter to him by Imperial Trading Company Executive Vice 
President John Georges that he could help the tobacco industry eliminate the Tobacco 
Consumption Privilege Tax 298, 299 John Georges December 1989 letter asserted legal action 
against New Orleans was unwise and faulted Haras, Inc. lobbyist Norris Fitzmorris for the City 
Council passing Giarrusso’s ordinance: 
 
I write to you with great concern over the direction in which our industry is 
approaching the current excessive 29% sales tax on tobacco products in the City 
of New Orleans….  
 
It has come to my attention, from different sources, that a potential court 
challenge is being prepared as your next move. If this is true, may I go on record 
as warning that this effort is the most costly of all approaches. It will cost over 
200,000 in legal fees and ultimately cannot be successful in the long run unless 
the proper lobbying game plan is put in place. If the same lobbyist is hired, takes 
the same unassisted approach, we will fail again…. 
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I have personally spoken to some of the city officials and the biggest problem 
with the vote was that they were poorly handled…. Many of the votes we lost, 
would have voted differently if they were more informed.299 
 
In his January 22 letter, TI Regional VP Ron Morris asked Haras, Inc.’s Michael O’Keefe 
for advice on eliminating the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax.300 Morris noted that if John 
Georges succeeded in removing the tax, it would reflect negatively on them: 
 
As we discussed, John Georges claims to be able to remove the other tobacco 
products tax from the package. If he were able to do this before you are able to 
accomplish a full repeal it would be most embarrassing for us as professionals.300 
 
In late February 1990, the tobacco industry continued preparing for legal action against 
the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax.283 As the industry readied to file a lawsuit, New 
Orleans lobbying firm Haras, Inc. sought to convince the City Council to repeal it.283  
 
To maintain relations with the City Council, the 
tobacco industry made contributions to 
Councilmembers Jackie Clarkson, Dorothy Mae Taylor, 
Johnny Jackson, Peggy Wilson, Lambert Boissiere, and 
Jim Singleton.283 In a February 21, 1990 memo, Morris 
told RJR State Government Relations Director Larry 
Bewley, “Several Council members had advised us they 
need some assistance with their campaign debt. We 
have contributed to assist with their reelection bids.”283  
TI provided $500 contributions to the 
Councilmembers285 (Table 6.15) and tried to coordinate donations to them from Philip Morris 
and RJ Reynolds.283 Philip Morris donated an unknown amount; we do not know if RJR gave the 
$400 Morris requested that RJR contribute to each Councilmember.283 Later in 1990, TI likely 
provided another $750 contribution286 to newly-elected New Orleans City Councilmember 
Jacquelyn Clarkson.301, 302 During an election that year, Clarkson secured Councilman Mike 
Early’s chair after he decided not to run again for the City Council.302 In a May 16, 1990 memo 
to TI Southern Sector Senior VP George Minshew, TI Regional Director Pat McWhorter stated 
the Institute’s New Orleans “Counsel feels that it is imperative that we contribute to this new 
councilperson and recommends that we send a check for $750 as soon as possible.”286 We were 
unable to confirm if the contribution was ultimately made. Before the request, Minshew and 
another TI official had guaranteed TI Regional VP Ron Morris as much as $1000 for the 
candidate.286 
 
The Tobacco Industry Files Suit against the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax 
 
TI and tobacco companies did not directly sue to overturn the New Orleans Tobacco 
Consumption Privilege Tax. Instead, a gas station and two patrons, Arny Reed and Jerry Boyce 
filed a civil case, likely in 1990, to overturn the law.234 However LWTCDA Executive Director 
Sarah Whalen credited TI for the lawsuit, stating in a April 2, 1991 newsletter that the Institute 
“Several Council members 
had advised us they need 
some assistance with their 
campaign debt. We have 
contributed to assist with 
their reelection bids.”  
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“instigated” the case.303 The lawsuit alleged that the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax was a 
local sales tax and therefore illegal under state law, since municipal sales, use, and consumption 
taxes combined could not surpass 3% of price without constituent or state legislature 
approval.232, 234 
 
Industry-allied law firm Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler and Sarpy represented the 
plaintiffs for TI.304 According to a TI document regarding unplanned expenses in 1991, “ 
Chaffee, McCall, Phillips, Toler was retained at the direction of the Committee of Counsel to 
assist in legal challenge to New Orleans local ad valorem tobacco tax.”304 TI expected to pay 
$46,500 for its work on the case in 1991.304, 305 
 
The Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax fared poorly in initial court proceedings.306 In 
February 28, 1991, the Division B Orleans Parish Civil District Court ruled against the City of 
New Orleans, finding it had failed to seek required approval for the Tobacco Consumption 
Privilege Tax as it was a sales tax over 3% despite its labeling. 232 The City appealed the decision 
to the State’s Supreme Court.232 The Louisiana Supreme Court did not hear oral arguments on 
the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax until October 23, 1991. 
 
While the State Supreme Court weighed the tax in Fall 1991, Councilmember Joe 
Giarrusso  proposed Ordinance No. 17,424 to extend the 20% of price Tobacco Consumption 
Privilege Tax.232 He likely introduced the ordinance to help address New Orleans’ ongoing 
budget issues.232 If not adopted, the 20% of price tax reverted to 10% on January 1, 1992 as 
required by increase to the Tobacco Consumption Privilege tax passed in 1988 (Ordinance No. 
12,906 MCS). 
 
Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler and Sarpy Attorney William Grace sent a letter to 
Giarrusso opposing Ordinance 17,424.232 The letter asserted the measure was careless, since the 
Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax lawsuit remained under appeal and the previous court 
ruling determined the tax was unconstitutional.232 Grace asked Giarrusso to postpone the debate 
of Ordinance No. 17,424 scheduled for November 7, 1991 until the State Supreme Court issued a 
verdict.232   
 
Ignoring Grace’s letter, the City Council Budget Committee considered Ordinance No. 
17,424 at a hearing on November 14, 1991.307 The 
Committee, consisting of Councilmembers Singleton, 
Giarrusso, and Boissiere, voted unanimously to 
recommend adoption of the measure.307 The New 
Orleans City Council voted on November 26, 1991 to 
pass Ordinance No. 17,424, indefinitely setting the 
Tobacco Consumption Privilege tax rate at 20%308 
despite its ongoing appeal before the State Supreme 
Court and the District Court’s earlier finding that the 
tax was illegal. 
 
 On January 17, 1992309 the Louisiana State 
Supreme Court overturned the Tobacco Consumption 
The Supreme Court affirmed 
the Division B Orleans Parish 
Civil District Court’s decision, 
finding that the Tobacco 
Consumption Privilege Tax 
was actually a sales tax over 
3% instituted without 
approval from the state 
legislature or voters. 
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Privilege tax from 1984, invalidating it and subsequent increases (Reed v. City of New Orleans, 
593 So. 2d 368 (La. 1992).310 The Supreme Court affirmed the Division B Orleans Parish Civil 
District Court’s decision, finding that the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax was actually a 
sales tax over 3% instituted without approval from the state legislature or voters. The Court 
ordered the City of New Orleans to repay taxes to any businesses that formally protested but paid 
their Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax collections. One business had protested the tax for a 
month, causing the City of New Orleans to reimburse it $225. Loss of the Tobacco Consumption 
Privilege Tax cost New Orleans $5.8 million in revenue included in the 1992 budget.311  
 
Tobacco Industry Allies Challenge a 1992 New Orleans Tobacco Tax in Court 
 
Seeking replacement tax revenue, the New Orleans City Council considered an ordinance 
on April 2, 1992 to levy multiple temporary tobacco taxes. The legislation established a 20¢ tax 
per cigarette pack, a 30¢ tax on loose leaf tobacco packages below 2 ounces and a 50¢ tax on 
packages over 2 ounces, and a 1¢ tax per cigar, all expiring December 31, 1992.311, 312 The 
ordinance imposed the tax on tobacco sellers, rather than consumers, to prevent it from being 
considered a sales tax. The measure maintained the same rate on cigarettes as the combined 
Tobacco Consumption Privilege Taxes the Louisiana Supreme Court previously struck down.313 
Councilmembers voted 5-2 to adopt the tax ordinance311 with Councilmembers Joe Giarrusso, 
Jacquelyn Clarkson, Dorothy Mae Taylor, Lambert Boissiere, and Johnny Jackson, supporting 
the measure and Councilmembers Peggy Wilson and Jim Singleton voting against. 311 Both 
Wilson and Singleton argued the tax encouraged customers to purchase lower priced cigarettes in 
nearby parishes.311 Unknown tobacco industry representatives vowed to overturn the tax in 
court.311 The City Council simultaneously repealed the Tobacco Consumption Privilege Tax 
invalidated by the Louisiana Supreme Court as it adopted the new, temporary tobacco taxes.312 
 
Tobacco industry ally the Louisiana Retailers Association (Chapter 2) opposed the New 
Orleans tax law, filing a class action lawsuit against the city to eliminate the increase.314 Circle 
Food Stores, Inc. served as the primary plaintiff in the case; its Vice President Dwayne 
Boudreaux was a board member of the Louisiana Retailers Association.314 TI-affiliated law firm 
Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler and Sarpy represented the plaintiffs in the class action suit.315  
 
 On December 1, 1992,316 the New Orleans City Council passed an ordinance extending 
its multiple, temporary tobacco taxes set to expire on 
December 31, 1992317 another year,317 necessitating 
continued legal action by tobacco industry allies. 
 
In July 1993 the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled 
the New Orleans tobacco tax enacted in April 1992 was 
unconstitutional (Circle Food Stores, Inc. v. City of 
New Orleans, 620 So. 2d 281 (La. 1993).314 Similar to 
its previous ruling on the New Orleans tax established 
in 1984, the Court decided the tax was a sales tax violating the 3% increase limit for local 
governments without constituent and legislative permission.314 The City had unsuccessfully 
argued the tax was “an ownership tax imposed on the privilege of owning tobacco products.”318 
The Court ruled that the City of New Orleans reimburse businesses that protested the tax.314 The 
In July 1993 the Louisiana 
Supreme Court ruled the 
New Orleans tobacco tax 
enacted in April 1992 was 
unconstitutional. 
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Louisiana Retailers Association pushed members to lodge formal protests unlike before the 
previous lawsuit, an effort that cost the New Orleans government an estimated $2 million in 
revenue it had to return to complaining businesses.314 Following the lawsuit, efforts to levy 
tobacco taxes in New Orleans ceased. 
 
Conclusion 
  
Prior to the 2000s, the tobacco industry successfully prevented adoption of significant 
taxes on their products at the state and local levels in Louisiana. Initially, Louisiana was one of 9 
states to enact a tobacco tax, having adopted Act 197 in 1926. Before the industry became 
heavily active in the state during the 1980s, Louisiana saw incremental tax increases on tobacco 
in 1948 and 1971. However, starting in 1980 with efforts by state lawmakers to fund the 
Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund, TI and tobacco companies began aggressively fighting 
attempts to raise taxes on tobacco products. Although the state began experiencing a budget 
crisis in 1984 resulting from its economic dependence on a collapsing oil industry, the tobacco 
industry managed to convince lawmakers to adopt a mere 4¢ per pack increase in cigarette taxes. 
Despite the continued presence of budget crises, the tobacco industry avoided further tax 
increases until another 4¢ increase in 1990. After the increase in 1990, taxes at the state level 
remained stagnant until 2000 (Chapter 11). 
 
At the local level, the tobacco industry was initially less able to prevent taxes. Facing a 
budget crisis in 1984, the City of New Orleans adopted a 5% of price tobacco tax despite 
resistance from TI. Believing it could remove the tobacco tax after Councilman Sidney 
Barthelemy introduced and passed a resolution stating the increase would be repealed when an 
alternative source of revenue was found, TI unsuccessfully worked to find another funding 
source for the city. Believing Barthelemy could be an ally in their efforts to lift the tax, TI 
contributed to Barthelemy’s successful 1986 mayoral campaign. However, under the Barthelemy 
administration in New Orleans, the tax rate increased. 
 
  Continuing to face a budget crisis in New Orleans, Mayor Barthelemy and the City 
Council doubled cigarette taxes in 1986 to 10% and again in 1988 to 20%. As New Orleans 
desperately sought to maintain and increase revenue, TI changed strategies on the advice of its 
New Orleans contract lobbyist Michael O’Keefe and helped organize a lawsuit against the city 
over the constitutionality of its tobacco tax in 1990 that ultimately invalidated the law. TI’s allies 
then defeated an attempt to salvage the tobacco tax in 1993 with another lawsuit, preventing 
future efforts to impose a local tobacco tax in New Orleans. 
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Chapter 7: Youth Access Laws 
 
• Louisiana was slow to adopt a minimum age law, remaining one of five states with no 
restriction on tobacco product sales to minors until 1991, when the Legislature set 18 as 
the minimum age to purchase tobacco. 
• Louisiana preempted local governments from adopting stricter youth access laws than the 
state in 1994. 
• Adoption of the federal Synar Amendment in 1992 gradually pressured lawmakers to 
pass more youth access laws and adopt a licensing and enforcement system for tobacco 
sellers with industry-friendly provisions. 
• Adoption of a licensing and enforcement system for tobacco sellers brought Louisiana 
from one of the highest violation rates of sales to minors to one of the best nationally 
between 1997 and 1999. 
• Louisiana included e-cigarettes in youth access laws for tobacco products in 2014. 
 
Introduction 
 
Preventing youth consumption of tobacco products is an important component of tobacco 
control because most tobacco users start as youth.1 Youth smokers have a higher probability of 
developing nicotine addiction, becoming long-term smokers, and suffering from tobacco-induced 
illnesses.1-4 Policymakers and public health advocates 
have viewed youth access laws as effective tools for 
reducing youth tobacco initiation and use.5 
Minimum age laws for purchasing tobacco 
products have existed in the United States since the late 
19th century.5 New Jersey passed the first minimum age 
law (prohibiting youth under 16 from procuring 
cigarettes) in 1883. In the 19th or early 20th century 
Louisiana adopted a law setting a minimum age (age 
unknown) for purchase of tobacco products, but 
repealed it in 1942.6 By 1921, 14 states had set 21 as the minimum purchasing age for tobacco 
products, but a concerted lobbying campaign by the tobacco industry over several years had 
rolled back the age to 18 by 1960.5  
Higher minimum ages are associated with reduced youth tobacco initiation and use.5, 7 
Places that have set a minimum purchase age of 21 have seen reductions in youth tobacco 
product use,8 purchases9, 10 and consumption frequency.8, 9 Although efforts to raise the 
minimum age increased and achieved some success in the 2010s, earlier attempts by health 
voluntaries to secure higher minimum purchasing ages failed. 
Efforts by the American Cancer Society around the country to boost state minimum age 
laws for acquiring tobacco products to 21 in the mid-1980s floundered in the face of opposition 
from the tobacco industry, which determined such restrictions significantly threatened its 
business.5 The industry recognized that 80% of smokers initiated before turning 21.5 To protect 
its interests, tobacco industry representatives opposed and weakened minimum age and youth 
Youth smokers have a higher 
probability of developing 
nicotine addiction, becoming 
long-term smokers, and 
suffering from tobacco-
induced illnesses.  
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access legislation.5 Louisiana was among the last states to adopt a minimum age law when it 
established 18 as the purchasing age for tobacco products in 1991.  
While opposing laws establishing purchasing ages higher than 18,5 the tobacco industry 
coopted youth access concerns to promote its policy agenda. The tobacco industry has attempted 
to improve its image and avoid effective regulation using youth educational initiatives and 
voluntary enforcement programs.11-14 The industry has also secured youth access legislation 
preempting local governments from adopting and enforcing stricter regulations.15 The tobacco 
industry has also actively supported laws penalizing youth for purchasing tobacco, which shift 
responsibility to minors instead of the tobacco industry and retailers selling them products.16 
Louisiana and Early Youth Access Laws  
Youth access and warning label legislation were among the first tobacco control bills 
introduced in Louisiana in the second half of the 20th century. After the state repealed its initial 
minimum age law in 1942,6 Representative Shelby Alford17 (D-St. Helena17) sponsored HB 1190 
in 1960 to reestablish a minimum age law at 18, the second statewide tobacco control bill  
introduced in Louisiana between 1950 and 1970.18 The first bill, HB 1124 in 1958, required 
tobacco companies to pay a $1 million bond (well below the possible damages) to address and 
insulate the industry from legal claims. In 1964, three bills, HB 132 by Parey Branton17 (D-
Webster17) to make 17 the minimum age of purchase, as well as HB 966 by TJ Strother17 (D-
Allen17) and SB 310 by W. Spencer Myrick19 (D-Morehouse19) to require warning labels on 
cigarettes, were considered.18 None passed.  
In the late 1980s Louisiana began slowly enacting weak, ineffective youth access 
restrictions on tobacco product sales. State lawmakers first restricted youth access to tobacco in 
1988 by prohibiting sampling to minors (usually considered those under 18 years of age), even 
though Louisiana did not have a minimum age of sale or purchase. 
Louisiana Struggles to Establish Basic Youth Access Laws: 1986-1991 
 
Regular introduction of youth access legislation in Louisiana started in 1986, with two 
bills to regulate tobacco product samples and restrict their provision to minors. From 1986 to 
1991, 19 bills were proposed (excluding substituted bills) to restrict youth access to tobacco 
(Table 7.1). Twelve bills sought to establish a minimum age to buy tobacco products and six 
prohibited giving samples to minors (Table 7.1). The first youth access law adopted in Louisiana, 
HB 1966, restricted the distribution of tobacco product samples to minors but did not address 
purchases. HB 1966 passed in 1988. 
Legislative Efforts to Restrict Distribution of Free Samples of Cigarettes   
 
Representative Jewel J. Newman17 (D-East Baton Rouge17) introduced the first 
legislation we found restricting sampling in Louisiana, HB 1525, on May 6, 1986.20 The bill  
prohibited sampling of free or underpriced tobacco products to minors less than 17 years of 
age.20 Tobacco producers, merchants and retailers faced penalties up to a $100 fine or 30 days in 
prison for violations.25 HB 1525 died in the House Health and Welfare Committee upon 
adjournment after being deferred.20 
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Table 7.1:  Sales Restrictions and Warning Label Bills from 1982-1991 Legislative Sessions20-24 
Bill Year Author 
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Outcome 
HB 1525 1986 Newman +         Died with adjournment 
HB 2012 1986 Newman        +   
HB 164 
(substituted 
for HB 
1965) 
1988 Lalonde     +    + Substituted by HB 1965 
HB 1965 1988 House 
Administration 
of Criminal 
Justice 
Committee 
   +   +  + Defeated in House 
HB 914  1988 Thomas +         Substituted by HB 1966 
HB 1966 1988 House 
Administration 
of Criminal 
Justice 
Committee 
+         Adopted 
SB 488 1988 Johnson  +       + Amended, and later tabled in 
House. Died with adjournment 
HB 22 1989 Lalonde    +*   +  + Died with adjournment 
HB 23 1989 Lalonde    +*
* 
  +  + Died with adjournment 
HB 24 1989 Lalonde    +*   +  + Died with adjournment 
HB 25 1989 Lalonde    +   +  + Died with adjournment 
HB 26 1989 Lalonde    +   +  + Died with adjournment 
HB 27 1989 Lalonde    +   +  + Died with adjournment 
HB 28 1989 Lalonde    +   +  + Died with adjournment 
HB 29 1989 Lalonde    +   +  + Killed in Senate 
SB 150 1989 Johnson         +*** Died with adjournment 
HB 1375 1990 Lalonde    +   +  + Died with adjournment 
SB 831 1990 Johnson  +        Died with adjournment 
             
HB 19 1991 Lalonde    +  +    Adopted 
SB 86 1991 Nelson   +       Defeated in House 
SB 87 1991 Nelson       +   Adopted 
SB 242 1991 Johnson  +        Died with adjournment 
*Smoking tobacco only. 
**Smokeless tobacco only. 
***Establishes penalties for illegal distribution of samples. 
-Requires smokeless tobacco samplers to give written notice of intent to sample to AG, ten days in advance regarding time, place, amount and 
method of distribution. 
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Another bill submitted by Rep. Newman on May 6, HB 2012 required warning labels on 
packaging and advertisements for smokeless tobacco products stating: 
Warning: Use of this product is addicting and dangerous to your health. It may 
cause oral cancer and other diseases of the mouth.20  
HB 2012 tasked the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) with 
developing provisions for health harm descriptors on future smokeless tobacco product warning 
labels. In addition, the bill mandated that smokeless tobacco samplers inform the State Attorney 
General of their promotional events ten days in advance via writing.20  
Newman had introduced HB 2012 after federal lawmakers passed the Comprehensive 
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 towards the end of February that year,26 
which required health warnings on those products for 
the first time.27 The Act, which provided multiple 
rotating labels, preempted federal, state and local 
legislation.26 HB 2012 passed the House but was 
defeated during a hearing before an unidentified 
legislative committee.20 We do not know why Newman 
introduced HB 2012 with provisions on smokeless 
tobacco warning labels despite the Smokeless Tobacco 
Health Education Act preempting the language. 
 It is possible that the Smokeless Tobacco 
Council (the analogous organization to the Tobacco 
Institute for companies that made smokeless tobacco 
products) influenced legislative efforts around HB 2012 
in 1986.28 A July 24, 1986, Smokeless Tobacco Council 
State Relations Planning Report claimed that a model 
minimum age bill it offered as a replacement to 
lawmakers for harsher legislation introduced in Louisiana and two other states bolstered the 
industry’s standing with them.28  
1987 Efforts Revolve Around Tobacco Product Sales in the State Capitol 
  
In 1987, DHHR proposed a rule forbidding the sale of tobacco products in facilities the 
agency operated.29 The rule required approval from the Legislative Oversight Committee and 
could not be enacted if the Governor or legislature opposed the proposal. The Legislative 
Oversight Committee blocked the rule on June 23, 1987, shortly after DHHR held a required 
hearing for the rule on June 16.  
1988 Efforts to Restrict Tobacco Product Sampling to Minors 
 
In December 198730, 31 and early January 1988 the Louisiana Lung Association searched 
for a sponsor to introduce legislation it had drafted to prohibit tobacco product sampling.32 The 
Lung Association wrote State Representative Kevin Reilly and provided a speech for a 
representative of the “Tobacco-Free Young America/Coalition” to give at a press conference and 
a news release to issue if he decided to introduce the bill.30 We do not know if Louisiana 
A July 24, 1986, Smokeless 
Tobacco Council State 
Relations Planning Report 
claimed that a model 
minimum age bill it offered as 
a replacement to lawmakers 
for harsher legislation 
introduced in Louisiana and 
two other states bolstered 
the industry’s standing with 
them.  
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lawmakers that introduced sampling restriction legislation in 1988 used the Louisiana Lung 
Association’s draft. 
Legislation to restrict tobacco sampling reappeared in Louisiana during the 1988 
legislative session. Senator Jon Johnson (D-New Orleans) introduced SB 488 on March 2, 1988 
to prohibit all tobacco product sampling regardless of location, venue, or age.33 Violations 
carried minimum $500 fines and or a six-month maximum prison sentence. Representative Jerry 
Thomas (D-Bogalusa) submitted HB 914 on March 2, 1988 to prohibit giving samples to minors 
younger than 18 but did not set penalties for violations.33 SB 488 was referred to the Senate 
Judiciary C Committee for initial consideration while HB 914 went to the House Committee on 
Administration of Criminal Justice.33 
In late May, the Louisiana State Medical Society announced support for a variety of 
tobacco control legislation, including prohibiting sales to minors and giving away free product 
samples on public property.34 We do not know if the organization publicly promoted or lobbied 
on behalf of Senator Johnson or Representative Thomas’ legislation. 
 The Senate Judiciary Committee considered SB 488 on June 7, 1988 and amended it to 
allow tobacco product sampling to adults only, then sent it to the Floor.33 Senators considered SB 
488 the next day (June 8, 1988) where they defeated multiple amendments to the bill and instead 
approved substitute legislation developed by the Senate Judiciary C Committee.33 We do not 
know the differences between SB 488 and its replacement. SB 488’s substitute went to the House 
and was referred to the House Criminal Justice Committee.33 The House Administration of 
Criminal Justice Committee began considering HB 914 on June 8, 1988. The next day, 
committee members replaced HB 914 with substitute HB 1966.33 Similar to HB 914, HB 1966 
prohibited sampling to minors younger than 18.33 However, HB 1966 also established penalties 
for noncompliance lacking from HB 914, permitting $3000 to $5000 fines for violations.33 
Committee members approved the substitute bill and reported it to the House Floor. We do not 
know why the Committee replaced HB 914 with a stronger substitute, or what the tobacco 
industry did to oppose the sampling restrictions. 
The House considered HB 1966 on June 21, 1988 and amended it to reduce penalty fines 
for first violations from $3000-$5000 to $100-$500 (additional penalties remained $3,000 to 
$5,000 per infraction).33, 35 Representatives voted 66 to 11 to pass HB 1966 to the Senate, where 
it was referred to the Judiciary C Committee.33  
Both HB 1966 and SB 488 progressed through their next committee hearings without 
additional changes. The House Criminal Justice Committee debated and approved SB 488 on 
June 27, 1988, sending the bill to the House Floor.33 On June 28, 1988, the Senate Judiciary C 
Committee approved HB 1966 and delivered it to the full Senate.  
Senators brought HB 1966 to the Senate Floor on July 5, 1988, and without making 
amendments, voted 38-1 to adopt HB 1966. (Representatives voted 61-27 the next day to table 
SB 488, which died without further action.33)   
 Governor Ed Roemer (D) signed HB 1966 into law as Act 709 on July 15, 1988. As 
adopted, HB 1966 prohibited providing samples of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, loose leaf 
tobacco, and cigars to minors.35 Samplers caught providing tobacco products to minors faced a 
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$100-$500 fine for first violations and a $3000-$5000 penalty for subsequent violations.33, 35  HB 
1966 entered effect on September 9, 1988.33 Although minors were not to be given samples, they 
could still lawfully possess and purchase tobacco products.  
Lawmakers Consider Bill to Prohibit Youth Purchase and Possession of Tobacco in 1988   
 
Attempts to prohibit Louisiana minors from obtaining or possessing tobacco products 
started in 1988. On April 18, 1988, Representative Raymond Lalonde (D-Sunset) introduced HB 
164 to prohibit people under 21 from procuring any form of smoked tobacco.33 The bill also 
required stickers stating the minimum purchasing age on all tobacco vending machines. HB 164 
levied a $50 fine against offending minors.33 Although we did not find evidence that HB 164 was 
a product of or influenced by the tobacco industry, bills that prohibit youth from purchasing 
tobacco are characteristic of bills the industry supports.16 Legislation outlawing youth purchases 
(as opposed to sales to youth) help the industry and retailers avoid responsibility or penalties for 
selling to minors and instead punish underage victims of tobacco use.  
The House Criminal Justice Committee considered HB 164 on June 8, 1988, when it 
replaced HB 164 with substitute HB 1965, which set the minimum purchasing age to 18, and 
sent the bill to the House Floor.33 Representatives subsequently voted 48-33 against passing the 
bill on June 21, 1988. Responding to HB 1965’s defeat, American Lung Association of 
Louisiana Community Program Director Ben Fontaine published an editorial in the Baton Rouge 
Advocate castigating lawmakers for not protecting the state’s youth.36 Fontaine’s editorial also 
praised the Orleans Parish City Council for adopting a law earlier that year setting the local 
purchasing age for tobacco products at 18, described below.36  
Local Governments Pursue Youth Access Laws: 1988-1990 
 
Lack of progress on youth access laws at the state level led local governments to pursue 
their own legislation. Beginning in 1988, local lawmakers considered legislation to set a 
minimum purchasing age, prohibit sampling to minors, and restrict tobacco product sales through 
vending machines (Table 7.2).   
New Orleans City Councilwoman Dorothy Mae Taylor introduced Ordinance 12578 
(Table 7.2, Ordinance LA88-539) on June 2, 1988 to prohibit the sale or gifting of tobacco 
products to youth under 18 years old.37 Violations were punishable by a maximum $300 fine and 
five-month prison sentence.38 The City Council 
approved the ordinance unanimously on June 16, 
198821, 36 and Mayor Sidney Barthelemy signed it 
on June 20, causing the law to take effect June 26, 
1988.37 In a letter to the editor published by Baton 
Rouge newspaper The Advocate, ALA Louisiana 
Community Programs Director Ben Fontaine 
praised the New Orleans City Council:  
The Orleans Parish City Council sees the 
merits of prohibiting the sale of tobacco 
products of minors and unanimously 
enacted its ordinance to that effect. That 
“The Orleans Parish City Council 
sees the merits of prohibiting the 
sale of tobacco products of minors 
and unanimously enacted its 
ordinance to that effect. That 
action is a ray of light penetrating 
the smoky atmosphere embraced 
at the State Capitol.” 
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action is a ray of light penetrating the smoky atmosphere embraced at the State 
Capitol.36 
The Associated Press reported that the New Orleans minimum age law was “believed the first of 
its kind in Louisiana.”38 We did not find evidence that the tobacco industry or health advocates 
lobbied councilmembers over Ordinance 12578. 
St. Charles Parish considered a minimum age law in 1989. City Council Chairman Steve 
Talbot39 introduced Ordinance LA89-858 to forbid tobacco sales to minors younger than 18.40 
The legislation featured penalties for selling tobacco to minors and carried signage requirements. 
Talbot pulled the ordinance on December 31, 1990 “in favor of state action,”41 amidst 
expectations that state lawmakers would pursue a bill in 1991 to make Louisiana no longer one 
of five states without a minimum age of purchase for tobacco products.42 We did not find 
evidence that the tobacco industry fought Ordinance LA89-858 or that health advocates 
promoted it.  
 On October 29, 1990 the Sulphur City Council unanimously decided to consider an 
ordinance from Councilmember Estes forbidding selling tobacco products to youth under 18 and 
prohibiting their sale through vending machines entirely.24 The City Council held a hearing for 
the legislation on November 20, 1990 after its introduction on November 13. Participants of an 
unidentified local smoker’s rights group opposed eliminating vending machine sales at the 
meeting.43 A councilmember proposed eliminating the vending machine ban but could not secure 
support from other councilmembers to approve the motion.44 The Council postponed debate on 
the ordinance, which a memo found in RJ Reynolds’ records regarding “External Relations” 
partially credited to attendees from the smokers’ rights group.43 
Table 7.2: Local Youth Access Laws Introduced, 1988-1991 23, 24 
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Outcome 
New 
Orleans 
LA88-539 1988 Taylor +   +     + Adopted 
St. 
Charles 
Parish 
LA89-858 
 
1989-
1990 
Talbot    +   +   Withdrawn in favor of 
anticipated legislative 
action at state level 
Welsh LA90-143 1990 Unknown   +**       Adopted 
Deridder LA91-146 1991 Citizen 
legislation 
  + +  +   + Died / Preempted by 
state law 
Sulphur LA90-137 1990-
1991 
Estes   + +  +* + + + Adopted 
Westlake LA91-170 1991 Unknown   + +  +    Adopted 
*Restricted to adult only establishments. 
**Purchasing age unknown. 
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The Sulphur City Council adopted the ordinance over a year later on December 3, 1991 
after amending it to allow tobacco product sales through vending machines to adults over 18.44 
We did not locate evidence that the tobacco industry or health advocates tried to influence the 
measure’s outcome. 
The town of Welsh also considered a youth access bill introduced on November 20, 1990 
to prohibit tobacco sales to minors and to forbid vending machine sales of tobacco products in 
areas accessible to minors. Local legislators adopted the ordinance into law on December 4, 
1990.23   
Local governments continued pursuing minimum age laws and prohibitions on tobacco 
vending machines into 1991, when Westlake and Deridder both considered youth access 
ordinances. Westlake adopted an ordinance on July 8, 1991 forbidding retailers from selling 
tobacco products to minors under 18 and prohibiting all vending machine sales.44 Deridder’s 
measure, based on US Department of Health and Human Services model legislation and 
submitted by local residents and not a councilmember, sought to prohibit retailers from selling 
tobacco products to youth under 18 and to outlaw vending machine sales of tobacco products. 
The proposal carried fines ranging from $250 to $500. The state ultimately adopted a minimum 
age law in 1991 before action was taken on the Deridder legislation, leading to it not being 
adopted.44  
We did not find evidence that other Louisiana localities pursued youth access ordinances 
before state lawmakers passed legislation preempting local tobacco product sales restrictions in 
1994. 
Attempts to Secure State Minimum Age laws 1989-1991 
 
After failing to pass HB 164 in 1988, in 1989 Representative Raymond Lalonde (D-
Sunset) introduced HB 25 to establish a minimum purchasing age. The bill set Louisiana’s 
purchasing age for tobacco products at 18 (instead of 21) and mandated that retailers display 
stickers stating the minimum age of purchase on vending machines.22 HB 164 levied fines of up 
to $50 on retailers for violations.  Lalonde also submitted companion bill HB 29, which forbade 
minors under 18 years of age from purchasing or possessing tobacco products.22, 45 Both bills 
were prefiled on April 6, 1989 and referred to the House Criminal Justice Committee for initial 
consideration.  
The House Criminal Justice Committee considered both bills on May 17, 1989.22 During 
deliberation, Representative Lalonde stated he offered the bills to deter youth tobacco use and 
reduce smoking rates, because of tobacco’s harmfulness and since most smokers started before 
age 18.45 No tobacco industry representatives or health advocates spoke against or for either bill 
at the hearing.45 The Committee passed HB 25 to the House Floor without changes and HB 29 
after amending it to allow minors to possess (but not buy) tobacco products.22  
The House considered HB 25 and HB 29 on May 22, 1989. During consideration, 
lawmakers approved amendments proposed by Representative John Travis (D-Jackson) to both 
bills exempting emancipated and legally-wed minors from sales and purchasing restrictions. The 
House then voted 82-17 to send Lalonde’s bills to the Senate.22, 46 
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In the Senate, HB 25 and HB 29 received initial consideration from the Senate Judiciary 
C Committee. The Committee approved HB 29, which prohibited most minors from purchasing 
tobacco products, and sent it to the Floor on June 6, 1989. The next day, the Committee 
considered HB 25, which prohibited retailers from selling tobacco products to minors, and killed 
it.22 Lalonde blamed HB 25’s demise on the “retail merchants lobby” because it opposed the $50 
fine retailers faced for noncompliance.47 
The Senate considered HB 29 on June 15, 1989 and voted 18-12 to kill the bill,22, 48 
marking the end of attempts to secure a minimum age law during the 1989 legislative session.  
In September, after efforts to establish a minimum age in Louisiana failed, the tobacco 
industry expressed concern that youth smoking made it increasingly vulnerable to attacks from 
opponents across the nation and could lead to an expansion in federal regulation.49 According to 
a draft document titled Smoking and Youth by RJ Reynolds: 
Smoking among youth is the core focus of the 
emotional strategy being employed by anti-
smoking activists to rationalize broad restrictions 
on the tobacco industry. Their claim – that the 
tobacco industry is specifically targeting youth and 
other “vulnerable” groups at home and abroad – is 
designed to generate public outrage so intense that 
it can be leveraged to offset First Amendment 
protection of the industry’s commercial speech.49  
The tobacco industry had considered youth access legislation a major threat since 1985, when the 
American Medical Association released youth policy recommendations to eliminate tobacco 
vending machines and raise the minimum sales age to 21.5  
In late September 1989, the tobacco industry considered a multifaceted public relations 
plan to fend off accusations from tobacco control advocates that it pushed products to youth.49 
Part of the strategy consisted of securing state-level legislation to make 18 the minimum 
purchasing age for tobacco products across the country.49 The industry desired state laws to 
avoid federal regulation on minimum age laws. 
The Tobacco Industry Attempts to influence 1990 Youth Access Legislation  
 
TI analyzed existing state youth access laws across the country and the impact of youth 
tobacco use on the industry’s political and legislative environment in spring 1990.50 In an April 
13, 1990  document titled “An overview of State Laws Relating to Minors and Tobacco 
Products” from TI’s records, an unknown author observed that, “ The so-called ‘issue of tobacco 
sales to minors’ will continue to pose a threat to the industry in the areas of advertising, 
sampling, promotion, and sales.’50 The document determined that tobacco control proponents 
primarily cited underage tobacco use as a reason to adopt marketing, sales, and sampling 
restrictions on tobacco products. Recognizing the threat that youth access restrictions posed, TI 
attempted to assist weak minimum age of purchase legislation introduced in Louisiana. 
“Smoking among youth is the 
core focus of the emotional 
strategy being employed by 
anti-smoking activists to 
rationalize broad restrictions 
on the tobacco industry.”  
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Only one lawmaker introduced youth access legislation in Louisiana during 1990. 
Representative Raymond Lalonde (D-Sunset)  proposed HB 1375 to prohibit minors younger 
than 18 from purchasing tobacco products and to mandate minimum purchasing age signage on 
vending machines.51 TI approached Lalonde that year to inquire if he would pursue youth access 
legislation with industry assistance, an offer he expressed interest in but did not accept.52 HB 
1375 died with adjournment on the House Floor after initially passing the House Administration 
of Criminal Justice Committee.23 An uncredited industry document from RJ Reynolds’ records 
blamed the bill’s defeat on it becoming linked to other bills supported by its sponsor Lalonde.53 
We did not find evidence that health advocates opposed or promoted HB 1375, or that tobacco 
industry interests tried to assist the bill indirectly. 
The Tobacco Industry Develops “It’s the Law” to Promote its Youth Access Agenda 
  
TI developed a youth access public relations campaign by September 1990 that sought to 
secure laws prohibiting sales to minors under 18 in states with lower or no minimum purchasing 
age and to obtain state laws requiring monitoring of (but not prohibitions of) tobacco vending 
machine sales in spaces open to the public.54 The plan included weak voluntary advertising and 
sampling restrictions, new industry standards towards youth access and tobacco use, as well as 
the creation and provision of a booklet about youth tobacco use for parents.54 The campaign  
included “It’s the Law,” a voluntary, nationwide industry program to educate tobacco retailers 
about their state’s minimum age law 55 and to inform them to sell tobacco to those only 18 or 
older.54  “It’s the Law” also provided retailers signage alerting customers to the age of sale.55 By 
November 1990 Philip Morris, Lorillard, RJ Reynolds, and the American Tobacco Company 
provided input on implementing “It’s the Law”.56, 57  
“We Card” follows “It’s the Law” in 1995 
  
TI replaced “It’s the Law” (which Philip Morris took over in 199414) with “We Card” in 
1995, another voluntary retailer compliance program that, similar to the original initiative, 
educated vendors on minimum age restrictions and provided youth access signage.14 The 
program called upon retailers to ask for picture identification whenever a person buying tobacco 
looked to be younger than 25. The major tobacco companies were the primary sponsors and 
funders of “We Card.”58 The Louisiana coalition for "We Card" consisted of the Louisiana Food 
and Tobacco Distributors Association (formerly Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy 
Distributors Association), Louisiana Oil Marketers Association, Convenience Store Council, 
Grambling State University Police Department, and the Office of Public Health.59 The Louisiana 
Retail Association, a longtime industry ally (Chapter 2), considered being a member of the 
coalition at the end of June 1997 but needed more information on the "We Card saturation” in 
the state.60 “We Card” became the most utilized industry youth access program14 and remained 
active in 2020. 
Effectiveness of Tobacco Industry Youth Access Programs 
 
Tobacco industry youth access programs are ineffective at reducing youth smoking and 
are meant to hinder legal restrictions. The programs were originally created to prevent 
meaningful and enforceable sales and sampling regulations, not to discourage youth from 
tobacco initiation.14, 58 Program messaging indicates to minors that smoking is an acceptable 
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choice as a legal adult and foists responsibility for youth tobacco use on parents.58 These industry 
youth access initiatives have not lowered illegal sales to minors58 and retailers participating in 
them have violated age-restriction laws as frequently as nonparticipants.61 A 1992 study 
determined that 14% of retailers participating in “It’s the Law” opposed providing minors 
cigarettes, only 2% more than stores not utilizing the program.62 The programs also reduce 
retailer compliance with existing youth access regulations, providing tobacco sellers’ program 
signage to post instead of signage required by law.58 The tobacco industry used youth access 
prevention programs to rehabilitate its public reputation.58 The initiatives have also resulted in 
adoption of weak minimum age laws featuring local preemption.58 
Tobacco Industry Plans to Secure a Minimum Age Law in Louisiana in Late-1990 
 
After Representative Lalonde’s HB 1375 failed during the 1990 regular session, the 
tobacco industry considered supporting a 1991 iteration of the bill in September 1990. According 
to an uncredited September 7, 1990 document found in RJ Reynolds’ records, industry 
representatives believed assisting a minimum age bill during 1991 would help the industry’s 
image: 
It is the opinion of our lobbying corps that open support of this bill would give a 
favorable impression of our industry. Our support would also tie in with the “It’s 
the Law” campaign and other efforts directed at minors by the Institute.53 
The tobacco industry planned to generate opinions and editorials supporting the bill. The 
industry also considered forming a coalition of business groups as well as tobacco sellers, 
vendors and wholesalers to back the legislation.53 In addition, the industry debated using phone 
banks to contact state legislators and influence them to support the bill. The tobacco industry 
determined it needed to develop a message tied to the Tobacco Institute’s new and not yet 
launched63 “It’s the Law” public relations campaign.53 The Tobacco Institute also planned to 
employ resources from “It’s the Law” to help advance the legislation.53 On December 11, 1990 
the Tobacco Institute issued a press release announcing its youth access campaign for 1991, 
including the “It’s the Law” voluntary retailer program.64 
Tobacco Industry Ties HB 19 into its Youth Access PR Campaign 
 
Representative Raymond Lalonde prefiled another youth access bill, HB 19, on April 15, 
1991.65 As introduced, HB 19 forbid selling or giving  
tobacco products to minors under 18 that were not 
emancipated.24, 66 It also required tobacco sellers and  
tobacco vending machine distributors to post signage on 
vending machines24 stating “Louisiana Law Prohibits 
the Sale of Tobacco Products to Persons Under Age 
18.” 67 HB 19 set fines up to $50 for violations by 
minors or retailers.67  
TI supported and sought passage of HB 19. The 
Institute informed Representative Lalonde it backed HB 
19 and planned to help pass the bill.68 According to an 
“[Lalonde] agrees that the 
public support of The 
Institute for HB 19 could 
create problems with other 
supporters and indicated his 
preference that we assist 
behind the scenes.”  
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April 30, 1991 memo from Pat McWhorter to TI Regional VP Ron Morris, Representative 
Lalonde asked TI to help privately: 
 [Lalonde] agrees that the public support of The Institute for HB 19 could create 
problems with other supporters and indicated his preference that we assist behind 
the scenes.68  
Representative Lalonde’s openness to the tobacco industry limited his overall legislative 
efforts on tobacco control that session. Lalonde had considered introducing a bill mandating that 
images of a “skull and cross bones” be stamped on tobacco product samples and added to state 
tax stamps for tobacco products.69 However, during a meeting with TI Regional Director Patrick 
McWhorter, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry and Philip Morris lobbyist Randy Haynie, Lalonde  was 
persuaded not to pursue his “skull and cross bones” bill.69   
HB 19, SB 86 and SB 87 during the 1991 Legislative Session 
 
HB 19 was one of two bills submitted in the 1991 legislative session to set a minimum 
age for tobacco product sales. The other, SB 86 by Senator Sydney Nelson (D-Shreveport70), 
prohibited minors under 17 from purchasing tobacco products.24 The bill did not include 
provisions for enforcement, signage requirements, or penalties for violation.24 Senator Nelson 
filed a companion bill for SB 86, SB 87, which required signage on vending machines that stated 
minors younger than 17 were prohibited from purchasing tobacco products.24 TI still planned to 
establish 18 as the minimum purchasing age in Louisiana after learning of SB 86 and SB 87.68 
According to an April 30 memo from TI’s State Activities Division Regional Pat McWhorter to 
TI Regional Vice President Ronald Morris, TI representatives intended to talk about the bills 
with their sponsor Senator Sydney Nelson.68 However we found no attempts by Nelson during 
the 1991 session to raise the minimum age in his legislation from 17 to 18. 
 The House Administration of Criminal Justice Committee provided initial consideration 
to HB 19 on May 22, 1991.24 At the hearing, committee members amended the bill to set a type 
size for signage and to require that minimum purchasing age signage be posted at the point of 
sale. As introduced, HB 19 had only required signage on vending machines. After amending HB 
19, the committee sent it to the House with a favorable report.24   
Representatives brought HB 19 to the Floor on May 30, 1991, where they questioned the 
bill’s necessity and ultimately weakened it.24 During debate, Representative Eugene Eason (R-
Springhill) opposed HB 19, arguing use by minors “should be left up to the parents and the 
kids.”71 Lalonde countered Eason, stating that approximately 40 states restricted tobacco product 
sales to youth.71 Representative Vic Stelly (R-Lake Charles) then proposed amending HB 19 to 
only penalize tobacco retailers for selling to minors if they knew the customer was underage.18 
Stelly ostensibly offered the amendment to protect retailers who sold tobacco to minors using 
fake identification from punishment.71 Tobacco interests have obtained similar provisions in 
other states to make minimum age laws less enforceable.72 HB 19 sponsor Lalonde argued 
against the amendment asserting it made enforcement impossible, but the House sided with 
Stelly and approved the change.71 Representatives then voted 60-27 to send HB 19 to the 
Senate.24, 71  
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Senator Nelson’s SB 86 and SB 87 initially faced less opposition and changes from 
lawmakers than HB 19. The bills passed the Senate in May and their House Committee hearings 
in early June without amendments.73 SB 86 ultimately failed to overcome resistance on the 
House Floor. 
Representatives considered and rejected SB 86 on June 18, 1991.73 During debate, HB 19 
sponsor Lalonde attacked SB 86 for not penalizing tobacco retailers caught selling products to 
minors.70 He subsequently offered an amendment to forbid noncompliant retailers from selling 
lottery tickets, which representatives failed on a 60-28 vote.70 Representative Raymond Jetson 
(D-Baton Rouge) also opposed SB 86, complaining it was government overregulation.70 In 
addition, Representative John Travis (D-Jackson) argued that it should not be illegal for minors 
to purchase tobacco since the legislation allowed them to be tried as adult and potentially face 
capital punishment for certain crimes.70 Jackson was an industry ally who later successfully 
sponsored smoking accommodation legislation in 1993 that preempted local clean air laws in 
Louisiana (Chapters 5). Concerned the bill failed to penalize retailers for selling tobacco to 
minors and would impact the juvenile courts, representatives voted 47-41 to reject SB 86.70, 73 
By mid-June, TI planned to amend industry-desired language into active minimum age 
legislation in Louisiana. On June 18, 1991, the day representatives killed SB 86, an uncredited 
document from TI’s records titled “1991 Proactive Legislative Plans” stated “attempts may be 
made to amend bills with industry language.”74 Representatives brought SB 87 to the House 
Floor for debate on June 25, 1991 and made unknown amendments to the bill.24 The bill 
continued to require signage on vending machines stating that tobacco product sales to minors 
under 17 were illegal.75 After amending SB 87 the House sent it to the Senate, which accepted 
changes the same day and sent it to Governor Ed Roemer (R).24, 76 He later signed SB 87 into law 
on July 6, to take effect September 6, 1991. Passage of SB 87 resulted in minimum age stickers 
on vending machines inaccurately informing viewers that people 17 years and older could 
purchase cigarettes, despite HB 19 later passing that year and setting the legal purchase age to 
18. The vending machine stickers remained inaccurate until youth access legislation to include 
electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) into tobacco product sales restrictions passed in 
2014 with an amendment correcting the age shown from 
17 to 18 (discussed later in this chapter).77 
While the House amended and passed SB 87 on 
June 25, 1991, the Senate Judiciary C Committee 
considered HB 19, which raised the minimum age of 
purchase to 18, and reported it to the Floor without 
changes.24 
That same day, TI used local news media in 
Baton Rouge to promote its youth access efforts and 
generate public support for its version of a minimum 
age law in Louisiana. In an interview with Baton Rouge 
news station WBRZ-TV, TI Assistant to the (TI) 
President Thomas Lauria78 claimed the Institute helped 
secured minimum age laws in three states during 
1991.79 He touted the Institute’s efforts to inform 
retailers to comply with state laws and not sell tobacco 
… Lauria and Representative 
Lalonde briefly appeared in a 
report on WBRZ-TV in Baton 
Rouge to generate public 
support for HB 19. The piece 
promoted the Institute’s “It’s 
the Law” initiative and 
indicated that Louisiana’s lack 
of a minimum age law would 
limit the campaign’s impact 
in the state.  
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to minors under 18 (It’s the Law), voluntarily restrict industry sampling and advertising 
practices, and provide parents assistance in how to talk to their kids about tobacco.79 Lauria and 
Representative Lalonde briefly appeared in a report on WBRZ-TV in Baton Rouge to generate 
public support for HB 19. The piece promoted the Institute’s “It’s the Law” initiative and 
indicated that Louisiana’s lack of a minimum age law would limit the campaign’s impact in the 
state. The segment highlighted Lalonde’s HB 19 as a way to establish a minimum sales age for 
tobacco products in Louisiana. Lauria subsequently participated in a radio interview on youth 
tobacco use at Baton Rouge radio station WYNK-FM on June 30 where he again promoted the 
Tobacco Institute’s “It’s the Law” campaign and the Institute’s intention to help Louisiana pass a 
minimum age law.80 
As TI touted “It’s the Law”, HB 19 passed through the rest of the legislative process 
without changes. The Senate unanimously approved the bill on July 5, 1991.24, 81 In an interview 
with The Times-Picayune, the bill’s Senate handler, Senator Jon Johnson, remarked that HB 19 
had not faced opposition from the tobacco industry like past legislation had.81 Governor Roemer 
signed HB 19 into law on July 24, 1991. Beginning September 6, 1991, tobacco products could 
not be sold to or purchased by minors under 18 that were neither married nor emancipated. 
Violations incurred a $50 fine.24, 67 As passed, HB 19 included language stating retailers could 
only be penalized if they “knowingly” provided tobacco products to a minor,24, 82, 83 severely 
limiting the state’s ability to enforce the new minimum age law. 
The Tobacco Industry Promotes Voluntary Regulation after HB 19 
  
After HB 19’s adoption, the Tobacco Institute organized promotional efforts for “It’s the 
Law” in Louisiana.84 By late August 1991, the Institute planned for Representative Lalonde and 
officials from the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association, Louisiana Grocers Association, Louisiana 
Retailer Association, Louisiana Restaurant Association, and the Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco 
and Candy Distributors Association to attend an event launching the initiative.84 Tobacco 
Institute lobbyist Joe Wood Berry also asked Governor Roemer in July or August to participate 
and on August 27, TI Regional VP Ron Morris wrote the Governor’s office repeating the 
Institute’s request for Roemer to join the event and provided sample “It’s the Law” materials .84  
The Tobacco Institute held an “It’s the Law” press conference in New Orleans with 
industry-allied business associations that frequently opposed tobacco control legislation on 
October 4, 1991 (Table 7.3). Lalonde appeared at the press conference, while Roemer sent his 
general counsel Thomas Casey in his place.85 At the event, Tobacco Institute Assistant to the 
President Thomas Lauria declared, “We are setting into 
motion additional measures to help curb youth access to 
cigarettes through aggressive work with the retail 
community and by supporting new state laws.”85  
According to the press release for the conference, the 
launch of “It’s the Law” in Louisiana sent another 
message: “By supporting the enactment of this law and 
widely distributing the ‘It’s the Law’ materials, the 
tobacco industry is reaffirming its long-standing policy 
that smoking is an adult choice.”85 The industry’s 
“adult choice” frame is regularly used in tobacco 
Casey also revealed a decree 
from Governor Roemer 
proclaiming October “It’s the 
Law Month” and praising the 
Tobacco Institute for 
voluntarily supporting youth 
sales restrictions.  
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industry marketing to give tobacco products a “forbidden fruit” image that appeals to youth,14, 86 
and, in particular to youth prevention campaigns, has been found to promote positive attitudes 
towards tobacco use.86 
During the press conference, Louisiana Food and Tobacco Distributors Association 
Executive Director Sarah Whalen praised the tobacco industry for limiting access to minors and 
for helping member businesses “send an important message to their customers and the 
community at large.”85 Sarah Whalen had collaborated with the tobacco industry since 1983 and 
helped it oppose clean air and tobacco tax increase legislation (Chapters 2, 5 and 6). 
Representative Lalonde and Governor Roemer’s general counsel, Thomas Casey, publicly 
endorsed the tobacco industry and business community’s nominal efforts to comply with the 
state’s new minimum age law at the press conference.85 Casey also revealed a decree from 
Governor Roemer proclaiming October “It’s the Law Month”87 that also praised the Tobacco 
Institute for voluntarily supporting youth sales restrictions.85, 87, 88 TI also gave Representative 
Lalonde and Casey plaques at the press conference.88 
1992 Effort to Establish Stronger Youth Access Restrictions and a Licensing System for 
Sales 
 
Senator Jon Johnson (D-New Orleans) introduced two youth access bills during 1992 to 
restrict marketing, bolster sales restrictions, and establish a licensing system for tobacco retailers 
in Louisiana that would have made it easier to enforce youth access restrictions. SB 159 forbade 
tobacco sampling in state or local government property89 and set fines for violations.90 SB 842 
required retailers to place signage regarding the minimum age of sale on vending machines and 
product displays, prohibited self-service displays, required tobacco items be sold in their 
unopened, original packages, and mandated that cigarettes be sold in packs of at least 20.89 SB 
842 established a licensing system for any business providing tobacco products to consumers 
that was to be run and enforced by the Louisiana Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, with  
violations resulting in license suspension.89 We did not find evidence that the tobacco industry 
fought SB 159, but it did plan to activate allies against SB 842.91 Both bills were sent to the 
Senate Judiciary C Committee, which killed them.89  
 
The Federal Synar Amendment and Enforcement 
 
While Louisiana had established a minimum age of 18 for purchasing tobacco products in 
1991, by 1992 three states still had no minimum age laws and three had laws allowing minors as 
young as 16 and 17 to buy tobacco products.92, 93 None of the states aggressively enforced 
minimum age purchase laws.94 To encourage states to implement and adequately enforce 18 and 
up minimum age laws, in 1992 Congress added the Synar Amendment to the Alcohol, Drug 
Table 7.3: Tobacco Industry Allies Attending It’s the Law Louisiana Launch 85 
Sarah Whalen Louisiana Food and Tobacco Distributors (formerly the 
Louisiana Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributors 
Association) 
Bill Langkopp Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association 
Nick Perez Louisiana Retail Merchants Association 
Barbara Easley Louisiana Grocers Association 
Jim Funk Louisiana Restaurant Association 
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Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act (ADAMHA).95, 96 The Synar 
Amendment, offered by Congressman Mike Synar (D-Oklahoma), obligated states to have a 
minimum purchasing age law of 18 (or older) for tobacco products95 to be eligible for certain 
substance abuse block grant funding.95, 96 Specifically, the amendment required states to establish 
a regulatory system by 1994 and to demonstrate that they had lowered youth access rates.94 by 
performing unannounced compliance checks yearly to gather youth access data and determine 
youth access to tobacco via retailers.95 The amendment also required that states produce annual 
reports on enforcement activity.95 If states failed to steadily reduce violation rates for sales to 
minors, the US Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS) would increasingly 
lessen block grant funding to them from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMSHA, which is part of USDHHS).94, 96 Looking at 1991 ($18,822,000) and 
1992 ($19,913,782) ADAMHA block grants and funding from an HR 5625 grant ($20,537,933), 
Louisiana received the 20th most funding from ADAMHA among Washington DC and all states 
those years.97  
The tobacco industry used the Synar Amendment to push youth access legislation that 
preempted local governments (where the tobacco industry has less influence) from passing and 
enforcing stronger youth access sales restrictions.98 According to an uncredited 1993 document 
from Philip Morris’ records regarding defensive efforts against ADAMHA and Synar legislation: 
Legislative Options [unspecified in source] to ADAMHA have been developed by 
Tobacco Industry counsel. The Options include minimum actions necessary to 
meet the minimum requirements of the proposed regulations even if they are not 
amended by HHS. In addition, the Options incorporate all of the Industry’s 
positions relative to responsible sales and marketing practices as well as state 
preemption of local restrictions.99 
Although a defensive gesture in reality, the tobacco industry framed efforts to secure preemptive 
Synar legislation as beneficial to effective regulation and youth prevention. According to a 
November 1994 Tobacco Institute issue brief:  
In further efforts to protect children, the industry is making a concerted effort to 
ensure the adoption of statewide preemption on these issues is adopted, creating 
one law which is easier to comply with than numerous local ordinances. 
Statewide uniformity enables efforts to prevent access to tobacco products by 
minors.100   
Despite industry plans to secure preemptive youth access legislation in states nationwide, we did 
not find evidence they worked to obtain such a bill in Louisiana during 1993. 
1993 and 1994 Efforts to Establish Enforcement for Youth Access Restrictions 
 
Louisiana lawmakers introduced five bills in the 1993 and 1994 legislative sessions to 
comply with the Synar Amendment and establish enforcement over youth restrictions for tobacco 
product sales (Table 7.4).  
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The first attempt to establish an enforcement regime for sales and youth access 
restrictions occurred in 1993 with introduction of SB 653 by Senator Randy Ewing (D-
Quitman103). As introduced, SB 653 prohibited free tobacco product samples except for at 
tobacco retailers. The bill also forbade coupons for free or discount tobacco products and 
prohibited their redemption. In addition, SB 653 permitted vending machines in bars and other 
venues that served alcohol, and outlawed their placement in venues accessible to minors under 
18. SB 653 assigned enforcement to local governments and allowed them to adopt laws stronger 
than the state’s. The bill permitted local governments to assign inspection capabilities to a health 
department staffer for enforcement.  
Before SB 653 received consideration it was drastically amended (Table 7.4). Following 
public health best practices, SB 653 required the Louisiana Department of Revenue and Taxation 
to establish a permit (licensing) system for tobacco product retailers, distributors, and vending 
machines that would record youth access violations by permit holders.101, 104 Permit fees were 
$50 for wholesalers, $100 for bonded agents, and $150 for distributors to fund enforcement.  
Besides establishing a permit system, SB 653 forbade tobacco product sampling outside of 
tobacconists, outlawed all coupon promotions, and prohibited tobacco vending machines except 
for at establishments that mainly sold alcohol for drinking on-site (i.e., bars).101 The bill also 
tasked local governments with enforcement of youth access restrictions and provided them the 
power to designate a local health department official to perform surprise, random checks to 
ensure compliance with Louisiana’s minimum age law.101 Violations resulted in a fine ranging 
from a minimum $100 to a maximum $1000, which escalated to a minimum $500 and maximum 
$2000 if the offender was found guilty.104 Violators could also lose their permit. 
SB 653 was referred to the Senate Judiciary C Committee. Committee members removed 
vending machine restrictions, weakened sampling and coupon restrictions, then tabled the bill on 
Table 7.4: Sales Restrictions Bills during the 1993 and 1994 Legislative Sessions101, 102 
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SB 653*  Ewing 1993  + + ^ ^    +  Deferred 
indefinitely 
HB 110 Flournoy 1994       +    Died with 
adjournment 
HB 114 Flournoy 1994        +   Died with 
adjournment 
HB 313 Smith 1994           Died with 
adjournment 
SB 130 Brinkhaus 1994       +  + + Adopted 
^Partial  
*Originally contained preemption. 
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May 25, 1993, killing it101 and leaving Louisiana without a licensing or enforcement framework. 
We could not find evidence that the tobacco industry or health advocates influenced the outcome 
of SB 653. 
Tobacco Industry Weighs Securing Weak Synar Legislation with Louisiana’s Attorney 
General 
 
Following the 1993 regular session, the tobacco industry planned to secure favorable 
legislation regarding sales violations reporting for Synar Amendment compliance that also 
preempted local youth access laws.105 According to a July 9, 1993 list of planned proactive 
legislative efforts for 1994 in Louisiana, the Tobacco Institute intended to develop legislation 
with Louisiana Attorney General Richard Ieyoub: 
If this [ADAMHA Reporting] means reporting of illegal sales to youth – we must 
meet with Louisiana Attorney General to design and draft proposal for 1994.105 
The same document stated that it planned to include local preemption of sampling and sales 
restrictions in the legislation developed with the Louisiana AG: 
Try to put [local preemption] in Attorney General’s proposed legislation relating 
to reporting illegal sales.105 
We did not find evidence that the attorney general worked with the tobacco industry on Synar / 
ADAMHA legislation in 1994. As the chairman of Louisiana’s Drug Policy Board that formed in 
1990,106 Ieyoub offered a 24-part legislative plan to prevent youth tobacco and alcohol use and 
address crime in March of that year107 that included a prohibition on tobacco advertisements 
within 1,000 feet of schools and forbade tobacco vending machines in establishments open to 
minors.108 Claiming issues with timing, Ieyoub dropped the advertising and vending machine 
restrictions from his package in mid-April.108  
Although the Attorney General did not appear to collaborate with the tobacco industry in 
1994, he opposed federal legislation it was campaigning against. Ieyoub sent a letter in October 
1993 to the Director of the US Center for Substance Abuse Prevention’s (CSAP) State 
Prevention System’s Program opposing proposed ADAMHA implementation rules, asserting 
that they “seem to attempt to micro-manage state law enforcement efforts.”109 Ieyoub felt the 
rules forced Louisiana to comply with vague and undefined youth access requirements that 
unfairly exposed the state to possible funding loss. He also argued the rules were expensive to 
implement and took away funds from the state when there were programs already devoid of 
money. The industry recorded that Ieyoub submitted a comment to CSAP against proposed 
ADAMHA rules but did not state how the comment came to exist or if it influenced the State 
Attorney General to send it.110 
Ieyoub ultimately became a strong adversary of the tobacco industry. He would later 
serve a major role in state lawsuits against the tobacco industry to recoup Medicaid funds, 
resulting in the Master Settlement Agreement (Chapter 9). 
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1994 Special Legislative Session 
 
In late February 1994, the tobacco industry 
considered Louisiana one of 14 key states in which to 
secure weak, preemptive Synar compliance legislation 
that year.111 In March 1994, an uncredited document 
from the Tobacco Institute’s records reveals the industry 
was developing “minimum compliance with ADAMHA 
preemption” legislation with assistance from Louisiana 
Retailers Association President112 Nick Perez.113 
Louisiana lawmakers did not introduce 
Synar/ADAMHA compliance legislation until a special 
session that began in June 1994. Around that time, 
Philip Morris had determined state legislation would be 
introduced in Louisiana to address ADAMHA 
compliance. The company felt any legislation posed a 
minor threat to its interests since Governor Edwin 
Edwards (D), elected in 1991, favored the industry’s 
stance on regulation. Philip Morris reported in a February 25, 1994 ADAMHA Legislation 
Update that Louisiana health advocates were fighting to stop local preemption of youth access 
restrictions in the anticipated bill.114  
To bring Louisiana into Synar compliance, Senator Armand Brinkhaus (D-Sunset) 
introduced SB 130 on June 9, 1994 for the upcoming Special Legislative Session.115 SB 130 
provided the Louisiana Alcoholic Beverage Control Commissioner the authority to enforce 
minimum age of sale laws at tobacco retailers by conducting random compliance checks using 
law enforcement officials and minors that received parental permission. SB 130 also established 
penalties for failing to comply with minimum age sales and signage violations, setting fines of no 
more than $50 for initial offences, $100 for second violations, $250 for third violations, and a 
maximum of $400 for all additional violations. Consistent with industry desires, the bill 
preempted existing and future local sales restrictions on tobacco.115  
HB 110, HB 114, and HB 313 were also introduced to change enforcement of minimum 
age laws for tobacco. Representative Melissa Flournoy (D-Shreveport) introduced HB 110 to 
increase fines from at most $50 to $500 for selling tobacco to minors or failing to post minimum 
age signage on vending machines.102 HB 114, also sponsored by Flournoy, increased the fine for 
buying tobacco as a minor from $50 to $150 maximum.102 HB 313 was an identical companion 
bill to SB 130 introduced by Representative John Smith (D-Leesville116, 117).102 HB 110, 114, and 
313 died without consideration102 while SB 130 easily passed into law. 
SB 130 passed through committee without changes and was sent to the Senate Floor, 
where lawmakers amended it on June 20, 1994.115 Senators imposed stronger penalties for failing 
to comply with signage requirements, increasing fines for fourth and additional signage 
violations by retailers from $400 to $500. The committee then voted 33 to 1 to send SB 130 to 
the house for further consideration. The House Administration of Criminal Justice Committee 
considered SB 130 and passed it to the House Floor, where it passed with a 98 to 1 vote on June 
27, 1994.115 
Around that time Philip 
Morris determined state 
legislation would be 
introduced in Louisiana to 
address ADAMHA 
compliance. The company 
felt any legislation posed a 
minor threat to its interests 
since Governor Edwin 
Edwards (D), elected in 1991, 
favored the industry’s stance 
on regulation. 
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Governor Edwin Edwards entered SB 130 into law on July 7, 1994.115 Although SB 130 
established a system that could bring Louisiana into compliance with inspection requirements of 
the Synar Amendment, it also preempted local sales restrictions on tobacco products and 
eliminated preexisting local ordinances already restricting their sale.115  
 In October or November 1994, after SB 130 passed, Philip Morris provided its sponsor 
Senator Brinkhaus a $500 contribution.118 
HB 1921 Passage in 1995 Requires Development of a Regulatory Regime for Tobacco Sales 
 
The tobacco industry expected to guard against ADAMHA legislation.119 State 
lawmakers introduced six bills in 1995 affecting the new regulatory regime for tobacco sales as 
well as penalties for violating youth access laws (Table 7.5).  
Some legislation attempted to move the Office of Alcoholic Beverage and Tobacco 
Control (ABC), which oversaw tobacco product sales restrictions, to a different agency. We do 
not know the logic provided by bill sponsors for the proposed transfer. HB 1921, HB 2215, and 
SB 1124 moved the ABC from the Department of Public Safety to the Department of Revenue 
and Taxation.120 HB 2156 and SB 1010 did not relocate the ABC, instead mandating licenses for 
tobacco shops as well as tobacco vending machines and their owners, while HB 948 
strengthened fines for  selling tobacco products to minors.120 Publicly, TI took a neutral stance or 
no position on the bills.121 The bills were introduced after the ABC’s commissioner was removed 
because of his ties to the alcohol industry. 
 
 
Table 7.5: Sales Restrictions Bills during the 1995 Legislative Session120 
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HB 948 Flournoy     +  Died in House Administration of 
Criminal Justice Committee 
HB 1921 Toomy + +    + Adopted (Act 1188) 
HB 2156 Flournoy +  + +   Died in House Ways and Means 
Committee 
HB 2215 Bowler  +     Died in Judiciary Committee 
SB 1010 Brinkhaus +  + +   Died in Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
Committee 
SB 1124 Brinkhaus  +     Died in Governmental Affairs 
Committee 
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In 1994, Governor Edwin Edwards fired ABC Commissioner Ray Holloway over his ties 
to the Beer Industry League of Louisiana and its lobbyist George Brown.122, 123 Edwards fired 
Holloway based on input from Louisiana State Police Colonel Paul Fontenot, leader of the State 
Police.123 His department had asserted Holloway had close ties to the alcohol industry and  acted 
inappropriately. Brown, an ally of the tobacco industry and one of the most powerful lobbyists in 
Louisiana (Chapter 2), advocated for relocating the ABC after Holloway’s firing.123 Brown 
publicly claimed transferring the ABC to the Department of Revenue made sense since it 
handled many sales regulations and taxes regarding 
alcohol products.124 He also claimed that most 
states’ revenue departments and the US Treasury 
oversaw alcohol control laws.124 However, evidence 
indicates Brown was retaliating for Holloway’s 
firing. According to an April 25, 1995 article in the 
Baton Rouge Advocate referencing efforts to pass 
HB 1921, “George Brown…is pushing the 
legislation. The bill appears to be the outgrowth of a 
feud between Brown and Louisiana State Police 
Superintendent Paul Fontenot.”125   
Relocating the ABC from the Department of Public Safety and Corrections removed it 
from the authority of Fontenot, who had persuaded Edwards to terminate industry-friendly 
Holloway.122, 123  
Only HB 1921 received consideration during the 1995 legislative session, with the other 
bills dying upon adjournment without being heard.120 HB 1921 ultimately benefitted the tobacco 
industry, passing with amendments that removed its proposed licensing system and weakened 
sales enforcement.120, 126 
Representative Joseph Toomy (D-Gretna) introduced HB 1921 on March 27, 1995.122 
Initially, HB 1921 renamed the ABC to the Office of Alcoholic Beverage and Tobacco Control 
and relocated it to the Department of Revenue and Taxation.127 HB 1921 tasked the Office with 
tobacco licensing, mandated the creation of a wholesaler permit, and required tobacco retailers to 
display their permits. The bill authorized compliance inspections by the Department of Revenue 
and Taxation as well as law enforcement.  
The tobacco industry did not take a position on HB 1921,128 allowing other forces to vie 
over the bill’s fate. We did not find evidence that health advocates attempted to influence HB 
1921’s outcome. Brown, the Beer Industry League representative and tobacco industry ally 
(Chapter 2), actively lobbied to pass HB 1921.123 
The Legislature approved HB 1921 and Governor Edwin Edwards signed it into law on 
June 29, 1995.127 Before HB 1921 passed, lawmakers amended the bill in a way that did not 
rename the ABC to include tobacco in its title and did not establish a licensing system for 
tobacco sales.120, 129 HB 1921 allowed the ABC to enforce youth access laws via compliance 
checks, but only using local law enforcement,120, 126 a change that resulted in minimal actual 
enforcement. 
 We do not know who proposed the changes or if the tobacco industry was involved. 
“George Brown … is pushing the 
legislation. The bill appears to 
be the outgrowth of a feud 
between Brown and Louisiana 
State Police Superintendent Paul 
Fontenot.”  
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Louisiana Increases Sales Restrictions and Establishes a Licensing System in 1997 
 
Louisiana Struggles to Comply with the Synar Amendment 
 
Following the adoption of HB 1921 in 1995, the 
Office of Alcoholic Beverage Control had limited 
authority to enforce tobacco sales restrictions.126, 130 
ABC could conduct tobacco compliance inspections 
only using local law enforcement.126, 130, 131 The 
requirement made enforcement of tobacco sales 
restrictions practically nonexistent in Louisiana.130  
Weak enforcement of minimum age laws fail to reduce 
illegal sales to minors.132-135 Lack of enforcement in 
Louisiana likely contributed to the 73% retailer 
violation rate of the minimum age law found by a December 1996 study commissioned by the 
Department of Health and Hospitals.131, 136 Using the survey as a starting position, the US Center 
for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) (housed at SAMSHA in the US Department of Health 
& Human Services137, 138) set a 60% violation rate of the minimum sales age law by retailers as 
Louisiana’s compliance threshold by 1998.136  Louisiana risked losing $8 million131 in SAMSHA 
grant funding if it failed to adequately reduce minimum age sales violations.136   
Voluntary Efforts to Prevent Youth Use in Louisiana During 1997 
 
Health and tobacco control organizations promoted youth prevention and sales 
restrictions in early 1997 to encourage compliance with impending federal FDA regulations 
regarding youth access and marketing.139 By late February, the new Louisiana Youth Tobacco 
Prevention Coalition and the American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, and 
American Lung Association engaged in youth prevention education with families and children 
without state assistance.139 Another health voluntary, the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free 
Kids, organized a survey in February demonstrating that 86% of Louisianans backed reducing 
minor access to tobacco.140 On April 10, Louisiana youth testified to the Senate Judiciary A 
Committee chaired by Senator Chris Ullo, together with Office of Alcohol Beverage Control 
Commissioner Murphy Painter, and Attorney General Richard Ieyoub about preventing underage 
tobacco use as part of National Kick Butts Day, a program of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free 
Kids.141 Ullo introduced the primary youth access and sales restriction bill in 1997, SB 1547, to 
improve Louisiana’s compliance with the Synar Amendment by establishing a licensing system 
for tobacco sales (Table 7.6). Testimony included discussion of predatory industry marketing 
practices towards minors, and one 10-year old’s ability to buy cigarettes from a vending machine 
because of the establishment’s employees’ indifference.142 
Public Health Agencies Work to Improve Synar Compliance Via Education Campaigns and 
Health Community Partnerships 
 
To reduce minimum age sales violations 15% by September 30 and avoid losing federal 
funds, in late March and April the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) and 
Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse took steps to increase awareness of sales 
restrictions through an education campaign and collaborative efforts with health and tobacco 
Lack of enforcement in 
Louisiana likely contributed 
to the 73% retailer violation 
rate of the minimum age law 
found by a December 1996 
study …. 
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control organizations, and coalitions across the state.143 The state intended to provide posters to 
stores about the minimum age but did not require that they be displayed.131 The Louisiana Office 
of Alcohol and Drug Abuse also sought to partner with agencies across Louisiana to build local 
coalitions that would work to improve knowledge of and compliance with youth access laws.143 
By April, the Office contracted 10 mostly unidentified agencies around Louisiana (we found the 
New Orleans and Gretna-based Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse was one agency) to create 
local tobacco control coalitions consisting of “youth groups, churches, law enforcement, and 
retail vendors” according to an article in the Baton Rouge Advocate. Those agencies received 
$5,000 grants to develop and assist the coalitions, which would each perform 15 informal 
compliance inspections and inform 100 tobacco retailers about the harmful effects of tobacco.143 
DHH hosted a “Working Together Tobacco Conference” on April 2 to facilitate cooperation  
between education organizations and health and tobacco control agencies participating in the 
Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse’s coalition plan to improve Louisiana’s compliance with 
youth access restrictions.143   
 
Youth Access Legislation in 1997 
 
State lawmakers sought to establish a licensing and enforcement regime for tobacco 
product sales and improve Synar Amendment compliance.131 Tobacco control advocates, 
engaged in inspection and informational efforts to reduce illegal tobacco sales to minors, also 
participated in efforts to secure legislation. We could not determine if they acted in unison. 
Lawmakers proposed twelve bills in 1997 to revise youth access laws, enhance retail 
enforcement, and improve Synar Amendment compliance (Table 7.6). Of those introduced, HB 
1077, SB 1547, and HB 76 were adopted into law (Table 7.6). HB 1077 assigned the DHH 
responsibility for Louisiana’s compliance with ADAMHA, SB 1547 established a licensing and 
enforcement system for the state tobacco market, while HB 76 outlawed minor possession of 
tobacco products (Table 7.6). The rest, which predominantly sought to restrict vending machine 
sales of tobacco products or establish regulatory licensing schemes for tobacco products, either 
died in committee or were withdrawn (Table 7.6).  
SB 729 and Its Substitute SB 1547 
 
SB 729 and its substitute SB 1547 were two of three bills offered by Senator Chris Ullo 
(D-Marrero) for the 1997 regular legislative session to establish a regulatory regime for tobacco 
sales. SB 729 and SB 1547 featured comprehensive licensing and sales restriction provisions 
(Table 7.7) 
SB 729 changed the Office of Alcoholic Beverage Control to the Office of Alcohol and 
Tobacco Control (ATC).145 Under the bill, permits were awarded by the ATC Commissioner, 
who had a 35-day probationary period to review applications. Violating Louisiana’s Prevention 
of Youth Access to Tobacco Law, Louisiana’s Unfair Sales Law rules, regulations for alcohol 
sales, or providing samples to minors were causes for permit denial or suspension. Failure to 
display a permit could result in denial, loss, or suspension of the permit. Possessing or selling 
tobacco products without a permit was a separate violation of law for each day of operation. 
Permits could also be suspended or not awarded if an applicant was not considered by the 
Department of Revenue and Taxation Secretary (the department the ATC resided in) to have 
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good morals or be an actual wholesaler. Retailers were responsible for employee infractions 
unless they had not encouraged the violation and had the offending employee participate in an 
ATC commissioner-endorsed sales class. SB 729 assigned the ATC with development of 
regulations and rules for the bill. The ATC Commissioner, Department of Revenue and Tax 
Secretary, as well as local government officials, law enforcement, and citizens could submit a 
petition to suspend or take an offending business’ permit or issue a written warning. SB 729 also 
required the sale of cigarettes in packs of at least 20. The bill prohibited vending machine sales 
unless in a store inaccessible to minors or if the device was placed in sight of employees.  
 Before SB 729 was considered, Senator Ullo introduced a very similar, untitled substitute 
bill for consideration that became SB 1547.145-147 Senator Ullo claimed he developed the 
substitute licensing legislation with assistance from unspecified tobacco control advocates, 
tobacco sellers, and tobacco industry representatives.147 In a 2014 interview for this report, 
former LSU Health Sciences Center representative and Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana 
President Dr. Charles Brown indicated the bill was the first passed by tobacco control advocates 
in Louisiana:  
He [LSU Health Sciences Center Chancellor Merv Trail] introduced me to a 
senator from the Westbank named Chris Ullo who had a bill having to do with 
Table 7.6: Sales Restrictions Bills during the 1997 Legislative Session144 
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HB 30 Faucheux +          Died in committee 
HB 47 Faucheux        + +  Died in committee 
HB 107 Riddle   +        Died in Senate Committee 
HB 
1077 
Riddle   +        Adopted 
HB 
1973 
Dewitt    +* + + +  +  Died in Committee 
SB 228 Ullo        +  - Died in Committee 
SB 269 Ullo        + +  Died in committee 
SB 373 Schedler        + +  Withdrawn from Senate 
SB 729 Ullo    +* + + + + + + Replaced by SB 1547 
SB 1547 Ullo    +* + + + + + + Adopted 
SB 1081 Johnson    + + + +  + + Died in committee 
HB 76 Fontenot  +***       +  Adopted 
HB 924 Donelon +          Died in committee 
*Redesignates ABC to ATC (Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control). 
***Exception for work performance. 
-Eliminated local law enforcement requirement for overseeing inspections. 
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regulating the mom and pop shops and doing checks on tobacco. Our first piece of 
legislation that we got passed was one in 1997.148 
SB 1547 established a similar licensing and 
penalty system to SB 729 for tobacco retailers, vending 
machines, and wholesalers (Table 7.7).144, 146 However, 
SB 1547 created one Retailer Dealer permit instead of 
two separate classes. In addition, SB 1547 created 
retailer dealer registration certificates as part of its 
licensing scheme that SB 729 lacked.146 The registration 
certificate was required by wholesalers, vending 
machine operators, and others for each sale location 
receiving untaxed tobacco products, but was not 
required by retail dealer permit holders. Certificate 
holders fined two times within a period of three years 
were required to obtain a Retail Dealer permit instead of 
a Certificate when they were up for renewal (After five years without an offense they could 
appeal to apply for certificates instead of permits again). 
Table 7.7: License Classes, Fees, and Penalties in SB 729 as Introduced145 and Substitute SB 1547 (After Senate Committee 
Changes and Adoption144, 146 
SB 729 Permits and License Types Renewal License 
Fee 
Penalties*** 
Retail Dealer Class A (tobacco product gross 
sales surpass $75,000 annually)+ 
Annual** $50 -Suspension 
-Loss of license 
-Fines (in order of offence) 
1. $50-$500 
2. $250-$1000 
3. $500-$2,500 
Retail Dealer Class B (tobacco product gross 
sales lower than $75,000 annually)+ 
$25 
Vending Machine $5 
Vending Machine Operator $75 
Wholesaler*+ $75 
SB 1547 Retail Dealer Registration Certificate^+ Annual $25 -Suspension 
-Loss of license 
-Fines (in order of offence 
within two years) 
1. $50-$500 
2. $250-$1000 
3. $500-$2,500 
Retail Dealer Permit+ $75 
Vending Machine*** $5 
Vending Machine Operator- $75 
Wholesaler*+ $75 
*Wholesalers did not need a vending machine operator permit. 
+Permit required for each retail outlet or place of operation. 
-Wholesalers operating vending machines not required to get Vending Machine Operator permit. 
***Permit required for each machine. 
^Can be issued to last 6-18 months. 
**Failure to renew license on time levied a delinquency penalty of 25% if application submitted before 30 days after renewal 
date, multiplied another 25% for every thirty days late thereafter. Right to retail or hold tobacco products may be suspended by 
ABC commissioner. 
“He introduced me to a 
senator from the Westbank … 
who had a bill having to do 
with regulating the mom and 
pop shops and doing checks 
on tobacco. Our first piece of 
legislation that we got passed 
was one in 1997.”  
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SB 1547 renamed the Office of Alcoholic Beverage Control to the Office of Alcohol and 
Tobacco Control, and provided the agency licensing and rulemaking authority over tobacco 
wholesalers, vending machine operators, and retailers (Table 7.7).144, 146 SB 1547 required a 
unique license for the state’s 37,000 retailers and wholesalers at each place of operation where 
tobacco was distributed or sold,147 administered by the Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control 
Commissioner.146 The commissioner could deny or rescind permits for selling to minors under 
18, violating tobacco sales restrictions, providing samples to minors, violating the Unfair Sales 
Law, violating the state’s “Youth Access to Tobacco Law,” or violating vending machine sales 
restrictions.146 The Secretary of the Department of Revenue and Taxation could also stop an 
applicant from receiving a wholesale permit if they believed they lacked good morals or were not 
a true wholesaler. 
In addition to establishing a licensing system, SB 1547 prohibited the sale of individual 
cigarettes, requiring they be purchased in 10-piece packs and forbade tobacco vending machines 
in areas accessible to minors or that were out of sight of an employee.146  
SB 1547 provided enforcement authority to multiple entities. The bill tasked the ATC 
Commissioner with conducting yearly inspections of tobacco registration certificate holders. The 
Secretary of the Department of Revenue and Taxation, law enforcement, and local government 
officials could also arrange inspections and request punishment by the Commissioner of any 
discovered violations.146 The Commissioner could conduct compliance checks as well. Citizens 
could also submit requests to the Commissioner for a business to have its license suspended or 
cancelled for violations by providing affidavits.146 SB 1547 allowed employers to avoid penalties 
if the worker that violated the bill attended a training program recognized by the Commissioner 
and had not been urged in any way to commit the violation by the employer.146 Penalties in SB 
1547 were less onerous than in SB 729 (Table 7.7). SB 1547 included a loophole that protected 
retailers who sold tobacco products to minors providing inaccurate or false legal identification 
(that was not suspicious in appearance) from penalties.150  
SB 1547 in the Legislature 
 
The Senate Judiciary C Committee considered SB 1547, then still untitled, on April 22, 
1997, where Senator Ullo and advocates from Louisiana’s health and medical community 
testified that a licensing regime for tobacco sales was needed to protect public health.147 Senator 
Ullo told the Committee that he wanted to see a “tobacco-free generation by the year 2000.”  
LSU Medical Center CEO Dr. Merv Trail testified that a licensing system for tobacco product 
sales was warranted in Louisiana because the state had the highest lung cancer rate in the nation 
and likely the highest among blacks internationally. Louisiana Cancer and Lung Task Force 
Board member Dr. John Rainey told the Committee that smoking caused “one jumbo jet, more 
than 300 people a year, [to] die” in Louisiana according to The Times-Picayune. LSU Stanley S. 
Scott Cancer Associate Director Sarah Moody Thomas echoed Rainey’s argument, stating that 
most smokers started before becoming 19 years old and that around 5 million youth would die in 
the future from tobacco related illnesses.149 In addition, Department of Health and Hospitals 
spokesperson Jake Hadley testified that Louisiana risked losing $8.8 million in federal funding 
(SAMHSA block grants) if it failed to meet the youth access enforcement targets set by the 
Synar Amendment. Hadley testified that the State’s tobacco retailer violation rate for sales to 
minors was 73% and needed to drop to 20%.   
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The tobacco industry did not publicly oppose SB 1547 at the Senate Judiciary C 
Committee hearing, but its longtime ally the Louisiana Retailers Association (LRA) (Chapter 2) 
testified against the bill. LRA spokesperson Dale Matthews argued the law would fail to stop 
sales violations but would burden businesses and increase government bureaucracy.147 
According to a Times-Picayune article covering the hearing, Mathews stated, “This [The Retail 
Dealer Registration Certificate] is a $25 increase in fees and bureaucratic good government. And 
it is not going to solve the problem. I am permitted out.”147 After listening to testimony 
Committee Chairman Max Jordan (R-Lafayette) postponed voting on SB 1547, stating that the 
bill needed further development.147 It is possible the version of SB 1547 presented at the April 22 
hearing was an unfinished draft featuring more onerous licensing requirements and harsher 
penalties similar to SB 729. We did not find an earlier version of SB 1547 and use the Original 
version of the bill in our description above. 
SB 1547 received a second hearing before the Senate Judiciary C Committee on April 29, 
1997150 after being further refined. Tobacco control advocate Dr. Charles Brown, identifying as a 
cancer expert, and Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids Director Leslie Gerwin, testified 
for the bill’s sales licensing and restrictions. Despite SB 1547 being weaker than SB 729 in the 
version presented to the Committee on April 29, Dr. Charles Brown supported the bill  at the 
hearing, stating it was a “first step” to shield minors from tobacco’s harmful health effects 
according to The Times-Picayune.150 The Times-Picayune also reported that Louisiana Campaign 
for Tobacco-Free Kids Director Leslie Gerwin told the committee that SB 1547 had become “a 
shadow of its original self,” but did not oppose the bill’s passage.150 The Louisiana Retailers 
Association dropped its opposition to SB 1547, its lobbyist Nick Perez claiming the legislation 
now kept retailers from having their licenses revoked too fast.150 After hearing comments on SB 
1547, the Senate Judiciary C Committee unanimously approved the bill. 
 SB 1547 passed an additional hearing before the Senate Committee on Revenue and 
Fiscal Affairs without changes and went to the Senate Floor, where it passed unanimously on 
May 7, 1997 after lawmakers made minor technical revisions that did not change the bill’s 
effects.146  
The House Judiciary Committee considered SB 1547 on May 16, 1997. At the hearing, 
Senator Ullo testified that SB 1547 prevented an $8 million funding loss in federal SAMHSA 
grants resulting from failure to reduce illegal sales to minors.151, 152 During the hearing, 
committee members amended SB 1547 to remove authority over levying penalties from the 
Commissioner of the Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control to an administrative law judge.152 
The Committee added the amendment at the request of Louisiana Division of Law Executive 
Director Ann Weiss, who felt SB 1547 provided the Commissioner too much power.153 Prior to 
the amendment, the Commissioner had the authority to prosecute and issue rulings against 
retailers it caught violating sales restrictions.152 The change left the Office of Alcohol and 
Tobacco Control Commissioner with the authority to investigate and prosecute retailers, but 
without the authority to directly issue fines and other sanctions. The House Judiciary Committee 
then sent SB 1547 to the House Floor.152 
Representatives approved the House Committee amendment to SB 1547 on the Floor on 
May 20, 1997 and then brought it back for debate on June 4 1997.146 During discussion of SB 
1547 Representative Shirley Bowler (R-Harahan) argued against the bill, claiming it was 
expensive and expanded government bureaucracy.153 According to the Baton Rouge Advocate, 
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Representative Bowler also complained that SB 1547’s supporters were more focused on 
restricting tobacco retail than “catching all the hoodlums out there.”153 Unknown proponents of 
SB 1547 argued the bill protected minors, who were pursued by the tobacco industry because 
they would likely become addicted and turn into lifelong smokers.153 
Two amendments to SB 1547 were proposed during deliberations on the House Floor. 
Representative Joseph Toomy (R-Gretna) successfully proposed eliminating the House 
Committee amendment granting judicial authority over tobacco sales violations to administrative 
law judges,146 returning judicial authority over tobacco retail violations to the Commissioner of 
the Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control.146 Representative Glenn Ansardi (D-Kenner) 
unsuccessfully introduced an amendment to prohibit the Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control 
from regulating product prices set by tobacco manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers.153 
Representatives then voted 82-16 to approve SB 1547.146 
The Senate voted 37-0 to adopt amendments made to SB 1547 in the House on June 19, 
1997,154 sending the bill to Governor Mike Foster (R) for signature.144   
Governor Foster signed SB 1547 into law on July 15, 1997.144 The bill entered effect on 
October 1, 1997 and had an implementation date of July 1, 1998.144 As passed, the law 
established a licensing system for tobacco businesses with fees dedicated towards administration 
and enforcement of the program, renamed the Office of Alcoholic Beverage Control to the 
Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control and made it the enforcement agency for tobacco product 
sales restrictions, and established escalating penalties for violations (Table 7.7).144, 146 SB 1547 
included a loophole protecting retailers from penalties if they sold tobacco products to a minor 
that presented authentic or authentic-appearing legal identification that falsely showed their age 
as 18 or higher.150 The Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control Commissioner could instigate 
compliance inspections of license holders, and levy fines and or suspend or revoke a license for 
violations.146 The Secretary of the Department of Revenue and Taxation, law enforcement, and 
local government officials could also inspect license holders and request punishment of any 
discovered violations by the Commissioner.146 Minors could be used to conduct compliance 
checks.155 SB 1547 also authorized the Office to recruit 20 additional agents to the 20 it already 
had.154  
Although weaker than its original version, SB 
1547 drastically reduced illegal tobacco product sales to 
minors. Synar Amendment compliance surveys 
organized by the State of Louisiana from 1996 to 2000 
found the state reduced its violation rate from 73% in 
1996, to 7% by 1999.94 The reduction in illegal sales to 
minors following the tobacco licensing and enforcement 
system brought Louisiana from the fourth-highest 
violation rate among states to the second lowest.94 
Youth Possession is Criminalized in 1997  
  
Until 1997, Louisiana prohibited minors from purchasing, but not possessing, tobacco 
products.156 In 1997, Representative Heulette “Clo” Fontenot (D-Livingston) introduced HB 76 
to forbid minors from possessing tobacco outside of workplace requirements.144 Violations were 
The reduction in illegal sales 
to minors following the 
tobacco licensing and 
enforcement system brought 
Louisiana from the fourth-
highest violation rate among 
states to the second lowest.  
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punishable by an initial fine of no more than $50 followed by a $100 fine for second violations, 
$250 fine for third violations, and $400 fine for any additional offenses. We did not find 
evidence that Fontenot directly collaborated with the tobacco industry before or during 1997. 
However, in December 1997 RJ Reynolds approved a $200 contribution to Fontenot.157 HB 76 
was directed to the House Criminal Justice Committee for initial deliberation. 
The Louisiana Association of Chiefs of Police (LACP) and the Louisiana Retailers 
Association, a regular industry ally (Chapter 2), supported the bill.158 We did not find evidence 
that the LACP previously collaborated with the tobacco industry on any statewide policy efforts 
or HB 76. However, in 1993 LACP member Jim Herford sat on Louisiana’s Coalition Against 
Regressive Taxation (CART) Advisory Committee,159 a nationwide group composed of business 
and political associations the tobacco industry helped build to oppose federal excise taxes.160  
The House Criminal Justice Committee considered HB 76 on April 10, 1997. To ensure 
HB 76 passed through the committee, Representative Fontenot proposed amending HB 76 to 
limit fines for first and additional violations to no more than $50 each, and to allow minors to 
possess tobacco when at home or with a parent.161 Fontenot also amended HB 76 to remove 
language permitting arrests after committee members Arthur Morrel (D-New Orleans) and 
Robert Marionneaux (D-Livonia) complained arrest was excessive. Fontenot also amended HB 
76 to provide police authority to summon offenders for court hearings.161 The Committee 
approved Fontenot’s amendments and voted 5-2 to send HB 76 to the House Floor.161  
HB 76 progressed through the remainder of the legislature with strong support and 
minimal changes. On April 16, 1997, representatives voted 97-3 to send HB 76 to the Senate 
without further amendment.144, 162 The Senate Judiciary C Committee considered HB 76 on June 
9, 1997 and amended the bill to clarify that minors could handle tobacco as part of their 
workplace duties,156 then reported HB 76 to the Senate Floor. HB 76 passed without amendment 
on June 16, 1997 and returned to the House for final approval. 144 
Representatives weighed Senate changes to HB 76 on June 20, 1997. During deliberation 
Representative John Travis (D-Jackson), an industry ally, asked colleagues to adopt the bill to 
prevent youth from becoming addicted to tobacco products.163 Representative Louis Jenkins (R-
Baton Rouge) also spoke in favor of HB 76 according to The Advocate, asserting the bill was 
necessary “because it [tobacco use] is a serious problem among our young people.”164 
Representative Shirley Bowler (R-River Ridge) unsuccessfully proposed eliminating fines from 
HB 76 on the grounds that it was wrong to punish people for possession of a legal product.163 
The House then voted 90 to 13 to approve HB 76 and send it to Governor Mike Foster.156  
Governor Mike Foster signed HB 76 into law as Act 1010 on July 11, 1997. 144 After HB 
76 was adopted, youth access laws remained unchanged until 2009, when legislation passed to 
restrict self-service displays. 
We did not find evidence that the tobacco industry or health proponents publicly or 
privately worked to influence HB 76’s outcome. 
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Louisiana Considers a Tobacco 21 Bill  
 
On March 17, 2008, Representative Walker Hines prefiled HB 240 to increase the 
minimum age for purchasing or possessing tobacco products from 18 to 21.165 The bill required 
minimum age signage to be displayed in at least 30-point font at points of sale and in 22-point 
font on vending machines. HB 240 did not establish penalties for any violations. Hines 
introduced the amendment to limit youth and young adult exposure to smoking in social 
situations. He told the media that most people who did not initiate tobacco use by 21 did not 
become tobacco users. The legislature avoided considering HB 240, allowing it to die upon 
adjournment without consideration. We did not find evidence that tobacco control advocates 
advocated or pressured for the legislation. 
 
Behind the Counter Restrictions Adopted in 2009  
  
Self-service displays of tobacco products in stores increase youth accessibility to those 
items, partially by creating opportunities for youth to steal said products.166, 167 Stores featuring 
self-service displays are also more likely to sell tobacco 
products to minors.166, 168 Requiring placement of 
tobacco products behind the counter at retailers reduces 
illegal sales to minors.168 
 
In 2009, Representative Roy Burrell (D-
Shreveport) prefiled HB 368 on April 14 to restrict the 
use of self-service displays for cigarettes in 
Louisiana.169 HB 368 required cigarettes to be kept 
behind the counter or in locked display cases requiring 
employee assistance to access at tobacco retailers.169 HB 368 defined tobacco retailers as stores 
where 50% or more of all sales were comprised of tobacco products in the 12 months before (not 
counting fuel sales). HB 368 exempted tobacconists from self-service display restrictions. To 
qualify as a tobacconist, at least 50% of total sales had to consist of tobacco products other than 
cigarettes. Tobacco retailers and tobacconists were not legally required to prohibit minors from 
their stores. HB 368 proved popular among lawmakers but divided members of the tobacco 
industry.  
 
The House Committee on Judiciary gave HB 368 its first hearing on May 13, 2009.169 
The Committee amended the bill to expand self-service display restrictions in the bill to cover all 
“smoking tobacco and tobacco” Then sent HB 368 to the House Floor.169  
During floor debate on May 20, Representatives Burrell and Neil C. Abramson (D-New 
Orleans) introduced amendments specifying the tobacco products included in self-service display 
restrictions. Representative Burrell’s amendment clarified that HB 368 restricted self-service 
displays of smokeless tobacco in addition to smoking tobacco and tobacco products in general. 
Burrell ultimately withdrew the amendment. Representative Abramson’s amendment simplified 
HB 368’s language to restrict self-service displays of any tobacco product. The House approved 
Abramson’s amendment and then sent HB 368 to the Senate in a 93 to 6 vote.169 
Self-service displays of 
tobacco products in stores 
increase youth accessibility to 
tobacco products, including 
by creating opportunities for 
youth to steal the products.  
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The Senate Health and Welfare Committee heard HB 368 on June 1, 2009. Tobacco 
control advocates did not attend the hearing to testify on behalf of HB 368. Tobacco company 
representatives, usually united on tobacco policy issues, attended the hearing and provided 
comments for and against the bill.170 Altria lobbyist Randy Haynie spoke in support of HB 368 
according to coverage from The Advocate, arguing the bill was “simply good public policy.” He 
asserted that major retailers and 22 states had adopted comparable policies or laws.170 
Representatives from smokeless tobacco company Swedish Match and RJ Reynolds testified 
against the bill. Swedish Match lobbyist Larry Murray claimed the bill did not prevent youth 
tobacco use because most minors received products from adult buyers and insinuated that HB 
368 unfairly favored larger tobacco companies by driving stores with limited space to prioritize 
stocking and displaying major brands over lesser ones.170 RJ Reynolds lobbyist CJ Blache used 
the absence of tobacco control advocates at the hearing to argue against HB 368: 
If this is such a big issue…where are the anti-tobacco, anti-smoking groups on 
this bill today? There are just industry people talking about this issue. I think that 
speaks volumes.170 
Despite opposition from Swedish Match and RJ Reynolds, the Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee reported HB 368 to the Senate Floor.170    
Senators debated HB 368 on June 10, 2009. Four amendments were unsuccessfully 
proposed, three of which were offered by convenience store owner and Senator Nick Gautreaux 
(D-Meaux) (Table 7.8).171 Gautreaux sought to prevent tobacco retailers and tobacconists from 
having self-service displays and to prevent major tobacco companies from purchasing desirable 
shelf space for product placement on the grounds that the bill unfairly favored larger tobacco 
companies.171 Senate President Joel Chaisson II (D-Destrehan), who was handling HB 368 in the 
chamber,171 dismissed Senator Gautreaux’s complaints, stating “I don’t really care who benefits, 
who loses, as long as we restrict access.”171 After rejecting the amendments, the Senate passed 
the bill in a unanimous 35-0 vote171 and sent it to Bobby Jindal (R), who was elected Governor in 
2007. 
 
Governor Jindal signed HB 368 into law as Act 162 on June 26, 2009.169 Effective 
August 15, 2009,169 self-service displays for tobacco products became illegal except for vending 
machines in stores where minors under 18 were prohibited. Locked floor displays with tobacco 
products were not considered self-service displays. Act 162 exempted tobacco retail stores and 
newly defined tobacconists, which were not required to prohibit minors from their premises, 
Table 7.8: Amendments Proposed to SB 368 on the Senate Floor 169 
Sponsor Description Outcome 
Gautreaux Defined retail tobacco businesses and tobacconists as 
businesses that prohibit minors. 
Rejected 
Gautreaux Redefined retail tobacco businesses and tobacconists to be 
stores that had 90% of total sales consist of tobacco products. 
Also defined retail tobacco businesses and tobacconists as 
stores that prohibited minors.  
Rejected 
Gautreaux Prohibits selling or acquiring display and shelf space for 
favorable tobacco product placement. 
Rejected 
Mount Eliminates vending machine exemption from self-service 
display restrictions. 
Withdrawn 
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from vending machine restrictions. Those businesses were also able to have self-service displays 
other than vending machines.  
 
Internet Sales of Tobacco Products Outlawed in 2013 
 
On March 29, 2013, Representative Jeff Thompson (R-Bossier)17 introduced HB 641 to 
improve Master Settlement Agreement (MSA, Chapter 9) enforcement, change Louisiana’s 
handling of tobacco manufacturers that did not participate in the MSA, alter tobacco tax stamp 
regulations in the state, and relevant to this chapter, restrict internet, telephone and mail order 
sales and purchases of tobacco products (referred to by HB 641 as “delivery sales”).172 HB 641 
prohibited businesses from “delivery sales” of tobacco products to “consumers” for personal use 
in Louisiana regardless of whether an entity was located within or outside the state. Wholesalers 
and cigarette retailers were not considered “consumers” and cigarette transactions between them 
did not count as “delivery sales.” First violations resulted in a $1,000 fine or a fine 5 times the 
price of cigarettes sold, whichever was greater. Second and additional violations faced a $5,000 
fine, or if greater, a fine 5 times greater than the cigarettes sold. Purposeful offenses of “delivery 
sales” restrictions resulted in a $10,000 fine or a penalty 5 times that of the cigarettes sold. HB 
641 assigned enforcement to the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control 
Commissioner and their designees. Individuals that placed a “delivery sale” were required to pay 
all taxes associated with the order and any expenses or fees incurred by the state in collecting the 
taxes. 
 
Although HB 641 was amended by state lawmakers before its adoption on June 11, 2013, 
provisions governing the “delivery sales” prohibition remained in the bill and were unchanged. 
Entering effect on August 1, 2013, the legislation ended all “delivery sales” to “consumers” and 
set penalties for violations. We did not find evidence that tobacco or health interests vied over 
the “delivery sales” restrictions in HB 641. 
 
Electronic Cigarettes and Other “Alternative Nicotine Products” Added to Louisiana 
Youth Access Laws   
 
Electronic Cigarettes and their Support Base 
 
Entering the United States market in 2007,173 
electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) have become 
increasingly popular and widespread over time, 
especially with youth.174 E-cigarettes deliver nicotine to 
users by heating a liquid solution into an aerosol, unlike 
traditional cigarettes which deliver nicotine through 
smoke produced by combusting tobacco. E-cigarette 
proponents assert they are a harm reduction tool and a 
cessation aid, but increasing evidence shows that for 
most smokers they depress quitting.175 Since 2014, 
youth were using e-cigarettes at higher rates than 
cigarettes, including some who likely would not have 
E-cigarette proponents assert 
they are a harm reduction 
tool and a cessation aid, but 
increasing evidence shows 
that for most smokers they 
depress quitting.  In addition, 
since 2014 youth were using 
e-cigarettes at higher rates 
than cigarettes …. 
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started nicotine use via cigarettes.175 Youth that initiate with e-cigarettes are subsequently likelier 
to use cigarettes.175-179    
 
As e-cigarettes increased their market share, state legislators and local health departments 
began pursuing sales and youth access restriction legislation on them.173 The growing use of e-
cigarette devices was accompanied by the rise of e-cigarette advocacy and business organizations 
that opposed sales and use restrictions beginning in 2008. E-cigarette manufacturers and tobacco 
manufacturers with e-cigarette products joined anti-regulatory efforts in 2009 and 2010. Tobacco 
company involvement increased the political power behind e-cigarettes, including by having 
longstanding third parties and front groups that worked with the cigarette companies enter the e-
cigarette debate.  
Louisiana Weighs Legislation to Restrict E-Cigarette and other Alternative Tobacco Products  
 
In 2014, Representative Frank Hoffmann (R-West Monroe) introduced HB 1264 (a 
substitute for HB 208) and Senator Rick Gallot (D-Ruston) introduced SB Bill 12 to incorporate 
e-cigarettes and other tobacco products into existing sampling, sales, and youth access 
restrictions on traditional tobacco products. Both bills received support from state lawmakers, 
and of the two SB 12 was ultimately the one adopted. Health and faith groups submitted 
comments of support for SB 12 to the state legislature as lawmakers considered the bill.180, 181 
 Senator Gallot filed SB 12 on January 22, 2014 after Chris Nevils, an 8th Judicial District 
Attorney from Winn Parish,182 notified him that existing youth access laws for traditional 
tobacco products did not cover new products like e-cigarettes.183 SB 12 prohibited the sale and 
sampling of “alternative nicotine products” to youth under the age of 18. The bill also 
incorporated alternative nicotine products under existing vending machine restrictions for 
tobacco products. SB 12 defined alternative nicotine products as that which “consists of or 
contains nicotine that can be ingested into the body by chewing, absorbing, dissolving, or 
inhaling, or by any other means.”77  
E-cigarettes, referred to as “vapor products” in SB 12, were initially considered a type of 
alternative nicotine product in the bill. By 2014, four states used the term “alternative nicotine 
product(s)” to define e-cigarettes and make them distinct from already regulated tobacco 
products.184 Separately classifying e-cigarettes from tobacco product definitions is characteristic 
of industry-supported legislation and generally requires additional legislation placing existing 
tobacco control restrictions on those devices, since specific electronic cigarette definitions leave 
them uncovered by existing smokefree laws addressing only tobacco products.184 However, we 
did not find evidence the industry tried to help pass SB 12. 
SB 12 primarily worked to include alternative nicotine products, including their subset 
vapor products, under Louisiana laws for tobacco product sales restrictions.77 As introduced, the 
bill incorporated alternative nicotine products into the state’s existing penalty scheme for tobacco 
product sales, levying a $50 fine on individuals caught illegally selling alternative nicotine 
products to minors, followed by $100 for second violations, $200 for third violations, and $400 
for subsequent offenses.77, 185 Minors found possessing but not purchasing tobacco or alternative 
nicotine products outside of legally approved situations faced $50 penalties.77, 185, 186 If at home 
or with their legal guardians or spouse, SB 12 permitted minors to legally consume tobacco, 
alternative nicotine or vapor products.77, 184 SB 12 also incorporated alternative nicotine products 
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into existing sampling, vending machine and self-service display restrictions for tobacco 
products.77 The bill preempted standing or future local laws for tobacco products, alternative 
nicotine products, and vapor products.77, 184 
SB 12 in the Legislature 
  
The Senate Judiciary C Committee considered SB 12 at a hearing on March 18, 2014.77 
SB 12 was not opposed at the hearing, and received support from its sponsor Senator Gallot as 
well as health and tobacco control advocates.180, 181 Speaking before the committee, Senator 
Gallot asserted the need to expand restrictions over alternative nicotine products: 
This is an increasing problem with our children who have been able to get a hold 
of these products…. We're trying to make sure that the law catches up with the 
technology out there.180 
Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL) Associate Director Tonia Moore testified 
that a lack of regulations was contributing to the growing use of e-cigarettes by minors.181  In 
addition, the Louisiana State Medical Society, the Louisiana Baptist Convention, Oschner 
Health, the Louisiana Academy of Physicians, and the Louisiana Society for Respiratory Care 
submitted cards to the committee announcing their support for SB 12.181   
The Senate Judiciary C Committee considered multiple amendments to SB 12 at the 
hearing. Committee members jointly proposed and adopted an amendment to include the term 
“vaporizer” under the definition of alternative nicotine products. Committee members also 
amended SB 12 to allow minors to use vaporizers to ingest medicine.181 The Senate Judiciary C 
Committee then passed SB 12 to the Senate Floor in a unanimous vote.180 
Senators brought SB 12 to the Floor on March 24, 2014. While Senators considered the 
bill, Gallot offered multiple amendments, mainly to define any electronic nicotine delivery 
system (ENDS) as a “vapor product” instead of e-cigarettes and vaporizers, and to define “vapor 
product” to include “any non-combustible product containing nicotine or other substances that 
employs a heating element, power source, electronic circuit, or other electronic, chemical or 
mechanical means, regardless of shape or size that can 
be used to produce vapor from nicotine in a solution or 
other form.”77 The amendment removed vapor products 
and e-cigarettes from the definition of alternative 
nicotine products in SB 12, making them into the 
distinct “vapor product” category.  The change would 
expand the definition of vapor products to ensure the 
incorporation of practically all ENDS into Louisiana’s 
existing sales restrictions for tobacco products. Gallot 
told The Advocate the definitions more accurately 
described products in SB 12.187 He also revealed the 
amendment was made using input from the tobacco 
industry and the Office of Alcohol and Tobacco 
Control.187 Gallot’s amendment also fixed vending machine signage established by the passage 
of SB 87 in 1991 that incorrectly stated the minimum age of purchase for tobacco products was 
Gallot told The Advocate the 
definitions more accurately 
described products in SB 12. 
He also revealed the 
amendment was made using 
input from the tobacco 
industry and the Office of 
Alcohol Tobacco Control.  
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17, correcting the number to 18.77 Senators approved his amendments and then voted 37 to 0 to 
send SB 12 to the House.187  
 SB 12 progressed through the rest of the legislative process without resistance. The 
House Committee on Judiciary and the House Floor passed SB 12 without amendments in 
unanimous votes. The bill returned to the Senate for approval of minor technical changes made 
by the House Legislative Bureau (which are technical alterations and did not affect the bill’s 
intent). Senators voted 35-0 to adopt SB 12, delivering the bill to Governor Bobby Jindal for 
signature.188 Governor Jindal signed SB 12 into law as Act No. 278 on May 28, 2014. Entering 
effect immediately, Act 278 incorporated e-cigarettes, vaporizers, and other nicotine products 
into existing youth access restrictions for traditional tobacco products, prohibiting their sale and 
sampling to minors, as well as their possession by them (except when accompanied by parents or 
at home).77, 189 SB 12 included alternative nicotine products and vapor products into penalties set 
for tobacco product sales violations, levying escalating fines of $50 for first offenses, $100 for 
second offenses, $200 for third offences, and $400 for subsequent offenses on employees caught 
illegally selling tobacco to minors. The bill established the same penalties for minors caught 
purchasing tobacco, alternative nicotine, and vapor products illegally. Certificate or permit 
holders whose establishment purposefully or unknowingly (by failing to check legal 
identification) violated sales restrictions faced an initial $50-500 penalty, a $250-1,000 fine for 
second offenses within 2 years, and a $500-$2,500 penalty for additional violations within 2 
years of last infraction. SB 12 did not eliminate the loophole created by SB 1547 in 1997, which 
protected retailers that sold products to a minor who provided them real-seeming or authentic 
legal identification misrepresenting their age, from penalties.146, 190 The bill also left the youth 
access loophole established by HB 19 in 1991 intact, which prevented retailers from being 
penalized unless they purposefully provided products to minors.44, 82, 83 Minors caught possessing 
tobacco, alternative nicotine or vapor products faced a $50 fine per infraction.189 Owners could 
also have their certificates and licenses suspended or taken for infractions. However, the bill 
permitted the use of tobacco and alternative nicotine products by minors when at home or while 
with their legal guardian,77, 184 and preempted current and future local youth access restrictions 
on those products.77 Lastly, SB 12 corrected minimum age signage on tobacco, alternative 
nicotine and vapor product vending machines to state the legal age of purchase was 18 and not 
17.77 
 In 2018, Louisiana Lawmakers passed HB 239 by Representative Vincent J. Pierre to 
expand the definition of vapor products established by SB 12.191, 192 The bill established that 
items not containing nicotine that are or are used in ENDS are also considered vapor products 
and fall into related youth access restrictions.191, 192 HB 239 passed with nearly no resistance and 
only minor revisions that did not weaken its intent.192 
Tobacco 21 Legislation in 2019 
 
Building Momentum in 2017 and 2018 
 
Discussion of increasing Louisiana’s minimum age to use tobacco, alternative nicotine 
and vapor products began in 2017. During a radio interview in late June that year, Representative 
Frank Hoffmann (R-West Monroe) expressed interest in raising the minimum age to smoke from 
18 to 21.193 Hoffmann claimed he planned to task the Louisiana Department of Health (DOH) 
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with conducting a study on “what’s going on around the country, what are the benefits, and what 
we can do about it [increasing the smoking age to 21].”193 He also stated that information on 
raising the minimum smoking age’s impacts on tobacco use, healthcare, and costs to society 
already existed. Hoffmann in that his planned DOH study intended to see the results increasing 
the smoking age had throughout the United States. Hoffmann said two states (California and 
Hawaii) and at minimum 225 localities with home rule charters had increased the legal smoking 
age from 18 to 21. Hoffmann claimed he and unidentified others were investigating separately 
from the proposed DOH study whether Louisiana municipalities with home rule charters could 
pass similar legislation. 
 During the 2018 legislative session, Representative Hoffmann introduced HR 107 to 
formally ask the state department of health to evaluate raising the minimum age of purchase for 
tobacco products from 18 to 21.194 The resolution easily passed the legislature,194 leading to a 
report by the Louisiana Department of Health’s Tobacco Cessation and Prevention Program on 
the subject in April 2019 that is discussed later in this chapter.195  
In September 2018, Orleans Parish Medical Society President George S. Ellis, Jr, 
Smoking Cessation Trust CEO Mike Rodgers, and Jefferson Parish Medical Society President 
John H. Wales called on lawmakers to raise the minimum age to purchase tobacco products in 
Louisiana from 18 to 21.196, 197 We did not find evidence that they offered a proposal, suggested 
potential enforcement or penalty provisions, or called for additional youth access restrictions 
besides raising the minimum purchasing age. Rodgers, Ellis Jr. and Wales released a letter that 
month stating their intention to “support and endorse legislation in Louisiana” hiking the legal 
age.196, 198 The letter referenced a Louisiana Department of Health finding that smoking caused 
7,200 deaths annually in Louisiana, and stated 95% of adults began smoking before turning 
18.198 In addition, the letter highlighted Louisiana’s F grade for tobacco control given by the 
American Lung Association’s 2018 State of Tobacco Control report.198 The authors called on 
other health organizations to support efforts to increase the legal purchasing age for tobacco 
products to 21. Despite the letter’s request for help, most health groups avoided supporting 
minimum age legislation introduced in 2019 because they considered the legislation weak or 
favorable to the industry. 
Tobacco 21 Legislation Introduced in 2019 
 
On February 28, 2019, Representative Frank Hoffmann (R-Monroe) introduced HB 38 to 
raise the minimum age of purchase and possession in Louisiana for tobacco, alternative nicotine 
and vapor products from 18 to 21 years of age.199 The bill also prohibited giving tobacco, 
alternative nicotine and vapor product samples to people under 21. HB 38 left existing penalties 
for providing tobacco, alternative nicotine or vapor products to underage persons unchanged and 
the loophole requiring that retailers knowingly provide products to a minor to face punishment in 
place. HB 38 updated minimum age signage to reflect the higher minimum age.199 Hoffmann 
stated the bill would reduce smoking initiation and lower state healthcare expenses.200 He also 
claimed the bill intended to pressure the tobacco industry. 
Most tobacco control advocates and health organizations did not support HB 38 because 
of its poor enforcement provisions.201, 202 American Heart Association statements indicated it 
opposed the legislation.201 203 The Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL) publicly 
refused to endorse the bill, claiming the legislation held people under age 21 more accountable 
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than the businesses selling them tobacco, alternative nicotine and vapor products.200 
Representative Hoffmann responded to TFL’s position by claiming that related legislation was 
strengthened and bolstered with provisions desired by the health community. He called attention 
to a separate bill intended to increase penalties for sales restriction violations. TFL remained 
unsupportive. In an April 25, 2019 article covering HB 38’s consideration by the House Health 
and Welfare Committee, American Heart Association Government Relations Director204 Ashley 
Hebert asserted “As it’s [HB 38] written, it’s largely a tobacco industry-favoring bill.”201 Indeed, 
the tobacco industry backed HB 38.205 However, tobacco control nonprofit Tobacco21 and 
Louisiana’s Smoking Cessation Trust (Chapter 4) supported HB 38 as a means to prevent 
nicotine addiction, and had representatives testify in support of the legislation.205, 206  
Non-health advocate opponents focused on the government’s definition of legal 
adulthood, the responsibilities that legal adulthood provided, and harm reduction claims to attack 
HB 38. State lawmakers argued that legal adults should be able to smoke.203-205, 207 Vape store 
owners claimed the bill’s adoption would force them to fire employees younger than 21.205 The 
retailers also argued that age 18 was considered a legal adult in the US.207 In addition, vape 
retailers argued that raising the minimum age of purchase would cause people that were 18-20 to 
procure tobacco and alternative nicotine products through others.207 At least one vape retailer 
claimed that e-cigarettes helped him quit smoking during the first hearing for HB 38.205  
The Department of Health Releases Report on Raising the Minimum Age in April 2019 
 
In April 2019, before the Legislature considered HB 38, the Louisiana Department of 
Health released its report on raising the minimum age of purchase for tobacco products as 
mandated by Representative Hoffmann’s HR 107 enacted during the 2018 Regular Session.195 
The report stated that Louisiana high school and middle school students used tobacco products at 
higher rates than the national average, and that an e-cigarette epidemic increased by 80% across 
the country between 2017 and 2018.195 The authors found research from the Institute of 
Medicine showing that increasing the minimum age to 21 “would result in a 12% decrease in 
tobacco use, approximately 223,000 fewer premature deaths, 50,000 fewer deaths from lung 
cancer, and 4.2 million fewer years of life lost for those born between 2000 and 2019.”195 The 
report also found that two-thirds of the state’s tobacco coalition, referred to by the agency as the 
Louisiana Tobacco Coalition, backed pursuing a future law to raise the minimum age law to 21 
but was ambivalent towards pursuing legislation in 2019. In addition, the report stated that local 
laws raising the minimum age to 21 could help determine if a state law was worthwhile, but that 
removing state preemption over tobacco product and alternative nicotine product sales 
restrictions would have to occur to enable local legislation. 
HB 38 Fails in the House 
 
HB 38 passed through its first committee hearing but was ultimately defeated on the 
House Floor. During HB 38’s initial hearing on April 24, 2019, the House Health and Welfare 
Committee approved the bill 10-2206 after adopting amendments exempting 18-20 year old 
military service members and veterans, as well as first responders, from the proposed minimum 
age restriction of 21 years.199, 204 However, the House proved more opposed to curbing the rights 
of legal adults and voted 55-24 against passing HB 38.203  Most health advocates and 
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organizations remained uninvolved on the legislation, 
with AHA Government Relations Director Ashley Hebert 
asserting in a radio interview on the day of the bill’s 
defeat:  
Passing something is not always better than 
passing nothing. We would rather have a 
comprehensive policy to start with. This is a 
tobacco industry bill.203 
Youth Access Restrictions and Enforcement as of 2019 
 
Minimum Age Restrictions 
 
The minimum age to purchase or possess all tobacco, alternative nicotine, and ENDS 
products is 18 in Louisiana as of 2019.190 Minors may possess these tobacco products as part of 
their work functions, if they are in a private residence, or in the presence of a spouse or legal 
guardian. The sale and sampling of tobacco, alternative nicotine and vapor products to minors by 
businesses and their employees is illegal if the provider knowingly sold to someone underage or 
unknowingly sold to a minor by failing to check their legal identification. Retailers and their 
employees did not face penalties if they sold to a minor that provided authentic or real-seeming 
identification misrepresenting their age, or if they did not “knowingly” sell to a minor. Inclusion 
of the term “knowingly” in the law makes enforcement of the law more difficult. 
In 2019, tobacco, alternative nicotine and vapor product vending machines remained 
legal in Louisiana.190 They had to be in direct sight of an employee, and were limited to 
establishments inaccessible to minors.190 Besides vending machines, tobacco, alternative nicotine 
and vapor products are to be kept behind counter or in a locked display case requiring employee 
assistance to access.190 Tobacco retailers and tobacconists are exempt from requirements that 
vending machines and self-service displays be placed in areas inaccessible to minors, and are 
allowed to have non-vending machine self-service displays.190 
All internet sales of tobacco products have been prohibited in Louisiana since 2013.190 
Initial fines resulted in $1,000, or if greater, 5 times the price of cigarettes sold. Second 
violations faced $5,000, or if greater, 5 times the price of cigarettes sold. Purposeful infractions 
faced a $10,000 fine or 5 times the price of cigarettes sold if more than the standard fine, and a 
prison sentence no greater than 5 years.  
Local governments in Louisiana are prohibited from passing youth access laws stronger 
than those set by the state.190 
Minors caught purchasing or possessing tobacco, alternative nicotine or vapor products 
faced penalties.190 First fines incurred $50, followed by $100, $250, and $400 for second, third, 
and additional infractions. Each possession violation resulted in a $50 fine. Penalties for 
employees and retailers are higher (Table 7.9). 
 
 
“Passing something is not 
always better than passing 
nothing. We would rather 
have a comprehensive 
policy to start with. This is 
a tobacco industry bill.”  
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Free Samples 
  
Provision of tobacco, alternative nicotine, or vapor product samples to minors is 
prohibited in Louisiana as of 2019.190 Violations incur a fine of $100-$500 in addition to 
penalties provided for tobacco license or permit holders.190 Offending tobacco license holders 
(wholesalers, retailers, etc.) faced an initial $50-$500 fine, followed by $250-$1000 for second 
violations and $500-$2,500 for subsequent infractions.190 Louisiana preempts local sampling 
laws stronger than the state.190 
Licensing and Enforcement 
 
Since the adoption of SB 1547 in 1997 (detailed earlier in this chapter), the Office of 
Alcohol and Tobacco Control (ATC) has monitored, regulated, and licensed tobacco and alcohol 
manufacturers, retailers, and wholesalers. The ATC also collects taxes on the sales of stamped 
cigarettes and on monthly reports of the sales of cigars and other tobacco products. The Secretary 
of Revenue sells tobacco stamps to wholesale tobacco dealers who in turn must attach stamps to 
the tobacco products prior to their leaving the wholesaler's premises.208, 209 Since adoption of SB 
12 in 2014 to place sales restrictions on ENDS , the ATC has regulated them similarly to tobacco 
products. 
 
The ATC is part of the Department of Revenue, which is organized into seven different 
management groups. The ATC has two divisions: enforcement and certification. Enforcement 
agents inspect retailers for violations using compliance checks with minors.210 The certification 
division is in charge of licensing wholesale dealers of tobacco products and notifying license 
holders of renewal dates. It also collects permit and administrative fees (Table 7.9).209 As of 
2018, the ATC awarded five types of annual licenses and fees (Table 7.9).  In Fiscal Year 2018 
the Office conducted 938 compliance checks at eligible retailers and found a 9.1% violation 
rate,210 a drastic reduction from the 73% offense rate found in Louisiana’s first Synar compliance 
survey in 1996,136 when enforcement was basically nonexistent.130 
 
Conclusion 
  
Youth access bills were among the first tobacco control legislation considered in 
Louisiana. The state adopted a minimum age bill in the late 19th or early 20th century, only to 
repeal it in 1942. Louisiana subsequently lagged behind nearly all states in adopting youth access 
provisions. After repealing its minimum age law, the state first adopted a youth access bill in 
Table 7.9: Current Tobacco License Classes, Fees, and Penalties in Louisiana as of 2019190 
Type Renewal License Fee Penalties for License 
Holder 
Penalties for Offending 
Employee 
Retail Dealer Permit Annual $25 
 
-Suspension 
-Loss of license 
-Fines (in order of 
offence) 
1. $50-$500 
2. $250-$1000 
3. $500-$2,500 
-Fines (in order of offence) 
1. $50 or lower 
2. $100 or lower 
3. $250 or lower 
4. 400 or lower 
 
Tobacconist $100 
Vending Machine $5 
Vending Machine Operator $75 
Wholesaler $75 
*Penalties assessed unless employee was not encouraged to violate law in any way and participates in an ATC 
Commissioner approved training program (2014). 
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1988 to prohibit sampling to minors (HB 1966), despite youth being able to legally purchase or 
possess tobacco products and retailers the right to sell said items to them. Louisiana remained 
one of five states at the end of 1990 lacking restrictions on tobacco product sales to minors. 
Although Louisiana lagged in setting youth access restrictions, the tobacco industry’s 
desire to improve its image and preempt stricter sales restrictions, combined with federal efforts 
to reduce youth tobacco use, caused state lawmakers to steadily implement laws that effectively 
prevented minors’ access to tobacco. In 1991 state lawmakers adopted HB 19 to set 18 as the 
legal age of sale for tobacco products with assistance from the Tobacco Institute, which used the 
law to promote its youth prevention campaign, “It’s the Law.” Subsequent passage of ADAMHA 
and the Synar amendment in 1992, federal legislation that required states reduce tobacco sales to 
minors under 18, prompted lawmakers in Louisiana to pass legislation curbing illegal sales to 
youth. Louisiana adopted HB 1921 in 1994 to provide enforcement of youth sales restrictions to 
the Office of Alcohol and Beverage Control and establish penalties on vendors for violations. 
The bill also instituted preemption over existing and future local youth access restrictions.  
A political fight between the beer industry and State Police Commissioner in 1995, 
whose agency oversaw the ABC, caused the transfer of the Office to the Department of Revenue 
and Taxation and made enforcement of youth access restrictions nonexistent. Legislation 
mandating the ABC’s department change failed to assign the agency the power to conduct 
compliance checks without the participation of local law enforcement. As a result, Louisiana had 
a 73% retailer violation rate of minimum age restrictions by 1997, one of the highest among 
states. To reduce illegal sales and stay in compliance with the Synar amendment, state 
lawmakers passed SB 1547 to establish a licensing and enforcement scheme for tobacco products 
in 1997. Despite industry-preferred provisions that weakened penalties for retailers, the bill 
established a regulatory system that improved Louisiana retailers’ compliance rates with youth 
sales restrictions to one of best nationally by 1999. In 2014 Louisiana lawmakers passed SB 12 
to incorporate ENDS into youth access restrictions. The bill received support from Louisiana’s 
health and faith community despite containing language and provisions favorable to the tobacco 
industry. The bill included industry-preferred language distinguishing ENDS from tobacco 
products and instituted preemption of stronger local ordinances over all tobacco, alternative 
nicotine, and vapor products. 
 In the 1997 and 2014 efforts to pass youth access laws, health advocates supported 
industry-friendly legislation to achieve some protections for minors. The decision by health 
advocates to compromise and support industry-favorable legislation secured more protections for 
Louisiana youth but allowed for weaker enforcement and preemption over local laws further 
restricting youth access. Health advocates avoided the same mistake in 2019, choosing not to 
support weak legislation to raise Louisiana’s minimum purchasing age from 18 to 21 that 
ultimately failed. 
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Chapter 8: Tort Reform 1986-1999  
 
• The Louisiana Supreme Court’s 1986 ruling in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 
determined companies were liable for inherently dangerous products, stimulating tort 
reform efforts by the state business community and increased tobacco industry 
involvement in legislative activities. 
• The tobacco industry secured legislation in 1988 removing liability for harm caused by 
inherently dangerous products. 
• The tobacco industry further developed the Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Coalition 
formed by the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry to advance the tobacco 
industry’s tort reform objectives. 
• The tobacco industry unsuccessfully pursued legislation throughout the 1990s to expand the 1988 
law limiting liability for inherently dangerous products and invalidate pending lawsuits. 
• Tort reform efforts remained an active issue as of 2019. 
 
Introduction 
  
 Beginning in the 1950s, people sued tobacco companies to recover damages from the 
harm caused to their health by tobacco products.2 For decades, the tobacco industry defeated all 
product liability lawsuits filed against it. However, in 1983 the tobacco companies suffered their 
first loss in court in the New Jersey case Cipollone v. Liggett.3 Though reversed on appeal, the 
plaintiff used the discovery process to release previously secret industry documents exposing the 
tobacco companies’ knowledge of the harm caused by their products.3 The Cipollone case, while 
still in trial, spurred systematic efforts by the cigarette companies to protect themselves from 
future liability by changing tort laws. In 1985, the Tobacco Institute (TI) started monitoring 
legislation affecting liability laws in multiple states. Brown and Williamson, Philip Morris, and 
RJ Reynolds feared that documents released as a result of the Cipollone case might expose them 
to more lawsuits.3 TI and law firm Covington & Burling subsequently formed the Tort Reform 
Project in 1986, a nationwide effort to secure legislation limiting their liability.4 The Tort Reform 
Project also sought to reduce public access to the courts, lower the amount of damages plaintiffs 
could receive in lawsuits and oppose increasing the industry’s liability or exposure to damage 
awards. Tobacco companies themselves would also later participate in the Tort Reform Project. 
The tobacco industry focused on “tort reform” 
to insulate itself from liability.5 Product liability laws 
are a subset of tort law.6 Product liability laws intend 
to hold entities responsible for harm caused by their 
products and to provide consumers a means to 
safeguard themselves from hazardous products.6 
Generally, harm caused by design flaws, items 
produced with defects, or items lacking proper 
warnings or instructions are causes of liability under 
product liability laws.6 Product liability claims can be 
made by asserting the defendant breached a product’s warranty, was negligent, or simply created 
a provably defective product that caused injury (i.e. strict liability, Table 8.1).6  “Tort reform” is 
The tobacco industry sought to 
change tort laws, generally 
pertaining to product liability, 
to make it difficult if not 
impossible to prevail in a 
lawsuit against it. 
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an industry term for efforts to limit tort litigation risks and damages obtainable by plaintiffs.5 The 
tobacco industry sought to change tort laws, generally pertaining to product liability, to make it 
difficult if not impossible to prevail in a lawsuit against it. 
The tobacco industry became heavily involved with tort reform efforts in Louisiana 
because of a 1986 State Supreme Court ruling there in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp.,484 So.2d 110 (1986), an asbestos exposure lawsuit. The decision made a manufacturer of 
an “unreasonably dangerous” product liable for injuries caused by that product, even if the 
manufacturer did not know of the danger it posed.7 (This chapter only discusses pro or anti-tort 
reform bills in a session if the tobacco industry specifically followed or was involved with the 
legislation.) As early as 1987, the tobacco industry pursued tort reform legislation at the state 
level to reduce its liability and fought bills to increase its liability. Working with major 
corporations, the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry, and state-based companies, the 
tobacco industry secured legislation limiting liability for “inherently dangerous” products in 
1988.  
Tort reform efforts expanded in 1992 as the tobacco industry helped build a Citizens 
Against Lawsuit Abuse coalition in Louisiana to advance tort reform legislation and defeat 
efforts to repeal the 1988 product liability law. Tobacco companies fought to increase product 
liability protections and shield itself from damages in the state as the industry faced coordinated 
Medicaid recovery lawsuits by state attorneys general, which were assisted by the exposure of 
the industry’s lies to the public about the dangers of its products (Chapter 9). 
Table 8.1: Tort Reform Terms and Definitions22 
Comparative Fault / 
Comparative 
Negligence 
Plaintiff’s negligence correspondingly reduces damages obtainable from defendant. 
Contributory 
Negligence 
Harm incurred by plaintiff is partially self-caused and to a high-enough amount to 
prevent them from obtaining damages. Principle used in a small amount of areas. 
Joint Liability Multiple parties share liability. 
Joint and Several 
Liability 
Liability dividable between two or more parties or amongst some of a group’s 
members. Involved parties are each accountable for the total obligation, but can seek 
financial compensation or protection from parties that did not pay towards the 
obligation. 
Product Liability Liability held by retailers and manufacturers for harm caused by a defective product. 
Protective Order A court order limiting or forbidding a party to a case from acting in a matter “that 
unduly annoys or burdens the opposing party or a third-party witness” 
Punitive Damages “Damages awarded in addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with 
recklessness, malice, or deceit”; damages penalizing a tortfeasor to prevent future 
tortious actions by the defendant or others. 
Several Liability “Liability that is separate and distinct from another’s liability, so that the plaintiff may 
bring a separate action against one defendant without joining the other liable parties.” 
Strict Liability A defendant is liable for harm regardless of behavior, motive, or previous efforts to 
ensure safety or prevent injury. Defendant is held responsible based on notion they 
failed their “absolute duty to make something safe.”   
Tort “A civil wrong” or a violation of lawful duty that may be addressed via damages. 
Excludes contract breaches. 
Tortfeasor An entity that engages in a tort or is responsible for one. 
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American Law Institute’s Second Restatement of Torts and Comment i 
 
The American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) is a definitive 
summary of common law principles and existing case law related to torts (civil wrongs that 
result in legal liability for harm or damages).8 While ALI restatements are not law they are very 
influential for judges and often form the basis for state legislation. Section 402A of the 1965 
Second Restatement of Torts discusses manufacturers’ liability for injury caused by 
unreasonably dangerous products they create.9 Comment i in the Restatement defines 
“unreasonably dangerous” products as those that are “dangerous to an extent beyond that which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community as to its characteristics.”10 However, the Restatement also notes that 
many products cannot be made completely harmless. Comment i provides examples of liability 
for alcohol and tobacco: 
Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some 
people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, 
containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil [a byproduct of alcohol fermentation 
comprised of various liquids and alcohol types that is found in alcoholic 
beverages at low amounts11], is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not 
unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; 
but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably 
dangerous.10 
The examples discussed in Comment i suggest 
that before a seller can be found liable for selling 
an unreasonably dangerous product, that product 
must be adulterated by uncharacteristic or 
unexpected components. Based on this theory, 
standard tobacco products would not subject a 
seller to liability for any harms they caused, but 
tobacco products that contained irregularly high 
nicotine levels or additional hazardous substances 
could.12 Since Comment i limited product liability 
to products sold that were more dangerous than 
would be contemplated by ordinary consumers, it effectively absolved tobacco manufacturers of 
liability for harm caused by their products because “ordinary consumers” with “ordinary 
knowledge” knew that tobacco was harmful.  
The tobacco industry had worked hard to obtain changes protecting it from liability in the 
Second Restatement, in particular Section 402A.13 After TI’s Committee on Legal Affairs found 
that an early version of Section 402A made the tobacco industry more likely to be liable for harm 
caused by its products, it established a subcommittee in fall 1961 to develop and insert industry-
favorable language in the Second Restatement.13 The final version of Comment i was issued on 
March 1, 1962 after the subcommittee met with ALI reporter William Prosser sometime during 
December 7 and December 14, 1961.13 The meeting with Prosser intentionally avoided the ALI’s 
Because Comment i limited 
product liability to products sold 
that were more dangerous than 
would be contemplated by 
ordinary consumers, it effectively 
absolved tobacco manufacturers 
of liability for harm …. 
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official channels for requesting changes during the restatement drafting process.13 After the 
meeting, Comment i specifically referred to “good tobacco” as an unreasonably dangerous 
product with commonly known risks that did not carry liability for inflicting injury if produced 
in a standard manner and used as expected.13 The tobacco industry explicitly discussed pursuing 
legislation to codify Comment i in Louisiana between 1993 and 1998, and they often sought even 
broader protections under bills they introduced to do so, including exemptions from liability for 
unintentional defects. 
The Castano Suit and Tobacco Industry Tort Reform Efforts 
  
In March 1994, four plaintiffs (Diane Castano, whose husband died from cancer caused 
by smoking,14 and three current smokers15) filed a class action federal lawsuit against the major 
tobacco companies in the New Orleans-based Eastern District Court of Louisiana.16 The case, 
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., sought damages for plaintiffs’ inability to quit smoking 
because of their nicotine addiction, and alleged their dependency resulted from the industry 
purposefully increasing nicotine in its tobacco products to create and sustain addiction (Castano 
v. American Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. La. 1994). Other companies named in the 
suit besides American Tobacco Co. were its owner Brown and Williamson,15 TI, Philip Morris, 
RJ Reynolds, Lorillard, and Liggett and Myers.15, 16 The suit argued the tobacco companies were 
strictly liable for harm caused by their products, accusing them of violating consumer protection 
laws and their warranty with customers, and asserted the companies knowingly deceived their 
customers.16 Anyone in the United States addicted to nicotine or who had lost someone 
dependent on the substance was included in the class.   
 Plaintiffs’ lawyers in Castano, comprised of 58 law firms across the nation led by 
Louisiana attorneys Wendell Gauthier and Peter Butler as well as Alabama attorney Francis 
Hare, sought to have the case classified as a class action lawsuit in late 1994.14 A class action 
classification potentially exposed the tobacco industry to a well-funded, coordinated network of 
opponents it had not faced before in a private liability lawsuit. Tobacco industry lawyers argued 
that the lawsuit was not qualified for class action status14 but failed to convince Eastern District 
Judge Benjamin Jones, who approved the class action certification request in part on February 
17, 1995 (Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995).17 The tobacco 
industry appealed the decision to the US 5th Circuit Court of Appeals which unanimously 
rejected the class certification on May 23, 1996, finding it too unmanageable for the federal court 
system (Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).15  
While parties to the Castano case argued over its federal class action certification from 
1994-1996,18 tobacco industry representatives pursued bills to curb and end class action lawsuits 
in Louisiana (discussed in detail in this chapter) and other states. After the federal class action 
request was rejected, lawyers and firms working on behalf of plaintiffs in Castano submitted 
state-level copycat class action lawsuits referred to as “sons of Castano.”19 
State Medicaid Litigation in Louisiana 
 
In June 1994, Mississippi Attorney General Michael Moore filed the first state lawsuit 
that year seeking to recover Medicaid expenses incurred treating tobacco-related illnesses from 
the tobacco companies.20, 21 The legal actions, which Louisiana joined in March 1996 to help 
secure an initial settlement from Liggett and Myers (Chapter 9), resulted in the November 1998 
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Master Settlement Agreement between the tobacco companies and 46 states and multiple US 
territories.2 The deal resulted in the tobacco companies paying hundreds of billions dollars to 
participating states, funding for tobacco control, the dismantling of TI and other lobbying arms 
of the major tobacco companies, and restricted tobacco industry marketing practices.2 As 
Medicaid recovery litigation brought by state attorneys general increased, the tobacco industry 
sought state legislation to prevent, weaken or neutralize such cases, including in Louisiana from 
1996-1998, as discussed later in this chapter.   
A State Supreme Court Decision Foments Concerted Tort Reform Efforts in Louisiana 
 
In February 1986, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court issued a ruling in Halphen v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corporation, a strict product 
liability lawsuit regarding asbestos (Halphen v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,484 So.2d 110 
(1986),23 in a manner that could drastically 
increase the tobacco industry’s potential liability 
for harm caused by its products. The court 
ordered the Johns-Manville Sales Corporation to 
pay damages to a widow whose husband died 
from asbestos exposure, finding the corporation 
liable irrespective of its knowledge of the harmful effects of asbestos exposure. According to the 
Baton Rouge Advocate, Justices reasoned that companies should be liable for goods that were 
“unreasonably dangerous per se,” to motivate them to eliminate dangers from their products 
before making them publicly available.23 The decision made businesses operating in Louisiana 
liable for products that were by their design and nature unsafe to use, such as cigarettes.  
 
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling spurred state industry groups to pursue tort reform 
legislation to nullify the decision. An April 16, 1986, letter from Harry McCall Jr. of the 
Louisiana law firm Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler and Sarpy to RJ Reynolds Vice President and 
General Counsel George Newton, reported that the ruling frightened Louisiana’s business 
community: 
As undoubtedly as you are aware, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently handed 
down a strict products liability decision…which is simply disastrous for 
manufacturers and strict products liability defendants in general. The case is 
indicative of the direction in which the Louisiana Supreme Court has been 
moving for some time, and understandably has generated considerable alarm 
among our state’s defense bar and business community.24 
The firm later helped the tobacco industry oppose a local tobacco tax in New Orleans during the 
early 1990s (Chapter 6). 
The Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI) collaborated with Louisiana 
Citizens for Legal Common Sense, a committee of businesses including TI and defense lawyers, 
to overturn the Halphen ruling.24 (We did not find evidence the tobacco industry created the 
organization.) The group later included municipal governments and universities.25 In 1986 LABI 
asked Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler and Sarpy if their clients, which included RJ Reynolds, 
“As undoubtedly as you are aware, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court 
recently handed down a strict 
products liability decision … which 
is simply disastrous for 
manufacturers and strict products 
liability defendants in general.” 
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would provide money or lobbying assistance to help its coalition pass tort reform legislation.24 
According to the letter, McCall contacted RJR Vice President Newton about assisting the tort 
reform coalition because the Halphen ruling put the tobacco industry at a legal disadvantage in 
Louisiana: 
It occurred to me that Reynolds might be interested in contributing in some way, 
particularly in the effort to reverse Halphen, because this decision alone is going 
to cause great difficulty in defending tobacco litigation here in Louisiana.24 
We could not find evidence that RJR acted on LABI’s request for assistance during the 1986 
legislative session. However, RJR monitored tort reform efforts and considered assisting LABI 
and its allies to secure favorable legislation.  
The Tobacco Industry Observes Louisiana Business Community Tort Efforts 
 
 RJR had a tort reform program in 1986 focused on Louisiana, California, Florida, New 
Jersey, and Ohio.26 In May 1986, an RJ Reynolds lobbyist identified a tort reform bill from the 
Louisiana Law Institute (LLI) that RJR could attempt expanding to include language eliminating 
the unreasonably dangerous per se claim established by the Halphen case.27 LLI was formed at 
Louisiana State University in 1938 to provide legal research to the State of Louisiana, serve as a 
law reform agency, and act as an advisory commission on law revision.28 We do not know if RJR 
influenced LLI’s proposed legislation. 
TI, tobacco companies, and Covington and Burling monitored Louisiana tort reform 
efforts during 1986 as part of a joint surveillance program led by the industry’s Ad hoc 
Committee on Tort Reform, an offshoot of TI’s Committee of Counsel created in either 1985 or 
1986 to monitor and guide tobacco industry tort efforts.29 According to TI Senior Vice President 
Roger Mozingo at a TI Executive Committee Meeting on June 5, 1986: 
Tort Reform, one of the sexiest issues to come along in some time, is not lost on 
our troops. Our staff, legislative counsel and Covington and Burling have been 
working closely to monitor and report on significant tort reform measures in the 
states. 
In conjunction with the Ad Hoc Committee on Tort Reform, we are focusing our 
efforts in twelve priority states….30  
Besides Louisiana, some of the 12 states the Ad Hoc Committee initially monitored  were 
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania.31 
Mozingo and staff circulated memos requesting information on tort and liability reform 
legislation as well as tort coalition activity.32, 33 TI staff and lobbyists identified legislation for 
Covington and Burling to review, which the law firm ranked on relevance and importance to the 
tobacco industry.30 The Ad Hoc Committee then decided on whether TI and tobacco companies 
should take any action on specific legislation.   
The Louisiana State Legislature considered 18 tort and liability bills during the 1986 
legislative session.34 At the time, the insurance industry asserted nationally it was taking harmful 
profit losses.35 LABI and other Louisiana advocates of tort and liability reform argued that 
changes, in particular reductions to damages awarded in cases, were needed because of liability 
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insurance’s increasing costs, growing lack of availability, and decreasing coverage.35 LABI 
worked with the Coalition on Professional Liability, which consisted of eight unknown groups, 
to advance tort and liability legislation in Louisiana.35 TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry collected 
tort reform legislation for TI, but did not engage in or follow policy efforts by LABI and its 
allies.36 
LABI and its allies failed to secure meaningful tort or liability reform during the 1986 
legislative session, with most bills supported by the business association and its coalition dying 
in the House Civil Law Committee or on the House Floor.34 RJ Reynolds considered legislative 
efforts on tort reform dead by mid-June that session.37 Joint Committee Advisor William G. 
Campbell,38 considered a key contact on tort reform in Florida by Covington and Burling,39 cited 
several factors for LABI’s failed campaign in a June 16, 1986 memo  to General Counsel Samuel 
B. Witt about state-level industry efforts on tort, liability and insurance reform legislation: 
• Short time frame available 
• Too complex package (couldn’t simplify into a right or wrong issue) 
• Never got insurer profiteering issue under control 
• Never got to merits37 
 
LABI-led tort reform efforts had also encountered opposition from the Louisiana AFL-CIO and 
the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association (LTLA), both of whom TI considered well-financed.34  
Tobacco company representatives and officials considered joining LABI efforts to secure 
tort legislation during the 1987 legislative session. In his June 16 memo to RJR General Counsel 
Witt, Campbell stated “[I] Hear business group (LABI) is serious about going for it again next 
year (1987) with analogy being drawn to right to work or comp. reform which took 2-3 years and 
required some serious changes such as defeat of some targeted opponents.”37 Campbell 
suggested that RJ Reynolds send him and RJR State Public Affairs Manager Larry Bewley to 
Louisiana in July 1986 to evaluate conditions if the company was considering helping state tort 
reform efforts.37 
TI also considered joining future tort efforts in Louisiana during the 1987 session. TI 
Vice President Ron Morris reasoned in a June 27, 1986 memo to TI Senior Vice President Roger 
Mozingo:  
We could become a part of this 
effort. However, with the attitude 
towards cancer and the high 
incidence thereof in Louisiana we 
should maintain a low profile. Any 
direct efforts to change this law 
could be construed as ‘tobacco 
industry favors.’36  
Morris recommended that TI reach out to 
LABI or the Public Affairs Research 
Council, an independent Louisiana policy 
“We could become a part of this effort. 
However, with the attitude towards 
cancer and the high incidence thereof 
in Louisiana we should maintain a low 
profile. Any direct efforts to change 
this law could be construed as ‘tobacco 
industry favors.’”  
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think tank,40 regarding tobacco industry participation in efforts.36 Meanwhile, the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Tort Reform continued discussing Louisiana tort reform efforts at a meeting held 
in September 1986.41 TI stated in a November 5, 1986 document regarding state tort and liability 
efforts that an interim committee would develop tort reform legislation for 1987 in November 
1986.34  
In fall 1986, tobacco industry representatives conducted meetings in Louisiana to 
ascertain how to influence state tort efforts.42 In a September 3, 1986 memo describing industry 
meetings, TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris reasoned that TI could guide LABI’s tort 
reform plans towards tobacco industry priorities:  
The Louisiana Association of Business and Industry will pursue tort reform next 
year. As members of LABI, we should have an opportunity to input for suggested 
tort reform through this organization.42 
Besides TI, RJR State Public Affairs Manager Larry Bewley attended meetings on Louisiana tort 
reform in mid43 and late September.44 In late October, two RJR representatives, Larry Bewley 
and a person referred to as Murray, likely RJR State Government Relations Regional Director 
Joe Murray,45 joined a planning session for tort reform efforts in Louisiana.46 
At a meeting in November 1986, TI Southern Sector Senior VP M. Hurst Marshall tasked 
TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry with providing copies of introduced tort and liability legislation.47 
Marshall instructed Guidry to follow legislation selected by TI for observation, but told her not 
to act on tort reform unless requested to do so.47   
By early January, Covington and Burling charged its attorney John Seymour with 
overseeing industry tort reform efforts in Louisiana.48  
The Tobacco Industry Monitors and Provides Legislative Assistance for State Tort Reform 
Efforts in 1987 
 
Louisiana became one of few states in 1987 where TI actively engaged in tort reform 
efforts.29 TI allocated $535,091 to support LABI and tort reform efforts in Louisiana from April 
1, 1986 to December 31, 198749 (Table 8.2). Firm principal Randy Haynie later became a key 
lobbyist for Philip Morris in 1989, while firm principals CJ Blache and Johnny Koch became 
important lobbyists for RJ Reynolds by 1988 and 1989 respectively (Chapter 2).49  
 
TI and RJ Reynolds helped LABI develop its four-bill legislative tort reform package for 
1987. A February 13, 1987 memo to Covington and Burling’s tort reform team reported that, 
“Product liability legislative language and a supporting memorandum ha[d] been drafted as part 
of the efforts of the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry.”50 (We do not know what 
the legislation affected, or what the supporting memorandum asserted.) In addition, RJ Reynolds 
helped LABI craft an unspecified tort reform bill in Louisiana it was pursuing in other states.51 
After receiving assistance from the tobacco industry, LABI’s Louisiana Liability Task Force 
produced four tort bills for the 1987 legislative session seeking to make it more difficult to 
establish strict, joint, several and products liability, prejudgment interest, and comparative 
fault.52  
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Tort Reform Bills During the 1987 Legislative Session 
  
Lawmakers introduced 13 tort reform bills and one resolution during Louisiana’s 1987 
legislative session53 (Table 8.3); eight died without consideration.53 Of the bills, only HB 841 
was considered.53 
TI and RJ Reynolds let LABI lead public advocacy efforts for tort reform during the 1987 
legislative session. LABI publicly argued that Louisiana’s tort laws increased liability for 
companies, resulting in unaffordable insurance rates for businesses and fewer jobs.57 LABI also 
claimed increased liability discouraged companies from locating in Louisiana. The association 
argued that tort reform would lower business liability and reduce prohibitive insurance costs for 
Louisiana companies.   
LABI promoted its legislative package by attacking trial lawyers as the culprit for 
increased liability insurance costs that initially spurred the need for tort reform. LABI sponsored 
a poll of its manufacturing industry members and shared the results by late April that found 85% 
of respondents blamed lawyers and unwarranted lawsuits for insurance cost increases.57  
The Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association (LTLA), whose members represented plaintiffs 
in liability cases, opposed LABI’s legislative agenda.58 The LTLA asserted that LABI’s tort 
reform package would harm consumers while increasing LABI’s insurance company members’ 
profits. An LTLA representative argued that expensive liability insurance prices arose not from 
Louisiana law nor were they unique to the state, but instead resulted from insurance companies 
increasing premiums after interest rates decreased following a six-year period of high interest 
rates and low premiums. LTLA pursued a package during the 1987 legislative session to increase 
restrictions on insurance companies.58 
Table 8.2: TI Expenditures from April 1, 1986 to December 31, 1987 49 
Organization Known 
Reasons 
Expenditures 
(April 1, 1986 – 
July 31, 1987) 
Expenditures (August 
1, 1987-December 31, 
1987) 
Total 
Adams and Reese 
 
 $90,446 $20,616 $111,062 
Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, 
Toler and Sarpy 
 $110,248 $102,949*+ $213,917 
Blache, Haynie and Koch Legislative 
Consulting 
$97,580 $52,112 $149,692 
Faucheaux-Farwell 
Associates, Inc* 
Media 
Consulting 
$116,066 Unknown* $116,066 
Tarrance, Hill, Newport 
and Ryan 
Polling $10,300  $10,300 
Louisiana Association of 
Business and Industry 
Contribution $7,500  $7,500 
Total                                                                                        $608,537 
*Payments to Faucheaux-Farwell Associates, Inc from August 1, 1987-December 31, 1987 are included in figure 
for payment to Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler & Sarpy. Document author combined figures from the two firms. 
+$22,949.77 from amount spent during July 1987. 
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One tort reform bill, HB 841 by Representative Ron Gomez (D-Lafayette), passed in 
1987 despite aggressive opposition.59 As introduced to the legislature on April 29, 1987, the bill 
prevented plaintiffs from recovering damages if they were found to be over 50% at fault and  
Table 8.3:  Tort Reform Bills Introduced during the 1987 Legislative Session53-56 
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HB 506 John Hainkel (D-
Orleans) 
+ +        Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 841* Ron Gomez (D-
Lafayette) 
+ + +       Adopted 
HB 843 NJ D’amico (D-
Jefferson) 
+ +  +      Defeated in House 
HB 844 Unknown + +   +   +  Tabled on Senate Floor 
HB 932 Jimmy Dimos (D-
Ouachita) 
     +    Died with adjournment on 
House Floor 
HB 1552 Hunt Downer (D-
Lafourche) 
 +       + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 1603 Edward Deano (D- 
St.Tammany) 
      +   Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 1644 Charles Melancon 
(D-West Baton 
Rouge) 
 +        Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 1646 Charles Melancon 
(D-West Baton 
Rouge) 
        + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 1647 Charles Melancon 
(D-West Baton 
Rouge) 
      +   Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 350 Allen Bares (D-
Lafayette,  
Ron Gomez (D-
Lafayette) 
+ +  +      Died on Senate floor / 
Unfavorably Reported from 
Committee 
SB 351 Allen Bares (D-
Lafayette,  
Ron Gomez (D-
Lafayette) 
    +   +  Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 353 Allen Bares (D-
Lafayette,  
Ron Gomez (D-
Lafayette) 
+ +       + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SCR 175 --         + Adopted  
*Known LABI Louisiana Liability Task Force Bill. 
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lowered damages a defendant must pay if the plaintiff was partially responsible.53 HB 841 also 
removed joint and several liability from Louisiana law, which allows liability to be apportioned 
between defendants and makes them individually responsible for the entire amount of damages.53 
HB 841 reduced the amount of damages the tobacco industry faced in product liability lawsuits 
and prevented its inclusion in lawsuits relying on joint and several liability as well as its’ 
subsequent responsibility for total damages in such cases.  
HB 841 passed after limited amendments by state lawmakers. Representatives amended 
the bill on the House Floor to “apply joint and several liability for no more than half of a 
claimant’s damages,”53 or in other words, make defendants in such lawsuits individually 
responsible for only half of the damages awarded in a case instead of the entire amount. In 
addition, the House removed provisions limiting or eliminating damages to plaintiffs based on 
their degree of fault.53 HB 841 passed the legislature on June 23, 2017 without additional 
changes despite being unfavorably reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee and failing to 
pass its initial vote on the Senate Floor.53 Governor Edwin Edwards (D) threatened to veto HB 
841 but signed it on July 2, 1987.52, 53 As passed, the bill provided minimum protection to the 
tobacco industry by making it liable for only 50% of total damages in cases where joint and 
several liability was applied.53 LABI and its coalition anticipated that the Louisiana Trial 
Lawyers Association would attempt to dismantle HB 841 the following year.54 
Besides HB 841, Louisiana lawmakers adopted Senate Committee Resolution 175, which 
was introduced by Senator Donald Kelly (D-Natchitoches)56 on June 22, 1987.60 SCR 175 asked 
the governor to establish a committee to analyze “the liability crisis” and produce a report by 
July 1, 1989. TI directed lobbyists to monitor SCR 175 as it traveled through the legislature.61 
Louisiana lawmakers approved the resolution on July 3, 1987.60 Louisiana was one of four states 
to establish committees to study tort reform in 1987.53 Tort reform would remain an active 
political and legislative issue in coming sessions.   
Louisiana Lobbyists and the Tobacco Industry Advance Tort Reform Using Campaign 
Contributions 
 
The Louisiana business community and tobacco industry made campaign contributions 
for fall 1987 statewide elections through two state political action committees (PAC), the BHK 
PAC and the Adams and Reese PAC, to bolster tort reform efforts.62  The BHK PAC provided 
state government officials and lawmakers $89,558 during 1987 while Adams and Reese donated 
$110,308 that year.62 Leadership for both PACs emphasized to Baton Rouge newspaper The 
Advocate that their primary focus in making contributions was tort reform. The principles of the 
BHK PAC – Randy Haynie, CJ Blache, and Johnny Koch – were LABI Louisiana Liability Task 
Force members62 and subsequently became 
lobbyists for Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds 
(Chapter 2). Philip Morris stated BHK was RJ 
Reynold’s firm in an early January 1987 
document.63 BHK and the Adams and Reese PACs 
received multiple donations from the tobacco 
industry or affiliated companies during the 1987 
election season (Table 8.4). We do not know what 
Leadership for both PACs 
emphasized to Baton Rouge 
newspaper The Advocate that 
their primary focus in making 
contributions was tort reform. 
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percent of total contributions to each PAC consisted of tobacco industry donations. 
 
Tobacco Industry Increases Involvement in Louisiana Tort Reform Efforts in 1988 
 
The Tobacco Institute Weighs Tort Reform Prospects in 1988 
 
Louisiana remained one of nine states in which TI had the Ad Hoc Committee on Tort 
Reform or its affiliates gathering intelligence on tort reform efforts by the end of 1987.65 
 In early November 1987, TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris met TI lobbyist Joe 
Wood Guidry and RJR legal counsel Sam Witt in New Orleans to discuss plans for tort reform 
during the 1988 legislative session.66 At the meeting, Guidry told Morris she was involved with 
incoming governor Buddy Roemer’s (D) administration, providing the industry more influence. 
Running for office while he was serving as a United States congressman,67 Roemer won election 
in a 1987 state primary after Governor Edwin Edwards (D) decided not to participate in a runoff 
election.68 According to TI Regional VP Ron Morris, Roemer’s election put tobacco industry 
allies into politically influential jobs: 
Spoke with Joe Guidry, she has been working closely with the governor’s 
transition team. It appears many of our friends will be placed in important 
positions when the new leadership takes over in the house and senate.69 
Roemer took office on March 14, 1988,67 before that year’s legislative session started.  
In November and December 1987, TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry gaged lawmakers’ 
amenability to altering product liability laws and case law codification.70 Guidry found “the 
governor’s people” were interested in codifying tort reform and might submit legislation.70  
To reinforce Joe Wood Guidry’ efforts on tort reform, TI’s Morris wrote Brown and 
Williamson Senior Vice President and General Counsel Ernest Pepples on December 4, 1987 to 
suggest actions the industry could take to bolster her lobbying effectiveness. He asked Pepples to 
educate Guidry about Comment i and case law.70 According to Morris: 
Joe has expressed a desire for further interpretation for our proposed codification. 
In addition, she would appreciate a better understanding of Comment i. While she 
is a good lobbyist and has worked to draft legislation, she does not have a good 
understanding of case law. You might want to chat with [RJ Reynolds 
Government Relations employee] Sam Witt about this issue and set up a private 
meeting with Joe for the purpose of further education and instruction on the 
issue.70 
Table 8.4: Known Tobacco Industry Contributions to PACS for the 1987 Election62 
 BHK PAC Adams and Reese Total 
Philip Morris -- $50,000 $50,000 
RJ Reynolds -- $7,000 $7,000 
RJR / Nabisco $125,000 -- $125,000 
RJR / Nabisco of Atlanta -- $7,000 $7,000 
Brown and Williamson $17,500 $17,500 $35,000 
Miller Brewing (owned by PM64) $20,000 -- $20,000 
Total $162,500 $81,500 $244,000 
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In his letter, Morris also suggested that the tobacco industry’s tort reform group provide Joe 
Wood Guidry more money for her Green House program, a daily lunch service she hosted for 
state lawmakers.70 As Morris told Pepples: 
I believe it might be a wise investment, in order to enhance the tort reform effort, 
for the tort reform group to participate in the support of the Green House. If they 
could place $3-5000 in that area, and perhaps see their way clear to help Joe 
[Wood Guidry] with some additional pre-approved expenses, it would definitely 
be beneficial to the cause of tort reform.70 
TI had already donated to Guidry’s Green House program prior to Morris asking Pepples’ to 
contribute.70 We do not know if Brown and Williams provided the program additional funds.  
By February 1988, the tobacco industry considered tort reform in Louisiana a major 
objective for that year. In a “Southern Region Top 10 List” published on February 2, 1988, TI 
identified Louisiana as “the highest priority tort reform state due to very negative current law and 
possible favorable 1988 action.”71 TI believed it had a 50% chance of achieving industry tort 
objectives52, 71, 72 in Louisiana that year because it had developed stronger relationships with 
lawmakers and hired powerful legislative consultants in 1987.71 In addition, incoming governor 
Roemer’s economic development agenda included tort reform.71 
Tobacco industry officials continued debating the state of tort reform and the potential for 
legislative action in the winter and spring of 1988.73 RJR Regional Director Joe Murray attended 
a meeting to discuss tort reform in New Orleans on February 12, 1988.73 
In early February 1988, while the tobacco industry evaluated tort reform prospects and 
planned for the 1988 session, LABI announced it would host conferences throughout Louisiana 
dedicated to tort reform, campaign finance, worker’s and unemployment compensation, and 
economic reform in March.74 In a statement to the Baton Rouge Advocate, LABI president Ed 
Steimel claimed “ that’s a tall order to fill, but these are the issues on business’ agenda that we 
will discuss with the business community and lawmakers at conferences across the state.”74 
LABI organized tort reform conferences in Lafayette, Hammond, and Baton Rouge in 
conjunction with the chambers of commerce in each city.74 
LABI Hosts a Conference on California Proposition 65, Inadvertently Tarnishing the Tobacco 
Industry 
 
Besides hosting tort reform conferences, LABI organized a conference with the Louisiana 
State University Institute on Environmental Studies75 on the implications of California’s 
Proposition 65 for Louisiana. A ballot initiative adopted by California voters in 1986, 
Proposition 65 forced businesses to disclose to the public their exposure to chemicals that caused 
cancer, were harmful to reproductive health or led to birth defects.76 The proposition also 
prohibited substances subject to its provisions from being dumped into drinking water sources. 
By late March 1987, the environmental nonprofit Sierra Club claimed that Louisiana and 
Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri, New York, and Wisconsin expressed interest in adopting 
Proposition 65-like legislation.77 LABI organized the conference to deter adoption of similar 
legislation in Louisiana.78 LABI, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, and Louisiana 
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Chemical Producers provided funds for the event.79 TI officials monitored the development and 
execution of LABI’s Proposition 65 conference.80, 81  
 
LABI and LSU held their Proposition 65 
conference on April 11, 1988.82 Around 150 people 
attended the event, including some House and Senate 
Natural Resource Committee members. Experts at the 
conference asserted that higher cancer rates in Louisiana 
resulted partly from lifestyle decisions such as 
smoking.82 Cornell University toxicologist Chris 
Wilkinson presented on Louisiana cancer statistics and 
LSU pathology professor Dr. Pelayo Correa presented 
on cancer causes. Both presentations reported that 
higher cancer rates in Louisiana resulted from smoking 
and other personal behaviors.83 TI Issues Analyst Margaret Rita described the event for a TI 
conference to discuss regulation of dangerous and toxic materials on September 27, 1988: 
 
The seminar was held by the major business organizations in the state [Louisiana] 
for legislators and other public officials to show the downsides of Proposition 65 
in order to discourage its introduction in the 1988 legislative session…It turned 
out to be a tobacco industry-bashing seminar…with the “experts” concluding…if 
you want to do something about the levels of cancer in the state…do something 
about smoking.78 
After attending the meeting, House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Bruce Bolin 
(D-Minden84) filed HB 1068 to provide the State of Louisiana a “cause of action” to sue tobacco 
companies for costs incurred treating patients that developed lung cancer from smoking.82 The 
bill would allow the state to sue tobacco companies to recover its costs from treating tobacco-
related illnesses. 
Tort Reform Proponents Prepare for the 1988 Legislative Session While the Industry Observes 
 
The 1988 legislative session in Louisiana started on April 18, before LABI and the 
tobacco industry finalized their tort reform plans and legislation.85 Once done, LABI’s legislative 
package included a strict liability bill requiring plaintiffs harmed by a defective product in 
someone else’s possession to demonstrate the defendant owning the product was aware of the 
flaw and failed to fix the design problem. Another LABI bill eliminated the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s 1986 ruling finding manufacturers liable for harm caused by inherently dangerous 
products even if they were unaware of the hazard. 
LABI served as the public face for tort reform efforts in the 1988 session. Articles in 
Louisiana newspapers highlighted the organization’s leadership work to change liability laws. 
News coverage leading to the 1988 legislative session did not report tobacco industry 
participation, except for exposing in May 1988 that tobacco companies made contributions to the 
BHK PAC and Adams and Reese PACs, which had made donations to state legislators to 
influence product liability and tort reform outcomes.62 LABI expected to overcome opposition to 
its tort reform legislative agenda from the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association and other 
“… It turned out to be a 
tobacco industry-bashing 
seminar … with the “experts” 
concluding…if you want to do 
something about the levels of 
cancer in the state … do 
something about smoking.”  
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opponents during the 1988 session because Governor Ed Roemer supported reforms.85 
According to LABI President Ed Steimel in comments published by the Baton Rouge Advocate 
on April 14, 1988:  
We’re hoping that the whole tort issue can be substantially resolved…I think they 
[tort reform opponents] recognize that instead of having a governor in their camp 
that they have a governor who’s in the other camp, and that makes a big 
difference.85  
Governor Roemer had backed tort reform during his 1987 election campaign,85 and 
before assuming office in March 1988, told The Advocate that he would reduce business costs in 
Louisiana partly by pursuing reforms to Louisiana tort and insurance laws.86 Roemer established 
an advisory panel to investigate tort reform85 and produce a report. Responding to a question in 
mid-April from The Advocate asking if Governor Roemer backed LABI tort reform objectives, 
Roemer’s special counsel John Kennedy sidestepped the question and asserted:  
The goal is to try to improve our tort system so it is fair to the people of Louisiana 
in terms of preserving their rights, No. 1, and No. 2, also fair to the citizens of 
Louisiana who are businessmen as well as those who might like to come into the 
state to be businessmen.85  
LABI later supported SB 684, a bill drafted by Roemer’s administration to reduce liability for 
companies and remove liability for selling “unreasonably dangerous per se” products.87 TI and 
the tobacco industry helped push the legislation. 
The 1988 Legislative Session Starts 
  
State lawmakers introduced eighteen tort and liability bills for the 1988 session52, 88 
(Table 8.5). In a May 3, 1988 memo to Covington & Burling, TI Issues Analyst Margaret Rita 
identified three favorable tort reform bills, LABI-backed HB 701 and 702 by House Ways and 
Means Committee Chairman Ron Gomez, and an unspecified product liability bill submitted for 
Governor Roemer.89 Governor Roemer’s bill was likely SB 684, introduced by Senator John 
Hainkel. 
HB 701 determined defenses against liability if manufacturers had met government 
requirements for product standards and warning labels and removed liability for harm caused by 
an inherent characteristic of a product that a standard person could identify as hazardous or that 
the public considered “ordinary knowledge.”82, 88 The bill reflected reasoning that liability did 
not pertain to products that were by nature dangerous or viewed by the public as hazardous, 
similar to the Second Restatement of Torts  (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). Passage 
of HB 701 would overturn the 1986 Louisiana Supreme Court Ruling that LABI opposed. 
HB 702, also supported by LABI,82 required plaintiffs to prove defendants knew or 
should have known about the hazard that caused the injury leading to the plaintiff’s claim. To be 
liable, the bill stipulated that defendants also had to be able to eliminate the hazard that harmed 
the plaintiff through “the exercise of reasonable care.”88  
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Table 8.5: Tort Reform and Product Liability Legislation Introduced in the 1988 Session52, 88 55, 56, 89 
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HB 701 Ron Gomez (D-Lafayette), 
NJ D’amico (D-Jefferson) 
+        Died with adjournment 
HB 702 Ron Gomez (D-Lafayette), 
NJ D’amico (D-Jefferson) 
+        Died with adjournment 
HB 1068 Bruce Bolin (D-Webster)       +  Defeated 
HB 1535 Bruce Bolin (D-Webster)  +       Died with adjournment 
HB 1600 Robert Garrity (R-Jefferson)   +      Died with adjournment 
HB 1636 Robert Waddell (D-Caddo) +    +    Died with adjournment 
SB 337 Mike Foster (D-Assumption)   +      Withdrawn 
SB 400 Randy Ewing (D-Jackson) +        Died with adjournment 
SB 450 John Hainkel (D-Jefferson) +        Died with adjournment 
SB 681 John Hainkel (D-Jefferson) +  +     + Died with adjournment 
SB 684 John Hainkel (D-Jefferson) +   +  +   Adopted 
SB 686 John Hainkel (D-Jefferson) +  +      Died with adjournment 
SB 690 John Hainkel (D-Jefferson)        + Died with adjournment 
SB 692 John Hainkel (D-Jefferson)        + Withdrawn 
SB 758 Ben Bagert (D-Orleans)        + Died with adjournment 
SB 803 Donald Kelly (D-Rapides)        + Died with adjournment 
SB 806 Donald Kelly (D-Rapides) +    +    Died with adjournment 
SB 811 Ben Bagert (D-Orleans)  +      + Died with adjournment 
SB 885 Donald Kelly (D-Rapides) +    + +   Died with adjournment 
*Toxic torts are defined as harm resulting from exposure to hazardous substances. 
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HB 701 and HB 702 were referred to the Committee on Civil Law and Procedure for 
initial consideration.82  
Governor Roemer’s administration filed tort reform bills on May 2, 1988 as part of its 
legislative package,82 including Senator John Hainkel’s SB 684.90 The bill limited causes of 
action against companies for injuries caused by manufacturing, design, and warning defects in a 
product as well as harm caused by violating a product’s express warranty.52, 91 Of relevance to 
tobacco, SB 684 mandated that claimants in liability lawsuits over harm caused by a design 
defect prove that an alternative design existed during manufacturing that would have stopped 
injury,91 and “that the benefits of that alternative design outweighed its risks.”52 To win a 
liability case against tobacco companies if SB 684 passed, plaintiffs would have to demonstrate 
manufacturers possessed a safer design with overall more positive than negative effects 
compared to the design used for the product at the time. SB 684 also removed the ability to sue 
over harm caused by “inherently dangerous products.” Lastly, SB 684 established that warnings 
were unnecessary for dangerous product characteristics if they were “not more dangerous than 
would be expected” by a normal individual with “ordinary knowledge common to the 
community.” The bill made a product liability claim against the tobacco industry significantly 
harder than existing tort law in Louisiana, which had been interpreted to hold companies liable 
for all harm caused by their products regardless of their characteristics or the entity’s knowledge 
of the hazard that caused harm after the State 
Supreme Court’s ruling in the 1986 Halphen Case. 
Tobacco companies would be able to avoid liability 
in lawsuits claiming their products featured 
inadequate warnings by asserting that the general 
public was aware of the dangers of tobacco 
consumption if SB 684 passed.  
Language in SB 684 regarding liability for 
unreasonably dangerous products and liability over 
warnings for such products reflected tobacco 
industry suggestions to ALI’s Second Restatement of Torts.13 Design liability language in SB 
684 was similar to industry-desired language included in the Third Restatement of Torts that was 
released in the 1990s.13 LABI’s tort reform coalition favored SB 684,91 which eliminated the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s 1986 ruling making manufacturers liable for inherently unsafe 
products.  
 In contrast to HB 701, HB 702 and SB 684, Representative Bruce Bolin’s (D-Minden) 
legislation, HB 1068, increased the tobacco industry’s exposure to lawsuits. Introduced on May 
2, 1988, HB 1068 provided the State of Louisiana a cause of action against tobacco companies 
permitting it to seek compensation for treating patients that developed lung cancer from using 
tobacco products.89 Bolin was inspired to draft HB 106892 from presentations he heard at LABI’s 
Proposition 65 conference asserting Louisiana’s high cancer rates were partly because of 
smoking habits and other lifestyle choices.89, 92 (We do not know if health advocates encouraged 
or assisted Bolin’s introduction of HB 1068.) HB 1068 also prevented tobacco company 
defendants from using “assumption of risk, victim fault, and comparative or contributory 
negligence” to defeat the state’s claims. The bill was referred to the House Civil Law and 
Procedure Committee upon introduction.89 
LABI’s tort reform coalition 
favored SB 684, which 
eliminated the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s 1986 ruling 
making manufacturers liable for 
inherently unsafe products. 
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RJR State Government Relations Regional Director Joe Murray93 considered these 
provisions “[t]he Real Concern” of the bill for the tobacco industry in a June 8, 1988 memo94  to 
RJR’s Senior Vice President of Government Relations (who was W.E.(Gene) Ainsworth at the 
time).95, 96 According to an uncredited analysis of HB 1068 from TI’s records: 
HB 1068 allows the State to recover from a tobacco manufacturer all medical 
costs and expenses of treating a smoker, even where a court has held that the 
manufacturer was not legally responsible for a smoker’s lung cancer. The bill 
applies only to medical costs for lung cancer. 
This is true even where a Court has found that the smoker was himself totally and 
exclusively at fault for his injuries or disability.  
The bill thus provides a standard of absolute liability against a party who is not 
negligent and not at fault [emphasis original].97 
The Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association and the Louisiana Consumers League filed and 
backed anti-tort reform legislation during the 1988 legislative session while advocating against 
industry tort reform measures, although we do not know the specific bills.85 We did not find 
evidence that tobacco control advocates opposed tort efforts in the 1988 session. 
Tobacco Industry Efforts During 1988 
 
The tobacco industry monitored Louisiana for legislative developments on tort reform89 
and tracked tort and liability legislation.89, 98-103 TI Regional VP Ron Morris104 and TI 
representative Joe Wood Guidry105 lobbied on Louisiana tort reform. TI sent Covington and 
Burling attorney Dick Kingham to assist Guidry,106 and an unnamed Philip Morris lobbyist also 
participated in tort efforts during the 1988 session.103 TI Legislative Information Director107 
Cathy Yoe sent Morris and Guidry testimony for product liability bills in Rhode Island and 
Wisconsin to help them ready for a hearing on an unspecified bill in Louisiana.106  
In June 1988, near the legislative session’s end, TI learned that LABI and its coalition 
had prevented the reelection of tobacco industry ally Senator Cliff Newman (D-Lake Charles) 
because the organization considered him “anti-business.”108 According to a June 3, 1988 memo 
from TI Regional VP Ron Morris to TI Vice President of Administration Bill Cannell,109 
Newman “had been a supported [sic] of ours throughout his term and had been a floor speaker in 
our behalf on more than one occasion.”108 (We did not find records elaborating on the legislative 
efforts he assisted the industry with.) While TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry and the Louisiana 
Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributors Association (LWTCDA)  raised $12,000 in 
contributions for Newman’s 1987 campaign, LABI and its coalition gave over $20,000 to his 
opponent.108 Morris felt the tobacco industry could have converted Newman to support tort 
reform if the coalition notified it beforehand108 and bemoaned the waste of a senior senator with 
influence as well as the industry’s lost campaign funds.108 In his memo to Cannell, Morris stated 
he desired to avoid future disconnects with allies in other states.108  
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Outcome of 1988 Tort Reform Legislation 
 
State lawmakers passed Senator John Hainkel’s SB 684, which overturned the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s 1986 ruling that companies were liable for harms caused by unreasonably 
dangerous products.52 HB 701 and 702 both died without consideration,88 and HB 1068, which 
would have made cigarette manufacturers liable for harms caused by their products, died on June 
16 in a 68 – 27 vote on the House Floor after surviving the House Civil Law Committee.88  
 Around a week87, 110 after SB 684 passed, the American Tort Reform Association 
(ATRA) praised Louisiana’s progress on tort reform. ATRA was formed by the American 
Council of Engineering Companies and the American Medical Association in 1986 to advocate 
for tort and liability reform.111 ATRA received millions of dollars directly from Philip Morris 
and other tobacco companies.3, 111 The tobacco industry also made indirect contributions to 
ATRA through allied law firm Covington and Burling.111 In a June 30, 1988 press release ATRA 
Executive Director Blair Childs said, “Louisiana is a good example of what is happening in 
states that continue to build on laws enacted in previous years.”110 In February 1989, the 
American Tort Reform Association recognized the LABI Louisiana Liability Task Force with an 
Achievement Award for helping pass SB 684.112  
TI’s State Activities Division considered 
Louisiana’s 1988 legislative session a successful 
model for tort reform efforts across the United States. 
The division incorporated presentations and panel 
discussions by TI Regional VP Ron Morris on how TI 
staff helped secure SB 684 into law and defeated HB 
1068 into a tort reform and product liability law 
meeting for TI lobbyists held in Tucson, Arizona on 
September 27, 1988.104 TI lobbyist Joe Wood Guidry was supposed to participate in the meeting 
but did not attend because of a Louisiana special session convened at the time to consider tax 
legislation (Chapter 6).104  
In an October 1988 Special Session113 (Chapter 6), the Louisiana Legislature passed a bill 
supported by the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association that delayed implementation of SB 684 to 
Governor Roemer for approval.52 Roemer vetoed the legislation.52  
Tort Reform Efforts in 1989 and 1990 
 
After helping pass SB 684 during the 1988 legislative session, TI and RJ Reynolds 
evaluated 1989 tort reform prospects in Louisiana. In a November 18, 1988 State and Local 
Legislative Forecast, TI’s State Activities Division predicted a 50% chance of Louisiana 
lawmakers introducing any tort reform legislation during the 1989 legislative session.114 The 
Institute believed adopting tort reform legislation was unlikely and categorized Louisiana as a 
secondary priority for nationwide tort reform efforts that year. In contrast, an RJR document 
listed Louisiana as one of eight major states for tort reform during 1989.115  
As the 1989 legislative session neared, TI and Covington and Burling anticipated 
defending against legislation making the tobacco industry liable for harm caused by their 
products. In April 1989, Covington and Burling expressed concern to TI Issue Analyst Margaret 
TI’s State Activities Division 
considered Louisiana’s 1988 
legislative session a successful 
model for tort reform efforts 
across the country …. 
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Rita that TI lobbyist Joe Wood Berry (Joe Wood Guidry remarried and became Joe Wood Berry 
by May 1989;116, 117 Chapter 2) would be overloaded managing “the cigarette manufacturer 
liability issue” alongside fending off other tobacco control policies, particularly tax increases.118 
Rita informed TI Regional VP Ron Morris of Covington and Burling’s concerns, who replied 
that Joe Wood Berry did not have to handle tobacco tax legislation during the upcoming 
session.118 Rita notified Covington and Burling that Berry would not have to monitor and 
advocate on tax legislation alongside tort reform during the 1989 session.  
Louisiana legislators introduced 8 tort reform and product liability bills during the 1989 
session, with only HB 487 by Hunt Downer (D-Houma) and HB 631 by Allen Bradley (D-
Beauregard)55 passing into law.119 HB 487 banned applying money amounts to damages affected 
in initial (original) and  amended (demands altered to change monetary demand or respondent 
from initial demand) demand that did not pertain to evidence.119 The bill also prohibited applying 
money amounts to incidental demands unrelated to evidence, demands where an outside party 
“asserts a claim that is related to the plaintiff’s suit.” 22, 119 
HB 631 reduced damages given to subrogees (parties that substitute for the original 
claimant) in proportion to the reduced awards received by their clients based on comparative 
fault.119 For example, insurance companies oftentimes become subrogees and seek damages after 
paying their clients’ policies. HB 631 limited damages a subrogee could obtain from the tobacco 
industry based on damages their client held in their case according to their degree of fault.  HB 
631 limited the amount of money insurance companies could seek from tobacco companies and 
others based on their client’s degree of fault. 
Louisiana lawmakers remained active on tort reform in 1990 and introduced at least four 
tort and liability bills during that session.52 TI spent $209,740 on lawyers, lobbyists,  and LABI’s 
coalition to assist state tort reform efforts 120 (Table 8.6), but we could not find reports of other 
specific engagement. 
 
Tort Reform Efforts in 1991 
 
Preparing for 1991, Philip Morris anticipated attacks on tort reform laws that the tobacco 
industry had secured in Louisiana and four other states.52, 121 In Philip Morris’ Corporate Affairs  
January 1991 draft five-year business plan, company officials intended to protect legislative 
gains on tort reform in Louisiana, California, New Jersey, Ohio, and other states.121 The 
company also planned to secure favorable liability legislation in states, particularly Pennsylvania 
and Texas. Philip Morris planned to advance its tort agenda nationwide by having legal and 
issues teams develop plans for each state using input from its state government affairs 
Table 8.6: Tobacco Institute Tort Reform Project Expenses 1990-1991120 
Costs 1990 1991 (Budgeted) 1992 (Budgeted) 
Breazeale, Sachse 59,436 77,000  
Chaffe, McCall 54,359 46,000  
Haynie & Associates 72,945 0  
Louisiana Governmental Studies, Inc. 15,000 0  
LABI Coalition 8000 10,000 10,000 
Total 209,740 133,000 10,000 
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representatives, PMUSA, and regional Miller Beer (a Philip Morris subsidiary) entities. It also 
intended to collaborate with non-tobacco manufacturers and state and national tort coalitions to 
obtain favorable liability legislation. In addition, Philip Morris intended to fund and work with 
national and local organizations supportive of tort reform and engage with municipal and local 
business organizations. The company also sought to generate favorable research on tort reform 
through unspecified think tanks and by contracting studies, mentioning the impact of tort laws on 
state economies as an example in its business plan.  
RJ Reynolds planned to prevent “attempts 
to repeal or weaken” tort reform laws in 
Louisiana, California and New Jersey in its 1991 
business plan.122 The company expected the 
Louisiana State Law Institute at LSU, which 
provided the state with legal research and reform 
recommendations,28 to introduce legislation to 
allow punitive damages in liability lawsuits if the 
state the plaintiff resided in or was harmed in permitted them.52 The Louisiana Law Institute 
failed to secure similar legislation in 1990. Louisiana did not award punitive damages in liability 
lawsuits except for some explicitly permitted situations.123 RJR also expected the plaintiff’s bar 
to push legislation limiting or repealing SB 684, the 1988 legislation that had limited liability for 
inherently dangerous products. The company felt LABI’s tort reform coalition could defend the 
law.52 
Outside tobacco company plans, LABI announced in a 1991 report that it would seek 
legislation limiting liability for businesses and individuals and fight bills to soften or relax tort 
reform laws.124 LABI also wanted to encourage “judicial excellence,” undefined, via unspecified 
programs and legislation. LABI planned to contribute over $1 million to legislative candidates in 
1991.125, 126 On March 21, 1999, LABI President Dan Juneau expressed concern to the Baton 
Rouge Advocate that state election results could reverse progress on tort reform policy stating, 
“Everything can disappear in three weeks if the wrong people come back.”126 Juneau feared the 
election could bring in new lawmakers that would eliminate business friendly legislation secured 
over the past 4 years. LABI wanted a majority of incumbents reelected in 1991, and urged voters 
to not purge incumbents.125 According to a June 1992 tort reform report from TI’s records, after 
Louisiana’s election in November 1991 LABI’s tort reform rival, “the Louisiana Trial Lawyer 
Association[,] gained an overwhelming political advantage in the legislature.”127 
The 1991 Legislative Session 
 
Lawmakers introduced 14 tort and product liability bills during the 1991 legislative 
session. According to TI and Covington & Burling’s Tort Reform Project in a July 23, 1991 
memo circulated after the legislative session, none of the bills introduced negatively affected 
product liability laws the industry hoped to preserve.128  
However, lawmakers passed one bill, HB 251 by Representative Randy Roach (D-
Calcasieu)55, which exposed the tobacco industry to damages in product liability lawsuits. HB 
251 allowed punitive damages in cases where plaintiffs were injured in or defendants resided in a 
state that permitted punitive damages.129 As adopted, plaintiffs could seek punitive damages 
from the tobacco industry in Louisiana if they suffered harm in or the company was based in a 
RJR also expected the plaintiff’s 
bar to push legislation limiting or 
repealing SB 684, the 1988 bill 
limiting liability for inherently 
dangerous products.  
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state that awarded them. Provision of punitive damages is prohibited under Louisiana law except 
under limited, specified circumstances.123 We could not find information on tobacco industry 
efforts around HB 251. The legislation was similar to what RJ Reynolds expected from the 
Louisiana Law Institute.52, 128 
Lead up to 1992 
 
Following the 1991 legislative session, TI and Covington and Burling’s Tort Reform 
Project evaluated efforts in Louisiana and other states. In a memo circulated on July 23, 1991, 
the Tort Reform Project suggested that an unnamed policy committee investigate ways to bolster 
tort reform efforts in Louisiana.128 In September 1991, Covington and Burling and the Task 
Force on Product Liability held a meeting where they tasked TI with performing an analysis, 
preparing a budget, developing tactics, and establishing a plan to defend existing product liability 
laws and prevent passage of laws that would erode the industry’s position in Louisiana, New 
Jersey and Ohio by October 7, 1991.130 Prior to primary elections in October and general 
elections in November 1991,131 the Tort Reform Project considered the Louisiana Trial Lawyers 
Association a strong foe with a powerful lobbying presence and access to multiple key 
lawmakers (Table 8.7). The Tort Reform Project expected the LTLA to give $1.5 million in 
campaign contributions during the 1991 election cycle, an amount it recognized the tobacco 
industry and Louisiana businesses could not match.131 
 
 The Tort Reform Project proposed forming a coalition to defeat unfavorable tort and 
product liability efforts by the LTLA in 1992.131 The plan suggested creating the coalition with 
LABI, an unspecified medical society, and entities from the tobacco, petroleum, auto, 
pharmaceutical, insurance, agribusiness products, dairy, business products, waste management, 
paper, utility, hospital, and chemical industries.127, 131 The coalition would gather lawmakers’ 
stances on tort reform, determine their information needs, and share such information to calibrate 
group efforts.131 The Tort Reform Project recommended that RJ Reynolds lobbyist CJ Blache 
serve as principal counsel for the coalition and guide group efforts and that TI lobbyist Joe Wood 
Berry serve as additional counsel for the coalition.131 
The coalition plan established a comprehensive legislative advocacy strategy to advance 
the industry’s tort reform agenda. Coalition lobbyists would analyze lawmakers’ stances on 
Table 8.7: State Lawmakers Considered Allies of the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association on Tort Reform131 
Lawmaker Chamber Special Legislative Roles 
Labeled an 
Ally Outside 
of Tort Reform 
Jimmy Dimos (D-Monroe) House Speaker N/A 
Charles D. Jones (D-Monroe) House Chairman, Legislative Black Caucus  N/A 
Allen Bradley (D-Deridder) House Chairman, Civil Law and Procedure 
Committee 
N/A 
Robert Garrity (R-River Ridge) House  N/A 
Mitch Landrieu (D-New Orleans) House  N/A 
Don Kelly (D-Natchitoches) Senate  Yes 
Sid Nelson (D-Shreveport) Senate  N/A 
Armand Brinkhaus (D-Sunset) Senate  Yes 
Dennis Bagneris (D-New Orleans) Senate  N/A 
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unspecified committees pertaining to tort reform and liability legislation. Using legislative 
committee members’ positions on tort reform, the coalition would develop comments on tort and 
liability legislation and ascertain if witnesses needed to appear at committee hearings.131 The 
plan also called for creation of a panel of coalition lobbyists to contact gubernatorial candidates 
and find their positions on tort reform and product liability issues. The coalition would also 
develop amendments for unfavorable bills before hearings and brief and recruit lawmakers to 
propose them, as well as identify procedural tactics to slow bills in the legislature.   
The Tort Reform Project’s coalition plan also included a multifaceted public outreach 
campaign to pressure lawmakers into supporting tort reform using phone, print, mail and other 
methods financed by member dues.131 The plan tasked the coalition with recruiting important 
constituents to pressure lawmakers into taking positions on tort and liability legislation favorable 
to the tobacco industry. The Project planned for Covington and Burling to provide $2,500 to the 
coalition and for group members to provide $50,000 donations to fund efforts.131 In addition, the 
plan called for coalition members to each give another $10,000 to the coalition’s PAC. We do 
not know if contributions were made as listed, but the Tort Reform Project stated at least 
$100,000 was spent on the coalition and $79,381 on services from firm Chaffee, McCall for 
product liability efforts, and another $40,000 used for contingency purposes.132 We do not know 
if the budget figures include contributions from other parties involved in Louisiana or just the 
Tort Reform Project.132 
As the tobacco industry planned for the next legislative session, in fall 1991 LABI’s 
Louisiana Liability Task Force established policy and procedure objectives for 1992.133 The 
objectives included securing legislation to reduce liability exposure for businesses and 
individuals, establish “fair allocation” of rewards from suits, bar insurance policies and 
coverages from inclusion in a claim, remove appellate review of factual conclusions from civil 
suits, and make trials by jury in civil suits a right under the state constitution.133 The task force 
also sought to reduce the number of legislators who were trial lawyers that sat on state judiciary 
committees “to assure balanced membership” according to an RJR document circulated in 
November 1991.133  
Election Galvanizes Industry Efforts to Defend Tort Reform Laws 
 
The results of Louisiana’s 1991 
statewide elections in November 
strongly favored tort reform opponents, 
necessitating a strong defense by the 
tobacco industry to protect favored tort 
and liability laws.127 According to a 
June 1992 Louisiana Legislative Report 
on Tort Reform found in TI’s records: 
The Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association (LTLA) gained an overwhelming 
political advantage in the legislature as a result of the November 1991 statewide 
elections. The legislature is dominated by the Democrats in both chambers. The 
Senate is extremely sympathetic to the plaintiff’s trial bar as are key committees 
in the House. Since there will not be another statewide election until 1995, the 
business community will have to focus its efforts on defending past reforms.127 
“The Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association 
gained an overwhelming political 
advantage in the legislature … the 
business community will have to focus its 
efforts on defending past reforms.”  
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LTLA had donated $1.2 million to candidates during the election, helping the organization 
increase lawyer membership in the state legislature and secure allies on legislative 
committees.134  
LABI contributed an unknown amount to legislators to protect its and the business 
community’s tort agenda while the tobacco industry provided $121,900 for the 1991 election 
cycle (Chapter 3). TI determined 12 of the 35 representatives newly-elected to the House were 
lawyers, bringing the total amount of attorneys in the chamber to 31.134 TI figured LTLA had 
over 40 reliable representatives in the 105 member House, and that the legal organization needed 
only 23 additional votes to pass legislation. According to TI in a February 1992 political analysis 
of Louisiana Tort Reform efforts, the 1991 election also eliminated all of the business 
community’s Senate allies and brought the number of lawyers serving in the 39-member 
chamber from 11 to 15. LTLA-friendly Representatives and Senators were appointed as 
chairpersons or made members of committees that considered tort legislation. TI recognized the 
state legislature’s composition would remain adverse until the next election in four years. 
Governor Ed “Buddy” Roemer (R), who had switched from the Democratic Party to the 
Republican Party in March 1991135 and was a strong backer of tort reform, lost reelection in 
1991 to former governor Edwin Edwards (D), whom the tobacco industry saw as inclined to 
LTLA’s positions on tort and product liability laws.127 Governor Edwards stated he would 
approve any tort legislation he received.134 
TI Regional Vice President Ron Morris and unidentified legislative counsel from TI 
alerted TI to the outcome of Louisiana’s election and its prospects on tort reform efforts in 
December 1991.136 TI’s counsel warned that the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association would 
push unfavorable punitive damage and protective order bills in the sympathetic political 
climate.136 Protective orders prohibit a party from revealing information learned about an 
opposing party in a case, to preclude them from unfairly encumbering or inflicting harm on them 
using the information.137 LTLA sought to legislatively prevent tobacco companies and other 
businesses from using protective orders to keep unfavorable information in product liability 
lawsuits secret.138 
In a February 19, 1991 memo regarding Louisiana’s tort landscape after the election, TI 
Regional VP David Hooper told Covington and Burling’s tobacco industry counsel Keith A. 
Teel: 
It is the assessment of the Louisiana team that LTLA will seize this opportunity to 
launch a simultaneous, multi-issue front to overwhelm opposition and to ensure a 
strong bargaining position for LTLA priorities.134  
TI’s legislative counsel also expected LTLA to weaken SB 846, the 1988 bill LABI and the 
tobacco industry succeeded in passing that removed liability for harm caused by inherently 
dangerous products.136 By February 19, 1992, TI officials expected LTLA to seek industry-
adverse joint and several liability provisions.134 
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Initial Consideration of a Comprehensive Tort Reform Coalition in Louisiana 
  
To prevent the LTLA from weakening or eliminating tort reform laws, a group identified 
in documents from TI’s records as the Louisiana Tort Team proposed another plan to form a 
strong statewide tort reform coalition backed by the tobacco industry in 1992. The Louisiana 
Tort Team sent a memo to the Lawyers for Civil Justice139 (LCJ) Ad Hoc Committee for 
Louisiana on January 30, 1992 detailing Louisiana’s tort reform landscape and a plan to advance 
industry objectives in that area.140 LCJ is a national nonprofit composed of defense and corporate 
lawyers seeking to reduce legal costs for business and industry through litigation reforms141 that 
advocated for tort reform in the early 1990s.142 In its January 30 memo to the LCJ Committee, 
the Louisiana Tort Team reasoned that state elections in 1991 made the Louisiana Trial Lawyers 
Association likely to attack the business community’s progress on tort reform: 
As a result of the successes of the LA Trial Lawyers during the recent LA 
legislative elections and governor’s election, Business enters the 1992-1996 
legislative term in a trial lawyer pro-active climate. The Trial Lawyers almost 
certainly will initiate a major effort on protective orders, as they did last year. 
Punitive damages, joint and several liability, third-party tort and the 1988 
products statute could also be included in the Trial Lawyers Legislative Package 
for the upcoming session.140 
In this newly adverse legislative climate, the Tort Team felt that the Louisiana 
Legislature’s House of Representatives remained the friendliest to business interests and 
suggested implementing a media campaign to kill legislation there to develop a favorable public 
opinion and political climate.140 With assistance from LABI’s Liability Task Force, the 
Louisiana Tort Team planned to conduct public outreach using phone calls, mailers, surveys, 
newspapers, radio, and television to convince Louisianans that shifting liability laws towards 
plaintiffs and their lawyers was unfair to businesses and a threat to the economy.140  
 The Louisiana Tort Team proposed 
forming a coalition of companies called Louisiana 
Business for Civic Justice to defend against the 
Louisiana Trial Lawyer Association’s legislative 
agenda.140 The Team saw a coalition as a method 
to defend against anti-tort attacks while allowing 
LABI, a business association, to also pursue its broader legislative agenda.140 According to the 
January 30, 1992 memo sent by the Louisiana Tort Team to the LCJ Ad Hoc Committee on 
Louisiana: 
The formation of a new coalition recognizes that (1) LABI is concerned with 
other legislative programs in addition to tort matters and (2) a single-purpose 
coalition is necessary to counter the Trial Lawyers’ strength on tort issues.140 
 The Louisiana Team proposed implementing the public outreach and coalition-building 
plan beginning on February 1, 1992 until the legislative session’s end on June 22, 1992, and 
estimated it would cost $300,000.140 The Team suggested that the National LCJ Ad-Hoc 
Committee make one of its members a liaison to the Louisiana Tort Team to help steer its and 
the campaign’s efforts. The Team recommended that the coalition arrange meetings on public 
“… a single-purpose coalition is 
necessary to counter the Trial 
Lawyers’ strength on tort issues.”  
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liability issues in critical legislative districts, conduct public outreach via surveys, mailers, and 
phone calls in critical districts, and form a mailing list of businesses and important figures in the 
districts of approximately 80 legislators. As part of the Team’s plan, its members would meet 
with state lawmakers on behalf of the coalition to determine their stance on tort reform.140 In 
particular, the Team planned to meet with the entire House of Representatives, the House 
Insurance and Civil Law Committees, and members of the Senate Judiciary A and B Committees 
to ascertain their stance on the coalition’s tort objectives and share policy papers with them. The 
Team recommended acquiring a local person to act as the coalition’s chairperson. Team 
members expected the coalition chairperson to regularly “represent, coordinate, and work” 
alongside the Louisiana Tobacco Team, LABI, the National LCJ Ad-Hoc Committee, and public 
relations firms 
 The tobacco industry and the Louisiana business community ultimately did not follow the 
Louisiana Tort Team’s plan but did utilize LCJ to help steer tort reform efforts. Instead of 
forming a coalition aligned with LCJ, LABI established a Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse 
coalition.143 The tobacco industry, manufacturers and Louisiana businesses instead used LCJ as 
an informational and coordinating clearinghouse for 1992 tort efforts.143 
The Tobacco Industry Helps Form Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse in Louisiana  
 
Initial Coalition Planning by the Louisiana Business Community 
 
On February 11, 1992, a team of unidentified Louisiana lobbyists (relationship to the 
tobacco industry unknown) released a three component plan to defend tort and liability laws 
against LTLA attacks.144 One part tasked LABI with performing early outreach to Louisianans 
by sending mailers to its members regarding LTLA tort and liability efforts between February 11 
and March 30. It also called for LABI to arrange a state survey “on key legislative issues to 
identify economic development, privacy issues and plaintiff lawyer influence as key public 
concerns” that February, and possibly indicate other organizations to the planners that could 
disseminate information about trial lawyers’ legislative activities to their members.144 
Another component consisted of a nationally-oriented media program designed to 
negatively characterize the Louisiana Trial Lawyer Association’s tort agenda and tort legislation 
while bolstering the image of tort reform efforts.144 Titled “The Louisiana Civil Justice Watch,” 
the campaign sought to draw national business and media attention to Louisiana using the 
country’s interest in the state government and Governor Edwin Edwards.144 To disseminate 
information, the campaign would notify employees at companies and associations about 
Louisiana tort efforts via internal mailers, routinely alert the press regarding the “threat to 
existing civil justice laws,” circulate action alerts to national business organizations, and hold 
press briefings and conferences.144 
The plan also called for formation of a Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALA) coalition 
by business interests to conduct legislative and public outreach as well as administration of a 
nationwide media and business outreach campaign to create pressure against weakening 
Louisiana’s existing tort and liability laws.144 The plan’s authors predicted the program would 
cost $160,000 to engage in general education and outreach efforts but  $410,000 total to 
administer if LTLA launched a strong policy campaign in 1992.144 The standard plan allotted 
$70,000 to public outreach by LABI, $60,000 for creating and running CALA, and $30,000 for a 
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media campaign. If LTLA waged a strong policy effort, the plan called for spending $100,000 on 
policy outreach and $310,000 total on CALA. Media spending remained the same regardless of 
LTLA launching a strong campaign. Ultimately the standard, less expensive plan was 
implemented in the 1992 session.143 
Origins of Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse 
 
Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALA) started as a local tort reform group that grew 
into numerous regional astroturf coalitions. The Rio Grande Valley Texas Chamber of 
Commerce formed the first CALA organization in 1991 in Weslaco, Texas without assistance 
from tobacco companies or any other major corporations. The Rio Grande Valley Chamber of 
Commerce created CALA to offset “a judicial climate it felt was too pro-consumer” following a 
local company settling a wrongful termination lawsuit by paying $2.5 million in damages.145 
CALA publicly claimed its mission was to stop “lawsuit abuse.”  
Unpopular and untrusted by the public, the 
tobacco industry used existing CALAs and formed 
new CALA chapters to generate the appearance of 
popular support for its tort reform objectives.3 As 
early as 1992, the tobacco industry began funding 
CALA groups directly and indirectly through 
APCO and the American Tort Reform Association 
(ATRA).3 APCO is a public relations organization 
formed by law firm Arnold & Porter, which 
represented Philip Morris and other major 
corporations.146 APCO advised industry tort efforts in multiple states, and helped form CALAs 
and the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA).146 CALA branches across the nation relied 
predominantly on messaging and advertising produced by APCO to generate public support for 
tort reform.3 ATRA is a tort reform advocacy nonprofit composed of industry and medical 
organizations.111 It was formed in 1986 by the American Council of Engineering Companies and 
the American Medical Association.111 
 
LABI Moves to Form a CALA Chapter in Louisiana  
 
After Louisiana business lobbyists released their plan to defeat LTLA’s legislative 
agenda, LABI moved to form a Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse coalition instead of helping 
create the Lawyers for Civil Justice coalition. LABI created the CALA coalition because of 
unspecified “IRS concerns” held by some of its members.143 
The Louisiana CALA formed by LABI was one of the first CALA organizations with 
active engagement from the tobacco industry.3 At a meeting on February 24, 1992, TI Regional 
Vice President David Hooper told TI’s Policy Committee that the tobacco industry should assist 
the Louisiana CALA: 
We view the CALA/LABI setup as useful as an opening broad-brush to meet our 
early public relations and polling needs such as benchmark research…yet we 
realize the limitations of the group due to its wider range of issues and somewhat 
broader scale of legislative priorities.143 
Unpopular and untrusted by the 
public, the tobacco industry used 
existing CALAs and formed new 
CALA chapters to generate the 
appearance of popular support 
for its tort reform objectives. 
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Hooper said the tobacco industry should fund the coalition because it provided LABI and the 
industry with “outreach, credibility, and political cover.”143 Hooper proposed to TI’s Policy 
Committee that TI funnel $20,000 in funds through LABI to CALA.143 In a line-edited version of 
Hooper’s remarks to the Policy Committee, the proposed $20,000 was raised to up to $50,000. 
The increase matched a $50,000 contribution the pharmaceutical company Pfizer promised to 
assist the coalition’s launch, fund research and public outreach, and fuel subsequent grassroots 
efforts to pressure representatives into supporting the industry’s tort reform objectives.   
Besides backing CALA, Hooper recommended forming a second coalition titled 
Concerned Citizens for Civil Justice (CCCJ) to coordinate grassroots efforts on individual 
bills.143 Hooper planned for the tobacco industry dedicate $80,000 and Pfizer to donate an 
additional $50,000 to the CCCJ coalition for phone calls ($55,000) and mailers ($75,000) to 
chosen associates.143   
The Tobacco Institute Seeks Lobbying Assistance from the Agriculture Industry 
 
TI tried to recruit the Louisiana Farm Bureau to defend against LTLA efforts to weaken 
or eliminate tort laws during the 1992 legislative session.147 In 1992, TI State Activities Vice 
President Walter Woodson discussed LTLA’s advantage in the legislature with Farm Bureau 
officials Bud Mapes and Jim Monroe in a bid to gain their organization’s assistance to bolster the 
industry’s tort efforts in Louisiana.147 Woodson failed to inspire Mapes and Monroe to action, 
prompting him to send a letter to American Farm Bureau official Steve Newton for advice on 
how to convince the Louisiana Farm Bureau to assist industry tort reform efforts.147 In the letter, 
Woodson warned that trial lawyers might be using Louisiana as a “trial for pursuing anti-tort 
legislation in other states.”147 We did not find any evidence that the Louisiana Farm Bureau 
cooperated with efforts to preserve tort reform legislation in Louisiana.  
 
The Tobacco Industry Remains in CALA After Initial Disagreements 
 
Disagreements with LABI prompted the tobacco industry to reconsider assisting CALA 
by March 1992. According to a memo from Covington and Burling lawyers Keith Teel and 
David Harfst to the Policy Committee on March 11, 1992: 
 
With respect to the structure of an industry effort to defeat the Trial Lawyer’s 
proposals, the Louisiana team has thus far been unable to work out satisfactory 
arrangements with the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry that would 
assure substantial contributors the necessary degree of control. If such 
arrangements are not resolved promptly, LABI will set up an organization called 
the Coalition Against Lawsuit Abuse…However, our own advisers will start a 
new organization called Louisianans for Lawsuit Reform.148 
 
The tobacco industry, Pfizer, and other pharmaceutical companies planned to form a new 
coalition titled Louisianans for Lawsuit Reform (LLR) to pursue tort and liability reform without 
participating in CALA, with the tobacco and drug industries each providing $100,000 to fund 
their alternative coalition.148 This $200,000 dwarfed the $130,000 TI Regional VP Hooper had 
proposed for funding a CCCJ coalition in addition to CALA.143 Instead of contributing $20,000-
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$50,000 that Hooper proposed paying CALA in February143 the tobacco industry and Pfizer 
planned to each give $5000 to LABI to  preserve ties to LABI’s coalition.148  
 
Shortly after talks of creating a separate 
coalition, TI Regional VP David Hooper met 
with LABI representatives on March 13, 1992 
and struck a deal providing the tobacco 
industry influence over CALA by securing it 
four seats on CALA’s 13-person steering 
committee and another four seats for industry 
allies149 (Table 8.8). In addition, former state 
legislator Al Ater, whom Hooper suggested 
lead CALA’s steering committee, was made 
chairman. Following the deal between Hooper 
and LABI, the tobacco industry recognized CALA as the public face of efforts to protect 
favorable tort and liability laws. 
 
 
Table 8.8: CALA Officials and Steering Committee Membership149, 150 
 Identified 
by 
Industry 
as Ally 
Organization Organization Position Steering Committee 
Position 
Officers 
Al Ater Yes   Chairman 
Nelson “Chip” 
Wagar 
-- Hailey, McNamara, Hall, 
Larmann & Papale / LABI 
Unknown/Liability Reform 
Committee Chair 
Vice Chairman 
Errol Savoir -- International Paper 
Company / LABI 
Unknown/ Public Awareness 
Committee Chair 
Secretary 
Arwyn Nichols -- Breazeale, Sachse & 
Wilson  
 Treasurer Ex Officio 
Steering Committee 
David Hooper -- Tobacco Institute Regional Vice President  
Randy 
Haynie* 
-- Philip Morris Lobbyist  
CJ Blache* -- RJ Reynolds Lobbyist  
Jimmy Babst -- Chaffee, McCall Counsel for RJR  
Ken Ardoin Yes Pfizer Government Affairs 
Liaison151 
 
Carmack 
Blackmun 
Yes Unknown (Railroad 
industry) 
Lobbyist  
Wayne 
Fontana 
Yes LABI Liability Task Force 
/ Courtenay, Forstall, 
Guilbault, Hunter & 
Fontana 
Unknown/Consultant   
Dan Borne Yes Louisiana Chemical 
Association 
  
Dan Juneau -- LABI Executive Director  
Don Hale  -- LP&L   
Jonica Coates  --    
*Partners of local lobbying firms. 
… TI Regional VP David Hooper met 
with LABI representatives … and 
struck a deal providing the tobacco 
industry influence over CALA by 
securing it four seats on CALA’s 13-
person steering committee and 
another four seats for industry allies.   
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The tobacco industry primarily used LLR to funnel money to the Louisiana CALA 
afterwards. The tobacco companies had formed Louisianans for Lawsuit Reform before Hooper 
reached an agreement with LABI to join CALA.149 No longer needing LLR to influence 
Louisiana tort reform efforts, the tobacco industry planned to funnel most of its promised 
$200,000 in funding to CALA when it needed money.149 On March 23, 1992, Hooper requested 
initial payments to LLR of $16,250 from Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds, $12,500 from Lorillard, 
and $5,000 from American Tobacco, $50,000 total, that would go to CALA when needed.152 
CALA received a majority of its overall revenue in 1992 and 1993 from donations through 
LLR.3 LLR ultimately contributed $234,000 to CALA in 1992.3 
 
After the tobacco industry joined CALA the coalition began public outreach efforts. On 
March 15, 1992 CALA circulated a letter from its chairman Al Ater asking recipients to 
participate in coalition efforts and provide donations to help defend against trial lawyer tort and 
liability efforts.153  
 
1992 Legislative Session  
  
State lawmakers introduced 36 tort and liability bills for the 1992 legislative session that 
started on March 30 (Table 8.9). Of tort and liability legislation introduced by April 10, 1992, TI 
Regional VP Hooper identified 8 bills as favorable and 12 as anti-industry (Table 8.9).154 Hooper 
determined House members submitted a mix of harmful and beneficial tort and liability 
legislation, while Senators primarily introduced unfavorable measures. Bills identified as 
friendly by the tobacco industry prevented consideration of insurance during civil cases, forbade 
legal action against insurance providers, limited damages to claimants, and criminalized filing 
frivolous lawsuits to harass defendants. 
Lawmakers submitted six bills on behalf of LTLA.162 In an April 14, 1992 memo TI 
Regional VP David Hooper reported LTLA sought to change protective order, punitive damage, 
third-party obligations, and workers’ compensation laws, as well as overturn the 1988 law 
limiting liability for selling inherently dangerous products.154 
 As the 1992 legislative session began, CALA 
and LABI’s Louisiana Liability Task Force 
conducted public outreach. LABI sent 700 letters to 
businesses the week of April 6, 1992 to generate 
support for CALA and its tort reform objectives.154 A 
letter by CALA chairman Al Ater  was also 
circulated to 306 newspaper editors by April 23.163, 
164 CALA Chairman Al Ater conducted a press tour 
to gain awareness and support for CALA’s agenda and published opinion pieces in Louisiana 
newspapers and the Wall Street Journal to build public support.165 
CALA attacked trial lawyers in early public outreach efforts instead of targeting specific 
legislation.166 According to APCO official Neil M. Cohen in a June 12, 1992 letter to RJR Senior 
Vice President W.E. Ainsworth: 
“Our goal, quite simply, was to 
make the trial lawyers 
‘radioactive’ so that legislators 
would be less likely to want to 
align with them on votes.”  
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Table 8.9: Tort Reform and Product Liability Legislation Introduced for the 1992 Session55, 56, 154-161 
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Outcome 
Pro HB 
18 
Stephen Gunn (I-
Grant) 
      +        Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
233 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
     +         Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
234 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
             + Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
235 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
     +         Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
236 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
  +            Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
237 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
 +             Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
801 
Joe Salter (D-
Sabine) 
             + Died in Senate Committee upon 
adjournment 
Anti HB 
224 
Carter **              + Adopted 
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HB 
257 
James Donelon 
(R-Jefferson) 
             + Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
489 
Ted Haik (D-St. 
Mary) 
  +            Unknown 
HB 
825 
Melvin “Kip” 
Holden (R-East 
Baton Rouge) 
   +           Defeated on House Floor 
HB 
873 
Buster Guzzardo 
(D-St. Helena) 
           +   Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
874 
Joel Chaisson 
(D-St. Charles) 
Yes         +     Died on Senate Floor with 
adjournment 
HB 
916 
Edward Deano 
(D-St. 
Tammany) 
Yes       +       Defeated on House Floor 
SB 
118 
James Cox (D-
Calcasieu) 
No             + Died upon adjournment without 
action 
SB 
121 
James Cox (D-
Calcasieu) 
 -             Died upon adjournment without 
action 
SB 
239 
James Cox (D-
Calcasieu) 
             + Died upon adjournment without 
action 
SB 
293 
John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
             + Died upon adjournment without 
action 
Unknown HB 
268 
Stephen 
Windhorst (R-
Orleans) 
             + Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
801 
Joe Salter (D-
Sabine) 
             +
+ 
Died in Senate Committee with 
adjournment 
SB 
367 
Donald Kelly 
(D-Rapides) 
             + Died upon adjournment without 
action 
SB 
572 
Dennis Bagneris 
(D-Orleans) 
   +           Died upon adjournment without 
action 
SB 
575 
Dennis Bagneris 
(D-Orleans), 
Sherman Copelin 
(D-Orleans), 
Carter**, Mitch 
Landrieu (D-
Orleans), Edwin 
Murray (D-
Orleans) 
        +      Died on Senate Floor with 
adjournment 
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SB 
610 
Larry Bankston 
(D-East Baton 
Rouge) 
              Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
1158 
Sherman Copelin 
(D-Orleans), 
Carter**, Mitch 
Landrieu (D-
Orleans) 
        +      Withdrawn 
HB 
1463 
Quentin 
Dastugue (R-
Orleans) 
             + Died upon adjournment without 
action 
HB 
1547
* 
Carter** Yes          +    Died on House Floor with 
adjournment 
HB 
1623
* 
Raymond 
Lalonde (D-
Sunset) 
            +  Defeated in committee 
HB 
1911 
Joseph Accardo 
(D-St. James) 
             + Unknown 
SB 
720*
* 
Donald Kelly 
(D-Rapides) 
         +     Died upon adjournment without 
action 
SB 
887 
John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
     +         Died upon adjournment without 
action 
SB 
904 
John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
No    +          Died upon adjournment without 
action 
SB 
924 
John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
             + Died upon adjournment without 
action 
SB 
936 
Dennis Bagneris 
(D-Orleans) 
Yes       +       Died upon adjournment without 
action 
SB 
1197 
Donald Kelly 
(D-Rapides) 
Yes          +    Died upon adjournment without 
action 
*Companion bill to HB 874. 
**We are unsure if the sponsor is Wilford Dan Carter (D-Calcasieu) or Troy Carter (D-Orleans). 
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Initially, we did not focus on specific legislation that the trial bar wanted, but 
chose to make the lawyers themselves an issue. Our goal, quite simply, was to 
make the trial lawyers ‘radioactive’ so that legislators would be less likely to want 
to align with them on votes.166 
CALA avoided promoting its legislative agenda to sidestep alienating potential supporters and 
maximize coalition recruitment.166 Instead, they planned to contact people later in the legislative 
session via phone and mailers about select bills.154 
During the 1992 session, LABI, CALA, and tobacco industry representatives and 
affiliates monitored legislative efforts and lobbied state representatives in support of industry tort 
goals.154 Members of LABI’s 22-person Liability Task Force, RJ Reynolds representative CJ 
Blache, Philip Morris representative Randy Haynie, and TI representative Joe Wood Berry also 
lobbied state lawmakers to support CALA’s agenda. Covington and Burling analyzed bills for 
the coalition.154   
 To assist advocacy efforts, APCO Associates Senior Vice President Neal Cohen166 sent 
CALA’s steering committee a package on April 23, 1992 containing a donor list for 42 
representatives targeted by the coalition.164 Cohen advised CALA to have donors contact 
representatives via phone or letter in support of the coalition.164 The package included issue 
“cheat sheets” and 8 policy white papers on tort and liability subjects, including protective 
orders, punitive damages, and product liability issues.  
The tobacco industry and LABI used CALA to oppose at least five specific tort and 
liability bills later in the 1992 legislative session: HB 874, HB 916, HB 1547, SB 936, and SB 
1197157, 159, 160 (Table 8.9). 
CALA conducted extensive outreach efforts to advance tort reform that session. CALA 
sent 32,000 introductory letters to in-state recipients and 450 letters to people and organizations 
outside Louisiana.165 CALA also convinced usually apolitical food producers in Louisiana to 
send coalition recruitment letters to restaurants and other food processors in the state, helping 
secure their membership. According to Cohen, recruitment of well-known eateries provided 
CALA “credibility with legislators, the media and the general public.”166 In total, CALA 
recruited 326 companies and 28 associations as supporters by June 9, 1992.165 They also directed 
and conducted phone calls to pressure lawmakers to support its agenda. CALA hosted a 1-800 
number that 542 individuals used to contact House Representatives (Figure 8.1).165 Key Senators 
also received 8,783 calls opposing  HB 874, which permitted the awarding of punitive damages 
in instances of serious carelessness by a plaintiff,167 by June 5, 1992.165 Of the 12 bills identified 
by TI as anti-tort reform, only HB 224, which allowed for a separate trial regarding insurance 
coverage related to a tort case if all parties agreed before the related tort trial started, passed the 
legislature (Table 8.9). We did not find evidence LTLA actively pushed HB 224.  
The tobacco industry credited CALA’s public and legislative advocacy efforts with 
preventing the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association from securing any of its legislative agenda 
during the 1992 session.156 According to an uncredited “Louisiana Legislative Report on Tort 
Reform” from June 1992 found in TI Records, “CALA…was successful in defeating all of 
LTLA’s legislative attacks.”156 A July 28 letter from Louisiana CALA Chairman Al Ater to TI 
Regional Director David Hooper credited the total defeat of LTLA-desired legislation during the 
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1992 session to contacts opposing the bills the group generated to lawmakers.168 A December 14, 
1992 “Defensive Efforts In Priority States” document from TI’s Records declared: 
The business coalition’s [CALA and its supporters] victory was particularly 
notable in the light of LTLA’s widespread success in the 1991 legislative and 
gubernatorial elections and the domination by its supporters of key Senate and 
House legislative committees.169 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Number of Pro-CALA Phone Calls to Senate Targets by June 5, 1992165  
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The tobacco industry reasoned LTLA’s 
aggressive objectives prevented it from securing 
legislation.169 A Covington and Burling memo to the 
Tort Reform Policy Committee stated its political 
advisors felt LTLA was disorganized and misjudged 
its opponents’ strength.170 A document from TI’s 
records expected LTLA to pursue a limited agenda 
during the 1993 legislative session that would be harder to defeat.169  
 The tobacco industry viewed its defense against the LTLA agenda in Louisiana as a 
model of success for industry lobbyists defending tort reform. In notes for a lobbyist meeting in 
August 1992, TI State Activities Division Senior VP 
Kurt Malmgren wrote, “If you run up against a tough 
tort issue in 1993, I suggest you call David Hooper 
and the rest of the Louisiana Team. Those folks beat 
back extremely serious threats in the face of 
overwhelming odds.”171 
Tort Reform Efforts in 1993 
 
Preparations for the 1993 Legislative Session Begin 
 
TI’s Region IX staff held a strategy meeting 
for Texas and Louisiana’s 1993 legislative sessions 
on July 21, 1992 to plan defensive efforts against 
LTLA as well asform a strategy on alliances and 
coalition development, political donations, and other 
industry issues.172 Officials and lobbyists from TI, 
Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, US Tobacco, and 
possibly the Smokeless Tobacco Council attended 
the meeting (Table 8.10). By March 1993, Philip 
Morris, RJ Reynolds, Lorillard, Brown and 
Williamson, and American Tobacco had developed a financial and grassroots support 
arrangement to aid industry tort efforts in Louisiana173 (Table 8.11). 
 
 
Table 8.10: Attendees of Tobacco Institute Strategy 
Meeting for 1993 Legislative Session Involved in 
Louisiana Tort Reform Efforts172 
Organization Attendee 
Tobacco Institute David Hooper 
Pat Donoho* 
Joe Wood Berry 
Leslie Dawson 
Lisa Ross 
Gaylord Armstrong 
Philip Morris Jack Dillard  
Randy Haynie 
Stan Schleuter 
Byron Tunnel 
Dick Brown 
RJ Reynolds Joe Murray 
CJ Blache* 
US Tobacco  James Clark 
Smokeless Tobacco Council JR Watson* 
Dale Evans* 
*Marked with “?” on RSVP sheet for July 21 meeting. 
Table 8.11: Cost Sharing Agreements and Involvement Level for Tobacco Companies During 1993 Tort Efforts in 
Louisiana173, 174   
 Company Market 
Shares as of Feb 1993 
Amount Contributed 
Towards Coalition 
Amount Contributed 
Towards Counsel 
Participation in 
Grassroots Efforts 
Philip Morris 42% 35% 20% Yes 
RJ Reynolds 32% 35% 20% Yes 
Lorillard 6% 10% 20% Yes 
Brown and 
Williamson 
10% 10% 20% No 
American 
Tobacco 
6% 10% 20% No 
The tobacco industry reasoned 
LTLA’s aggressive objectives 
prevented it from securing 
legislation.  
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Forming a Political Action Committee to Influence Upcoming Elections 
  
By February 1993, a political action committee named the Louisiana Civil Justice League 
(LCJL) was formed to help elect judges, state lawmakers and officials supportive of tort 
reform.175 LCJL would donate to candidates that supported tort reform and oppose LTLA-led 
efforts to weaken industry protections. The tobacco industry did not have direct representation in 
LCJL, but CALA chairman Al Ater served on the PAC’s advisory committee.175 During the 1993 
legislative session, LCJL disseminated a recruitment letter by Louisiana businessperson and 
LCJL PAC chairman George Crain Jr. that asked recipients to have their state representatives 
oppose SB 956, an industry-adverse bill affecting third party tort176 in a manner unknown to us. 
We did not find HB 956 listed in TI’s 1993 Legislative Report. Philip Morris considered Crain a 
critical opinion leader in Louisiana.177 Although tobacco companies received recruitment letters, 
we do not know if the industry contributed to or participated in the LCJL PAC.175, 176 
Tobacco Industry and Coalition Efforts for the 1993 Legislative Session 
  
Lawmakers submitted 44 tort and liability bills for the 1993 legislative session (Table 
8.12).178 The tobacco industry faced 10 lawsuits in Louisiana before the session’s start on March 
29,.179 A CALA mailer by Chairman Al Ater asserted trial lawyers sought legislation affecting 
punitive damages, product liability, third party tort, as well as joint and several liability.180 We 
were unable to determine which bills formed the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association’s 
legislative package. CALA focused on defeating adverse legislation instead of pushing favorable 
tort and liability bills since LTLA controlled important legislative committees.181 
CALA performed a variety of public and legislative outreach to push its tort and liability 
agenda during the 1993 session. CALA disseminated a recruitment letter from its chairman Al 
Ater in March 1993 that attacked trial lawyers for pursuing a “greed package” of legislation.180 
Ater’s letter called for recipients to join CALA and make donations to the coalition. Another 
letter by Ater in mid-April requested donations to fund CALA’s legislative defensive efforts.180 
CALA conducted a statewide survey in 1993 of 600 Louisianans regarding public 
attitudes towards lawsuits and trial lawyers and released the results on April 7.184 The poll found 
that almost 60% of respondents disliked the state government’s management of “liability 
lawsuits” according to the New Orleans Times-Picayune. The paper also reported that 
approximately 70% of the poll’s respondents believed trial lawyers pursued legislation for 
monetary gain and 76% felt “the liability lawsuit problem in Louisiana [was] mainly due to 
greedy trial lawyers who will take any case to make money.” A majority of survey respondents 
blamed lawsuits for diminished job availability as well as higher medical and government 
expenses.   
CALA targeted key tort and liability legislation in its later outreach efforts during the 
legislative session. On May 6, 1993, CALA distributed a recruitment letter by Chairman Al Ater 
asking recipients to pressure state representatives to oppose SB 956, attacking it as the “trial 
lawyers’ full employment measure.”185 Ater insinuated that consumers, companies, and 
taxpayers inherited the costs of more lawsuits from companies and an expanded legal system if 
SB 956 passed.185 He urged recipients to have lawmakers oppose LTLA-supported legislation.185 
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Table 8.12: Tort Reform and Product Liability Legislation Introduced for the 1993 Session55, 56, 182, 183 
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Outcome 
HB 27 Stephen Gunn (I-
Grant) 
  +       Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 28 Stephen Gunn (I-
Catahoula) 
  +       Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 29 Stephen Gunn (I-
Catahoula) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 47 Vic Stelly (R-
Calcasieu) 
  +       Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 48 Vic Stelly (R-
Calcasieu) 
  +       Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 232 Shirley Bowler 
(R-Jefferson) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 310 Stephen 
Windhorst (R-
Orleans) 
  +       Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 376 Stephen 
Windhorst (R-
Orleans) 
  +       Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 422 Vic Stelly (R-
Calcasieu) 
    +     Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 688 James Donelon 
(R-Jefferson) 
     +    Died in Senate Committee 
upon adjournment 
HB 706 Edward Deano 
(D-St. 
Tammany) 
    +     Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 909 Charles Riddle 
(D-Avoyelles) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 930 James Singleton 
(D-Caddo) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 945 Edward Deano 
(D-St. 
Tammany) 
   +      Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 946 Edward Deano 
(D-St. 
Tammany) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 964 Dirk Deville (D-
St. Landry 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1199 Dale Sittig (R-St. 
Landry) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1300 J. Luke Leblanc 
(D-Lafayette) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1340 Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
 +        Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
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HB 1341 Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
 +        Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1366 Larry Bankston  
(D-East Baton 
Rouge) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1395 Sean Reilly (D-
East Baton 
Rouge) 
 +        Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1615 Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1625 James Singleton 
(D-Caddo) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1756 James Donelon 
(R-Jefferson) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1796 David Vitter (R-
Jefferson) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1789 Raymond 
Lalonde (D-
Sunset) 
       +  Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
HB 1790 Raymond 
Lalonde (D-
Sunset) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
SB 13 James Cox (D-
Calcasieu) 
+         Withdrawn 
SB 389 Jay Dardenne 
(R-East Baton 
Rouge) 
        + Killed on Senate Floor 
SB 584 John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
SB 589 John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
        + Died on House Floor with 
adjournment 
SB 600 John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
     +    Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
SB 602 John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
        + Died in House Committee 
with adjournment 
SB 603 John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
 +        Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
SB 604 John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
 +        Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
SB 702 Mike Foster (D-
Assumption) 
     + +  + Substitute died on House 
Floor with adjournment 
SB 706 Craig Romero 
(R-Vermilion) 
        + Adopted 
SB 728 James Cain (D-
Vernon) 
 +       + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
SB 791 John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
 +        Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
SB 807 Larry Bankston 
(D-East Baton 
Rouge) 
        + Withdrawn 
SB 924 Marc Morial (D-
Orleans) 
   +      Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
SB 972 Sam Nunez (D-
St. Bernard) 
        + Died without consideration 
upon adjournment 
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SB 1053 Donald Kelly 
(D-Rapides) 
        + Withdrawn 
 
If SB 702 was adopted, defendants could argue they were not liable for harm caused by 
their product because it was commonly perceived as, and was, inherently dangerous. The 
provision made it impossible to sue for harm caused by cigarettes and other items with innate 
hazards. If passed, SB 702 would also block ongoing product liability lawsuits against the 
tobacco industry that the 1988 product liability law failed to prevent.1, 187 In a June 14, 1993 
memorandum to the Tort Reform Policy Committee, Covington and Burling tobacco industry 
counsel Keith Teel blamed the ongoing lawsuits against the industry on 1998 bill SB 684’s 
exclusion of a Comment i provision.1 
After SB 702’s introduction on April 12, 1993, the bill languished in the Senate Judiciary 
C Committee through May without a hearing.183  
The tobacco industry realized it needed 
the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association’s 
assistance to secure SB 702.1 According to a 
June 14, 1993 memo from Covington and 
Burling’s Keith Teel to the tobacco industry’s 
Tort Reform Policy Committee, “We had no 
chance of enacting comment i legislation 
without trial lawyer help, because they 
controlled the key House committee. We were 
forced to try to reach a compromise with the 
trial lawyers, an effort bitterly opposed to by the business community….”1 Philip Morris lobbyist 
Randy Haynie and other industry lobbyists 189 briefly corresponded and collaborated with LTLA 
to pass Comment i legislation.1 Other tobacco industry representatives and allied lobbyists did 
not help secure Comment i legislation because they had other clients in the Louisiana business 
community opposed to working with LTLA, creating a business conflict.1  
LABI and its allies strongly opposed collaborating with LTLA, souring relationships with 
the tobacco industry and its lobbyists.1 In a June 14, 1993 memo to the Tort Reform Policy 
Committee, Covington and Burling’s Keith Teel reported, “This effort [to pass comment i 
legislation] strained relations with the business community [i.e., LABI] and among our own 
lobbyist team, and it could affect the manner in which we participate in legislative activities next 
year.”1 Teel feared LABI might retaliate against PM lobbyist Randy Haynie, a member of 
CALA’s three-person management committee,189 for helping the tobacco industry work with 
LTLA.1  
Despite collaborating with LTLA, the tobacco industry failed to pass SB 702’s substitute. 
The legislation passed the House Civil Law Committee only to die without further action183 on 
June 11, 1993 when the legislative session ended.178 
In a mid-July document from Philip Morris’ records, PM’s tort reform coordinator in 
Massachusetts Bernie Robinson190 expressed that SB 702’s passage could be jeopardized if a 
private liability lawsuit in Louisiana, Gilboy v. RJR, proceeded as planned on July 26, 1993.191 
“We had no chance of enacting 
comment i legislation without trial 
try to reach a compromise with the 
trial lawyers, an effort bitterly 
opposed to by the business 
community ….” 
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The plaintiff sought damages for  lung cancer he developed from smoking.192 The Gilboy case 
was delayed,192 but SB 702 did not receive additional action that year.   
The brief alliance between the tobacco industry and LTLA exposed the trial lawyer 
association’s weakness and disorganization to the tobacco industry.1 Tobacco industry officials 
determined LTLA had bad leadership and less political influence in Louisiana than previously 
thought. Knowledge of LTLA’s weaknesses and lack of political influence prompted the tobacco 
industry to consider reducing resources to future tort and liability efforts in Louisiana.   
CALA leadership convened before mid-July to discuss future efforts by the coalition. 
RJR lobbyist CJ Blache and lawyer Jim Babst from tobacco industry-allied law firm Chaffee 
McCall joined the gathering.189 At the meeting, coalition leadership agreed to maintain and grow 
CALA. Meeting participants also punished Philip Morris lobbyist Randy Haynie for 
compromising with LTLA to pass Comment i legislation for the tobacco industry by removing 
him from CALA’s 3-member management committee.189 
After the meeting, Louisianans for Lawsuit Reform member companies from the 
consumer goods and pharmaceutical industries, including Philip Morris, agreed to withhold 
guarantees of future participation or support to CALA.189 Many of the companies had assisted 
CALA through LLR, the astroturf organization the tobacco industry used to funnel money to the 
LABI-led coalition.189 The companies decided not to make any promises of assistance to CALA 
since the coalition’s policy objectives for the next legislative session were unknown.189 In 
addition, there was no cause for immediate action since that year’s legislative session recently 
ended.  
State lawmakers grew resistant to LABI and its aggressive tactics, prompting the tobacco 
industry to consider assisting legislators with creating an alternative state business association. 
According to a July 14, 1993 memo by PM’s Bernie Robinson, after negotiations on SB 702 and 
similar bills between key lawmakers and the governor near the 1993 legislative session’s end, 
Louisiana House Appropriations Chairman Elias Bo Akal (D-New Iberia193) informed Covington 
and Burling lawyer Keith Teel that LABI’s behavior and composition had frustrated lawmakers: 
Bo Akal’s concern—which is shared by other political leaders in Baton Rouge—
is that when they vote against a position advocated by Dan Juneau and the 
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI), LABI papers their 
constituents with “misinformation” and the Legislators and the Governor have to 
spend an inordinate amount of time sorting out the situation. A related political 
concern is that LABI doesn’t in fact represent all business interests (as LABI 
says). The political leadership believes that LABI is dominated & controlled by 
Big Oil, Big Chemical, Big Contractors and Utility companies.189 
Governor Edwin Edwards, Senate President Sam Nunez, and House Speaker John Alario 
asked business lobbyists (including PM’s Randy Haynie) to form an organization representing 
and factually truthful to Louisiana’s small businesses. Representative Ackal had developed a 
plan to form an organization called the Small Business Advocacy Institute (SBAI) of Louisiana. 
Robinson found Ackal’s plan the most realistic answer to lawmakers’ request to create a new 
statewide business association in his July 14, 1993 memo. The tobacco industry weighed the 
proposal, and Keith Teel, Philip Morris Regional Director of Government Affairs for Louisiana 
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and Texas Jack Dillard (Chapter 2), and APCO official Neal Cohen received the budget and 
plans for the program.189 However, we did not find evidence that Philip Morris or other industry 
members implemented the SBAI proposal. 
The Industry Considers Plans for the 1994 Session 
 
The Tort Reform Policy Committee discussed defensive efforts in Louisiana and other 
states during 1993 and possible actions for 1994 at a meeting on June 15, 1993. Members also 
considered the failure of the Comment i bill, based on the product liability interpretation the 
tobacco industry helped secure in the ALI Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1962,13 and 
considered pursuing similar legislation during the 1994 legislative session.194 As early as July 
1993, Philip Morris determined that passing Comment i legislation and preserving the 1988 
product liability law were its highest tort reform priorities in Louisiana.189, 195 Passing Comment i 
legislation further increased the tobacco industry’s defenses in lawsuits for harm caused by their 
tobacco products.187 Since the industry’s products were widely viewed as harmful and were 
innately so, standard tobacco products could not be considered unreasonably dangerous. Philip 
Morris sought to push Comment i legislation during an anticipated October 1993 special 
session.195 
 PM lobbyist Randy Haynie attempted to recruit assistance from lobbyists outside the 
tobacco industry. He asked Bud Mapes, a lobbyist who represented the Louisiana Farm Bureau, 
banks, and Miller Brewing195, Tommy Hudson, who participated in the tobacco industry’s 
national Federal Excise Tax Campaign196, 197 opposing federal tax increases,198, 199 and Gus Weill 
and Paul Gallagher (positions and clients unknown, but Gallagher was at least on the tobacco 
industry’s Louisiana tort team200) how Philip Morris and its allies could help CALA pass 
Comment i bill SB 702 during the 1994 session.189 Mapes agreed to show SB 702 to his clients 
and try to secure their support for similar legislation the next year.189 
APCO Associates, which worked with the 
tobacco companies nationwide to advance tort 
reform,146 mirrored PM’s stance and regarded 
Comment i legislation as a critical objective in 
Louisiana. In a July 26, 1993 Tort Project memo 
regarding nationwide efforts prepared for PM Vice 
President of Government Affairs Buffy Linehan, 
APCO official Neal Cohen regarded passage of such legislation in Louisiana as his 
organization’s most important tort reform objective.201 APCO planned to pursue Comment i 
legislation during a special session that might occur as soon as October, and found several 
legislators open to introducing a Comment i bill then or during 1994.201 Cohen believed there 
was a decent chance of passing Comment i legislation, but realized success partly depended on 
convincing state lawmakers that voting for Comment i legislation was not politically 
damaging.201  
By September 1993, the tobacco industry expected Philip Morris lobbyist Randy Haynie 
to lead efforts to secure Comment i legislation if a special session occurred. The tobacco industry 
set aside $285,000 for efforts during a special session or subsequent 1994 regular session170 
(Table 8.13).  
… success partly depended on 
convincing state lawmakers that 
voting for Comment i legislation 
was not politically damaging. 
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Constitutional Amendment Limits 1994 Tort Reform Efforts 
  
Louisianans adopted a constitutional amendment in October 1993 preventing the 
legislature from considering non-fiscal legislation during even-numbered years.202 As a result, 
consideration of tort and liability legislation in 1994 could only happen during a special 
legislative session. Louisiana tobacco industry advisors felt Governor Edwin Edwards was 
amenable to including tort reform in a special session he might organize for non-fiscal legislation 
that year.203 If Governor Edwards did not hold a special legislative session, Louisiana legislators 
were unlikely to consider tort and liability legislation until the 1995 legislative session.202 
According to a document found in Philip Morris’ records, in November 1993 a program 
titled the Tort Reform Project listed four tort and liability legislative objectives for Louisiana as 
the year neared its end:   
• “Preserve 1988 product liability statute 
• Preserve existing law which prohibits punitive damages unless expressly 
authorized by statute 
• Preserve availability of protective orders 
• Change from pure to modified comparative fault”204  
 
The tobacco industry, similar to Philip Morris’ objectives, ultimately had a limited proactive tort 
reform legislative agenda in Louisiana during 1994. Likely since a constitutional amendment 
passed in 1993 only allowed consideration of fiscal legislation in even number years (unless 
during a special session).203, 205207 
 That year, Philip Morris lobbyist Randy Haynie pursued a deal with trial lawyers to pass 
tort reform legislation. He sought to amend a bill intended to greater enable employees to sue 
employers for work injuries to include an unrelated provision classifying cigarettes as 
“‘inherently unsafe’ products.”206 In exchange, Haynie offered to help secure the bill. Trial 
lawyers turned down Haynie’s proposal. We did not find evidence that other tort reform 
legislation was pursued by the tobacco industry in 1994. 203 
1994 State Supreme Court Elections 
 
Although legislative work on tort reform was mostly inactive in 1994, the tobacco 
industry recognized a State Supreme Court election in November 1994 as an opportunity to 
strengthen tort reform efforts in Louisiana. Justices on the Louisiana Supreme Court are elected 
and serve 10 year terms.207 The tobacco industry viewed Louisiana Supreme Court justices as 
judicial activists that secured office because of Louisiana Trial Lawyer Association assistance.208 
Industry members blamed State Supreme Court rulings for “causing a loss of ground for business 
Table 8.13: Planned Allocation of Funds for Industry Efforts to Pass Comment i 
Legislation during a 1993 Special Session170 
Item Amount 
Unidentified Coalition $100,000 
Political Action Committee $75,000 
Legislative consultants $50,000 
Extra consultants (if required) $60,000 
Total $285,000 
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interests” despite legislative success against LTLA policy efforts.208 In a February 3, 1994 
memo, Covington and Burling’s Keith Teel reported that “Louisiana litigators” recommended 
supporting State Supreme Court incumbent Pike Hall over his likely challenger, State Circuit 
Court justice Henry Brown. Hall retired that year, pitting Brown against Louisiana Circuit Court 
Judge Jeff Victory instead,209 who the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) determined 
supported tort reform.210 Teel reasoned the tobacco industry could also influence a possible 
special election in 1995 for Louisiana’s Supreme Court if State Supreme Court judge Jim Dennis 
was selected to serve on the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.203 “Louisiana litigators” 
recommended backing Democrat Joe Bleich instead of Republican district judge Bob Kostelka if 
a special election to replace Dennis occurred.203   
We did not find evidence that the tobacco industry directly influenced or contributed to 
races for Louisiana’s Supreme Court in 1994. Candidate Jeff Victory defeated Henry Brown and 
replaced Justice Hall on the State Supreme Court.209 Louisianans also elected Bernette J. Johnson 
to the court that year.211 After the judicial races, ATRA stated in a collection of 1994 election 
results that the State Supreme Court’s membership remained against tort reform.210  
The 1995 Legislative Session 
 
The tobacco industry determined in a late-January 1995 analysis of Louisiana tort reform 
efforts that it and the state’s business community were deadlocked legislatively with the 
Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association. Neither side secured meaningful legislation during the 
1993 and 1994 sessions.208  
The tobacco industry worried LTLA was using the judicial system to undermine 
favorable tort reform laws obtained by the tobacco companies and Louisiana business 
community. An undated analysis from Philip Morris for the 1995 legislative session concluded 
that, “the trial lawyers have taken the battle of tort reform to the courts. Many of the reforms in 
place are now at risk of being reversed judicially in this climate. Judicial reform will be crucial 
for the future of tort reform in [Louisiana].”212 The industry believed the State Supreme Court 
consisted of LTLA-backed judicial activists whose rulings in 1993 and 1994 negatively affected 
the tort reform community’s goals.208 As a result, they expanded their political efforts beyond the 
legislature. According to a tobacco industry analysis of tort reform efforts in Louisiana: 
The bottom line is – if tort reform is to be realized in Louisiana business interest 
must develop an aggressive, focused, well-designed plan to take back the 
legislature in the 1995 legislative elections. In addition, attention must be given to 
the two 1996 Supreme Court races or our best efforts at the legislature could be 
futile.208 
Louisiana’s primary election occurred on October 21 and its general election on November 18, 
1995.212 Although LABI and its allies contributed heavily to legislative candidates, an uncredited 
document from RJ Reynolds’ records determined LTLA had an advantage with legislators on 
tort issues because it only gave contributions to advance its tort goals.208 The document also 
noted that LABI and its allies had not substantially engaged in state judicial elections.208 
Philip Morris observed that Louisianans rejected two LTLA-backed candidates in special 
elections during 1994. The company stated in an internal document on tort reform that the races 
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“showed an early trend.”212 All legislative seats and constitutional offices were included in 
Louisiana’s election, affording an opportunity to shift the state government’s composition to be 
more favorable to tort reform.212  
A Plan to Counter the LTLA’s Strong Influence on Louisiana Elections 
 
Despite the tobacco industry’s fallout 
with LABI in 1993, a comprehensive plan in 
RJ Reynolds’ records described working with 
the state business association, Louisiana 
companies, and CALA and utilizing 
campaign contributions, strategic lobbying, 
and grassroots mobilization to influence state 
election outcomes in favor of tort reform 
objectives. The plan was a response to LTLA’s perceived advantage on tort reform during 
elections, since the trial lawyers had one focus and Louisiana businesses had multiple issues they 
tried to influence outcomes over. It said: 
[T]he business point of view includes a broad range of issues such as taxes, 
environment, employee relations, health care, education and state fiscal policy. 
Whereas the plaintiff bar has a single, narrow area of concern, tort de-form. In a 
nutshell businesses’ electoral assistance is diffused while the plaintiff bar’s is 
pinpointed. The proponents of tort reform must come together in a targeted effort 
to go heads-up against the resources of the LTLA with a separate tort reform 
focused electoral strategy to overcome this obvious disadvantage.208 
The document marked a transition from the primarily defensive strategy employed by the 
tobacco industry in 1994 to a more aggressive plan to change the membership of the state 
legislature and make it friendlier to tort reform.  
The document from RJ Reynolds’ files proposed forming a new six-member committee 
of business lobbyists to coordinate Louisiana’s tort coalition’s electoral efforts against LTLA.208 
Six unnamed lobbyists, four of whom actively served on CALA’s advisory panel, would sit on 
the committee and guide the tort reform coalition’s efforts. The committee would assign 
coalition resources, gather information for the coalition’s electoral and policy campaigns, steer 
campaign efforts, as well as assist and report information to coalition donors. The committee 
would also lobby state lawmakers to advance the business community’s tort reform objectives. 
The plan found in RJ Reynolds’ records suggested naming the panel Louisianans Against 
Lawsuit Abuse or the Committee for the Future of Louisiana. The plan anticipated committee 
efforts to need a $200,000 budget in 1995. 
Part of the plan required the tobacco industry and Louisiana’s business community to 
develop a second campaign contribution scheme specifically for tort reform and separate from 
non-tort campaign contributions made by LABI and other business interests, to counter LTLA 
donations.208 The plan suggested forming a political action committee with a name relevant to 
tort reform. According to the 1995 tort analysis and plan for Louisiana from RJ Reynolds’ 
records, the tobacco industry desired to minimize its role in the PAC: 
“In a nutshell businesses’ electoral 
assistance is diffused while the 
plaintiff bar’s is pinpointed. The 
proponents of tort reform must come 
together in a targeted effort ….” 
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 Efforts should be made to have broad participation in contributors to the PAC 
with an emphasis on companies with major capital and labor investments in 
Louisiana. Contributions by others are welcomed but the maximum PR impact 
would be derived from major and/or multiple Louisiana contributors.208 
The plan reasoned that tobacco industry members should together provide 20% of the PAC’s 
total funding, which it expected to have a $300,000 budget in 1995.208 The tobacco industry 
planned to use most PAC funds to assist pro-tort reform candidates and defeat anti-tort reform 
candidates in select districts. In instances where an anti-tort reform politician lacked a pro-tort 
reform opponent in their race, the industry considered recruiting a candidate to oppose them.208 
According to the Louisiana analysis and plan from late-January, its authors hoped to utilize other 
resources to influence state elections instead of the PAC when possible in order to keep as low a 
profile as possible: 
The lobbyists on the oversight committee will try to accomplish as much as 
possible by non-PAC, and as such non-reportable means and through existing 
business groups and associations as not to bring unnecessary attention to this 
endeavor. 208 
 The plan had six implementation phases spread across three years.208 The first plan phase 
(January-March 1995) focused on coalition development, locating possible candidates, 
developing a strategy to protect incumbents, studying Louisiana’s electorate characteristics, and 
establishing target districts.208 The second phase (March-June 1995) occurred during the 
legislative session and consisted of maintaining phase 1 projects, passing favorable tort and 
liability bills, as well as stopping adverse legislation. The third phase (July-November 1995) 
focused on influencing Louisiana’s statewide election via public outreach by CALA and visiting 
select electoral districts. The last phase in 1995 focused on observing and influencing legislative 
committee selections as well as observing legislative elections for House Speaker and Senate 
President. Tobacco industry officials sought to convince the victor of the gubernatorial election 
to hold a special session on tort reform in 1996, since lawmakers could not consider non-fiscal 
bills in that year’s legislative session. The plan intended to use CALA to generate grassroots 
pressure and conduct public outreach for tort reform,208, 212 similar to previous years, and 
estimated that $500,000 was needed to fund CALA’s efforts for the electoral campaign in 1995. 
The tobacco industry intended to pursue tort reform legislation and defend against LTLA 
efforts to remove existing tort reform laws during the 1995 legislative session. The industry 
sought to eliminate strict liability statutes, establish modified comparative fault into law, and 
obtain better laws regarding joint and several liability.208 In addition, the tobacco industry and 
tort reform proponents sought to pass legislation overturning the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Billiot v. BP Oil Co. in 1994,208, 213 which opened businesses to punitive damages.212, 214 
In that case, the Court found that the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act, which prevented 
workers in Louisiana from seeking compensatory damages in exchange for expected workers 
compensation benefits, did not pertain to punitive damages and did not prevent employees from 
receiving punitive damages when an employer’s wanton or reckless disregard for public safety 
caused their harm.213 Industry officials planned to fight bills establishing third party tort, 
protective order restrictions, and the creation of a two-year prescriptive period.208  
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While tobacco companies planned a broad 
legislative agenda for tort reform with the Louisiana 
business community, industry members also 
maintained focus on securing a Comment i bill.215 
According to an uncredited January 4, 1995 industry 
document from TI’s records regarding tort and 
liability efforts in Louisiana: 
We have more cases in Louisiana than in any 
other state. This is so despite the good law 
enacted in 1988. We continue to believe that 
a retroactive comment i provision is highly 
desirable, though our efforts in 1993 to enact 
such a measure were unsuccessful and had 
long-term negative effects against the industry in Louisiana and perhaps 
elsewhere.215 
The tobacco industry faced multiple state level product liability lawsuits in Louisiana and 
elsewhere. The tobacco industry was also fighting federal class action lawsuit Castano v. 
American Tobacco Co et al., brought by private parties in New Orleans in 1994. As a result, 
tobacco companies saw passage of Comment i legislation, which prevented damages from being 
awarded to plaintiffs for harm caused by an inherently dangerous product being faulty or too 
dangerous,183 as critical to ending ongoing lawsuits and insulating itself from legal claims in 
Louisiana.215 
 The tobacco industry and its allies dedicated significant resources to 1995 tort reform 
efforts in Louisiana but did not expect to secure favorable legislation. The tobacco industry 
recognized that important committees had anti-tort chairmen unlikely to allow consideration of 
tort reform bills, making passage difficult.212 In a multi-state analysis for 1995, the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) determined passing tort reform legislation in Louisiana 
was unlikely.216 ALEC, which receives nearly 100% of its funding from corporations, is an 
organization that places company representatives and lawmakers on task forces together and has 
them jointly develop and certify business-friendly model legislation for later introduction by 
member legislators.217 Besides ALEC, after the 1995 legislative session started, RJ Reynolds 
officials expressed in a memo circulated on April 28 that they did not expect desired legislation 
to pass.218 
1995 Legislation 
 
Lawmakers introduced 47219 tort and liability bills during the 1995 legislative session 
(Table 8.14).212 Lawmakers adopted 14 tort and liability bills but did not approve comment i 
legislation sought by the tobacco industry. Lawmakers introduced a balanced mix of tort 
legislation that the tobacco industry generally took no position on (Table 8.14). 
The tobacco industry’s Tort Reform Project initially allocated $350,000 to fund 1995 
Louisiana tort reform efforts.220 Tort Reform Project officials later lowered Louisiana’s budget to 
$310,000 and divided the money among the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry 
“We have more cases in 
Louisiana than in any other 
state. This is so despite the 
good law enacted in 1988. We 
continue to believe that a 
retroactive comment i provision 
is highly desirable ….” 
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($100,000), Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse ($130,000), and Louisianans for Legal Reform 
($100,000).220 
Philip Morris contributed $20,000 of $40,000 it budgeted for campaign donations to 
support 1995 tort reform efforts in Louisiana by April 27, 1995 and planned to give the 
remaining $20,000 to the Louisiana State Democratic Party to influence statewide elections in 
fall 1995.222 The project also planned to donate $5,000 each to the House and Senate Legislative 
caucuses, the Republican Legislative Caucus, and the Democratic State Party in 1996. 
Despite tobacco company documents showing preparation, planning, and spending to 
advance the industry’s tort agenda in Louisiana, we found limited evidence of legislative 
advocacy and media campaign efforts during the 1995 legislative session. The American Tort 
Reform Association, which represented industry tort reform interests, released a survey that 
showed Louisianans supported tort reform during the 1995 legislative session. The survey was 
part of a nationwide campaign to pressure the US Senate into adopting “civil justice reform” 
according to an APCO memorandum circulated on May 16, 1995.223 The survey received 
coverage from two radio stations, the Associated Press, and six publications.   
Of the legislation introduced during the 1995 session, the tobacco industry and its allies 
identified HB 1846 as unfavorable to their policy objectives and sought to weaken or defeat the 
bill. Introduced by Rep. Glenn Ansardi (D-Jefferson),55 HB 1846 restricted the use of protective 
orders to hide lawsuit details concerning hazards to the public.224, 225 LABI issued an action alert 
on May 2, 1995 encouraging recipients to pressure lawmakers into opposing HB 1846. The 
action alert argued HB 1846 encouraged copycat lawsuits, instigated “lawsuit abuse,” and made 
Louisiana unappealing to businesses.225 Tobacco lobbyists tried to amend HB 1846 to benefit the 
industry but failed to secure changes.226 HB 1846 ultimately passed into law (Table 8.14).   
The 1996 Special Session  
 
Tort reform remained a policy priority for the tobacco industry in Louisiana during 1996. 
In a memo circulated on August 15, 1995, 
Philip Morris Regional Director of 
Government Affairs for Texas and Louisiana, 
Jack Dillard (Chapter 2), listed passage of a 
tort reform legislative package as one of two 
policy objectives for Louisiana if a special 
session occurred in 1996.227 The Tort Reform 
Project established a $310,000 total budget for Louisiana tort reform efforts in 1995 by October 
of that year and planned to budget $500,000 towards “product liability and judicial elections” in 
1996.228 Statewide elections in late 1995 improved odds of tort reform legislation becoming law 
during 1996. LABI President Dan Juneau reasoned that statewide elections in November 1995229 
had changed the Louisiana Legislature’s composition and made it supportive of the 
organization’s (and the tobacco industry’s) tort objectives.230 Louisianans also elected business-
friendly Mike Foster (R) as governor.231, 232 Governor Mike Foster’s approval and active 
participation in legislative tort reform efforts also appeared beneficial to LABI. 230 
 
Statewide elections in late 1995 
improved odds of tort reform 
legislation becoming law during 1996. 
 346 
 
Table 8.14: Tort Reform and Product Liability Bills during the 1995 Session55, 56, 219, 221 
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Result 
N
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HB 4 Mitch Landrieu 
(D-Orleans) 
+             Withdrawn 
HB 161 Chuck 
McMains (R-
Livingston) 
    +         Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 308 Glenn Ansardi 
(D-Jefferson) 
     +     +   Adopted 
SB 15 James Cox (D-
Calcasieu) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 68 Donald Kelly 
(D-Rapides) 
            + Defeated on Senate Floor 
N
o 
Po
sit
io
n 
HB 306 Glenn Ansardi 
(D-Jefferson) 
     +        Adopted 
HB 307 Glenn Ansardi 
(D-Jefferson) 
            + Defeated in House 
HB 309 Glenn Ansardi 
(D-Jefferson) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 310 Glenn Ansardi 
(D-Jefferson) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 312 Glenn Ansardi 
(D-Jefferson) 
            + Adopted 
HB 313 Glenn Ansardi 
(D-Jefferson) 
            + Adopted 
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HB 336 Sean Reilly (D-
East Baton 
Rouge) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 358 Jimmy Dimos 
(D-Ouachita) 
            + Adopted 
HB 360 Jimmy Dimos 
(D-Ouachita) 
          +   Adopted 
HB 361 Jimmy Dimos 
(D-Ouachita) 
     +        Adopted 
HB 539 Stephen 
Windhorst (R-
Orleans) 
            + Adopted 
HB 545 James Singleton 
(D-Caddo) 
            + Adopted 
HB 546 James Singleton 
(D-Caddo) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 547 James Singleton 
(D-Caddo) 
            + Adopted 
HB 548 James Singleton 
(D-Caddo) 
            + Adopted 
HB 639 Alexander    +          Withdrawn 
HB 
1011 
Joel Chaisson 
(D-St. Charles) 
 +   +        + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 
1019 
Chuck 
McMains (R-
Livingston) 
    +        + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 
1065 
Robert Adley 
(D-Bossier) 
  +           Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 
1162 
Vic Stelly (R-
Calcasieu) 
      +       Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 
1329 
Dale Sittig (R-
St. Landry) 
   +          Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 
1800 
Daniel Martiny 
(R-Jefferson) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 
1824 
Daniel Martiny 
(R-Jefferson) 
            + Died with adjournment on 
House Floor 
HB 
1828 
Ted Haik (D-St. 
Mary) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
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HB 
1846 
Glenn Ansardi 
(D-Jefferson) 
        +     Adopted 
HB 
1859 
Ted Haik (D-St. 
Mary) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 
2058 
Garey Forster 
(D-Orleans) 
           + + Adopted 
SB 580 Donald Kelly 
(D-Rapides) 
    +     +    Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 1163 Ron Landry (D-
St. Charles) 
            + Adopted 
SB 1188 Thomas Greene 
(D-West Baton 
Rouge) 
       +      Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 1195 Craig Romero 
(R-Vermilion) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 1196 Craig Romero 
(R-Vermilion) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 1197 Craig Romero 
(R-Vermilion) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
U
nk
no
w
n 
HB 108 Randy Roach 
(D-Calcasieu) 
 +            Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 229 Stephen Gunn 
(I-Grant) 
 +            Died in Committee 
HB 842 Robert Adley 
(D-Bossier) 
            + Died with adjournment on 
House Floor 
HB 
2014 
Windhorst             + Adopted 
SB 255 Mike Foster (D-
Assumption) 
 +   +         Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 562 John Hainkel 
(D-Jefferson) 
    +         Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 563 John Hainkel 
(D-Jefferson) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 564 John Hainkel 
(D-Jefferson) 
    +         Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 1141 Craig Romero 
(R-Vermilion) 
            + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
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Louisiana legislators introduced 11 tort and liability bills for the 1996 special session 
(Table 8.15).233 Four bills, HB 18, HB 20, and HB 21 by Rep. Chuck McMains (R-Baton 
Rouge),234 and HB 164235 by tobacco industry ally Representative Elias “Bo” Ackal (D - New 
Iberia), likely composed the state tort reform community’s legislative package. The Baton Rouge 
Advocate stated in a March 22, 1996 article that McMains would “handle many of the lawsuit 
bills pushed by the business community.”236 The Advocate described proposals offered by 
Governor Foster that appear to match HB 18 and HB 21.230 HB 18 eliminated strict liability and 
required claimants to demonstrate that harm caused by an animal, “thing” or property resulted 
from the owner’s negligence.234, 237 HB 18 did not particularly apply to the tobacco industry, as it 
pertained to harm caused by the negligence of an owner, rather than manufacturers or producers. 
HB 20 eliminated punitive damages for lawsuits over harm caused by dangerous or toxic 
substances.234 The bill does not appear to apply to the tobacco industry, and is not included in 
TI’s 1996 Legislative Report238 that covers legislation of concern to the tobacco industry. HB 21 
made defendants responsible for damages only to their degree of fault in cases featuring joint and 
several liability.234, 239 Existing Louisiana law made defendants liable for up to 50% of damages 
in a lawsuit if other defendants could not afford payments.230 Another tort reform bill in the 
legislative package,  HB 164, removed liability for the tobacco industry and other manufacturers 
for harm caused by inherently dangerous products.233, 240 The Louisiana Trial Lawyers 
Association would attack HB 164 as a tobacco industry bill during the 1996 session.240   
One piece of legislation specifically targeted the tobacco industry during that session. 
Senator Chris Ullo (D-Jefferson)56 introduced SR 20 on April 18 to officially call for research 
into the tobacco industry’s efforts to influence 
tort reform in order to protect itself.233 
According to a May 23, 1996 memo by 
tobacco industry law firm Covington and 
Burling, “In 1996, the most significant effort to 
pass favorable legislation was in Louisiana.”235 
CALA ran television, radio, and billboard 
advertisements that provided a phone number for 
people to contact state lawmakers. CALA 
instigated approximately 4000 calls, letters, and 
faxes from the public to pressure to lawmakers 
into supporting CALA’s legislative package.3  
Trial lawyers countered industry efforts 
by labeling tort reform bills it supported as 
creations of the tobacco companies, politically alienating tobacco industry representatives in 
Louisiana and harming their legislative efforts.235 According to the Covington and Burling memo 
circulated on May 23 by tobacco industry counsel Keith Teel, trial lawyers attacked HB 164 as 
tobacco industry-supported legislation during an April 1, 1996 hearing before the House Civil 
Law and Procedure Committee:240 
The trial bar charged that the tobacco industry was behind much of the proposed 
package of bills, a fact that was not true, and they very effectively attacked the 
industry….The attacks on the industry neutralized supporters and left our team of 
lobbyists largely on its own.235 
“The trial bar charged that the 
tobacco industry was behind much 
of the proposed package of bills, a 
fact that was not true, and they 
very effectively attacked the 
industry … The attacks on the 
industry neutralized supporters and 
left our team of lobbyists largely on 
its own.”  
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The attacks coincided with multiple lawsuits targeting the tobacco industry for deceiving 
the public about the dangers of its tobacco products and the harm they caused. During the 1996 
special session, multiple state attorneys general were suing the tobacco companies to recoup 
Medicaid costs from treating tobacco-related illnesses, efforts that later culminated in the 1998 
Master Settlement Agreement (Chapter 9). The tobacco companies were also appealing the 
Table 8.15: Tort Reform and Product Liability Legislation Introduced for the 1996 Special Session55, 56, 233, 237, 239, 241 
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Outcome 
HB 
18 
Chuck McMains (R-
Livingston), et al 
      + Adopted 
HB 
20 
Chuck McMains (R-
Livingston), et al 
 +      Adopted 
HB 
21 
Chuck McMains (R-
Livingston), et al 
+ +      Adopted 
HB 
142 
Chuck McMains (R-
Livingston) 
 +      Withdrawn 
HB 
164 
Elias “Bo”Ackal (D-
St. Martin), 
 Shirley Bowler (R-
Jefferson), 
Et all 
  +     Died with adjournment in 
Senate Judiciary A 
Committee 
HB 
193 
John “Juba” Diez (D-
Ascension) 
 +      Died with adjournment 
SB 22 Jay Dardenne (R-East 
Baton Rouge),  
Randy Ewing (D-
Jackson), Et al 
      + Defeated in Senate 
Judiciary A Committee 
SB 24 Jay Dardenne (R-East 
Baton Rouge),  
Randy Ewing (D-
Jackson), Et al 
   + +   Died with adjournment 
SB 
150 
J. Lomax Jordan (R-
Lafayette) 
    +   Died with adjournment in 
Senate Judiciary A 
Committee 
SB 
161 
J. Lomax Jordan (R-
Lafayette) 
     +  Died with adjournment in 
Senate Judiciary 
Committee 
SB 
198 
John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
  +     Died with adjournment in 
Senate Judiciary A 
Committee 
SR 20 J. Chris Ullo (D-
Jefferson) 
      + Adopted 
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federal class action certification of Castano vs. American Tobacco Co. et al., an attempt by over 
50 law firms to sue the industry for nicotine addiction caused by its products. 
The House Civil Law Procedure Committee considered HB 164 on April 1, 1996 where it 
was attacked by the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association and other high profile figures as a 
tobacco industry machination.240 According to an April 2, 1996 article in the Baton Rouge 
Advocate, incoming LTLA President Drew Ranier asserted at the hearing that HB 164 “opens the 
floodgate to continued abuses by the tobacco industry.”240 LTLA also claimed that tobacco 
industry representatives helped craft HB 164. Other hearing attendees attacked HB 164’s 
shielding of tobacco products and tobacco companies from legal liability. During deliberations, 
attorney Maury Herman, a lawyer involved in the Castano case19 (serving on multiple 
committees organized by participating firms242) and on the team of lawyers organized by 
Attorney General Richard Ieyoub242 to recoup Louisiana’s tobacco-related Medicaid 
expenditures (Chapter 9), told committee members that tobacco products were lethal and that 
adopting HB 164 prevented addicted children from seeking legal redress.240 Former tobacco 
industry scientist Victor Denoble also testified to the committee that the tobacco companies 
targeted children. In addition, committee member Glenn Ansardi (D-Kenner) quoted a statement 
by Louisiana Attorney General Richard Ieyoub during the hearing accusing HB 164 of being an 
effort to protect the tobacco companies. 
During the House Civil Law Procedure Committee hearing for HB 164, the bill’s sponsor 
Rep. Elias Ackal defended its provisions protecting the tobacco industry from liability for harm 
caused by its products. He justified them by claiming that morphine and alcohol also killed users 
as a comparison.240 
The House Civil Law and Procedure Committee was receptive to attacks on the tobacco 
companies and moved to eliminate liability protections for the industry in HB 164.240 Covington 
and Burling tobacco industry counsel Keith Teel reported in a May 23, 1996 memorandum that 
Comment i legislation failed because, “ultimately, it became apparent that there was not a viable 
political strategy for passing the bill, and we were forced to withdraw it.”235 As debate on HB 
164 concluded at the hearing, committee members voted 8-5 to adopt an amendment by member 
Rep. Randy Wiggins (R-Pineville) that excluded the tobacco industry from HB 164’s provisions 
and then passed the bill.240 As a result, the tobacco industry again failed to secure Comment i 
legislation. HB 164 ultimately died with adjournment in the Senate Committee on Judiciary A 
after passing the House.238 Although the tobacco industry, LABI and CALA failed to pass HB 
164 and its initial provisions featuring Comment i protections for the industry, LABI and CALA 
secured HB 18, HB 20, and HB 21 into law.233, 238, 241, 243, 244 
HB 18 did not pertain to the tobacco industry and did not increase its protection from 
liability.237 HB 20, which eliminated punitive damages in lawsuits regarding harm caused by 
dangerous and toxic substances, also passed245 but did not affect the tobacco industry. HB 21 
limited liability based on defendants’ and plaintiffs’ respective degree of fault, but held 
tortfeasors fully accountable in cases of  intentional torts, where defendants engaged in behavior 
they knew could cause harm.239, 246 HB 21 limited liability for the tobacco industry, allowing it to 
shift fault and degree of liability to people injured by its products.238  
The successful business community effort to pass tort and liability laws prompted the 
New Orleans Times-Picayune to credit LABI as the biggest winner of the special legislative 
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session in an April 21, 1996 article.243 In a 1997 performance review, RJR Senior Vice President 
of Government Relations W.E. Ainsworth stated that passage of the legislative package was 
damaging to state trial lawyers.247 Ainsworth oversaw the tobacco industry’s Medicaid liability 
program and led Louisiana tort reform efforts in 1996.   
Although tort reform proponents in Louisiana secured most of their tort reform agenda in 
1996, state lawmakers also passed SR 20 to draw scrutiny towards the tobacco industry’s 
attempts to influence tort reform for its own gain.238 SR 20 tasked the Senate Committee on 
Judiciary A to study whether the tobacco industry utilized tort reform to protect itself from 
lawsuits over injuries, particularly cancer, cardiovascular disease, and emphysema, caused by its 
products.248 
Castano Case is Defeated 
 
In May 1996, shortly after Louisiana’s special session, tobacco industry lawyers 
convinced the US 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans to unanimously reject the class 
action certification request sought by plaintiffs in Castano vs. American Tobacco Co. The judges 
decided against approving the class action, believing it would be too unwieldy for the federal 
court system.15 The decision killed efforts to bring a national class action lawsuit for nicotine 
addiction, but caused participating lawyers and law firms to file state-level class actions, termed 
“sons of Castano,” mimicking the design of the original case.19  
The Tobacco Industry Plans for 1997 
  
TI outlined offensive and defensive policy priorities for 1997 Louisiana tort reform 
efforts in June 1996.249 TI tort reform goals included prohibiting state agencies from bringing 
lawsuits using contingency fees, securing Comment i legislation, protecting against Medicaid 
lawsuit liability (Chapter 9), and defending favorable product liability laws.249  
 Philip Morris developed similar legislative objectives for tort reform during the 1997 
session.250 In an undated draft plan for 1997 statewide political efforts, Philip Morris intended to 
secure Comment i legislation, and defend the 1988 law limiting liability for inherently dangerous 
products.250 Philip Morris also planned to defeat legislation permitting Medicaid reimbursement 
lawsuits without proving “causation and actual damages for individual claims,” as well as any 
bills introduced by trial lawyers.250 To advance tort reform goals, PM officials sought to bolster 
its statewide tort reform coalition and revise tort discussion points and claims used to lobby its 
legislative agenda.250 
 State lawmakers submitted 13 tort and liability bills that the tobacco industry monitored 
during the 1997 legislative session (Table 8.16). Lawmakers adopted into law one bill affecting 
class action lawsuits, HB 1984 by Chuck McMains (Table 8.16). HB 1984 created more 
requirements and more prohibitive thresholds for filing class action lawsuits, benefitting the 
tobacco industry by limiting the ability of plaintiffs to take such actions.251 The tobacco 
companies had defeated an attempt by plaintiffs in Castano vs. American Tobacco Co. et al. the 
prior year to file a federal class action lawsuit, and sought to invalidate subsequent state-level 
class action cases filed by lawyers and law firms party to the failed federal suit. 
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We did not find bills to enact Comment i legislation despite earlier industry plans. In 
addition, we did not discover documentation of tobacco industry efforts to advance tort reform 
during the 1997 legislative session.  
  
Legislative Efforts Stall in 1998 
  
Louisiana law restricted the 1998 regular session to financial legislation, limiting 
consideration of tort reform to any special session convened by the governor. Philip Morris 
planned by late August 1997 to pursue Comment i legislation and preserve 1988 product liability 
Table 8.16: Tort Reform and Product Liability Legislation Introduced for the 1997 Session55, 56, 252, 253 
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Outcome 
HB 27 Vic Stelly (R-
Calcasieu) 
      + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 193 Robert 
Marionneaux (D-
West Baton Rouge) 
      + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 321 Tom Thornhill (R-
St. Tammany) 
    +   Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 
1289 
Charles Hudson 
(D-St. Landry) 
      + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 
1299 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
+       Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 
1869 
John “Juba” Diez 
(D-Ascension), 
Charles DeWitt (D-
Rapides) 
 +      Died upon adjournment 
without consideration  
HB 
1984 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
+       Adopted 
SB 209 John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
      + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 245 J. Lomax Jordan 
(R-Lafayette) 
   +   + Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 520 Mike Smith (D-
Grant) 
+       Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 759 Phil Short (R-St. 
Helena) 
+       Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 888 J. Lomax Jordan 
(R-Lafayette) 
  +     Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 897 J. Lomax Jordan 
(R-Lafayette) 
     +  Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
SB 
1085 
John Hainkel (D-
Jefferson) 
+       Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
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laws if one happened.229 PM officials also intended to defeat any legislative efforts by trial 
lawyers.229 To achieve its 1998 tort objectives, Philip Morris planned to bolster its Louisiana 
business alliance as well as revise arguments and resources related to tort reform and Medicaid 
liability.229 However, no special session convened to consider tort reform in 1998, stalling 
tobacco industry legislative efforts until 1999.  
 The tobacco industry and LABI remained judicially active on tort reform in 1998, 
contributing to candidate Charles Cusimano’s unsuccessful fall election run for the Louisiana 
Supreme Court against Chief Justice Pascal Calogero, whom LABI blamed for unfavorable 
rulings (Chapter 3).  
1999 Tort Reform Efforts 
 
Philip Morris formulated a draft 
strategy for 1999 political efforts in Louisiana 
by late August 1998 that included tort reform 
objectives.254 PM officials planned to defend 
against legislation allowing the state to receive 
damages in Medicaid recovery lawsuits 
without demonstrating fault or harm in each 
claim.254 In addition, Philip Morris intended to 
protect the 1988 law limiting liability for 
inherently dangerous products and to prevent 
trial lawyers from securing any legislation.254 
Philip Morris viewed success on tort reform 
during the 1999 legislative session as defeating any bills making lawsuits more viable against the 
tobacco companies.254 
 To achieve its tort reform goals in Louisiana, Philip Morris developed a multifaceted 
strategy that included improving its lobbying effectiveness on the subject, alliance building, a 
publicity campaign, and donations.254 Philip Morris planned to engage industry legal consultants 
to inform their tort activities and improve industry representatives’ abilities to observe and 
impede unfavorable legislative efforts. In an uncredited strategy document, Philip Morris also 
intended to “strengthen [its] business coalition on liability issues.” The company planned to 
enhance liability discussion themes used by its media affairs and legal teams and monitor 
liability resources and assertions used by its issue management officials. Externally, Philip 
Morris sought to improve ties with its Miller Beer subsidiary’s distributors as well as the Beer 
Industry League of Louisiana. It also planned to keep an official referred to in its 1999 Louisiana 
draft plan as “RD” on LABI’s Product Liability Taskforce. 
Philip Morris planned a publicity campaign to bolster its tort reform efforts. The 
company sought to publish letters and editorials in newspapers. In addition, Philip Morris would 
contribute to charities and organizations to demonstrate the company’s positive impact in 
Louisiana and form bonds with critical populations.254 In essence, it planned to employ a 
corporate social responsibility campaign to improve its public image and support in Louisiana. 
Philip Morris also intended to donate to state candidates supportive of business interests. 
To achieve its tort reform goals in 
Louisiana, Philip Morris developed 
a multifaceted strategy that 
included improving its lobbying 
effectiveness on the subject, 
alliance building, a publicity 
campaign, and donations. 
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 The tobacco industry tracked ten tort and liability bills introduced by Louisiana 
lawmakers for the 1999 legislative session255 (Table 8.17). Three tort and liability bills, HB 858, 
HB 1094, and HB 1784, passed into law. The tobacco industry had desired passage of two bills 
adopted, HB 858 and HB 1784.255 HB 858 allowed defendants to pursue termination of a lawsuit 
if more suitable court venues existed at the federal or state levels. HB 1784 prohibited using 
damages to cover health screenings unless an injury existed at the beginning of a lawsuit. HB 
1094, which addressed gun manufacturer liability, did not pertain to tobacco products or tobacco 
manufacturer liability.255 Other bills desired or opposed by the tobacco industry died with 
adjournment (Table 7.16). We found no evidence besides Philip Morris’ draft plan for 1999 that 
the tobacco industry lobbied or conducted a campaign to pass tort reform during the 1999 
legislative session. 
 
 
Table 8.17: Tort Reform and Product Liability Legislation Introduced for the 1999 Session55, 56, 255-257 
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Outcome 
HB 204 Steve Scalise (R-
Orleans) 
Neutral       + Died with adjournment 
HB 858 Ronnie Johns 
(D-Sulphur) 
Supported    +    Adopted 
HB 
1059 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
Supported +       Died with adjournment on 
House Floor  
HB 
1094 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
Neutral       + Adopted 
HB 
1095 
Mike Michot (R-
Lafayette) 
Supported     +   Died with adjournment 
HB 
1508 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
Opposed   +     Died with adjournment 
HB 
1784 
Chuck McMains 
(R-Livingston) 
Supported  +      Adopted 
SB 66 James Cox (D-
Calcasieu) 
Opposed      +  Died with adjournment 
SB 203 John Hainkel (D-
Orleans) 
Neutral        Died with adjournment 
after being designated 
duplicate of HB 1094 
SB 1001 John Siracusa 
(D-St. Mary) 
Supported    +    Died with adjournment 
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Tort Reform After 1999 
 
We did not find evidence of tobacco industry participation in Louisiana tort reform 
efforts after 1999 in the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library. However, tort reform 
organizations and the business community remained active in the state. During 2016 state 
elections, Republican gubernatorial candidates received significant funding from unidentified 
tort reform interests, some of whom were seeking to secure a business-friendly legislative 
package the following session.258 Gubernatorial candidate John Bel Edwards (D), who received 
$685,000 in funding from trial lawyers during the 2016 election cycle and was not a tort reform 
proponent, won office.258 Before being elected governor, Edwards opposed tort reform and 
supported trial lawyer positions while he served in the state legislature.258 
In 2018, the American Tort Reform Foundation listed Louisiana as a “Judicial Hellhole,” 
claiming its court system was unfair to businesses and biased towards plaintiffs, partly because 
of trial lawyers’ influence on the state government.259 CALA no longer appeared to be active, but 
Louisianans for Lawsuit Reform, a tort reform organization similar to CALA that was created in 
2007, continued to attack trial lawyers and promote tort reform in Louisiana as of September 
2018.260 As of 2019, LABI continued to endorse product liability reforms.261  
Conclusion 
 
The tobacco industry implemented a comprehensive strategy consisting of monitoring 
and lobbying legislation, providing campaign contributions to lawmakers, and developing a state 
business coalition to advance its tort reform agenda and protect itself from product liability 
lawsuits in Louisiana. By 1986, the tobacco industry began observing tort and liability legislation 
in Louisiana. That year, the State Supreme Court’s ruling in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corporation (a product liability lawsuit over harm caused by asbestos exposure) finding 
companies liable for inherently dangerous products regardless of their knowledge or ability to 
protect consumers, subsequently increased the tobacco industry’s activity on tort reform. The 
tobacco industry shortly began contributing to lawmakers and lobbying for tort reform legislation 
in tandem with the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry and businesses in the state. 
The industry particularly sought bills to limit or eliminate liability for inherently dangerous 
products. The tobacco industry and Louisiana’s business community subsequently secured SB 
684 in 1988, eliminating liability for harm caused by inherently dangerous products and 
effectively overturning the 1986 State Supreme Court ruling.  
Afterwards the tobacco industry continued monitoring and lobbying for tort reform 
legislation in coordination with Louisiana businesses and associations, allowing it to gradually 
increase its protections from liability in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Statewide elections in 
1991 radically changed the membership of the legislature and aligned it with the anti-tort reform 
Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association, jeopardizing the tobacco industry and Louisiana business 
community’s legislative gains in tort reform and liability laws. To counter the threat posed by the 
new legislature and LTLA, the tobacco industry funded and participated in Citizens Against 
Lawsuit Abuse, a coalition created by LABI in 1992 to coordinate tort reform efforts by pro-tort 
reform businesses and organizations and defend favorable tort reform laws. CALA served as the 
face of tort reform efforts in Louisiana and ran a publicity campaign that demonized LTLA and 
promoted tort reform as a societal benefit. Efforts by the tobacco industry and Louisiana business 
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community, partially through CALA, prevented LTLA from securing its anti-tort reform 
legislative agenda despite a friendly legislature. Instead, the cooperative legislative and media 
campaigns backed by the tobacco industry and Louisiana business community secured additional 
bills during the 1990s limiting their liability, reducing their exposure to damages, and hindering 
people’s ability to sue them. Although the tobacco industry was not visibly participating in 
Louisiana tort reform work after the 1990s, tort reform proponents remained active in the state as 
of 2018.  
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Chapter 9: Louisiana and the Master Settlement Agreement  
 
• In 1996 Louisiana became the sixth state to sue the tobacco industry. 
• Louisiana’s participation caused Liggett and Myers to settle, giving state attorneys 
general access to internal documents and information critical to their lawsuits against the 
tobacco companies. 
• Louisiana used initial payments from the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement to address a 
budget shortfall in 1999. 
• Lawmakers placed approximately 70% of the state’s settlement reward into a protected 
trust for health and education initiatives. 
• Louisiana securitized $2.4 billion of its first 25 years of MSA payments in 2001 for an 
immediate $1.2 billion payment. 
 
Introduction 
  
In 1994, attorneys general from Mississippi, Minnesota and West Virginia, and in 1995 
those from Florida and Massachusetts, filed lawsuits against the major tobacco companies.1 The 
suits claimed the tobacco industry hid the harmful effects of cigarettes and the addictiveness of 
nicotine, and sought compensation for Medicaid funding used by the states to treat tobacco-
related illnesses, as well as injunctive relief to reign in tobacco industry marketing directed at 
youth. The lawsuits named the American Tobacco Company, RJ Reynolds, British American 
Tobacco, Brown and Williamson, Philip Morris, Liggett and Myers, Lorillard, the United States 
Tobacco Sales and Marketing Company, the Council for Tobacco Research, and the Tobacco 
Institute as defendants.  
States started individually settling their cases against the tobacco industry on increasingly 
favorable terms in 1997. That year, Mississippi2 and Florida3 settled their cases, followed by 
Texas 4 and Minnesota5 in 1998. By 1998 the remaining 46 states, the District of Columbia, and 
5 US territories had filed lawsuits against the industry. The participating attorneys general and 
tobacco companies negotiated the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) to settle all these 
remaining cases.6 The MSA required the tobacco companies to acknowledge the addictiveness of 
nicotine and the harms of tobacco consumption. The 
MSA also prohibited participating companies from 
marketing to minors and restricted where and how they 
could advertise.6 The MSA required the settling tobacco 
companies to pay billions of dollars in damages in 
perpetuity to state plaintiffs based on a formula related 
to the costs smoking imposed on each state’s Medicaid 
program and other factors.6  
Louisiana was the sixth state to file suit against 
the major tobacco companies when it sued in March 
19967 and played a critical role in the success of the 
Master Settlement Agreement. The state’s Attorney General, Richard Ieyoub, had considered 
filing suit against major tobacco companies in 1994 to recoup Louisiana’s Medicaid costs from 
treating tobacco-related illness,8 but did not join the other states’ legal action against the industry 
Louisiana was the sixth state 
to file suit against the major 
tobacco companies when it 
sued in March 1996 and 
played a critical role in the 
success of the Master 
Settlement Agreement. 
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until 1996. Louisiana’s participation secured the settlement of tobacco company Liggett and 
Myers, which provided the attorneys general an insider witness as well as internal documents 
proving the industry knew their products were harmful and addictive. Louisiana provided further 
pressure on the tobacco companies to settle using its unique ability among participating states to 
name as defendants the insurance companies that were providing coverage for the tobacco 
industry.9, 10  
Louisiana Joins Litigation against the Tobacco Companies: The Liggett and Myers Settlement 
  
After initiating legal action against the tobacco industry in 1994 and 1995, in 1996 the 
attorneys general from Mississippi, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Florida, and West Virginia 
considered settling with Liggett and Myers to turn the business into a witness for the 
participating states against the other major tobacco companies. Two major considerations 
precipitated the deal sought by Liggett and Myers in court. First, Liggett only had a 2% share of 
the US tobacco market after it unsuccessfully fought a price war against Philip Morris in 1993 
and generated a mere $11 million in profit annually before tax. Settling early allowed Liggett and 
Myers to avoid bankruptcy if the state attorneys general reached a larger settlement with the 
bigger tobacco companies or defeated them in court. Second, Liggett’s CEO Bennett LeBow did 
not rise to power from within the tobacco industry and did not hold allegiance to its practices. 
Known for buying poorly performing companies and selling them for a profit, he became CEO 
after purchasing Liggett in 1986.11 Being an industry outsider, he was not inclined to maintain 
ranks with the other companies as tobacco industry leadership had always done. As a result, 
LeBow and Liggett sought a deal with the state attorneys general without informing the rest of 
the tobacco industry. 
Settling with Liggett would provide the attorneys general access to internal documents on 
advertising to minors and nicotine modification in cigarettes. The attorneys general believed the 
documents would prove companies and trade associations named in the lawsuits knew nicotine 
was addictive and had worked to make cigarettes more addictive. Liggett CEO Bennett LeBow 
welcomed a settlement if all five states suing at the time agreed to the deal.12  
The attorneys general for Mississippi, Massachusetts, Florida and West Virginia 
negotiated a settlement with Liggett, but Minnesota refused to agree to the deal.12, 13 Minnesota 
AG Hubert Humphrey, Jr. felt the terms were not strong enough. He wanted Liggett to further 
curb marketing to minors and offer more money for Minnesota to settle.13 As a result, the 
participating attorneys general were one short of the five states LeBow required to settle. 
Looking for a fifth state to settle with Liggett, Mississippi Attorney General Michael 
Moore recruited Louisiana Attorney General Richard Ieyoub to participate in the lawsuit and 
settlement. Moore, along with Drew Ranier, a Louisiana lawyer that was friends with Ieyoub and 
knew attorneys general participating in the lawsuits, called the Louisiana AG imploring him to 
join the settlement. Fearful of tobacco industry retaliation since he planned to run for a US 
Senate seat the coming year, Ieyoub requested time to consider Moore and Ranier’s request. 
According to Richard Ieyoub in a 2014 interview for this report: 
That particular time was not the best time for me to consider filing a lawsuit 
politically against the tobacco companies who obviously were very powerful, 
very politically involved with a very strong lobby -- because I was getting ready 
to announce to run for United States Senate from Louisiana. And when Mike 
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Moore called me, I explained that to Mike, you know, there's no question…I was 
concerned because politically it would be very damaging, you know, for me to 
file a lawsuit at the time.14 
After Ieyoub spoke with Moore and Ranier, 
the tobacco companies attempted to intimidate the 
Louisiana attorney general into not entering the 
Liggett settlement. A Baton Rouge attorney 
contacted Ieyoub requesting an appointment for 
lawyers interested in the tobacco lawsuits to meet 
with him. At the appointment, approximately 13 
lawyers that previously or currently represented the tobacco industry attended to persuade Ieyoub 
that the state lawsuits were frivolous and unmerited. The lawyers insinuated that if Ieyoub joined 
the settlement, he would jeopardize his political career. Ieyoub recalled the encounter in a 2014 
interview for this report: 
They [tobacco industry lawyers] got into the fact that they were aware that I was 
interested in running for the U.S. Senate and that politically it was crazy for me at 
this point to file a lawsuit. Why would you want to file when you have a frivolous 
lawsuit and when you're getting ready to run for political office?14 
Despite threats from the tobacco industry, Ieyoub contacted Mississippi Attorney General Mike 
Moore and informed him he would join the Liggett settlement.14  
Mississippi, Massachusetts, Florida, West Virginia and Louisiana settled with Liggett and 
Meyers on March 12, 1996.15 The settlement forced Liggett to pay a total of $10 million and 
7.5% of profits before tax over 25 years.16 Five percent of pre-tax profits, capped at $50 million 
per year, would go to smoking cessation programs.16 If RJR Nabisco merged with Liggett in 
1996, which it was considering, the settlement required a $135 million payment and an annual 
allocation of either 2.5% of pretax profits or $30 million to the participating states.17 
The settlement forced Liggett to limitedly follow proposed FDA rules prohibiting 
advertising and marketing to minors.18, 19 Settlement rules based on the proposed FDA rules were 
narrower in scope and focused on limiting advertising to minors (Table 9.1). As with most 
settlements, Liggett did not admit fault.18 The settlement allowed other state attorneys general to 
join as parties up to six months after its finalization and permitted later entries if Liggett 
approved an extension.15 
Louisiana Joins the State Lawsuits against the Major Cigarette Companies 
 
While Louisiana joined efforts to settle with Liggett, Attorney General Richard Ieyoub 
moved to start a larger lawsuit under state law on behalf of Louisiana against the other major 
tobacco companies. Ieyoub approached Lake Charles lawyer Drew Ranier, who had urged him to 
join the settlement with Liggett, to form a team of lawyers to handle the lawsuit.14 Ranier formed 
a team of approximately 17 lawyers to draft a lawsuit for Louisiana and represent the state in 
court.14 The suit accused tobacco companies, distributors, and their trade organizations and think 
tanks of hiding the harmful effects of tobacco and the addictiveness of nicotine while trying to 
promote tobacco products.7 Ieyoub’s team brought the suit under the Louisiana Constitution of  
“Why would you want to file 
when you have a frivolous 
lawsuit and when you're getting 
ready to run for political office?”  
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Table 9.1: Comparison of FDA Proposed Rules and Liggett Settlement Provisions Based on FDA Proposed Rules18, 19 
Rule Number FDA Proposal  Liggett Settlement 
§ 897.16(a) Prohibits use of all non-tobacco product branding and trade names 
on tobacco products. Grandfathers in tobacco products using non-
tobacco branding or trade names by January 1, 1995. 
Prohibits use of non-tobacco product branding and trade names that are 
appealing to minors. 
§ 897.16(b) Established minimum cigarette pack size at 20 cigarettes. Same as FDA proposal. 
§ 897.16(d) Prohibited distribution of free tobacco product samples. Prohibited distribution of free tobacco product samples except for at 
places unlikely to have or devoid of minors. 
§ 897.30(a) Defined acceptable mediums for advertising. Permitted advertising 
via print, billboards, placards, non-point of sale advertising 
materials, placards, video and audio advertising at point of sale, 
event teams and submissions. 
Defined acceptable mediums for advertising. Permitted advertising via 
print, billboards, placards, non-point of sale advertising materials, 
placards, video and audio advertising at point of sale, event teams and 
submissions. 
§ 897.30(b) Forbade outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of playgrounds and 
park and elementary and secondary school playgrounds. 
Only prohibited billboards within 1,000 feet of playgrounds controlled by 
the government and licensed elementary and secondary schools. 
§ 897.32(a) Restricted visual tobacco product advertising to use black font 
with white backgrounds. Prohibited additional visual elements. 
Limited visual tobacco product advertising in print publications to black 
font with white backgrounds if their readership consisted of 15% or 
greater of minors. Prohibited additional visual elements. Gave a five-year 
period to transition advertising in said print outlets that the tobacco 
company was already advertising in. 
§ 897.34(a) Forbade sale or provision of non-tobacco products with tobacco 
product identifiers or branding. 
Forbade sale or provision of non-tobacco products with tobacco product 
identifiers or branding not made available, advertised, or transmitted 
before agreement. Permits sale and distribution of branded products at 
certain events. 
§ 897.34(b) Forbade contests and gambling games that required the purchase 
of tobacco products. 
Forbade contests and gambling games that required the purchase of 
tobacco products if they provided rewards that appealed to minors more 
than adults. 
§ 897.34(c) Forbade sponsorship of events that used tobacco product logos, 
branding, marketing lingo, or other identifying product imagery. 
Forbade sponsorship of events that used tobacco product logos, branding, 
marketing lingo, or other identifying product imagery. Only applied to 
events with an average minor attendance of 15% or greater over prior 18 
years. Excepted events the defendants ran, sponsored or participated in 
during previous 10 years.  
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1974, which tasked the state with ensuring the health and wellbeing of Louisianans. The 
Attorney General and his legal team filed the lawsuit at the State District Court in Lake Charles 
since it was Ieyoub’s home region, he had served as a district attorney there, and his lead 
lawyer’s firm was based in the city.12  
On March 13, 1996, the same day of the Liggett settlement, Louisiana filed a lawsuit 
against the major tobacco companies and their associates (Table 9.2) to recoup Medicaid costs 
from treating tobacco-related illnesses as well as injunctive relieve to curb industry marketing to 
children.7 
Louisiana Governor Mike Foster (R) denounced the legal action and moved to curb the 
attorney general’s constitutional authority to bring such a suit. In a mid-March 1996 interview 
with the Baton Rouge Advocate, Foster attacked the lawsuit for targeting a legally operating 
business.20 The lawsuit against the tobacco companies strained a tense relationship between the 
Attorney General and Governor Foster, who was already upset with Ieyoub for defending a 
redistricting plan in federal court that increased minority representation in the state’s 
legislature.20-22  
On March 18, 1996 Governor Foster added legislation to the agenda of a special 
legislative session, convened the day before, to remove the attorney general’s power to file 
lawsuits on behalf of Louisiana without approval from the governor.20, 22 Ieyoub denounced the 
legislation in a March 1996 interview with the New Orleans Times-Picayune, stating the conflict 
between him and Foster created a “constitutional crisis….this [Foster’s bill] eliminates the 
attorney general as an independent elected official as far as protecting legally the interests of the 
state.”23 The Louisiana Democratic Party opposed the Governor’s Legislation, asserting that the 
bill practically made Foster the attorney general.23 Foster pulled the legislation in April 1996, 
after Ieyoub agreed to secure his permission for future legal actions that required filing under the 
name of the governor or a governor’s appointee-led agency.24, 25  
Table 9.2: Defendants Named in Louisiana Lawsuit7 
Tobacco Companies American Tobacco Company 
RJ Reynolds 
Brown and Williamson 
Philip Morris 
Liggett and Myers 
Lorillard 
United States Tobacco Company 
Trade Organizations and Think Tanks The Tobacco Institute 
The Council for Tobacco Research 
Consultants Hill and Knowlton 
Distributors Generic Products Corporation 
Pelican Cigar Company 
Schlesinger Wholesalers and Automotive Cigarette 
Service 
Baton Rouge Tobacco Company 
Malone and Hyde 
Imperial Trading Company 
Lee-Dee Wholesale Distributing Company 
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 Tobacco industry lawyers filed a motion to dismiss Ieyoub’s lawsuit in late November 
1996. The motion argued the legal complaint was invalid because Ieyoub had not received 
permission from Governor Foster or Department of Health and Hospitals Secretary Bobby Jindal 
to pursue the case.16 Industry lawyers acquired signed affidavits from Foster and Jindal that 
stated Ieyoub lacked permission to file a lawsuit against the tobacco companies.16 Foster’s 
executive counsel indicated to the Baton Rouge Advocate that the Governor submitted the 
affidavit because he disagreed with lawsuits targeting companies for providing legal goods.16  
 Judge Wilford Carter of the state district 
court in Lake Charles considered the motion to 
dismiss Ieyoub’s case, as well as a request from 
tobacco industry lawyers to relocate the case to 
Baton Rouge, on January 10, 1997.26 At the 
hearing, Drew Ranier of Ieyoub’s legal team 
argued that Louisiana’s constitution allowed the 
attorney general to file lawsuits on behalf of the 
state without prior approval from the governor or 
other state officials.26 Tobacco industry lawyer Jimmy Nieset argued Governor Foster’s 
opposition to the lawsuit overrode Ieyoub’s ability to pursue his claim. Judge Carter found that 
Foster’s affidavit proved the governor did not give Ieyoub permission to file a claim but failed to 
show the Governor was actively against the suit. 
Besides arguments over Ieyoub’s authority to file the tobacco lawsuit, Philip Morris’ 
lawyer, New Orleans attorney Patrick Juneau, asked to move consideration of the lawsuit to East 
Baton Rouge Parish.26 Juneau argued the Baton Rouge court should handle the lawsuit because it 
had more judges to assist with the case, and because numerous witnesses were located in the 
region.  
Judge Carter ruled that Louisiana law allowed the Attorney General to submit the tobacco 
lawsuit without approval from other state officials.26 He also denied the industry lawyers’ request 
to relocate the lawsuit. The rulings allowed the lawsuit to proceed, kept hearings near Ieyoub’s 
legal team12 and away from the documents and witnesses in East Baton Rouge that the tobacco 
industry’s lawyers argued to the court warranted relocating the case there.27 Tobacco industry 
lawyers stated they would request a review of Carter’s decisions by the Louisiana Third Circuit 
Court of Appeal,26 which they ultimately submitted in early February with a request to stay the 
case.28 
 Tobacco industry lawyers attempted to hinder Ieyoub’s lawsuit in mid-late January 1997 
by attacking the Attorney General for forming a legal team containing friends and political 
supporters.29 Industry lawyers argued Ieyoub selected Drew Ranier’s law firm, Badon and 
Ranier, to serve as lead counsel on the lawsuit in return for past political assistance. Badon and 
Ranier, as well as other law firms contracted by Ieyoub for the tobacco lawsuit, had given 
campaign contributions to the Attorney General in past years. In a 2014 interview for this report, 
Ieyoub said he built his team based on their abilities: 
AGs had to stave off all kinds of insinuations that they were just rewarding their 
friends making these lawyers rich, you know? They [attorneys general] were 
making their lawyer friends rich so they could get political contributions. Your 
enemies always seized on that. The fact of the matter is, I chose my lawyers based 
Industry lawyers acquired signed 
affidavits from Foster and Jindal 
that stated Ieyoub lacked 
permission to file a lawsuit 
against the tobacco companies.  
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on who would do the best job. A lot of them were my supporters, but you know, it 
was people that I knew. They did an excellent job. They did a fantastic job.14 
Industry lawyers also asserted that Badon and Ranier’s contract for the lawsuit was invalid 
because state agencies had not authorized the agreement.29 Ieyoub acknowledged his ties to 
Badon and Ranier but asserted the legal team was effective and winning important exchanges in 
the tobacco lawsuit, such as preventing the case from relocating to Baton Rouge.  
 The American Lung Association of Louisiana’s Executive Director, Ben Fontaine, 
defended Ieyoub from allegations of corruption and favoritism made by the tobacco industry. In 
a letter published by The Times-Picayune on February 1, 1997, Fontaine asserted tobacco 
industry lawyers were attacking Ieyoub’s legal team because it had a “good case” that might earn 
millions for Medicaid in Louisiana.30 
Tobacco industry lawyers also attacked Ieyoub over a federal investigation into his 
conduct, claiming it might affect the tobacco lawsuit.29 In November 1996, the Department of 
Justice began investigating Ieyoub31 for legal opinions he gave on a 1994 contract to install fiber 
optic cable in New Orleans awarded by the Orleans Levee Board.32 In the opinion, Ieyoub found 
that the Orleans Levee Board made the contract illegally, but stated the deal remained valid.32 
The opinion drew scrutiny because 18 shareholders of the company that received the fiber optic 
contract were from Ieyoub’s home region, six had contributed to Ieyoub’s unsuccessful Senate 
campaign, and one had purchased Ieyoub’s house. The Department of Justice subpoenaed 
Ieyoub, placing an additional burden on the Attorney General’s office in the midst of the tobacco 
litigation.29 Ieyoub dismissed claims that the federal investigation affected the tobacco lawsuit, 
stating in a January 1997 interview with The Times-Picayune that “[The investigation] hasn’t had 
any effect whatsoever; I’m not going to let this inquiry in any way impede my duties.”29 The 
Attorney General’s office continued to pursue the tobacco lawsuit as it handled the Department 
of Justice Investigation.  
 In March 1997, Attorney General Ieyoub amended Louisiana’s lawsuit to add 1409 
insurance companies giving tobacco companies liability coverage as defendants in the case.10 
Among the states taking legal action against the tobacco companies, only Louisiana had a law 
permitting plaintiffs to sue insurance companies because of their clients’ actions.9 
The Attorney General and his legal team sought documents the tobacco industry gave 
insurance companies to use as evidence. According to statement released by Ieyoub’s office 
covered in a March 20, 1997 article in The Advocate, “It…provides a vehicle in which the state 
may obtain documents provided by the tobacco industry to its insurers. Having these documents 
will significantly strengthen our case.”10 Ieyoub also believed naming insurance companies as 
defendants might drive them to cooperate with his lawsuit against the tobacco industry in order 
to avoid paying damages.10  
Initial Efforts to Settle the Litigation 
  
By the time that the Attorney General filed Louisiana’s claim against the major tobacco 
companies on March 20, 1997, 22 states (including Louisiana) secured an expanded settlement 
with Liggett and Myers that exacted further concessions from the company.33, 34 The settlement 
was an extension of the initial March 1996 agreement between Louisiana, four other states, and 
Liggett, in which Liggett agreed to publish warnings that smoking is addictive on cigarette packs 
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and to state publicly that the tobacco industry targeted teens.33, 34 In addition, Liggett agreed to 
give 25% of annual pre-tax earnings to settling states for 25 years. As part of the settlement, 
Liggett also gave plaintiffs internal documents about the industry’s marketing practices and 
discussions on smoking. In a statement to the press covered by The Times-Picayune, Ieyoub’s 
spokesperson, Denise Bottcher, claimed the documents “show[ed] how tobacco companies have 
attempted to addict youth so they would always have smokers.”33 In an interview with The 
Times-Picayune, Louisiana tobacco litigation team member Wendell Gauthier (also involved in 
the Castano case (Chapter 8)) said the information threatened the tobacco industry’s survival: 
We’ve [states attorneys general and their legal teams] broken the iron wall; we’re 
seeing how they [the tobacco industry] do business. The revelations now are 
things that we were learning anyway, but they put the nail in the coffin of the 
cigarette industry.33 
The internal documents revealed the tobacco industry’s knowledge of nicotine addiction and 
smoking related harms, strengthening the lawsuits filed by states’ attorneys general.  
 Richard Ieyoub as well as the Attorneys 
General from Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, 
Mississippi, New York, and Washington, led initial 
settlement talks with the tobacco industry, which 
started in the latter half of April 1997.35, 36 By the 
time settlement negotiations started, 24 states had 
filed lawsuits against the tobacco companies.   
During negotiations, health advocates and 
lawsuit proponents feared attorneys general planned 
to give tobacco companies immunity from future 
lawsuits in exchange for money and restrictions on 
youth advertising. The American Lung Association (ALA) sent a letter to Attorney General 
Ieyoub imploring him not to grant immunity as part of a settlement.35 National ALA Managing 
Director John Garrison issued a statement to the news media asserting that providing tobacco 
companies immunity was not an option in any settlement, arguing that future legal action should 
be allowed against an industry that knew for over 30 years their products caused harm.   
At a press conference on April 23, 1997, Ieyoub denied that attorneys general were 
considering offering tobacco companies immunity from future lawsuits.35 Ieyoub stated that 
attorneys general sought reimbursement for medical costs incurred for treating tobacco-related 
illnesses, disclosure by companies of tobacco use’s impact on health, and a prohibition on 
tobacco advertisements to minors.35 
As Ieyoub and seven other attorneys general worked to negotiate a settlement with the 
tobacco industry in late April, a federal judge ruled that the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) could regulate tobacco products as a drug delivery medical device.36 (The 
ruling was later overturned by the United States Supreme Court in 200037). At a conference 
regarding tobacco lawsuits, Ieyoub told attendees the ruling improved states’ position in 
negotiations with the industry. Despite impending agency oversight, Ieyoub stated legislation 
was still needed to rein in the industry’s behavior.36   
“We’ve broken the iron wall; 
we’re seeing how they [the 
tobacco industry] do business. 
The revelations now are things 
that we were learning anyway, 
but they put the nail in the 
coffin of the cigarette industry.”  
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Ieyoub reinforced the unity among attorneys general participating in negotiations and 
their commitment to penalizing the tobacco industry at the press conference in late April. Ieyoub 
addressed concerns among attendees that attorneys general were in disagreement over settlement 
requirements, stating that they had “presented a unified front” in discussions.36 He reasserted that 
any settlement the states agreed to would require tobacco companies to stop targeting minors, to 
reimburse states for treating tobacco-related illnesses, and to admit the negative health effects of 
tobacco use. Ieyoub added that no settlement would grant the tobacco industry immunity from 
future legal actions.  
While attorneys general worked to negotiate a settlement, Ieyoub announced a petition 
drive in support of reducing youth tobacco use at a press conference in Baton Rouge on May 14, 
1997.38 According to the Baton Rouge Advocate, Ieyoub told attendees “Our goals are to 
generate grassroots support and involvement in our communities, and to bring the untapped 
resources and power of our youth to the forefront on this issue.”38 Ieyoub also asserted that the 
“petitions will be the representative voice of the people. These petitions will speak for the 
thousands of citizens who want our children to be protected from tobacco, but cannot always be 
where change is made.”38 He detailed the adverse effects of tobacco on minors to generate 
support for the petition, claiming 3,000 youth nationwide became addicted to cigarettes daily, 
that tobacco served as a gateway drug, and that 75% of Louisiana minors had tried cigarettes. 
The Attorney General announced the formation of an approximately 30-person group dedicated 
to preventing tobacco use by Louisiana minors called the Youth Anti-Tobacco Network. At the 
press conference, Ieyoub and 30 others, including two youth active with the Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Kids, signed the petition. Ieyoub also appeared in Alexandria, Lake Charles, 
Lafayette, and New Orleans to announce the petition.38 
 The attorneys general from Mississippi, 
Florida, Arizona, New York, Washington and 
Louisiana convened in New York City on May 20, 
1997 to continue settlement negotiations with the 
tobacco companies.9 The attorneys general planned 
to bring insurance companies into talks, believing 
they would pressure tobacco companies to settle in order to avoid paying damages on the 
industry’s behalf.9, 39 Attorney General Ieyoub served as chair of the Attorneys General’s 
insurance committee during litigation.9 Ieyoub told the Richmond Times-Dispatch why they were 
incorporating insurers into the tobacco lawsuit: 
We’re exploring the extent of coverage available. If the coverage is significant 
then it becomes an important asset which would play a significant role in the 
negotiations…This petition leaves the tobacco company’s insurers little choice. 
They either pay up, or join us. 39 
The insurance industry resisted inclusion in the tobacco litigation and denied any 
responsibility for potential damages owed by tobacco companies. The American Insurance 
Association argued insurers were exempt from paying damages because policies with the 
tobacco companies had not covered tobacco product liabilities for over 30 years.9, 39 The 
Attorneys General believed that insurance companies might be required to pay damages because 
of past policies with the tobacco companies that covered liabilities arising from tobacco 
“This petition leaves the tobacco 
company’s insurers little choice. 
They either pay up, or join us.”  
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products. Insurers paid damages in previous legal actions against companies involved in asbestos 
and pollution. 
As the attorneys general brought insurance providers into their lawsuits against the 
tobacco industry, Louisiana’s legal team resisted another effort by tobacco company lawyers to 
dismiss the state’s lawsuit. In late May 1997, tobacco industry lawyers argued in state district 
court that Ieyoub’s lawsuit was illegitimate because only the Louisiana Department of Health 
and Hospitals (DHH) could sue to recover Medicaid funds.40 Judge Wilford Carter, who rejected 
an earlier motion to dismiss Louisiana’s lawsuit, found the Attorney General had legal standing 
to file suit since it was the state suffering harm and not the DHH.40 Tobacco industry lawyer 
James Nieset planned to appeal the ruling to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal following the 
loss. However, it appears the decision was ultimately not appealed by the tobacco industry. 
The Global Settlement 
 
After 40 states had sued the tobacco companies,  state Attorneys General held a press 
conference on June 20, 1997 to announce they reached a settlement with the tobacco industry.41 
The agreement, which became known as the “Global Settlement,”42 required tobacco industry 
members to admit that tobacco products were harmful and addictive.41 Tobacco companies had 
to submit to federal marketing restrictions,42 could not brand events, secure product placements 
in media, give away or distribute branded merchandise, advertise in magazines with readership 
bases consisting of 15% or more of minors, create product packaging or advertisements featuring 
cartoons or humans, conduct internet advertising to or from within the US, or advertise on public 
transit or outdoors except at establishments accessible only to adults.42, 43 In addition, tobacco 
products could not use non-tobacco brands, and non-tobacco items could not be awarded in 
exchange for purchasing tobacco products.42 The settlement also made the minimum pack size 
20 cigarettes. 42 In the settlement agreement the tobacco companies also agreed to support giving 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory authority over tobacco products.42 The 
settlement required tobacco companies to award participating states $368 billion in damages 
across 25 years, and to pay $15 billion annually in following years for perpetuity.41, 44, 45 Of the 
initial $360 billion, $310 billion was to go to states for tobacco prevention, cessation, education, 
and regulatory enforcement.45 The remaining $50 billion would go to national programs, with 
$25 billion going to fund a national health care trust fund and $25 billion to provide health care 
to children without insurance.45  
 
Despite promises by Ieyoub and other attorneys general that legal actions against the 
tobacco companies would not be restricted, all class action lawsuits, as well as lawsuits against 
the industry for prior offenses, were prohibited in the future.41 The agreement also limited the 
amount in annual payments the industry had to make as a result of litigation, and restricted the 
amount of punitive damages payments the companies had to make in any active or future 
lawsuits.42 This “immunity” provision in the Global Settlement caused dissension among tobacco 
control and health advocates, with some opposing the deal because of its restrictions on 
litigation, and others supporting it because of the regulatory and political advances the deal 
brought.42 
Unlike a conventional legal settlement, which only requires the parties and the 
supervising court to agree, the Global Settlement deal required approval from Congress and 
 368 
 
President Bill Clinton before going into effect because it required legislation to grant FDA 
authority over tobacco as well as enact its provisions limiting future lawsuits.46  
Following the announcement, Ieyoub started working to secure a higher portion of the 
settlement payments for Louisiana.46 He told the New Orleans Times-Picayune, “I will fight to 
make sure Louisiana gets its fair share of this settlement. I think (the state’s relative poverty) is a 
big factor and I will be pushing that factor.”46 Ieyoub also felt Louisiana had a stronger 
bargaining position for reward money because it was the sixth state to take action against the 
industry. He planned to push for Louisiana to receive more money at a meeting of the National 
Association of Attorneys General in late June.46  
Before the United States Congress took action on the Global Settlement, Mississippi 
settled with the tobacco companies on July 3, 1997.47 Asked by the Baton Rouge Advocate if 
Louisiana planned to settle its legal action with the tobacco companies, Attorney General Ieyoub 
said that the state would not act until federal action occurred on the collective settlement, 
expected that Fall.47 Ieyoub planned to have his office pressure Congress to accept the settlement 
and pass the related necessary legislation. If Congress failed to approve the settlement, the State 
would pursue an independent settlement.47 Congress did not consider the proposed tobacco 
settlement in 1997, waiting to debate the settlement during the 1998 legislative session.48 
Tobacco industry lawyers moved to prevent an individual settlement based on the 
inclusion of insurers in Louisiana’s lawsuit. In 1997, lawyers for the tobacco industry managed 
to move Louisiana’s lawsuit from the state district court in Lake Charles to a US District 
Court.49,50 In federal court, tobacco industry lawyers asserted the lawsuit must move to London, 
England for arbitration because an insurance company defendant, ACE Insurance Co, required 
mediation of lawsuits to occur there in three of its policies.49, 50 On September 14, 1997, US 
District Judge James Trimble Jr. ruled that Louisiana’s lawsuit go to London for arbitration, 
putting the state’s case at risk. According to Louisiana tobacco legal team member Thomas 
Gayle in an interview with The Times-Picayune, the court ruling “seriously jeopardizes our 
ability to do what Florida and Mississippi did: Force them to a courtroom and have an 
opportunity to settle.”49 
Moving the case to London required the Louisiana legal team to negotiate a settlement in 
an unfamiliar arbitration system and increased their costs to pursue the case.49 Since Congress 
had not approved the Global Settlement, Louisiana might receive little to no damages previously 
expected from the tobacco industry. In an interview with The Times-Picayune, Attorney General 
Richard Ieyoub acknowledged arbitration in London was less favorable towards Louisiana’s case 
than any US federal or state court.50 Ieyoub planned to appeal the Federal District Court ruling to 
the US Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit to keep Louisiana’s individual lawsuit in the country. 
The Master Settlement Agreement 
  
Attorneys general announced another 
settlement with the tobacco companies on November 
14, 1998.51, 52 Congress had struggled to approve the 
Global Settlement during the 1998 legislative session, 
prompting the states’ attorneys general to work on an 
alternative agreement with the industry titled the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). The new 
agreement restricted the tobacco industry’s advertising and marketing and forced the companies 
Louisiana would receive a $4.4 
billion share of the payments 
(over the first 25 years) ….  
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to dissolve their trade and political groups, including the Tobacco Institute. As part of the 
agreement, the tobacco industry would pay the settling states based on their smoking-induced 
Medicaid costs in perpetuity, totaling $206 billion over the first 25 years,52 $162 billion less than 
the Global Settlement. Louisiana would receive a $4.4 billion share of the payments (over the 
first 25 years), more than the $400 million originally proposed for Louisiana in the Global 
Settlement, and the $3.6-$3.9 billion expected in March 1998 when Congress was debating the 
Global Settlement.53 Because the MSA was only a settlement between the parties and did not 
include FDA authority over tobacco or industry immunity from some lawsuits, it did not require 
legislation to implement it. 
Attorney General Ieyoub announced at a press conference held in November 1998 at the 
Louisiana State University Medical Center that he would probably agree to the new settlement.51 
Ieyoub told attendees that money should fund initiatives for tobacco prevention education, 
tobacco regulatory enforcement, research, and health. He also revealed he had been recruiting 
medical societies to advocate for allocating settlement funds towards health programs.52 
Ieyoub and other attorneys general approved the revised settlement on November 20, 
1998, establishing the Master Settlement Agreement.54 Forty-six states, four US territories as 
well as Washington DC were initially party to the revised agreement.54 The deal ensured that an 
estimated $4.4 billion would come to Louisiana’s general fund for allocation by state lawmakers 
over its first 25 years. Future securitization of anticipated MSA funds would reduce the amount 
Louisiana received to $2.7 billion (Table 9.3). 
After announcement of the MSA, Attorney General Ieyoub stated he was collaborating 
with medical groups to advocate for lawmakers to dedicate settlement money towards health 
initiatives.57 In particular, Ieyoub worked with Chancellor Merv Trail of the LSU Medical 
Center, Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana Executive Director Charles Brown, and 
Table 9.3: Actual MSA Payments Made to Louisiana 1999-2016 (millions of dollars) 
Year Amount in Millions 
1999 $56 
2000 $130 
2001 $137 
2002 $156 
2003 $129 
2004 $140 
2005 $144 
2006 $132 
2007 $137 
2008 $161 
2009 $176 
2010 $147 
2011 $139 
2012 $141 
2013 $211 
2014 $140 
2015 $131 
2016 $138 
2017 $141 
Total $2,744 
Source: Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids54-56 
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unspecified local tobacco control groups.12 Although opposed to the Attorney General’s lawsuit, 
Louisiana Governor Mike Foster informed the press he welcomed the money, and would push 
for its use to fund youth tobacco prevention and other health initiatives.57  
Despite state officials pledging to use MSA funds for health programs, the American 
Lung Association (ALA) of Louisiana viewed the agreement negatively. Annual settlement 
payments were based on the number of cigarettes sold, prompting ALA of Louisiana 
spokesperson Ben Fontaine to tell The Times-Picayune in a late November 1998 interview, “It’s 
a little distasteful to us. Basically the state of Louisiana is in a partnership with tobacco 
companies to make sure their payments don’t decline.”58 Although some health organizations 
viewed the MSA negatively, they would pressure Louisiana lawmakers to dedicate settlement 
money to health and tobacco control programming. 
By November 1998, before Louisiana received its first MSA payment, the state’s receipt 
of expected funds from the deal was called into question because of possible federal 
intervention.59 State Attorneys General feared the federal agency that oversaw the United States 
Medicaid and Medicare programs, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA),60 would 
claim a significant portion of damages from the Master Settlement Agreement as reimbursement 
for federal Medicaid funds used to treat tobacco-related illnesses in the states.59 Because of the 
federal and state shares of Medicaid expenditures in Louisiana, HCFA could possibly take 70% 
($3.1 billion) of Louisiana’s total $4.4 billion award from the MSA.59 Ultimately, Congress 
passed legislation in May 1999 that prevented the federal government from considering MSA 
proceeds as “federal overpayments for purposes of Medicaid,” causing HCFA not to take any 
settlement awards.61 
Allocation of Master Settlement Agreement Funds 
 
Securitization of Master Settlement Payments 
 
In December 1998 Governor Mike Foster proposed selling Louisiana’s $4.4 billion in 
MSA payments anticipated over 25 years for an immediate lump sum, a process known as 
securitization.62 Louisiana’s Commissioner of Administration, Mark Drennen, projected the state 
could sell its settlement share for approximately $2.2 billion.63, 64 Foster believed selling the 
settlement payment stream for a large upfront payment would allow Louisiana to pay a portion 
of the state’s approximately $3.3 billion debt. According to Foster in statements covered by The 
Advocate, “there is no better way to use it [the lump sum from selling Louisiana’s settlement 
payment stream] than to pay off as much of the state debt as possible, maybe all of it.”62 Foster 
added that money originally dedicated towards paying Louisiana’s debt, approximately $257 
million for the next fiscal year, could fund other initiatives, in particular raising public educators’ 
salaries. Foster did not list health or tobacco control programs as possible recipients of funding 
despite previous statements he made. If an upfront sale of Louisiana’s settlement payments was 
not possible, Foster suggested Louisiana sell bonds to address the state’s debt and reimburse 
bondholders using MSA money.62 
  Governor Foster’s proposal received mixed reactions from state lawmakers. They feared 
the windfall might grow state spending, or, over time, provide less financial assistance or 
benefits than the actual settlement funding stream would.63 According to Representative John 
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Alario (D-Westwego), a prominent legislator and chairman of a state debt oversight committee, 
in a December 1998 interview with The Advocate: 
Sounds like a terrible way to spend that money…Remember, whoever buys it, 
they are in the business of making a profit, and the premium for that would be a 
heck of a lot of money to cover that…I would be awfully cautious and would 
have to look hard at the numbers. 63 
Lawmakers also feared dumping settlement 
money into the budget, where it could be 
appropriated for various uses such as paying 
recurring government expenses.63-65 Senate 
President Randy Ewing (D-Quitman) supported 
funding health and education initiatives, or 
placing settlement money into a trust dedicated 
to such initiatives.64 Ken Duncan, Louisiana’s 
Treasurer, also expressed interest in establishing 
a trust using settlement money. 
 As Louisiana lawmakers debated Governor Foster’s proposal to sell the state’s MSA 
funds in January, Department of Health and Hospitals Secretary David Hood advocated for the 
money to go to health programming because the tobacco lawsuit sought to compensate the state 
for Medicaid funds used treating tobacco-related illnesses.65 The Secretary and DHH developed 
a list of funding priorities, advocating for settlement money to go to tobacco prevention, 
children’s health insurance, improving healthcare access, creating drug courts, and increasing 
services for mental health care and developmentally disabled persons. Secretary Hooper and the 
DHH also recommended allocating settlement money for cancer and gene therapy research at the 
Louisiana State University Medical School. The list did not appear to gain traction. 
 Governor Foster dropped his proposal to securitize Louisiana’s Master Settlement 
Agreement payments towards the end of January 1999 because it was not politically feasible.66 
Foster also announced he did not plan to include the $56 million expected from the tobacco 
industry’s first payment into his budget proposal for the upcoming 1999 legislative cycle. Foster 
feared that settlement payments to Louisiana might shrink or be delayed because the federal 
government was considering filing a lawsuit against the tobacco industry and debating taking a 
portion of MSA monies to fund Medicare and Medicaid.66, 67 Foster returned to publicly 
supporting funding for health care initiatives, telling employees at Baton Rouge General Medical 
Center he backed using a share of the settlement money for health programming.66 
Putting the Money in Trust Accounts 
 
On January 27, 1999, Senators Foster Campbell (D-Elm Grove), Jim Cox (D-Lake 
Charles), Donald Cravins (D-Lafayette), Max Jordan (R-Lafayette), Ron Landry (D-LaPlace) 
and Max Malone (R-Shreveport) proposed a constitutional amendment to commit half of 
Louisiana’s anticipated $4.4 billion MSA payments to form trusts for public school systems 
called Louisiana Educational Excellence Funds.68 The proposal dedicated around $88 million 
yearly to individual funds for each public school district, allocating one-half equally across 
districts and the other half by enrollment. 
Lawmakers also feared dumping 
settlement money into the budget, 
where it could be appropriated for 
various uses such as paying 
recurring government expenses.  
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 The proposal received support from education officials and proponents but faced 
pushback from Governor Foster and Attorney General Ieyoub. Louisiana Board of Elementary 
and Secondary Education member Paul Pastorek and Louisiana Superintendent of Education 
Cecil Picard praised the proposal in interviews with the Baton Rouge Advocate.68 Louisiana 
Association of Educators President Fred Skelton and lobbyist Lawrence Narcisse also 
championed the constitutional amendment in statements to The Advocate, asserting the plan 
provided state school districts with lasting “savings accounts.”68 Governor Foster and Attorney 
General Ieyoub countered optimism from education advocates, cautioning against developing 
plans for Louisiana’s MSA money since the timing and amount of settlement payments remained 
uncertain.  
 Support for placing settlement funds into trusts continued to grow in Louisiana as the 
state waited for its first payment from the tobacco companies. On February 8, 1999, Louisiana 
State Treasurer Ken Duncan published a letter in The Times-Picayune calling for MSA money to 
go into trusts “instead of spending it ‘as soon as we (the state) get our hands on it’ and having it 
go down ‘the black hole.”69 Duncan suggested trusts provided continual funding for chosen 
programs without burdening taxpayers.  
Backing for establishing trusts using MSA money continued to grow, with the public 
policy organization Council for A Better Louisiana70 (CABL) announcing on February 10, 1999 
that a majority of the settlement should go into a trust fund.71 CABL representative Barry Erwin 
told The Times-Picayune that during Council discussions, members leaned towards a plan 
placing 75% of settlement money into a trust with established funding directives. The Council 
revealed it had not formulated recommendations for the 25% of settlement money not dedicated 
to a trust but expressed that funds should go towards healthcare or education initiatives. The 
Council planned to ask legislators to propose a constitutional amendment to create a trust for 
MSA money during the 1999 legislative session. Stating he needed to assess the Council’s 
recommendation, Governor Foster declared he desired funds upfront to remedy problems linked 
to tobacco.70  
 The same day CABL announced support for creating a trust fund, Louisiana 
Commissioner of Insurance Jim Brown stated in a speech to the Denham Springs Chamber of 
Commerce  that settlement money should go to a healthcare fund.72 Commissioner Brown stated 
that 50% of Louisiana’s budget went to healthcare costs, straining the state’s coffers. Brown 
reasoned that the number of Louisianans with health insurance, the lowest percentage of insured 
among the United States, contributed to Louisiana’s high spending on healthcare. To reduce the 
state’s financial burden, Brown argued for placing settlement money into a fund dedicated to 
subsidizing private insurance plans to increase the percentage of insured in Louisiana and reduce 
state costs on healthcare. Later that February, Attorney General Ieyoub announced support for 
placing settlement funds into a healthcare trust but did not mention subsidizing insurance plans.73 
 As discussions of placing MSA payments into a trust increased, Commissioner of 
Administration Mark Drennen announced on February 11, 1999 he would lead a panel to 
develop recommendations for allocating settlement money.74 The panel would consist of state 
employees and officials from finance, upper education, and public health agencies, as well as 
legislators and elected officials. Drennen told The Advocate that using a panel to decide 
settlement money allocation prevented possible chaos in the legislature: 
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[W]e’re going to get into the session and there will be all these ideas being thrown 
around. Rather than fighting it out on the floor, let’s see if we can iron it out 
before we get there. If there’s no consensus before the session, I’m afraid it’s 
going to be a mess.74  
Drennen indicated the panel might evaluate dedicating half of the tobacco settlement money to a 
trust and the other half to paying repeating costs. The Commissioner wanted the panel to develop 
a proposal for settlement fund allocation before late March, when the legislative session started. 
 As lawmakers and elected officials debated how to allocate settlement funding, the 
Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA) announced it supported using settlement money 
to fund healthcare initiatives. In a letter published by the Baton Rouge Advocate, LNHA 
Executive Director Joseph A. Donchess argued that settlement money should go to funding 
healthcare since treating tobacco-related illnesses had cost federal and state governments 
billions.75  
The Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus ,  the held five open hearings to get the public’s 
opinion on settlement fund allocation.76, 77 At a hearing held in Baton Rouge on February 27, 
1999, Attorney General Ieyoub and DHH Secretary Hood told the Caucus that they supported 
establishing healthcare trusts using settlement money.76 Hood also told the Caucus he was 
debating forming an Office of Minority Health inside the DHH since the African-American and 
Asian communities in Louisiana had a high smoking prevalence.76 Based on public comments at 
the hearings, the Legislative Black Caucus found people supported using settlement money to 
fund “smoking prevention” and healthcare initiatives.76  
Fear that the federal government would take Master Settlement Agreement Funds from 
Louisiana waned in early March 1999. During a meeting with the Louisiana Legislature’s House 
Speaker Hunt Downer (D-Houma) and Senate President Randy Ewing (D-Quitman) on March 5, 
1999, lawyer Chris Kirkpatrick perceived that political attitudes in Congress supported the states 
receiving their MSA funds.78 Kirkpatrick also observed that Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-
Texas) added an amendment to an appropriations bill awaiting consideration in the US Congress 
that gave states full authority over their settlement money. Downer and Ewing convened a 
meeting in early March to inform state lawmakers that Louisiana would probably receive all $4.4 
billion of its settlement reward.  
 On March 9, 1999 Attorney General Ieyoub announced Louisiana would receive an 
additional $168 million from a strategic fund created by states participating in the MSA.79 The 
strategic fund held $8.6 billion for distribution among settling states based on unique 
contributions they made to the tobacco litigation. The Strategic Fund allotted Louisiana $168 
million for enabling the Liggett and Myers settlement, which provided the attorneys general 
industry documents and evidence that the tobacco companies knew about the harm and 
addictiveness of tobacco products. Payments from the fund would start in April 2008. Louisiana 
ultimately received an even greater sum of $223.8 million.  
 
Debates over MSA Fund Allocation before the Start of the Legislative Session 
 
 In mid-March, as the 1999 legislative session neared, state legislators debated using 
tobacco settlement money to help fund Louisiana’s Medicaid program in the general budget.80 
Governor Foster had cut $60 million from the state Medicaid budget for the 2000 fiscal year, and 
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the program faced a $380 million deficit.81 Louisiana’s Medicaid funding in Governor Foster’s 
budget proposal was $50 million below the funding threshold to receive matched federal money, 
risking $150 million in federal matched funding for the State’s program. State lawmakers sought 
money for Medicaid but also faced a significant funding shortfall for Louisiana’s Minimum 
Foundation education program meant to help local schools, further complicating efforts to 
adequately fund both programs.82 On March 15, 1999, Senate President Randy Ewing (D-
Quitman) told the Press Club of Baton Rouge that the state’s first payment from the tobacco 
settlement was a source of revenue state lawmakers could consider to increase funding for 
Medicaid.80, 82 Lawmakers planned to designate $110 million of $199 million in expected 
settlement funds for that fiscal year as recurring revenue, which would permit its use in the 
operating budget.83  
 
The budget Governor Mike Foster proposed 
for the 1999 legislative session dedicated $27.1 
million in tobacco settlement money83 to shore up 
Medicaid funding.81 Combined with other sources, 
including over $70 million in gambling revenue also 
dedicated to Medicaid, the state expected to generate 
$170 million in matching funds from the federal 
government. 81 
 While state lawmakers considered using 
tobacco settlement money to increase Medicaid funding, an African American smokers’ group 
called the United Black Smokers of America Incorporated (UBSAI) advocated for using the 
funds to treat tobacco-related illnesses and for the money to be designated in a manner not 
prejudiced towards African Americans.84 We do not know the origin or history of UBSAI. The 
organization held a rally on March 19, 1999 near a state office building, where attendees claimed 
the tobacco industry targeted African Americans with advertisements. At the rally, spokesperson 
JT Hill stated African Americans composed 40% of Louisiana’s smokers, and called for all 
settlement money to go towards treatment for smoking-related illnesses.84 The organization 
announced it planned to fight for legislation allocating settlement funds to healthcare initiatives 
during the legislative session. That same day, UBSAI filed a lawsuit85 in Baton Rouge calling on 
the courts to guarantee that the governor and state legislature allocated a warranted amount of 
funds to African Americans when dedicating settlement proceeds.  
 As the legislative session started on March 29, 1999,86 legislators were uncertain of how 
much settlement money could be used for spending during the 2000 fiscal year. To include MSA 
funds in the 1999 (FY 2000) budget plan, the state constitution required the Louisiana Revenue 
Estimating Conference, a four-person committee composed of a state official, lawmakers and an 
economics professor, to certify the settlement money was a reliable revenue source for no less 
than three years (Table 9.4).  
At a meeting on April 1, 1999, the Louisiana Revenue Estimating Conference decided 
legislators could include $110 million of the $199 million in MSA funds expected by June 30, 
2000 88 in the budget proposed for the 2000 fiscal year.83 The ruling allowed the Foster 
Administration to include $27.1 million of tobacco settlement money in the budget for Medicaid 
funding as previously planned. In addition, the ruling permitted using more MSA funds to 
address the state’s budget deficit, which Governor Foster had desired. Following the meeting, 
Lawmakers planned to 
designate $110 million of $199 
million in expected settlement 
funds for that fiscal year as 
recurring revenue, permitting 
its use in the operating budget.  
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Commissioner of Administration Mark Drennen cast doubt that MSA funds would go to the 
general budget in statements to the Baton Rouge Advocate: 
What we put in the budget [tobacco settlement and land casino funds] was just a 
recognition that there were other revenue sources out there that could be used as a 
last resort. But as of today, we don’t plan on using that money for those 
purposes.83 
At the same time, Senate President Randy Ewing, a member of the Revenue Estimating 
Conference, reiterated in statements to The Advocate that lawmakers desired to use tobacco 
settlement money for issues such as healthcare rather than general operations or addressing the 
budget deficit: 
There are a lot of people in the Legislature and throughout the state who would 
like to see us take these funds and do extraordinary things.83 
After the Revenue Estimating Conference announced lawmakers could incorporate MSA 
money in the budget in early April, the news media urged Governor Foster and state lawmakers 
to place settlement funds into trusts. The New Orleans Times-Picayune and Baton Rouge 
Advocate published editorials on April 4, 1999 opposing using settlement money to address the 
state’s deficit or fund immediate initiatives.89, 90 The editorials called for all MSA money to be 
put into a trust,82, 83 with The Advocate highlighting Mississippi’s move to place all of its 
settlement proceeds into a fund.83 The Advocate’s editorial also cited the success of an education 
fund created by Louisiana lawmakers in the late 1980s using money from a lawsuit against the 
fossil fuel industry. The Times-Picayune published an additional editorial on April 4, 1999 
supporting the Council for A Better Louisiana’s call to place settlement funds in a trust.91 The 
second editorial in The Times-Picayune argued Governor Foster and lawmakers should not 
“squander” settlement funds on fixing the state’s budget deficit.  
 As part of an effort to pass legislation supporting mental health services, in early April 
1999 the Louisiana Mental Health Reform Coalition urged lawmakers to dedicate some tobacco 
settlement money to a healthcare trust.92 The coalition consisted of The Extra Advocacy Mile, 
Families Helping Families, Family Voices, Louisiana AFL-CIO, Louisiana Council on 
Developmental Disabilities, Louisiana Psychological Association, Mental Health Association in 
Louisiana, National Association of Social Workers, Louisiana Federation of Families, Louisiana 
Health Care Campaign, and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill.  
 According to a survey commissioned by Louisiana television stations released on April 
12, 1999 by Baton Rouge-based polling firm Southern Media & Opinion Research, 
approximately 60% of residents supported putting tobacco settlement money into a trust.93 
Lawmakers, nongovernmental organizations, and the public expressed continued support for 
placing MSA funds into trusts over the general budget.  
Table 9.4: Membership of the Louisiana Revenue Estimating Conference87 
Member Position 
Hunt Downer Speaker of the House 
Randy Ewing Senate President 
Mark Drennen Commissioner of Administration 
Jim Richardson Economist, Louisiana State University 
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 Governor Mike Foster publicly resisted placing all of the MSA reward into a fund. At a 
press conference convened on April 20, 1999 by the University of New Orleans Business / 
Higher Education Council in support of the governor’s program for post-secondary education, 
Foster told attendees, “A trust fund makes sense if you get a big slug of money all at once. It 
doesn’t make sense if you get it over a period of years.”94 Foster did not oppose placing a portion 
of the settlement into a trust but wanted money to address immediate issues, including 
unspecified healthcare challenges. Foster’s Administration asked former DHH Secretary Bobby 
Jindal for help determining tobacco settlement allocation prior to the press conference.  
Jindal Joins Settlement Fund Allocation Debate 
  
The Foster administration and prominent legislators asked former DHH Secretary Bobby 
Jindal to examine how Louisiana should use its $4.4 billion share of the tobacco settlement by 
developing a report on how other states were using their tobacco settlement funds.94 Jindal 
reported that other states planned to place MSA money into trusts or dedicate the funds to 
tobacco control, education, and healthcare initiatives.94 After preparing the report, Jindal 
circulated questions to people throughout the state, including to DHH employees and Coalition 
for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana (CTFLA) leader Dr. Charles Brown, to collect opinions on how to 
allocate tobacco settlement funds.95 
Governor Foster relayed a message through Attorney General Richard Ieyoub to CTFLA 
leader Dr. Charles Brown asking him to visit Jindal at the state law library in Baton Rouge to 
make recommendations on settlement money allocation.95 When Brown met with Jindal he 
discovered that DHH personnel had not asked for settlement money to conduct tobacco control 
programming.95 In a 2014 interview for this report, Brown stated DHH told Jindal they did not 
need additional funds for tobacco control (Chapter 4). According to Brown, Jindal claimed 
responses from DHH put him in a difficult situation because he had to heed their 
recommendations.95 Although the DHH denied needing funds for tobacco control, the Coalition 
for a Tobacco-Free Living and LSU Medical Center mobilized and worked with Attorney 
General Ieyoub to secure improved funding for anti-tobacco programming. 
Debates over MSA Fund Allocation during the 
Legislative Session 
 
American Lung Association of Louisiana Calls for 
MSA Money to go Towards Tobacco Control 
Programming 
  
As the legislative session started, American 
Lung Association of Louisiana Executive Director 
Ben Fontaine published a letter in late April 1999 in 
the New Orleans Times-Picayune asserting that 
MSA money should be used to fund tobacco control 
programming.96 According to his letter: 
 
There should be little debate on where the tobacco settlement is spent. The 
tobacco industry spends about $84 million in Louisiana on tobacco advertising 
and promotion. The first payment from the settlement is $54 million with 
“Currently, less then a half-
million dollars is spent by the 
state on tobacco control. The 
Legislature should allocate it 
where the people want it to go: 
anti-tobacco programs.”  
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additional deposits in the years to follow. Currently, less then [sic] a half-million 
dollars is spent by the state on tobacco control. The Legislature should allocate it 
where the people want it to go: anti-tobacco programs.96 
Fontaine claimed that Louisiana Governor Mike Foster as well as the Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee had been educated on model tobacco control programs by tobacco control advocates. 
He claimed that industry lobbyists and allied legislators sought to divert funding from initiatives 
to reduce tobacco use. Fontaine argued that settlement funds should be placed in a trust to 
prevent lawmakers from appropriating the money for other purposes.  
MSA Allocation Bills Introduced in 1999 Session 
 
Lawmakers introduced 29 bills during the 1999 legislative session to allocate Master 
Settlement Agreement funds (Table 9.5), including some bills that established trusts and or 
dedicated money to healthcare and education initiatives. Of the 29 bills introduced, 24 died with 
adjournment, three died traveling through the legislature, and two, HB 640 and HB 1547, were 
adopted. HB 640 and HB 1547 together established three trusts that primarily dedicated MSA 
funds to education and healthcare.  
 The first legislation allocating settlement funds considered during the 1999 legislative 
session, SB 224 and SB 711 by Senator Foster Campbell (D-Bossier City),100 received a hearing 
before the Senate Committee on Education on April 22.101, 102 SB 224 dedicated 50% of MSA 
money, approximately $88 million, towards creating and funding trusts for each parish and city 
school district in Louisiana.103 SB 224 also established a collective trust called the Louisiana 
Educational Excellence Fund (LEEF) financed by each school trust’s earnings not reinvested into 
their account.103 SB 711 was a companion piece to SB 224 that required school districts to form 
committees to create yearly plans for money received from the LEEF trust.102, 104 School districts 
received yearly disbursements from the LEEF trust for improving classes and teaching. SB 711 
did not allow LEEF disbursements for other purposes.102, 105 
Senate President Randy Ewing argued against ushering SB 224 and SB 711 through 
committee because lawmakers lacked consensus on how to use settlement money and had  
introduced multiple bills with different effects.105 Senator Campbell disagreed with Ewing 
according to coverage from The Advocate, telling the Senate Committee on Education, “This is 
bigger than any politics or personalities. This is our opportunity as senators to do something 
about educating our kids.”105 During the hearing, the Senate Committee on Education amended 
SB 224 to establish a shared trust for private schools using 10% of tobacco settlement money 
given to all school trust funds. In addition, the Committee amended SB 224 to create five 
individual trusts for specialty schools and dedicate $250,000 to each yearly in tobacco settlement 
money, which changed allocation of total settlement funds in SB 224 (Table 9.6).101 Committee 
members also made private and specialty schools contributors to and recipients of the LEEF 
Trust. After amendments, the Senate Committee on Education unanimously approved SB 224 
and SB 711.105 The bills went to the Senate Finance Committee for further consideration.
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Table 9.5: 1999 Bills to Allocate Tobacco Settlement Money as Introduced97-99 
Bill Sponsor Party and District 
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Outcome 
HB 74 Robert Faucheux D - St. James  +   No  + + +   Died with 
adjournment 
HB 362 Charles Riddle D - Avoyelles + +   Yes  + + +   Died with 
adjournment 
HB 387 William Daniel D- East Baton 
Rouge 
  +  Yes  + + + + + Died with 
adjournment 
HB 388 John Alario D-Jefferson +  +  Yes  +  + + + Died with 
adjournment 
HB 638 Sherman Copelin D-Orleans  +   No  + +    Died with 
Adjournment 
HB 640 Hunt Downer D-Terrebonne +    Yes       Adopted 
HB 646 Naomi Farve D-Orleans   +  Yes      + Died with 
adjournment 
HB 898 Elcie Guillory D-Calcasieu  +   No  +     Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
1097 
Tony Perkins R-East Baton 
Rouge 
+    Yes       Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
1123 
Charles Riddle D - Avoyelles  +   No  +     Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
1331 
John Alario D-Jefferson +  +  Yes  +  + + + Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
1479 
Sherman Copelin D-Orleans  +   No  + +    Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
1547 
Hunt Downer D-Terrebonne   +  Yes      + Adopted 
HB 
1741 
Charles Riddle D - Avoyelles + +   Yes  + + + +  Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
1745 
Naomi Farve D-Orleans   +  Yes  +    + Died with 
adjournment 
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HB 
1765 
Francis 
Thompson 
D-East Carroll  +   No       Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
1819 
Naomi Farve D-Orleans   +  Yes      + Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
1862 
William Daniel D- East Baton 
Rouge 
+  +  Yes  + + + + + Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
2107 
Roy Hopkins D-Bossier    + No       Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
2139 
Bob Barton R-Bossier    + Yes       Died with 
adjournment 
HB 
2170 
Jacquelyn 
Clarkson 
D-Orleans  +   Yes +  +    Died with 
adjournment 
SB 192 Foster Campbell D-Bossier   +  Yes      + Died with 
adjournment 
SB 224 Foster Campbell D-Bossier   +  No      + Died in committee 
SB 240 Chris Ullo D-Jefferson +    No  + + +   Died with 
adjournment 
SB 285 Wilson Fields D-East Baton 
Rouge 
  +  Yes      + Died with 
adjournment 
SB 293 Randy Ewing D-Jackson +    Yes       Died in committee 
SB 374 CD Jones D-Madison     No  +     Died in committee 
SB 821 Randy Ewing D-Jackson +    Yes       Died with 
adjournment 
SB 907 John Hainkel D-Orleans    + No       Died in committee 
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Debate around Settlement Fund Allocation Continues 
  
Following the hearing for SB 224 and SB 711, American Lung Association of Louisiana 
Executive Director Ben Fontaine published a letter in The Times-Picayune on April 25, 1999 
calling for lawmakers to dedicate the MSA reward to tobacco control programming.96 Fontaine 
asserted settlement money should go to tobacco prevention, education, and cessation initiatives 
since 37.5% of high school students in Louisiana smoked and the state spent less than $500,000 
on tobacco control yearly.96 Fontaine also argued that the public preferred for settlement funds to 
go to tobacco control initiatives. He criticized tobacco-friendly legislators and politicians  for 
wanting to use settlement money in ways that would not lower youth smoking after they had 
opposed Ieyoub’s lawsuit. 
 Around the same time as hearings for SB 224 and SB 711 and Fontaine’s letter, the 
Council for A Better Louisiana released a 10-point plan for allocating MSA funds.106 The plan 
reflected earlier statements by the Council supporting placing MSA funds into a trust, urging 
lawmakers to put 75% of settlement money into a trust dedicated towards healthcare initiatives. 
The plan put $2 billion of the settlement payments into a protected fund. The Council wanted 
lawmakers to establish a panel of Louisianans not employed by the state government to control 
the trust.  
 As the legislative session entered May, bills to allocate tobacco settlement funds 
stagnated in committees. Only Senator Foster Campbell’s SB 224 and SB 711 had received a 
hearing by May 2, 1999.107 To work toward a consensus on settlement money distribution and 
clear a path forward for legislation, the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget held a 
meeting on May 2, 1999 for lawmakers to consider plans for fund allocation.107, 108 In an 
interview with The Advocate regarding the meeting, Commissioner of Administration Mark 
Drennen stated: 
We are trying really hard to determine which of these concepts can be put 
together that will produce a substantial result over time…We are trying to choose 
a package that will have the greatest impact over a long term…and that you can 
pass.108 
Government agencies, government officials, and special interest groups including the Coalition 
for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana, attended the hearing to offer proposals.100, 109 
Before the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget meeting, Attorney General Ieyoub 
and the Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana developed a joint proposal for allocating MSA 
funds to present at the hearing. CTFLA had asked Ieyoub for assistance with promoting the use 
Table 9.6: Allocation of Settlement Funds in SB 224 after Senate Education Committee Amendments101 
Division of Funds in 
Trust 
Target Allocation of Revenue 
10% Private Schools Proportional to student population per school 
45% Public school systems Equal across school systems 
45% Special Schools $250,000 per school ($1,250,000 total) 
Public school systems Remainder distributed among school systems 
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of MSA funds for tobacco control programming. According to Ieyoub in a November 2017 
interview for this report: 
They approached me, and of course, wanted my support, in trying to do what we 
could to guide some…of those [MSA] funds into smoking cessation and public 
health generally. And I was happy to work with them. 
And quite frankly, I was happy to get their input because they were extremely 
knowledgeable and had the resources to do whatever research was required to 
develop information that would help us before legislative committees…Once they 
got in touch with me, we formed a very strong bond in the way of trying to lobby 
for better programs and more consideration of funding cessation programs and 
preventing smoking.12 
 At the meeting held by the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget to discuss 
settlement fund allocation, lawmakers, government officials, and special interest groups 
proposed various plans that mostly centered 
on creating trusts or funding healthcare and 
education initiatives (Table 9.7).  
During the meeting, Drs. Mervin 
Trail and Charles Brown of the Coalition for 
a Tobacco-Free Louisiana, along with 
Attorney General Ieyoub, presented their 
plan to use settlement money for tobacco 
control, healthcare, and education.95 
According to Brown in a 2014 interview for 
this report, due to the large amount of 
people vying over settlement money: 
It was like a zoo up there. They had everybody including…the money 
launderers…and everybody testifying trying to get money out of this big hunk of 
money. And as a result of that, nobody got anything.95  
In statements to The Times-Picayune after the meeting, Senator Jay Dardenne (R-Baton 
Rouge) commented on the difficulty of choosing any of the plans offered: 
I’m still dizzy from yesterday. It’s like judging a beauty contest. When you see 
the first one, that’s the one. Then another comes along that’s equally 
impressive.110 
Following the committee meeting, Senator Dardenne proposed placing a portion of tobacco 
settlement money into the state’s rainy day account.111 Lawmakers and government officials 
failed to develop consensus on settlement fund use at the meeting. Attorney General Ieyoub and 
CTFLA continued presenting their plan to other unidentified legislative committees.12 
Funding Concerns Attach Initial Settlement Payments to FY 2000 Budget Bill HB 1 
 
 In early May 1999, the Louisiana Legislative Fiscal Office predicted lower than 
previously projected state revenues, leaving less funds available than expected to address a $100  
“Once they got in touch with me, 
we formed a very strong bond in 
the way of trying to lobby for 
better programs and more 
consideration of funding cessation 
programs and preventing 
smoking.”  
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Table 9.7: Proposals Made at May 2nd Meeting Convened by Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget 100, 109 
Proponent Position Plan 
Ken Duncan* Louisiana Treasurer • Place all tobacco settlement funds into a trust. 
• Allowed the state to borrow $100 million annually from trust for first four 
years. 
• Supposedly allowed state to earn more money than lost making payments. 
Nicole Baute Louisiana Genetics 
Research Consortium 
• Dedicate $44.5 million in settlement funds across five years to form a 
genetic research program statewide. 
Foster Campbell Louisiana State Senator • Dedicate half of settlement funds to an education trust. 
• Distribute earnings from trust to school districts. 
Louisiana Board of Regents for 
Higher Education 
State Committee • Use funds to boost research at postsecondary education institutions. 
• Fund public service and education programs. 
• Improve agriculture, academic, and research programs. 
Millie Naquin Professor, Southeastern 
Louisiana University 
• Provide Southeastern Louisiana University $4 million across three years to 
create the Institute for Action on Addiction. 
• Program would be dedicated to studying youth addiction to alcohol, drugs 
and tobacco and constructing methods to prevent addiction. 
Richard Ieyoub / Dr. Mervin Trail 
and Dr. Charles Brown 
Attorney General / 
Coalition for A Tobacco-
Free Louisiana 
• Place 50% of settlement reward to trust dedicated to education and health 
care. 
• Use 50% of settlement for preventing youth tobacco use. 
JT Hill Injured United Black 
Smokers of America 
• Use portion of settlement money to fund treatment for African Americans 
suffering from tobacco related illnesses. 
Catholic Hospital Care Association -- • Place settlement reward into trust dedicated to funding cancer research. 
Cecil Picard Louisiana Superintendent 
of Education 
• Dedicate $30 million of annual settlement money to fund an early education 
program for vulnerable kids. 
David Hood Louisiana Department of 
Health and Hospitals 
Secretary 
• Place unspecified portion of settlement funds into trust dedicated to tobacco 
control. 
• Use settlement funds Improve access to health care in rural and poorly 
served regions. 
• Increase amount of state drug courts. 
• Fund local services for developmentally disabled. 
• Fund mental health programming for vulnerable youth. 
• Use settlement money to fund Louisiana Children’s Health Insurance 
Program. 
• Fund health research. 
*Referred to as his Bond and Trust Plan by this report. 
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million deficit in Governor Mike Foster’s proposed $13 billion budget plan.112 After the 
Legislative Fiscal Office finding, on May 6, 1999 the Louisiana Revenue Estimating Conference 
classified another $46 million of settlement money as recurring funds available for use in the 
operating budget. The Conference previously approved $110 million of the $199 million in 
settlement money the state expected to receive by June 30, 200088 as recurring funds.112 For a 
revenue source to qualify as recurring by the Conference, it must be available to the state for at 
least five years. Remaining settlement money not approved as a recurring revenue source was 
available for funding one-off initiatives but not for use in the operating budget.113  
To help lawmakers address the budget shortfall, committee member Representative Hunt 
Downer called for the Revenue Estimating Conference to classify all $199 million of the tobacco 
settlement money expected during the 2000 fiscal year as recurring funds that could be used for 
repeating costs.112 Committee member and LSU economist James Richardson opposed Downer’s 
proposal, arguing that not all $199 million qualified as recurring since the state expected $43 
million less in settlement money the next fiscal year. Louisiana Commissioner of Administration 
and Conference member Mark Drennen opposed using tobacco settlement money for the 
shortfall and stated during the meeting he would look for alternative revenue to address the 
problem. Commissioner Drennen suggested using settlement money to reduce the state’s debt or 
to fund non-recurring costs.  
The Conference voted 3-1 against classifying all $199 million in FY 2000 settlement 
payments as recurring funds, with only Downer in support.112 After the meeting, Downer told 
The Times-Picayune that lawmakers might have to address the $100 million budget shortfall 
using settlement money, stating, “I don’t want to, but we may have to.”112  
On May 10, 1999, while state officials and lawmakers publicly debated using tobacco 
settlement funds to address the budget deficit, Senator Foster Campbell’s SB 224 received a 
hearing before the Senate Finance Committee.114 Committee members expressed support for SB 
224, but postponed voting on the legislation to allow the committee to hear other settlement 
allocation bills.  
That same day, the House Appropriations Committee discussed HB 1,115 the governor’s 
budget proposal. As introduced, HB 1 used $32.7 million in tobacco settlement money to fund 
portions of the budget.116 At the hearing, Louisiana Legislative Fiscal Officer John Rombach 
asserted to the Committee that using tobacco settlement money to address the budget deficit left 
legislators empty handed. Rombach claimed the Governor’s budget had a deficit because it did 
not fund certain healthcare and education initiatives adequately enough to generate matched 
federal funds.115 Rombach pushed the committee to fix the shortfall using surplus funds, 
carryover funds, or spending cuts. Committee Chairman Jerry Luke LeBlanc (D-Lafayette) 
doubted it would be possible to avoid using tobacco settlement funds to address the budget 
deficit.  
The House Appropriations Committee unanimously approved HB 1 at a hearing on May 
13, 1999 after Committee members added $134 million of the $199 million in incoming 
settlement money to expenses in the budget (Table 9.8).117 The Committee allocated tobacco 
settlement money predominantly to health and medical initiatives in the budget, claiming it was 
to respect to the intentions of the Master Settlement Agreement.88 The House Appropriations 
Committee had received approval from Governor Foster’s administration to use settlement funds 
to address the budget deficit.118 Besides allocating $134 million to healthcare and education 
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initiatives in the budget, the Committee dedicated an additional $53.7 million of settlement 
money to a new Louisiana Fund for future use but did not establish requirements for 
appropriations from the account.119 
Committee Chairman Jerry Luke LeBlanc (D-Lafayette) faulted Louisiana’s slow growth 
for generating less money than expected for the budget.88 Representative LeBlanc stated that 
Governor Foster’s administration and lawmakers were forming a plan to dedicate one-third of 
Louisiana’s $4.4 billion settlement reward to a trust, likely for the state’s scholarship program 
the Taylor Opportunity Program for Students (TOPS).117 Following the passage of HB 1 through 
the Appropriations Committee, Representative LeBlanc and Commissioner of Administration 
Mark Drennen asserted that lawmakers would not use tobacco settlement money to fund general 
budget items in future legislative sessions.116 
At a hearing on May 17, 1999,121 the House Appropriations Committee appropriated an 
additional $14.9 million of tobacco settlement money expected in FY 2000 to cover expenses in 
HB 2, the budget for the state’s capital outlay projects (Table 9.9).121-123 After amending HB 2, 
the House Appropriations Committee unanimously reported the bill to the House Floor.121, 122 
The House Appropriations Committee dedicated approximately $149 million of $199 million in 
incoming tobacco settlement money to general budget initiatives and capital outlay projects 
instead of trust funds.  
 
 
Table 9.8: Allocation of Tobacco Settlement Funds in HB 1117, 119, 120 
$87 million Medicaid 
$13 million Children’s health insurance 
$6.5 million Facility improvements to the Louisiana Genetics Research Institute clinic. 
$5 million Cancer research conducted by the LSU Medical Center in New Orleans 
$5 million Healthcare grants given by the Board of Regents 
$4.2 million Health clinics at schools 
$3.7 million Mental health clinics 
$3.2 million Parish health unit construction 
$1.9 million Fund procurements by the Biomedical Research Foundation of Northwest Louisiana  
$1.5 million Quit programs for smoking 
$1.5 million Preschool for underprivileged kids 
$375,000 Louisiana Genetics Research Institute operating costs 
$330,000 Master Settlement Agreement Enforcement by the Attorney General 
$128.2 million Total 
Table 9.9: Tobacco Settlement Funds Dedicated to Capital Outlay Projects in HB 2123 
$6,500,000 Louisiana Genetics Research Institute facility construction and renovation  
$2,500,000 Equipment purchases for Higher Education Institutions  
$650,000 Building a Parish Health Unit in Iberville Parish 
$2,000,000 Creation of Health Unit and Primary Care Center in Ouachita Parish 
$545,000 Building a Parish Health Unit in Tensas 
$843,000 Building a Parish Health Unit in Richland 
$1,900,000 Purchase of a scanner for the Biomedical Research Foundation of Northwest Louisiana 
$14,938,000 Total 
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HB 640 and 1547, Bills to Determine Post FY 2000 MSA Money Allocation, Receive Their 
First Hearing 
 
The House Appropriations Committee considered eight bills seeking to dedicate tobacco 
settlement funds on May 17, 1998. The Committee deferred multiple bills before considering HB 
640 and its implementing legislation HB 1547 (Table 9.10) from Representative Hunt Downer 
(D-Houma). As introduced, HB 640 and HB 1547 allocated 25% of Louisiana’s MSA money to 
a new Tobacco Settlement Trust Fund and 75% to a new Louisiana Fund. After the Tobacco 
Settlement Trust received $1 billion in MSA funds, all payments from the tobacco companies as 
well as interest generated by the Settlement Trust would go to the Louisiana Fund. HB 640 
forbade lawmakers from appropriating funds from the Tobacco Settlement Trust for any use. HB 
640 and HB 1547 allowed lawmakers to appropriate money from the Louisiana Fund for any 
reason, including for maintenance of the Tobacco Settlement Trust. HB 640 was a constitutional 
act requiring a two-thirds majority of the Louisiana Legislature and subsequent voter approval.124  
 
 
 During the hearing, the House Appropriations Committee amended HB 640 and HB 1547 
to turn the Tobacco Settlement Trust into the TOPS Trust (Table 9.11). Committee amendments 
permitted use of TOPS Trust investment returns (no greater than yearly earnings projections) to 
provide scholarships to students attending higher education institutions. Money from the 
Louisiana Fund was restricted to maintenance of the TOPS Trust, to youth education and 
healthcare initiatives, general healthcare research and treatment, chronic disease management, 
treatment of tobacco-related diseases, and to projects for healthcare facilities. In addition, 
lawmakers could dedicate money from the Louisiana Fund to tobacco prevention, cessation, and 
enforcement. Committee members altered the distribution of MSA money between both 
accounts, allocating 33% of settlement funds to the TOPS Trust and 67% to the Louisiana Fund. 
Both accounts received MSA funds in perpetuity, and interest from the TOPS Trust would not go 
to the Louisiana Fund. To provide more settlement funds to the TOPS Trust and less to the 
Louisiana Fund than set in HB 640, Committee changes required the Louisiana Legislature to 
Table 9.10: HB 640 and HB 1547 as Introduced 125, 126 
HB 640 (Constitutional Amendment) 
Trusts Created Amount of MSA Payments Dedicated to 
Trust* 
Permitted Use of Money 
 
Tobacco 
Settlement 
Trust Fund 
25%** None 
Louisiana Fund 75% Any purpose 
HB 1547 (Implementing Legislation) 
Trusts Created Amount of MSA Payments Dedicated to 
Trust* 
Permitted Use of Money 
Tobacco 
Settlement 
Trust Fund 
25%** None 
Louisiana Fund 75% Any purpose 
*Total percentage after legally required dedications to Bond Security and Redemption Fund and a 
$10 million dedication to the State’s Children’s Health Insurance Program Support Fund. 
**Once the trust reaches $1 billion, all further MSA payments and earnings generated by trust are 
deposited in Louisiana Fund. 
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secure a two-thirds vote in both chambers. Amendments by the House Appropriations 
Committee established July 1, 2000 as the date of effect,125 leaving tobacco settlement money in 
Governor Foster’s budget proposal in place. 
After the House Appropriations Committee amended HB 640 and HB 1547, it voted 
unanimously to report the bills to the House Floor.124 Following the hearing, only Representative 
Downer’s HB 640 and HB 1547, as well as Senator Campbell’s SB 224 had successfully passed 
through a committee hearing.127 
Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Bills HB 1 and HB 2 Pass the House 
  
Representatives brought HB 1 to the House Floor on May 18, 1999128 and passed the 
budget in a 92-2 vote without adding to or removing from the $132 million in tobacco settlement 
money attached to the bill.129 
 CABL criticized lawmakers for using tobacco settlement funds to address the deficit.130 
According to a statement by CABL covered by The Times-Picayune: 
Table 9.11: HB 640 and HB 1547 after House Appropriations Committee Amendments125, 126 
HB 640 (Constitutional Amendment) 
Trusts created Amount of MSA 
payments dedicated 
to trust* 
Permitted use of money*** 
 
TOPS 
Settlement 
33%** Revenue generated by fund may go to TOPS Scholarship Program 
Louisiana Fund 67% -Programs supporting youth via healthcare or education 
-Healthcare research, upgrades for state health care facilities, treatment 
of tobacco-related sicknesses, and treatment of chronic diseases 
-Education, advertising, cessation, and enforcement initiatives to 
prevent and eliminate tobacco use. 
HB 1547 (Implementing Legislation) 
Trusts created Amount of MSA 
payments dedicated 
to trust* 
Permitted use of money*** 
TOPS 33%** Revenue generated by fund may go to TOPS Scholarship Program, 
specifies methods and amounts. Specifies how money in fund may be 
invested. 
Louisiana Fund 67% Specifies approved methods, initiatives and programs, and quality 
assurance measures, for funding in following categories established by 
HB 640: 
 
-Programs supporting youth via healthcare or education 
-Healthcare research, upgrades for state health care facilities, treatment 
of tobacco-related sicknesses, and treatment of chronic diseases 
-Education, advertising, cessation, and enforcement initiatives to 
prevent and eliminate tobacco use. 
 
*Total percentage after legally required dedications to Bond Security and Redemption Fund and a $10 million 
dedication to the State’s Children’s Health Insurance Program Support Fund. 
**Once the trust reaches $1 billion, all MSA payments and earnings generated by trust are deposited in Louisiana 
Fund. 
***No spending area can receive more than 50% of annual total dedication from Louisiana Fund. 
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 Using the very first tobacco payment to balance the budget and fund recurring 
expenses sets a dangerous precedent. If it is going to be done this year, what about 
next?130 
After Representatives sent HB 1 to the 
Senate, the Public Affairs Research Council (PAR), 
another Louisiana think tank, panned lawmakers for 
including settlement money in the budget. 
According to The Times-Picayune, PAR President 
Jim Brandt called out legislators on May 19, 1999 
for justifying the use of initial settlement payments 
in the budget because the money primarily funded 
health and education initiatives:  
Considering that the majority of the state’s general fund expenditures are for 
health and education, restricting tobacco funds to these purposes is not much 
different from putting the money into the general fund.130  
Brandt asserted that state lawmakers had not thoroughly studied methods to distribute and use 
settlement money and called for legislators to put all settlement payments into a trust for the time 
being. 
 Despite complaints over using settlement money in HB 1, on May 19, 1999 
representatives approved the capital outlay plan HB 2 in a 99-0 vote.121 Amendments made to 
HB 2 on the House Floor did not affect the $14,938,000 of settlement funds the legislation 
dedicated to projects. Passing to the Senate, HB 1 and HB 2 still allocated $149 million of 
tobacco settlement funds to general spending and one-time expenses.  
House Floor Debate on HB 640 and HB 1547 Begins  
 
While HB 1 and HB 2 went to the Senate with initial settlement payments, legislation to 
allocate portions of Louisiana’s total settlement payments, House Speaker Hunt Downer’s HB 
640 and HB 1547, remained in the House. After passing the House Appropriations Committee, 
HB 640 received hearings from the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee on May 18 and 
19,125 which amended the bill to specify that education, healthcare, and tobacco-related 
healthcare initiatives faced a 50% limit on use of total monies in the Louisiana Fund per 
permitted purpose.131 For example, the legislature could use half of the Louisiana fund for 
smoking cessation, and half for another purpose allowed by the trust and not fund other things 
specified in bill. However, they could not dedicate 51% (or more) of the money from the 
Louisiana Fund to any one item. Committee members also changed HB 640 to permit 50% of 
money in the TOPS Trust to be invested in stocks instead of equities, as previously established. 
The Committee then voted unanimously to report HB 640 favorably to the House Floor.125 
Representatives brought HB 640 to the House Floor for consideration on May 19, 20, and 
25, 1999 and HB 1547 on May 18, 20 and 25. Debate centered on HB 640 because HB 1547 was 
a companion bill. While discussing HB 640, legislators offered amendments to establish trusts, 
alter trust structures, and establish permitted dedications of trust money towards certain 
healthcare and education initiatives (Table 9.12). The two amendments that passed, B638 and 
B722 from the bill’s sponsor Downer, permitted funding certain healthcare and education 
“Using the very first tobacco 
payment to balance the budget 
and fund recurring expenses sets 
a dangerous precedent. If it is 
going to be done this year, what 
about next?”  
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through new MSA-supported trusts (9.12) B722 also set the percent of annual MSA payments 
that would go to each of the trusts created by HB 640 (9.12). 
Lawmakers proposed two amendments to HB 1547 on the House Floor.132 Representative 
Farve failed to secure an amendment to HB 1547 changing the TOPS Trust to the Education 
Trust that would also allow grants to be issued from said trust to public schools. The other 
amendment, from Hunt Downer, was a companion to his amendments for HB 640 and mirrored 
their changes.132 
Lawmakers attempted to amend HB 640 multiple times on the House Floor while 
considering the bill on May 20, 1999. Representative Naomi Farve (D-New Orleans) introduced 
an amendment to fund grants for public primary and secondary schools using the TOPS Trust. 
Farve claimed the amendment benefitted children who were poor or from rural areas that who 
were unlikely to get a postsecondary education and benefit from the tuition assistance provided 
by TOPS.133 According to The Advocate, Farve asserted to colleagues that, “TOPS, by its nature, 
is a program for the white middle class.” Representatives rejected the amendment in a 72-23 
vote. Representative Farve also unsuccessfully attempted to attach an amendment to HB 640’s 
companion HB1547.134 Representatives Mitch Landrieu, Kip Holden, Raymond Jetson, and 
Charles Riddle introduced Amendment B633-B to reapportion settlement money between the 
TOPS and Louisiana Fund Trusts and restrict their usage (Table 9.12). Lawmakers rejected the 
proposal. Representative Hunt Downer offered and secured Amendment B638 to qualify 
additional programming to receive money from the Louisiana Fund and to restrict expenditures 
from the Trust for treatment of tobacco-related diseases (Table 9.2). After Representatives 
finished considering HB 640 and amendments to the bill, they held the legislation for further 
debate.133  
House Passes Constitutional Amendment HB 640 and its Implementing Legislation HB 1547 
 
Representatives resumed debate on HB 640 and ultimately passed the bill on May 25, 
1999. Representative Carl Crane asked lawmakers to advance HB 640 to place the tobacco 
settlement money into a trust and protect it from other appropriations.135 Representative Louis 
“Woody” Jenkins (R-Baton Rouge) opposed HB 640, arguing that tobacco settlement money 
should go to relieving the state’s debt or to shoring up the state’s retirement programs.135, 136 
Representatives Kip Holden (D-Baton Rouge) and Hunt Downer proposed further amendments. 
Holden’s amendment dedicated the first $10 million of tobacco settlement money received 
annually to a new Louisiana Children’s Health Insurance Program Fund to supplement the state’s 
insurance program for underprivileged youth (Table 9.13). Representative Downer opposed the 
amendment, asserting that $10 million already was destined for the insurance program because 
of another statutory dedication.135 The House rejected Holden’s proposal. Downer proposed and 
secured Amendment B772 to HB 640, establishing a Health Trust Fund alongside the TOPS 
Fund and Louisiana Fund. The amendment reapportioned the percentage each trust received of 
annual settlement payments, with most Health Trust Funds coming from money originally 
dedicated to the TOPS Trust (Table 9.13). Downer similarly amended HB 640’s companion, HB 
1547.  
 
Representatives passed HB 640 by a 90-8 vote125 and its implementing legislation HB 
1547 in a 91-8 vote.132 Representative Downer championed the passage of HB 640 and HB 1547 
according to The Times-Picayune, stating “What we have before us is a  
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Table 9.12: Amendments to HB 640 Proposed on the House Floor98, 125 
Number Sponsor Party and District Changes Adopted 
B632 Naomi Farve  D-Orleans • Renamed Tops Trust to Education Trust. 
• Allowed for provision of grants to primary and secondary public schools from Education Trust. 
• Retained TOPS program as a beneficiary of the Education Trust. 
No 
B638 Hunt Downer D-Terrebonne • Permitted dedication of money from Louisiana Fund to programs for lowering child abuse and infant 
mortality. 
• Limited use of Louisiana Fund monies to pay for treatment of tobacco-related diseases. 
o No more than 35% of total money taken from Fund in FY 2002. 
o No more than 20% of total money taken from Fund in FY 2003 and beyond. 
Yes 
B633-B Mitch Landrieu D-Orleans • Provided TOPS Trust 25% of annual settlement payments and the Louisiana Fund 75%. 
• Made allocation of settlement money to Louisiana Fund increasable, and allocation of settlement 
money to the TOPS Trust decreasable via legislative vote (reversed from previous). 
• Once the Louisiana Fund reaches $2 billion, all revenue generated by the account, and all portions of 
tobacco settlement payments slated for the account, would go to the state’s general fund. 
• Allowed Louisiana Fund to surpass $2 billion to match inflation, using account investment earnings. 
• Limited yearly appropriations from Louisiana Fund to annual estimates of all investment earnings. 
• No initiative may receive more than 50% of money available for use each year from Louisiana 
Fund. 
• Prohibited use of money from Louisiana Fund to cover or replace general fund expenses. 
No 
Kip Holden D-East Baton Rouge 
Raymond 
Jetson 
D-East Baton Rouge 
Charles Riddle D-Avoyelles 
B722 Hunt Downer D-Terrebonne • Established the Health Trust Fund. 
• Changed allocation of tobacco settlement payments to TOPS Trust. 
o 15% of MSA funds in FY 2001. 
o 20% of MSA funds in FY 2002. 
o 25% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and onward. 
• Dedicated tobacco settlement payments to new Health Trust Fund. 
o 15% of MSA funds in FY 2001. 
o 20% of MSA funds in FY 2002. 
o 25% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and onward. 
• Louisiana Fund receives leftover tobacco settlement money after distributions to TOPS Trust and 
Health Trust Fund. 
• Restricted use of money from Health Trust Fund. 
o Providing healthcare to children. 
o Initiatives for chronic disease management. 
o Funding improvements to state healthcare facilities. 
o Funding “pursuit of innovation in advanced health care sciences.” 
o Treatment of tobacco-related diseases. 
• Limited use of Louisiana Fund monies to pay for treatment of tobacco-related diseases. 
o No more than 30% of total money taken from Fund in FY 2001 (previously amended to 35%). 
Yes 
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• Restricted appropriations from Health and TOPS Trust to amount of annual investment earnings for 
each account. 
• Eliminated language from Downer’s past amendment allowing for dedication of Louisiana Fund 
money towards treatment for tobacco-related disease and initiatives to lower child abuse and infant 
mortality. 
B648-A Kip Holden D-East Baton Rouge • Established the Louisiana Children’s Health Insurance Program Fund. 
o Dedicated first $10 million of tobacco settlement payments each year to Trust from FY 2001 to 
FY 2010. 
o Limited use of money from the trust to assisting the state’s health insurance program for kids. 
Required a two-thirds vote to appropriate money from the Trust. 
No 
Raymond 
Jetson 
D-East Baton Rouge 
Mitch Landrieu  
Table 9.13: Distribution of Tobacco Settlement Money to Trust Funds After House Amendments to HB 640 
and HB 1547 
Stage Time Range TOPS 
Trust 
Health Trust 
Fund 
Louisiana Fund 
Pre-House Floor Amendments None 33% -- 67% 
After house Amendments FY 2001 15% 15% 70% 
FY 2002 20% 20% 60% 
FY 2003- 25% 25% 50% 
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consensus. What we have is a focus on healthcare…We still must face the challenge of ending 
those smoke-related illnesses.”136 
Approved House amendments to HB 640 and HB 1547 created the Health Trust 
alongside the TOPS Settlement Trust and Louisiana Fund, changed the allocation of annual MSA 
settlement payments between the trusts, and altered and expanded acceptable appropriations 
from the accounts (Table 9.14). Both bills went to the Senate Committee on Finance for further 
consideration. 
Senate Finance Committee Approves Legislation Dedicating Tobacco Settlement Funds to 
Education 
 
While Representatives debated HB 640 and HB 1547 on the House Floor, on May 24, 
1999, the Senate Finance Committee heard settlement allocation bills SB 224 by Senator Foster 
Campbell and SB 293 by Senate President Randy Ewing (D-Quitman). SB 224 had stalled in the 
Senate Finance Committee while its members waited for legislators to build consensus on 
settlement fund allocation.  
 
Lawmakers had not considered SB 293 prior to the May 24 Senate Finance Committee 
meeting. A constitutional amendment, the bill dedicated 25% of tobacco settlement money to a 
new Tobacco Settlement Trust Fund and 75% to a new Louisiana Fund137 (Both HB 640 and SB 
293 created a Louisiana Fund.125, 138). After the Tobacco Settlement Trust totaled $1 billion, all 
earnings generated by the account went to the Louisiana Fund.137 SB 293 forbade appropriations 
from the Tobacco Settlement Trust but allowed legislators to take an unrestricted amount from 
the Louisiana Fund each year.137 
During the Senate Finance Committee hearing for SB 224 and SB 293, Senators 
Campbell and Ewing offered a plan to alter and combine their legislation to dedicate 30% of total 
settlement money to healthcare initiatives and 70% to education initiatives.133, 139 The Louisiana 
AFL-CIO, school bus drivers, the Louisiana Association of School Superintendents, the 
Louisiana School Boards Association and others endorsed Campbell and Foster’s new plan the 
day of the hearing.139  
Ultimately, the Committee amended SB 224 to reduce the total amount of tobacco 
settlement funds appropriated annually from 50% to 30%140 and changed the allocation of 
settlement funds for programming in SB 224 to allocate more money to private schools (Table 
9.15). 
The Committee amended SB 293 to dedicate the 70% of total tobacco settlement money 
not allocated by SB 224 to health and education trusts. Committee members removed the 
Tobacco Settlement Trust Fund and Louisiana Fund originally in SB 293, and instead dedicated 
30% of settlement money towards forming and funding a new Health and Science Support Fund, 
10% towards a Louisiana Educational Excellence (LEEF) Direct Support trust, and 40% towards 
a Higher Education Support Fund. Appropriations from the health care trust were restricted to 
children’s health and education initiatives, chronic illness management, treatment for tobacco-
related diseases, tobacco education and cessation programs, tobacco regulatory enforcement, 
healthcare research, and state healthcare facility renovations. Funds in the LEEF Direct Support 
Trust went to school systems for use in local education programming. The Higher Education  
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Table 9.14: HB 640 and HB 1547 After House Floor Amendments125, 126 
HB 640 (Constitutional Amendment) 
Trusts created Amount of MSA Payments Dedicated to Trust* Permitted Use of Money*** 
 
TOPS 
Settlement 
• 15% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 20% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 25% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and onward 
** 
Revenue generated by fund may go to TOPS Scholarship Program. 
Health Trust • 15% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 20% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 25% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and onward 
 
• Providing healthcare to children. 
• Initiatives for chronic disease management. 
• Funding improvements to state healthcare facilities. 
• Funding “pursuit of innovation in advanced health care sciences. 
• Treatment of tobacco-related diseases. 
Louisiana Fund Louisiana Fund receives leftover tobacco settlement 
money after distributions to TOPS Trust and Health 
Trust Fund. 
 
• 70% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 60% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 50% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and onward 
• Programs supporting youth via healthcare or education. 
• Healthcare research, upgrades for state health care facilities, treatment of tobacco-related 
sicknesses, and treatment of chronic diseases. 
• Education, advertising, cessation, and enforcement initiatives to prevent and eliminate tobacco 
use. 
• Investment expenses from TOPS and Health Trusts. 
HB 1547 (Implementing Legislation) 
Trusts created Amount of MSA Payments Dedicated to Trust* Permitted Use of Money*** 
TOPS • Same as HB 640 Revenue generated by fund may go to TOPS Scholarship Program, specifies methods and amounts. 
Specifies how money in fund may be invested. 
Health Trust • Same as HB 640 
 
Specifies approved money sources and permissible uses of trust funds. 
Louisiana Fund • Same as HB 640 
 
Specifies approved methods, initiatives and programs, and quality assurance measures, for funding 
in following categories established by HB 640: 
 
• Programs supporting youth via healthcare or education. 
• Healthcare research, upgrades for state health care facilities, treatment of tobacco-related 
sicknesses, and treatment of chronic diseases. 
• Education, advertising, cessation, and enforcement initiatives to prevent and eliminate tobacco 
use. 
• Expanded definition of permissible health care expenditures for youth to include school, 
primary care, and rural clinics. Funding allowed for “schools in need of corrective action.” 
Also permits funding intervention programs for youth up to age four. 
• Limits expenditures for direct health care to 30% of total trust expenditures for FY 2002 and 
20% for subsequent years. 
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*Total percentage after legally required dedications to Bond Security and Redemption Fund and a $10 million dedication to the State’s Children’s Health Insurance Program 
Support Fund. 
**Once the trust reaches $1 billion, all MSA payments and earnings generated by trust are deposited in Louisiana Fund. 
***No spending area can receive more than 50% of annual total dedication from Louisiana Fund. 
Table 9.15: Allocation of Settlement Funds in SB 224 After Senate Education Committee Amendments140, 141 
Funding Recipients Before Finance Committee 
Amendments 
After Finance Committee Amendments 
Private Schools 10% 15% 
Specialty Schools  $1,250,000 *+ $1,250,000*++ 
Public School Systems 
 
90% 50% equal across school 
systems 
85% 30% equal across school 
systems 
50% based on existing state 
education spending plan and 
formula (enrollment) 
70% based on existing state 
education spending plan and 
formula (enrollment) 
*Represents funding total for five specialty schools. Four schools existed during the 1999 legislative session, and 
a fifth was being formed. Lawmakers set the fifth school as a recipient. 
+$1,250,000 dedicated after equal distribution of funds to public school systems and before distribution of funds 
to public school systems based on existing state education spending plan and formula. 
++$1,250,000 dedicated to specialty schools before distribution of any settlement money to public schools. 
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Support Fund served as a rainy day account for Louisiana’s postsecondary education spending 
during economic slumps. Lawmakers could also appropriate money from the Higher Education 
Support Fund to fund non-recurring education programming and maintain state tuition initiatives 
during economic slumps (e.g., TOPS). Appropriations from the Higher Education Support Fund 
needed approval from two-thirds of the legislature. 
 
After the Senate Finance Committee amended SB 224 and SB 293, they advanced the 
bills to the Senate Floor.  
 
SB 224 Passes the Senate with a New School Funding Plan Attached 
 
Lawmakers called SB 224 and its companion SB 711 to the Senate Floor for debate on 
June 7, 1999. During consideration of SB 224, bill sponsor Foster Campbell circulated 
projections to Senators showing that in the next 25 years trust funds established by SB 224 
would generate over $1 billion in trust earnings for public school systems to use.142 
Senators offered twelve amendments to SB 224 and adopted three proposed changes 
(Table 9.16). Multiple senators introduced amendments to morph SB 224 into Louisiana 
Treasurer Ken Duncan’s “bond and trust” proposal to establish a trust that the state could issue 
bonds with to relieve immediate spending needs and debt. Except for Amendment 732 by 
Romero, all of the proposals to implement Treasurer Duncan’s plan were withdrawn before 
consideration. Senator Campbell asserted that Treasurer Duncan’s proposal needed further 
examination before lawmakers adopted it142 Senators rejected Romero’s amendment in an 11-27 
vote.142, 143 
After debating SB 224, Senators voted 37-0 to send the bill to the House.142 The same 
day, Senators amended the legislation’s companion bill, SB 711, to reflect changes to SB 224 
and sent that bill to the House in a unanimous vote.142 As passed by the Senate, SB 224 dedicated 
30% of annual MSA payments and 20% of subsequent earnings from said money to individual 
trust funds for each Louisiana public, private, and specialty school.101 Of that money, $250,000 
went to each specialty school’s trust, and 15% went to private school trusts. Leftover money 
would be apportioned to public schools, 30% equally and 70% distributed based on Louisiana’s 
“minimum foundation formula.” Earnings generated by individual school accounts that were not 
required to remain in them were deposited in a joint LEEF fund. Interest from the LEEF fund 
would be distributed to private, specialty, and public schools in proportion to their contribution. 
The Senate added the New Orleans Center for Creative Arts as another specialty school intended 
to have a trust funded by MSA payments. The amendments also required that fund money not be 
used for pay raises, and stipulated that 5% of annual income from fund investments go towards a 
drug abuse and smoking program. 
Following debate over SB 224, Senator Tom Schedler, who introduced but withdrew an 
amendment to SB 224 implementing Treasurer Duncan’s trust and bond proposal, announced he 
intended to offer a similar amendment to Senate President Randy Ewing’s SB 293 at a later 
hearing.144 Senator Schedler believed Senate-President Ewing was more amenable to Duncan’s 
plan than Senator Campbell, making the amendment likelier to pass.  
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More Tobacco Settlement Money is added to the Budget for 
FY 2000 
  
At a hearing on June 8, 1999, the Senate Finance 
Committee dedicated another $24.5 million in tobacco 
settlement money to HB 1 to address the budget’s remaining 
shortfall and fund newly added initiatives (Table 9.17).145 
State lawmakers incorporated $147.5 million total in 
settlement funds to the budget plan in HB 1. The House also 
tied $15 million in settlement funds to the State’s 
construction projects in HB 2. The Senate Finance Committee 
was considering attaching an additional $17.3 million of 
tobacco money to that bill. House and Senate Finance Committee dedications tied approximately 
$190 million of $199 million in tobacco settlement money for FY 2000 to programs and projects 
in HB 1 and HB 2.   
SB 224 is Killed in House Committee, Causing Supporters to Try Including the Bill in Other 
Legislation 
  
SB 224 received a hostile hearing before the House Appropriations Committee on June 9, 
1999, which killed the bill in a 5-8 vote.147 Representatives appeared to desire less funding for 
schools than the Senate, and wanted provisions giving the legislature more control over how 
schools used the money.148 As the regular session neared its June 21 end date, State 
Representatives became increasingly disposed towards allocating MSA money during a special 
legislative session.147 After the Appropriations Committee killed SB 224, its sponsor, Senator 
Foster Campbell, planned to salvage the LEEF education plan by attaching it as an amendment to 
House Speaker Hunt Downer’s HB 640,147 which gave settlement funds to healthcare, the TOPS 
scholarship program, as well as a health and education trust. 
 
Senators Incorporate Treasurer Duncan’s Plan into SB 293 Only for the Bill to Stall in the 
House 
 
On June 10, 1999, the day after Representatives killed SB 224, Senators brought the bill’s 
counterpart SB 293 to the Floor. Senators proposed five amendments to SB 293, predominantly 
to implement Louisiana Treasurer Ken Duncan’s proposal placing all settlement money into a 
trust the state could use to issue bonds. Some lawmakers also sought to attach a variant of 
Senator Foster Campbell’s school trust and LEEF trust education plan to SB 293 from SB 224.  
 
After failing to attach Treasurer Duncan’s trust and bond plan to SB 224, Senators Tom 
Schedler, Ron Landry, and Tom Romero successfully attached the scheme to SB 293, creating  
the Louisiana Investment for Tomorrow (LIFT) Fund to deposit all MSA payments into and 
issue bonds from.101 In addition, the amendment established a Louisiana Fund which would be 
funded using bond earnings from the LIFT Fund. The State Legislature could appropriate from 
the Louisiana Fund for any purpose. Schedler’s amendment eliminated the LEEF Support Fund 
added to SB 293 by the Senate Finance Committee as well as language stating that revenue from 
it could be used for tobacco cessation, education, and MSA enforcement. Following adoption of 
Amendment 839, Senator Foster Campbell proposed Amendment 841 to implement a smaller 
House and Senate finance 
Committee dedications tied 
approximately $190 million 
of $199 million in tobacco 
settlement money for FY 
2000 to programs and 
projects in HB 1 and HB 2.  
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Table 9.16: Amendments to SB 224 Proposed on the Senate Floor99, 101 
Number Sponsor Party / 
District 
Change Outcome 
716 Tommy 
Casanova 
R-Acadia • Eliminated city school system trusts, made city school systems as beneficiaries of parish trusts. 
• City School systems received money from parish school system trust based on proportion of student 
population. 
 
Withdrawn 
717 Foster 
Campbell 
D-Bossier • Prohibited school systems from using LEEF Fund payments to raise employee wages. 
• Prohibited private schools from using Trust payments to raise employee wages. 
Adopted 
719 Foster 
Campbell 
D-Bossier • Required public school systems, private schools, and specialty schools to put at least 5% of yearly 
investment earnings received from LEEF Fund on program to prevent smoking. 
Withdrawn 
721 Lynn 
Dean 
R-Jefferson • Eliminated Campbell’s amendment prohibiting use of trust moneys to provide employees pay 
increases. 
• Required public school systems, private schools and specialty schools to use 90% of investment 
earnings annually payed out from trusts to increase classroom teacher salaries. 
o Pay increases awarded based on student test scores in each classroom. 
Rejected 
722 Foster 
Campbell 
D-Bossier • Required public school systems, private schools, and specialty schools to dedicate at least 5% of 
yearly investment earnings to a prevention program for smoking and drug abuse. 
Adopted 
723 Tom 
Schedler 
R-St. 
Tammany 
• Eliminated LEEF Fund and School Trusts. 
• Dedicated all tobacco settlement funds except those appropriated during the 1999 legislative session 
to the Louisiana Investment for Tomorrow Fund. 
• Allowed for state bonds to be backed by the LIFT trust. 
• Prohibited appropriations from LIFT trust. 
• Assigned all income earnings from the LIFT Fund to the Louisiana Fund. 
• Dedicated bond proceeds to Louisiana Fund. 
• Appropriations from Louisiana Fund allowed for any purpose. 
• Entered effect July 1, 2000. 
Withdrawn 
725 Tom 
Schedler 
R-St. 
Tammany 
• Eliminated Campbell’s amendment prohibiting use of trust moneys to provide employees pay 
increases. 
• Eliminated Campbell’s amendment requiring public school systems, private schools, and specialty 
schools to dedicate at least 5% of investment earnings from trust funds to a prevention program for 
smoking and drug abuse. 
• Eliminated LEEF Fund and School Trusts. 
• Dedicated all tobacco settlement funds except those appropriated during the 1999 legislative session 
to the Louisiana Investment for Tomorrow Fund. 
• Allowed for state bonds to be backed by the LIFT trust. 
• Prohibited appropriations from LIFT trust. 
Withdrawn 
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• Assigned all income earnings from the LIFT Fund to the Louisiana Fund. 
• Dedicated bond proceeds to Louisiana Fund. 
• Appropriations from Louisiana Fund allowed for any purpose. 
• Entered effect July 1, 2000. 
 
729 Craig 
Romero 
R-Iberia • Eliminated Campbell’s amendment prohibiting use of trust moneys to provide employees pay 
increases. 
• Eliminated Campbell’s amendment requiring public school systems, private schools, and specialty 
schools to dedicate at least 5% of investment earnings from trust funds to a prevention program for 
smoking and drug abuse. 
• Eliminated LEEF Fund and School Trusts. 
• Dedicated all tobacco settlement funds except those appropriated during the 1999 legislative session 
to the Louisiana Investment for Tomorrow Fund. 
• Allowed for state bonds to be backed by the LIFT trust. 
• Prohibited appropriations from LIFT trust. 
• Assigned all income earnings from the LIFT Fund to the Louisiana Fund. 
• Dedicated bond proceeds to Louisiana Fund. 
• Appropriations from Louisiana Fund allowed for any constitutionally legal purpose. 
• Entered effect July 1, 2000. 
Withdrawn 
731 Lambert 
Boissiere 
D-Orleans • Added the New Orleans Center for Creative Arts to specialty schools covered by SB 224. Adopted 
732 Craig 
Romero 
R-Iberia • Eliminated LEEF Fund and School Trusts. 
• Dedicated 70% of tobacco settlement funds except those appropriated during the 1999 legislative 
session to the Louisiana Investment for Tomorrow Fund. 
• Allowed for state bonds to be backed by the LIFT trust. 
• Prohibited appropriations from LIFT trust. 
• Assigned all income earnings from the LIFT Fund to the Louisiana Fund. 
• Dedicated bond proceeds to Louisiana Fund. 
• Dedicated 30% of Louisiana Fund earnings to education spending outlined in SB 224. 
• Allowed appropriation of remaining Louisiana Fund money for any purpose. 
• Entered effect July 1, 2000. 
Rejected 
194 Foster 
Campbell 
D-Bossier • Technical revision. Proposed 
N/A Senate 
Floor 
Bureau 
 • Technical revision. Proposed 
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 version of his education plan from SB 224 into SB 293 (Table 9.18) that left portions of 
Schedler and Romero’s amendment intact. Campbell’s amendment reduced the amount of annual 
MSA money that could be used to back bonds. His amendment also dedicated a portion of bond 
earnings backed by MSA payments and a portion of interest generated by invested MSA money 
towards school and school systems trusts. He also included the LEEF education funding plan 
into the bill, which would be funded by investment income from school trusts that was not 
required to be reinvested into those accounts. The amendment also deposited some earnings from 
bonds issued using MSA settlement payments and investment earnings from MSA money to the 
Louisiana Fund, appropriable for any purpose. Senators then sent SB 293 to the House.138 
 
As passed by the Senate, SB 293 allocated all MSA payments into the LIFT Fund for the 
state to issue bonds against. The entirety of the LIFT account would be invested (35% stocks, 
65% government bonds). SB 293 dedicated 60% of earnings from MSA-backed bond sales and 
60% of interest from MSA investments to the Louisiana Fund for any use. 40% of proceeds from 
bond sales and investments would go to school and school system trusts. Of the 40% dedicated 
to education spending, 5% would go to prevention programming for smoking and drug abuse. 
SB 293 subsequently died in the House Appropriations Committee without a hearing.138 
Tobacco control funding using Louisiana’s settlement payments remained uncertain.  
Table 9.17: Allocation of Tobacco Settlement Funds in HB 1 Before and After Senate Committee Amendments117, 119, 120, 
145, 146 
Programming Tobacco 
Settlement 
Allocations as 
Passed by 
House 
Senate Finance 
Committee 
Funding 
Additions 
Proposed Fund 
Dedications After 
Passing Through House 
and Senate Committee 
Medicaid $87 million -- $87 million 
Children’s health insurance $13 million -- $13 million 
Endowed chairs and professorships  -- $10 million $10 million 
Medical research grants -- $10 million $10 million 
Facility improvements to the Louisiana Genetics 
Research Institute clinic. 
$6.5 million -- $6.5 million 
Cancer research conducted by the LSU Medical Center in 
New Orleans 
$5 million -- $5 million 
Healthcare grants given by the Board of Regents $5 million -- $5 million 
Health clinics at schools $4.2 million -- $4.2 million 
Mental health clinics $3.7 million -- $3.7 million 
Parish health unit construction $3.2 million -- $3.2 million 
Bridge renovation -- $3 million $3 million 
Fund procurements by the Biomedical Research 
Foundation of Northwest Louisiana  
$1.9 million -- $1.9 million 
Quit programs for smoking $1.5 million -- $1.5 million 
Preschool for underprivileged kids $1.5 million -- $1.5 million 
Comprehensive Care Clinic and Diabetic Foot Clinic -- $969,878 $969,878 
Maternal and Child Health Home Nurse Visitation 
Program 
-- $513,021 $513,021 
Louisiana Genetics Research Institute operating costs $375,000 -- $375,000 
Master Settlement Agreement Enforcement by the 
Attorney General 
$330,000 -- $330,000 
Total $147.7 millions  
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Table 9.18: Amendments to SB 293 Proposed on the Senate Floor101 
Number Sponsor Change Status 
830 -Schedler, 
Tom 
-Romero 
• Dedicated all tobacco settlement funds except those appropriated during the 1999 legislative session to the 
Louisiana Investment for Tomorrow Fund. 
• Allowed for state bonds to be backed by the LIFT trust. 
• Prohibited appropriations from LIFT trust. 
• Assigned all income earnings from the LIFT Fund to the Louisiana Fund. 
• Dedicated bond proceeds to Louisiana Fund. 
• Appropriations from Louisiana Fund allowed for any purpose. 
• Eliminated specific funding permissions for tobacco education, cessation, and MSA enforcement 
created by Senate Finance Committee Amendment. 
Withdrawn 
839 Schedler, 
Tom 
• Dedicated all tobacco settlement funds except those appropriated during the 1999 legislative session to the 
Louisiana Investment for Tomorrow Fund. 
• Allowed for state bonds to be backed by 95% of the LIFT trust. 
• Prohibited appropriations from LIFT trust. 
• Assigned all income earnings from the LIFT Fund to the Louisiana Fund. 
• Dedicated bond proceeds to Louisiana Fund. 
• Appropriations from Louisiana Fund allowed for any purpose. 
• Eliminated specific funding permissions for tobacco education, cessation, and MSA enforcement 
created by Senate Finance Committee Amendment. 
 
Adopted 
840 Campbell, 
Foster 
• Deleted part of Amendment 839. 
• Established LIFT fund and Louisiana Fund. 
• Dedicated all tobacco settlement funds except those appropriated during the 1999 legislative session to the 
Louisiana Investment for Tomorrow Fund. 
• Allowed for state bonds to be backed by 35% of the LIFT trust: 
o Prohibited appropriations from LIFT trust. 
o Dedicated 60% of LIFT income earnings to Louisiana Fund. 
o Dedicated 40% of income earnings to Louisiana Education Excellence Fund and school funds. 
• Appropriations from Louisiana Fund allowed for any purpose. 
• Appropriations to LEEF: 
o 20% of realized capital gains on collective investment of monies to school funds: 
 15% Private Education Excellence Fund. 
 $1.5 million to specialty schools ($250,000 to six schools). 
 Remainder to Louisiana Educational Excellence Fund. 
Failed 
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o Prohibited schools and school systems from using income earnings for renovation or construction 
projects; prevented using income earnings to pay expenses normally covered by the state’s general 
budget; forbid using earnings to pay for religious classes and related material; prohibited using earnings 
to provide wage increases for employees. 
o Required school systems and schools to spend at least 5% of investment earnings on drug abuse 
and smoking prevention programming. 
841 Campbell, 
Foster 
• Deleted part of Amendment 839. 
• Established LIFT fund and Louisiana Fund. 
• Dedicated all tobacco settlement funds except those appropriated during the 1999 legislative session to the 
Louisiana Investment for Tomorrow Fund. 
• Allowed for state bonds to be backed by 35% of the LIFT trust. 
• 40% of LIFT income earnings to LIFT fund annually. 
• 60% of LIFT income earnings to Louisiana Fund. 
o Appropriations from Louisiana Fund allowed for any purpose. 
• Established Louisiana Education Excellence Fund and school funds. 
o 20% of LIFT realized capital gains to school funds. 
 Forbid appropriations for any reason. 
 15% to Private Education Excellence Fund. 
 $1.5 million to specialty schools ($250,000 to six schools). 
 Dedicated remaining funds to: 
• 30% equally to public school systems. 
• 70% on state education spending formula (proportional) school funds credited in amount relative 
to balance of all combined school finds. 
o Income earnings from school funds not dedicated back into school funds deposited in LEEF. 
 Annual payments to schools from LEEF income earnings provided based upon school or school 
system fund balances compared to LEEF fund balance. 
 Annual payments to private schools from LEEF income earnings based upon Private Education 
Excellence Fund balance to school funds balance. 
o Prohibited schools and school systems from using income earnings for renovation or construction 
projects; prevented using income earnings to pay expenses normally covered by the state’s general 
budget; Forbid using earnings to pay for religious classes and related material; prohibited using earnings 
to provide wage increases for employees. 
o Required school systems and schools to spend at least 5% of investment earnings on drug abuse 
and smoking prevention programming. 
 
Adopted 
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The Senate and House were divided internally and with each other over what plan to use 
for future MSA payments. Both chambers desired funding for health and education, but had 
different views over method and allocation.149 According to a June 17 article regarding a 
different version of Senator Campbell’s school trust proposal, the House was opposed to the 
Senate-supported education trust plan believing it lacked accountability and would take too long 
to provide needed funding via interest generated by accounts.149 The House wanted a fund that 
could be fully depleted annually to fund education 
from pre-kindergarten to 12th grade and a health 
fund from which only interest could be used. 
Representatives desired a health trust that limited 
spending to interest because they felt the 
healthcare industry would exploit the additional 
funds available from the state. In contrast, the 
Senate desired a trust dedicated to health spending 
that could be depleted annually.  
Governor Foster Calls for Financing a Teacher 
Raise Using Settlement Money 
  
Less than two weeks before the end of the legislative session, on June 10, 1999, Governor 
Mike Foster called for using 20-25% of the tobacco settlement money to provide public teachers 
a salary increase.150 Governor Foster had been silent on the allocation of settlement money after 
his earlier unsuccessful calls in March 1999 to securitize the MSA funding stream to balance 
Louisiana’s budget. The Council for A Better Louisiana, House Speaker Hunt Downer, and 
Senate President Randy Ewing criticized Governor Foster’s proposal and timing.150 CABL 
President Harold Suire told The Times-Picayune: 
While it is important for us to continue working to raise teacher pay, the use of 
tobacco money to do that is a totally inappropriate use of these funds. Surely we 
can do something more with this special windfall.150   
Lawmakers ignored the governor’s request. 
HB 640 Becomes Main Focus of Legislative Efforts to Determine Use of MSA Funds  
  
On June 10, 1999, the Senate Committee on Finance held a hearing for House Speaker 
Downer’s HB 640.148 As passed by the House, HB 640 created a trust for the TOPS higher 
education scholarship program, the Health Trust Fund, and the Louisiana Fund, another trust 
dedicated to providing children insurance, funding health research as well as treating tobacco-
related illness (Table 9.19). 
At the hearing, Senate President Randy Ewing pushed Committee members to turn HB 
640 into his and Senator Foster Campbell’s earlier joint spending proposal in SB 224 and SB 
Table 9.19: Allocation of Settlement Funds in HB 640 as Amended by the House125 
Stage Fiscal Year TOPS Trust Health Trust Fund Louisiana Fund 
 FY 2001 15% 15% 70% 
FY 2002 20% 20% 60% 
FY 2003- 25% 25% 50% 
“While it is important for us to 
continue working to raise teacher 
pay, the use of tobacco money to 
do that is a totally inappropriate 
use of these funds. Surely we can 
do something more with this 
special windfall.”  
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293, which used MSA money to create education and healthcare trusts.148 Committee members 
agreed and approved a package of amendments that transformed HB 640 from Speaker 
Downer’s TOPs plan into Ewing and Campbell’s earlier proposal (Table 9.20). Similar to SB 
224, schools and school systems received funding from earnings generated by a newly created 
collective LEEF account, as well as income earned from their individual trusts, to improve 
instruction and student performance. Schools and school systems would be required to dedicate 
at least 5% of income earned on a drug abuse and smoking prevention program.151 
After the Committee adopted the amendments, Senate President Randy Ewing told the 
Baton Rouge Advocate that the bill now reflected the Senate’s priorities for using MSA money: 
This reaffirms some things we want to put up on the table. We want some money 
for health-science research. We want some money to supplement our health-care 
effort, particularly in high risk people. We want some money in high risk areas of 
pre-K(indergarten) through [grade] 12. And we want some support for higher 
education in one way or another.148 
The Committee sent HB 640 to the Senate floor after amending it. The bill’s 
implementing legislation (needed since HB 640 was a constitutional amendment), HB 1547, 
passed the Senate Finance Committee three days later on June 14.132 HB 640 only required 
schools to spend 5% of income they received annually from the LEEF Trust on tobacco control 
programming (Table 9.20).  
Status of MSA Payment Allocation Bills 
 
When Senate Finance Committee members approved HB 640, few bills remained active 
to allocate MSA reward money for FY 2000 and future years. State lawmakers planned to 
appropriate most MSA settlement money received in FY 2000 ($190 of $199 million) in HB 1 
and HB 2, to fund general operating costs, fund recurring programs such as Medicaid, and help 
pay for construction projects that year. HB 1 only included $3.3 million in funding for tobacco 
prevention, cessation and enforcement of the MSA in 1999 (Table 9.17).129, 121 Bills besides HB 
640 and HB 1547 specifically designed to allocate MSA funds after FY 2000 failed to gain 
traction. Senator Foster Campbell and Senate President Randy Ewing’s bill to establish a 
collective LEEF Fund for schools, SB 224, was killed by Representatives.101 SB 293, which was 
amended to advance Campbell and Ewing’s LEEF education trust plan after SB 224 failed, 
stalled in the House Appropriations Committee.138 
Senators Try to Eliminate MSA Funds from FY 2000 Budget Bill HB 1 
  
The Senate debated HB 1, Louisiana’s general budget bill that included $147 million of 
FY 2000’s tobacco settlement payments, on June 11, 1999. Senators Tom Schedler (R-Slidell) 
and Art Lentini (R-Kenner) proposed amending HB 1 to prohibit using MSA money in 
legislation entering effect during the 1999 regular legislative session, to prevent its use in that 
year’s budget.152 Schedler argued that voters disliked the incorporation of MSA settlement 
money into the budget and asserted that lawmakers should not use the funds until they made a 
unified decision on their allocation.152-154 The amendment would remove $147 million in MSA 
payments from HB 1 and any other settlement funds in legislation meant to be implemented that 
session. Senators Schedler and Lentini proposed another amendment that imposed spending cuts 
to address the budget shortfall resulting from removing settlement funds from HB 1.154, 155  
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Table 9.20: Annual Allocation of Tobacco Settlement Money in HB 640 Before and After Senate Committee on Finance Amendments125, 151 
 Trusts Established Total Amount of Settlement Money Distributed 
Between Trusts 
Allocation of Settlement Fund Money in Trusts 
HB 640 as 
Passed by the 
House 
TOPS Settlement • 15% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 20% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 25% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and onward 
TOPS Scholarship Program 
Health Trust • 15% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 20% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 25% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and onward 
• Providing healthcare to children. 
• Initiatives for chronic disease management. 
• Funding improvements to state healthcare facilities. 
• Funding “pursuit of innovation in advanced health care sciences.” 
• Treatment of tobacco-related diseases. 
Louisiana Fund • 70% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 60% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 50% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and onward 
• Programs supporting youth via healthcare or education: 
o Healthcare research, upgrades for state health care facilities, treatment of 
tobacco-related sicknesses, and treatment of chronic diseases. 
o Education, advertising, cessation, and enforcement initiatives to prevent 
and eliminate tobacco use. 
o Investment expenses from TOPS and Health Trusts. 
HB 640 After 
Senate 
Finance 
Committee 
Amendments  
 
Louisiana 
Educational 
Excellence Fund 
30% Private Schools 15% to Private Education Excellence Fund. 
Specialty Schools $1.5 million* 
Public School System 
Funds 
30% of remaining funds distributed equally. 
70% of remaining funds distributed based on 
State’s formula for education spending. 
Louisiana 
Educational 
Excellence Direct 
Support Fund 
10% Appropriations allowed only to school system funds, based on the State’s 
formula for education spending. 
Higher Education 
Support Fund 
30% • Appropriations require two-thirds approval from legislature. 
• Appropriations allowed for: 
o To support postsecondary education spending during economic slumps. 
o Improve non-recurring higher education programs. 
Health and Sciences 
Support Fund 
30% • Improvement of education and healthcare initiatives for children. 
• Advanced healthcare sciences innovation programming. 
• Treatment of tobacco-related diseases. 
• Provision of chronic illness management. 
• State healthcare facility renovations. 
• Tobacco prevention, education and cessation initiatives. 
• Tobacco regulatory enforcement. 
*Six specialty schools to receive $250,000 each annually. 
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Neither amendment passed, leaving the $147 million of tobacco settlement money in the 
budget.154 Rejection of the amendments also preserved $1.5 million in settlement funds dedicated 
towards tobacco cessation in HB 1 (Table 9.17). 
Other Senators offered amendments limiting use of tobacco settlement funds in the 
budget or rededicating the money to a trust but failed to secure their adoption. After Senators 
rejected amendments to HB 1 they voted 32-6 to pass it, retaining $147 million of initial 
settlement payments in the FY 2000 budget. They dedicated $1.5 million of included MSA 
money towards tobacco cessation.  
Since the Senate version of HB 1 differed from the House version, the House had the 
option of either accepting Senate changes or forming a six-person conference committee 
consisting of three representatives and three senators to draft a compromise version of HB 1. A 
conference committee represented the last opportunity that lawmakers had to add or remove 
tobacco settlement money in the budget, including for tobacco control programming. A 
conference committee would ultimately keep FY 2000 MSA payments in HB 1. 
 
The ALA of Louisiana Urges State Lawmakers to Fund Tobacco Control Programming Using 
MSA Payments 
 
The American Lung Association 
of Louisiana pressured state lawmakers 
to fund tobacco control programming 
using MSA money as the legislative 
session neared its end. The Times-
Picayune published a letter from ALA 
of Louisiana Executive Director Ben 
Fontaine on June 14, 1999 calling on 
lawmakers to use MSA for tobacco control.156 Fontaine stated that 37% of high school students 
in Louisiana smoked. He asserted that state lawmakers should respect the MSA’s goal of 
reducing youth smoking by implementing a tobacco control program. Fontaine stated that the 
program should feature community interventions, school-based programs focused on deterrence 
and health, counter-marketing, programming grants for nonprofits and local health agencies, 
administration, as well as surveillance and evaluation. He stated that first year funding should at 
least be $27 million according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.156, 157 We did 
not find evidence that other health voluntaries pressured for MSA money to go towards 
comprehensive tobacco control programming at that time. 
 
More of Initial MSA Payments are incorporated into HB 2 for Use in FY 2000 
 
On June 14, 1999 the Senate Finance Committee attached approximately $17 million in 
tobacco settlement money to HB 2, the state’s construction budget.158 HB 1 and HB 2 included 
almost all $199 million of MSA funds Louisiana expected for FY 2000. Tobacco control 
programming in FY 2000 remained minimally funded by the initial MSA payments despite its 
major incorporation into budget expenses, with only $1.5 million going towards cessation 
programming in HB 1 (Table 9.17). 
 
… The Times-Picayune published a letter 
from American Lung Association of 
Louisiana Executive Director Ben Fontaine 
calling on lawmakers to use MSA money to 
fund tobacco control programming.  
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Louisiana Senators Finalize Changes to HB 640 and HB 1547 to Allocate Post FY 2000 MSA 
Payments  
 
The same day the Senate Finance Committee revised HB 2, the Senate brought HB 640, 
which allocated future MSA money not incorporated in FY 2000 spending, to the floor for 
consideration.159 Senators proposed multiple amendments to establish new trusts, reallocate 
tobacco settlement money, and allow MSA money to back state-issued bonds (Table 9.21). In 
particular, Senate President Randy Ewing proposed Amendment 1023 to assuage backers of 
Senator Campbell’s LEEF education trust plan100, 109 and an earlier bill providing settlement 
money to the TOPS scholarship program.159 Ewing’s amendment also included features 
appealing to supporters of Treasurer Ken Duncan’s plan to place settlement money in a trust the 
state could take from to relieve immediate debt and financial needs.100, 109 
 
Ewing’s amendment kept the LEEF Trust he added to HB 640 during the bill’s Senate 
Finance Committee hearing as well as the requirement that 5% of money from the fund go to 
smoking prevention and drug abuse programming (Table 9.21). It also permitted an unspecified 
amount of funding from another trust it added, the Education Support Trust, to go towards 
general drug abuse prevention and treatment initiatives. Senators approved Ewing’s proposal, 
and adopted four additional amendments to approve healthcare initiatives for funding from the 
Healthcare and Research Fund established by Amendment 1023.   
 After reworking HB 640 to appease supporters of Campbell’s LEEF plan, Treasurer 
Duncan’s bond and trust plan, and the TOPS scholarship program,159 Senators voted 32-2 to pass 
the bill and send it back to the House for consideration of Senate amendments (Table 9.22). HB 
1547, HB 640’s enabling legislation, was amended to reflect changes to its companion and 
passed the Senate on June 15, 1999.132 HB1547 also went to the House for approval of Senate 
changes.  
As passed by the Senate, HB 640 dedicated interest from 50% of annual MSA payments 
towards education funding, 10% of MSA payments towards education, and 40% of MSA 
payments towards health research and programming (Table 9.22). The Senate version of HB 640 
dedicated more funds towards education scholarships and programming than the House version, 
which allocated more MSA settlement money towards health care and drug prevention 
initiatives. After passing the Senate, HB 640 also had a provision allowing a supermajority of  
state lawmakers to replace its education and health trusts with a fund dedicated to issuing state 
bonds.  
 
Lawmakers Pass FY 2000 Budget Bills HB 1 and HB 2 with Nearly All First Year Settlement 
Payments included 
 
After FY 2000 budget bills HB 1 and HB 2 returned to the House, Representatives 
rejected Senate changes, forcing conference committees to convene for both bills to resolve the 
differences. The final version of HB 1 passed by the legislature used approximately $149 million 
in settlement money, mainly for health and education initiatives, while HB 2 contained $39 
million for construction, renovation, and equipment purchases.160 Besides allocations in HB 1 
and HB 2, lawmakers allocated the remaining $11 million of tobacco settlement money for FY 
2000 to the State’s rainy day fund since it was classified as nonrecurring and not allowed for  
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Table 9.21: Amendments to HB 640 Proposed on the Senate Floor125 
Number Sponsor Party and 
District 
Change Status 
1023 Randy 
Ewing 
 (D-Ouachita) • Removes Senate Finance Committee Amendments. 
• Established five trusts with settlement money not dedicated by other legislation during the 1999 
session. 
o Education Trust Fund: 
 50% of total MSA money received annually. 
 All annual account earnings deposited in LEEF. 
o Louisiana Educational Excellence Fund (LEEF): 
 All annual account earnings kept in LEEF. 
 50% of LEEF Fund distributed to school systems, specialty schools and private schools each 
year: 
• 15% to private schools. 
• $250,000 to each specialty school (six schools). 
• Of money remaining after dedications to private and specialty schools: 
o 30% spread equally among public school systems. 
o 70% spread using states formula for spending education (proportional). 
• Spending restricted to improving student performance or classes 
• Prohibited use for construction or renovation projects. Prohibited pay increases for 
employees using LEEF money. 
• Required 5% of money to go towards drug abuse and smoking prevention programming. 
• Required schools and school systems to submit a spending plan to the Louisiana 
Department of Education. Required plan approval from Department of Education to 
receive payout.  
• Prohibited use of LEEF money for existing costs in the state’s general fund. 
 50% of LEEF Fund dedicated to TOPS annually. 
o Education Support Fund: 
 10% of MSA money annually. 
 All account earnings placed back in fund. 
 Entire account given to public school systems annually, based on state’s education spending 
formula (proportional). 
• Appropriations restricted to early childhood education initiatives to help struggling or at-
risk students, or for any other education program approved by lawmakers. 
o Health Care and Research Fund: 
 40% of MSA money annually (remaining). 
 All account earnings returned to account. 
 25% of account money dedicated to Board of Regents for “health science research project 
grants.” 
Adopted 
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 75% of account money to be allocated by two-thirds vote of legislature: 
• Early intervention initiatives for health and health related issues. 
• Health clinics at schools. 
• Preventing infant mortality. 
• Drug abuse prevention and treatment initiatives. 
• Health insurance for poor children. 
• Preventing teen pregnancy. 
o Louisiana Investment for Tomorrow Fund (alternative to Education Support Fund and Health Care 
and Research Fund if chosen by legislature). 
 Replaces Education Support Fund and Health Care and Research Fund. 
• Two-thirds vote by lawmakers required to create as replacement for two trusts. 
 Received 50% of MSA money. 
• If approved by two-thirds vote of legislature, LIFT fund would back state-issue bonds. 
• Could back bonds using up to 50% of account balance. 
1037 Jim Cox D-Calcasieu • Allowed use of money from the Health Care and Research Fund created by Amendment 1028 to 
provide elderly Louisianans prescription drugs. 
Adopted 
1039 Don Hines D-Calcasieu • Allowed use of money from the Health Care and Research Fund created by Amendment 1023 for 
healthcare initiatives approved of by the Legislature. 
Adopted 
1040 Don Hines D-Calcasieu • Changed funding under Health Care and Research Fund created by Amendment 1023. 
o Changed grant program to fund medical research grants instead of health science grants. 
o Made the Louisiana Public Academic Health Centers a recipient of the grant program. 
Adopted 
1041 Noble 
Ellington 
D-Ouachita • Allowed use of money from the Health Care and Research Fund created by Amendment 1023 to assist 
medically underserved regions. 
Adopted 
1043 Tom 
Schedler 
D-St. Tammany • Allowed use of money from the Health Care and Research Fund created by Amendment 1023 for hospice 
Medicaid initiatives. 
Adopted 
986 Randy 
Ewing 
D-Ouachita • Removes Senate Finance Committee Amendments. 
• Established Education and Health Trusts using MSA money. 
• Similar to Amendment 1028. 
Died 
without 
action 
991 Noble 
Ellington 
D-Ouachita • Allowed use of money from the Health Care and Research Fund created by Amendment 1028 for 
health care in rural areas. 
Died 
without 
action 
998 Foster 
Campbell 
D-Bossier • Removes Senate Finance Committee Amendments. 
• Removes Amendment 1028. 
• Implemented a modified version of Senate education funding plan from SB 224 (LEEF, private, public, 
and specialty schools). 
• Established Education Support Fund and Health Care and Research Fund from Amendment 1028 and 
restricted spending based on Amendment 1028 provisions. 
Died 
without 
action 
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1000 Noble 
Ellington 
D-Ouachita • Allowed use of money from the Health Care and Research Fund created by Amendment 1028 for 
healthcare in regions that were medically underserved. 
Died 
without 
action 
1006 Lynn Dean R-Jefferson • Changed annual allocation of MSA money in Amendment 1023 to Education Trust from 50% to 60%. Died 
without 
action 
1007 Don Hines D-Calcasieu • Removes Senate Finance Committee Amendments. 
• Early version of Amendment 1023. 
Died 
without 
action 
1008 Tom Greene R-West Baton 
Rouge 
• Removes Senate Finance Committee Amendments. 
• Deletes Amendment 1023 from Senator Randy Ewing. 
• Establishes Louisiana Tobacco Trust Fund and Louisiana Tobacco Expenditure Fund with settlement 
money not dedicated by other legislation during the 1999 session. 
o Louisiana Tobacco Trust Fund: 
 Dedicated 100% of annual settlement payments to Louisiana Tobacco Trust Fund. 
 Prohibited appropriations from Trust. 
 90% account earnings dedicated to Louisiana Tobacco Expenditure Fund. 
 10% of account earnings returned to Louisiana Tobacco Trust Fund. 
o Louisiana Tobacco Expenditure Fund: 
 50% of annual appropriations to education initiatives. 
 50% of annual appropriations to healthcare initiatives. 
Rejected 
1010 Randy 
Ewing 
D-Ouachita • Allowed use of money from the Health Care and Research Fund created by Amendment 1028 to 
programming for “drug prevention and treatment.” 
Died 
without 
action 
1018 Lynn Dean R-Jefferson • Changed annual allocation of MSA money in Amendment 1023 to Education Trust from 50% to 60%. 
• Changed annual allocation of MSA money to LIFT fund established by Amendment 1023 from 50% to 
40%. 
Withdrawn 
1019 Noble 
Ellington 
D-Ouachita • Allowed use of money from the Health Care and Research Fund created by Amendment 1028 for 
healthcare in regions that were medically underserved. 
Withdrawn 
1028 Lynn Dean R-Jefferson • Changed annual allocation of MSA money in Amendment 1023 to Education Trust from 50% to 60%. 
• Changed annual allocation of MSA money to LIFT fund established by Amendment 1023 from 50% to 
40%. 
Rejected 
1029 Don Hines D-Calcasieu • Same as Amendment 1040. Withdrawn 
1035 Don Hines D-Calcasieu • Same as Amendment 1040. Withdrawn 
1038 Tom 
Schedler 
 R-St. Tammany • Allowed use of money from the Health Care and Research Fund created by Amendment 1023 for pilot 
hospice Medicaid initiatives. 
Withdrawn 
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appropriation in general budget spending.160 The $199 million in first year MSA payments went 
to the budget ($149 million), construction initiatives ($39 million), or Louisiana’s rainy day fund 
($11 million).160, 161  
 
Only $4 million in HB 1 was 
designated for tobacco control 
programming.162 The allocation of settlement 
funds to tobacco control programming 
reflected previous statements in The 
Advocate from House Speaker and HB 1 
Conference Committee member Hunt 
Downer (D-Houma) that the budget shortfall 
prevented funding for tobacco control 
initiatives: 
 
What we have is such a demand on this money that there’s not enough to go 
around. The tobacco money was built into the budget before it came to the 
Legislature. To back it out we would have had to cut the budget. What about in 
future years?163 
The conference committee version of HB 1 provided $1 million to Louisiana Universities and 
research centers for smoking prevention and cessation programs.162 The conference committee 
also designated $3 million of settlement funds towards a tobacco prevention and cessation 
program in the Louisiana DHH’s Office of Health.162 The $3 million dedication resulted from a 
tobacco prevention and education initiative developed and proposed to lawmakers by the 
Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana (CTFLA) with assistance from DHH.164  
The coalition consisted of approximately 60 officials from health care organizations, 
hospitals, and higher education institutions164 CTFLA was pivotal in Louisiana’s later tax 
(Chapter 11) and smokefree policy victories (Chapter 10). We do not know the details of DHH 
and CTFLA’s tobacco control proposal. 
The Legislature adopted the Conference Committee versions of HB 1 and HB 2 on June 
21, 1999, the last day of the legislative session. In an interview with The Advocate, 
Commissioner of Administration Mark Drennen justified use of tobacco settlement money in the 
FY 2000 general budget because it secured federal funding for state programming:  
We [Governor Foster’s administration and lawmakers] used the tobacco money to 
match $300 million in federal funds… We were able to turn $200 million into 
$500 million, so we feel like that’s a great investment.160    
Commissioner Drennen also defending the incorporation of settlement money into the budget, 
stating the funds prevented cuts to education, art, and parks programming. The debate over the 
future of MSA funds in future years remained unresolved, particularly whether the money would 
be set aside in dedicated trusts that were insulated from the year-to-year appropriations process. 
“What we have is such a demand on 
this money that there’s not enough to 
go around. The tobacco money was 
built into the budget before it came to 
the Legislature. To back it out we 
would have had to cut the budget.”  
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Table 9.22: Annual Allocation of Tobacco Settlement Money in HB 640 as Passed by the House and Senate125 
 Trusts 
Established 
Total amount of Settlement money distributed 
between trusts 
Allocation of settlement fund money and earnings in trusts 
H
B 
64
0 
as
 P
as
se
d 
by
 th
e 
H
ou
se
 
TOPS 
Settlement 
• 15% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 20% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 25% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and onward 
TOPS Scholarship Program. 
Health Trust • 15% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 20% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 25% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and onward 
• Providing healthcare to children. 
• Initiatives for chronic disease management. 
• Funding improvements to state healthcare facilities. 
• Funding “pursuit of innovation in advanced health care sciences.” 
• Treatment of tobacco-related diseases. 
Louisiana 
Fund 
• 70% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 60% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 50% of MSA funds in FY 2003and onward 
• Programs supporting youth via healthcare or education: 
o Healthcare research, upgrades for state health care facilities, 
treatment of tobacco-related sicknesses, and treatment of chronic 
diseases. 
o Education, advertising, cessation, and enforcement initiatives to 
prevent and eliminate tobacco use. 
o Investment expenses from TOPS and Health Trusts. 
 Trusts 
Established 
Total amount of Settlement money distributed 
between trusts 
Allocation of settlement fund money and earnings in trusts 
H
B 
64
0 
as
 P
as
se
d 
by
 th
e 
Se
na
te
 Education 
Trust Fund 
50% Account Earnings deposited in LEEF Fund 
Louisiana 
Educational 
Excellence 
Fund** 
None – Operated on investment earnings deposited 
from Education Trust Fund 
50% Private Schools 15% to Private Education Excellence 
Fund. 
Specialty 
Schools 
$1.5 million.* 
Public School 
System Funds 
30% of remaining funds distributed 
equally 
70% of remaining funds distributed based 
on State’s formula for education spending 
(proportional). 
50% TOPS Scholarship Program 
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Education 
Support 
Fund** 
10%  • Entire account given to public school systems annually, based on state’s 
education spending formula (proportional). 
o Appropriations restricted to early childhood education initiatives to 
help struggling or at-risk students, or for any other education 
program approved by lawmakers. 
 
Health and 
Research 
Fund** 
40%  25% “Health science research project grants” selected by 
Board of Regents. 
75% 
(requires 
2/3 
legislature 
approval) 
• Early intervention initiatives for health and health related 
issues. 
• Health clinics at schools. 
• Preventing infant mortality. 
• Drug abuse prevention and treatment initiatives. 
• Health insurance for poor children. 
• Preventing teen pregnancy. 
Louisiana 
Investment 
for Tomorrow 
Fund***   
 
50% (If LIFT Fund replaced Education Support 
Fund and Health and Research Fund) 
Could back state-issued bonds using up to 50% of account balance.  
*Six specialty schools to receive $250,000 each annually. 
**All account earnings (via investing in stocks, bonds, etc) deposited in same fund. 
***Replaced Education Support Fund and Health Care and Research Fund if Legislature Passed 2/3 vote. 
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Conference Committees Propose Compromise Versions of HB 640 and HB 1547 
 
HB 640 and its implementing legislation HB 1547, the bills dedicating future MSA 
payments and not the $199 million in initial settlement money included in FY 2000 budget bills 
HB 1 and HB 2, returned to the House for approval of Senate changes. Representatives rejected 
the amendments, forcing the House and Senate to form conference committees to resolve the 
chambers’ differences. The Conference Committees for HB 640 and HB 1547 formed on June 
16, 1999,125, 132 five days before the regular legislative session ended on June 21, 1999.165 The 
HB 640 conference committee consisted of HB 640 sponsor and Speaker Hunt Downer, 
Representative Jerry Luke LeBlanc, and Representative Charles Dewitt, as well as Senate 
President Randy Ewing, Senator John Hainkel, and SB 224 sponsor Senator Foster Campbell. 
The HB 1547 conference committee had the same membership as the HB 640 panel, except 
Senator Jay Dardenne (R-Baton Rouge) took the place of Senator Campbell.  
On June 20, 1999 the HB 640 conference committee announced the creation and near 
approval of compromise legislation166, 167 that removed amendments made in the Senate and 
dedicated future tobacco settlement money (not initial payments, which were used in HB 1 and 
HB 2) to two new accounts, the Millennium Fund and the Louisiana Fund (Table 9.23-D).167 
Settlement money dedicated to the Millennium Fund went to three distinct trusts for education 
and healthcare programming (Table 9.23-D). The Education Excellence Fund in the Millennium 
Fund was a smaller version of Senator Foster Campbell’s education spending plan from SB 224, 
and the TOPS Fund was similar to Speaker Hunt Downer’s original plan dedicating settlement 
money to a trust supporting the TOPS scholarship program. Total annual appropriations from the 
specialty funds in the Millennium Trust could not surpass yearly estimates of income earned by 
the Millennium Trust. Tobacco prevention, cessation, and regulatory enforcement programming 
qualified for money from the Louisiana Fund, but they did not have a required minimum funding 
level and lawmakers could choose not to provide settlement dollars towards those initiatives 
(Table 9.23-D). 
The conference committee version of HB 640 allowed lawmakers to establish and 
dedicate any amount of tobacco settlement money to an additional account called the Millennium 
Leverage Fund via a two-thirds vote of the legislature. Revenue from investment earnings and 
bond proceeds of the Millennium Leverage Fund went to the Education Excellence, Health 
Excellence, TOPS, and Louisiana Funds also created by the bill. The compromise version also 
allowed lawmakers to issue state bonds using the Millennium Leverage Fund with a two-thirds 
vote in both legislative chambers. The plan came from Treasurer Ken Duncan’s bond and trust 
proposal168 to place settlement funds in a trust that lawmakers could use to back bonds with.100, 
109 If adopted the bill entered effect on July 1, 2000.  
The Conference Committees approved their versions of HB 640 and its implementing 
legislation HB 1547 on July 21, 1999, sending them to the Senate for a vote. HB 640 was a 
constitutional amendment, needing approval from two-thirds of each chamber instead of a simple 
majority to pass. After passing the legislature, Louisiana voters had to vote to enact HB 640 in 
the October 1999 election. Despite conflicting desires over settlement money allocation, 
Senators and Representatives voted overwhelmingly to approve the compromise versions HB 
640 and HB 1547. Adoption of HB 640 placed it on the October 23, 1999 ballot for voters to 
pass or reject. 
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Passage of HB 640 and HB 1547 ensured 45% of settlement money in FY 2001, 60% in 
FY 2002, and 75% received starting in FY 2003 and beyond went into protected trusts that state 
lawmakers could not appropriate for general budget expenses (as happened in FY 2000 with HB 
1 and HB 2) (Table 9.23-D).169 All tobacco settlement money received in future fiscal years, as 
well as income earned by Funds established in HB 640 and HB 1547, would go into trusts or to 
healthcare and education initiatives if voters approved the constitutional amendment. HB 640 
and its implementing legislation permitted spending for tobacco prevention, cessation, and 
related healthcare treatment, but did not guarantee funding as it did not set a minimum funding 
requirement.169 Appropriations from the Louisiana Fund for tobacco control and other allowable 
purposes would be made annually, and could vary. 
Placement of MSA payments into trusts satisfied state lawmakers’ and political figures’ 
desires to preserve the money for specific purposes and prevent it from being used to remedy 
budget gaps. Senate President Randy Ewing told The Advocate that placing most settlement 
money into a trust protected it from waste in future budgets stating, “By putting in (sic) a trust 
and not letting it [tobacco settlement money] just be used to plug the budget, we have demanded 
that future legislators make the tough decisions.”160 Although not entirely satisfied with the 
outcome of HB 640 and HB 1547, Attorney General Richard Ieyoub told The Advocate that 
putting most of the MSA money into trust was preferable to leaving the payments in the state’s 
general fund:   
I would have probably given more priority to 
health care and been more specific about what 
kinds of health care projects the money could 
be spent on…after all, that was the basis of the 
lawsuit in the first place. 
He added: 
The worst thing that could happen, and I hope 
it never happens, is that some of the trust fund would end up in the general 
fund.160 
Leadership from CABL and the Louisiana Association of Educators (LAE) also 
expressed support for HB 640 and HB 1547.170 CABL President Harold Suire, whose 
organization called on lawmakers to place settlement money into a trust, expressed pride in 
CABL’s influence over the allocation debate.170 LAE President Mary Washington stated that use 
of settlement money to fund education initiatives was a positive outcome in an overall negative 
legislative session for teachers.170 We found no statements from health or tobacco control 
advocates regarding the settlement allocation plan adopted by the Louisiana Legislature.  
After passing the legislature, HB 640 went to the ballot for voter approval and HB 1547 
went to Governor Foster for signature into law. Governor Foster signed HB 1547 into law on 
July 12, 1999. Louisianans subsequently approved HB 640’s constitutional amendment on 
election day.171 
Passage of HB 640 divided MSA payments not used in the FY 2000 budget bills HB 1 
and HB 2 between the three trusts in the newly created Millennium Fund as well as the Louisiana 
Fund, predominantly for health and education programming (Table 9.23-D). Tobacco use  
“The worst thing that could 
happen, and I hope it never 
happens, is that some of the 
trust fund would end up in 
the general fund.”  
 414 
 
 
 
Table 9.23-A: HB 640 as Introduced125 
Accounts 
Established 
Total Amount of Settlement Money 
Distributed Between Trusts * 
Allocation and Use of Settlement Fund Money and Earnings in Trusts 
 
Tobacco Settlement 
Trust Fund 
25%** None. 
Louisiana Fund 75% Any purpose. 
*Total percentage after legally required dedications to Bond Security and Redemption Fund and a $10 million dedication to the State’s Children’s Health 
Insurance Program Support Fund. 
**Once the trust reaches $1 billion, all MSA payments and earnings generated by trust are deposited in Louisiana Fund. 
Table 9.23-B: Annual Allocation of Tobacco Settlement Money in HB 640 as Passed by the House125 
Accounts 
Established 
Total Amount of Settlement Money 
Distributed Between Trusts 
Allocation and Use of Settlement Fund Money and Earnings in Trusts. 
TOPS Settlement • 15% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 20% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 25% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and 
onward 
TOPS Scholarship Program. 
Health Trust • 15% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 20% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 25% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and 
onward 
• Providing healthcare to children. 
• Initiatives for chronic disease management. 
• Funding improvements to state healthcare facilities. 
• Funding “pursuit of innovation in advanced health care sciences.” 
• Treatment of tobacco-related diseases. 
Louisiana Fund • 70% of MSA funds in FY 2001 
• 60% of MSA funds in FY 2002 
• 50% of MSA funds in FY 2003 and 
onward 
• Programs supporting youth via healthcare or education: 
o Healthcare research, upgrades for state health care facilities, treatment of 
tobacco-related sicknesses, and treatment of chronic diseases. 
o Education, advertising, cessation, and enforcement initiatives to prevent and 
eliminate tobacco use. 
o Investment expenses from TOPS and Health Trusts. 
*Six specialty schools to receive $250,000 each annually. 
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Table 9.23-C: HB 640 as Passed by the Senate125 
Accounts Established Total Amount of 
Settlement Money 
Distributed 
Between Trusts 
Allocation of Settlement Fund Money and Earnings in Trusts 
Education Trust Fund 50% Account earnings deposited in LEEF Fund 
Louisiana Educational 
Excellence Fund** 
None – Uses 
LEEF Fund 
earnings 
50% Private Schools 15% to Private Education Excellence Fund. 
Specialty Schools $1.5 million.* 
Public School System Funds 30% of remaining funds distributed equally. 
70% of remaining funds distributed based on State’s 
formula for education spending (proportional). 
50% TOPS Scholarship Program 
Education Support 
Fund** 
10% • Entire account given to public school systems annually, based on state’s education spending 
formula (proportional). 
o Appropriations restricted to early childhood education initiatives to help struggling or at-
risk students, or for any other education program approved by lawmakers. 
 
Health and Research 
Fund** 
40% (remaining) 25% “Health science research project grants” selected by Board of Regents. 
75% (requires 
2/3 legislature 
approval) 
• Early intervention initiatives for health and health related issues. 
• Health clinics at schools. 
• Preventing infant mortality. 
• Drug abuse prevention and treatment initiatives. 
• Health insurance for poor children. 
• Preventing teen pregnancy. 
Louisiana Investment 
for Tomorrow Fund***   
 
50% (If LIFT 
Fund replaced 
Education Support 
Fund and Health 
and Research 
Fund) 
Could back state-issued bonds using up to 50% of account balance. 
*Six specialty schools to receive $250,000 each annually. 
**All account earnings (via investing in stocks, bonds, etc) deposited in same fund. 
***Replaced Education Support Fund and Health Care and Research Fund if Legislature Passed 2/3 vote. 
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Table 9.23-D: HB 640 as Adopted125, 168, 169 
Accounts 
Established 
Total Amount of Settlement 
Money Distributed Between 
Trusts 
Allocation of Settlement Fund Money and Earnings in Trusts 
Millennium Fund • 45% of settlement 
funds for FY 2001 
• 60% of settlement 
funds for FY 2002 
• 75% of settlement 
funds for FY 2003 and 
onward 
Education Excellence 
Fund- 33% of money and 
interest from Millennium 
Trust 
• 15% annually to private schools. 
• $75,000 annually to six specialty schools. Also received money based on 
average amount spent on students in public school systems. 
• Public school systems: 
o FY 2001 through FY 2007. 
 30% equally distributed among school systems. 
 70% distributed based upon state education spending formula 
(proportional). 
o FY 2008 and onward. 
 100% distributed based upon state education spending formula 
(proportional). 
 
• Appropriations for construction and renovation projects, employee salary 
increases prohibited. 
 
• Appropriations allowed only for initiatives to improve student 
performance and classes. 
 
• Appropriations may not replace or enhance appropriations from state 
general fund. 
Health Excellence Fund- 
33% of money and interest 
from Millennium Trust 
• School health clinics. 
• Rural health clinics. 
• Primary care clinics. 
• Initiatives to reduce infant mortality. 
• Providing health insurance to children. 
• Initiatives to generate innovation in healthcare sciences 
• Comprehensive chronic disease management services. 
TOPS Fund- 33% of 
money and interest from 
Millennium Trust 
state scholarship programs for higher education (Tuition Opportunity 
Scholarship Program). 
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Louisiana Fund+ • 55% of settlement 
funds for FY 2001 
• 40% of settlement 
funds for FY 2002 
• 25% of settlement 
funds for FY 2003 and 
onward 
• Initiatives to reduce infant mortality. 
• Assisting state initiatives to provide children health insurance. 
• Primary care, rural, and school health clinics. 
• Initiatives to generate innovation in healthcare sciences.  
• To provide comprehensive services for management of chronic disease. 
• To improve state healthcare facilities. 
• Treatment of tobacco-related illnesses.** 
• Tobacco prevention and cessation programming. 
• Tobacco regulatory enforcement. 
+Not a trust. 
*Receives MSA money remaining after allocation to Millennium Fund. 
**Dedication may not surpass 30% of total appropriations from Louisiana Fund in FY 2002. Dedication may not surpass 20% of total appropriations from 
Louisiana Fund for FY 2003 and beyond. 
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prevention, smoking cessation programming, and treatment of tobacco related illnesses qualified 
for money from the Louisiana Fund but were not guaranteed a minimum amount, meaning 
lawmakers could choose not to fund them or vary how much it provided each year for those 
purposes (Table 9.23-D). Ultimately, the State’s Department of Health and Hospitals received 
$500,000 annually from the Louisiana Fund for tobacco control programming.172 
Louisiana Debates Securitizing its Share of the Master Settlement Agreement  
 
In late 1999 and the 2000s, lawmakers in many states debated securitizing their states' 
share of Master Settlement Agreement monies.173 Securitization is the process of states selling 
future payments through bonds in exchange for receiving a much smaller amount of cash 
immediately.174, 175 Investment firms and banks persuaded 18 states and the District of Colombia 
to sell all or part of their future tobacco settlement payments in the early 2000s, including 
Louisiana.176 Securitizing states claimed that they sold their MSA payment stream at a 
discounted rate because they feared tobacco companies might default on future MSA payments 
and decided to obtain a portion of their funds immediately. Bankers warned state legislators that 
the tobacco industry may default on future payments as a result of large court case settlements, 
stricter FDA regulations, and declining sales. Bankers and investment firms used this uncertainty 
to their advantage by buying bonds at a significant discount to cover the risk of default on future 
payments.173 As a result, states that securitized part or all of their MSA payments collected far 
less money according to a 2002 report by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids:  
[A]bout $1.9 billion of the $9.9 billion payment to Ohio [through 2025] would be 
paid to investors and bond firms. Similarly, the New York State counties that 
have securitized are reportedly receiving, on average, only about 40 cents on the 
dollar through 2025 (with one getting only 32 cents). In Washington State, 
projections used by the proponents of the securitization proposal that passed there 
showed that the state will, at best, get less than 38 cents on the dollar – with 
returns of only 25 to 30 cents per dollar more likely according to the state’s 
director of financial management.177 
Debate over securitizing Louisiana’s MSA payments started during fall 1999. In mid-
September, State Treasurer candidate John Kennedy, who previously served as State Revenue 
Secretary, attacked incumbent Treasurer Ken Duncan’s goal of issuing state bonds backed by 
settlement money.178 Duncan’s plan had materialized as the Millennium Leverage Trust created 
in HB 640, which allowed the legislature to dedicate all settlement money to the fund by a two-
thirds vote of each chamber, invest it and provide bonds using the trust. In contrast, Kennedy 
advocated for selling all settlement payments up front for an immediate lump sum. He claimed 
that Duncan’s trust plan was risky because tobacco companies might not make payments.  
Louisianans Vote HB 640 and a New Treasurer into Law 
 
On October 23, 1999, Louisianans approved HB 640’s ballot measure, entering into law 
the multi-trust framework for MSA payments dedicated to education and healthcare funding.179 
Voters also elected John Kennedy Treasurer over incumbent John Duncan.179 In early November, 
Standard and Poor’s, Fitch’s Investment, Moody’s Investment Service, and other financial 
advisors recommended Louisiana sell its MSA settlement for an immediate payment instead of 
risking money on future payments, believing the survivability of the tobacco companies was 
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questionable.179 Louisiana lawmakers did not securitize their state’s expected MSA funds 
following the announcement. However, Louisiana would move to securitize a portion of its 
expected MSA funds in 2001. 
MSA Funds Intended for Tobacco Control Programming are Diverted Because of 2000 
Budget Crisis 
  
As Louisiana officials and lawmakers weighed securitization, in December 2000 the 
Department of Health and Hospitals announced a $126 million budget deficit, prompting an 
unidentified legislative budget committee to direct the agency to not adopt new programming.164 
The order caused DHH not to use the $3 million secured in 1999 (FY 2000) budget bill HB 1 for 
a tobacco control initiative that the agency and CTFLA had proposed as initially planned. A 
portion of tobacco control money was reallocated to Louisiana’s Medicaid Program instead. 
CTFLA Chairman Charles Brown blamed DHH for the lost funds, claiming the agency moved 
too slowly to arrange a legislative committee hearing to discuss the program despite his 
prodding. DHH contested this claim, stating that it would have been irresponsible to launch a 
tobacco control initiative without a stable revenue source.   
 
The fallout over lost funding was an indicator of growing tensions between health 
advocates and DHH that prevented maximal cooperation on tobacco control initiatives for years 
and resulted in the formation of the tobacco control nonprofit the Louisiana Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Living (Chapter 4). Louisiana Coalition for Maternal and Child Health Executive 
Director Sandra Adams, whose organization participated in efforts to secure funding for the 
tobacco control initiative, also decried the lost money.180 After losing the $3 million allotted for 
the tobacco control initiative, DHH Secretary Hood David Hood expected lawmakers to provide 
only $500,000 for tobacco control programming in FY 2001. Afterwards, tobacco control 
programming at the DHH received only $500,000 annually from the Louisiana Fund,172 one of 
the two trusts receiving MSA money. However, in a 2019 interview for this report, former LTCP 
Director Diane Hargrove-Jupiter did not recall DHH’s LTCP receiving recurring state funding 
from the MSA settlement.181 
Louisiana Securitizes 60% of Its Settlement in 2001 
 
Debate over selling Louisiana’s MSA settlement continued into January 2000. Treasurer 
John Kennedy maintained securitizing tobacco payments as a priority entering office.182 
Louisiana officially investigated selling its MSA settlement starting later that month, with 
Governor Foster announcing the formation of a task force to consider and provide 
recommendations on securitizing MSA payments by the 2000 Legislative Session. The panel 
was expected to consist of important lawmakers, State Treasurer John Kennedy, Attorney 
General Richard Ieyoub, and experts from policy nonprofits the Public Affairs Research Council 
and Council for A Better Louisiana. Both state officials and legislators debated securitization 
from early 2000 through most of 2001.  
As debate over selling Louisiana’s settlement continued towards late January 2001, ALA 
of Louisiana’s Ben Fontaine published a letter in the Baton Rouge Advocate attacking Governor 
Mike Foster and state lawmakers. for considering securitization to use MSA money to address 
budget problems instead of to fund tobacco control programming. He chastised the state for not 
already implementing tobacco control programming using MSA payments, asserting: 
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[T]he question we 
should be asking the 
governor and 
legislators is – “Why 
are you not willing to 
use a portion of the 
tobacco settlement to 
help resolve one of 
Louisiana’s most costly 
drains on the annual 
budget – health care for tobacco – related illnesses?”183   
Fontaine posited that tobacco prevention, education and quit initiatives worked. He referenced 
programs in Florida, Massachusetts and California as successful examples.   
CARE, a coalition consisting of Louisiana healthcare businesses and organizations, also 
published a letter in early February pressuring lawmakers and Governor Foster’s administration 
to use MSA money in accordance with HB 640.184 In the letter, CARE Chairman Kyle Ardoin 
urged the administration and legislators not to repurpose settlement money to address 
Louisiana’s budget deficit, finance new projects, or reduce existing debt. According to Ardoin in 
a February 8, 2001 letter published by The Advocate, using settlement money for the budget 
harmed Louisiana’s financial credibility and endangered its residents: 
Using the tobacco settlement money in any way, other than how it was approved 
by the Louisiana Legislature and by an overwhelming 70 percent of voters of our 
state in a constitutional amendment, would jeopardize the state’s improved bond 
rating. More importantly, it could further endanger health care to those already at 
risk in Louisiana.184  
We did not find evidence that other health organizations pushed state officials and lawmakers to 
use funds received from securitization for tobacco control programming. 
After health proponents called for increased tobacco control funding and braced for 
diversion of MSA payments, state lawmakers passed SB 632 by Senator Jay Dardenne (R-Baton 
Rouge185) during the 2001 legislative session to permit Louisiana to securitize at most 60% of its 
MSA settlement.186 SB 632 did not allow funds generated by securitization to be used for general 
spending, requiring they go into the Millennium Fund established for settlement payments by HB 
640 in 1999.187 Lawmakers subsequently created the Tobacco Settlement Financing Corporation 
to validate the state legislature’s sale and provide bonds on behalf of Louisiana.188, 189 The 
corporation was created to insulate the State from legal liability if tobacco companies failed to 
make MSA payments.189 
In November 2001, the state sold $2.4 billion, over half its total MSA payments expected 
over 25 years and the entire amount permitted by SB 632, yielding $1.2 billion in immediate 
money.190 According to the New Orleans Times-Picayune, “[O]f the bond sale total, $917.6 
million will go into the Millennium Trust Fund, and $50 million will go toward health care and 
education expenses. Another $102 million was put aside for grants to schools.”191 The state sold 
over half its MSA income stream expected over 25 years for about 50 cents per dollar. Despite 
calls from health advocates and coalitions in early 2001 for increased tobacco control spending 
“[T]he question we should be asking the 
governor and legislators is – “Why are you not 
willing to use a portion of the tobacco settlement 
to help resolve one of Louisiana’s most costly 
drains on the annual budget – health care for 
tobacco – related illnesses?”  
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using MSA money, funding remained lower than the amount proposed in the FY 2000 budget. 
Governor Mike Foster and his administration planned to focus the money on education 
initiatives. 
Attempt to Securitize the Final 40% of the Master Settlement Agreement in 2007 
 
In early 2007, Governor Kathleen Blanco (D) and her administration considered selling 
the remaining 40% of MSA money expected from the first 25 years of the settlement that the 
state had not securitized. Blanco’s administration hoped to sell the payments for $1 billion in 
immediate funds.192 The Blanco administration planned to dedicate approximately $350 million 
(20%192) of the lump sum to coastal restoration and the remaining amount to the Millennium 
Fund.193 The environmental dedication was required by a 2006 constitutional amendment backed 
by Blanco’s administration194 which stipulated that 20% of money received from securitization 
of remaining MSA payments go towards coastal rehabilitation.195 Voters passed the amendment 
fearing that lawmakers would raid settlement money.195 Louisianans also voted for the 
amendment to provide funds to help address Louisiana’s shrinking coastline, which would 
safeguard against floods194, 196 Louisiana had been devastated by flooding caused two years 
earlier by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The Administration argued securitizing MSA payments 
ensured money upfront that the tobacco industry might not pay in the future.197, 198 Blanco and 
her administration also planned to refinance Louisiana’s 2001 sale of 60% of its settlement 
payments, which would provide the state another $600 million.192 The sale and refinancing 
required approval from the Tobacco Settlement Financing Corporation created to assist the 2001 
securitization.188, 189 
At a meeting in mid-February 2007, 6 members of the 7-person Tobacco Settlement 
Financing Corporation voted to securitize the final 40% of the first 25 years of MSA payments, 
or $2.1 billion,197 for $1 billion in immediate money.192 The Corporation also voted to refinance 
the initial 60% sale of MSA payments, which would provide $600 million to the State. State 
Treasurer John Kennedy, who supported securitization in 2001 and sat on the Corporation, voted 
against selling future MSA monies. Kennedy was skeptical of banking interests’ claims that 
tobacco companies would not make future payments and questioned the constitutionality of the 
securitization since the corporation made short-notice changes to its meeting agenda and did not 
provide adequate public notice.   
 After the Tobacco Settlement 
Financing Corporation approved 
securitizing remaining settlement funds 
from the MSA’s first 25 years, the 
American Heart Association, American 
Cancer Society, and American Lung 
Association mobilized to prevent 
securitization. The organizations sent state 
officials a letter regarding the burden 
tobacco use inflicted on Louisiana and the 
negative impact that selling the state's remaining 40% of settlement funds would have on tobacco 
control funding. Only $500,000 annually of MSA money172 went to the DHH’s Louisiana 
Tobacco Control Program. If the sale occurred, even the $500,000 in annual money for tobacco 
control, which came from the Louisiana Fund, would stop.172 Executive Director of  the 
“While a buyout may yield $1.6 billion 
today, it pales in comparison to the $4.6 
billion over a 25-year, span of the (1998) 
settlement agreement. The health issues 
that come with tobacco use will loom 
over us for many years to come ….” 
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American Lung Association’s Louisiana chapter, Tommy Lotz, argued securitization guaranteed 
that "the opportunity to expand funding [for tobacco control initiatives] would be reduced."198 
Governor Blanco, her chief financial adviser Jerry Luke LeBlanc, State Treasurer John Kennedy, 
and members of the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget and the State Bond Commission 
received letters from the voluntaries. According to the letter signed by Tommy Lotz of ALA, 
Terri Broussard of AHA, and Tara O'Neal Rodriguez of ACS:  
While a buyout may yield $1.6 billion today, it pales in comparison to the $4.6 
billion over a 25-year, span of the (1998) settlement agreement. The health issues 
that come with tobacco use will loom over us for many years to come…. A short-
term financial gain always looks attractive until you examine what may be 
sacrificed in the long term.192 
Debate over securitizing remaining MSA payments lasted until late June 2007, when 
Governor Blanco’s administration ended efforts to have the legislature approve the sale.172 The 
securitization plan had struggled in the legislature according to The Times-Picayune because of 
“opposition from state Treasurer John Kennedy, public health groups and Republican 
legislators.”172 To avoid pushing the resolution on the last day of that year’s legislative session, 
Blanco and her administration dropped the effort. The failed securitization attempt left the 
$500,000 annually allocated from MSA money to tobacco control programming untouched. 
Governor Jindal Diverts MSA Money to TOPS Scholarship Program in 2011 
 
In January 2011, Governor Bobby Jindal (R) announced he would seek a constitutional 
amendment during that year’s legislative session to reallocate $43 million in annual MSA 
payments from the Millennium Trust to the state’s TOPS scholarship program.199 TOPS 
provided tuition to Louisianans that had at least average ACT test scores, graduated high school 
with at least a 2.5 GPA, and were attending in-state higher education institutions. Jindal planned 
to divert cash from the Millennium Trust by limiting the amount of settlement money it could 
receive. By 2018, MSA money given to TOPS would increase to $70 million annually.199, 200 The 
money did not cover all funding required by TOPS, which cost the state $134 million each 
year.201 Jindal sought to divert MSA money to TOPS as Louisiana faced a budget deficit 
resulting primarily from budget cuts enacted in 2007 and 2008.202 
 We did not find evidence that health proponents and voluntaries opposed Jindal’s plan. 
Louisiana is a conservative state, causing health advocates to pursue policy and political 
campaigns strategically and in a more discriminate, stealthy manner, possibly a reason why they 
did not mobilize against the securitization threat. CABL, a public interest and policy nonprofit203 
that advocated for placing settlement payments in a trust during initial debates over MSA fund 
allocation in 1999, supported the Governor’s proposal believing it reduced pressure on the 
general budget, lowered tuition, and provided secure funding for TOPS.204 
 During the 2011 legislative session, the Jindal administration successfully passed SB 53 
to redirect all MSA settlement payments to the TOPS scholarship program after the Millennium 
Fund reached a $1.38 billion cap.200 The bill was amended by Representative Harold Ritchie 
before its adoption to feature a 4-cent per pack cigarette tax renewal that Jindal had vetoed 
earlier in the session (Chapter 11). Lawmakers subsequently passed SB 53 in late June and 
placed it on the ballot. Louisiana voters then approved the constitutional amendment in an 
election that October, shifting MSA money to TOPS.205 The amendment applied to the 
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distribution of MSA payments received after April 1, 2011.205 Reallocation of MSA money to 
TOPS did not affect the annual $500,000 of settlement payments given to DHH for tobacco 
control programming.  
Louisiana Again Considers Securitizing the Remainder of Settlement Funds in 2015 
 
Facing a $1.6 billion structural budget shortfall in 2015, Louisiana reconsidered 
securitizing its remaining tobacco settlement proceeds to get an influx of immediate cash.206 
Governor Jindal proposed borrowing against the remainder of the state’s MSA payments 
expected from the first 25 years to receive a lump sum of approximately $750 million.206 The 
administration wanted securitization to provide 8 years of sustained funding for Louisiana’s 
TOPS program.206 After being notified of the 2006 constitutional amendment requiring that 20% 
of proceeds from MSA payment securitization go towards coastal rehabilitation, Jindal’s 
administration expressed support for funding those programs as well.207 
 The proposal faced opposition from Senate President John Alario, State Treasurer John 
Kennedy, and the Louisiana-based policy nonprofit the Public Affairs Research Council (PAR). 
Senator Alario expressed disdain for the plan to the Baton Rouge Advocate, stating it was a 
“worst-case scenario” for managing the budget crisis.208 Having supported securitization in 
2001206 and opposed securitization in 2007, Treasurer Kennedy argued that selling the remaining 
bonds was a temporary solution costly to taxpayers.208 Kennedy also stated the funds would not 
be legally required to go towards TOPS, that lawmakers would seek the funds for other purposes, 
and as a result the lump sum payment would likely contribute to Louisiana’s structural deficit.206 
According to the Baton Rouge Advocate, PAR asserted Jindal’s proposal was “a method of 
borrowing from the future to pay for today’s expenses.”209 In general, state lawmakers in both 
chambers were uninterested in securitizing remaining MSA payments and avoided considering 
legislation to allow the deal.210, 211  
We did not find evidence that health advocates or voluntaries opposed Jindal’s 
securitization plan.  
Jindal’s securitization proposal failed to gain support, causing it to stall and die. The 
failed securitization of remaining tobacco settlement funds protected the $500,000 in tobacco 
control funding Louisiana annually provided the DHH using MSA payments. 
As of 2019, Louisiana’s remaining 40% of MSA payments had avoided securitization. 
Conclusion 
  
Louisiana became the sixth state to file a lawsuit against the tobacco industry to recoup 
Medicaid funds lost treating tobacco-related illnesses, a move that helped enable the 1998 Master 
Settlement Agreement. After Minnesota’s Attorney General opposed settling with tobacco 
company Liggett and Myers, Louisiana joined Mississippi, Florida, West Virginia, and Texas to 
secure a deal and gain access to documents exposing industry knowledge of nicotine’s 
addictiveness and the harmful effects of tobacco. Louisiana’s legal team included tobacco 
companies’ insurers as defendants in their lawsuit, adding additional pressure on tobacco 
companies to settle. Louisiana’s actions amid multi-state efforts to sue the tobacco industry 
helped secure the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement with the major tobacco companies, curbing 
their marketing practices and providing states billions in additional revenue. 
 424 
 
 Fears of tobacco companies defaulting on payments, and Louisiana’s perpetual budget 
crises, threatened the loss of MSA payment funds to general spending, prevented their use for 
tobacco control, and exposed them to repeated attempts at securitization. As the state prepared to 
allocate funds for FY 2000 amidst a significant budget crisis, the Governor’s administration and 
legislators appropriated all $199 million in initial payments for general expenses or spending 
requirements. Only around $3 million, pushed for by health and tobacco control advocates, was 
dedicated to tobacco control programming in that year’s budget. The $3 million would not be 
spent after Louisiana’s DHH suffered financial problems, and only $500,000 annually was 
ultimately allocated to tobacco control. Forward thinking state lawmakers passed HB 640 in 
1999 to dedicate 70% of MSA payments not incorporated into that year’s general spending into 
the Millennium Trust and Louisiana Fund for health and education initiatives. However, fear of 
tobacco companies defaulting on settlement payments prompted Louisiana lawmakers to sell 
60% of the state’s first 25 years of MSA funds ($2.4 billion) for $1.2 billion in immediate 
money. The sale received limited opposition from health proponents.  
Multiple attempts were made to divert MSA moneys after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In 
2007 Governor Kathleen Blanco’s administration unsuccessfully pursued a sale of remaining 
settlement payments to generate money for coastal restoration efforts. The attempt failed because 
of opposition from health groups, Republican legislators, and the state treasurer. In 2011, 
Governor Bobby Jindal successfully sought reallocation of $43 million ($70 million starting in 
2018) in annual settlement payments from the Millennium Trust to the state’s college scholarship 
program, TOPS. We did not find evidence that advocates opposed the change. During a budget 
crisis in 2015, Governor Jindal sought to sell the remaining 40% of MSA settlement funds 
Louisiana expected the first 25 years after the MSA to fund the TOPS program. Despite the lack 
of opposition we found from health proponents, the proposal failed to win support. By defending 
MSA payments from future raids, health advocates can ensure money is not diverted from health 
programming and can advocate for more of the funds to go towards tobacco control 
programming. 
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Chapter 10:  Clean Indoor Air Part. 2: Partial Repeal of 
Local Preemption and the State Clean Air Law during the 
2000s 
 
• Comprehensive local smokefree ordinances were stalled by state preemption for 10 years 
between 1993 and 2003. 
• Louisiana tobacco control advocates developed increased capacity and coordination, 
allowing them to partially reverse state preemption of smokefree air laws covering 
workplaces and restaurants without alcohol licenses in 2003. 
• Tobacco control advocates passed 14 local ordinances between 2004 and late June 2006. 
• Passage of local ordinances built momentum for a state law passed in 2006 that prohibited 
smoking in most public places and workplaces and completely repealed preemption. 
 
After the Industry Accommodation Laws (1993-2003) 
 
1999 and 2001 Efforts to Repeal Preemption of State Agency and Local Smoking Restrictions 
Stronger than State Law 
 
Concerted campaigns by tobacco control advocates to reinstate local control over 
smoking restrictions started in 1999.2 That year, the Louisiana Municipal League and the 
Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana (CTFLA), which consisted of state and national health 
voluntaries, backed HB 1452 by Representative William Daniel (D-Baton Rouge) and SB 839 by 
Senator Jon Johnson (D-New Orleans). The bills sought to eliminate preemption of smokefree 
laws by local governments as well as smokefree regulations by state agencies and political 
subdivisions that were stronger than state law.2-5 
 
HB 1452 allowed state agencies, local governments, and “other political subdivisions” to 
enact stronger smoking restrictions than state law except for on school property and hospitals.4 
State lawmakers had previously passed legislation in 1992 to prohibit smoking on school 
property and school buses (only when students were present), except for in designated smoking 
areas on campuses (Chapter 5). That same year, lawmakers passed legislation to prohibit 
smoking in enclosed hospital spaces except for in ventilated smoking areas and in patient rooms 
with approval from patient occupants and a doctor’s order (Chapter 5).6 
 
SB 839 permitted state agencies, local governments, and political subdivisions to enact 
general smoking restrictions stronger than state law.5  
Senator Daniel’s bill was referred to the House Health and Welfare Committee and 
Senator Johnson’s bill to the Senate Commerce Committee where both died upon adjournment 
after being deferred.2, 4, 5, 7 Lobbyists representing the tobacco, liquor, bar, and restaurant 
industries argued that Daniel’s bill made private places vulnerable to stronger smoking 
restrictions.7 Although unsuccessful, tobacco control advocates maintained CTFLA to pursue 
tobacco control policies. 
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Tobacco control advocates subsequently supported preemption repeal bills HB 1073 and 
SB 427 in 2001. HB 1073, introduced by Representative Hunt Downer (R-Houma) and Sydnie 
May Durand (D-St. Martinville8), permitted localities, state agencies and political subdivisions to 
adopt smokefree ordinances stronger than state law.9, 10 SB 427, introduced by Senator Jon 
Johnson (D-New Orleans), also allowed local governments, state agencies and political 
subdivisions to adopt smoking restrictions tougher than  state law.11 The Louisiana Restaurant 
Association and Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association, both historic allies of the tobacco industry 
(Chapter 2), lobbied against the bills in the state legislature.9, 12 The Louisiana Wholesale Food 
and Tobacco Distributors Association (LWTCDA), another industry ally (Chapter 2), fought SB 
427 claiming that Senator Johnson’s legislative record on tobacco control indicated he would 
seek further restrictions if the bill passed.12 We do not know if  LWTCDA actively fought HB 
1073. The American Cancer Society (ACS) and American Lung Association (ALA) supported 
HB 1073.13 We do not know if health voluntaries backed SB 427. 
Neither HB 1073 nor SB 427 passed. Representative Downer returned HB 1073 to 
calendar on April 23 where it died without additional consideration. He returned the bill after 
Representative Melinda Schwegmann (D-New Orleans) secured an amendment on the House 
Floor to exempt bars and restaurants from local smoking restrictions.13 In an April 24 article in 
the Baton Rouge Advocate, Downer told the press, “I’m a realist. When a bill’s been gutted, 
there’s no sense in going forward with it.”13 The House Health and Welfare Committee 
subsequently rejected SB 427 at a hearing on June 5, 2001 despite previously approving HB 
1073.12 
CTFLA Reorganizes in 2001 and Prepares to Pursue Preemption Repeal 
 
Utilizing a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation and matching funds from the American 
Cancer Society (ACS), American Heart Association 
(AHA), and ALA, the Louisiana Public Health Institute 
(LPHI) revived the CTFLA coalition in 2001 to 
advocate for and pursue tobacco control policy 
objectives in Louisiana.1 Advocates initially used 
CTFLA to help secure a 12 cent tax increase on 
cigarette packs in 2002,1 which created recurring funding for the state’s future nonprofit tobacco 
control program the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL) (Chapter 11). CTFLA 
then focused on repealing preemption over local smoking restrictions. 
Between 2002 and 2003, CTFLA established a framework for its operations. The 
coalition sought to conduct “strategic planning, membership outreach and recruitment, outreach 
to local and state officials, passage of local resolutions, public relations and media campaigns, 
and training and technical assistance” of local governments and health advocates to repeal 
preemption.1 According to a 2003 presentation by CTFLA members, in 2002 the coalition 
formed a process to develop a strategic plan on preemption repeal:  
 
• Convene steering committee for a strategic planning session 
• Identify key competency areas for plan development and related tasks 
• Assign timelines to identified tasks 
… the Louisiana Public Health 
Institute (LPHI) revived the 
CTFLA to advocate for and 
pursue tobacco control policy 
objectives. 
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• Assign staff member and steering committee representatives with 
responsibility for each task 
• Present Strategic Plan to full Coalition for review and endorsement.1 
 
CTFLA organized quarterly meetings to train and disseminate information to partners. The 
coalition onboarded both an advocacy and policy coordinator to steer its tobacco control policy 
efforts1 and two additional people to conduct statewide outreach.  
 
During 2002 and 2003, CTFLA developed and trained a community and advocacy base 
to support preemption repeal. The coalition worked with Louisiana Tobacco Control Program 
(LCTP) grant recipients to find potential supporters across the state.1 CTFLA also developed a 
postcard program to guide advocates and supporters. Training and technical assistance activities 
for advocates included hosting a Midwest Academy training, developing a “Local Action Kit” 
for restoring local control, training supporters at the state capitol to effectively communicate with 
lawmakers, and educating partners receiving state and federal funding on what constitutes 
lobbying.1 As a result, the Coalition developed a network of grassroots followers effective at 
increasing public awareness and pressure for preemption repeal. 
 
 In 2002 and 2003, CTFLA contacted politicians, local lawmakers and political 
organizations to recruit their support and generate political pressure for restoring local control 
over smoking restrictions. The coalition worked with the Louisiana Municipal Association to 
gauge local legislators’ sentiments towards preemption repeal. CTFLA also used its letter 
initiative to generate over 1000 letters to lawmakers supporting local smoking restrictions.1 In 
addition, CTFLA attended the Louisiana Municipal Association and Black Mayors Association’s 
annual conferences to get signatures for its preemption repeal petition.  Collaborating with local 
groups and ACS, CTFLA obtained over 30 resolutions from local governments calling for 
preemption repeal.1 
  
CTFLA planned and implemented a multifaceted media campaign to generate support for 
preemption repeal. The coalition ran a paid print and television media campaign complimented 
by earned media during the 2003 legislative session while it pursued preemption repeal bill SB 
901.1 CTFLA specifically aired print and television ads to coincide with key dates during the 
legislative process.1 CTFLA hired a media consultant to assist publicity efforts and a national 
firm to produce media for them through a partnership with the Department of Health and 
Hospital’s (DHH) LTCP. The coalition also sponsored the Gubernatorial Candidate Forum at an 
annual conference held by the Louisiana Medical Society.1 
 
Besides calling for local control in campaign messaging, CTFLA asserted the tobacco 
industry lobbied lawmakers in 1993 to establish preemption and prevent local governments from 
protecting people against secondhand smoke exposure. In a 2003 opinion editorial in the Baton 
Rouge Advocate, CTFLA Director Al Hannah argued:   
 
The law [1993 preemption of smoking restrictions (Chapter 5)] not only 
guarantees that children are exposed to dangerous tobacco smoke, but promotes 
children's perception that smoking is part of normal adult behavior. When a 
community enacts a smokefree ordinance, it reduces the toxins children breathe 
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and sends a consistent signal to our children that tobacco is deadly. That's why the 
tobacco industry doesn't want your community to have power to develop local 
ordinances on smoking.14 
 
Local Control Partially Restored in 2003: SB 901  
 
SB 901 As Introduced in 2003 Legislative Session 
 
On CTFLA’s behalf, Senator Jon Johnson (D-New Orleans) introduced SB 901 to 
eliminate preemption over local smoking restrictions on March 28, 2003.15,16 The bill permitted 
local governments, state agencies and other political subdivisions to set smoking restriction laws 
and regulations as strict or stronger than state law.15 SB 901 did not specify penalties for 
violating local smoking restrictions and did not require local governments to establish 
punishments, but allowed them to do so. 
   
Proponent Strategy for Passage of SB 901 
 
Anticipating opposition from the tobacco industry and its allies, CTFLA increased its 
visibility at the state capitol and held educational and lobbying events targeting lawmakers to 
pass SB 901. The coalition hired a contract lobbyist to lead lobbying efforts. CTFLA established 
a policy that at least one lobbyist from ACS and AHA, or the CTFLA’s Policy and Advocacy 
Manager be present at the Capitol in an effort to counter the influence of lobbyists from the 
tobacco companies and its third-party allies in the restaurant and gaming industries. CTFLA 
hosted legislative breakfasts and dinners with key caucuses and committees to educate 
lawmakers on the importance of restoring local control.1 In mid-April, early in the legislative 
session, CTFLA Director Al Hannah promoted restoring local control over smoking restrictions 
at a Baton Rouge Press Club Luncheon.17 CTFLA maintained contact with key lawmakers to 
ensure their commitment to and understanding of preemption repeal and clean air regulation. 
Before SB 901 received consideration, Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights (ANR) issued an 
action alert on April 17, 2003 urging state lawmakers to adopt the bill and repeal preemption.18 
The action alert criticized state legislators for previously protecting tobacco industry interests 
instead of Louisianan’s health by passing preemption over local smoking restrictions in 1993 
(Chapter 5): 
 
In 1993 the Louisiana Legislature took a big step backwards by uniting with Big 
Tobacco. That was the year that the state legislature passed a law that stripped 
away the ability of local communities to protect nonsmokers from secondhand 
smoke. A decade has passed in which Louisianans were needlessly subjected to 
the death and disease caused by secondhand smoke. That is ten years too long.18 
 
ANR asserted local smokefree laws reduced the social acceptability of tobacco use, improved 
public health, and increased tobacco education. ANR also argued the tobacco industry disliked 
local smoke free laws because they “spread from community to community” and received public 
support.18 The action alert provided recipients contact information for Louisiana lawmakers and 
the Governor to request their support for repealing preemption over local smoking restrictions. 
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The alert also asked recipients to write letters favoring preemption repeal to Baton Rouge 
Advocate.18 
 
Opposition to SB 901 
 
The tobacco industry primarily partnered with the Louisiana Restaurant Association 
(LRA) and the gaming industry to fight SB 901. To combat CTFLA’s “restore local control" 
message, opponents argued smoking restrictions harmed businesses and that local level 
governments lacked authority to interfere with private business. In an opinion editorial published 
by The Advocate early in the legislative session on April 23, LRA’s Eric Sunstrom:  
 
The state's pre-emption law of 1993 is a business issue. After all, who knows 
better how to accommodate the dining preferences than the owner of an 
establishment? Louisiana has the best restaurants in the country, and we should be 
able to offer a choice to all patrons, those who wish to smoke and those who do 
not. Owners are typically small-business people who have their life savings 
invested in restaurants. The loss of revenue from one smoke-free municipality to a 
smoking municipality would be felt by the business and employees making a 
living in the restaurant. Louisiana doesn't need 360 different smoking laws, one 
for every incorporated municipality in the state.19 
 
Claims used by opponents reflected traditional tobacco industry economic harm20 and freedom of 
choice21 arguments. 
 
Lawmakers also argued against SB 901 using tobacco industry talking points created to 
deter smokefree restrictions in restaurants and other businesses. Representative Mickey Frith (D-
Abbeville), a restaurant owner, argued for the installation of expensive ventilation systems to 
accommodate smoking in restaurants in mid-April at the same Press Club of Baton Rouge 
luncheon attended by CTFLA Director Al Hannah.17, 22 The tobacco industry has promoted 
ventilation systems as solutions to allow indoor smoking, despite their ineffectiveness at 
protecting public health.23 Senator Butch Gautreaux (D-Morgan City) also publicly opposed 
smoking restrictions, stating they were a choice for businesses and not the government during 
legislative debate of SB 901.24  
 
SB 901 in the Legislature 
  
The Senate Health and Welfare Committee heard SB 901 on April 23, 2003.15 Tobacco 
control advocates heavily attended the hearing, with ACS activists in blue shirts marked "Help 
Us Restore Local Control" and hundreds of others appearing to show their support for 
preemption repeal.16 CTFLA Director Al Hannah testified in favor of SB 901, asserting that 
1,600 local governments nationwide had pursued smoking restrictions and that attempts would 
continue.22 
 
Tobacco-industry allied trade groups and a lawmaker opposed preemption repeal at the 
hearing. Louisiana Restaurant Association Executive Vice President Jim Funk, Representative 
and restaurant owner Michael Frith (D-Abbeville), and lobbyists from the Louisiana Hotel-Motel 
 430 
 
Association and the tobacco industry attended.22, 25 Funk asserted to the committee that SB 901 
robbed restaurateurs of choice and unfairly singled out the restaurant industry for regulation. 
Providing the same claim, Representative Frith testified that smoking restrictions are a choice for 
businesses to adopt and not for the government to impose.22 The Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee voted unanimously to report SB 901 to the Senate without changes despite the 
arguments made by opponents.22, 25 
 
 Senators considered SB 901 during Senate on April 30, 2003. Senator Butch Gautreaux 
(D-Morgan City) spoke against SB 901, arguing that businesses should decide to impose 
smoking restrictions and not the government.24 During debate Senators rejected amendments 
circumscribing the ability of local governments to penalize violations of local smoking 
restrictions. As introduced, SB 901 did not establish penalties for violating local smoking 
restrictions and did not require local governments to impose penalties, but allowed them to set 
penalties for infractions without restriction.15 Senator Fred Hoyt (D-Abbeville) unsuccessfully 
proposed two amendments requiring local governments to punish infractions that limited the 
potential fines they could levy.15 His first amendment permitted fines ranging from $250-$500 
and the second $25-$1000. Senator Art Lentini (R-Metairie) offered and withdrew a similar 
amendment that required local governments to impose fines for smoking restriction violations 
but limited them to a $25-$50 range. 
After debating and considering amendments to SB 901, Senators voted 31 to 5 to send the 
bill to the House unchanged.15, 24 
The House Health and Welfare Committee considered SB 901 at a hearing on May 28, 
2003.15 At the meeting, committee members amended the bill to retain state preemption over 
smoking in bars, gaming facilities, restaurants serving liquor, guest rooms at hotels, and tobacco 
retailers.15, 26 SB 901’s sponsor, Senator Jon Johnson, accepted the amendment claiming it 
honored an  agreement with unknown parties to pass SB 901 through the Senate.29 He stated the 
amendment was also designed to assuage the Louisiana Restaurant Association.26 At the hearing, 
Representative B.L. Shaw (R-Shreveport) opposed exempting restaurants serving liquor, 
believing “restaurants should be free of cigarette smoke.”26 Shaw tried to remove the restaurant 
exemption but failed to convince committee members. The Committee then voted 13 to 0 to send 
SB 901 to the House Floor.15 Despite the House Health and Welfare Committee adding 
preemption exemptions, CTFLA Director Al Hannah lauded the panel for passing SB 901.26 
 
The House debated SB 901 on June 1 and June 5, 2003 (Table 10.1). Representative Gil 
Pinac unsuccessfully proposed amending SB 901 to require that local governments penalize 
offenses of local smoking restrictions.15 Like previous amendments offered by Senators Hoyt 
and Lentini in the Senate, Pinac’s offer limited penalties local governments could levy, 
permitting fines ranging from $25 to $1000 (to be chosen by local governments) for violations.15 
Representatives rejected Pinac’s proposal, leaving SB 901 without a local enforcement 
requirement and without restrictions on penalties that local governments could establish for 
infractions. As a result, local governments did not have to enforce their own smoking 
restrictions, but could set any penalties for infractions that they desired. Representative Daniel 
Martiny, who received the third-highest amount of tobacco industry campaign contributions 
between 1983-2015 (Chapter 3),27 proposed amending SB 901 on the House Floor to make its 
contents “null, void, and of no effect on August 15, 2004” but withdrew the amendment.15 
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Other unsuccessful attempts to amend SB 901 on the House Floor revolved around 
entirely preempting local control over all restaurants or allowing local smoking restrictions over 
them (including those serving alcohol). SB 901 was previously amended by the House Health 
and Welfare Committee to preempt local smoking restrictions over restaurants with liquor 
licenses. Representative Jeff Arnold (D-Algiers) introduced an amendment excluding all 
restaurants from the preemption repeal instead of just those serving alcohol.15, 26 In contrast, 
Representative B.L. Shaw (R-Shreveport) proposed allowing local governments to impose 
smoking restrictions on all restaurants.26 Representative Sydnie Mae Durand (D-Parks) 
convinced representatives to reject both amendments, preserving the concessions made on SB 
901 in the House Health and Welfare Committee, which she chaired.26  
 
 The House approved two amendments to SB 901 during Floor debate.15 Representative 
William Daniel (D-Baton Rouge) secured language declaring that private offices staffed 
completely by smokers and offices in private residences, which were exempt from smoking 
restrictions set by the 1993 Louisiana Office Clean Indoor Air Law (Chapter 5), remained 
preempted from local smoking restrictions. Representative Joseph Toomy (R-Gretna) obtained 
an amendment stating that SB 901 did not affect the status of local smoking ordinances passed 
before the implementation of Louisiana’s 1993 smoking accommodation bill (Chapter 5). 
 
Representatives voted 83 to 14 to pass SB 901 and returned the bill to the Senate for final 
approval.15 As passed by the House, SB 901 lifted state preemption of local smoking restrictions 
except over bars, casinos, restaurants with liquor licenses, hotel guest rooms, and tobacco 
retailers (Table 10.1). SB 901 completely repealed preemption until the House Health and 
Welfare Committee added exemptions (Table 10.1). Following the vote, health advocates at the 
capitol thanked lawmakers for supporting smoking restrictions. Advocates that were not at the 
capitol instead called and emailed lawmakers to express their gratitude. 
 
Table 10.1: SB 901 as it Passed through the Louisiana State Legislature15 
  Original Senate 
Committee 
Senate 
Floor 
House 
Committee 
House 
Floor 
Final 
Date  3/28/2003 4/23/2003 4/30/2003 5/28/2003 6/01/2003 6/20/2003 
Scope of 
Preemption 
Public Places Full -- -- Full -- Full 
Restaurants Full -- -- Partial* -- Partial 
Bars Full -- -- No -- No 
Hotel Rooms Full -- -- No -- No 
Gaming 
Establishments 
Full -- -- No ---- No 
Tobacco 
Retailers 
Full -- -- No  No 
Enforcement 
Requirements 
 None -- -- -- -- None 
*Restaurants with liquor licenses exempted from local control. 
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CTFLA continued supporting SB 901 after it passed the House because they viewed it as 
progress although it failed to fully repeal preemption.16 
According to a June 6, 2003 Times-Picayune article, 
Denise Bottcher, a principal reporter to CTFLA’s 
Steering Committee, stated that “It [SB 901] was 
definitely a compromise bill, but one we feel we could 
work with.”16 Disappointed that “special interests had 
the power to block certain environments,” Bottcher 
asserted that CTFLA planned to repeal remaining 
exemptions for restaurants that served alcohol and bars 
the following year if SB 901 passed.16   
 
The Senate unanimously approved House amendments to SB 901 on June 10, 2003 and 
sent the bill to Governor Mike Foster (R), who signed it into law on June 20, 2003. 15 Although 
SB 901 failed to fully repeal preemption, it enabled tobacco control advocates and CTFLA to 
pursue local clean air ordinances covering most public places as well as restaurants without 
liquor licenses, which helped increase awareness and support for a future statewide smokefree air 
law. 
 
The Louisiana Legislature Bans Smoking in New Orleans’ Professional Arenas (SB 869) 
  
Besides filing SB 901, Senator Jon Johnson introduced SB 869 in late March to prohibit 
smoking in all areas of the Superdome and to allow the commission in charge of the stadium to 
establish rules for ejecting patrons that continued offending the law after being warned.28 
Smoking was prohibited in the Superdome’s arena area but allowed in other sections of the 
stadium by a 1986 state law (Chapter 5). We did not find evidence that health advocates or the 
tobacco industry lobbied lawmakers on SB 869 or ran campaigns to promote their agenda around 
it. The Superdome’s general manager29 and its managing organization30 both supported the bill. 
SB 869 passed without amendment and without resistance,28 and was signed into law on June 27, 
2003 by Governor Mike Foster. SB 869 entered effect August 15, 2003. 
 
2004 Efforts to Pass SmokeFree Legislation at the State Level 
 
2004 Statewide SmokeFree Restaurants Legislation Fails 
  
In March 2004, Representative Austin Badon (D-New Orleans) prefiled HB 249 to 
prohibit smoking in all Louisiana restaurants.31 He filed the legislation because his constituents 
desired smokefree restaurants.32 The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals supported 
HB 249 since it considered secondhand smoke dangerous for employees.33 The Louisiana 
Restaurant Association opposed the bill, with its Director Jim Funk stating that the law was 
unnecessary since most eateries were already smokefree.32 Funk claimed that the existing law 
regarding smoking in restaurants, which allowed establishments to create smoking sections or 
allow smoking in all areas if alcohol sales comprised more than 50% of their sales (Chapter 5), 
was adequate.32 We did not find evidence that TFL or CTFLA supported or actively promoted 
HB 249.  
 
… the CTFLA planned to 
repeal remaining exemptions 
for restaurants that served 
alcohol and bars the 
following year if SB 901 
passed.  
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 HB 249 died with adjournment after the House Health and Welfare Committee deferred 
the bill at a hearing on May 27, 2004.34 As discussion of HB 249 started, Badon told the 
committee his bill did not cause economic harm to tourism or restaurants and was important for 
protecting public health. Committee Chair Sydnie Mae Durand (D-Parks) called for and secured 
a unanimous dismissal of HB 249 by arguing that the 2003 partial preemption repeal should 
receive additional time to have effect.  
 
Bill to Prohibit Smoking in Schools and Childcare Centers Fails 
  
On April 20, 2004, Senator Lydia Jackson (D-Shreveport) introduced SB 863 to prohibit 
smoking in smokefree zones, defined as on or within 1000 feet of all public and private school 
property, including trade schools, colleges and universities.35 SB 863 also prohibited smoking on 
school buses, in and around community centers owned by quasi-public agencies, and in and 
around licensed day care centers. Smoking where prohibited  carried a $100 maximum fine, 
while trying to cover or damage smokefree zone signage faced up to a $1000 fine and at most a 6 
month jail sentence. Jackson modeled SB 863 after legislation to keep drugs off of campuses.36 
 
We did not find evidence that health or tobacco control advocates helped develop or 
promote SB 863. However, unrelated to efforts to pass the bill, TFL met with the Louisiana 
Department of Education to discuss the benefits of making school campuses tobacco-free. We 
did not find evidence that the tobacco industry opposed the bill. 
 
The Senate Health and Welfare Committee considered SB 863 on May 5, 2004.35 During 
the hearing, committee members approved amendments that eliminated the 1000 foot buffer 
around smokefree zones and removed trade schools as well as higher education institutions from 
the bill’s smoking restrictions. The committee also changed smokefree zones to forbid 
consumption of any form of tobacco. As amended, SB 863 only made the property of public and 
private primary and secondary schools, school buses, community centers, and licensed day care 
centers tobacco-free zones but did not establish tobacco-free areas around them. The committee 
subsequently sent SB 863 to the Senate Floor. 
SB 863 died after finding some success in the Senate. Senators passed SB 863 
unanimously after it left committee. However, the bill died with adjournment after the House 
failed to consider it.  
State Lawmakers Prohibit Smoking at the University of New Orleans’ Arena 
  
On April 20, 2004 Representative Charmaine Marchand (D-New Orleans) introduced HB 
1603 to prohibit use of any combustible form of tobacco at the Senator Nat G. Kiefer University 
of New Orleans Lakefront Arena.37 HB 1603 required university staff to notify offenders they 
were violating smoking restrictions. The bill permitted the Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College Board of Supervisors to create rules to remove individuals 
violating the smoking prohibition despite receiving an initial warning. We did not find evidence 
that health advocates or the tobacco industry worked to advance or defeat HB 1603. The 
Louisiana State Legislature passed HB 1603 without amendments and Governor Kathleen 
Blanco signed it into law on June 25. The bill entered effect August 15, 2004.  
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The State Capitol Goes Smokefree (SCR 132) 
 
 On May 27, 2004, Senator Joel Chaisson II introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 132 
to direct the leaders of Louisiana’s House and Senate, as well as the governor, to make the state 
capitol a smokefree area.36, 38 As a resolution, SCR 132 did not make smoking illegal at the 
capitol, but tasked the legislature and governor with instituting a smokefree policy there.36 ACS 
and other voluntary health organizations endorsed SCR 132.36 We do not know if they lobbied or 
promoted SCR 132. We did not find evidence that the tobacco industry worked to affect SCR 
132’s outcome. The resolution faced minimal opposition and passed on June 21, 2004.38 The 
resolution effectively required that the Capitol be made smokefree.36 
The Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living Attempts to Educate the Restaurant 
Industry about Smoking Restrictions 
 
 The Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL), a state-funded tobacco control 
nonprofit formed in 2004 (Chapter 4), began assisting efforts by health advocates and CTFLA in 
2004 and 2005 to fully repeal preemption and obtain a comprehensive smokefree law.. In 2004 
and 2005, TFL ran a booth at the LRA’s trade convention to educate attendees about smoking 
restrictions.39 TFL Director Tom Houston (Chapter 4) also met with LRA Executive Director Jim 
Fink to counter tobacco industry claims that smoking restrictions cause economic harm and to 
inform him of the harmful health impacts of secondhand smoke.39 Despite their meeting, LRA 
continued opposing smoking restrictions. Houston and other TFL employees also met with 
prominent New Orleans Chef  Paul Prudhomme, who ran smokefree restaurants, to have him 
privately persuade restaurateurs to adopt smokefree policies.39 According to Houston in a 2019 
email to us for this report, TFL “did not ask him to become a public face for clean indoor air 
initiatives, but rather to help us behind the scenes.”39 We do not know if Prudhomme urged other 
restaurateurs to institute smoking restrictions.  
 
Tobacco Control Coalition Meets at Annual Summit to Organize Statewide Strategy for a 
New Smokefree Law 
 
TFL hosted a Tobacco-Free Living Summit on March 23, 2005 at the Southern 
University School of Nursing where public health advocates gathered to discuss the political 
landscape, consider policies passed in other states, and apply lessons learned to Louisiana. The 
TFL Summit prioritized statewide and local goals, including: 
 
• Reduction of exposure to secondhand smoke 
• Reduction of tobacco use initiation among youth 
• Promotion of cessation among adult and youth 
• Coordination of efforts statewide40  
 
At the summit, health advocates discovered they needed to challenge common tobacco industry 
arguments on adverse economic effects of smokefree laws in the media. Dr. Stanton Glantz, 
director of the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the University of 
California, San Francisco (and a coauthor of this report), participated in the summit, informing 
attendees they must combat industry arguments regarding the effects of clean indoor air on 
business. After passage of smokefree policies in restaurants, evidence indicated no effect or a 
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positive effect on sales.41 In a 2005 article published in 
Baton Rouge Advocate, Glantz asserted to attendees:  
 
As for the claims of smoking ban opponents that 
tourism will suffer once restaurants and bars go 
smokefree…a lie repeated enough times 
becomes the truth.41 
  
To create a favorable policy environment for 
smokefree legislation, TFL began a four-part plan in 
2005 to increase public attention and support for smoking restrictions. TFL regional coordinators 
and TFL's grantees educated the public about secondhand smoke exposure, encouraged adoption 
of voluntary smokefree policies in workplaces, homes, and cars, urged restaurants to adopt 
voluntary smokefree policies, and called on nonsmokers to avoid establishments allowing 
smoking to foster norm change and generate momentum for smoking restriction legislation.40 
 
Gaining Momentum: 14 Cities Enact Smokefree Laws (2005-2006)  
  
After preemption was partially repealed in 2003, health advocates and TFL worked to 
pass local smokefree ordinances. Before adoption of the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act in 2006, 
fourteen cities passed local smokefree laws restricting smoking in public places, government 
buildings, workplaces, and restaurants without liquor licenses.42-44 The first local laws passed in 
Shreveport, Mandeville, Sulphur and Lafayette.  
 
Shreveport Adopts the First Local Ordinance after SB 901 in 2005 
 
Shreveport adopted the first local clean indoor air ordinance in Louisiana after the 2003 
partial preemption repeal in April 2005.45 Shreveport Councilmember Jeff Hogan introduced the 
smoking restriction measure, Ordinance 37, on March 21, 2005.46, 47 Hogan developed the 
legislation with assistance from ACS48 and AHA.49 Ordinance 37 prohibited smoking in banks, 
malls, retailers, waiting rooms, government facilities, arenas, restaurants, banks and other public 
places.47, 50 The legislation did not affect places still preempted by state law (bars, casinos, hotel 
guest rooms and restaurants serving alcohol).50 Ordinance 37 also covered parks and 
playgrounds.51 After giving Logan’s legislation consideration on March 22, the Council voted 6-
0 (with one absent) to debate the measure on April 12, 2005.49 
 
TFL and health advocates supported Ordinance 37. TFL ran a secondhand smoke media 
campaign during Spring 2005 consisting of television, outdoor, radio, print, movie, and online 
advertisements that generated approximately 67 million  impressions in Shreveport alone 
regarding the dangers of secondhand smoke.51 The Shreveport ad blitz was part of a statewide 
campaign ran in numerous Louisiana cities and generated almost 410 million overall impressions 
that spring. TFL Director Tom Houston and TFL staff also traveled to vital cities to discuss the 
importance of smokefree air with newspaper editorial boards and employees at television 
stations. According to comments by Ordinance 37 sponsor Jeff Hogan at an April 12 hearing, he 
did not expect the advertising run to occur while pursuing his legislation.49 Health organization 
“As for the claims of smoking 
ban opponents that tourism 
will suffer once restaurants 
and bars go smokefree … a lie 
repeated enough times 
becomes the truth.”  
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officials, medical professionals, as well as TFL  and health voluntary staff also attended hearings 
to persuade the Shreveport City Council to adopt Ordinance 37 (Table 10.2).  
 
The Shreveport City Council considered Ordinance 37 on April 12, 2005.49 Eight 
proponents testified in favor of the measure at the hearing, including medical professionals, 
health organization officials, health voluntary representatives, and a TFL steering committee 
chair (Table 10.2). Supporters informed the Council of tobacco’s harmful and deadly toll, the 
economic impacts of smoking and smokefree laws, and asserted people had a right to breathe 
smokefree air (Table 10.2). Three Louisianans argued against the ordinance using a mix of 
freedom of choice arguments and personal or property rights assertions commonly used by the 
tobacco industry (Table 10.2). 
 
 After hearing comments on Ordinance 37, Councilmember Mike Gibson introduced an 
amendment to replace the measure with substitute legislation.49 We do not know the content of 
Gibson’s replacement ordinance. Another Councilmember subsequently called for consideration 
of the ordinance and Gibson’s proposal to be delayed until April 26, 2005, which the Shreveport 
City Council approved unanimously with one absence.  
 
 Following the April 12 hearing, skeptics of Ordinance 37 voiced concern about acting on 
or approving the measure. Shreveport City Council Chairman Mike Gibson suggested tabling the 
measure to form a committee and have it analyze the legislation.47 Hogan publicly resisted the 
motion, arguing the last legislation tabled subsequently had its consideration delayed for months. 
The Shreveport City Council ultimately did not form a committee to review Councilmember 
Hogan’s ordinance. Shreveport’s restaurant community publicly complained about the measure, 
with two restaurant owners telling the Baton Rouge Advocate that smoking restrictions put them 
at a competitive disadvantage with eateries serving alcohol.47  
 
 The Shreveport City Council considered Ordinance 37 on April 26, 2005.49 Physician and 
health organization official Philip Roseman, TFL Region VII Manager Feamula Bradley, and 
five members of the public provided comments supporting the measure during the meeting 
(Table 10.3). Two people spoke against Ordinance 37 (Table 10.3). 
  
 The Shreveport City Council considered 8 amendments after hearing public testimony 
(Table 10.4). The only one that passed required smoking signs to state that smoking was 
prohibited in Shreveport and identify the specific ordinance creating the law (Ordinance 37). 
 
Councilmembers first considered Amendment 8 from Ordinance 37 sponsor Jeff Hogan 
(Table 10.4). The Councilmember offered the change to assuage Councilmember Gibson and 
another unspecified individual’s concern over Festival Plaza being incorporated into smoking 
restrictions. He also proposed the change to address concerns regarding smoking restrictions on 
golf courses. After Hogan introduced Amendment 8, Councilmembers Jackson and Lester voiced 
opposition to excluding Festival Plaza and golf courses from smoking restrictions. Gibson stated 
that Festival Plaza was a significant investment for Shreveport that provided the city money, 
implying he wanted it exempted because of negative economic impacts he anticipated from 
smoking restrictions. Hogan defended the amendment as a concession designed to secure 
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Table 10.2: Comments at First Hearing (Second Reading) for Ordinance 3749 
Pro or Anti 
Ordinance 
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Pro Dr. Philip 
Roseman 
Region VII Healthcare 
Consortium Chairman 
+ +  +        
Cardiologist 
Past President of Alliance 
for Education 
Willis Knighton Health 
Systems board member 
Jerry Jones Unaffiliated     + +      
Dr. Jerry 
McLarty 
Feist Weiller Cancer Center 
Director of Cancer 
Prevention and Control 
+   +        
TFL Steering Committee 
member 
Allison May Unaffiliated +  + +        
Dr. Peter 
Boggs 
Physician and Allergist +   +        
Norma 
Candler 
Unaffiliated  +       +    
Alison Trotter American Heart Association 
Youth Market Director 
+   +    +    
Jim 
Healthman 
Unaffiliated           + 
Anti Paige Ham Unaffiliated       +  +   
Martha 
Belchic 
Unaffiliated +  +       +  
Ronald Toney Unaffiliated       +     
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Table 10.3: Comments at Second Hearing (Third and Final Reading) for Ordinance 3749 
Pro or Anti 
Ordinance 
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To
ba
cc
o 
Sm
ok
e 
is 
D
ea
dl
y 
/ H
ar
m
fu
l 
To
ba
cc
o 
Ill
ne
ss
es
 C
os
t 
Lo
ui
sia
na
 / 
Pu
bl
ic
 M
on
ey
 
Fa
m
ili
al
 L
os
s f
ro
m
 
To
ba
cc
o-
Re
la
te
d 
Ill
ne
ss
 
N
on
sm
ok
er
s’
 R
ig
ht
s 
Ex
er
t L
oc
al
 A
ut
ho
rit
y 
Be
hi
nd
 O
th
er
 L
oc
al
iti
es
 
Pe
rs
on
al
 F
re
ed
om
 / 
Pr
op
er
ty
 R
ig
ht
s 
Ec
on
om
ic
al
ly
 B
en
ef
ic
ia
l 
Ec
on
om
ic
 H
ar
m
 
Bu
sin
es
s C
ho
ic
e 
O
th
er
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
Re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t O
ve
rr
ea
ch
 
Pro Dr. Philip Roseman Region VII Healthcare Consortium 
Chairman 
+           +  
Past President of Alliance for Education 
Willis Knighton Health Systems board 
member 
Jim Heathman Unaffiliated +  +        +   
Norma Candler Unaffiliated           +   
Feamula Bradley TFL Region VII Manager52 +             
Yolanda Mitchell 
Duckworth 
Unaffiliated +             
Robert Graham Unaffiliated + +            
Amanda Roark Unaffiliated + +            
Anti Paige Ham Unaffiliated             + 
Ronnie Toney Unaffiliated           +  + 
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Table 10.4: Proposed Amendments Considered at Second Hearing (Third Reading to Ordinance 3749 
Amendment Sponsor Provisions Result 
1 Gibson Deletes Ordinance 37 text and replaces it with weaker legislation limiting smoking restrictions to city buildings and 
public facilities  
Rejected 
2 Unknown Permitted smoking in designated smoking areas.  Defined designated smoking areas as separate and contained areas 
with independent ventilation systems. Limited designated smoking areas to 25% of contained area accessible by the 
public.  Prohibited smoking in waiting or line areas during times open to the public, regardless of it being an 
enclosed area.  
Motion to 
consider 
failed 
Established Ordinance date of effect as January 2, 2006. 
3 Hogan Prohibited smoking in places specified by Ordinance 37. Required owner, manager, or operator of establishments to 
notify any persons violating smoking restrictions. Made failure to post no-smoking signage required by Ordinance 37 
illegal. States it is illegal for owner, manager or operator to permit smoking outside of specified smoking areas. 
Levied a $500 penalty for any violation, and counted each day of violations as a separate offense. 
Withdrawn 
4 Gibson Prohibited smoking in places specified by Ordinance 37. Required owner, manager, or operator of establishments to 
notify any persons violating smoking restrictions. Made failure to post no-smoking signage required by Ordinance 37 
illegal. Made failure by owner, manager or operator of an establishment where smoking was prohibited to comply 
with ventilation or smoking section size requirements illegal. Levied a $500 penalty for any violation, and counted 
each day of violations as a separate offense. 
Withdrawn 
5* Green Allowed smoking in Government Plaza parking garage and in non-governmental offices leased by the city in 
government owned or administered facilities. 
Withdrawn 
Prohibited smoking in city owned or leased vehicles if a passenger opposed consumption Withdrawn  
Made ordinance enter effect 6 months after adoption Withdrawn 
6 Hogan Required smoking signs (already required by the ordinance) to state that smoking was prohibited in 
Shreveport and state the specific ordinance creating the law (Ordinance 37). 
Approved 
7* Walford Incorporates common area of malls into smoking restrictions. Removes restaurants and nonpublic buildings from 
Ordinance 37 smoking restrictions. 
Rejected 
Prohibits smoking in all areas of city administered, used, owned or leased by the City of Shreveport. Permits 
smoking in Government Plaza parking garage except within 15 feet of adjoining city building entrance. 
Rejected 
Prohibits smoking in city owned or leased vehicles. Rejected 
Prohibited smoking at the Stoner Marina barge Rejected 
Removed stadiums from Ordinance 37’s smoking restrictions for sports arenas. Permits stadium administrators or 
owners to establish smoking sections under stadiums that are 50 feet away from restrooms, food vendors, and ramps. 
Rejected 
Prohibited smoking at Shreveport Convention Center (already prohibited by Ordinance 37). Also prohibited smoking 
at balconies, loading docks, and entrances. Permitted smoking on one balcony, one loading dock, and one corner are 
of the facility. 
Rejected 
Allows smoking in designated smoking areas Withdrawn 
8 Hogan States that Ordinance 37’s prohibition on smoking in city parks and playgrounds does not apply to Festival Plaza or 
golf courses. 
Rejected 
*Contained multiple amendments within proposal. 
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passage of Ordinance 37. The Shreveport City Council voted 2-5 to reject the change. 
Subsequent amendments were either rejected or withdrawn by councilmembers except for 
Hogan’s amendment 6, which the Council passed to define signage requirements (Table 10.4). 
The City Council last considered, and initially adopted in a 4-3 vote, amendment 1 to drastically 
weaken Ordinance 37 (Table 10.4). Gibson introduced Amendment 1 believing that smoking 
restrictions economically disadvantaged some businesses and the city of Shreveport, and were a 
choice for businesses to impose. After one councilmember recognized they mistakenly voted for 
Amendment 1, the City council reconsidered the change and rejected it in a 4-3 vote. Afterwards, 
councilmembers voted 5-2 to pass Ordinance 37.49, 50 
 
As adopted on April 26, 2005, Ordinance 37 
forbade smoking in public places except for in bars, 
casinos and restaurants providing alcohol, which were 
still preempted from local smoking restrictions under 
state law.50 The ordinance also prohibited smoking in 
parks and playgrounds.51 Establishments were required 
to post signage stating if they were a smoking or 
smokefree places that also cited the ordinance.49, 50 A Shreveport smoking restriction ordinance 
that had passed before statewide preemption in 1993 (Chapter 5) previously set a $500 fine and 
up to 60 days of imprisonment for violations, which was maintained  for infractions of Ordinance 
37.50 The measure entered effect on May 10, 2005.48  
 
The ordinance was the first local tobacco control legislation adopted after partial 
preemption repeal.48 ACS later provided the Shreveport ordinance to other Louisiana localities 
interested in passing smoking restrictions.48 
 
Mandeville 
 
Mandeville considered a smoking restriction ordinance approximately a month after 
Shreveport adopted its clean air measure. The measure prohibited smoking in public 
establishments, parks (and parklets53), as well as golf courses and tennis courts.48, 54 The 
ordinance also forbade smoking in event lines and within 25 feet of entrances to public places 
and facilities controlled or used by city government.51 Residences, tobacco stores, bars, 
restaurants with alcohol licenses, rooms at hospitality establishments and casinos were exempted 
from smoking restrictions.48, 55 The ordinance tasked Mandeville’s police department with 
enforcement. Owners faced $200 fines per infraction while smokers faced $50 fines per 
offense.54 City Council President Denis Bechac54 introduced Ordinance 05-16 after ACS 
identified his interest in smoking restriction legislation. He drafted the ordinance, similar in 
design to Shreveport’s measure, with assistance from ACS and TFL.48, 54 
 
The Mandeville City Council considered Ordinance 05-16 at a hearing on June 9, 2005.54 
Representatives from TFL and the North Shore Chapter ACS attended to support the measure. 
During debate, Councilmembers Adelaide Boettner and Zella Walker offered amendments to 
eliminate parks and playgrounds from smoking restrictions and to remove the smoking distance 
requirement in the ordinance (or alternatively reduce it from 25 feet to 10 feet).54 
Councilmembers rejected their amendments. Afterwards the City Council voted 3-2 to pass 
The ordinance was the first 
local tobacco control 
legislation adopted after 
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Bechac’s ordinance (Table 10.5). We did not find evidence that the tobacco industry or its allies 
opposed the smokefree measure at the hearing. 
 
After the Mandeville City Council passed Bechac’s ordinance, Mayor Eddie Price 
indicated on June 20 he would veto the measure unless Councilmembers weakened its outdoor 
smoking restrictions, in particular footage requirements and outdoor smoking area prohibitions.56 
According to a June 22 article in The Times-Picayune, the Mayor opposed the ordinance for 
having stricter outdoor smoking restrictions than existed in some indoor places, saying, “I just 
find it ridiculous to have an ordinance that allows people to smoke in bars and restaurants…and 
tell those patrons they can’t step outside and smoke.”56 He also opposed preventing people from 
smoking outside in certain areas when others could easily move away from them. Price had not 
vetoed any legislation since becoming mayor in 1996. He suggested creating smoking areas at 
parks as a partial remedy. Mayor Price ultimately signed the smokefree ordinance after 
councilmembers agreed to weaken the law in the future.53  
 
To uphold its agreement with Mayor Price, the Mandeville City Council introduced 
legislation at a meeting on July 14, 2005 to weaken Bechac’s smokefree ordinance.53 The new 
measure reduced the distance requirement for smoking around entrances from 25 feet to 5 feet 
and forbade smoking at specific parks, recreational facilities and 5 playgrounds instead of all 
parks. The ordinance also removed smoking restrictions established by Bechac’s smokefree 
measure at Mandeville’s lakefront (considered a park by the city57).53 City Council President 
Bechac announced his intention to amend the footage requirement in the ordinance from 5 feet to 
15 feet, arguing the distance thwarted indoor smokefree areas.53 ACS and TFL representatives 
attending the hearing also planned to press for a 15- foot distance requirement in the new 
ordinance, but because of rules preventing testimony upon a measure’s introduction did not 
provide comments at the hearing.53 The city councilmembers scheduled debate of the ordinance 
for July 28. 
 
 The Mandeville City Council considered the measure weakening the town’s new 
smoking restrictions as planned on July 28, 2005.58 Residents testified for and against expanding 
the footage requirement. We did not find comments from health voluntary representatives or 
tobacco industry affiliates. During debate, City Council President Denis Bechac unsuccessfully 
motioned for the Council to consider expanding the 5-foot distance requirement to 15 feet. 
Ultimately the council adopted the ordinance without amendments, reducing the footage 
requirement for smoking near building entrances from 25 feet to 5 feet. The ordinance also 
reduced smoking restrictions over all Mandeville parks and playgrounds to only some parks, 
recreational facilities and playgrounds. Other provisions of the original clean air ordinance that 
passed in June remained unaltered. Smoking remained prohibited in public establishments not 
preempted by state law, including restaurants without alcohol licenses. 
 
Table 10.5: June 9, 2005 Mandeville City Council Vote on Ordinance 05-1654 
Councilmember Yes No 
Denis Bechac +  
Adelaide Boettner  + 
Jerry Coogan +  
Trilby Lenfant +  
Zella Walker  + 
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Lafayette Ordinance Passes in 2005 
 
Consideration of Smoking Restrictions in Lafayette Begins in 2003 
 
Debate over smoking restrictions in Lafayette began at the Coalition for a Healthy 
Acadiana Regional Grassroots Effort’s forum for City-Parish candidates in October 2003.59 At 
the forum, Lafayette City-Parish President candidate Glenn Weber, who was Lafayette City-
Parish’s Chief Administrative Officer, and his opponent Joey Durel, a local business owner, 
expressed support for smoking restrictions.59 Weber claimed he wanted to work with health and 
business groups to develop smoking restrictions that balanced freedom of choice and protected 
public health. Durel, who previously owned an Arby’s restaurant he forbade smoking at and 
currently owned a pet shop he prohibited smoking in, condoned clean air policies and stated they 
did not harm businesses. However, he expressed support for legislation that would not pertain to 
bars or restaurants.  
 
2004 Efforts to Pass a Smokefree Ordinance  
 
On December 7, 2004, Lafayette City-Parish Councilmembers Marc Mouton and Chris 
Williams cosponsored60 and submitted Ordinance No. 0-278-200461, 62 to restrict smoking in the 
Parish of Lafayette. Councilmember Mouton served on TFL’s Steering Committee.63, 64 The 
ordinance prohibited smoking in most public places not preempted by state law.61, 65 The 
ordinance also exempted smoking in private and semi-private rooms at long term care facilities 
and at outdoor places of employment although they 
were not preempted by state law.61  Ordinance No. 0-
278-2004 resulted from advocacy efforts by the 
Coalition for a Healthy Acadiana Regional Grassroots 
Effort.65  It required covered establishments to remove 
ash trays and post no smoking signs. The measure also 
urged places not covered by smoking restrictions to 
implement smokefree policies. In addition, the 
ordinance forbade smoking within 25 feet of 
establishments required to be smokefree by the law. 
Establishments faced at most a $100 fine for initial 
violations, $200 for second offenses, and a $500 
maximum penalty for additional infractions. Offending 
establishments could also have their permits or licensing stripped or suspended. Smokers did not 
face penalties for violations.61 The ordinance prohibited establishments or individuals from 
retaliating against individuals acting against smoking restriction violations or utilizing their 
rights in accordance with the law. 
 
The day that Councilmembers Mouton and Williams introduced their smokefree 
ordinance, the Coalition for a Healthy Acadiana Regional Grassroots Effort provided the 
Lafayette City-Parish Council a gift basket of products that contained chemicals found in 
tobacco smoke to promote the smoking restriction legislation.66  
 
… the Coalition for a Healthy 
Acadiana Regional Grassroots 
Effort provided the Lafayette 
City-Parish Council a gift 
basket of products that 
contained chemicals found in 
tobacco smoke to promote 
the ordinance.  
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The Lafayette City-Parish Council considered the smokefree ordinance on December 21, 
2004, with health advocates from New Orleans and Shreveport attending to support the 
measure.67 After 9 amendments were revealed shortly before councilmembers convened that day, 
the Council voted 6-3 to delay consideration claiming they needed additional time to review the 
possible changes. We do not know the content of each amendment, but one from ordinance 
sponsor Chris Williams expanded the bill to extend coverage to Lafayette Parish’s 
unincorporated regions. AHA’s Advocacy Director for Louisiana, Terri Broussard, expressed 
support for the council’s delay stating it allowed the bill to be further tailored for the public. The 
decision postponed consideration of smoking restrictions in Lafayette until the next year. 
 
Lafayette Reconsiders Modified Smokefree Ordinance in 2005 
 
Before the Lafayette City-Parish Council reconsidered smoking restrictions in 2005, TFL 
conducted a media campaign to generate public awareness about secondhand smoke. TFL ran 
advertisements that spring on the disrespectfulness and harmfulness of secondhand smoke in the 
parish as part of a statewide media campaign. Aired on television, radio, the internet, movie 
theaters, and outdoors, TFL’s secondhand smoke campaign generated 33 million impressions in 
Lafayette.51 TFL also generated over 15 articles in earned media via unspecified media advocacy 
and the successful passage of Shreveport’s smokefree ordinance. 
 
On June 7, 2005, Lafayette City Councilmember Bobby Badeaux introduced Ordinance 
No. 0-179-2005, a near copy of the 2004 smokefree measure sponsored by Councilmembers 
Mouton and Williams.68, 69 The ordinance established identical smoking restrictions to the 2004 
ordinance,61  prohibiting smoking in workplaces, restaurants without liquor licenses, indoor 
places of employment, and most other public places in the city and parish of Lafayette.69 The 
ordinance also prohibited smoking within 25 feet of doors, windows, entrances, and ventilation 
systems of establishments where smoking was prohibited. Ordinance No. 0-179-2005 exempted 
gaming facilities, hotel rooms, bars, and tobacco retail shops, which were preempted by state 
law, as well as private and semi-private rooms at long-term care facilities and outdoor places of 
employment, which were not preempted. Places covered by smoking restrictions were required 
to post no smoking signs. The measure reaffirmed the right of establishments and employers not 
covered by smoking restrictions to adopt smokefree policies. The ordinance made smoking 
illegal in voluntary smokefree establishments that posted no-smoking signage in compliance 
with the ordinance’s signage requirements.  
 
 Ordinance No. 0-179-2005 expanded penalties compared to the 2004 ordinance. 
Smokers violating smoking restrictions faced a $100 initial fine, followed by $200 for second 
offenses and $500 for additional infractions. Establishments that violated the ordinance faced 
suspension or loss of any licenses, unless they developed and secured approval of a written plan 
to address their offences after a third infraction. The penalties in Ordinance No. 0-179-2005 
differed from the measure submitted in 2004, which fined businesses and did not fine smokers.61, 
68 The ordinance assigned enforcement to the Lafayette Fire Department Chief, his appointee, or 
any other law enforcement officers.69 The law forbade employers and individuals from 
retaliating against anyone taking action against smoking restriction violations or using their 
rights in accordance with the ordinance. The Lafayette City-Parish Council scheduled 
consideration of Ordinance No. 0-179-2005 for June 21, 2005. 
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Sulphur Quietly Passes a Smokefree Ordinance during Lafayette Ordinance Fight 
 
On June 13, shortly before passage of the Lafayette ordinance, the City of Sulphur passed 
an ordinance based on that measure.51 However, unlike the Lafayette ordinance, Sulphur’s 
smokefree law only restricted smoking in indoor areas.   
 
TFL Director Publicly Praises Initial Smokefree Ordinances Passed in 2005 
 
 The Times-Picayune published a letter from TFL Director Tom Houston on Jun 20, 2005 
promoting smoking restrictions in parks, playgrounds, and public places that he wrote in 
response to an earlier letter published by the newspaper that opposed smoking restrictions.70 In 
his letter, Houston justified smoking restrictions as a means to denormalize tobacco use for 
youth:  
 
Removing the visible evidence of smoking in playgrounds, parks and public 
places used by families reduces the allure and profile of tobacco use for children.  
 
It places cigars or cigarettes outside the realm of normal, which discourages 
children from trying them. This is the only proven method of keeping our children 
from becoming lifelong smokers. Numerous studies have shown that people who 
do not begin smoking by age 18 will never start.70 
 
Houston highlighted that Louisiana had a higher prevalence of high school smokers than the 
national average.70 He asserted that smokefree ordinances passed by Shreveport, Mandeville and 
Sulphur prevented youth from starting to smoke.  
 
The Lafayette City Council Passes Smoking Restrictions in 2005 
 
The Lafayette City-Parish Council considered Ordinance No. 0-179-2005 on June 21, 
2005. At the hearing, health professionals and voluntary officials testified in support of smoking 
restrictions (Table 10.6).71 Members of the public also provided comments for and against the 
bill (Table 10.6). In addition, 12 people, including AHA Louisiana Government Relations 
Director Terri Broussard,72 signed that they attended the hearing and indicated their support for 
the ordinance. Only one person signed in at the meeting and noted opposition. We did not find 
evidence that the tobacco industry or its allies appeared at the hearing. 
 
 After hearing public comments, Councilmember Lenwood Broussard desired 
confirmation that smokers and not business owners faced fines for violating indoor smoking 
restrictions.71 He also expressed that smoking should be allowed in designated smoking sections 
15 feet away from entrances instead of 25 feet as set by the measure, and that existing ventilated 
indoor smoking sections should be grandfathered into the ordinance  as legal smoking areas. In 
contrast, Councilmember Rob Stevenson argued that smoking should be prohibited in all 
restaurants and argued that Ordinance No. 0-179-2005 failed to protect the public from cancer 
since some eateries were excluded.  
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 Following comments, the Lafayette City-Parish Council closed debate and voted 7-2 to pass 
Ordinance No. 0-179-2005 without amendments (Table 10.7).71 
 
As adopted, the Ordinance prohibited smoking 
in all indoor public places in the City and 
unincorporated areas of Lafayette except for bars, 
restaurants with liquor licenses, semi-private and 
private rooms at long term care facilities, tobacco 
retailers, and gaming facilities.69 Outdoor public places 
of employment were also exempted from smoking 
restrictions. The ordinance prohibited smoking within 
25 feet of entrances, ventilation systems, windows, and 
access points. Establishments were required to post no-
smoking signage. Places exempted from smoking 
restrictions could create voluntary smokefree policies and also post no-smoking signs. Smokers 
caught violating restrictions faced a maximum fine of $100 for first offenses, $200 for second 
infractions, and $500 for additional violations. Owners and establishments faced license 
suspension and revocation unless they submitted a written plan to address noncompliance that 
was approved by the enforcing officer after their third violation. The ordinance assigned 
enforcement to the Lafayette Fire Department Chief, his 
appointee, or other law enforcement personnel. 
Retaliation against people using their rights in 
accordance with the measure, or attempting to ensure 
compliance with the ordinance, was prohibited. The 
ordinance entered effect immediately. TFL 
subsequently used the 2005 Lafayette Ordinance as 
model legislation for local smokefree policy initiatives 
across Louisiana.51 
Table 10.6: Comments Provided at June 21, 2005 Lafayette Smokefree Ordinance 68, 71 
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Pro Michelle Devall Resident   + +     
Dr. Luis Meza Oncologist +        
Rose Hoffman 
Cormier 
Resident +  +      
Dr. Mitchell Lirtzman Cardiovascular Surgeon  +   +   + 
Anti Louis Kellogg       +   
Jimmy Theaux       +   
Patrick Brasseaux        +  
Table 10.7: Lafayette City-Parish Council 
Vote to Adopt Ordinance No. 0-179-200571 
Councilmember Yes No 
Badeaux +  
Benjamin +  
Bourgeois +  
Broussard  + 
Conque +  
Menard  + 
Mouton +  
Stevenson +  
Williams +  
TFL subsequently used the 
2005 Lafayette Ordinance as 
model legislation for local 
smokefree policy initiatives 
across Louisiana.  
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Cumulative Smokefree Ordinance Efforts preceding the 2006 Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act  
 
Before securing the statewide Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act in 2006, a total of 13 local 
smokefree ordinances were passed between late April 2005 and late June 2006 (Table 10.8). TFL 
gave local governments supplies, expert witnesses, a framework and money to pursue smokefree 
ordinances.51, 73 ANR also provided training and technical assistance to local lawmakers in 
Louisiana that pursued smoking restriction ordinances.74 TFL continued its statewide media 
campaign about the harmfulness of secondhand smoke and conducted unspecified advocacy 
activities that generated additional press coverage regarding secondhand smoke. TFL also 
provided technical and monetary support for cities and parishes to increase support and pressure 
for a new statewide smokefree air law.51 Unfortunately Hurricane Katrina’s impact in 2005 
displaced early TFL staff (Chapter 4) and destroyed records the program held regarding 
ordinance efforts before passage of the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act, limiting information on 
those smoking restrictions. 
 
 
Table 10.8: Coverage of Smoking Restrictions in Cities that Passed Local Ordinances from 2003-2006 (Before 
Statewide Law Was Passed)42 43, 44, 51 
Locality Date* TFL Description of Ordinance Other Restrictions 
Shreveport 3/11/2005+ “Adheres to Smoke-Free Parks and Footage 
Ordinance.”  
Prohibits smoking in indoor 
public places. 
Mandeville 3/11/2005+ “Adheres to smoke-free parks and children’s parks 
and footage law.”  
Prohibits smoking in indoor 
public places. 
Sulphur 6/14/2005** -- Prohibits smoking in indoor 
public places. 
Lafayette 6/23/2005** “Adheres to smoke-free parks and footage 
ordinance.”  
Prohibits smoking in indoor 
public places. 
Lafayette 
Parish 
6/23/2005**  Prohibits smoking in indoor 
public places 
Cullen 6/27/2005+ “Adheres to Louisiana smoking law.”  
Gibsland 6/27/2005+ “Adheres to Louisiana state smoking law.”  
Grambling 6/27/2005+ “Adheres to Louisiana smoking law.” Prohibits smoking in indoor 
public places 
East Baton 
Rouge 
Parish 
8/10/2005+ “Adheres to smoke-free park and footage” -- 
Terrebonne 
Parish 
1/11/2006+ “Adheres to smoke-free parks” -- 
Alexandria 3/11/2006+ “Adheres to smoke-free parks and footage 
ordinance.” 
-- 
Rayville 3/11/2006+ “Adheres to Louisiana state smoking law.” -- 
Crowley 3/11/2006+ “Adheres to Louisiana state smoking law.” -- 
Monroe 6/27/2006+ “Adheres to smoke-free park and footage law.” -- 
*TFL and ANR provide different dates for legislation, and have different localities listed as having adopted 
smoking restrictions. Sulphur was not listed by TFL, so we used ANR’s date. We used ANR date for Lafayette and 
Lafayette Parish since Lafayette Parish was not listed by ANR. Otherwise we rely on TFL dates. 
+ Date provided by TFL. 
**Date provided by ANR. 
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2005 Comprehensive Statewide Smokefree Bill SB 354 Defeated 
 
 In mid-April 2005, Senator Rob Marionneaux (D-Baton Rouge) introduced SB 314 to 
fully lift state preemption over local smoking restrictions.75 Marionneaux substituted SB 314 for 
SB 354, a comprehensive smokefree bill, on May 19, 2005.76  
 
SB 354 prohibited smoking in public places and workplaces, including bars, casinos and 
restaurants. The legislation exempted private residences and vehicles, limousines, a maximum 
25% of guest rooms designated as smoking rooms at hospitality establishments, retail tobacco 
businesses and bars, airport smoking businesses, outdoor areas at businesses, and separated 
patient rooms at hospice facilities. Exempted businesses were required to provide smokefree 
areas for employees opposed to working in secondhand smoke. Smokers caught violating clean 
air restrictions after receiving multiple warnings from an establishment could be summoned to 
court and face a $50 fine. Second offenses in a calendar year earned violators a $150 fine and 
additional violations a $250 fine. Businesses and business operators faced a maximum $500 fine 
and/or 6-month prison sentence for initial smoking restriction violations. Subsequent offences 
faced $1000 fines. SB 354 entered effect upon adoption. In a 2019 interview for this report, 
Senator Marionneaux indicated he drafted SB 354 and shared the bill with TFL, ALA, AHA, and 
ACS for review and feedback.77 We did not find evidence that health advocates actively 
supported SB 354 during the legislative session. 
 
 The bar, restaurant and gaming industry 
opposed SB 354.77, 78 Primary opponents of SB 
354 included the Louisiana Restaurant Association 
and the Louisiana Casino Association. We did not 
find evidence that the tobacco industry publicly 
opposed SB 354. In a 2019 interview for this 
report, Senator Marionneaux reflected on alcohol 
and tobacco industry participation in efforts to 
defeat the bill:   
 
I can’t say that specifically [the alcohol and 
tobacco industries actively lobbied against 
[SB 354], but I’m sure behind the scenes 
they were. I don’t remember them being at the table against me as much as the 
local bars, restaurants, casinos, etcetera.77 
 
Opponents relied on traditional tobacco industry arguments against clean air policies,20, 21 and 
asserted that smoking restrictions caused economic harm and infringed on personal choice.77.  
 
 SB 354 died on the Senate Floor on June 6, 200576 amid opposition from the restaurant 
and casino industries.78 We did not find evidence that tobacco control or health advocates 
supported the bill at the hearing. During debate, LRA CEO Jim Funk testified that businesses 
should be allowed to set their smoking policies. Louisiana Casino Association Executive 
Director Wade Duty asserted prohibiting smoking in the state’s casinos put them at a 
disadvantage with Native American and Mississippi-based gaming establishments. To increase 
“I can’t say that specifically [the 
alcohol and tobacco industries 
actively lobbied against [SB 354], 
but I’m sure behind the scenes 
they were. I don’t remember 
them being at the table against 
me as much as the local bars, 
restaurants, casinos, etcetera.” 
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SB 354’s odds of passage, Marionneaux proposed an amendment to exempt casinos from 
smoking restrictions. Senators defeated the amendment, arguing it gave casinos a competitive 
advantage over restaurants by encouraging smokers to dine or drink at gaming establishments.78 
After debate, Senators voted 19-14 against passing SB 354. 
 
Achieving Full Preemption Repeal and a Statewide Clean Air Law 
 
After advocates partially repealed preemption over local smoking restrictions in 2003, 
CTFLA and TFL sought a robust statewide clean air law to prohibit smoking in public places. 
The American Cancer Society (ACS), American Heart Association (AHA) and American Lung 
Association (ALA) sat on CTFLA’s Steering Committee after the public health nonprofit 
Louisiana Public Health Institute (LPHI) (Chapter 4) housed and funded the coalition through a 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant and assisted statewide and local smokefree initiatives 
that built support for smoking restrictions and a comprehensive smokefree air law.79 ACS 
provided the most money, grassroots mobilization, and lobbying support among the coalition’s 
voluntaries in smokefree efforts before 2006.79 AHA provided additional money, lobbying 
support, and volunteers, while ALA provided limited lobbying assistance because of its smaller 
capacity.79  
CTFLA members during the 2006 legislative campaign consisted of the American Cancer 
Society, American Heart Association, American Lung Association of Louisiana, the Louisiana 
Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) Center for Community Health and Louisiana 
Tobacco Control Program (LTCP), the Louisiana Cancer Control Partnership (LCCP), and 
TFL.73 ACS and AHA were the primary backers of the 2006 smokefree bill pursued by 
CTFLA.80 In a 2016 interview for this report, AHA Louisiana Government Relations Director 
Terri Broussard Williams stated that “pretty much it was Cancer [ACS] and Heart [AHA] that 
did all the heavy lifting.”80 Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights74 and the Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids81 provided the coalition technical assistance with developing its 2006 smokefree 
legislative efforts.82 
Key CTFLA representatives during the 2006 smokefree legislative campaign were AHA 
Louisiana Government Relations Director Terri Broussard Williams, Cindy Bishop, who was a 
Checkmate Strategies lobbyist contracted by ACS, TFL representative Carrie Griffin Monica, 
Maternal Child Health lobbyist Sandra Adams, ACS representative Zoey Devall and ACS 
lobbyist Berry Burnside.80, 83 ALA representative Tommy Lotts provided assistance when 
requested by CTFLA, participating in a lobby day and providing testimony during consideration 
of SB 742 in the legislature.82 Management at ACS and AHA also participated in 2006 efforts to 
secure a smokefree law.82 LPHI lobbyist Eric Vicks was integral to earlier CTFLA smokefree 
legislative efforts but left before the 2006 campaign. 
CTFLA and TFL Build Support for Smoking Restrictions before the 2006 Legislative Session  
 
CTFLA and TFL promoted smokefree policies in restaurants between 2005 and 2006 to 
generate support for a smokefree law. CTFLA listed restaurants with 100% indoor smokefree 
policies on its website,84, 85 providing publicity to establishments, normalizing smokefree 
policies, and countering claims of economic harm by promoting smokefree businesses. TFL 
organized a smokefree concert at the House of Blues in New Orleans in February 200684 and 
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held a smokefree music tour where the organization encouraged restaurants to implement 
smokefree policies to comply with clean air restrictions expected to pass in the Louisiana 
Smoke-Free Air Act.73 TFL also urged restaurants to implement smokefree policies in 
anticipation of statewide smoking restrictions at health walks the nonprofit conducted  and at 
events for World No Tobacco Day, the Great American Smokeout, and Kick Butts Day.73 
TFL also generated public awareness and support for smoking restriction via media 
campaigns. Beginning in January 2006, TFL ran its “Let’s Clear the Air” television campaign to 
promote smoking restrictions and to highlight Louisiana cities that had adopted smokefree 
legislation. TFL also placed “Secondhand Smoke Genie” ads on television, radio, and billboards 
during February 2006 that highlighted the dangers of secondhand smoke in restaurants, cars and 
homes.73 
Turning Weak Legislation into a Strong Smokefree Bill 
 
State Senator Rob Marionneaux (D-Baton Rouge) initially filed weak smoking restriction 
bill SB 105 for the 2006 session. Introduced on March 15, 86 SB 105 prohibited smoking at 
indoor areas of workplaces, state and local government buildings, public transportation, and 
health care facilities. SB 105 excluded designated smoking rooms at hotels and motels, tobacco 
bars, bars, retail tobacco businesses, airport concessions, designated rooms in hospices, outdoor 
areas, and gaming facilities (including race tracks, video poker, bingo halls, riverboat casinos, 
and land-based casinos).86 SB 105 also preempted local control.  
 
Marionneaux’s bill caught CTFLA off-guard.80 According to former AHA Association 
lobbyist and Coalition spokesperson Terri Broussard Williams in a 2016 interview for this report, 
CTFLA was initially unsure of Marionneaux’s reason for introducing SB 105:  
 
Senator Marionneaux filed a bill, and it was just based on what he thought was 
right. And what he knew to be tobacco control, in the research that his staff have 
done. So, originally, at the coalition, we didn’t know what it was, we didn’t know 
if he was friend or foe.80  
 
Coalition members approached Marionneaux and convinced the Senator to withdraw SB 105 and 
replace it with a public health-oriented smokefree bill.   
 
After partnering with CTFLA, Senator Marionneaux introduced comprehensive 
smokefree bill SB 742 as a substitute for SB 105 on April 27, 2006.87 Developed and drafted by 
the coalition,80 SB 742 prohibited smoking in public buildings, in schools and school buses 
except outdoor teacher smoking areas separated from buildings, and enclosed areas of 
employment. The bill exempted bars, gaming facilities, twenty percent of hotel and motel rooms, 
tobacco retail businesses, private and semi-private rooms of nursing homes and assisted living 
homes (if all occupants were smokers and requested a designated smoking room).87 The 
substitute featured a clause allowing local governments to establish smoking restrictions stronger 
than state law, and would repeal preemption over local smoking restrictions.87    
CTFLA developed SB 742 from model smokefree legislation provided by tobacco 
control nonprofit ANR.82 Coalition partners used feedback from a third of the state legislature to 
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shape the bill’s smoking restrictions.82 ANR and tobacco control nonprofit the Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Kids also provided technical assistance during drafting. In a 2019 interview for 
this report, AHA’s Terri Broussard Williams stated CTFLA partners used ANR’s smokefree 
model as a starting point but greatly shaped the bill on their own since ANR and CTFK were not 
on the ground in Louisiana and were not around for immediate assistance:  
We were, you know, a highly sophisticated staff, so we didn’t really need to lean 
on them (ANR and CTFK)…We would share information with them, you know, 
for their blessing and approval.82 
The CTFLA’s Decision to Exclude Bars and Restaurants from Smoking Restrictions 
 
CTFLA partners excluded bars and casinos from SB 742’s smoking restrictions for 
strategic reasons. ACS initially wanted SB 742 to eliminate smoking in bars and casinos. 
However, ACS’ contract lobbyist81 Cindy Bishop asserted to the voluntary that CTFLA should 
limit itself to securing smoking restrictions in restaurants. According to Bishop in a 2016 
interview for this report:  
 
When we were working on the bill…our client the American Cancer Society 
wanted us to ban smoking in casino[s] –and bars… I said, “You all, change is 
incremental. And what we need to do is ban in restaurants. And then we can go 
back later and try to get casinos and bars.”81 
 
Bishop said that CTFLA recognized that the bar and casino industry were powerful opponents, 
causing the coalition to avoid including those venues in smoking restrictions: 
 
[W]e knew we were going against big, big guns, if 
you will. We knew that the issue in front of us was 
huge …they took my counsel and said, “Let’s focus 
on getting it banned in restaurants. Then we’ll come 
back at a later date … and look at banning [smoking 
in] … bars and casinos.”81 
Besides avoiding casino and bar industry opposition, AHA Louisiana Government Relations 
Director Terri Broussard Williams asserted in a 2016 interview for this report that Hurricane 
Katrina made including bars and casinos in the bill unfeasible: 
New Orleans had just been destroyed [because of Hurricane Katrina in 2005], 
and, having to overcome the high emotions to really educate people that it was not 
an economic factor, it was, it would be an economic driver. It was just something 
we didn’t feel could be done, and also, we didn’t feel that it was very sensitive of 
us at the time.80  
Williams added in a 2019 interview for this report that  CTFLA chose not to include bars 
because of opposition from state lawmakers, claiming, “We developed it [SB 742] after doing 
some meetings with about a third of the legislature and got the sense that they were not interested 
in including bars. And so we did not include bars.”82 Despite not being included in smoking 
“[W]e knew we were 
going against big, big 
guns, if you will.” 
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restrictions, the bar and casino industries still lobbied against SB 742 alongside the tobacco 
industry.  
Opponents of SB 742 
 
Tobacco Industry 
 
Tobacco companies Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and US Tobacco opposed SB 742.80, 81 
PM lobbyist Randy Haynie and RJR lobbyist CJ Blache were the lead industry lobbyists fighting 
the bill.82 Haynie and Blache had lobbied for the tobacco industry since the 1980s (Chapter 2) 
and helped secure the 1993 legislation that preempted local smoking restrictions. Health 
advocates sought to overturn the smoking accommodation and preemption law it established 
with SB 742 (Chapter 5). PM lobbyist Randy Haynie represented 50 additional clients during the 
2006 legislative session,88 including Harrah’s Entertainment and Miller Brewing Company,88 a 
subsidiary of Philip Morris until it was sold in 2002.89 LPHI Policy Manager and lobbyist Eric 
Vicks,90 who participated in pre-2006 smokefree efforts, considered Haynie more influential than 
Blache.79 Blache reported 12 additional clients besides RJ Reynolds in 2006.91 According to 
Vicks, Blache focused his lobbying on members of the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus in 
pre-2006 efforts.79 In a 2019 interview for this report, AHA Louisiana Government Relations 
Director Terri Broussard Williams asserted that Haynie and Blache employed “traditional 
lobbying” to convince lawmakers to oppose SB 742 during the 2006 legislative session, in 
particular “lots of dinners and, you know, bar conversations.”82 Senator Marionneaux could not 
recall tobacco industry lobbyists directly testifying against SB 742 during a 2019 interview for 
this report.77 
Third Party Allies of the Tobacco Industry 
 
LRA served as a major third party of the tobacco industry in the fight over SB 742. LRA 
argued SB 742 would have an adverse economic impact on smaller restaurants, particularly since 
SB 742 excluded bars and gaming facilities. Commenting to the Associated Press for an April 
2006 article on SB 742, LRA CEO Jim Funk argued restaurant owners should decide to adopt 
smoking restrictions based on consumer preference.92-94 LRA CEO Jim Funk,77 contract lobbyist 
Gina Goings and LRA lobbyist Eric Sunstrom fought SB 742 for the restaurant association.82 
 
The bar and gaming industries opposed the bill despite not being covered by its smoking 
restrictions.77, 80 According to AHA’s Williams, the third party industries lobbied against the bill 
fearing future regulation. She said “They didn’t want anything to pass. I do think they thought it 
really would create the stage, you know, for everything to go smoke free.”80 Senator Rob 
Marionneaux shared similar sentiments about the gaming industry during a 2019 interview for 
this report: 
 
They [the gaming industry] didn’t want…any bill to pass. They didn’t want to 
start this effort in knowing that, you know, sooner or later they would be in the 
crosshairs. And sure enough, here we are, what, 13 years later, and finally it’s 
gotten to them here in Louisiana.77 
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Gaming industry opponents came from the Louisiana Casino Association and its lobbyist Wade 
Duty, as well as interests from the land-based casino, riverboat casino, and truck stop gaming 
sectors.77 Lobbyist Alton Ashy represented truck stop gaming and restaurant / bar machine 
gambling interests.77 The main lobbyist of the alcohol industry in Louisiana,82 Chris Young, also 
opposed the bill. Other opponents included lobbyists for the Ernest M. Morial Convention Center 
in New Orleans and the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association, who sought to weaken SB 742 and 
create exemptions for their clients.  
 
Legislative Groups 
 
 SB 742 faced resistance from some of the state 
legislature’s New Orleans delegation. AHA Louisiana 
Government Relations Director Williams explained 
lawmakers’ economic reasons and desire to maintain the 
status quo in a 2019 interview for this report: 
 
One was that they [New Orleans lawmakers] just 
had Hurricane Katrina that year and they didn’t 
want to jeopardize their economy any further. 
The second thing is just the tradition 
of…smoking bars. A lot of people just did not 
want to give that up.82 
 
Efforts to Pass the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act 
 
Generating Pressure in Support of SB 742 
 
CTFLA publicly messaged that SB 742’s smoking restrictions were essential for making 
workplaces safe.81 The coalition directly targeted the message to state lawmakers, having an 
employee at the capitol who contracted cancer from secondhand smoke exposure tell them her 
experience. In a 2016 interview for this report, ACS contract lobbyist Cindy Bishop recalled 
when the employee spoke to lawmakers for CTFLA: 
She got secondhand smoke from being around a lot of smokers at the Capitol. 
And she came and sat at the table. And she pulled her wig off, and she was bald. 
And she said, “I'm going to die. I never smoked a cigarette a day in my life. But I 
am going to die… And I didn't smoke a single cigarette.” So, you know, it was 
somebody that a lot of people loved at the Capitol.81 
To support lobbying efforts for SB 742, the Coalition also hosted events to exhibit public 
support for smoking restrictions and to mobilize grassroots supporters. Shortly after the 2006 
legislative session convened on March 2795 and before SB 742 substituted SB 105, TFL 
organized a youth rally and press conference for Kick Butts Day on April 5, 2006 at the state 
capitol in Baton Rouge.96 Other CTFLA representatives attended the event.81 (Kick Butts Day is 
a national event created by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids to engage youth and educators 
in tobacco control, prevent tobacco use, generate public awareness of tobacco’s negative impacts 
and the industry’s bad behavior, and generate pressure on lawmakers to pass tobacco control 
“One was that they just had 
Hurricane Katrina that year 
and they didn’t want to 
jeopardize their economy any 
further. The second thing is 
just the tradition of … 
smoking bars. A lot of people 
just did not want to give that 
up.” 
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legislation.97) TFL held additional Kick Butts Day events in all nine of its districts during early 
April.95 
CTFLA partners organized four separate lobbying days during the 2006 legislative 
session to meet with lawmakers about backing SB 742.82 ACS, ALA, and AHA each held a 
lobby day to support the bill.  
The Coalition relied on paid and earned media to generate and maintain public support 
for SB 742. CTFLA aired advertisements asking their audience to contact lawmakers or dial a 
provided number if they desired smokefree restaurants.81 The coalition ran paid advertisements 
on television, radio, and billboards.77 The CTFLA also generated letters to newspapers and calls 
to the governor in support of SB 742, and curried favorable news coverage.80   
CTFLA used polling to highlight public support for increasing smokefree restrictions in 
Louisiana81 before Senator Marionneaux’s SB 105 was substituted with SB 742. At a press 
conference in mid-April, CTFLA released a telephone survey of 500 Louisiana voters it 
contracted from polling firm Opinion Research Associates finding that 95% of respondents 
believed people should not work in secondhand smoke.98 The poll, performed from March 13 to 
March 16, 2006, also found that 86% of participants considered secondhand smoke a moderate 
or significant health risk.98 During the press conference, ACS representative Zoe Devall asserted 
that smoking restrictions in workplaces reduced cancer rates and AHA Louisiana Government 
Relations Director Terri Broussard Williams claimed clean air policies safeguarded families and 
employees. CTFLA hosted the conference at a smokefree restaurant, whose manager claimed 
smoking restrictions had not financially harmed the business. The Baton Rouge Advocate 
reported the CTFLA press conference and survey in an April 14 article, disseminating the poll’s 
findings, giving the smokefree restaurant free publicity, and providing the coalition’s budding 
legislative campaign free media coverage. 
CTFLA reminded lawmakers of public support for the bill by placing the polling results 
on a billboard at the freeway exit for the State Capitol.81   
During efforts to pass SB 742, Louisiana’s tobacco control programs generated grassroots 
pressure for CTFLA lobbying efforts. According to the AHA’s Terri Broussard Williams in a 
2019 interview for this report, “they [the DHH Louisiana Tobacco Control Program and TFL] 
provided a lot of grassroots support…their supporters and their staff were extremely engaged.”82 
TFL orchestrated letter writing campaigns that resulted in 24 letters to the editor and 16 opinion 
pieces supporting smoking restriction legislation being published by newspapers in May and 
June 2006.73 TFL also circulated petitions.82 
Health advocates and medical professionals attended legislative debates for SB 742 
during the 2006 session to testify in support of the bill.77 In a 2019 interview for this report, 
Senator Marionneaux remembered and credited Dr. Mitchell Lirtzman, (who testified in support 
of Lafayette’s smokefree ordinance in 2005) with giving influential testimony that ultimately 
helped pass SB 742: 
That doctor [Mitchell Lirtzman] in particular, because he was such a powerful 
individual voice, and because he brought personal experience to the table, I think 
is probably the biggest difference-maker…You know, he wasn't a paid lobbyist. 
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He wasn't on anybody's payroll. He was on his own time telling his own story. 
And so that's why I think it carried the day, really.77 
According to Marionneaux, health advocates and medical professionals generally provided 
information on cigarette smoke’s harmful effects.  
The Legislative Battle 
 
The Committee on Senate and Governmental Affairs first considered SB 742 at a hearing 
on April 26, 2006 (Table 10.9).99 Representatives from the Louisiana Restaurant Association and 
the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center in New Orleans testified against the bill. LRA 
representative Jim Funk requested that bars in restaurants be exempted from SB 742 since some 
restaurants had installed expensive ventilation systems to allow smoking in their bar sections.99 
The tobacco industry had promoted ventilation systems as an alternative to smokefree laws, 
particularly in bars and restaurants, all over the world in the 1980s.23 New Orleans Convention 
Center lobbyist Lynn Berry requested that lawmakers exempt events at the facility to draw more 
customers to New Orleans.99 Beer industry lobbyist Chris Young also attended, but we do not 
know if he testified. AHA Louisiana Government Relations Director Terri Williams recalled 
Young’s behavior at the hearing: “I’ll never forget Chris because on [sic] the Senate…committee 
hearing, he actually took gum out of his mouth and put it in my purse. I don’t know if he was 
retaliating or if he was intimidating me.”82 We did not find evidence that tobacco industry 
representatives testified publicly at the hearing.  
Tobacco control advocates testified that clean air policies protect public health. At the 
hearing, Lafayette-based cardiovascular surgeon Dr. Mitchell Lirtzman stated that public 
smoking prohibitions were a major advancement in health policy that numerous states and 
countries had adopted into law.99 According to The Advocate, Lirtzman also testified that 
“secondhand smoke is a preventable form of death.”100 CTFLA representative and ACS lobbyist 
Zoey Devall also provided comments, telling the committee 
that Louisiana loses approximately 1,200 lives a year to 
secondhand smoke and that SB 742 could save lives.99, 100 
AHA’s Terri Broussard Williams informed committee 
members that 1 million Louisianans were already covered by 
local smoking restrictions.100 
Following public comments, the Committee passed an 
amendment by Senator Cleo Fields (D-Baton Rouge) to 
prohibit smoking on all school property, eliminating smoking 
restriction exemptions in SB 742 for school buses and teacher 
smoking areas.87, 99 Committee members then unanimously 
approved SB 742, sending it to the Senate Floor.99 
The Senate considered SB 742 on May 2, 2006. During 
consideration, Senator Marionneaux lit a cigar to call attention 
to the hypocrisy of prohibiting smoking in the Senate while 
allowing it in restaurants Figure 10.1). According to 
Marionneaux in a 2019 interview for this report: 
 
 Figure 10.1: Senator Rob 
Marionneaux with a cigar 
on the Senate Floor 
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Table 10.9: Development of SB 742 Through the Louisiana State Legislature87 
Version Date Smoking Restrictions:   Full   ○ Partial  - None Enforcement 
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Original N/A     - - ○ ○  ○ -  Department of 
Health and 
Hospitals 
(DHH) 
 
Offender: (i) $100, (ii) $200, (iii) 
$300 
 
Employer: (i) $300, (ii) $600, 
(iii)$1000 
Senate 
Committee 
4/26/2006     - - ○   ○ -  Offender: (i) $100, (ii) $200, (iii) 
$300 
 
Employer: (i) $300, (ii) $600, 
(iii)$1000 
Senate 
Floor 
5/02/2006    - - - ○  ○ ○ -  $25-$50 state penalty, with local 
penalties allowed 
House 
Committee 
6/07/2006    - - - -*  ○ ○** -  $25-$50 state penalty, with local 
penalties allowed 
House 
Floor 
6/12/2006     - - ○  ○ ○   Offender: (i) $25, (ii) $50, (iii) $100 
 
Employer: (i) $100, (ii) $250, (iii) 
$500 
Adopted 
(signed into 
law 
6/30/2006) 
6/18/2006     - - ○  ○ ○   Offender: (i) $25, (ii) $50, (iii) $100 
 
Employer: (i) $100, (ii) $250, (iii) 
$500 
*Established a minimum amount of required hotel rooms. 
**Allows for designated, ventilated smoking rooms in establishments permitting smoking. 
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I broke out a cigar, you know, to light it on the senate floor. And at the moment I 
did that, two sergeant-at-arms came behind me. And they were going to 
physically remove me from the floor, which was exactly the point. I mean, I can't 
smoke in  the chamber, but yet I can take my kid out to the local restaurant, and 
you all can light up and smoke as many cigarettes in front of ’em as you want. So 
yeah, they had a -- they had a good picture of that in the paper.77 
Senators proposed six amendments to weaken SB 
742 during consideration (Table 10.10).87 Throughout 
the legislative process, opponents proposed changes to 
SB 742 to weaken its provisions and reduce health 
advocates’ support for the legislation. According to the 
AHA’s Williams, “the strategy from the opponent was 
just to put a whole bunch of amendments on it [SB 742], 
because they thought if they did that, we’d walk away, 
because that was what had been done before.”80 During 
Senate Floor debate, Senators only introduced 
amendments to weaken the legislation. Marionneaux also 
introduced amendments to weaken SB 742 on the Floor, 
but not on behalf of opponents.  
Senator Ken Hollis (R-Metairie) secured an 
amendment that weakened smoking restrictions and 
fractured the CTFLA coalition. The amendment 
permitted smoking inside restaurant bars “clearly designated and enclosed” with no additional 
ventilation or air quality requirements.101 Hollis offered the proposal as a favor to the LRA 
because he had a longstanding friendship with a major unidentified official in the association.102 
In a 2019 interview for this report, AHA Louisiana Government Relations Director Williams 
asserted LRA lobbyist Gina Goings assisted Hollis with the amendment.82 
 Senators Chris Ullo (D-Marrero) and Marionneaux fought Hollis’ change. They argued 
the amendment failed to prevent secondhand smoke exposure since most establishments had 
integrated ventilation systems.102-104 According to the Baton Rouge Advocate, Marionneaux 
asserted to Hollis that his amendment “is a direct attempt to go back to where we were last year 
to defeat the bill.”104 Hollis replied that he supported SB 742 but also backed the free market.104 
Senators sided with Hollis, voting 23 to 15 to adopt his amendment.103 Jim Funk and the LRA 
continued opposing SB 742 although the change excluded restaurant bars from SB 742’s 
smoking restrictions.99, 102, 105  
Senator Diana Bajoie (D-New Orleans) offered an amendment to exempt convention 
center facilities from smoking restrictions when they hosted private events where tobacco 
products were being shown for convenience store associations or the tobacco industry. The 
amendment also permitted smoking at Mardi Gras Balls hosted in convention facilities.106 The 
proposal came after Ernest N. Morial convention center lobbyist Lynn Berry sought exceptions 
at the Committee of Senate and Governmental Affairs hearing for SB 742.99 Senators approved 
Bajoie’s amendment, weakening smoking restrictions at convention centers under the bill. 
“I broke out a cigar, you 
know, to light it on the 
senate floor. And at the 
moment I did that, two 
sergeant-at-arms came 
behind me ... I mean, I can't 
smoke in the senate 
chamber, but yet I can take 
my kid out to the local 
restaurant, and you all can 
light up and smoke …. ” 
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Senator Nick 
Gautreaux (who is not 
related to Senator 
D.A.“Butch” Gautreaux107) 
introduced an amendment 
to eliminate smoking areas 
in casinos and to permit 
smoking at casino 
restaurants. He ultimately 
withdrew his proposal 
(Table 10.10).   
Senator 
Marionneaux offered two 
changes to SB 742. One 
amendment exempted 
tobacco-related facilities 
from smoking restrictions 
and the other reduced 
penalties for violating 
smoking restrictions (Table 
10.10). The Senate adopted 
both amendments.  
After debating and 
considering amendments to SB 742, Senators voted 36-2 to pass the bill to the House.103 As 
approved in the Senate, the bill prohibited smoking in most workplaces and public places except 
in bars, casinos, enclosed restaurant bars, tobacco industry businesses, and convention centers 
when they were hosting Mardi Gras celebrations or trade events featuring tobacco products. 
Senators also weakened proposed penalties for violations, choosing to maintain Louisiana’s 
existing fines for noncompliance with smoking restrictions (Table 10.10). 
CTFLA Coalition Fractures Because of Unfavorable Amendment to SB 742 
 
Adoption of Senator Ken Hollis’ amendment allowing smoking in enclosed restaurant 
bars caused CTFLA to withdraw its endorsement of SB 742 after it passed the Senate.80AHA and 
ACS, the leaders and predominantly active members of CTFLA, also withdrew their 
endorsement. They stated that they would re-endorse SB 742 after the exception permitting 
smoking in restaurant bars was removed.102 The amendment caused the Coalition lobbying team 
to become nearly inactive on SB 742. According to AHA lobbyist Terri Broussard Williams, 
“the coalition just split up. So I remained the only 
lobbyist from the coalition that kept moving.”80  
Working to Fix SB 742 
 
After Senator Hollis sabotaged SB 742, AHA 
Louisiana Government Relations Director Terri 
Broussard Williams convinced AHA to let her continue 
Table 10.10: Amendments Offered to SB 742 on the Senate Floor87 
Amendment Sponsor Changes Result 
2110 Ken Hollis Exempt smoking in enclosed 
bars within restaurants. 
Adopted 
2215 Diane Bajoie Exempt smoking at 
convention center facilities 
during tobacco industry and 
convenience store events 
involving tobacco products. 
Adopted 
2116 Nick 
Gautreaux 
Eliminates required 
smokefree areas in casinos. 
Allows smoking in casino 
restaurants. 
Withdrawn 
2125 Rob 
Marionneaux 
Exempt tobacco product 
manufacturer, importer, 
wholesale, distributor, leaf 
dealer, processor, and storage 
facilities from smoking 
restrictions. 
Adopted 
2133 Rob 
Marionneaux 
Eliminates SB 742 penalty 
schedule: Smoker: (i) $100, 
(ii) $200, (iii) $300 / 
Employer: (i) $300, (ii) $600, 
(iii)$1000. 
Adopted 
Changes penalty schedule to 
existing fines under state law: 
$25-$50 state penalty, 
permits local penalties. 
“I got to the place where I 
knew I could do it. I didn’t 
know how, but I knew I could 
do it.” 
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lobbying the bill. Williams reflected on her drive to fix SB 742 in a 2019 interview for this 
report:  
I got to the place where I knew I could do it. I didn’t know how, but I knew I 
could do it. And to be frank, the votes weren’t there. They had to be worked. But I 
knew we [CTFLA] hadn’t worked the votes yet, and so I just wanted a shot.82 
Terri Broussard Williams lobbied behind the scenes to salvage the bill with assistance 
from CTFLA partner and ACS contract lobbyist Cindy Bishop, elected state officials, state 
employees, unaffiliated lobbyists, and SB 742 sponsor Rob Marionneaux.82 TFL representative 
Carrie Griffin Monica also assisted efforts to revive SB 742. According to Marionneaux in a 
2019 interview for this report, Williams, Bishop and Monica worked in the background to 
salvage the bill: 
They [Williams and Monica] certainly supported it. But they couldn’t go against 
their clients’ wishes, so they really had to publicly kind of step back. I want to 
mention one more person, a lady named Cindy Bishop and her client at the 
time…She worked, and those three.77  
Marionneaux expressed disappointment at how health voluntaries rescinded public support for 
SB 742 in the same interview: 
[Williams, Bishop and Monica] took a step back and that was what kind of 
disappointed me and in the fashion that it[they] did. I had already lost the bill [SB 
354] the year before. So they kind of took a step back after their clients took the 
position they did. And then from there, I kept marching forward and trying to 
encourage them to join the ranks again. And ultimately, I think probably — hope 
— I like to think behind the scenes they did that.77 
Williams and Bishop maintained varying degrees of activity on SB 742.82 According to 
Williams, she remained completely active on SB 742 while Bishop provided assistance. 
Lobbyists and politicians provided various assistance to Williams while she sought to 
revive SB 742. Lobbyists not linked to CTFLA gauged sentiment on SB 742 for Williams when 
meeting with lawmakers about other issues and reported their findings to her. Representatives 
Donald Cravins Jr., Michael Jackson, and Karen Carter Peterson whipped votes for SB 742 in the 
House. (Peterson also pursued tobacco tax increase legislation during the 2000s [Chapter 11].) 
The office of Lieutenant Governor Mitch Landrieu, who as a state representative in 2002 secured 
tobacco tax increase legislation that helped create and fund TFL (Chapter 6), also whipped the 
bill. Senator Jay Dardenne regularly monitored the legislature’s sentiments towards SB 742 and 
reported his findings to advocates.  
Selection of SB 742’s House Handler 
 
Lawmakers continued efforts to weaken and sabotage SB 742 as the bill moved to the 
House Floor. Representative Taylor Townsend (D-Natchitoches) identified by ACS contract 
lobbyist Cindy Bishop as a tobacco industry ally during a 2016 interview for this report,81 
attempted to become SB 742’s manager on the House Floor. Townsend was a close friend of the 
bill’s sponsor Senator Marionneaux.77 However, before 2006 Townsend received money from 
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Altria ($1000) and the Cigar Association of America ($750).108 He also took contributions from 
various restaurants, the Louisiana Restaurant Association ($1000), the, Beer Industry League of 
Louisiana ($6,269), the Louisiana Wholesale Food and Tobacco Association ($100)  (LWTCDA, 
Chapter 2), and gambling organizations.108  In a 2016 interview for this report, ACS contract 
lobbyist Cindy Bishop said Townsend’s effort caused panic among CTFLA representatives, 
recalling  “they came to me freaking out about, ‘he’s not for us. He wants to amend the bills to 
let bars—and exempt all these groups.’ And I said, ‘It’s your football. Go get it back.’”81  
SB 742 backers had Representative William Daniels (D-Baton Rouge) manage the bill 
instead of Townsend.82 Marionneaux did not believe Representative Townsend tried to sabotage 
the bill, saying in a 2019 interview for this report “I…know that he's [Townsend] close to the 
casino industry. So maybe all of a sudden, he became reluctant, and I became concerned. And so 
therefore, we looked for someone else to handle it.”77 Initially, Williams and SB 742 proponents 
considered having Bill “Coach” Montgomery (D-Haughton) handle the legislation in the 
House.82 However, they decided to have Montgomery generate support for SB 742 in the 
legislature as a storyteller. He would ultimately share a personal tale of loss caused by tobacco-
related illness to generate support for SB 742.82 Both Montgomery and Daniels had casinos in 
their districts, which proponents considered beneficial. However, according to Terri Broussard 
Williams in a 2019 interview for this report, SB 742 backers chose William Daniels (D-Baton 
Rouge) because they believed LSU’s presence in his district provided additional pull. She also 
cited that his ties to the “capital-area delegation” (Baton Rouge is the capital of Louisiana) and 
his good debate skills provided additional strength.82  
Efforts to derail SB 742 Continue in the House 
 
House Health and Welfare Committee Considers SB 742 
 
The House Health and Welfare Committee considered SB 742 on June 7, 2003.87 Senator 
Rob Marionneaux (D-Grosse Tete) defended the bill at the hearing, who asserted it still 
prohibited smoking in 80% of restaurants despite the Senate amendment exempting enclosed 
restaurant bars from clean air restrictions.109 Marionneaux told the committee he disliked Senator 
Hollis’ change, and blamed its adoption as the reason ACS and AHA rescinded their support for 
SB 742.109 He told the committee that restaurant ventilation systems would circulate secondhand 
smoke from restaurant bars and expose patrons in non-smoking areas of establishments.105 LRA 
CEO Jim Funk spoke against SB 742 at the hearing, asserting to committee members that the bill 
discriminated against the restaurant industry and should be defeated.105, 109  
The House Health and Welfare Committee considered 5 amendments to weaken or 
strengthen SB 742’s smoking restrictions (Table 10.11).105  
Representative Charles MacDonald (D-Bastrop) proposed amending SB 742 to exempt 
only completely enclosed restaurant bar areas from smoking restrictions.102, 105 The Senate 
previously amended the bill to permit smoking in enclosed restaurant bars but did not specify 
requirements for enclosures or mandate floor to ceiling containment. Representative MacDonald 
offered the change as a compromise on the restaurant bar exemption.102 He expressed support for 
SB 742, stating to the committee that Louisiana spent millions of dollars annually treating 
tobacco related illnesses, sicknesses he revealed his parents passed away from.109 MacDonald’s 
amendment required restaurant bars allowing smoking to become fully enclosed by July 1, 
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2008.102, 110 In a 2019 interview for this report, Terri Broussard Williams indicated she believed 
MacDonald introduced the amendment to hinder SB 742: 
It was just a distraction tool. He was trying to get us 
to go along with it. But he was also trying to get the 
lawmakers to see there was a better way. But it was 
so cost-prohibitive. He thought it would pass, and 
then that would essentially kill the bill. 
Everyone knew if our deal-breaker didn’t happen, we were going to pull out. So 
they just kept trying to add things to the bill to get us to pull out.82 
The House Health and Welfare Committee unanimously approved MacDonald’s proposal.105 
Representative John LaBruzzo (D-Metairie) proposed amending SB 742 to prohibit 
smoking in bars and casinos. He asserted that SB 742 was “pitting businesses against one 
another” and that bars and casinos should not be exempt from smoking restrictions “if that’s 
what’s right.”105, 109 LaBruzzo’s proposal threatened to generate opposition to SB 742 from the 
bar and casino industries. Senator Marionneaux, who earlier told committee members he 
excluded casinos from smoking restrictions to avoid industry attacks that killed his 2005 clean 
air bill, argued LaBruzzo’s amendment made passing SB 742 unfeasible.109 The committee 
rejected LaBruzzo’s proposal in a 9-3 vote.105 
After failing to incorporate bars and casinos into smoking restrictions, Representative 
LaBruzzo offered an amendment to weaken SB 742 and permit smoking in restaurants serving 
liquor. The Committee rejected the amendment 12 to 2.105 Labruzzo received $10,956 in 
campaign contributions from the alcohol, restaurant, gaming, and tobacco industries through 
2006 (Table 10.12) The gaming and restaurant industries contributed the most to Labruzzo, and  
Table 10.11: Significant Amendment Attempts to SB 742 in the House Committee on Health and Welfare87 
Amendment 
Sponsor 
Strengthen or 
Weaken SB 742 
Provisions Result 
Charles MacDonald Strengthen Required enclosed restaurant bars to be fully closed 
from floor to ceiling to permit smoking. Gave 
restaurant bars until July 1, 2008 to develop full 
enclosures. 
Adopted 
LaBruzzo Strengthen Made gambling establishments and bars smokefree.  Defeated 
LaBruzzo Weaken Allowed restaurants serving liquor to permit smoking 
(existing law permitted smoking in all restaurants. 
Limited prohibition to restaurants not serving 
alcohol).* 
Defeated 
Nita Hutter (R-
Chalmette) 
Weaken Raised maximum smoking rooms allowed in 
hospitality establishments from 20% to 50%. 
Adopted 
Unknown Weaken Exempts any and all hotel and motel rooms operated 
by a gambling establishment from smoking 
restrictions. 
Adopted 
Unknown Strengthen Prohibited smoking in restaurants and food service 
areas of gaming establishments. 
Adopted 
*As introduced, SB 742 prohibited smoking in all restaurants. After Senator Hollis’ amendment on the Senate 
Floor, SB 742 prohibited smoking in restaurants but exempted enclosed bars in restaurants. 
“… they just kept trying 
to add things to the bill 
to get us to pull out.” 
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the 
Louisiana 
Restaurant 
Association 
gave more to 
him than any 
other donor 
from 
industries 
fighting SB 
742 (Table 
10.12) 
Representative Nita Hutter (R-Chalmette) offered an amendment expanding the number 
of guest rooms that hospitality establishment could designate as smoking. As originally 
introduced, SB 742 allowed hotels and motels to allow smoking in 20% of guest rooms. Hutter’s 
amendment required hotels and motels to dedicate at least 20%, and up to 50% of rooms as 
smoking.105, 110 In a 2019 interview, AHA’s Terri Broussard Williams credited the amendment to 
hospitality industry lobbyists likely from the Louisiana Hotel-Motel Association or an equivalent 
organization.82 Williams stated that “somebody asked her [Hutter] for that, you can always tell.” 
We did not find evidence that hospitality industry representatives testified during committee 
hearings or floor debate for the changes Hutter proposed. The Committee adopted the 
amendment, forcing hotels and motels to permit smoking in at least 20% of their rooms and 
allowing them to designate 50% of rooms for smoking.105  
Another committee member introduced an amendment to exempt casino-operated 
hospitality guest rooms, outdoor patios, and designated, ventilated smoking rooms in nursing 
homes from SB 742’s smoking restrictions.110 The amendment also removed an original 
provision of SB 742 that allowed smoking in private and semi-private rooms at nursing homes87, 
110 The House Health and Welfare Committee adopted the amendment.  
 The House Health and Welfare Committee or one of its members proposed an 
amendment to prohibit smoking at restaurants and food service areas within gaming 
establishments.110 The change established no requirements for keeping secondhand smoke from 
drifting into eating areas. The Committee adopted the amendment, prohibiting smoking in food 
service areas of gaming establishments but failing to protect patrons from secondhand smoke 
exposure. 
After finalizing amendments, the House Health and Welfare Committee voted 13-1 to 
send SB 742 to the House Floor.109 As passed by the Committee, SB 742 prohibited smoking in 
public places and workplaces except for in fully enclosed restaurant bars, bars, casinos, tobacco 
industry businesses, and convention centers holding tobacco trade and Mardi Gras events. The 
committee also amended SB 742 to allow hotels and motels to designate 50% of guest rooms as 
smoking rooms and to prohibit smoking in restaurant and food service areas of casinos.  
 
 
Table 10.12: 2003-2006 Contributions to Representative Labruzzo from Industries Opposing 
SB 742111 
Industry Donor Contribution 
Amount 
Tobacco Altria $500 
Super Tobacco Discounters Inc. $150 
Gaming Louisiana Horsemens Benevolent & Protective Association $1,800 
Master Video Poker $1,800 
Alcohol  Beer Industry League of Louisiana $850 
Anhueser-Busch $120 
Miller Brewing Company $250 
Restaurant Louisiana Restaurant Association $5,000 
Miscellaneous restaurants $486 
Total $10,956 
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SB 742 Proponents Salvage Bill on House Floor 
 
The House considered SB 742 on June 12 and 15, 2006.87 Representatives introduced 
multiple amendments seeking to weaken or strengthen SB 742, ultimately adopting changes to 
further protect public health and completely prohibit smoking in all restaurants (Table 10.13). 
Rep. Jeff Arnold (D-Algiers) unsuccessfully introduced an amendment permitting 
restaurants to allow smoking if they held an alcoholic beverage license.112 Arnold next proposed 
an amendment granting restaurant owners the choice to prohibit smoking and argued that 
businesses be given the right to decide their policy.113 His second amendment failed 44 to 48.113 
Prior to becoming a representative in 2002, Arnold worked for multiple years on economic 
development for the City of New Orleans,114 a tourism destination with a prominent bar and 
restaurant scene that was decimated by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
  Representative LaBruzzo proposed expanding smoking restrictions in SB 742 to cover 
“any indoor establishment that serves food” as well as bars and casinos.113 Representative 
Daniel, who was handling SB 742, argued against adoption of LaBruzzo’s amendment, asserting 
it was “clearly designed to do one thing: kill the bill.”113 The House rejected Labruzzo’s change 
54-27.113 
In contrast to most attempted changes on the House Floor, which sought to weaken SB 
742, Representative and bill handler William Daniel proposed strengthening it. He offered an 
amendment redefining restaurants to include any bar 
located within a restaurant, which eliminated the exemption 
from smoking restrictions for enclosed bars in restaurants 
adopted by the Senate.113, 115 Daniel proposed the 
amendment for SB 742 proponents, who drafted it.80, 82 
LRA officer and lobbyist Jim Funk protested the 
amendment, claiming restaurants faced a “competitive 
disadvantage” to bars and casinos if it passed.113 After 
considering the amendment, representatives voted 53 to 41 
to adopt  the change and  make the House version of SB 742 prohibit smoking in all 
restaurants.113 In a 2016 interview for this report, AHA Louisiana Government Relations 
Director Williams recalled the impact of Daniel’s amendment, stating “Once I was able to show 
the coalition where the votes were, and that things were back on track, then they came back.”80 
Adoption of Daniel’s amendment reactivated the CTFLA Coalition and its efforts to pass SB 
742. 
After Daniel’s amendment passed, lawmakers continued attempts to weaken SB 742 on 
the House Floor. Representative Gordon Dove (D-Houma) proposed exempting enclosed 
restaurant bars featuring separate air conditioning units, a “smoke inhibitor” device (likely 
referring to air filters, which are ineffective at eliminating harmful secondhand smoke exposure 
116, 117), and a divider wall “at least seventy-five percent the height of the full wall” from smoking 
restrictions.118 Dove subsequently withdrew his amendment and replaced it with one allowing 
smoking in designated dining rooms. The second proposal required restaurant smoking sections 
to be fully enclosed, have a “smoke inhibitor” device, and feature a separate air conditioner from 
the rest of the restaurant.118 Dove argued that the amendment gave consideration to smokers, 
stating to representatives that “We can’t line smokers up and shoot them.”119 He also asserted the 
“Once I was able to show 
the coalition where the 
votes were, and that 
things were back on track, 
then they came back.” 
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amendment prevented restaurants from losing customers.119 Dove’s claims, that clean air laws 
discriminate against smokers and have negative economic effect on restaurants utilized 
traditional tobacco industry talking points against smoking restrictions.120, 121 The House rejected 
Dove’s amendment, maintaining total prohibition over smoking in restaurants.  
Table 10.13: Proposed Amendments to SB 742 on the House Floor87 
Amendment sponsor Strengthen or 
Weaken SB 742 
Provisions Status 
LaBruzzo Weakens Exempts establishments serving food from smoking restrictions. Rejected 
Dove Weakens Mandate separate ventilation system and smoke inhibitor for restaurant 
bars permitting smoking. Requires walls for enclosed restaurant bars to 
be at least 75% the height of standard walls in establishments. 
Withdrawn 
Dove Strengthens Require fully enclosed restaurant bars to have separate ventilation 
system and smoke inhibitor to allow smoking. 
Rejected 
Daniel Strengthens Increase fines 
for violating 
SB 742 
Penalties in SB 
742 as 
introduced to the 
House Floor 
$25-$50 state fine. Allows local 
penalties. 
Adopted 
Proposed 
Penalties 
Smoker: $25 (1st offence); $50 
(2nd offence); $100 (all others). 
Knowing employer: $100 (1st 
offence); $250 (2nd offence); 
$500 (all others ). 
Daniel Strengthens Redefine term “restaurant” to include any bar located within. Removes 
exception allowing smoking in restaurant bars. 
Adopted 
Martiny Strengthens Prohibit correctional facilities, whether private, local, or state, from 
allowing smoking after August 15, 2009. 
Adopted 
Smith Weakens Preempt local clean air restrictions.  Rejected 
Arnold Weakens Allow smoking in restaurants holding an alcohol license. Eliminates 
language allowing smoking in bar areas in restaurants.*  
Denied 
Dartez Strengthens Prohibit smoking in private limousines. Removes smoking restriction 
exemptions for bars, casinos, and convention facilities hosting tobacco 
related events or Mardi Gras events. 
Withdrawn 
Walsworth Strengthens Remove 20% minimum smoking rooms requirement for hotels and 
motels 
Adopted 
Crowe Weakens Remove House Health and Welfare Committee amendments 
prohibiting smoking in gaming establishment food service areas. 
Rejected 
LaBruzzo Strengthens Removes amendment exempting bars without food service from 
smoking restrictions. 
Submitted, no 
action taken 
Richmond Weakens Exempt Orleans Parish from SB 742. Submitted, no 
action taken 
Arnold Weakens Eliminate House Health and Welfare Committee amendment requiring 
restaurant bars allowing smoking to be fully enclosed. 
Submitted, no 
action taken 
Arnold Strengthens / 
Weakens 
Remove bar and restaurant bar smoking restriction exemption. 
Removes smoking prohibition over food service areas in gaming 
establishments. 
Submitted, no 
action taken 
*Smoking would be allowed throughout restaurant if amendment passed. 
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Representative Jack Smith (D-Stephensville) proposed changing SB 742 to prohibit local 
governments from enacting smoking restrictions stronger than state law.122 As introduced, SB 
742 featured an anti-preemption clause to eliminate statewide smoking restriction preemption 
over local control. The industry had secured smoker accommodation legislation instituting 
preemption in 1993 (Chapter 5) that health advocates partially repealed in 2003. Smith’s 
amendment prevented comprehensive local control and maintained preemption, antithetical to 
health advocates’ goals in passing SB 742. During debate, Smith argued that people would not 
“know what the rules are because there will be separate ordinances throughout the state.”119 
Representatives rejected the amendment, protecting SB 742’s anti-preemption clause. 
Representative Daniel Martiny (R-Kenner) secured an amendment to prohibit smoking 
within public and private correctional facilities effective August 15, 2009.123 Previously, there 
had been no legal restrictions on smoking in correctional facilities in Louisiana. In a 2019 
interview for this report, AHA Louisiana Government Relations Director Terri Broussard 
Williams asserted Martiny offered the amendment on behalf of SB 742’s opponents.82 She 
reasoned in an earlier 2016 interview for this report that the amendment was possibly introduced 
as a distraction.80 Representative Martiny received the third highest amount of tobacco industry 
campaign contributions among Louisiana Legislators in years covered by this report (Chapter 3), 
and ultimately voted against SB 742.113 Health advocates backed Martiny’s measure during 
consideration.80 According to Williams in her 2019 interview for this report, smoking restriction 
opponents argued against the amendment claiming that prohibiting prisoners from smoking made 
them more dangerous, hoping it would kill the bill: 
Research shows that people in jail have a high rate of smoking. And so they 
[unspecified] kept telling us that they already had trouble really keeping 
prisoners—you know, their behavior, they had trouble getting them to act right 
and if they took away their cigarettes, that they would become violent in jail.82 
The House adopted Martiny’s amendment, causing SB 742 to prohibit smoking in public and 
private correctional facilities if adopted.87 Although intended to reduce SB 742’s viability, the 
amendment strengthened the bill’s smoking restrictions and ultimately did not hinder the 
legislation’s passage. 
The House also removed the minimum hotel and motel smoking room requirement 
attached by Representative Nitta Hutter in the House Health and Welfare Committee that would 
force hospitality establishments to allow smoking. Representative Mike Walsworth (R-Ouachita) 
obtained an amendment eliminating the requirement that hotels and motels designate at least 
20% of guest rooms for smoking. Walsworth’s change permitted hospitality establishments to 
institute 100% smokefree policies. However, SB 742 still permitted hotels and motels to 
designate up to half of guest rooms as smoking.  
After finalizing amendments, Representatives voted 58-33 to pass SB 742 and return it to 
the Senate for approval of House-made changes.113 In a 2016 interview for this report, -ACS 
contract lobbyist Cindy Bishop recalled Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and US Tobacco lobbyists 
prematurely celebrating SB 742’s defeat the day that the bill passed: 
I’ll never forget them [tobacco industry representatives] patting each other on the 
back the day the bill came up to be heard, saying, ‘We got it. We got it.’ And you 
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know, we fought that two-hour long debate on the House Floor. And they 
[tobacco industry representatives] didn’t have it, obviously, because we prevailed 
and by a wide margin.81 
SB 742 continued prohibiting smoking in most public places and workplaces except for at bars, 
casinos, convention center events for tobacco products or Mardi Gras, and tobacco industry 
businesses. Representatives strengthened SB 742 on the Floor, adding an amendment to prohibit 
smoking in correctional facilities and allow hotels and motels to prohibit smoking. The House 
also passed an amendment to prohibit smoking in all restaurants, reversing a Senate Floor change 
allowing smoking in enclosed restaurant bars. 
Senators approved House amendments to SB 742 on June 16, 2006, sending the bill to 
the Governor for approval. A spokesperson for Governor Kathleen Blanco, who earlier signaled 
she would sign SB 742, stated there was no indication her support for the bill had changed.124 
  
After the legislature passed SB 742,  LRA officials and Representative Cedric Richmond 
(D-New Orleans) tried persuading Governor Kathleen Blanco to veto the bill despite her 
previously expressed intention to sign it.124 Representative Richmond was a member of the New 
Orleans delegation, and considered RJR lobbyist CJ Blache as one of his mentors.82 Richmond 
published an editorial opposing SB 742.82 He and LRA organized a joint call with Governor 
Blanco to persuade her to oppose the bill.124, 125 They also attacked SB 742 in the press using 
traditional tobacco industry claims, arguing the bill negatively “discriminated” against 
restaurants by putting them at a competitive disadvantage with bars and gaming 
establishments.124, 126 Richmond and  LRA claimed resulting damage to the restaurant industry 
could hinder Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts.124, 126 Meanwhile, LRA CEO Jim Funk 
indicated his organization might pursue a lawsuit to overturn SB 742 if Blanco signed the bill.124 
 
CTFLA actively countered efforts by opponents to prevent SB 742’s enactment into law. 
After Richmond and LRA set up a call with Blanco, AHA Louisiana Government Relations 
Director Terri Broussard Williams and ACS Government Relations Director Zoey Devall wrote 
Acting Legislative Director Hunt Downer to arrange a conference with the Governor to convince 
her to sign the bill.124 The letter claimed that smokefree policies were the only effective method 
of protecting against secondhand smoke. They also referenced Surgeon General Richard 
Carmona’s report reiterating secondhand smoke’s damaging effects in the letter. According to 
Williams in a 2019 interview for this report, CTFLA also “leaned a lot on personal relationships 
and key stakeholders. That was when we really leaned on our grasstops.”82 Williams alerted 
reporters to Richmond’s efforts to generate awareness of the attack on SB 742.82 CTFLA worked 
to generate press for the bill to pressure Governor Blanco to sign it.80 In addition, the Coalition 
generated calls to Blanco’s office and letters to newspapers to increase public awareness and 
support for SB 742.80 
 
ANR assisted CTFLA efforts to protect SB 742 from being vetoed. ANR issued an action 
alert on June 20, 2006 encouraging recipients to contact Governor Blanco and urge her to protect 
employees and tourists in Louisiana restaurants and businesses from secondhand smoke by 
signing SB 742.127 The action alert asserted that the bill was “a major victory and step forward 
for public health in Louisiana” that prevented tobacco-related illnesses and deaths.127   
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CTFLA representatives were uncertain about SB 742’s fate. In a 2016 interview for this 
report, ACS contract lobbyist Cindy Bishop said she believed CTFLA expected the bill to be 
enacted, stating “I don’t think we had any doubt that Kathleen Babineaux Blanco was going to 
sign our bill into law…she understood the health impact of smoking.”81 However, in a 2019 
interview for this report AHA lobbyist Terri Broussard Williams, recalled fearing a veto, saying 
“I was by myself for a while. So I was definitely in a state where I did not feel like it was going 
to happen.”82  
 
Governor Blanco signed SB 742, the 
Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act, into law on June 30, 
2006. ACS contract lobbyist Cindy Bishop reflected 
on CTFLA’s victory in her 2016 interview for this 
report:  
 
Do you know about the story in the Bible 
about David and Goliath? When I think about 
this effort, it was a Herculean effort. And it 
reminds me of the David and Goliath story.81   
 
Remembering the Coalition’s success, TFL’s Rosalind Bello stated, “I think everybody was 
really shocked when that [the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act passing] happened in 2006.”128 
 
As adopted, SB 742 prohibited smoking in indoor public places, school property, 
restaurants, food service areas of gaming establishments, and correctional facilities (Table 
10.14).129 Smokers faced a $25 fine for initial smoking restriction violations, followed by $50 for 
second violations and $100 penalties for additional infractions. Employers knowingly offending 
SB 742 received a $100 penalty for first offences, a $250 fine for second infractions, and a $500 
penalty for subsequent violations. SB 742 assigned enforcement to the DHH and law 
enforcement. Exempted from smokefree requirements were bars, private limousines, businesses 
in the tobacco sector, tobacco stores, gaming establishments, gaming establishment guest rooms, 
up to 50% of hospitality guest rooms, convenience store or tobacco industry events at convention 
centers that featured tobacco products, convention center Mardi Gras events, outdoor patios, 
Table 10.14: SB 742 As Adopted by the Louisiana State Legislature129 
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Health and 
Hospitals 
Offender: (i) $25, (ii) 
$50, (iii) $100 
 
Employer: (i) $100, 
(ii) $250, (iii) $500 
*Smoking prohibited in food service areas 
“Do you know about the story 
in the Bible about David and 
Goliath? When I think about 
this effort, it was a Herculean 
effort. And it reminds me of the 
David and Goliath story.” 
 467 
 
private and semi-private rooms occupied by consenting smokers at long term care facilities, and 
ventilated smoking rooms in nursing homes.  
 
SB 742 fully repealed preemption, allowing local governments to adopt comprehensive 
smokefree ordinances that covered places exempted by the statewide bill. SB 742 entered effect 
January 1, 2007. After SB 742’s adoption, Louisiana became one of 38 states that did not 
preempt local smokefree ordinances and one of 22 states with an explicit anti-preemption clause 
in their law to protect local smoking restrictions.130, 131 
 
Implementation of the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act  
 
After SB 742 passed, Louisiana’s tobacco control programs assisted implementation. 
TFL Associate Director Rosalind Bello and Director Ashley Ross sought implementation advice 
from ANR and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, who connected TFL to people 
knowledgeable with implementing smokefree legislation.128 In a 2014 interview for this report, 
Bello stated that contacts told TFL to tackle implementation proactively:  
 
Get out front early. Be prepared. You don't want to be reactionary, you want to be 
proactive in getting messaging out and making sure that all your bases are 
covered. So we had little forums for law enforcement and information [around] 
law enforcement. We had stuff for schools. What did it mean for schools? What 
did it mean for restaurants? So we tried to cover the bases that way.128 
TFL and CTFLA developed a joint plan to implement the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act.73 
CTFLA partners ACS and AHA also supported implementation by providing speaker training to 
Louisiana tobacco control programs and performing air quality studies.82 
TFL and CTFLA assisted implementation in various ways. The tobacco control programs 
arranged thank you events in nine regions for grassroots tobacco control advocates and state and 
local lawmakers.73 TFL also ran a television media campaign entitled “Thanks from the Bottom 
of Our Hearts and Lungs,” which aired from October to December 2006 to maintain awareness 
and support for the new law.73 In addition, TFL conducted an air quality test demonstrating the 
air quality improvement in smokefree venues following the state law’s passage. TFL also 
developed implementation kits.80   
Attempts to Repeal the Smoke-Free Air Act 
 
 In 2007, Representatives Robert Faucheaux Jr. (D-Gramercy) and Alex Heaton (R-New 
Orleans) attempted to weaken smoking restrictions established by the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air 
Act.132 Faucheaux introduced HB 537 to permit smoking at bars in private clubs.133 Heaton 
submitted HB 824 to exclude enclosed areas in restaurants with separate ventilation systems 
from the definition of restaurant under the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act and permit smoking in 
those areas.134 
Representatives Faucheux and Heaton had ties to the tobacco industry and its allies. 
Faucheaux previously received $250 from Altria / Philip Morris, $500 from the Louisiana 
Restaurant Association, and $250 from industry-tied law firm Adam and Reese,135 which the 
tobacco industry used to assist its tort reform efforts in the late 1980s (Chapter 8). He also 
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received a $250 donation from the Tobacco Institute in 1998.136 Heaton received campaign 
contributions from Altria / Phillip Morris ($3,000), the Tobacco Institute ($700), RJ Reynolds 
($250), and the Smokeless Tobacco Council ($250).137 He also obtained campaign donations 
from tobacco industry allies the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry ($7,500), 
LABI’s East PAC ($4,952), law firm Chaffee McCall Phillips Toler and Sarpy, The Louisiana 
Wholesale Food and Tobacco Association, PM lobbyist Randy Haynie’s firm Haynie and 
Associates ($1,500), the Beer Industry League of Louisiana ($6,612), and the Louisiana 
Restaurant Association ($3,500)(Table 10.15).137 
 
 
Table 10.15: Contributions from the Tobacco Industry and its Allies to Representative Alex Heaton 
from 1997-2007136-138 
Contributor Contribution Year Contribution Amount Total 
Philip Morris 1995 $500 $3,000 
1997 $500 
1998 $500 
1999 $500 
1999 $500 
2000 $500 
RJ Reynolds 1998 $250 $250 
Tobacco Institute 1996 $200 $700 
1997 $250 
1998 $250 
Smokeless Tobacco 
Council 
1999 $250 $250 
LABI 1999 $2,955 $7,500 
2000 $2,500 
2000 $2,045 
LABI EastPAC 1999 $2,452 $4,952 
2000 $2,500 
Beer Industry League 
of Louisiana 
1997 $500 $6,612 
1998 $612 
1998 $500 
1999 $1000 
1999 $500 
2000 $1000 
2000 $500 
2003 $2000 
Haynie and Associates  1999 $1000 $1,500 
2000 $500 
Louisiana Restaurant 
Association 
1998 $1,000 $3,500 
1999 $1,500 
2000 $500 
2003 $500 
Chaffee McCall 
Phillips Toler and 
Sarpy 
2000 $500 $500 
Louisiana Wholesale 
Food and Tobacco 
Association 
1998 $100 $300 
1999 $100 
2000 $100 
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TFL, with assistance from CTFLA and ACS, defended the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air 
Act from legislative attacks in 2008.132 TFL and ACS circulated fact sheets and met with 
lawmakers to inform them about how the smokefree act benefitted Louisiana. In addition, TFL 
and ACS visited editorial boards in prominent Louisiana media markets to alert the public that 
CTFLA intended to preserve the integrity of the 2006 smokefree law. TFL Baton Rouge Area 
Regional Coordinator Pam Malveaux also wrote a letter published by the Baton Rouge Advocate 
attacking HB 537 and HB 824 for seeking smoking exemptions that exposed the public to 
secondhand smoke.139 She cited polls conducted by TFL that year that found 81% of Louisiana 
voters supported restaurant smoking restrictions and 78% smoking restrictions for workplaces, to 
highlight that the bills went against the public’s desires.139  
Tobacco control advocates sparred over HB 537 and HB 824 with lawmakers 
sympathetic to business interests during a House Health and Welfare Committee hearing on June 
5, 2007.140 Dr. Mitchell Lirtzman, who previously testified in support of the Lafayette smokefree 
ordinance in 2005 and SB 742 in 2006, told committee members about various tobacco-related 
illnesses, asserted that tobacco use inflicted significant harm and death, and claimed weakening 
smoking restrictions would result in “a public health disaster.”140 CTFLA representatives 
attended the hearing and cautioned the Committee against weakening a public health law.140 
LRA CEO Jim Funk complained that smoking 
restrictions put restaurants at a competitive 
disadvantage to bars, and correctly asserted to 
committee members that “if smoking is bad for you 
in a restaurant, it’s bad for you in the bar next-
door.”140 HB 824 sponsor Alex Heaton argued 
smoking restrictions discriminated against restaurants that had bars. Representative Diane 
Winston (R-Covington), who owned a business that sold tobacco products, expressed sympathy 
for weakening smoking restrictions out of fairness.140 Representative Robbie Carter (D-
Greensburg) expressed support for existing smoking restrictions, arguing that restaurants should 
find alternative methods to increase revenue.140 
Following debate, the House Health and Welfare Committee voted 9-3 to defer HB 
537140 after committee members failed to introduce an amendment Faucheux requested to 
prohibit smoking in bars, convention centers, and gaming establishments. HB 824 was also 
deferred at the hearing.134 
After 2007 no additional attempts were made to weaken the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air 
Act.  
Attempts to Strengthen the State Law: 2008-2010 
 
From 2008 to 2010, lawmakers proposed 8 bills and one resolution to restrict smoking in 
places exempted or not covered by the 2006 Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act (Table 10.15). All 
but two, HB 466 and resolution HR 69, failed in the legislature (Table 10.15). As introduced in 
2008, HB 466 eliminated a smoking restriction exemption for designated, ventilated smoking 
rooms in nursing homes. HB 466 passed with a House Health and Welfare Committee 
amendment that permitted designated smoking areas in nursing homes but prohibited their 
placement in waiting or lobby areas, dining rooms, and other public areas of establishments,141 
practically negating the bill’s intention and public health impact. The only other legislation to 
After 2007 no additional 
attempts were made to weaken 
the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act.  
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pass, 2008 resolution HR 69, prohibited tobacco products in all House-controlled areas of the 
State Legislature (Table 10.16). The legislation had limited effects on clean air restrictions since 
smoking was already prohibited in the state capitol.142 Without making amendments, 
representatives voted 62-19 to approve HR 69, prohibiting tobacco products in all House-
controlled areas of the legislature.143 
Attempts to Include Bars and Casinos in State Smoking Restrictions 2008-2010 
 
Smoking restriction bills introduced and rejected by state lawmakers from 2008-2010 
primarily sought to prohibit smoking in bars and casinos, and as a result faced opposition from 
those industries. Three of the bills died in the House Health and Welfare Committee (Table 
10.16). According to the Baton Rouge Advocate in a 2010 article, “in recent years, the [House 
Health and Welfare] committee has been a graveyard for bills that sought to expand Louisiana’s 
Smoke-Free Air Act.”150 
2008 Legislation 
 
In 2008, SB 742 sponsor Rob Marionneaux introduced SB 185 to prohibit smoking in 
bars serving food (Table 10.16). Senator Marionneaux proposed the bill to establish parity 
between food-serving bars and restaurants.151 TFL Advocacy and Policy Manager Carrie 
Broussard expressed support for SB 185 to the press stating, “We would support a smoke-free 
environment, period.” She claimed TFL desired to discuss SB 185 with Marionneaux and wanted 
to ensure current smoking restrictions were not weakened. Philip Morris notified the media it did 
not plan action against any smoking restriction legislation.151 SB 185 died in the Senate Health 
and Welfare Committee without consideration.152 Marionneaux later introduced bills in 2009 and 
2010 to prohibit smoking at food-serving bars. 
Representative Walker Hines (D-New Orleans) introduced HB 1021 in 2008 to prohibit 
smoking in cars occupied by a minor under 18 years of age.153 At the time, Louisiana law only 
prohibited tobacco use in cars when minors under 13 were present.153 Hines also introduced HB 
240 that year to raise the minimum age of purchase for tobacco products in Louisiana from 18 to 
21 (Chapter 7).154 We did not find evidence that tobacco control advocates or the business 
community worked for or against HB 1021 during the legislative session. 
The House Transportation, Highways and Public Works Committee deferred HB 1021 at 
a hearing on April 28, 2008.153 Committee members indicated that the bill overreached, with one 
lawmaker asserting that children needed additional protection from smoking compared to teens 
because they lacked autonomy.153 The House Transportation, Highways and Public Works 
Committee reconsidered and passed HB 1021 on May 12, 2008 after Hines secured an 
amendment reducing the age of an accompanying minor prohibiting smoking in a car from 18 to 
16.155  
Representatives twice failed to approve HB 1021 by one vote, voting to pass the bill 52-
26 on May 21 and 52-34 on May 28.144 We do not know if health advocates or the business 
community lobbied HB 1021. The House reconsidered HB 1021 a third time on June 4 and 
passed the bill without changes.  
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Table 10.16: Smokefree Legislation as Introduced Between 2008-2010141, 143-149 
Bill Author Year Smoking Restrictions  Full: +   Partial: ^  Outcome 
   Bars Casinos Legislative 
Areas Controlled 
by the House of 
Representatives 
Cars with 
Minor Under 
18 Present 
Nursing Home 
Smoking 
Rooms 
 
HB 466 Jerome “Dee” 
Richard (I - 
Thibodeaux) 
2008     + Adopted*** 
HB 1021 Walker Hines 2008    +  Died in Senate Committee on 
Transportation, Highways and 
Public Works. 
HR 69 Karen Carter Peterson 2008   +   Adopted 
SB 185 Rob Marionneaux 2008 ^*     Died with adjournment in 
Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee 
HB 844 Gary Smith (D-
Norco) 
2009 +     Rejected by House (amended to 
ban smoking in gaming 
establishments) 
SB 186 Rob Marionneaux (D-
Livonia) 
2009 ^*     Died in House Health and 
Welfare Committee 
SB 334 Rob Marionneaux 2010 ^*     Killed on Senate Floor 
SB 348 Rob Marionneaux 2010 + +    Killed in House Health and 
Welfare Committee 
HB 1323 Rick Nowlin 2010  ^**    Killed in House Health and 
Welfare Committee 
*Prohibited smoking in any bar serving food. 
**Prohibits smoking in riverboat and land casinos with a permitted occupancy amount over 500 people. Also permits smoking in riverboat and land 
casinos featuring a separate smokefree gaming facility. 
*** Amended in HWC to allow smoking rooms except in areas considered public places by 2006 smokefree law. 
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The Senate Transportation, Highways and Public Works Committee considered HB 1021 
on June 12, 2008.156 At the hearing, Hines claimed the bill nearly acted as a component of 
Louisiana’s law against child abuse.156 He also argued HB 1021 lowered healthcare costs by 
reducing the amount of children needing treatment for asthma and allergies.156 Committee 
member Senator Butch Gautreaux (D-Morgan City) opposed HB 1021, complaining that the bill 
was another attempt to make legal acts criminal. The Committee voted 3-2 to reject HB 1021, 
killing the legislation.156 HB 1021 sponsor Hines later tried and failed to attach HB 1021 as an 
amendment to legislation prohibiting texting in cars.157  
2009 Legislation Fails 
 
Representative Gary Smith introduced HB 
844 in 2009 to prohibit smoking in bars. The bill 
died on the House Floor after he amended it in the 
House Health and Welfare Committee to prohibit 
smoking in gaming establishments in an effort at 
parity.145, 158  
Initially, the bar industry opposed HB 844 
without assistance from the gaming industry.158 
After casinos were included in HB 844, the casino 
industry fought the bill. In general, HB 844 opponents argued customers and establishments 
should be able to make their own decisions on smoking.158 Opponents also claimed smoking 
restrictions harmed businesses.158 The gaming industry promoted a study showing that gaming 
revenue dropped 20% in Illinois after the state passed smokefree legislation covering gaming 
establishments.158 Tobacco control proponents defended HB 844 by referencing studies showing 
gaming revenue did not suffer from existing smoking restrictions covering casinos in California, 
Kentucky and Montreal. Supporters highlighted studies showing smokefree policies reduced 
business costs by lowering cleaning requirements, health care expenses, and absences.158 
Representatives sided with the bar and gaming industry, voting 71-29 to kill SB 844.158 
Senator Marionneaux introduced SB 186 in 2009 to prohibit smoking in bars serving 
food. The Louisiana Restaurant Association, usually against smoking restrictions, backed SB 186 
because it eliminated a competitive advantage the organization perceived smoking bars with food 
service had over smokefree restaurants.159 The bar and gaming industries opposed SB 186 upon 
the bill’s introduction.159 According to coverage from The Advocate, opponents argued SB 186 
robbed people of choice. Video poker lobbyist Alton Ashy also asserted the bill harmed small 
businesses. Despite industry opposition, the Senate Health and Welfare Committee adopted an 
amendment from Senator Yvonne Dorsey (D-Baton Rouge) at SB 186’s first hearing to prohibit 
smoking in all gaming establishments and bars.159  
SB 186 subsequently passed the Senate with increased smoking restrictions but was 
weakened and then defeated at a House Health and Welfare Committee meeting on June 9, 
2009.160 Believing the casino industry killed HB 844 a week before, Senator Marionneaux 
convinced committee members to amend SB 186 to only prohibit smoking in bars serving food 
instead of all bars and casinos. Despite the amendment, bar and casino representatives remained 
opposed to SB 186 and secured the bill’s defeat. At the House Committee hearing, Louisiana 
Association of Beverage Alcohol Licenses lobbyist Mike Young argued SB 186 placed bars at a 
HB 844 opponents argued 
customers and establishments 
should be able to make their 
own decisions on smoking. 
Opponents also claimed smoking 
restrictions harmed businesses. 
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competitive disadvantage and incentivized them against offering food. Video poker lobbyist 
Alton Ashy intoned to committee members that prohibiting smoking in food-serving bars harmed 
them by pushing customers to alternative establishments160 Opponents also claimed that small 
businesses with gaming would lose business to bigger gambling venues, and that bars should 
have the ability to set their own smoking policy.161 After hearing comments, the House Health 
and Welfare Committee voted 11-6 to reject SB 186. 
Failed 2010 Legislation 
 
Senator Rob Marionneaux introduced SB 348 in 2010 to forbid smoking in bars and 
gaming establishments. Bar and casino representatives opposed SB 348, arguing its smoking 
restrictions were economically harmful. At a Senate Health and Welfare Committee hearing for 
SB 348, Casino Association of Louisiana Executive Director Wade Duty argued the bill 
economically harmed Louisiana casinos by driving customers to establishments allowing 
smoking.162 At SB 348’s later House Health and Welfare Committee hearing, alcohol and 
gaming industry representatives told legislators that prohibiting smoking in bars and gaming 
establishments reduced customers, economically harmed them, caused layoffs, and reduced state 
and local tax revenues.150 Smokefree proponents also attended the House Committee hearing to 
support SB 348. LSU School of Public Health Assistant Professor Daniel Harrington informed 
lawmakers that bar and casino patrons experienced 14 times more secondhand smoke exposure 
according to one of his surveys, and that air quality testing in bars and casinos found 
significantly unhealthy conditions.150 Marionneaux urged the committee to adopt SB 348, 
arguing that tobacco-reliant North Carolina had already prohibited smoking in bars. The House 
Health and Welfare Committee sided with industry interests and killed the bill.150   
Besides SB 348, Senator Marionneaux introduced SB 334 to prohibit smoking in bars 
serving food, similar to legislation he proposed in 2008 and 2009 (Table 10.16). Marionneaux 
filed SB 334 as a backup bill in case SB 348 struggled during the legislative process.163 Although 
SB 334 was weaker than SB 348, alcohol industry lobbyist Chris Young asserted that he and the 
gaming industry still intended to defeatit.164 We do not know what actions the bar and gaming 
industries took against the bill. The Senate Health and Welfare Committee weakened SB 334 to 
permit smoking at bars where food sales comprised less than 10% of sales then passed the bill.148 
Senators subsequently voted 21-15 to reject SB 334 on May 19, 2010.165 During Floor debate, 
Senators complained that SB 334 negatively impacted small businesses and that an exemption 
from smoking restrictions for bars with food sales less than 10% of total sales was too easy to 
accidentally offend.165 
 Representative Rick Nowlin (R-Natchitoches) introduced HB 1323 in 2010 to add 
riverboats and casinos into existing smoking restrictions if they had an occupancy rating of over 
500 people unless they maintained a separate smokefree facility. HB 1323 defined separate 
facilities as having separate ventilation systems or ventilation systems that featured technology to 
remove smoke from air circulated to smokefree areas.166 Smoking and smokefree facilities also 
needed walls and doors separating them.166 
The House Health and Welfare Committee deferred HB 1323 at a House Health and 
Welfare Committee hearing on May 9, 2010.166 At the hearing, Louisiana Casino Association 
Executive Director Wade Duty asserted to committee members that a June 2009 study of Illinois 
casinos after a smokefree air law passed in that state reduced gaming industry employment, tax 
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revenue and profits.166 He also stated that the research found Indiana, which permitted smoking 
in casinos, received 6% of Illinois’ business after smoking restrictions entered effect.166 Duty 
claimed that 65% of casino customers and 24% of Louisianans smoked, and argued that 
prohibiting smoking in some gaming establishments threatened 3,300 jobs and $80 million of tax 
revenue in Louisiana.166 He also asserted that creating separate smoking and smokefree areas at 
riverboat gaming establishments was unfeasible because of their structural design and need for 
physical changes to be approved by the Coast Guard.166 We did not find evidence that tobacco 
control advocates defended HB 1323 at the hearing. HB 1323 sponsor Rick Nowlin attacked the 
design of the Illinois casino study used by Duty but failed to convince committee members to 
support his bill.166 The House Health and Welfare Committee voted 8-6 to defer HB 1323,166 
killing it. 
Conclusion 
 
Public health advocates seek clean indoor air policies because they reduce secondhand 
smoke exposure, denormalize smoking behavior, and have neutral or positive economic impacts 
on the hospitality industry despite claims from the tobacco industry that smokefree policies hurt 
business.167 Comprehensive statewide clean indoor air policies have been associated with 
reductions in secondhand smoke exposure and lower consumption levels in adults and youth. 
Workplace policies affect smoking behavior and exposure, and workplace smoking bans are 
associated with decreased secondhand smoke exposure, reduced consumption, and reduced 
smoking prevalence.168 Louisiana adopted the Louisiana Smoke-free Air Act in 2006 to protect 
public health and reduce tobacco-related health problems. 
In 1993, the tobacco industry secured passage of the Louisiana Clean Indoor Air Act and 
the Louisiana Office Clean Indoor Air Act, enacting accommodation policies into law and 
prohibiting local restrictions stronger than the State’s for a period of ten years (Chapter 5). As a 
result, Louisiana experienced a ten-year period of weak smoking restrictions and total 
preemption over local control. In 1997 state medical groups, the Louisiana Tobacco Control 
Program, and health voluntaries came together to form the Coalition for a Tobacco-Free 
Louisiana. Health interests operating in Louisiana repeatedly participated in CTFLA to pursue 
tobacco control legislation, sustaining partnerships between members and maintaining a public 
brand for tobacco control. 
Tobacco control advocates in Louisiana developed comprehensive, sustained 
collaborative efforts and campaigns beginning in 2001 that resulted in the reinstitution of local 
authority over smoking restrictions and adoption of a statewide clean air law that prohibited 
smoking in most public places. After CTFLA revitalized under the Louisiana Public Health 
Institute, its members developed goals in consensus and employed a multilevel campaign 
utilizing grassroots networks, paid and earned media, as well as outreach to local and state 
lawmakers to increase support and pressure for repealing preemption over local clean air 
regulations.  
In 2001, CTFLA mobilized local governments to pressure state legislators to restore local 
control but failed to secure preemption repeal legislation. CTFLA subsequently formed an 
advocacy coalition of local legislators favoring tobacco control policies and legislators desiring 
local level decision-making as well as limited state government to pressure state lawmakers. 
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Sixteen cities also passed resolutions urging the state government to restore local control over 
smoking restrictions.  
Dedicated efforts by CTFLA and its members secured policy victories in 2003 and 2006 
that eliminate preemption and obtain an effective statewide smokefree law. In 2003, the coalition 
partially repealed preemption over smoking restrictions in public places except bars, gaming 
establishments, and restaurant bars. CTFLA and TFL capitalized on partial preemption repeal to 
bring tobacco control to the local level where the industry is less powerful.169, 170 CTFLA 
members and TFL enabled sixteen localities including Shreveport, Mandeville, Sulphur  and 
Lafayette to pass clean indoor air laws.171, 172 Partial repeal allowed health advocates to generate 
public awareness and support for stronger smoking restrictions and a full repeal of preemption by 
passing local ordinances. In 2006, CTFLA campaigned to pass SB 742, a statewide clean air law 
that fully repealed preemption. The Coalition employed paid and earned media, smokefree 
events, and promoted restaurants adopting smokefree policies to generate public support for 
smoking restrictions. Despite business community opposition, continual advocacy by key 
lobbyists and lawmakers allowed tobacco control advocates to overcome sabotage attempts and 
pass SB 742 as effective public health legislation. Coalition members and tobacco control 
programs then engaged in a media campaign and policy outreach to ensure ready adoption and 
compliance with the new Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act.  
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Chapter 11: Tax Increase Efforts Following the MSA 
 
• State lawmakers adopted a 4¢ per pack cigarette tax increase in 2000, the first increase since 
1990.  
• Health and tobacco control advocates secured a 12¢ increase to the cigarette tax in 2002 with 
dedicated funding for tobacco control. 
• Louisiana has remained a low tobacco tax state, with the 49th highest cigarette tax rate 
nationwide in 2015 until moving to 36th that year; in 2016 it improved to 33rd. 
 
Louisiana legislators made minimal progress on increasing tobacco taxes from the 1970s 
through the 1990s, causing Louisiana’s cigarette tax rate to become among the lowest in the 
United States. Health advocates secured a 12¢ cigarette pack increase in 2002 but failed to 
sustain momentum and win additional increases, causing Louisiana to have the second lowest 
tobacco tax in the nation by 2014. However, the Invest in a Healthy Louisiana Coalition, 
composed of the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL), the Louisiana Cancer 
Prevention and Control Programs, the American Heart Association (AHA), the American Lung 
Association (ALA), the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network (ACS-CAN), and the 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (CTFK),1 ran legislative campaigns that helped raised the 
cigarette tax per pack 50¢ in 2015 and another 22¢ in 2016.2, 3 Louisiana tobacco taxes remained 
low after the increases, even compared to other southern states (Figure 11.1). The 2015 and 2016 
increases brought the total cigarette tax per pack to $1.08,3 ranking it 33rd nationally.4 In late 
2019, Louisiana’s cigarette tax remained unchanged, ranking the state 37th nationwide.5-7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.1: Cigarette Pack Tax Rates Over Time in Louisiana and Select Southern States 6, 8 
*No cigarette tax increases occurred among featured southern states after 2016. 
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A Tobacco Tax Increase is adopted in 2000 
 
The Budget Deficit Leads to Consideration of a Cigarette Tax Increase 
 
Louisiana faced a $540 million budget deficit for 
the 2000-2001 fiscal year.9 In order to avoid raising 
corporate or individual income taxes, state legislators 
were inclined to consider tax increases on cigarettes, 
alcohol, food, utilities, and river boat casinos during the 
2000 session.  
 
Table 11.1: Tobacco Tax Legislation as Introduced in the 2000 Legislative Session10-13 
  HB 51 HB 52 HB 56 HB 117 
 Existing Tax Rates Proposed Tax Rates 
Cigarette 
Packs 
20¢ Per Pack 60¢ Per Pack (40¢ 
Increase) 
-- 60¢ Per Pack (40¢ 
Increase) 
34¢ Per Pack 
(14¢ Increase) 
Cigars 
(Priced at 
$120 or 
Less Per 
1000) 
8% of invoice 
price 
16% of invoice 
price 
-- -- -- 
Cigars 
(Priced at 
$120 or 
More Per 
1000) 
20% of invoice 
price 
40% of invoice 
price 
-- -- -- 
Loose Leaf 
Tobacco 
33% 66% of invoice 
price 
-- -- -- 
Matches 
and 
Lighters 
--* -- 99% sales tax  -- 
*No tax specific to matches and lighters. 
 
To address the budget crisis, State Representative Robert Faucheux (D-LaPlace) and 
House Speaker Charles W. Dewitt (D- LeCompte) introduced tobacco tax increase bills (Table 
11.1). Representative Faucheux prefiled HB 51, 52 and 56 on April 11, 2000 to implement tax 
increases on tobacco products and accessories.10-12 HB 51 increased cigarette taxes 40¢ per pack, 
set a 16% tax on cigars priced at $120 or less per 1000, a 40% tax on cigars priced at $120 or 
greater per 1000, and a 66% tax on loose leaf tobacco.11 HB 51 did not allocate revenue 
generated by these taxes.11 HB 52 established a 99% sales tax on matches and cigarette lighters 
with revenue dedicated to teaching and research hospitals.12 HB 56 raised the cigarette tax 40¢ 
and dedicated the revenue to prevention, research, education, and treatment programs for public 
hospitals and associated academic health centers specializing “in maternal health, cancer, and 
cardiopulmonary disease.”10 Speaker Dewitt prefiled HB 117 on April 19, 2000.13 Cosponsored 
by Representatives Bryant Hammett (D-Ferriday) and Jerry Luke LeBlanc (D-Lafayette), as well 
as State Senators Robert Barham (D-Oak Ridge), Jay Dardenne (R-Baton Rouge), and John 
Hainkel (R-New Orleans), HB 117 increased the cigarette tax by 14¢ per pack without 
dedications.13 All four bills were referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means for 
consideration.  
Louisiana faced a $540 
million budget deficit for the 
2000-2001 fiscal year. 
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In mid-April 2000, before consideration of tobacco tax bills, the Louisiana Legislative 
Fiscal Office released potential revenue estimates for tobacco tax increases.14 The agency 
predicted that $78.7 million in revenue could be generated by raising the cigarette tax 20¢ per 
pack and increasing cigar and pipe tobacco taxes between 8% and 33% of invoice price.  
 
Public interest groups supported HB 51, HB 52 and HB 56 while business interests 
opposed them. Health advocates, health voluntaries, and a teacher’s union supported Faucheux’s 
bills (HB 51, HB 52, and HB 56) as a means to improve Louisiana’s health and protect minors. 
The tobacco industry and its wholesale and retail community allies opposed the bills claiming 
they were unnecessary and ineffective at preventing underage tobacco use, economically 
harmful, regressive, unfair to smokers, and likely to cause crime and reduce state revenue. All 
three bills ultimately stalled in the House Ways and Means Committee. 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee considered findings and arguments against 
tobacco taxes on March 22, 2000. At the hearing, State fiscal office employee Greg Albert 
testified that cigarettes provided 90% or more of total revenue to the state from Louisiana’s 
combined tobacco product taxes.15 He stated that cigarettes should be the primary focus for 
taxation if lawmakers sought to generate revenue since the public consumed them at much higher 
rates than other products. Albert told the Committee that Louisiana would need to increase its 
rate from 75%-100% to generate $50 million or more in new revenue. Albert also found that 
increasing the tax each 1% resulted in a 0.4-0.5% decline in consumption. In addition, he 
claimed that levying a tax on smokeless tobacco (untaxed in Louisiana) similar to neighboring 
states could provide another $4 to $5 million in revenue. Albert added a tax hike would drive 
down actual use but would reduce legal consumption at even higher rates. Upon questioning 
from the committee, he reasoned black market sales would not be an issue if rates were kept 
similar to neighboring states (Texas and Arkansas had higher tax rates, while Mississippi had a 
lower one) and overall pack price was similar. He explained that cigarettes could be taxed at a 
higher amount than a neighboring state but still retail at a comparable rate based on other 
factors). Albert added that raising cigarette taxes did not provide an equal return in new revenue, 
but a lesser amount. After Albert provided findings to the committee, opponents spoke against 
the tax increase bills. 
 
Opponents of the tobacco tax increases primarily used economic and crime-based 
arguments in the House Ways and Means Committee to fight tobacco tax increases (Table 11.2). 
Louisiana Wholesale Food and Tobacco Distributors Association (LWFTDA) Executive 
Director Sarah Whalen, LWFTDA President Keith Landing, RJ Reynolds lobbyist CJ Blache, 
and Philip Morris lobbyist Randy Haynie opposed tobacco tax increases at the hearing. Whalen, 
Blache, and Haynie had helped the tobacco industry oppose tobacco control legislation since the 
1980s (Chapters 2, 5, 6, 8, 10). The tobacco industry and its allies asserted the taxes were 
regressive, threatened tax revenue, harmed cross border sales, and led to increases in smuggling 
and gray market sales (i.e., off-brand discount cigarette sales). Blache also complained that 
increased cigarette prices did not deter youth use and that education did. Blache’s assertion was 
incorrect, as studies have found youth are particularly price sensitive and tobacco tax increases 
prevent youth tobacco use.16, 17 
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Health and tobacco control advocates did not testify at the hearing. After hearing 
arguments from tobacco interests, House Ways and Means committee members postponed action 
on tax increase legislation. 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee 
considered Representative Faucheux’s tobacco tax 
legislation at a May 2, 2000 hearing.18 At the meeting, 
CTFLA representative Dr. Charles Brown provide 
comments in support of HB 51.19 He testified that 36-
38% of Louisiana youth smoked each month, and that 
the industry targets minors to ensure future business.19 
Brown highlighted the gap between industry and 
tobacco prevention and cessation spending, claiming 
that tobacco companies spent $85 million annually on 
advertising in Louisiana while the state only dedicated 
$500,000 in Master Settlement Agreement (MSA, 
Chapter 9) funds towards anti-tobacco programming. Brown stated that tobacco-related illnesses 
cost Louisiana $1.4 billion each year. He argued that increasing the tobacco tax would help 
address Louisiana’s tobacco burden and urged the committee to adequately fund tobacco control 
programming. Brown pointed to the 80,000-person reduction in youth smoking over two years in 
Florida, where a tobacco control program had been implemented. When committee member 
Bryant Hammett retorted that the bill was contradictory since it sought to prevent smoking and 
increase revenue, which would not be raised if people quit smoking, Brown asserted the state had 
to remember the costs incurred by the state from tobacco use. Responding to questioning later in 
Table 11.2: Arguments Used Against Tobacco Taxes at March 22 Hearing15 
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Sarah 
Whalen 
LWFTDA-
Executive 
Director 
+    + +   +   +  
Keith 
Landing 
LWFTDA + + + +    + + +    
CJ Blache RJ 
Reynolds 
   +   +       
Randy 
Haynie 
Philip 
Morris 
+          +  + 
… tobacco companies spent 
$85 million annually on 
advertising in Louisiana while 
the state only dedicated 
$500,000 in Master 
Settlement Agreement funds 
towards anti-tobacco 
programming. 
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the hearing, Brown stated that 3,400 people in Louisiana contract lung cancer annually and that 
smoking caused 90%-95% of lung cancer instances. He stated that 40% of people that contracted 
coronary heart disease were smokers. Brown also claimed that Louisiana had the fourth highest 
rate of lung cancer in the US, with the Acadiana region in the state having the highest prevalence 
in the country. He added that the African American population in Jefferson, Orleans, and St. 
Bernard parishes had the greatest lung cancer prevalence in the world. The harms of tobacco and 
its costs to healthcare and society were a primary focus of the bill’s proponents. 
 
Other health and education advocates spoke in support of  HB 51 at the hearing.19 Nurse, 
and AHA volunteer Collette Barrett testified that research indicated 10% price increases on 
tobacco products resulted in a 7% decrease in smoking among minors.19 She asserted that youth 
were sensitive to price increases and stated that lawmakers could address youth smoking then or 
pay for it later in healthcare costs. Upon questioning, Barrett told the committee a 55¢ tax 
increase would reduce adult tobacco use by 9%. Following Barrett, Joyous Van Buskirk, a 
representative of the Louisiana Federation of Teachers union urged the committee to pass 
tobacco tax increases. She stated that youth were starting alcohol and tobacco use by elementary 
school, and suggested enactment of educational programming. Buskirk also advocated for 
tobacco tax increases to disincentivize people from becoming addicted to tobacco and provide 
extra revenue for the budget, which faced funding shortfalls for fire and police services, 
healthcare, and education. After Buskirk testified, the House Ways and Means Committee 
postponed voting on HB 51 allow Faucheux’s other bills to be introduced. 
 
The Committee moved to consider HB 52, Faucheux’s legislation to place a 99% sales 
tax on tobacco accessories, in particular matches and lighters (Table 11.1). Asked to introduce 
HB 52, Representative Faucheux stated that the bill would cost Louisiana money to implement 
and run according to a fiscal note, and requested that the committee permanently defer it. The 
committee approved the request, deferring HB 52 and taking it out of consideration.  
 
The House Ways and Means Committee subsequently moved to have HB 56 introduced. 
HB 56 featured the same cigarette tax increase of 40¢ per pack contained in HB 51, but did not 
raise taxes on other tobacco products (Table 11.1). After HB 56’s introduction, the committee 
heard comments from opponents. 
 
Wholesalers, tobacco industry ally Sarah Whalen and the LWFTDA, retailers, and 
tobacco industry lobbyists testified against the taxes proposed in HB 51 and HB 56 (Table 11.3).  
Opponents argued that the tobacco tax increases were regressive, were ineffective at preventing 
youth use, were economically harmful, would cause Louisiana to lose business to cross border 
sales, and would reduce tax revenue. RJ Reynold representative CJ Blache also indicated that the 
state attorney general’s office had a small tobacco prevention program. The Louisiana Deputy 
Attorney General subsequently rebutted Blache’s claim, informing the committee that his 
department’s tobacco control programs did not focus on preventing tobacco use but MSA 
enforcement. 
 
After opponents testified, Representative Faucheux announced he would withdraw HB 
51, which hiked taxes on cigarettes, cigars and loose leaf tobacco, in favor of the committee 
passing HB 56, which contained the same 40¢ hike per cigarette pack without raising taxes on  
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Table 11.3: Opponent Testimony at May 2, 2000 House Ways and Means Committee Hearing on Tobacco Taxes15 
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Sarah Whalen LWFTDA-Executive 
Director 
     +   +*   +*  +   
Keith Landing LWFTDA-President   +   +  + +        
Steve Shehane Baton Rouge Tobacco 
Company 
 +      +   +      
Holly 
Khumenal 
Louisiana Oil 
Marketers and 
Convenience Store 
Association- Executive 
Director 
               + 
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LJ Gielan Louisiana Oil 
Marketers and 
Convenience Store 
Association- President 
 
Co-owner Shop Rite 
Stores 
 +              + 
Morris Coates Nichols State 
University- Economist 
+  +     + +   +     
CJ Blache RJ Reynolds +   + +        +**  + + 
Randy Haynie Philip Morris + + +  +*     +*   +    
*Stated in response to Committee Questioning. 
**Funds tobacco control programming. 
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cigars and loose leaf tobacco (Table 11.1).19, 20 Faucheux made the request because the non-
cigarette tax increases in HB 51 generated only 5% of new revenue in the bill.19, 20 The Louisiana 
Legislative Fiscal Office predicted that HB 56 would generate $124 million annually for the 
state18 compared to $129 million from HB 51.20 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee did not vote on any of the bills18 and HB 51, 52 
and 56 all died upon adjournment. 
 
Opposition from the NCPPR Following the House Committee Hearing 
 
On May 12, 2000 the National Center for Public 
Policy Research (NCPPR) issued a press release 
opposing tax increases on tobacco products and other 
goods and services being considered by the Louisiana 
Legislature.21 A longtime tobacco industry ally,22 the 
NCPPR press release claimed the tax increases being 
considered to alleviate Louisiana’s budget deficit were 
regressive and harmed low income Louisianans. The 
press release also asserted that tobacco taxes were a 
poor source of revenue because of potential federal tax 
increases, the ability for lawsuits against the tobacco 
industry to inflate product costs, and the decline of cigarette and sales tax revenues it 
claimed had been ongoing since the mid-1960s. In addition, the NCPPR incorrectly stated 
that Louisiana lawmakers increased the cigarette tax in 1990 by 20¢; the actual increase 
was 4¢ (from 16¢ to 20¢) in a compromise between lawmakers and the tobacco industry 
to alleviate budget shortfalls (Chapter 6).  
 
House Bill 117 in the Legislature  
 
House Speaker Charles Dewitt Jr. (D-Lecompte) submitted and tried to push HB 117 and 
other tax bills to the House Floor during the 2000 session to provide lawmakers multiple avenues 
to remedy the state’s $374 million budget shortfall that session.23 The bill initially increased the 
cigarette tax by 14¢ per pack (from 20¢ to 34¢) and did not dedicate revenue to health or tobacco 
control, instead allowing money to flow into Louisiana’s general fund.  After being weakened, 
HB 117 became the only tobacco tax increase to pass during the 2000 session. 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee first considered HB 117 on May 23, 2000.13 At 
the hearing, its sponsor Dewitt secured an amendment to lower the bill’s cigarette tax increase 
from 14¢ per pack to 4¢ per pack.24, 25 He offered the amendment as part of an agreement with 
tobacco industry representatives.26, 27 Dewitt told tobacco industry lobbyists he planned to hold 
HB 117 if lawmakers amended the bill to further increase the cigarette pack tax above that 
amount.26 Dewitt later justified the agreement in a May 26, 2000 Baton Rouge Advocate article 
on the grounds that “’sometimes you make deals to make things happen.’”28 The Committee also 
approved an amendment making the 4¢ cigarette tax temporary instead of permanent, scheduling 
the tax increase to expire on June 30, 2002. After approving the amendment, the committee 
voted 14-0 to send HB 117 to the House Floor.13  
A longtime tobacco industry 
ally, the NCPPR press release 
claimed the tax increases 
being considered to alleviate 
Louisiana’s budget deficit 
were regressive and harmed 
low income Louisianans .… 
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 The House debated HB 117 and weighed multiple amendments to increase the 
legislation’s public health benefits on May 25, 2000. Representative Mitch Landrieu (D-New 
Orleans) introduced House Amendment B-89 to create and dedicate revenue generated from the 
cigarette tax increase to a Tobacco Tax Health Care Fund to support: 
 
• The Louisiana Tumor Registry  
• The Louisiana Cancer and Lung Trust Fund for lung cancer research and “a statewide 
cancer control program” 
• The Louisiana Tobacco Resource Center to develop smoking cessation programming 
• Public hospital smoking cessation programs for patients that were pregnant or had lung 
or heart disease29 
 
Representatives voted 25 to 67 against Landrieu’s amendment.30  
 
Representative Robert Faucheux (D-Gramercy) introduced House Amendment B-90 to 
raise HB 117’s cigarette tax increase from 4¢ per pack to 40¢ per pack, which would bring the 
total tax rate from 24¢ to 60¢ per pack.31 After portions of the cigarette tax revenue were paid 
into the Bond Security and Redemption Fund (a constitutional fund in Louisiana used to back 
state bonds and obligations that received nearly all money provided to the treasury and released 
the remainder to Louisiana’s general fund32) and used to pay the state’s loans, remaining money 
would be split between two funds established by the amendment, the Tobacco Tax Health Care 
Fund and the Tobacco Tax School Support Personnel Fund.31 The Tobacco Tax Health Care 
Fund provided money to public hospital and affiliated academic health centers’ prevention, 
research, treatment, and education efforts for cardiopulmonary disease, cancer, and maternal 
health.31 Tobacco Tax School Support Personnel Fund monies increased pay for public school 
“support personnel.”31 Faucheux’s amendment was rejected in an 8 to 90 vote.33 
 
Following Faucheux’s failed attempt to raise the cigarette tax in HB 117, Representative 
Cedric Richmond (D-New Orleans) introduced an amendment to increase tax rates on cigars and 
loose leaf tobacco.34 The bill raised taxes on cigars invoiced at $120,000 or less of price per 
thousand by producers from 8% of invoice to 10%, and cigars invoiced over $120,000 of price 
per 1000 from 20% of invoice price to 24%. Loose leaf tobacco faced a tax hike from 33% of 
invoice price to 40%.13 Representative Richmond proposed the increases believing HB 117 
raised taxes on a product predominately used by the poor, while other tobacco products used by 
the rich did not have their taxes raised.27 The House voted 40 to 59 against the amendment. 35 
 
 Representatives Jackie Clarkson (D-New Orleans) and Elbert Guillory (D-Opelousas) 
proposed dedicating revenue generated by the cigarette tax increase to the Louisiana Charity 
Hospital System in a manner that could be matched by federal money.36 Representatives voted 
28-65 against the change.13 
 
 After weighing amendments, state representatives voted 64 to 38 in favor of HB 117,13 
keeping the bill in the House since approval fell below the two-thirds threshold needed to pass 
tax legislation in Louisiana.26 In an interview with the Baton Rouge Advocate, HB 117 sponsor 
Dewitt claimed some representatives voted against his bill because tobacco industry lobbyists 
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insinuated to lawmakers that Senators sought to raise the bill’s cigarette tax increase from 4¢ to 
8¢,26 higher than the rate that the tobacco industry representatives had agreed upon. Dewitt 
reaffirmed to representatives his intention to defeat HB 117 if the Senate raised its cigarette tax 
increase above 4¢ and pushed lawmakers to pass the legislation. 
 
Representatives reconsidered HB 117 that same day. During reconsideration, 
Representative Richmond introduced an amendment to establish a 39.7% of invoice price tax on 
smokeless tobacco.26 Representatives approved the change 51-50. The House subsequently voted 
79-25 to pass HB 117. Following the vote, 
Representative John Travis (D-Jackson) told the New 
Orleans Times-Picayune that the budget shortfall 
pressured lawmakers to approve HB 117: 
 
People realized they are going to have to pass 
some sin taxes…. If we can’t vote for a sin tax, 
we may as well adjourn sine die. We can’t go 
home and face people, and tell them we closed 
down hospitals.27 
 
Dewitt, the sponsor of HB 117, publicly announced he intended to have Richmond’s amendment 
removed in the Senate to honor his promise to industry representatives to limit a tobacco tax 
increase to 4¢ per cigarette pack.27  
 
Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee Votes to Increase the Cigarette Tax by 10 Cents  
 
The Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee considered HB 117 on May 
30, 2000, where members attached amendments to increase cigarette and cigar taxes as 
well as reduce the smokeless tobacco tax rate (Table 11.4). The committee also 
eliminated an amendment added during HB 117’s House Ways and Means Committee 
hearing that sunsetted the tobacco tax increase in 2002, after committee member Bill 
Jones (D-Ruston) advocated the taxes be permanent.37 As passed by the House, HB 117 
Table 11.4: Existing Tax Rate Compared to House and Senate Versions of HB 11713, 39 
Tobacco Product Existing 
tax rate  
Tax Rates in HB 117 
Set by House 
Tax Rates in HB 117 
Set by Senate 
Committee 
Tax Rates 
in HB 117 
as Passed 
by Senate 
Tax Rates in HB 
117 Conference 
Committee 
Version (adopted)* 
Cigarettes 20¢  24 ¢ 30¢ 37 No change 24¢  
Cigars Invoiced at 
$120 Per Thousand 
or Less by Producer 
8% of 
invoice 
price 
No change 18% of invoice price  No change None 
Cigars Invoiced More 
Than $120 Per 
Thousand by 
Producer 
20% of 
invoice 
price 
No change 28% of invoice price  No change None 
Smokeless Tobacco None 39.7% of invoice price 20% of invoice price No change No change 
*Taxes had a 2-year sunset. 
“People realized they are going 
to have to pass some sin taxes 
…. If we can’t vote for a sin tax, 
we may as well adjourn sine 
die. We can’t go home and 
face people, and tell them we 
closed down hospitals.” 
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generated $19 million in annual revenue. Proposed Senate Committee amendments 
increased expected revenue to $48 million.37, 38    
 
Tobacco industry representatives testified that the tax increases were regressive 
and economically harmful to businesses.37 Swedish Match lobbyist Larry Murray,40 who 
had also represented Lorillard41 and Brown and Williamson42 in the past, claimed raising 
taxes on smokers was an inadequate remedy for Louisiana’s revenue shortage.37 The New 
Orleans Times-Picayune reported Murray asserting, “This is not Louisiana's long-range 
solution…This takes us another step in the wrong direction. ... This will approach $900 a 
year in what a smoker will pay ... and most smokers make about $22,000 a year."37 
Industry representatives also complained the tax increase elevated Louisiana above the 
average rate for southern states.37 
 
Murray was not the only tobacco industry representative to testify that the 
amendments increased tobacco taxes in Louisiana above the average in the South.37 New 
Orleans tobacco shop owner Bob Winston testified against the tax increase for cigars, 
arguing it was “Kevorkian” (referring to euthanasia activist Dr. Jack Kevorkian) and may 
kill his business.38 Representative Diane Winston (R-Covington), Winston's spouse who 
had received $3,050 in tobacco industry contributions between the 1995 and 2003 
election cycles,43-45 also attended the hearing but did not testify.38 Americans for Tax 
Reform (ATR), an industry ally on taxes since the early 1990s,46 listed Representative 
Winston in a press release opposing Louisiana tax increase bills that year as a Taxpayer 
Protection Pledge signer.47 The Taxpayer Protection Pledge is an ATR initiative that 
politicians sign to signal and declare their total opposition to tax increases.48  
 
Despite tobacco industry opposition, the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
Committee approved amendments increasing the cigarette tax, cigar taxes, and reducing 
the loose leaf tobacco tax (Table 11.4) and then advanced HB 117 to the Senate in a 7-1 
vote. Momentum to pass tobacco taxes regardless of the industry’s stance possibly came 
from Louisiana’s budget shortfall. We did not find evidence that health advocates were 
fighting to advance HB 117 at this point. 
 
House Bill 117 on the Senate Floor 
 
When HB 117 was debated on the Senate Floor on May 31, 2000,  Senator Frank 
Hoyt (R-Abbeville) offered an amendment to reduce the cigarette tax increase from 10¢ 
to 4¢ per pack and lower the 10% of invoice price cigar tax increase added in Senate 
Committee to 4%.49, 50 Senators rejected Hoyt’s amendment to preserve revenue gains.50  
Senators subsequently voted 30-9 to pass HB 117, sending it back to the House for 
approval of Senate-made changes.   
 
 The House considered Senate amendments to HB 117 on June 1, 2000. During debate, 
HB 117 sponsor and House Speaker Charles Dewitt asked representatives to reject the bill, 
arguing he had promised tobacco industry representatives to limit his cigarette tax increase to 4¢  
per pack.51 Respecting Dewitt’s request, representatives voted 101-0 against HB117,51 resulting 
in a conference committee to create compromise legislation.  
 487 
 
Conference Committee Forges a Compromise Version of HB 117 
 
The Legislature formed a six-person conference committee of three House and three 
Senate members to produce a compromise version of HB 117. House members of the committee 
consisted of Speaker Charles Dewitt (D-LeCompte), Ways and Means Committee Chairman 
Bryant Hammett (D-Ferriday), and Commerce Committee Chairman John Travis (D-
Jackson).Senate members of the committee were President John Hainkel (R-New Orleans), 
Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Chairman Robert Barham (D-Morehouse), and Finance Committee 
Chairman and floor leader Jay Dardenne (R-Baton Rouge).   
 
At a meeting in early June, Conference 
Committee members sparred over increasing the 
cigarette pack tax. Speaker Dewitt argued against raising 
the cigarette tax more than 4¢, insisting that he promised 
the House Ways and Means Committee to limit the 
cigarette tax increase to that amount.52 According to The 
Times-Picayune, Senate President Jay Dardenne argued 
the legislature’s failure to pass taxes to address the 
deficit necessitated a higher increase, stating “We have 
not gotten our things done…We had a $374 million 
shortfall, we have cut it to $250 million, and we haven’t 
raised the $250 million…We can’t do it with four cents.”52 Dardenne added that the tobacco tax, 
along with alcohol and gambling taxes being considered that legislative session, should be 
prioritized because of these uses’ and behaviors’ negative effects.52 Committee member 
Representative John Travis, who acted as an ally of the industry in the past (Chapters 5 and 6), 
also supported a higher cigarette tax increase. He argued it prevented a reduction in nursing 
home care assistance and the shuttering of charity hospitals and small universities.52  
 
At the conference committee hearing for HB 117, RJ Reynolds lobbyist CJ Blache 
(Chapter 2) argued that prioritizing products and services for taxation because of their health 
effects was unfair, asserting other harmful goods were not being considered for tax increases.52   
 
Although some conference committee members publicly supported a higher cigarette tax, 
they ultimately capitulated to Speaker Dewitt’s demands to support the lower tax increase. The 
conference committee proposed a compromise version of HB 117 that: 
 
• Established a 4¢ tax increase per cigarette pack.  
• Established a 20% tax on the invoice price of smokeless tobacco.  
• Removed the tax increases for cigars adopted in the Senate  
• Set a two year sunset for tax increases in HB 117.39 
 
The Conference Committee bill managed to win approval. The Senate accepted the 
conference committee bill (33-5) as did the House (82-17). Governor Mike Foster (R) signed HB 
117 into law on June 20, 2000. In statements to the Louisiana Republican State Central 
Committee published by The Times-Picayune, Foster stated "I wished we could have put a 
dollar-a-pack tax on cigarettes and g[o]t rid of them."53 From July 1, 2000 through June 30, 
“We have not gotten our 
things done .… We had a 
$374 million shortfall, we 
have cut it to $250 million, 
and we haven’t raised the 
$250 million .… We can’t do 
it with four cents.” 
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2002, the cigarette tax increased from 20¢ to 24¢ per pack to address Louisiana’s budget deficit 
(Table 11.4). No money was designated revenue for tobacco control.13 
 
House Bill 157 and the Tobacco Tax Healthcare Fund 
 
In 2002, Louisiana lawmakers passed HB 157 to raise the cigarette tax 12¢ per pack 
(from 24¢ to 36¢) and allocate revenue from 2¢ to tobacco control prevention and cessation. 
Health advocates secured tobacco control funding by participating in Tulane University and 
Louisiana State University’s (LSU) legislative campaign to obtain money for a new joint cancer 
research center approved by state lawmakers without funding.  
 
Senate Bill 73 Creates a Cancer Center in Need of Funding 
 
During the 2002 First Extraordinary Legislative Session, Senate President John Hainkel 
(R-New Orleans) and cosponsors Louis Lambert (D-Prairieville54), Diane Bajoie (D-New 
Orleans), and Tom Schedler (R-Slidell55) introduced SB 73 to create the Tulane/LSU Cancer 
Research Center.56 The proposed center would  perform research and educate on the diagnosis, 
detection, and treatment of cancer.56 The extraordinary session57 was convened by Governor 
Mike Foster primarily to focus on economic development legislation.58 SB 73 was developed 
with help from Roy Weiner, director of the Tulane Cancer Center,59, 60 and Oliver Sartor, director 
of the Stanley S. Scott Cancer Center at the LSU Health Sciences Center (New Orleans).61 
Tulane University and LSU would jointly administer the new center to help their  health science 
centers in New Orleans earn a National Cancer Institute cancer center designation.56 SB 73 
passed the Louisiana Legislature with little opposition and was signed into law by Governor 
Mike Foster (R) on April 18, 2002.56    
 
The bill did not appropriate funding to create the Tulane/LSU Cancer Research Center 
(LCRC, later named the Louisiana Cancer Research Consortium) or fund its operating costs,62 
prompting Hainkel, Sartor, and Weiner to seek a revenue source for the new institution. Sartor, 
Weiner, and Hainkel approached CTFLA Chairman Dr. Charles Brown to learn how much 
revenue an increase to the state cigarette tax would create. Brown informed them a 1¢ increase 
generated $4 million annually since Louisianans smoked 30 to 35 million cigarettes a month at 
the time.62 The meeting brought Brown62 and tobacco control advocates into efforts to pass a 
tobacco tax increase in 2002.  
 
Only the Louisiana House of Representatives could propose tax increases, prompting 
Hainkel, Sartor and Weiner to search for a House member to introduce a bill. Sartor and Weiner 
asked Representative Mitch Landrieu (D-New Orleans) to file tobacco tax legislation with 
dedicated funding to Tulane and LSU’s cancer center (Landrieu was later elected mayor of New 
Orleans in 201063 and signed a comprehensive smokefree ordinance into law there in 2015; 
Chapter 12.). Earlier in 2002, before the legislative session started, Brown and Louisiana Public 
Health Institute (Chapter 4) CEO Joseph Kimbrell had approached Landrieu and asked him to 
introduce a cigarette tax increase.64 According to Kimbrell in a 2014 interview for this report, 
Landrieu denied the request, stating, "No, ya'll don't really have a prayer."64 According to 
Louisiana Public Health Institute (LPHI) Policy Manager Erick Vicks in a 2019 interview for 
this report, advocates sought Landrieu because of his local political aspirations: 
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He [Landrieu] was local for me and all of us…if we weren’t in New Orleans, 
stationed, we were there just about all the time. He was somebody who was liked. 
He was a known commodity. Everybody knew he wanted to do something bigger. 
And so this game him the opportunity to do that.65 
 
According to Dr. Charles Brown in a 2014 interview for this report, Senator Hainkel, Sartor, and 
Weiner ultimately convinced Landrieu to submit HB 157 in a bid to fund the impending joint 
cancer center.62  
 
House Bill 157 Proposes a Cigarette Tax Increase to Fund the Cancer Center 
 
As introduced, HB 157 raised the cigarette tax 4¢ per pack (from 24¢ to 28¢) and 
deposited revenue to the Tobacco Tax Healthcare Fund to fund the joint New Orleans cancer 
center. HB 157 also permitted using new cigarette tax revenue to fund public hospital smoking 
cessation and prevention programs targeting patients with heart and lung disease as well as 
expecting mothers.66  
 
Prior to HB 157’s introduction, the Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana (CTFLA) 
contacted Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore to hear his opinions on forming a tobacco 
control program. In the 1990s, Moore initiated and led litigation against the tobacco industry by 
state attorneys general to recoup Medicaid funds used to treat tobacco-related illnesses (Chapter 
9).67 Moore had remained active in Mississippi’s nonprofit, youth-oriented tobacco control 
program The Partnership for a Healthy Mississippi that was created as part of a Mississippi’s 
settlement with the tobacco industry.67 On February 15, 2002, Louisiana Coalition for Maternal 
and Child Health Executive Director and CTFLA member Sandra Adams sought Moore’s advice 
before the upcoming special and regular legislative sessions.68 According to LeBlanc in a 2002 
article in the Shreveport Times, “If we had a proven program and information that it yielded 
results, we could phase it in over two years in pilot programs.”68  
 
Tobacco Control Support for HB 157 
 
The Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana (CTFLA), a tobacco control policy coalition 
consisting of health advocates and voluntaries whose primary members were the American 
Cancer Society and American Heart Association (Chapters 4, 10), supported HB 157. In 2001, 
LPHI secured a SmokeLess States grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to fund 
CTFLA, enabling it to develop a statewide presence and advocacy base to support policy 
campaigns (Chapter 4).64, 69 During the legislative session, CTFLA held a lobbying day and tried 
to generate earned media to create support and pressure for HB 157.65 ACS and AHA also held 
lobbying days where their representatives advocated for the tobacco tax bill. CTFLA also urged 
advocates throughout the state to contact lawmakers and make known their support for HB 157. 
The Coalition provided advocates information on how a tax increase reduced youth tobacco use 
and provided additional revenue for the state. The campaign to pass HB 157 was CTFLA’s 
second legislative effort65 at the state level (the first was clean air preemption repeal in 2001) and 
its first success. 
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Advocates and health organizations supported HB 157 to improve public health 
outcomes, discourage smoking, and obtain tobacco control funding. According to LPHI Policy 
Manager 70 Erick Vicks in a 2019 interview for this report: 
 
We [the CTFLA] only advocated for 
tobacco taxes to be utilized in an 
effort to decrease tobacco utilization 
in the state. We wanted the money 
and we did suggest the money could 
be used for tobacco control. But we 
never demanded or said that it had to 
go to one particular entity or area. We 
just wanted the tobacco tax to be 
levied, and they could use it for health 
purposes.65 
 
Vicks reported during the interview that ”it 
was initially believed we were just trying to 
fund that program [the joint cancer center] 
and not create something new.”65 CTFLA 
Steering Committee Chair Dr. Charles Brown ultimately secured funding for tobacco control 
programming in HB 157 on behalf of advocates.62, 64  Advocates avoided pursuing funds for the 
Department of Health and Hospitals’ tobacco control program because they and lawmakers 
perceived it as ineffective (Chapter 4). In addition, advocates had strained relations with the 
state’s tobacco control program (Chapter 4). Instead, tobacco control advocates sought to secure 
funding for tobacco control programming outside the DHH.  
 
In early May, two weeks before its members considered HB 157, the House Ways and 
Means Committee heard testimony from Mississippi Attorney General Michael Moore about his 
state’s smoking cessation and prevention program. Moore stated that Mississippi had 
successfully used Master Settlement Agreement funds to operate its tobacco control program.71 
In 2000, Mississippi spent $22 million of the $62 million it received from its settlement with the 
tobacco industry for FY 1999 and FY 2000 on its tobacco control program.67 In contrast, 
Louisiana appropriated just $500,000 of the millions it received annually from MSA payments to 
fund tobacco control in 2000. In 2001, Louisiana was one of twenty states (out of 46 states) 
appropriating less than $600,000 of MSA funds to develop and operate a tobacco control 
program.72 Only six states fell below Louisiana in allocating MSA funds to tobacco control 
(Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Alabama, Connecticut, and North Carolina).73   
 
HB 157 in the Legislature 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee first considered HB 157 on May 22, 2002.74 At 
the hearing, Representative Landrieu told committee members that his bill funded the Tulane and 
LSU joint cancer center and tobacco control: 
 
“We only advocated for tobacco taxes 
to be utilized in an effort to decrease 
tobacco utilization in the state. We 
wanted the money and we did suggest 
the money could be used for tobacco 
control. But we never demanded or said 
that it had to go to one particular entity 
or area. We just wanted the tobacco tax 
to be levied, and they could use it for 
health purposes.” 
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This bill is designed to help fund the mechanism that we actually created during 
the last legislative session. The Master Settlement Agreement through the tobacco 
litigation is going to provide us with the capital funds needed to build the building 
in New Orleans and this bill is designed right now to do two things. One to fund 
the operations of that center, and also to fund the operations of the center in 
Shreveport. But secondly, to create a smoking prevention and cessation program 
which is much needed. As you know we really haven't provided for that under 
state law….74 
 
He highlighted HB 157’s importance by citing Louisiana’s high cancer mortality rates despite 
sharing similar contraction rates to other states.74 
 
After Landrieu introduced HB 157, Senator Diane Bajoie (D-New Orleans) spoke in 
support of funding a cancer center. She recounted the experiences of people she witnessed 
receiving treatment for cancer, particularly minors, while she received treatment for her own 
cancer. Bajoie felt the center could conduct research to prevent and cure such illnesses:  
 
I think [there is] no better instrument to tax than cigarettes. And you know I was a 
smoker. But I bet none of those children smoked. I know they weren’t smokers. 
So I think we have a great opportunity to take and tax an industry that has been 
proven to be somewhat at fault. They’re not the only industry at fault. But I think 
with this money going to research, to this research center, we can find other 
reasons why people are getting cancer.74 
 
She told committee members that HB 157 was a bill they could proudly acknowledge their vote 
on later.74 
 
CTFLA and LSU’s Dr. Charles Brown, LSU’s Oliver Sartor, and Tulane University’s 
Roy Weiner promoted HB 157 as a vehicle to improve Louisiana’s cancer research, cancer 
treatment, and public health in comments at the hearing. During their testimony, Weiner stated 
that cancer mortality rates in Louisiana were high, and that NCI-level cancer centers provided 
excellent cancer prevention and research in areas they resided. Sartor asserted that HB 157 
provided state lawmakers a rare moment to save lives. Brown discussed tobacco taxation in the 
south, and health advocates’ desires for using new cigarette tax revenue in Louisiana:  
 
An increase in the excise tax is a 
very good weapon to discourage 
individuals from first starting. The 
average tax on a pack of cigarettes in 
non-tobacco [growing] states is 47¢. 
The average tax in Arkansas is 34¢, 
the tax in Texas is 41¢, the tax in Mississippi is 18¢ and there are two bills in the 
Mississippi legislature as we speak to raise that either to add an additional 25¢ or 
50¢ to that….We envision three things to be started under these monies. The first 
is to create an administrative structure including a statewide multidisciplinary 
board to oversee comprehensive tobacco control in the state. This will include 
“An increase in the excise tax is a 
very good weapon to discourage 
individuals from first starting.” 
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organizations that are currently working in this field, including the Office of 
Public Health. The second is to fund a statewide mass media program utilizing the 
information that has already been created by our sister states [Mississippi] and 
that have been offered to us free of charge. And finally to institute a smoking 
cessation/prevention program in the public hospital system.74  
 
Brown stated they were interested in targeting expecting mothers and cancer patients with the 
hospital program.74 Other public health proponents that endorsed HB 157 at the hearing but did 
not speak included representatives from the Louisiana State Medical Society, American Cancer 
Society, and the Governor’s Office.74 
 
As the hearing progressed, Representative Robert Faucheux (D-LaPlace) suggested to 
Representative Landrieu that the legislature should increase the tax by at least $1.00 to as much 
as $1.50 per pack of cigarettes if the bill sought to reduce smoking prevalence and initiation. 
Faucheux argued that minimally raising the tax failed to solve the tobacco problem. He went on 
to question Landrieu on what the state did with the monies from the Master Settlement 
Agreement, asking, "Didn't we put some of that money into cessation programs?" Landrieu 
responded, "This legislature chose not to do that."74 Replying to Faucheux, Landrieu stated he 
was trying to have a passable tax increase and would go as high as votes needed to pass it 
allowed.74  
 
House Ways and Means Committee Amendments to HB 157  
 
After HB 157 proponents testified, the House Ways and Means Committee 
considered an amendment from Landrieu to increase the cigarette tax hike in HB 157 
from 4¢ to 7¢ per pack. Landrieu explained that the original calculation found a 4¢ 
increase would raise $24 million annually when it actually generated $16 million.74 The 
amendment dedicated 72% (5¢) of new revenue to funding Tulane and LSU’s future  
cancer center in New Orleans as well as development and implementation of smoking 
cessation and prevention media and hospital programs.66 The remaining portion of 
revenue (28%, 2¢) went towards the LSU Health Sciences Cancer Center in Shreveport.66 
The House Ways and Means Committee approved Landrieu’s amendment. 
 
Next, committee member Karen Carter Peterson (D-New Orleans) offered an 
amendment to increase the cigarette pack tax another penny per pack and dedicate 
resulting revenue to the Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Addictive 
Disorders for addiction treatment.74 The amendment was similar HB 177, a bill Peterson 
introduced that session that increased tobacco taxes and also dedicated revenue to the 
DHH’s Office of Addictive Disorders. Unlike HB 157, Peterson’s legislation also 
increased taxes on cigars and smokeless tobacco. She did not propose the change to HB 
157 to replace her bill. The Committee adopted Peterson’s amendment, raising the 
cigarette tax from 7¢ to 8¢ per pack. 
 
After the House Ways and Means Committee considered amendments, 
Representative Taylor Townsend (D-Natchitoches) expressed caution on the tobacco tax 
increase. He questioned if Tulane and LSU were willing to work together, prompting 
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Sartor and Weiner to confirm they would.74 Townsend also suggested that the cigarette 
tax acted like a flat tax that could possibly shrink over time if the tobacco program 
proposed by Brown was effective, and thus limit funds for the joint cancer center. LSU 
cancer center director Sartor replied that they hoped Brown’s proposed tobacco control 
programming was successful and that revenue decreased over time because of reduced 
tobacco use and the product’s harmful health impacts. Sartor also claimed the National 
Cancer Institute designation that cancer center proponents sought allowed Louisiana to 
leverage funds and better compete with other states. Tulane cancer center director Weiner 
added that the NCI designation provided further leverage by making the state competitive 
for partnerships with private interests. Brown claimed the bill allowed Louisiana to 
establish a centralized tobacco control program similar to Mississippi’s. 
 
During consideration, Committee member Willie Hunter (D-Monroe) asked 
Landrieu, Brown, Sartor and Weiner if they were open to an amendment expanding 
tobacco control programming to schools. Hunter felt the amendment would educate 
youth, who were targeted by the tobacco industry. Brown expressed awareness of tobacco 
industry targeting of youth but explained that tobacco control did not receive enough 
revenue from HB 157’s dedication to conduct programming in schools. He claimed that 
tobacco control proponents would revisit programming in schools after other revenue 
streams were located and a committee to steer the new tobacco control initiative formed. 
Regardless, Hunter offered an amendment to include public schools in HB 157’s tobacco 
control programming alongside public hospitals that the House Ways and Means 
Committee adopted. 
 
Next, Representative Billy “Coach” Montgomery (D-Bossier City) inquired about 
Landrieu’s receptiveness to him amending HB 157 to increase the cigarette tax to provide 
Louisiana State Police a salary increase.74 Landrieu resisted the amendment’s inclusion, 
because another bill featured the tax increase and that bill’s sponsor disliked its possible 
inclusion in HB 157 (Likely HB 221 by Representative Charlie Dewitt Jr., which raised 
gaming taxes to provide the state police a salary increase.75) Montgomery did not offer 
the amendment. 
 
Committee member Rick Farrar (D-Pineville) subsequently asked Landrieu, 
Brown, Sartor and Weiner how much Master Settlement Agreement money was currently 
allocated to tobacco control programming.74 Landrieu replied that to his knowledge the 
MSA provided no funding to tobacco control programming in Louisiana. Farrar doubted 
that HB 157 adequately funded cancer and tobacco control programming at rates 
proposed in the bill. He also cautioned against starting a new program that would be 
immediately susceptible to spending cuts or that would rob funding from existing 
programs. Landrieu added that a model tobacco control program needed over $20 million 
in annual revenue but needed any possible funding to start. He also argued the program 
saved Louisiana healthcare costs incurred from treating tobacco-related illnesses. 
Landrieu expressed doubt that more tobacco control program funding could be secured in 
HB 157. In addition, he asserted HB 157 provided the tobacco control program dedicated 
money, protecting it from funding issues. Landrieu also argued that creation of a cancer 
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center would create a new industry in Louisiana that would bring the state additional 
funds. Farrar doubted Landrieu’s claims. 
 
After talking with Landrieu, Farrar offered an amendment to increase the cigarette 
tax another 2¢. The proposal dedicated revenue from one penny towards the DARE youth 
drug prevention program and the other towards the Agricultural Center at LSU.74 The 
House Ways and Means Committee adopted Farrar’s amendment, raising the cigarette tax 
increase from 8¢ to 10¢ per pack (from 24¢ to 34¢ total per pack).   
 
Following Farrar, Committee member 
Carla Blanchard Dartez (D-Morgan City) 
expressed displeasure that only cigarettes faced 
tax increases and not cigars.74 She then offered an 
unrelated amendment to add another 2¢ to HB 
157’s cigarette tax increase that dedicated 
resulting revenue to the Louisiana State Police for 
a salary increase. Landrieu said he was open to the 
amendment if the committee felt the bill was 
feasible but expressed concern about overloading 
the legislation. During consideration of Dartez’ amendment, Landrieu told committee 
members, “I’m about trying to get enough votes to pass something, so I’ll go as high as 
you can get the votes for. I think I can carry a bill with about 10 wheels on it. I get a little 
nervous when I get to 15 or 20.”74 The House Ways and Means Committee approved the 
amendment. Dartez’ amendment generated $8 million annually, half the amount needed 
to provide troopers a salary increase.76 
 
Opponents Argue Against HB 157 at House Ways and Means Hearing 
 
After the House Ways and Means Committee considered amendments, tobacco industry 
representatives and allied lobbyists argued against increasing tobacco taxes. Louisiana 
Wholesaler Tobacco Association lobbyist Sarah Whalen, Philip Morris lobbyist Randy Haynie 
and RJ Reynolds lobbyist CJ Blache opposed HB 157 at the hearing alongside other Louisiana 
wholesalers and retailers (Table 11.5). 
 
Arguments against HB 157 included claims that people will purchase tobacco from 
businesses in neighboring states or from the internet instead of Louisiana businesses to avoid 
higher taxes, that existing tax rules were not adequately enforced, that customers will use lower 
quality products to reduce costs, that the state would lose tax revenue from reduced sales, and 
that tobacco is an adult product people choose to use.74 Opponents also argued that HB 157 
singled out around a fifth of Louisiana’s population, smokers, to pay for programs benefitting all 
residents. They added that tobacco was already taxed at high rates and smokers paid hundreds of 
millions in taxes. 
 
Tobacco industry lobbyists mainly claimed HB 157 unfairly targeted smokers and the 
tobacco industry. RJ Reynolds lobbyist CJ Blache argued that the cigarette tax was regressive 
because it levied an increase on smokers, a majority of whom were poor.74, 79 Blache also 
“I’m about trying to get enough 
votes to pass something, so I’ll go 
as high as you can get the votes 
for. I think I can carry a bill with 
about 10 wheels on it. I get a little 
nervous when I get to 15 or 20.” 
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asserted the tax in HB 157 treated the tobacco industry discriminatively and unfairly by 
insinuating tobacco products were the only cause of cancer.74 He complained that other 
industries harmful to human health were not taxed, and that revenue from HB 157’s tax increase 
would go towards unrelated programs (Table 11.5). Altria lobbyist Randy Haynie also argued 
HB 157’s tax increase unfairly targeted the tobacco industry.74 He complained that existing 
cigarette taxes were already high, that the proposal unfairly targeted a minority of Louisiana’s 
population, and that high tax rates spurred tax evasion. 
 
After the tobacco company lobbyists testified, HB 157 sponsor Mitch Landrieu 
questioned them over their assertions the tobacco tax was unfair.74 Landrieu asked Haynie and 
Blache why the chemical and gaming industries should not be targeted for tax increases. Haynie 
represented Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, Inc, New Orleans Saints Limited 
Partnership, Greater New Orleans Sports Foundation, and Louisiana Oilfield Contractors 
Association. Two of CJ Blache’s clients, Chevron and BP America, were in the petro-chemical 
industry. Both were reluctant to agree to Landrieu’s suggestion. Blache retorted that he and 
Haynie would not target other industries on the stand but could share a list with Landrieu in 
private. Landrieu subsequently debunked Blache and Haynie’s assertions the tobacco tax 
increase unfairly targeted smokers to pay for services used by all Louisianans, arguing that 
Louisianan’s paid $2 billion annually in taxes to treat tobacco-related illnesses. Haynie replied 
that they did not want other industries taxed. He claimed that the tobacco industry and smokers 
already paid $224 million in taxes and Master Settlement Agreement payments, and questioned 
Landrieu about how much of that revenue went towards healthcare. Landrieu replied: 
 
Let me answer that question because you know as well as I do because you helped 
draft the bill. The Millennium Trust two years ago, 55% of it went into the state  
general fund, and you know in the state general fund the majority of that goes into 
healthcare, or primary and secondary education, but I can understand that tobacco 
doesn't think that's important too. Alright, and  then it goes--and then some money 
the next year gets 65% and then 75%, and the corpus of that trust fund is held in 
perpetuity so that we can have lots of money in the future so that we don't have to 
come back to you. And 30% as you know is spent on healthcare related issues.74 
 
Haynie again asserted that smokers paid Louisiana $224 million annually. Landrieu attacked 
Haynie’s claim, telling him and attendees at the House Ways and Means hearing that the $224 
million received each year came from MSA payments based on participating tobacco companies’ 
global sales. Representative Landrieu asked Haynie if cigarette prices had raised over the past 
three years. Haynie replied they had because of tax increases and the MSA. 
 
 After limited questions from committee member Robert Faucheux to Blache and Haynie, 
as well as testimony from tobacco retailers Thomas Gross and John Dan Gielen, Landrieu 
provided closing comments on HB 157. He told the committee he respected tobacco interests and 
their concerns, as well as those of PM Representative Randy Haynie and RJR representative CJ 
Blache. Landrieu noted Haynie and Blache’s ability to protect their chemical and gaming 
industry clients from exposure to tax increases while fighting HB 157. Landrieu also argued the 
tobacco industry underpaid society relevant to the costs it inflicted upon it, and asserted HB 157 
provided funding for an appropriate tobacco control program. 
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Table 11.5: Opponent Arguments Against HB 157 at House Ways and Means Hearing74, 77, 78 
Lobbyist Affiliation Arguments Against Proposed Tax Increase 
  
H
ar
m
s T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
 
Pu
sh
 P
eo
pl
e 
to
 B
uy
 C
he
ap
er
, L
ow
 E
nd
 P
ro
du
ct
s 
Ta
x 
In
cr
ea
se
s E
co
no
m
ic
al
ly
 H
ar
m
fu
l 
Ta
x 
In
cr
ea
se
s C
re
at
e 
Co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
D
isa
dv
an
ta
ge
 
w
ith
 N
ei
gh
bo
rin
g 
St
at
es
  
N
ot
 C
ol
le
ct
in
g 
Cu
rr
en
t T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
 
H
ig
h 
Ra
te
s D
riv
e 
Ta
x 
Ev
as
io
n 
Ex
ist
in
g 
Ta
xe
s A
lre
ad
y 
H
ig
h 
/ S
m
ok
er
s P
ay
 
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 T
ax
es
 
Ta
x 
Fu
nd
s I
te
m
s U
nr
el
at
ed
 to
 T
ob
ac
co
 
Sm
ok
in
g 
is 
a 
Pe
rs
on
al
 C
ho
ic
e 
O
th
er
 P
ro
du
ct
s C
au
se
 H
ar
m
 a
nd
 a
re
 N
ot
 T
ax
ed
 
To
ba
cc
o 
Ta
x 
In
cr
ea
se
s a
re
 R
eg
re
ss
iv
e 
Ta
x 
U
nf
ai
rly
 P
ro
fil
es
 / 
Pr
ej
ud
ic
ed
 A
ga
in
st 
Sm
ok
er
s 
Ta
x 
In
cr
ea
se
 D
oe
s N
ot
 D
et
er
 o
r R
ed
uc
e 
U
se
 
Ta
rg
et
s M
in
or
ity
 G
ro
up
 o
f L
ou
isi
an
a 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
O
th
er
 
Sarah 
Whalen 
Louisiana 
Wholesale 
Tobacco  
  +           + • Only industry hit by tax two years 
before. 
• Harms state businesses while the 
state lures outside companies. 
Robert 
Hale 
Lee Dee 
Wholesale 
Distributing 
+ + + +  +         • Companies based in Texas and 
Mississippi (settled outside MSA) 
undercutting prices. 
•  Louisiana has higher tax rate for 
smokeless tobacco compared to 
southern region 
Thomas 
Gross 
National 
Association of 
Tobacco 
Outlets Vice 
President 
Tommy Gross 
+ +        +    + • Should tax soda, since all 
Louisianans drink it. 
•  Not collecting taxes on internet 
sales, which have cost brick and 
mortar Louisiana businesses 
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John Dan 
Gielen 
Shop-Rite 
stores 
      +         
Keith 
Landing 
Louisiana 
Wholesale 
Association 
+  +  + + +         
Randy 
Haynie 
Philip Morris      +* +       + • Tobacco industry stood up in past 
and accepted tax increase to help 
state during budget crisis in 1990 
(Chapter 6).  
• Industry not opposing 4¢ tax 
renewal being considered that 
session. Unfair to tobacco industry. 
CJ 
Blache 
RJ Reynolds        + + + + +  +  
*Implied by stacking up the amount smokers are already paying combined with sales tax. 
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 Following Landrieu’s comments, committee members voted 15-0 to send HB 157 to the 
House Floor. HB 157 rose from a 4¢ per pack increase to a 12¢ hike, which took the total 
tobacco tax from 24¢ to 36¢ per pack. 
  
Representatives brought HB 157 to the House Floor for consideration on May 23, 2002,66 
proposed no amendments to the bill, and voted 85-12 to send it to the Senate. 
 
HB 157 Backers Divide Future Tax Revenue between the Cancer Center and Tobacco Control 
 
Before Senators considered HB 157, supporters met in Senate President John Hainkel’s 
office to allocate tax increase revenue. Hainkel had sponsored SB 73, the bill mandating creation 
of LSU and Tulane’s joint cancer center in New Orleans. Representative Landrieu, House 
Speaker Charles Dewitt, Senator Hainkel, CTLFA Chairman Brown, LSU and Tulane Presidents 
and Chancellors, Senator Greg Tarver (D-Shreveport) and possibly others attended the 
gathering.62 According to Brown in a 2014 interview for this report, cancer center advocates 
convinced backers to allocate more tax revenue to the cancer center than tobacco control 
programming: 
 
…so they decided that of those 12 
pennies, 5 ought to come to New 
Orleans [for the cancer center and 
tobacco control programming]. 
Originally they were going to give 
three to tobacco control and two to 
cancer. But the cancer people spoke 
up. I didn’t know what I was doing. 
I was just sitting there. I was just a 
kid.62 
 
Meeting attendees also agreed to provide funding to the Southern University Agricultural 
Research and Extension Service. Brown indicated in a 2014 interview for this report that the 
inclusion of Southern University into HB 157 resulted from the influence of Senator Greg Tarver 
(D-Shreveport):  
 
We were talking and there was a very prominent African American senator from 
northern part of the state named Greg Tarver. And he says, “Doc, how much is in 
it for Southern?” [A historically African American college]. I said I don't know 
how much is in it. He says, "Take this telephone number down. This is my brother 
[Dr. Leon R. Tarver II, acting president of the historically black college Southern 
University in Baton Rouge]. You call him tomorrow and tell him what you're 
going to give him."62 
  
Leon Tarver also served as a state senator from 1984-2004 and sat on the Joint Legislative 
Committee on Budget, the Senate Finance Committee, and acted as Vice Chairman of the Local 
and Municipal Affairs Committee, and the Chairman of the Senate Insurance Committee from 
1992 until 2004. The Southern University Agricultural Research and Extension Service 
“… so they decided that of those 12 
pennies, 5 ought to come to New Orleans. 
Originally they were going to give three to 
tobacco control and two to cancer. But 
the cancer people spoke up. I didn’t know 
what I was doing. I was just sitting there. I 
was just a kid.” 
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subsequently received a $1 million annual dedication in cigarette tax revenue from an 
amendment made to HB 157 during its Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee hearing. 
 
 The meeting determined the ultimate allocation of revenue generated by the 12¢ per pack 
increase in HB 157. Stakeholders decided to assign 5¢ of revenue per pack to the LSU / Tulane 
joint cancer center in New Orleans, with 2 of those 5¢ dedicated specifically to tobacco control 
programming. Participants also allocated 2¢ to the LSU Shreveport Cancer Center, 1¢ to the 
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals Office of Addictive Disorders, 1¢ to the LSU 
Agricultural Center (of which $1 million would go to the Southern University Agricultural 
Research and Extension Service), 1¢ to the DARE drug prevention program, and 1¢  towards 
state police raises. The division of revenue benefitted interrelated public health efforts and 
provided stable annual funding for tobacco control. The agreed allocation was incorporated into 
HB 157 during its Senate Committee hearing. 
 
The Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee Considers HB 157 
 
The Senate assigned HB 157 to the Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee for 
consideration. Senate President and SB 73 sponsor John Hainkel was an ex officio member of the 
Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee, providing HB 157 an ally during its hearing.  
Most committee members had received $1000 or more in campaign contributions from the 
tobacco industry in the 1980s and 1990s through the 2003 election cycle (Chapter 3).45 
 
 The Senate Fiscal and Revenue Affairs Committee considered HB 157 on May 29, 2002, 
where Philip Morris lobbyist Randy Haynie and RJ Reynolds lobbyist CJ Blache testified against 
the bill.80 Haynie argued that HB 157’s 12¢ tax increase, combined with a 4¢ increase passed in 
2000, raised the tax 70% in two years. He added that smokers already paid an additional 30¢ per 
cigarette pack in sales tax and complained that for multiple years the alcohol industry had 
avoided tax increases on its products. According to an article from The Advocate, at the hearing 
RJR lobbyist CJ Blache asserted to committee members: “I’m talking about fairness in taxation. 
There are other products that have not been taxed, taxes we haven’t looked at. It’s just easy to 
pound on cigarettes.”80 Blache stated that HB 157 overtaxed smokers. He complained that the 
bill’s various revenue dedications made it difficult to fight. 
 
 Senators expressed support for HB 157 at the Senate Fiscal and Revenue Affairs 
Committee hearing. Senator Greg Tarver (D-Shreveport), who had convinced HB 157 backers to 
allocate revenue to Southern University, told the committee he supported the bill because of 
smoking’s cancer-causing effects.80 Senator Diane Bajoie also commented in support of HB 157, 
stating it provided funding for cancer research. She noted her own experience with cancer and 
her desire to prevent others from contracting it. Bajoie stated HB 157 was the first tobacco tax 
she backed as a state lawmaker. We did not find evidence that health advocates spoke in support 
of HB 157 at the hearing.  
 
During debate, the committee adopted a package of amendments from Mitch Landrieu 
that apportioned the 5¢ revenue dedication to the LSU/Tulane joint cancer center in New Orleans 
and tobacco control programming. The change allocated 3¢ towards the cancer center and 2¢ to 
tobacco control programming (Table 11.6). Landrieu’s amendment also expanded tobacco 
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control programming to include “’community development programs’” alongside public hospital 
and school programs, and provided $1 million in annual funding from the 1¢ revenue dedication 
to the Louisiana Agricultural Center to Southern University for tobacco control programming.66 
Revenue dedications to state trooper pay raises (2¢), the DHH Office of Addictive Disorders 
(1¢), and D.A.R.E (1¢) remained unaltered. The changes reflected decisions made by HB 157 
stakeholders at the meeting in Senator Hainkel’s office to allocate revenue. The Committee then 
advanced HB 157.  
 
Instead of going to the Senate Floor, HB 157 went to the Committee on Finance and 
received another hearing on May 31, 2002.66 During consideration, the Committee proposed two 
amendments to HB 157 requiring the Tulane/ LSU joint cancer center and LSU Shreveport 
cancer center to share any income generated by their property, intellectual or otherwise, with the 
state.81 The amendments did not affect HB 157’s cigarette tax increase or allocation of its 
revenue. After approving the amendments, the Committee passed HB 157 to the Senate Floor. 
 
HB 157 on the Senate Floor 
 
The Senate debated HB 157 on May 31, 2002, where it faced a receptive audience. To 
generate support for the legislation, the bill’s co-sponsor Diane Bajoie told the chamber of her 
experience battling cancer and emphasized that the cigarette tax dedicated revenue to cancer 
research.76 Other senators also stated their support for HB 157 while the bill was up for 
consideration. Senator Lynn Dean (R-Caernarvon) supported HB 157 despite generally opposing 
tax increases. She reasoned that tax payers have to cover the costs of indigent smokers unable to 
afford healthcare bills because of the "money they wasted on cigarettes."76 Senator Butch 
Gautreaux (D-Morgan City) also advocated for HB 157 on the Senate Floor, asserting “I don’t 
think this tax is enough. We should make these cigarettes impossible to afford.”76 Supporters of 
HB 157 outnumbered opponents of the cigarette tax increase in the Senate. Senator Fred Hoyt 
(D- Abbeville), who owned several convenience stores, opposed HB 157 during debate.76 Hoyt 
argued that Louisiana generated significant revenue from existing cigarette taxes, reporting that 
Table 11.6: Allocation of HB 157 Cigarette Tax Revenue Throughout Legislative Process66 
 Original House 
Committee 
House Senate 
Committee 
Senate Adopted 
LSU / Tulane New 
Orleans Cancer 
Center 
4¢ 5¢ 5¢ 3¢ 3¢ 3¢ 
Tobacco Control 
Programming 
2¢ 2¢ 2¢ 
LSU Shreveport 
Cancer Center 
-- 2¢ 2¢ 2¢ 2¢ 2¢ 
DHH OAD -- 1¢ 1¢ 1¢ 1¢ 1¢ 
LSU Agricultural 
Center 
-- 1¢ 1¢ 1¢ - $1 million 
in revenue to 
SU Ag 
Research and 
Extension 
Service 
1¢ - $1 million 
in revenue to 
SU Ag 
Research and 
Extension 
Service 
1¢ - $1 million 
in revenue to SU 
Ag Research 
and Extension 
Service 
Southern 
University 
-- -- -- 
DARE -- 1¢ 1¢ 1¢ 1¢ 1¢ 
State Police -- 2¢ 2¢ 2¢ 2¢ 2¢ 
Total 4¢ 12¢ 12¢ 12¢ 12¢ 12¢ 
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the state had earned $137 million total from sales taxes ($39 million) and excise taxes ($98 
million) on cigarettes in 2001.76  
 
Lawmakers considered two amendments to HB 157 on the Senate Floor.66 Senator John 
Hainkel proposed  reallocating revenue from the 5¢ tax increase in HB 157 that was split 
between the joint cancer center and tobacco control programming to give tobacco control 
programming 48.2% of funds instead of 29.2% and the Tulane/LSU joint cancer center 29.2% 
instead of 48.2%. Senator Don Cravins (D-Lafayette) introduced an amendment to make HB 
157’s tax source alcoholic beverages instead of tobacco. During the 2002 legislative session, 
efforts to increase alcoholic beverage taxes had been unsuccessful.82-84 Hainkel and Cravins both 
withdrew their amendments. 
 
After discussing HB 157, Senators voted 36-2 to adopt the bill85 and sent the bill back to 
the House for approval of changes made in the Senate. 
 
Back to the House for Final Vote  
 
 The House weighed Senate amendments to HB 157 on June 4, 2002. Amidst debate, 
Representative Troy Hebert’s (D-Jeanerette) motioned to postpone voting on the bill.86 The 
chamber rejected Hebert’s request 50-49, causing Landrieu to question whether HB 157 had 
enough support to pass. Landrieu postponed a vote on  HB 157 by returning it to calendar after 
representatives devated HB 157 for 30 minutes.86 Before the House brought HB 157 back for 
debate, representatives considered HB 177 by R Karen Carter Peterson (D-New Orleans), which 
also sought to increase taxes on cigarettes as well as other tobacco products. 
 
Another Tobacco Tax Bill: HB 177 
 
Representative Karen Carter Peterson prefiled HB 177, another bill to increase tobacco 
taxes, on April 26, 2002. After being reported to the House Committee on Ways and Means on 
April 29, the bill languished without consideration until June. HB 177 increased taxes on 
cigarettes by 4¢ per pack and raised the percentage taxed on invoice prices to 10% for cigars 
priced at $120 or less per 1,000, 22% for cigars invoiced over $120 per 1,000, 35% for loose leaf 
tobacco, and 22% for smokeless tobacco.87 HB 177 did not allocate revenue from its proposed 
increases. 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee 
considered HB 177 on June 6, 2002 and raised the 
bill’s tobacco tax increases despite industry 
opposition. At the hearing, RJR lobbyist CJ Blache 
argued that HB 177 unfairly targeted smokers since 
they were already taxed.88 PM lobbyist Randy Haynie 
claimed HB 177 was “absolutely punitive to almost 
25 percent of our citizens (who smoke).” Tobacco industry arguments failed to move the House 
Ways and Means Committee, which offered an amendment to raise HB 177’s cigarette pack tax 
increase another 4¢ to levy an 8¢ hike (Table 11.7).   
 
PM lobbyist Randy Haynie 
claimed HB 177 was “absolutely 
punitive to almost 25 percent of 
our citizens (who smoke).” 
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The Committee also passed an amendment extending the sunset date for HB 117’s 
temporary 4¢ cigarette tax increase passed in 200089 from 2002 to 2004.89 The committee 
changed HB 177’s funding targets, allocating 4¢ per cigarette pack to the Department of Health 
and Hospitals for payments to medical retailers, 3.5¢ per pack to the Department of Culture, 
Recreation and Tourism in the office of state parks, and half a cent per pack to be split between 
the Louisiana Games and Louisiana High School Athletic Association.87 The Committee then 
voted 7-5 to report HB 177 favorably to the House Floor.88 HB 177 stalled after leaving 
committee, dying upon adjournment without additional consideration. 
 
HB 157 is Adopted into Law  
 
 HB 157 returned to the House Floor for 
reconsideration on June 10, 2002. State police officers, 
who would receive a salary increase if the bill passed, 
watched legislators debate the bill from the visitors’ 
gallery.86 HB 157 proponents, in particular State Police, 
had intensified lobbying efforts on HB 157 the week of 
the vote.86 After less than a minute of debate, 
representatives voted 84 to 18 to adopt HB 157.86, 90 HB 
157 sponsor Mitch Landrieu credited passage to the 
various interests behind the bill, telling The Times-
Picayune that, “The only way you can pass legislation of this magnitude against such a fierce 
opposition is to create a coalition of people who have a common purpose.”86 Governor Murphy 
Foster subsequently signed HB 157 on June 18, 2002, which became effective July 1, 2002.66 
 
As adopted, HB 157 increased the state cigarette tax from 24¢ per pack to 36¢, a 12¢ hike 
(Table 11.8).66 The legislature dedicated the revenue to funding cancer centers and cancer 
research, substance abuse treatment and prevention, and salary increases for state police. In 
addition, HB 157 provided money for tobacco control programming outside of DHH’s LTCP, 
which was considered ineffective by health advocates and had a strained relationship with them 
(Chapter 4) (Table 11.9).   
 
HB 157’s tax increase generated $27 million in revenue from July to December 2002 and 
$45 million for FY2 2003,76 providing approximately $7 million to funding tobacco control 
programming (Table 11.10). The tobacco tax increase secured by the Coalition for a Tobacco- 
 Table 11.7: Original Tax Rates and Tax Rates Proposed by HB 177 for Tobacco Products87 
Tobacco Product Existing Tax Rates HB 177 Proposed Tax 
Rates as Introduced 
HB 177 with Ways and 
Means Amendments 
Cigarettes Per Pack 20¢  24¢  28¢  
Cigars Invoiced at $120 
or Less Per 1000 by 
Producer 
8 % of invoice price 10% of invoice price 10% of invoice price 
Cigars Invoiced at $120 
or More Per 1000 by 
Producer 
20% of invoice price 22% of invoice price 22% of invoice price 
Loose Leaf Tobacco 33% of invoice price 35% of invoice price  
Smokeless Tobacco 20% of invoice price 22% of invoice price 22% of invoice price 
“The only way you can pass 
legislation of this magnitude 
against such a fierce 
opposition is to create a 
coalition of people who have 
a common purpose.” 
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Table 11.8: HB 157 Evolution Through the Legislature66 
 Total 
Cigarette 
Tax Rate 
Per Pack 
Increase 
Amount 
Per 
Pack 
Allocation of New Revenue Per Pack 
Funding Target Amount 
Existing Tax Rate 
Per Pack 
24¢  -- -- -- 
HB 157 Original 28¢  4¢  LSU / Tulane Joint Cancer Center and smoking 
cessation  
100% 
HB 157 House 
Ways and Means 
Committee 
36¢  7¢  LSU/Tulane Cancer Center and tobacco 
programming 
72% 
LSU Health Sciences Center Shreveport 28% 
5¢  DHH Office of Addictive Disorders 20% 
LSU Agricultural Center 20% 
DARE drug prevention programs 20% 
State Police 40% 
HB 157 House 
Floor 
36¢  7¢  -- -- 
5¢  -- -- 
HB 157 Senate 
Committee 
Revenue and Fiscal 
Affairs 
36¢  7¢  LSU / Tulane Joint Cancer Center and 
smoking cessation program creation by 
Southern University Board of Supervisors 
42.8 
Tobacco control programming 29.2% 
LSU Health Sciences Center Shreveport 28% 
5¢  DHH Office of Addictive Disorders 20% 
LSU Agricultural Center and Southern 
University 
20% $1 million 
to SU 
All 
remaining 
LSU Ag 
DARE drug prevention programs 20% 
State Police 40% 
HB 157 Senate 
Committee on 
Finance 
36¢  7¢  -- -- 
5¢  -- -- 
HB 157 Senate 36¢  7¢  -- -- 
5¢  -- -- 
HB 157 as Adopted 36¢  7¢  LSU / Tulane Joint Cancer Center and 
smoking cessation program creation by 
Southern University Board of Supervisors 
42.8 
Tobacco control programming 29.2% 
LSU Health Sciences Center Shreveport 28% 
5¢  DHH Office of Addictive Disorders 20% 
LSU Agricultural Center and Southern 
University 
20% $1 million 
to SU 
All 
remaining 
LSU Ag 
DARE drug prevention programs 20% 
State Police 20% 
--No changes occurred (revenue allocation remained same). 
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Table 11.9: Breakdown of the 12¢ Cigarette Tax Revenue Allocation66, 76 
Program Portion of 
Tax 
Annual 
Appropriation 
LCRC $.03 $12 million 
Tobacco Control Programming $.02 $7.5 million 
LSU Agricultural Center and the Southern University 
Agricultural Research and Extension Center 
$.01 $3.5 million 
D.A.R.E $.01 $3.5 million 
LSU Health Sciences Cancer Center (Shreveport) $.02 $7.5 million 
Department of Public Safety and Corrections $.02 $7.5 million 
DHH, Office of Addictive Disorders $.01 $3.5 million 
Total $.12 $45 million 
 
Free Louisiana led to the creation and sustained funding of the tobacco control program the 
Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living, which was instrumental in securing smoking 
restrictions at the state and local level (Chapters 4, 10 and 12). 
 
Governor Kathleen Blanco Pursues a Tax Increase in 2005 to Increase Teacher Pay 
 
The Governor Develops Legislation to Fulfill a Campaign Promise 
 
In 2005, Governor Kathleen Blanco (D) pursued a cigarette tax increase to fulfill  
campaign promise she made to fund a pay raise for Louisiana’s teachers in her successful 2003 
election bid.91 Louisiana teachers received on average $38,700 in annual pay in 2005, $4000 
below the average $42,600 educator salary in the south and $10,000 below the national 
average.92 Blanco decided to pursue sin tax increases to provide educators a pay raise in the 
midst of a budget crisis.93 
 
Tobacco control advocates gave Governor Blanco her idea to increase tobacco taxes to 
fund an educator pay raise, but remained mostly uninvolved during the ensuing legislative 
battle.65 According to LPHI Policy Manager Eric Vicks in a 2019 interview for this report,  
CTFLA brought up the idea of a cigarette tax to Blanco’s Administration. Advocates floated 
dedicating tax revenue to tobacco control programming, but the Administration ultimately 
introduced cigarette tax increase legislation that dedicated revenue to raising educators’ salaries. 
 
Blanco revealed her administration was investigating raising excise taxes on tobacco, 
alcohol, and gaming to finance a teacher salary increase during a speech to the Baton Rouge 
Table 11.10: Comparison of Existing Taxes and Tax Rates Proposed by HB 75124 
Tobacco Product Existing Tax HB 75 Tax  
Cigarettes 36¢ per pack $1.36 per pack 
Cigars Invoiced at $120,000 
or Less Per 1,000 
8% of invoice price 12% of invoice price 
Cigars Invoiced at More Than 
$120,000 Per 1,000 
20% of invoice price 30% of invoice price 
Loose Leaf Tobacco 33% of invoice price 49.5% of invoice price 
Smokeless Tobacco 20% of invoice price 30% of invoice price 
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Rotary Club on February 23, 2005. The administration considered raising teacher salaries $1000, 
possibly followed by wage hikes in subsequent years to bring Louisiana around the southern 
state average.92 She did not intend to secure pay raises for school staff, which the Louisiana 
Association of Educators sought. Blanco’s proposal paled in comparison to the $6000 raise 
applied over 3 years desired by the Louisiana’s two biggest teacher unions.94 At the press event 
Blanco did not reject providing educators a $2000 raise, the baseline salary increase advocated 
for by the Louisiana Federation of Teachers union.92 The tax increases provided for a salary hike 
despite the state having a $200-400 million budget deficit that year.93  
 
As Blanco mulled boosting excise taxes, the Baton Rouge Advocate published an article 
on March 9, 2005 regarding tobacco taxes and tobacco control funding that supported a cigarette 
tax increase. It used information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (CTFK), TFL, and TFL Director Dr. Thomas Houston95 to 
report that smoking in Louisiana (excluding second hand smoke’s contribution) cost Louisiana 
$1.35 billion in direct healthcare costs, including $611 million from Medicaid, to treat tobacco-
caused illnesses. The Advocate also included a CTFK finding that smoking cost the state $1.79 
billion in lost economic productivity. The article reported TFL statistics that 36.4% of Louisiana 
teenagers smoked compared to the 22.9% national average and that smoking would kill 
approximately 107,900 minors in the state prematurely. The Advocate provided information from 
TFL that 26.5% of Louisiana adults smoked, above the 22.5% average nationwide and resulting 
in 6,400 deaths annually. The article included information from TFL Director Houston that a 
10% increase in cigarette pack prices lowered smoking rates among youth 7% and adults 4%. 
Houston also told The Advocate that tobacco control programming received $11.3 million in 
Louisiana that fiscal year, well below the CDC’s $27 million annual recommendation for the 
state.  
 
Blanco’s tobacco tax proposal initially received a tepid reception from Louisiana’s 
education community and lawmakers. By early March the Blanco Administration considered 
increasing the cigarette tax to generate approximately $70 million for teacher pay raises,96 the 
amount of revenue it determined necessary to provide $1000 salary increases.93 Blanco’s 
Administration openly considered pursuing alcohol and gaming taxes to secure a total of $120 
million for teacher pay raises.96 Education representatives found the proposal lackluster, feeling 
the wage hike was inadequate and tobacco an unreliable revenue source.96 Democratic state 
lawmakers were bewildered by Blanco’s proposal since they already planned to use a cigarette 
tax increase to help address Louisiana’s $300 million Medicaid deficit. Republican legislators 
viewed the tax increases as an opportunity to fight Blanco.  
 
Health voluntaries and tobacco control programs advocated for a cigarette tax increase 
while Blanco’s administration developed its sin tax plan. The American Lung Association, 
American Cancer Society, and various organizations actively supported a tobacco tax 
increase.97In a March 25, 2005 Times-Picayune article, ALA of Louisiana Executive Director 
Thomas Lotz explained, “We are always interested in reducing consumption. You will see a 
decrease in consumption in the long run.”97 While voluntaries advocated for a cigarette tax hike, 
TFL provided data supporting a tax increase to the Blanco Administration and state lawmakers 
interested in pursuing tobacco tax increases during 2005.98 
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In late March, Governor Blanco announced her administration was contemplating 
doubling the state cigarette tax from 36¢ to 72¢ per pack,97 which would generate between $70 
and $80 million annually to provide primary and secondary school teachers a $1,300-$1,400 
raise.97 ALA of Louisiana Director Lotz praised Blanco’s plan claiming it reduced smoking.97 
Lotz asserted the cigarette tax hike especially deterred cash-strapped youth from purchasing 
tobacco. 
 
As details of the Governor’s cigarette tax hike came out, support increased from 
education proponents. Louisiana Federation of Teachers CEO Steve Monaghan signaled support 
for increasing the tobacco tax to fund educator and school staff pay increases after Blanco hinted 
at doubling the tax. LFT subsequently revealed it sought at least a $2,000 salary increase for 
educators during the 2005 legislative session.99 The union also asserted that school staff should 
receive a minimum $1,500 pay hike. As introduced, the Blanco administration’s cigarette tax 
increase legislation failed to dedicate revenue. 
 
The Blanco Administration Files Cigarette Tax Bill HB 437 
 
On behalf of Governor Blanco, 
Representative Bryant Hammett (D-Ferriday) 
prefiled HB 437 on April 14, 2005 to raise the 
cigarette tax 50¢ per pack (to 86¢ total).100 The bill, 
projected to generate $87.8 million annually,101 did 
not dedicate revenue despite being advertised as a 
pay raise vehicle for teachers.100, 101 HB 437 was 
coordinated with two other bills to increase taxes on 
alcohol and gaming101 that would generate a combined $120 million.101 The Blanco 
Administration planned to dedicate $70 million from the tax package to provide educators a 
$1000 pay increase. The remaining $50 million went towards raises for support staff at schools 
and college educators. HB 437 awaited its first hearing without fanfare while Governor Blanco 
continued to advocate for raising teachers’ salaries using taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, and 
gambling. Education advocates rallied behind the legislation with limited support from health 
and tobacco control proponents. 
 
HB 437 received limited support from health and tobacco control organizations operating 
in Louisiana, many who were members of CTFLA. The American Cancer Society,102  American 
Lung Association of Louisiana97, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids,103 American Heart 
Association, the Louisiana State Medical Society, Louisiana Academy of Physicians and others 
backed the bill.102 ACS released a survey of 600 people on April 26, 2005 showing Louisianans 
supported a higher cigarette tax.103 The survey, paid for by ACS and conducted by Ed Renwick 
at the Loyola University Institute of Politics, found that 69% of participants supported raising the 
cigarette tax and that 65% supported a 75¢ increase per pack.103 Of those surveyed, 90% 
supported using cigarette tax increase revenue for cancer treatment and prevention, 81% 
supported salary increases for teachers, and 78% backed using funds for Medicaid. The poll also 
found that 69% of participants supported increasing the alcohol tax and 70% backed increasing 
taxes on gaming. CTFK also shared its finding in late April that a 50¢ cigarette tax increase 
lowered youth smoking rates 9.5%. However, according to LPHI’s Eric Vicks in a 2019 
The bill, projected to generate 
$87.8 million annually, did not 
dedicate revenue despite being 
advertised as a pay raise vehicle 
for teachers. 
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interview, the CTFLA did not campaign assertively for HB 437 because it did not fund the 
group’s priorities: 
 
I don’t think that the coalition was very strong on that honestly…We were doing 
what we could. But I don’t think that everybody bought into it just because it was 
going someplace that wasn’t tobacco-related or health-related.65 
 
CTFLA members also avoided intensive efforts on HB 437 believing Governor Blanco lacked 
the political strength to pass the legislation. LPHI’s Eric Vicks stated in his 2019 interview for 
our report: 
 
The governor…was weakened early on. And they [CTFLA] felt that she just 
didn’t have the ability to force something through. Generally speaking, Louisiana 
is a top-down state, so whatever the governor wants usually happens. And people 
don’t like it. But they saw her [Governor Blanco] with too many chinks in the 
armor so to speak, and I don’t think that we believed she had the ability to just 
force something through.65 
 
Teachers, instead of tobacco control and health proponents, served as the primary supporters of 
HB 437. Educators and their unions actively campaigned for the legislation during the 2005 
legislative session. Members of teacher unions contacted lawmakers to pressure them into 
supporting the bill.104 
 
 Republican state legislators fought HB 437 because of their opposition to taxes. The 
Louisiana Republican Party had issued a resolution in 1999 asking candidates to oppose all tax 
increases and sign a no-tax pledge.105 The Republican State Central Committee approved the 
resolution for distribution. By April 21, 2005 House Republican Caucus Chairman Jim Tucker 
(R-Algiers) and Senate Republican Caucus Chairman Tom Schedler (R-Mandeville) sent a letter 
to Governor Blanco stating a salary increase for teachers could be accomplished by using newly 
expected revenue instead of raising taxes.106 Despite Republican opposition to tax increases, 
Governor Blanco pursued her taxation plan.  
 
House Bill 437 in the Legislature 
 
The House Committee on Ways and Means considered HB 437 on May 9, 2005. 
Representative Bryant Hammett, HB 437’s sponsor, chaired the Committee.101 At the hearing, 
tobacco wholesalers and retailers attacked HB 437 as regressive and economically harmful.107 
Church Point Wholesalers General Manager Jack Casanova argued a black market would 
develop as people smuggled in lower cost cigarettes from neighboring states.107 Fred Hoyt, a 
former state senator and convenience store chain owner, testified that increasing the cigarette tax 
discriminated against smokers and threatened to cause a revenue decline for the state as people 
stopped smoking.107 Another distributor, Franklin Supply Inc. President Keith Landen, asserted 
that increased taxes resulted in people turning to “other sources.”108 Committee member Arthur 
Morrell (D-New Orleans) asserted that the tax increase was excessive and argued that funds for 
the salary increase should come from the Taylor Opportunity Program for Students (TOPS) 
(Chapter 9).107 TOPS, established by law in 1989, is a state program that provides Louisianans 
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scholarships for attending university, college, or trade schools.109, 110 The program is popular in 
Louisiana, and a perennial funding concern during state budget crises. 
 
Governor Blanco testified at the hearing, urging the Committee to approve HB 437 to 
provide a pay increase for teachers, prevent youth smoking, and help adults quit smoking.107 She 
asked committee members to amend the bill to increase the cigarette pack tax by $1.00 instead of 
50¢ as an alternative to introducing alcohol and gambling tax increase legislation, believing that 
passing a single tax increase was more feasible.107 The Committee obliged Blanco and raised the 
tax increase in HB 437 to $1 per pack,107, 111 increasing the existing cigarette tax from 36¢ to 
$1.36 if the bill passed. 
 
During the hearing Representative Rick Farrar (D-Pineville) proposed an amendment to 
dedicate all of HB 437’s revenue to raising teachers’ salaries. The committee rejected the 
amendment 12-5, causing HB 437’s revenue to remain unallocated.107   
 
After considering comments and amendments to HB 437, the House Ways and Means 
Committee unanimously reported the bill favorably to the House Floor. 
 
An Unexpected Windfall Influences Legislative Debate Around HB 437 
  
In mid-May 2005, state officials determined that Louisiana expected more revenue than 
initially projected during the current 2004-2005 fiscal year and the following 2005-2006 fiscal 
year, lessening lawmakers’ incentives to increase taxes during the session. The Revenue 
Estimating Conference, a 4-person committee that determined the amount of money the state 
could appropriate, determined Louisiana had $360 million in additional funds available for 
use.112 The conference anticipated Louisiana receiving another $192 million for FY 2004-05 and 
$169 million during FY 2005-06. The additional revenue, primarily coming from energy sector 
earnings,113 affected lawmaker and third-party attitudes around HB 437. 
 
The state windfall reduced the legislature’s willpower to pass tax increases, placing HB 
437 in limbo. Tax legislation required a two-thirds vote to pass,112, 114 a difficult threshold to 
cross in the face of staunch anti-tax opposition from Republicans. As a result, Speaker of the 
House Joe Salter (D-Florien) withheld HB 437 from consideration on the House Floor while bill 
proponents pushed lawmakers to pass the cigarette tax.114 
 
The $360 million windfall influenced HB 437’s proponents and opponents’ messaging 
and legislative objectives. Lawmakers supportive of HB 437 asked Blanco to dedicate cigarette 
tax revenue specifically to educators instead of allowing it to enter the general budget.112 The 
Blanco Administration maintained support for HB 437, arguing it provided educator pay raises 
while allowing use of the $360 million windfall to address shortfalls for Louisiana’s charity 
hospital system and other underfunded initiatives and programs. Republican legislators 
advocated against passing the cigarette tax, calling for using the windfall to fund the educator 
salary increase and other state programming.113  
 
The tobacco industry and tobacco retailers ignored the windfall and indirectly attacked 
HB 437 by campaigning against tax increases in general.115 RJ Reynolds Spokesperson David 
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Howard asserted to the press that HB 437’s cigarette tax increase was regressive. According to 
The Times-Picayune, he also claimed the tax unfairly targeted smokers, stating “No one’s going 
to argue the importance of adequate pay for teachers, (but) why should a minority of residents be 
responsible for something that is really the responsibility of every state.”113 The tobacco 
industry116 launched radio ads117 urging constituents to contact their lawmakers and ask them to 
reject all tax increases instead of singling out HB 437’s cigarette tax hike.104, 116 The Advocate 
published an excerpt from one radio ad in a May 
24, 2005 article:  
 
Manage the budget, stop the waste, end the 
slush funds, stop buying fancy cars, new 
helicopters and going on big trips with our 
money. That’s how we pay our teachers.118 
 
The ads did not specifically reference HB 437116 
and ran uncredited.118 Opponents also conducted 
phone calls and distributed mailers against tax increases.119 According to The Advocate, Philip 
Morris circulated handouts claiming that HB 437 placed the “‘third largest total tax burden on a 
pack-a-day smoker in the nation’” behind Montana and Rhode Island.118  Rhode Island had the 
highest tax in the United States at $2.46 per cigarette pack.120 Montana had a $1.70 per cigarette 
pack tax, the 4th highest in the country.120  It is possible Philip Morris used average income or 
other statistics into account when making the tax burden claims in its handouts. 
 
Governor Blanco countered attacks against HB 437 by promoting the bill, making the 
legislation more passable, and attacking the tobacco industry. The Governor held a speech on 
May 23, 2005 to promote HB 437118 that prominent members of the education community and 25 
lawmakers attended in support. There, Blanco announced that all revenue from HB 437’s $1 
cigarette tax increase (which remained unallocated in the bill) would go to funding pay raises for 
teachers and school staff instead of a portion going to healthcare funding as originally planned. 
According to The Advocate, Blanco attacked the tobacco industry in her speech for preying on 
minors: 
 
They don’t care about you or about your children’s future. They don’t care about 
health, and they certainly don’t care about the children in the public schools – 
except to turn them into smokers. 
 
Big Tobacco will spend – and do – whatever it takes to protect their bottom line, 
no matter what it costs our children.  
 
They’re going to attack me personally because this plan hits their vast profits. 
After all, they depend on our children to replace their dying customers.116  
 
Blanco displayed a mock billboard at the hearing designed to attract Texas educators to work in 
Louisiana if her state’s teachers received their desired salary increase. She subsequently 
published a letter in The Advocate on June 1 advocating for HB 437’s cigarette tax increase. She 
asserted that Louisiana’s student outcomes were improving and that the state needed to increase 
“Manage the budget, stop the 
waste, end the slush funds, 
stop buying fancy cars, new 
helicopters and going on big 
trips with our money. That’s 
how we pay our teachers.” 
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teacher pay to retain educators and continue progress.121 Blanco claimed to have made $300 
million in budget cuts before requesting the $1 per pack cigarette tax increase. She also 
dismissed calls to use the state’s windfall to provide educator pay raises, since that money was 
needed to address current and future healthcare costs (partially caused by reduced federal 
funding116). She argued the tax raised teacher salaries to an average of $41,600 (approximately 
$3,300 over two years to teachers), $200 below the average among southern states. Blanco 
asserted the tax increase also deterred youth smoking. In her letter, Blanco attacked tobacco 
industry opposition to the tax increase: 
 
The big tobacco companies are going to use all their money and all their power to 
intimidate legislators and try to defeat this tax. They don’t care about our 
children’s future – except to turn them into smokers.121 
 
She called on parents to push for HB 437’s adoption since it benefitted their children and those 
educating them.121 Besides targeting the tobacco industry in public messaging, Blanco privately 
met with and pushed state legislators to vote for HB 437.122 
 
 The Louisiana education community provided moderate support for HB 437 while it 
awaited consideration on the House Floor. Teachers pressured lawmakers via direct lobbying115 
and email contacts to pass the bill.119 Teachers appeared at the state capitol on June 8, 2005 to 
advocate for the cigarette tax increase. In contrast, “several dozen red-clad Republican women 
milled about the Capitol sporting large buttons that advertised their opposition to taxes” 
according to an article in The Times-Picayune.115 The education community’s lobbying efforts 
disappointed the Blanco administration, which felt that educators had not adequately pressured 
legislators to pass the cigarette tax increase. 115 
 
 The Blanco Administration Fails to Pass HB 437 
 
To increase support for HB 437 the Blanco Administration and HB 437 sponsor Bryant 
Hammett (D-Ferriday) suggested amendments to make the bill likelier to pass. In May, after the 
reveal of Louisiana’s windfall, Hammett announced he would amend the legislation to dedicate 
revenue to teachers and school workers instead of leaving the money open to the general 
budget.104, 117 The amendments dedicated all $186 million generated in HB 437’s first year119 to 
provide educators a $3,300 raise and lesser wage hikes to other school staff.115, 119 Hammett 
offered the amendment to make HB 437 more passable after discovery of the windfall.117 Later 
in June, Governor Blanco proposed reducing the cigarette tax increase to 50¢ and dedicating 
some of the revenue to sheriffs and healthcare instead of only teacher pay raises.115, 123 Under 
Blanco’s plan teachers still received a salary increase with funding coming from money 
previously dedicated to the General Fund or healthcare expenditures.123 Blanco met with 
lawmakers on June 9, 2005 to explore their openness to the changes123 but failed to secure 
enough votes to pass HB 437.115  
 
Governor Blanco’s efforts on HB 437 ultimately proved fruitless. While she pursued 
votes, The New Orleans Times-Picayune quoted House Republican Caucus Chairman  Jim 
Tucker dismissing efforts to salvage HB 437: 
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Flipping it [switching HB 437’s revenue dedication from educator pay raises to 
healthcare] won’t get any more votes that way. Why would anybody want to 
dedicate it to health care until we know the teachers are taken care of? This is a 
tax looking for a purpose.123 
 
After failing to garner support for HB 437, Governor Blanco suspended efforts to pass the bill on 
June 14, 2005, and the bill died.104, 119  
 
Attempt to Increase the Cigarette Tax by a Dollar in 2009 
 
On March 20, 2009, House Speaker Pro-Tem (temporary House Speaker) Karen Carter 
Peterson (D-New Orleans) filed HB 75, the Louisiana Healthier Families Act (LHFA), to 
increase taxes on all tobacco products.124 The bill initially did not allocate revenue and sought to 
address Louisiana’s budget deficit by producing an additional $209 million annually.125 126 
 
 HB 75 faced an adverse political climate in the 2009 legislative session. Governor Bobby 
Jindal (R), elected in 2007,127 opposed tax increases.125 The US was also in an economic 
recession.125, 128 According to The Advocate, Jindal denounced HB 75 as a “regressive tax that 
hits people that can least afford it” and announced he would veto the bill if it survived the 
legislature.125  
 
 To generate support for HB 75, CTFLA, ACS, AHA, ALA, hospitals, and others released 
statements to the media and ran advertisements supporting the tobacco tax increase. In March, 
Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center Vice President Coletta Barrett told Louisiana 
news media that tobacco killed thousands of Louisianans yearly and that a tobacco tax reduced 
smoking.125 CTFLA, ACS, AHA, ALA and other groups issued a press release by late April 
2009  supporting the bill because it would prevent youth smoking.129 TFL also ran print and 
online advertisements promoting the “health and economic advantages of increasing the tobacco 
tax during the 2009 legislative session,130 which ran from April 27 to June 25.131 At HB 75’s first 
hearing, the Baton Rouge Area Chamber of Commerce, the American Association of Retired 
Persons  (AARP), and the Louisiana Federation of Teachers also endorsed the bill.132, 133   
 
The Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus, which had historically opposed tobacco taxes 
believing they were regressive, also supported HB 75.134 TFL Policy Manager Carrie Griffin 
Monica credited the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus’ support to TFL and other CTFLA 
members’ outreach efforts to the group. According to Monica in a 2014 interview for this report: 
 
So we [TFL] worked really closely with the CTFL[A] life partners, and spent 
some time sharing with them [the Black Caucus] how their communities without a 
tax increase are disproportionately affected by smoking and how the long term 
benefits of having a hard tax would actually benefit their communities more. And 
I think what really resonated for them is the fact that they’re targeted much, much 
more than wealthier communities. 
 
I think that they started to say, “You know, this is actually not really fair. And we 
don’t want our communities targeted. We don’t want our folks to die more.”134 
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HB 75 was the first tobacco tax increase backed by 
the Caucus.134  
 
HB 75 in the Legislature 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee 
considered HB 75 on April 28, 2009. Before the 
hearing, the Jindal Administration told Committee 
Chairman Hunter Greene (R-East Baton Rouge) that the Governor opposed the bill.132, 133, 135  
 
As discussion over HB 75 began at the hearing, Representative Peterson amended the bill 
to dedicate tax revenue towards various health programs and agencies. In particular, the 
amendments designated revenue to paying healthcare providers (which would get matched 
federal funds), the LSU Pennington Biomedical Research Center,133 tobacco quit programs, 
school health clinics, and programming at the Office of Mental Health and the Office of 
Addictive Disorders.135 Representative Peterson argued lawmakers should adopt the tax to 
alleviate healthcare spending cuts in Governor Jindal’s budget and to reduce healthcare costs by 
curbing smoking.133 Peterson cited a survey conducted by LSU that found 75% of participants 
backed the tax increases in HB 75, to show Committee members the public supported the bill.133 
 
During the hearing, trade representatives and business owners testified against HB 75.  
Louisiana Association of Wholesalers Executive Director David Tatman argued legislators 
wanted to pay for recurring expenses using revenue from a tobacco tax increase, which would 
decrease over time.136 David Tatman previously worked as a coordinator for the Philip Morris 
Field Action Team, and had worked as a lobbyist for Philip Morris/Altria since the 1990s 
(Chapter 2). Other wholesalers and convenience store owners attending the hearing argued the 
tobacco tax increases in HB 75 would economically harm businesses that had recently 
experienced a federal tobacco tax increase, and that the increases targeted a limited portion of the 
population.133 
 
After considering HB 75, The House Ways and Means Committee voted 11-7 to kill the 
bill.133 
 
Effort to Revive 2009 Tax increase 
 
Following HB 75’s defeat, Representative Karen Carter Peterson filed HB 889 (Table 
11.11) on May 9 to increase the cigarette tax 50¢ per pack. HB 889 also raised tax rates on other 
tobacco products, proposing the same increases on cigars, loose leaf and smokeless tobacco as 
Table 11.11: Tobacco Tax Increases Proposed in HB 889138 
Tobacco Product Existing Tax HB 889  
Cigarettes 36¢ per pack 86¢ per pack 
Cigars Invoiced at 
$120,000 or Less Per 1,000 
8% of invoice price 12% of invoice price 
Cigars Invoiced at More 
Than $120,000 Per 1,000 
20% of invoice price 30% of invoice price 
Loose Leaf Tobacco 33% of invoice price 49.5% of invoice price 
Smokeless Tobacco 20% of invoice price 30% of invoice price 
“You know, this is actually 
not really fair. And we don’t 
want our communities 
targeted. We don’t want our 
folks to die more.” 
 513 
 
Peterson’s HB 75 with revenue dedicated to healthcare (Table 11.12).137 Peterson introduced the 
legislation to prevent impending cuts to healthcare funding.126  
 
The Louisiana Budget Project Releases Policy Note Supporting HB 889 
  
In May 2009, the Louisiana Budget Project (LBP) issued a policy note supporting 
adoption of HB 889 to generate revenue for health initiatives and curb negative health impacts 
caused by smoking.139 LBP is a nonpartisan policy nonprofit created by the Louisiana 
Association of Nonprofit Organizations in 2006 to inform the public on Louisiana’s budget 
development. In addition, LBP reports on state spending decisions, particularly regarding their 
impacts on moderate to low income families in Louisiana. In its policy note, LBP stated that HB 
889 intended to generate $92 million annually for the state while reducing smoking and 
improving health in Louisiana.139 LBP referenced findings from CTFLA that 65,000 Louisianans 
died yearly from tobacco-related illnesses. The nonprofit highlighted another CTFLA finding 
that 25% of high school students in the state smoked at a combined rate of 13 million cigarette 
packs yearly. LBP referenced a Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids statistic that raising cigarette 
taxes 10% reduced smoking across the population by 4% and approximately7% for minors. LBP 
reiterated CTFLA claims that a $1 increase to Louisiana’s cigarette tax would reduce smoking by 
48,800 minors and 26,600 adults. In addition, LBP referenced a CTFLA finding that a $1 hike 
would lower the minor smoking rate 16.3% and thus prevent 22,600 tobacco-related deaths.  
 
While acknowledging that tobacco taxes aim to reduce smoking and as a result were not a 
long-term source of funding, LBP recommended that the yet-undedicated revenue in HB 889 go 
Table 11.12: Allocation of Funds in HB 889138 
Funding Target Percent of New 
Tobacco Tax 
Revenue Dedicated as 
Introduced 
 
Required Money Be Used for Tobacco Control 
Programming 
  HB 889 Original HB 889 House Committee 
Version 
DHH Medicaid Payments 50 - - 
Office of Addictive Disorders 10 - + 
Office of Mental Health 5 - + 
Office of Public Health-School Health 
Clinics 
2 - + 
Office of Public Health-Nurse Family 
Partnerships 
2 - + 
DHH Office of Secretary-Health Center 
Funding 
4 - + 
LSU Pennington Biomedical Research 
Center 
5 - - 
LSU Health Sciences Center Shreveport 5 - +* 
LSU Health Sciences Center New Orleans 2 - +* 
LCRC 10 - - 
New Orleans Biosciences Economic 
Development District 
3 - +* 
Southern University-Tobacco Prevention 
Programs 
2 + + 
*Permitted use of funds for cancer research or tobacco control programming. 
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towards health initiatives. LBP suggested using $27.2 million of the $92 million expected 
annually from HB 889 to expand health coverage for pregnant women whose yearly family 
income did not exceed twice the poverty rate, which was $36,620 for a three-person family.139 
LBP also recommended using part of the $27.2 million to increase access to “the Nurse-Family 
Partnership Program from 15% to 20% of eligible women with annual family income no more 
than twice the rate of poverty.”139  LBP stated that expanded health coverage for pregnant 
women would prevent premature births and reduce infant mortality. LBP asserted the nurse 
partnership program “improved pregnancy outcomes, increased family self-sufficiency, and 
enhanced child health and development for low-income families.”139 LBP recommended using 
the $64.8 million of remaining funds from HB 889’s tobacco tax increases towards ongoing 
tobacco cessation programming, which would create health care savings for Louisiana. LBP 
stated that Louisiana had the worst health among states according to the United Health 
Foundation’s 2008 state health rankings. In particular, Louisiana ranked 45th in cardiovascular 
mortality and 49th in cancer mortality, two tobacco-related illnesses. LBP highlighted that 
Louisiana had the sixth lowest cigarette tax in the United States. 
 
 LBP countered claims of tobacco tax increases causing economic harm and provided 
potential solutions to reduce the regressive nature of an excise tax increase in its policy note on 
HB 889.139 The nonprofit referenced studies finding that tobacco tax increases did not hurt 
retailer profits, that higher cigarette sales were correlated with reduced retail jobs, and that a $1 
cigarette tax increase increased employment at retailers. To address the regressive nature of an 
excise tax increase, LBP suggested providing low-income Louisianans tax credits. The nonprofit 
also suggested that low income Louisianans would have their health improved by the tax 
increase. LBP stated that government spending related to smoking cost Louisiana households 
$628 annually, and claimed a tobacco tax increase “would at least transfer this responsibility 
from non-smokers to those that choose to smoke.”139 LBP closed by stating HB 889 helped 
Louisiana and that tobacco-related harm could be prevented.  
 
HB 889 in the Legislature 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee 
scheduled HB 889 for consideration on May 12, 
2009, but postponed it when members Steven Carter 
(R-Baton Rouge) and Frank Hoffmann (R-West 
Monroe) prevented quorum by failing to appear.140 
The House Education Committee paused its hearing 
to allow Carter and Hoffmann, who were also members on that committee, to attend the Ways 
and Means hearing for HB 889.140 However, Carter and Hoffmann went to Governor Jindal’s 
office to avoid the meeting, resulting in the hearing’s cancellation after an hour of waiting.140, 141 
According to the New Orleans Times-Picayune, Jindal’s office had Carter and Hoffmann visit to 
prevent the House Ways and Means Committee from voting on HB 889.126 Questioned by the 
press about his absence, Carter stated the House Ways and Means Committee hearing “did not 
meet my principles”140 and “we [Carter and Hoffmann] had personal reasons for why we did not 
go.”141 Carter added he needed to look over HB 889, telling the Baton Rouge Advocate “I am 
anti-tax and anti-smoking…I am caught between a rock and a hard place.”141  
 
“I am anti-tax and anti-smoking 
… I am caught between a rock 
and a hard place.” 
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The House Ways and Means Committee ultimately considered HB 889 on June 8, 
2009.142 At the hearing representatives and officials from nonprofits, research and healthcare 
organizations testified in support of the bill (Table 11.13). HB 889 sponsor Peterson and other 
lawmakers also backed the legislation at the committee hearing. HB 889 proponents asserted the 
tax increases were popular, saved the state and its residents’ money, improved public health, 
reduced tobacco use, and addressed ongoing budget issues. 
 
Opponents testifying against HB 889’s tax increase included tobacco retailers and 
wholesalers, the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Revenue, conservative think tank and 
activist organizations, and tobacco industry representatives (Table 11.14). They asserted the tax 
increases would cause crime, reduce state revenue, unfairly target smokers and the poor, fail to 
limit youth tobacco use and asserted that the government needed to have fiscal restraint. 
 
During the hearing, the Committee adopted a package of amendments specifying that HB 
889’s revenue be used to fund tobacco control programming or cancer research (Table 11.12).138 
The Committee then voted 8-7 to advance HB 889 to the House Floor (Table 11.15).142  
 
Representatives brought HB 889 to the House Floor for debate on June 9, 2009126 where 
opponents attempted to stall the bill. During discussion of HB 889, Representative Joseph 
Lopinto (R-Metairie) unsuccessfully requested  the bill to be sent to the House Health and 
Welfare Committee for additional consideration.126 Speaker Jim Tucker (R-Terrytown) 
subsequently moved the bill to the House Appropriations Committee, arguing that house rules 
required consideration by that committee since the bill established a new fund and allocated 
revenue.126 HB 889 sponsor Peterson asked the House to allow HB 889 to stay on the Floor, 
which Representatives rejected in a 52-44 vote.144 To save HB 889 from being trapped in 
committee, Peterson motioned for the House to skip the hearing and discharge HB 889 from the 
Appropriations Committee.144 Representatives voted 58 to 41 to bring HB 889 back to the House 
Floor without consideration by the Appropriations Committee.144 Afterwards Representative 
Lopinto tried tabling HB 889 to practically kill the bill. Representatives rejected Lopinto’s 
motion 61-37, keeping the legislation in the House for additional consideration.144 
 
HB 889 returned to the House Floor for consideration on June 15, 2009.138 Numerous 
lawmakers provided comments in favor of the tobacco tax increase bill during debate.145 
According to The Advocate, Representative Walt Leger III attacked anti-tax increase arguments 
against HB 889. He claimed lawmakers opposing the bill supported the tobacco industry stating, 
“This anti-tax rhetoric is simply a pretext to support big tobacco…You can go with Joe Camel 
and the Marlboro man or you can go with the people of Louisiana.”146 Representative Hollis 
Downs  spoke in support of the bill, recalling losing his father to a tobacco related illness.146 
Downs also announced his desire to eliminate tobacco products using taxation.146 Representative 
Harold Ritchie, a smoker, supported HB 889 believing it might help people quit.146 HB 889’s 
sponsor, Representative Peterson, stated that Louisianans would save $627 annually in taxes by 
lowering smoking rates and reducing tobacco-related healthcare costs. She also stated that 
tobacco was the leading cause of preventable death in Louisiana.146 Only Representative Lopinto 
stood against HB 889 during Floor debate on June 15. He claimed the state should attempt 
austerity measures before increasing taxes. 146 
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Table 11.13:  Testimony from HB 889 Supporters at the June 8 House and Ways Committee Hearing143  
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Karen Carter 
Peterson 
Representative – HB 
889 sponsor 
+ + +   +     + +          
Carmodie Representative    + +  +                
Joe Harrison Representative          +   +         
Lejay Representative  +    +        +        
Gray Senator     +               +  
Rita Matthews Louisiana Budget 
Project – Analyst 
  + + +                 
Kim Williams Nurse Family 
Partnership National 
Service Office 
    +          + + +     
Henry 
Williamson 
Unknown                  +    
Jennifer Hayden Louisiana Cancer 
Comprehensive 
Control Program 
       + +            + 
Hollis Downs Representative     +               + + 
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Jim Macnamara President and CEO 
Greater New Orleans 
Biosciences Economic 
District 
                    + 
Carrie Everett AARP Louisiana  + + + + +    +    +        
Jennifer Jantz Executive Director – 
National Alliance on 
Mental Illness 
              +  + + +   
Braxton Mary Perkins Cancer 
Center and Louisiana 
Primary Care 
Association 
       + +             
Claude Buchard Executive Director 
Pennington 
Biomedical Research 
Center 
 +  +     +      + + +     
Gary Smith Representative     + +                
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Table 11.14: Testimony from HB 889 Supporters at the June 8 House and Ways Committee Hearing143 
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Revenue - 
Secretary 
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Shop Rite Stores 
(Retailer) 
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Renee Girard Pipers Heaven 
(Retailer) 
     + + +      + +           
Bob Winston Tinderbox 
(Retailer) 
     +             + +  +    
Jeb Bruneau Pelican Institute 
for Public Policy* 
                 +        
Mark Zelden Louisiana 
Conservative 
Action Network  
                         
David Tatman Louisiana 
Association of 
Wholesalers** 
       + + + + +  + +     +      
Randy Haynie Altria      + +                + + + 
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Table 11.15:  House Ways and Means Committee Votes on Tobacco Taxes in 2009133 142 
Name Party District HB 75 Vote HB 889 Vote 
Hunter Greene (Chair)   -- Abstained 
Damon Baldone  D Houma Yes Yes 
Roy Burrell D Shreveport Yes Yes 
Steve Carter R Baton Rouge Yes Yes 
Avon Honey D Baton Rouge Yes Yes 
Girod Jackson D Harvey Yes Yes 
Cedric Richmond D New Orleans Yes -- 
Harold Ritchie D Bogalusa Yes Yes 
Taylor Barras D New Iberia No -- 
Michael Danahay D Sulphur No Yes 
Mickey Guillory D Eunice No -- 
Cameron Henry R New Orleans No No 
Frank Hoffmann R West Monroe No Yes 
Rick Nowlin R Natchitoches No No 
Jonathan Perry R Abbeville No No 
Jane Smith R Bossier City No No 
Dee Richard I Thibodaux No No 
Joel Robideaux I Lafayette  No No 
Ricky Templet R Gretna  No No 
*Louisiana has four-year election cycles. 
--Not included in vote count. 
 
Lawmakers did not consider substantive changes to HB 889 on the House Floor. 
Representative Mike Danahay (D-Sulphur) submitted an amendment that eliminated tax 
increases for cigars, loose leaf tobacco and smokeless138 that lawmakers did not consider. 
Despite seeking to weaken HB 889, Danahay later voted to adopt the bill.146  
 
After consideration, the House voted 55-45 against HB 889.146 In a 2009 interview with 
the New Orleans Times-Picayune, Representative Peterson attributed the defeat of HB 889 to a 
press conference held by House Leadership the same day her bill was considered, where House 
Leaders stated their opposition to any tax increases that session.147  Peterson also blamed 
Governor Jindal, asserting he prioritized maintaining a tax-free legislative record for his 
presidential ambitions over the state’s needs.147   
 
The death of HB 889 ended efforts to increase tobacco taxes in 2009. 
 
Lawmakers and Advocates Pursue Tobacco Tax Increases in 2011 
 
In 2011, Louisiana’s political climate remained averse to pursuing tobacco tax legislation 
despite public support for an increase. A survey of 600 likely Louisiana voters conducted in 2010 
by Southern Media and Opinion Research Inc. had found that 65% of total respondents 
supported raising tobacco taxes regardless of how lawmakers allocated resulting revenue (the 
results were publicly released by at least mid-March 2011).148 Another survey, released by late 
March 2011 and conducted by Louisiana State University, found that 74% of Louisianan’s 
favored increasing the state cigarette tax.148 However, Governor Bobby Jindal (R), who sought 
reelection that year, publicly opposed taxation of any form149 despite Louisiana’s $1.6 billion 
budget deficit.148 He aired campaign ads opposing tax increases and pledged to veto any tax 
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renewals or hike.149 The state legislature was also controlled by Republicans, who generally 
opposed taxes.148 
 
Health, Civic and Religious Organizations Call for a Tobacco Tax Increase 
 
Despite known and expected political opposition to taxes, health, faith and policy groups 
announced support for increasing Louisiana’s cigarette tax during the 2011 legislative session. 
On February 28, 2011 the Louisiana chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) 
announced to the Press Club of Baton Rouge its support for increasing the state’s cigarette tax to 
offset expected budget cuts in healthcare funding and deter smoking.150 In mid-March, religious 
leaders Reverend John Yeats of the Louisiana Baptist Convention, Reverend Dan Krutz of the 
Louisiana Interchurch Conference, Bishop Thomas Brown of the Louisiana Christian Methodist 
Episcopal Church, Church Women United of Louisiana President Mary Collins, and Bishop 
William Wayne Hutchinson of the Louisiana United Methodist Churches151 signed a letter 
calling to increase the state cigarette tax by $1.25.151   
 
During March 2011, the Louisiana Budget Project (LBP), a nonpartisan policy think-
tank, released a research note urging the state to increase tobacco taxes to help address its $1.6 
billion budget deficit.152 LBP cited Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids’ findings that states had 
raised tobacco taxes over 100 times since 2002, the last year Louisiana had passed an increase, to 
convey the state’s tax stagnation. The note highlighted that a temporary 4¢ cigarette tax passed in 
2002 would expire without action in 2012, lowering the $137 million in annual tobacco taxes 
Louisiana received by $12 million amid ongoing budget issues. LBP claimed a 50¢ increase per 
cigarette pack (to 86¢ total) would provide Louisiana $158 million in yearly revenue and that a 
$1 increase per pack (to $1.36 total) would generate $301 million annually. LBP also provided 
various health and economic reasons for increasing tobacco taxes. The organization stated that a 
tax increase lowered smoking prevalence, particularly among minors. LBP highlighted that the 
United Health Foundation ranked Louisiana second worse in healthcare among the United States, 
partially because of high incidences of smoking-related illnesses. LBP’s note reported that 
Louisiana had the 48th highest cigarette cost in the country and had the 9th highest smoking rate 
in the country. In addition, LBP stated that 20% of Louisiana high school students had tried a 
cigarette, exposing them to potential addiction and health problems that would harm the state’s 
future economic health. LBP reasoned that a tobacco tax increase could be leveraged to prevent 
teenage smoking because they are sensitive to price, and as a result, protect the state’s ongoing 
economic wellbeing. The think-tank stated that a tobacco tax raised taxes on all socioeconomic 
groups, but acknowledged such an increase was regressive and negatively impacted low income 
Louisianans more since they “face[d] a larger increase as a share of income.”152 LBP reasoned 
stated that tax credits could address regressivity and that low-income groups (who smoke at 
higher rates than high-income groups) would experience health improvements from reduced 
smoking. LBP recommended that tobacco tax increase revenue not be dedicated towards long-
term programs since funds would decline with reductions in tobacco use. Tobacco tax increase 
legislation appeared shortly after health and religious groups, and LBP expressed support for a 
cigarette tax hike.  
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 Representative Harold Ritchie (D-Bogalusa) pre-filed HB 63, tobacco tax increase 
legislation, on March 30, 2011. The bill increased taxes on cigarettes, cigars, loose leaf and 
smokeless tobacco (Table 11.16). It also made HB 117’s temporary 4¢ cigarette tax increase, 
adopted in 2000 and then set to expire on June 30, 2012, permanent.89, 153 HB 63 did not allocate 
revenue upon introduction. Ritchie indicated he would introduce an amendment to direct 
resulting funds “to health care.”154 Supporters estimated that HB 63 would provide Louisiana 
approximately $176 million in revenue.155 The American Cancer Society, various health groups, 
and Louisiana Faith Leaders United Against Tobacco backed the bill.156 157 
 
Support for HB 63 quickly fragmented after the bill’s introduction. In early April, the 
Louisiana Baptist Convention and Reverend John Yeats withdrew their support for increasing 
tobacco taxes after meeting with Governor Jindal’s Chief of Staff Timmy Teepall. In an 
interview with the Baton Rouge Advocate, Teepall claimed to merely state the administration’s 
position on tax increases at the meeting.155 Reverend Yeats and the Louisiana Baptist Convention 
claimed to stop advocating for a cigarette tax increase to work on other issues such as child care 
and abortion policy.155 After Reverend Yeats and the Louisiana Baptist Convention stopped 
backing a cigarette tax increase, Reverend Dan Krutz wrote a letter to The Advocate stating that 
the Louisiana Interchurch Conference supported Ritchie’s tobacco tax increase.158   
 
Louisiana’s political climate and aversion to taxes caused Representative Ritchie to fear 
his bill would be killed in committee.159 Prior to the House Ways and Means Committee hearing 
for HB 63, Governor Jindal expressed opposition to all tax increases, including renewal of the 4¢  
cigarette tax increase.160 On April 25, four days after Jindal announced his stance against the tax 
renewal,160 Ritchie submitted another tobacco tax bill, HB 591. The bill made the temporary 4¢ 
tax increase scheduled to sunset on June 30, 2012 permanent. HB 591 did not include other 
tobacco tax increases.161  
 
Other groups signified support for tobacco tax increases before Ritchie’s legislation 
received consideration during the 2011 Regular Session. By mid-April, the Better Choices for a 
Better Louisiana Coalition, formed to advocate for middle and lower classes, called for 
lawmakers to raise $940 million in additional taxes to address Louisiana’s budget issues.162 As 
part of the tax increases, the coalition proposed raising the cigarette tax per pack from 36¢ to 
$1.36 to generate $301 million in new revenue annually. The group consisted of the Louisiana 
Association of Nonprofit Organizations, the Louisiana AARP, Louisiana NAACP, the Louisiana 
Federation of Teachers, the Louisiana Budget Project, and Greater Baton Rouge AFL-CIO162 as 
well as other civic, education, health, mental health and labor organizations.163  The Louisiana 
Academy of Family Physicians’ also expressed support for tobacco tax legislation in early to 
mid-May during an event at the State Capitol.157 The event celebrated a child’s poster entry for a 
contest held 
for the 
American 
Academy of 
Family 
Physician’s 
tobacco 
prevention 
Table 11.16: Tax Increases Proposed in HB 63153 
Tobacco Product Existing Tax Rate Tax Rate Proposed in HB 63 
Cigarettes 36¢ per pack $1.06 per pack 
Cigars Invoiced at $120,000 or Less 
Per 1,000 
8% of invoice price 12% of invoice price 
Cigars Invoiced at More Than 
$120,000 Per 1,000 
20% of invoice price 30% of invoice price 
Loose Leaf Tobacco 33% of invoice price 49.5% of invoice price 
Smokeless Tobacco 20% of invoice price 30% of invoice price 
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program Tar Wars.157 We were unable to find efforts by the Academy in support of Ritchie’s 
tobacco tax increases. 
 
Opposition Preceding Hearings for HB 63 and HB 591 
 
Before consideration of HB 63 and HB 591 occurred, tobacco industry ally the Louisiana 
Association of Wholesalers (LAW) (Chapter 2), The 
Louisiana Republican Party and Louisiana Tea Party 
Federation publicly opposed increasing or extending 
cigarette taxes. According to The Advocate, LAW 
released a statement arguing that raising the cigarette 
tax would “weaken the state’s economy, put jobs at 
risk and encourage out-of-state and black market 
sales.”149 The Louisiana Republican Party began 
airing a radio ad on May 13, 2011 opposing HB 
63.164 The ad was narrated by Bob Livingston,164 a 
former US Congressman for Louisiana who was 
then serving as the Louisiana Republican Party’s 
Finance Chairman.165 He had also lobbied on behalf 
of the tobacco industry.166 According to coverage by The Times-Picayune, Livingston claimed in 
the ad:  
 
Liberal lawmakers in Baton Rouge are dead set on a massive $120 million tax 
hike. Conservatives must stand united against tax increases – especially fiscally 
irresponsible tobacco taxes that threaten Louisiana’s small businesses.165   
 
In the ad, Livingston called for listeners to contact their state lawmakers to oppose the tax 
increases.167 The Louisiana Republican Party paid for the advertisements.165 Besides the ad, the 
party urged legislators to oppose extending the 4¢ tax set to expire, arguing that it “was not 
intended to be levied in perpetuity.“168  
 
The Louisiana Tea Party Federation argued the tobacco tax increases and cigarette tax 
extension burdened Louisianans.168 Federation Coordinator Robin Edwards and State 
Representative and small business owner Fred Hoyt sent letters into the Baton Rouge Advocate 
opposing the tobacco tax increases. Hoyt’s letter, published on May 5, 2011, argued that the 
cigarette tax was economically harmful and made Louisiana retailers less competitive with 
businesses in neighboring states.169 Edwards’ letter, published by The Advocate on May 4, 
argued that HB 63 sought to restrict personal choice and impose behavior change.170 Edwards 
added that HB 63 placed Louisiana tobacco retailers at a competitive disadvantage and drove 
consumers to purchase products on the internet or out of state.170 
 
House Ways and Means Committee Considers HB 63 and HB 591 
 
Tobacco tax proponents and opponents sparred over HB 63 and HB 591 at a House Ways 
and Means Committee hearing on May 16, 2011.168 Health and tobacco control advocates 
asserted tobacco tax increases reduced use among youth and current smokers. Patients and 
“Liberal lawmakers in Baton 
Rouge are dead set on a massive 
$120 million tax hike. 
Conservatives must stand united 
against tax increases – especially 
fiscally irresponsible tobacco 
taxes that threaten Louisiana’s 
small businesses.” 
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medical providers testified on the problems and expense of lung cancer treatment.168 The Jindal 
Administration, Louisiana Association of Wholesalers, and tobacco retailers attacked HB 63 and 
HB 591. Jindal staffer Rina Thomas reiterated the Governor’s plan to veto both bills if they 
survived the legislature.168 LAW President Jack Casanova referenced a study from the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to assert that raising the tobacco tax increased crime.168 LAW is 
an ally of the tobacco industry, whose director David Tatman had lobbied on behalf of Philip 
Morris since the 1990s (Chapter 2). Individual retailers argued tax increases would cause them to 
lose customers to the black market and out of state businesses.168 Lawmakers also stated their 
opposition to HB 63, with Committee member Ricky Templet (R-Terrytown) stating, “Seventy 
cents doesn’t stop anybody from anything, in my mind.”168 
 
As a result of the adverse political climate and opposition displayed at the hearing, HB 
63’s sponsor Ritchie asked the House Ways and Means Committee to defer the bill. Committee 
members approved the request, voting 8-7 to postpone consideration.168 The bill died with 
adjournment. 
 
HB 591 garnered support at the hearing, with committee members voting 10-5 to report 
the cigarette tax extension favorably to the House Floor.168, 171 At a rally held after the House 
Ways and Means Committee hearing, Ritchie thanked health advocates for backing HB 591 and 
asked them to continue mobilizing support for his bill.171   
 
House Bill 591 Continues Through the Legislature  
 
 Governor Jindal continued opposing HB 591 as part of his policy against adopting any 
form of tax increase. Before representatives considered HB 591 on the House Floor, Governor 
Jindal’s office delivered notes to lawmakers asking them to vote against the bill.172 Governor 
Jindal claimed that HB 591 was a tax increase despite it being a renewal of an existing tax; his 
opposition to the bill was a significant focus during legislative debate. 
 
Representatives considered HB 591 on May 24, 2011 and debated whether the bill was 
simply a tax renewal or a tax increase as claimed by Governor Bobby Jindal.173 Representative 
MJ Smiley (R-St. Amant) and another representative echoed Jindal’s assertion and argued to the 
House that HB 591 was a tax increase. In contrast, several lawmakers usually aligned with Jindal 
did not view HB 591 as a tax increase and planned to vote for the bill.173, 174 Supportive 
lawmakers argued  the bill was a tax renewal, that cigarette taxes deterred youth smoking, and 
that the tax provided a stable funding source for healthcare.172, 173 Proponents also argued that 
dedicating revenue to Medicaid might provide matching funds from the federal government.173 
  
Lawmakers proposed three changes to HB 591 on the House Floor.161 Since HB 591 did 
not dedicate the funds to any specific projects, its sponsor Ritchie secured an amendment 
dedicating revenue from the 4¢ cigarette tax extension to the state general fund for healthcare 
expenses that could be matched by federal funding.161 Representative Kay Kellog Katz (R-
Monroe) introduced an amendment to establish a June 30, 2017 sunset date for the 4¢ tax 
extension and Representative Damon Baldone (D-Houma) proposed indexing the cigarette tax 
annually to the Consumer Price Index. The House rejected Rep. Katz’ amendment 58-35 and 
Representative Baldone pulled his change from consideration.161 
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Following debate and amendments, representatives voted 70-30 to approve HB 591, 
meeting the minimum two-thirds majority necessary to pass tax legislation in the House.173 The 
bill then went to the State Senate for consideration.  
 
The Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee debated HB 591 on May 31, 2017.175 
Before the hearing, tax proponents inundated committee members with cards declaring their 
support for the tax renewal.176 The only testimony we discovered against HB 591 came from 
Jindal administration official Rina Thomas, who stated the bill increased taxes on Louisianans 
and could potentially have other increases attached as riders.175, 176 HB 591 sponsor Ritchie 
promised to fight the addition of other tax hikes to the legislation.177 Despite antipathy towards 
taxes from the Jindal administration, committee members reported HB 591 favorably to the 
Senate in a 7-2 vote (Table 11.17).175 
 
 The Senate considered HB 591 on June 2, 2011,178 where Senate President Joel Chaisson 
II (D-Destrehan) served as floor manager. He argued that HB 591 generated revenue to fund 
critical health care programs facing elimination because of budget cuts.178 After just 10 minutes 
of consideration, Senators voted 29 to 8 to make the 4¢ temporary cigarette tax increase 
permanent.178 Following Senate passage of HB 591, the Governor’s Spokesperson Kyle Plotkin 
stated that Jindal intended to veto the bill.178 Representatives and Senators would have to 
override Governor Jindal’s veto with a two-thirds vote in their respective chambers for HB 591 
to become law.178 
 
After HB 591 passed both chambers, 
Governor Jindal worked to shore up support for a 
veto. Jindal wanted to avoid lawmakers overriding 
him to avoid political embarrassment. Louisiana 
legislators rarely overruled the Governor, last 
rejecting a veto in 1993.179 Jindal met with 
Republican House members on June 8, 2011 to 
convince them not to overturn his impending 
veto.180, 181 At the meeting Jindal asserted HB 591 
was a personal matter for him180 and that he would 
“stick to [his] guns” and strike the bill down 
according to Representative Jane Smith (R-Bossier 
City) in coverage by the Associated Press. 182  
Table 11.17: Senate Committee on Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Vote on HB 591176 
Committee Member Vote 
Dan Claitor (R-Baton Rouge) Yes 
Yvonne Dorsey (D-Baton Rouge) Yes 
Dale Erdey (R-Livingston) Yes 
David Heitmeier (D-Algiers) Yes 
Bob Kostelka (R-Monroe) Yes 
Cynthia Willard-Lewis (D-New Orleans)  Yes 
JP Morrell (D-New Orleans) Yes 
Buddy Shaw (R-Shreveport) No 
Neil Riser (R-Columbia) No 
… proponents distributed an 
article from the Journal of the 
Louisiana Medical Society that 
Jindal wrote in 1997 arguing that 
a cigarette tax increase would 
decrease cigarette use and lower 
healthcare costs, claims made by 
HB 591 supporters. 
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To pressure the Governor to adopt HB 591, on June 14, 2011 proponents distributed an 
article from the Journal of the Louisiana Medical Society that Jindal wrote in 1997 arguing that a 
cigarette tax increase would decrease cigarette use and lower healthcare costs, claims made by 
HB 591 supporters.183, 184 Nevertheless, Jindal remained committed to vetoing the tax extension. 
 
Jindal vetoed HB 591 on June 13, 2011.185 In a letter to the legislature explaining his 
veto, Jindal stated, “I have made a commitment to the taxpayers of Louisiana to oppose all 
attempts to raise taxes.”186 The veto prompted lawmakers to hold a vote on whether to override 
the veto, and Jindal continued to lobby them to prevent himself from being overruled.187   
 
Health advocates attempted to shame Governor Jindal and build public support for HB 
591 in response to the veto. American Cancer Society lobbyist Andrew Muhl publicly criticized 
Jindal in a statement to The Times-Picayune for dropping cigarette prices in the midst of state 
budget cuts to healthcare.188 The American Cancer Society and other coalition members also 
organized a rally at the Governor’s residence in support of HB 591 on June 14, 2011.188 Before 
Representatives voted on  Jindal’s veto of HB 596, health organizations urged legislators to 
remain faithful to their initial votes for the bill.187 
 
The House debated overriding Governor Jindal’s HB 591 veto on June 16, 2011. 
Supportive lawmakers pressed for HB 591’s passage during deliberation while opponents 
avoided commenting.179 Backers, consisting of Republicans and Democrats, urged fellow 
representatives to pass the bill to curb the negative health and familial impacts of smoking. They 
asserted the legislature’s independence from the executive branch and cited polling showing 
public support for extending the cigarette tax.179 Even House Speaker Jim Tucker, a legislative 
ally of Jindal’s, urged lawmakers to override Jindal’s veto.179 
 
Despite impassioned pleas from legislators and external efforts by health advocates, 
lawmakers failed to override the Governor’s veto of HB 591. Eleven lawmakers sided with 
Governor Jindal’s veto after previously voting to pass HB 591. The vote to override Jindal was 
58-44, 12 votes below the 70 needed.179 In comments to the Associated Press following the floor 
battle, Representative Tom McVea (R-Jackson) explained his decision to vote against HB 591 
after previously voting for the bill, stating  “I don’t agree with him on this issue, but I don’t want 
to embarrass the governor.” 179   
 
After the override vote, the Better Choices for a Better Louisiana Coalition publicly 
chastised state lawmakers for failing to rebuff Governor Jindal’s veto of HB 591.163 In a June 16 
interview with independent Louisiana news blog BayouBuzz, coalition founder and Louisiana 
Federation of Teachers President Steve Monaghan stated: 
 
Did they change their minds about the addictive nature of cigarettes, the cost to all 
taxpayers associated with the usage of the product, or the danger that cancer poses 
because of this product? Why is it all right to surrender over $40 million in 
federal matching funds just to give the governor a victory on this issue? This is a 
strange, dubious victory for the governor, and a sad defeat for Louisiana.163 
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Although HB 591 was defeated, its sponsor Representative Harold Ritchie would 
continue efforts during the 2009 legislative session to extend the expiring 4¢ cigarette tax.  
 
Resurrecting HB 591 
 
Following HB 591’s defeat, Representative Ritchie and House Speaker Tucker searched 
for active bills that they could attach the cigarette tax extension to.189 In particular, they sought to 
place HB 591 as a rider on a constitutional amendment, since that legislation was immune to 
veto by the governor in Louisiana. 
 
Representative Ritchie attached the 4¢ cigarette tax renewal to SB 53, a constitutional 
amendment190 that appropriated Master Settlement Agreement money from health and education 
funds to Louisiana’s higher education scholarship program, the Taylor Opportunity Program for 
Students (Chapter 11).176, 189-192 Introduced by Senator John Alario (R-Westwego) on behalf of 
the Jindal Administration, SB 53 required voter approval after passage.190 As a result, Jindal did 
not have the power to veto SB 53.  
  
Lawmakers revived HB 591’s cigarette tax extension during House Consideration of SB 
53 on June 20, 2011. On the Floor, Representative Ritchie proposed and secured a 4¢ cigarette 
tax extension to the constitutional amendment.190 SB 53’s handler, Representative Jane Smith, 
asked legislators to oppose the amendment by claiming it was unrelated to the bill193 and harmed 
its ”integrity.”190 Nevertheless, lawmakers voted 58-41 to include the extension190, 191 and then 
voted 90-12 to adopt SB 53.191 The bill  returned to the Senate for consideration of House 
Changes.   
 
After SB 53 survived the House Floor, its sponsor Senator John Alario and the Jindal 
Administration expressed opposition to Ritchie’s amendment. Alario weighed pushing the bill 
into a conference committee to remove the cigarette tax extension.190 Jindal Administration Press 
Secretary Kyle Plotkin issued a statement on the extension reported by the New Orleans  
Times-Picayune: 
 
While we are disappointed that the House amended the TOPS bill to include the 
cigarette tax, we can’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good... TOPS is too 
important to our children and to the future of our state.190 
 
Although Alario and the Jindal Administration opposed the cigarette tax extension, they resisted 
killing SB 53 to prevent the rider’s adoption. 
 
 The Senate considered House changes to SB 53 on June 22, 2011. Senators voted 36-0 to 
reject House amendments, sending the bill to conference committee. The conference committee 
retained the cigarette tax extension in the compromise version of SB 53, which cleared the House 
in a 99-4 vote and the Senate in a 38-0 vote.194 Jindal did not lobby conference committee 
members to eliminate the cigarette tax extension from SB 53, fearing its removal could kill the 
bill.195 SB 53 required voter approval that coming fall to enter effect.194 
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In an October 22, 2011 election, 70% of voting Louisianans approved SB 53, allowing 
the constitutional amendment and cigarette tax extension to enter law.196 The permanently 
extended 4¢ cigarette tax was expected to provide Louisiana’s Health Excellence Fund $12 
million annually for healthcare programs, possibly generating an additional $48 million in 
federal matching healthcare funds for Louisiana.196  
 
While Representative Harold Ritchie’s doggedness in securing the extension kept the 
cigarette tax per pack at 36¢, Louisiana’s tax rate remained the third lowestnationally.197 
 
2013 Tax Increase Efforts 
 
Although generally opposed to tax increases, Governor Bobby Jindal signaled support for 
increasing the cigarette tax before the 2013 legislative session198, 199 and mulled introducing 
legislation to enact the tax hike. Jindal considered increasing cigarette taxes to provide a revenue 
replacement for personal income and corporate taxes he wanted to eliminate in his legislative 
plan.198, 199 The plan would also increase sales taxes to make up for the revenue declines from 
income tax.199 Tim Barfield, Jindal’s head tax person on recrafting the tax code in 2013, listed a 
tobacco tax increase as part of a potential legislative package by early February 2013. The 
possible tax hike on cigarettes received public support from American Cancer Society 
spokesperson Andrew Muhl, who stated in a February 4, 2013 Associated Press article that “we 
[tobacco-control groups] are definitely encouraged by the governor’s proposal to increase the 
tobacco tax….”199  Muhl added that a $1 increase would prevent the early deaths of 21,900 
Louisianans and stop 35,800 minors from nicotine addiction.199 Jindal had not revealed the 
amount his administration was seeking to raise the cigarette tax at the time of Muhl’s 
statement.200 In another February 4, 2013 article from the Baton Rouge Advocate regarding 
Jindal’s evaluation of a tobacco tax hike, Muhl claimed “tobacco tax increases are one of the 
most effective ways to reduce smoking and other tobacco use, especially among kids.”201  
 
Shortly thereafter, the Jindal Administration announced it would pursue more than a $1 
increase to Louisiana’s cigarette tax as part of its tax reform plan. In an outline of plans to 
eliminate corporate and income taxes circulated to state lawmakers by February 9, 2013, the 
administration proposed increasing Louisiana’s cigarette tax $1.05 per pack, raising  it from 36¢  
per pack to the same rate as Texas’ cigarette tax, which was $1.41 per pack.202 ACS’s Muhl 
subsequently praised Jindal’s proposed tax increase in news coverage, claiming again that tax 
increases were effective at lowering tobacco use rates, particularly among minors.202 Jindal’s 
official plan to eliminate corporate and income taxes, 
revealed on March 14, 2013, contained the $1.05 per 
pack increase to the cigarette tax203 proposed in 
February. However, the governor ultimately abandoned 
his tax restructuring plan around mid-April,204 
eliminating his support for tobacco tax increases. 
 
After Jindal withdrew his plan, he opposed all 
tobacco tax increase bills because they were not used to 
replace revenue from tax cuts.204, 205 According to a 
statement released by Governor Jindal that was reported 
“Our tax plan contained a 
revenue neutral cigarette tax 
increase. No cigarette tax 
increases being considered 
by the Legislature at this time 
are revenue neutral, and we 
will not support any net 
increase in taxes.” 
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on in the Baton Rouge Advocate, “Our tax plan contained a revenue neutral cigarette tax 
increase. No cigarette tax increases being considered by the Legislature at this time are revenue 
neutral, and we will not support any net increase in taxes.”204 Jindal’s opposition proved a 
harbinger of defeat for the tobacco tax increases proposed in 2013, with every bill failing to 
leave committee.206-210 
 
Lawmakers introduced five tobacco tax increase bills in 2013 (Table 11.18). Two of the 
bills, HB 235 and HB 417, featured the cigarette tax increase proposed in Jindal’s tax 
restructuring package before he abandoned it. Four of the five tax increase bills, Representative 
Ritchie’s HB 417, Jackson’s HB 537 and HB 623, as well as Talbot’s HB 304 were scheduled 
for a committee hearing before the House Ways and Means Committee on April 22, 2013. 
Representative Badon postponed consideration of HB 235 to see how other tobacco tax increases 
fared in their hearings.204 Ritchie’s HB 417 received consideration first at the April 22 
Committee hearing.198  
 
At the committee hearing for HB 417, health advocates and members of the religious 
community testified in support of the tobacco tax increase. Executive Director Ashley Politz of 
the Louisiana chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics testified on the health impacts 
children suffered from secondhand smoke and asserted a cigarette tax increase could prevent 
consumption. Louisiana Interchurch Conference Executive Director Dan Krutz argued 
lawmakers should prioritize the public over special interests.198 American Cancer Society of 
Louisiana Government Relations Director Andrew Muhl also testified for the bill.   
 
Opposition to HB 417 came from Louisiana’s wholesale and retail community. Church 
Point Wholesale representative Jack Casanova and Louisiana Oil Marketers and Convenience 
Store Association representative Darrell Amar Jr. testified against the bill.198 Casanova argued a 
tax increase would cause retailers to lose customers to stores in neighboring states and create a 
black market, while Amar Jr. asserted businesses would close because higher cigarette prices 
would reduce spending by smokers on other products.  
Table 11.18: Tobacco Tax Legislation as Introduced in the 2013 Legislative Session206-210 198, 205 
 Sponsor Cigarettes 
(Per Pack) 
Cigars 
Invoiced at 
$120,000 or 
Less Per 
1,000 
Cigars 
Invoiced at 
More Than 
$120,000 Per 
1,000 
Loose 
Leaf 
Tobacco 
Smokeless 
Tobacco 
Legislative Outcome 
Existing -- $0.36 8% 20% 33% 20% -- 
HB 235 Austin Badon $1.41 -- -- -- -- Died upon adjournment 
without consideration 
HB 304 Kirk Talbot 
(R-River 
Ridge) 
$0.60 -- -- -- -- Died upon adjournment 
without consideration** 
HB 417 Harold 
Ritchie 
$1.41 68% 68% 68% 68% Withdrawn  
HB 537* Katrina 
Jackson 
$0.68 15% 15% 15% 15% Defeated in House Ways 
and Means Committee** 
HB 623 Katrina 
Jackson 
$0.68 15% -- -- -- Died upon adjournment 
without consideration** 
*Proposed Constitutional Amendment. 
**First hearing postponed by sponsor after seeing fate of HB 417 in its committee hearing. 
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Realizing that the House Ways and Means Committee intended to vote against HB 417, 
Representative Ritchie withdrew his bill from consideration.198 After he pulled HB 417 
Representatives Talbot and Jackson deferred their bills. 
 
After being deferred the day before, HB 537 received a hearing before the House Ways 
and Means Committee on April 23, 2013. The bill’s sponsor, Katrina Jackson, was the chair of 
the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus,211 which had historically opposed tobacco tax increases 
(Chapter 6) until 2011. HB 537 increased the cigarette tax from 36¢ to 68¢ per pack (Table 
11.18).212 The bill also changed tax rates on all cigars, loose leaf and smokeless tobacco to 15% 
of invoice price (Table 11.18).   
 
At the Committee meeting, HB 537 faced opposition from tobacco retailers, tobacco 
companies, and the American Cancer Society.205 While the Committee heard comments, ACS 
Government Relations Director Andrew Muhl testified that his organization could not support 
HB 537 because the tax increase was too small to deter tobacco use.205, 213 He asserted that the 
tobacco industry and retailers could subsidize such a small increase for its customers.213 
Countering criticism from opponents, Representative Jackson argued that HB 537 produced $64 
million in annual revenue for healthcare as well as institutions that trained medical professionals 
and conducted cancer research. Representative Jackson failed to convince the House Ways and 
Means Committee to support HB 537, which voted 11-7 against the bill (Table 11.19). After HB 
537 died in the House Ways and Means Committee, lawmakers considered no other tobacco tax 
increases during the remainder of the 2013 legislative session. 
 
Tobacco Tax Increases in the Mid-2010s 
 
A Budget Crisis in 2015 Leads to a Cigarette Tax Increase 
 
After the last legislative effort to raise cigarette taxes in 2013, Louisiana dropped from 
having the third lowest cigarette tax in the nation to the second lowest by 2015.214 
Table 11.19: House Ways and Means Committee Vote on HB 537 205 
Taylor Barras (R-New Iberia) No 
Regina Barrow (D-Baton Rouge) Yes 
Wesley Bishop (D-New Orleans) Yes 
Chris Broadwater (R-Hammond) Yes 
Richie Burford (R-Stonewall) No 
Mike Danahay (D-Sulphur) No 
Mickey Guillory (D-Eunice) No 
Chris Hazel (R-Pineville) No 
Frank Hoffman (R-West Monroe) Yes 
Robert Johnson (D-Marksville) No 
Eddie Lambert (R-Prairieville) Yes 
Harold Ritchie Yes 
Julie Stokes (R-Kenner) No 
Major Thibaut (D-New Roads) No 
Jeff Thompson (R-Bossier City) No 
Patrick Williams (D-Shreveport) Yes 
Lenar Whitney (R-Houma) No 
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 Regularly plagued by financial deficits, Louisiana faced a $1.6 billion budget deficit in 
2015215 that health advocates used to pursue a tobacco tax increase. The shortfall resulted from a 
combination of declining oil prices, financial tricks and maneuvering by Jindal’s administration 
and the state government to balance the budget in prior years, and a structural deficit.215, 216 The 
year before, the Jindal administration had transferred $985 million from various non-recurring 
funds to run the state, setting up Louisiana for budget problems in 2015.217 Before Jindal entered 
office in 2008, Louisiana had a budget surplus because of federal financial assistance for 
recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina.218 Despite his past anti-tax positions, Jindal announced 
he would support raising cigarette taxes during the 2015 legislative session if spending cuts were 
made in exchange.214 
 
Taking advantage of the budget crisis, health and tobacco control organizations created a 
coalition and formed the Invest in a Healthy Louisiana campaign to pursue tobacco tax increases 
during the 2015 legislative session. Coalition partners were the American Heart Association, the 
American Lung Association, the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network, the 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living, and the 
Louisiana Cancer Prevention and Control Programss.1  The coalition hired T. Bradley Keith of 
Gulf South Strategies and Solutions, a firm specialized in public affairs, to serve as campaign 
director.219, 220 The Rapides Foundation, a state-based nonprofit dedicated to improving Central 
Louisiana’s health,221 as well as multiple partners from CTFLA, funded the coalition and its 
campaign.222, 223  
  
Louisiana lawmakers introduced 11 bills during the 2015 legislative session to increase 
tobacco taxes as part of efforts to address the state’s budget shortfall (Table 11.20).224 For the 
first time in Louisiana, four tobacco tax bills sought to establish taxes on the nicotine liquid (“e-
juice”) used in electronic smoking devices. The 11 tobacco tax bills were directed to the House 
Table 11.20: Tobacco Tax Increase Bills Introduced in the 2015 Legislative Session 225-235 
Bill Sponsor Cigarettes 
Per Pack 
Cigars 
Invoiced at 
$120,000 or 
Less Per 
1,000 
Cigars 
Invoiced at 
More Than 
$120,000 
Per 1,000 
Loose 
Leaf 
Tobacco 
Smokeless 
Tobacco 
Electronic 
Smoking 
Devices 
Existing -- 36¢ 8% 20% 33% 20% None 
HB 77 Harold Ritchie $1.54 -- -- -- -- -- 
HB 119 Harold Ritchie $1.54 -- -- -- -- -- 
HB 148 Austin Badon $1.41 16% -- 66% 40% -- 
HB 224 Frank Hoffmann $1.08 -- -- -- -- -- 
HB 252 Jack Montoucet 68¢ 12% 30% 50% 30% 5¢ per ml e-
juice 
HB 407 Major Thibaut -- -- -- 34% -- -- 
HB 427 Katrina Jackson $1.08 16% 40% 66% 40% 5¢ per ml e-
juice 
HB 487 Walt Leger III $1.08 -- -- -- -- -- 
HB 515 Harold Ritchie -- 16% -- 66% 40% 5¢ per ml e-
juice 
HB 544 Randal Gaines $1.86 -- -- -- -- -- 
HB 792 Stokes $1.08 16% 40% 66% 40% 5¢ per ml e-
juice 
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Committee on Ways and Means for consideration, where only HB 119 received a hearing. The 
Invest in a Healthy Louisiana Coalition endorsed HB 119, which had the highest cigarette tax 
increase of the bills offered that session.214  
 
Representative Ritchie prefiled HB 119 on March 19, 2015 to increase the state cigarette 
tax from 36¢ a pack to the national average of $1.54226 and generate $250 million annually.224  
 
The Invest in a Healthy Louisiana Coalition 
organized public events, disseminated data, and 
conducted a media campaign to generate public 
awareness and support for HB 119. The Coalition 
held a press conference on April 7, 2015 to release 
data showing the public health benefits of adopting a 
higher tobacco tax.214  At the press conference, 
Representative Ritchie promoted the bill as a way to 
deter youth from smoking.214 The Campaign for 
Tobacco Free Kids and the American Cancer 
Society Cancer Action Network predicted  that the $1.18 increase in HB 119 would deter 17.9% 
more youth from smoking and cause 43,400 adult users to quit.214 The Invest in a Healthy 
Louisiana campaign used Facebook,236 Twitter,237 and YouTube238 to conduct public outreach 
and develop a grassroots support network for HB 119. The campaign distributed calls to action 
on Facebook asking people to call their state representatives. The Coalition also encouraged 
people to text their reasons for supporting a tax increase to the Invest in a Healthy Louisiana 
Campaign to engage followers and generate statements for advocacy efforts. To facilitate 
constituent outreach to legislators, the coalition provided an online tool people could use to send 
emails to their state representatives. and complemented the online email platform with a toll-free 
telephone line (888-NOW-ICAN) that directly connected constituents to their legislators.236 In 
addition, they released radio spots promoting the $1.18 cigarette tax increase.239 
 
The Louisiana Oil Marketers and Convenience Store Association opposed the tax even 
before the bill received committee consideration.224 LOMCSA Executive Director Natalie Babi 
Isaaks argued the cigarette tax increase put small businesses at a competitive disadvantage with 
retailers from neighboring states.224 
 
House Bill 119 in the Legislature 
 
The House Ways and Means Committee considered HB 119 on April 27, 2015.226 Before 
considering testimony, the Committee proposed and adopted a package of amendments to lower 
the cigarette tax increase from $1.18 to 32¢ per pack, limiting the total tax rate per pack to 
68¢.226 The reduced rate was the same as Mississippi’s.240 Another amendment sought to 
establish a Tax Medicaid Match Fund that used tobacco tax revenue generated by HB 119 to 
fund Louisiana’s Medicaid program.226 Ritchie accepted the lowered tax rate to get HB 119 
through the Committee.241 
 
Tobacco retailers, who regularly testified alongside the tobacco industry against tax 
increases, testified against HB 119 while health advocates and medical professionals testified in 
The Invest in a Healthy Louisiana 
Coalition organized public 
events, disseminated data, and 
conducted a media campaign to 
generate public awareness and 
support for HB 119. 
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support.241 Convenience store chain owner and past state senator Fred Hoyt testified against HB 
119, claiming   the bill would cause job loss as well as harm consumers and businesses.241 As a 
former state senator, Hoyt had opposed HB 157 during the 2002 legislative session. Arguing in 
support of HB 119, Louisiana State University Director of the Pulmonary/Critical Care Program 
Stephen Kantrow asserted that the harm caused to people and the economy by tobacco use 
warranted a tax increase on tobacco products.241 Other HB 119 backers at the hearing justified 
the tax by asserting the state lost $700 million yearly treating disadvantaged Louisianans 
suffering tobacco related illnesses.241  
 
After hearing testimony, the House Committee on Ways and Means approved HB 119 by 
an 11 to 5 vote.241  
 
After its Ways and Means hearing, HB 119 went the House Appropriations Committee, 
which approved it unanimously without amendments and sent it to the House Floor.226 The 
House considered thirteen tax bills, including  HB 119, on May 7, 2015.240 Representatives voted 
78 -27 that day to send HB 119 to the Senate.242   
 
After the House approved HB 119, Invest in a Healthy Louisiana pushed for the bill’s 
passage and restoration of its tax increase from 32¢ to $1.18 in the Senate. The Coalition held a 
“Rally for a Healthy Louisiana” in Baton Rouge on May 27, 2015 to call for a higher cigarette 
tax increase that waas attended by 100 people.243 In conjunction with the physical gathering, the 
coalition held a “virtual rally” that encouraged participants to text messages of support for a 
$1.18 cigarette tax increase to the coalition for it to share with legislators. The coalition also used 
social media outreach to ask followers to contact their representatives via email or phone through 
the Invest in a Healthy Louisiana campaign website.236, 244 To maintain public visibility and 
support, the coalition also ran a radio ad detailing the savings in healthcare costs and lives that 
raising the cigarette tax by $1.18 per pack would cause.245  
 
The Senate referred HB 119 to the Committee on Revenue and Fiscal Affairs where it 
was heard on May 18, 2015.226 The Committee reported HB 119 favorably without amendments. 
The bill then moved for a second hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance.   
 
The Senate Finance Committee considered HB 119 on June 3, 2015. At the hearing 
cardiovascular surgeon Dr. Mitchell Lirtzman, who testified in support of tobacco control 
legislation in the past (Chapter 10), told committee members that a large tobacco tax deterred 
youth use.246 He also claimed a large tax increase was warranted for a product that inflicted $1.8 
billion in  healthcare costs annually on the state.246 We do not know if other proponents or any 
opponents testified at the hearing.  
 
During the hearing, committee members amended HB 119 to increase taxes on all 
tobacco products. They raised the cigarette tax increase to 64¢ per pack, which would bring 
Louisiana’s total cigarette tax to $1.00 and make it the32nd highest in the country (Table 
11.21).246 The Committee also amended HB 119 to increase taxes on cigars, little cigars, 
smoking tobacco, smokeless tobacco, moist snuff, and nicotine liquid for use in electronic 
smoking devices.247 Following amendments, the Senate Committee on Finance sent HB 119 to 
the Senate Floor.226 
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The Senate considered HB 119 on June 5, 2015226 and adopted two amendments to raise 
cigarette and moist snuff tax increases while rejecting efforts to weaken proposed tax hikes for 
other tobacco products (Table 11.22). Senator Ben Nevers secured an amendment to increase 
taxation on moist snuff products. Senator Jean-Paul Morrell (D- New Orleans) obtained an 
amendment to raise the cigarette tax increase from 64¢ to 72¢ , bringing the potential tax rate per 
pack of cigarettes to $1.08 total.248, 249 Senator Jody Amedee introduced three amendments to 
either remove taxes on tobacco products besides cigarettes or lower tax increases on moist snuff; 
all of which failed. Senators raised tax hikes in HB 119 and avoided reducing other proposed 
tobacco tax increases to address that year’s budget shortfall and avoid severe cuts to education 
and healthcare funding.249 The Senate approved the amended bill in a 31-8 vote and returned it to 
the House for final confirmation.226 
 
Following Senate consideration of HB 119, the Invest in a Healthy Louisiana Coalition 
praised Senator Morrell for raising the tax increase in HB 119 and continued to push for the 
restoration of the initial $1.18 increase in the House.236 It started a campaign over social media 
that depicted a higher cigarette tax as a choice between children and Big Tobacco.236 The 
coalition also held a second virtual rally on June 8, 2015 to have supporters call and email their 
legislators, as well as provide text messages in support of, “a responsible cigarette tax 
increase.’”236  
 
The Senate’s amendments to HB 119 set up a 
confrontation with the House. Upset by Morrell’s 
amendment, House Speaker Chuck Kleckley (R-Lake 
Charles), owner of three convenience stores, publicly 
opposed the tax. He told the Baton Rouge Advocate, 
“It’s way too high. The best thing to do is completely 
remove the cigarette tax from the table. Let’s work to 
find revenue sources from other bills coming from the 
Senate.”249 The House considered HB 119 with Senate 
amendments on June 9, 2015 and voted 81-15 against 
the changes.226, 250 Lawmakers subsequently formed a 
conference committee to develop a compromise version of the legislation.250 
 
In response, the Invest in a Healthy Louisiana Coalition used paid media and mobilized 
grassroots supporters to pressure state legislators. The Coalition released a radio spot castigating 
the Louisiana State House for having “sided with Big Tobacco instead of public health.” 251  The 
ad singled out Representative Lance Harris (R-Alexandria) for his efforts to prevent a tax 
increase favorable to public health.251 In addition, the Campaign encouraged people to send 
letters to representatives through its website to express their unhappiness regarding the House’s 
rejection of  Senate amendments that expanded tobacco tax increases.252 
 
The HB 119 conference committee convened on June 11, 2015.253 Committee members 
included Representatives Harold Ritchie, Joel Robideaux (R-Lafayette), and Lance Harris and 
Senators Ben Nevers (D-Bogalusa), Robert Adley (R-Benton), and Jack Donahue (R-
Mandeville).226 The committee agreed to raise the cigarette tax by 50¢, establishing a total 
“It’s way too high. The best 
thing to do is completely 
remove the cigarette tax from 
the table. Let’s work to find 
revenue sources from other 
bills coming from the 
Senate.” 
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cigarette tax of 86¢ per pack.226 Committee members also placed a low 5¢ per milliliter tax on 
any nicotine-containing liquid used in electronic smoking devices and dropped tax increases for 
other tobacco products.226 
 
The Louisiana State Legislature adopted HB 119 and Governor Jindal signed it into law 
as Act 94 on June 19, 2015.226 The 50¢ tax increase per cigarette pack entered effect July 1, 2015 
and the 5¢ tax per milliliter on nicotine-containing fluid August 1, 2015. Cigarette taxes were 
deposited in the Tobacco Tax Medicaid Match Fund created by HB 119 to fund Louisiana’s 
Medicaid program.  
Table 11.21: Tobacco Tax Rates in Existing Law and HB119 226 
Tobacco Product Existing Law HB 119 
Original 
HB 119 with 
House Ways and 
Means Committee 
Amendments 
HB 119 with 
Senate Finance 
Committee 
Amendments 
HB 119 with 
Senate Floor 
Amendments 
HB 119 
Final 
Cigarettes Per Pack 36¢ $1.54 
($1.18 
increase) 
68¢ 
(32¢ increase) 
$1.00 (68¢ 
increase) 
$1.08 (72¢ 
increase) 
86¢ (50¢ 
increase) 
Cigars Invoiced at 
$120,000 or Less Per 
1,000 
8% of invoice -- -- 10% of invoice  -- 
Cigars Invoiced at 
More Than $120,000 
Per 1,000 
20% of invoice -- -- 25% of invoice  -- 
Little Cigars -- -- -- 3.2¢ per little 
cigar ($1.00 per 
pack of 20)* 
3.2¢ per little 
cigar ($1.00 
per pack of 
20)** 
-- 
Loose Leaf Tobacco 33% of invoice -- -- 50% of invoice  -- 
Smokeless Tobacco 20% of invoice -- -- 25% of invoice  -- 
Moist Snuff 20% of invoice -- -- 20% of invoice 
or 60¢ per 1.2 
ounce can 
(whichever 
higher) 
25% of 
invoice or 
74¢ per 1.2 
ounce can 
(whichever 
higher) 
-- 
Electronic Smoking 
Devices 
-- -- -- 5¢ per ml 
nicotine fluid 
 5¢ per 
ml 
nicotine 
fluid 
*Rate anchored to current tax rate for cigarettes. 
**Rate anchored to tax rate established by HB 119. 
Table 11.22: Amendments Proposed to HB 119 on Senate Floor226 
Sponsor Amendment Adopted 
Ben Nevers Changed moist snuff tax rates set in Senate Finance Committee from 20% 
of invoice or 60¢ per 1.2-ounce can to 25% of invoice or 74¢ per 1.2 ounce 
can. 
Yes 
Jean-Paul Morrell Increase cigarette tax per pack by 72¢ ($1.08 total). Yes 
Jody Amedee Eliminate Senate Finance Committee amendments increasing or setting 
taxes on tobacco products other than cigarettes. 
Withdrawn 
Jody Amedee Remove Nevers amendment to change tax rates on moist snuff. Withdrawn 
Jody Amedee Remove Nevers amendment to change tax rates on moist snuff. Set moist 
snuff tax rate at 25% of invoice. Remove tax on snuff cans. 
Rejected 
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Although the Invest Coalition’s campaign did not achieve the $1.18 tax increase it 
desired on cigarettes, it facilitated the first tobacco tax increase since 2002. The cigarette tax 
increase raised Louisiana from having the 49th highest (or 2nd lowest) cigarette tax rate in the 
nation to 36th.4 
 
Invest in a Healthy Louisiana Backs another Tax Increase in 2016 
 
After Governor Jindal left office, Louisiana faced a $943 million budget deficit. Elected 
governor in 2015, John Bel Edwards (D) convened an extraordinary legislative session in 2016 
to pass bills to resolve the budget crisis.254, 255 The legislature mainly considers tax legislation in 
odd number years because of constitutional restrictions.256 The special session allowed state 
lawmakers to bypass this requirement.256 
 
To help address Louisiana’s budget deficit, Representative Walt Leger III (D- New 
Orleans) pre-filed HB 14 on February 12, 2016 to raise the cigarette tax from 86¢ to $1.08 per 
pack, a 22¢  increase. Revenue from the increase would go to the state’s general fund.257 
Representative Leger sponsored HB 14 on behalf of Governor Edwards as part of his tax 
legislation package, which also included tax hikes on car rentals, alcohol, and internet sales. If 
passed, Louisiana would go from having the 36th highest cigarette tax in the nation to 33rd.4  
  
To seize on the opportunity afforded by the 2016 First Extraordinary Session, The Invest 
in a Healthy Louisiana Coalition mobilized to secure a greater cigarette tax increase than 
proposed in HB 14. Instead of seeking to raise the cigarette tax to $1.18 per pack (as it had in 
2015), Invest called for a $1.25 increase per pack (for a total tax of $2.11 per pack).1 The 
coalition also sought to equalize other tobacco products to the new cigarette tax rate and dedicate 
revenue from the cigarette and tobacco tax increases to tobacco prevention and cessation efforts.1  
 
The Invest in a Healthy Louisiana Coalition employed a social media-based information 
campaign to support increasing the cigarette tax. To mobilize grassroots support to pressure state 
legislators, the Coalition used Facebook and Twitter to disseminate information on how the 
$1.25 cigarette tax increase helped address Louisiana’s budget shortfall, save lives, reduce 
healthcare costs, and prevent youth use.236, 237 The Coalition also commissioned a poll that 
showed strong support for a $1.25 cigarette tax hike among Louisianans compared to other 
revenue generating measures. 
  
HB 14 received consideration from the House Ways and Means Committee alongside 
thirty other tax bills on February 23, 2016.258 Committee members favorably reported the bill to 
the Floor without debate.258   
  
After HB 14 passed committee, Representative Leger twice delayed consideration fearing 
his bill lacked enough votes to survive the House.259 Perhaps recognizing that the tobacco 
industry could not block all tax increases, on February 29, the second day HB 14 was scheduled 
for debate, Altria lobbyist Randy Haynie, together with 9 or 10 lobbyists from tobacco 
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers met with Representative Leger and Governor Edward’s 
staff to discuss a smaller cigarette tax increase.260 In an interview with the New Orleans Times-
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Picayune, Haynie stated that the tobacco industry sought to lower the tax increase but did not 
oppose a hike altogether.260 Discussions between Representative Leger, Governor Edwards’ 
staff, and tobacco interests did not lead to a weakening of HB 14’s cigarette tax increase. Instead, 
the tobacco industry and its allies agreed to shelve opposition to HB 14 after Governor Edwards’ 
administration promised not to pursue future cigarette tax increases.261 
 
 The House considered HB 14 on March 3, 2016262 after Leger, the bill’s sponsor, had 
delayed floor debate five times.261 Lawmakers proposed three amendments, approving only one 
from Representative Lance Harris (R-Alexandria) to exempt cigarettes acquired by retailers 
before HB 14’s implementation date from its tax increase (Table 11.23). (Harris was the leader 
of the House Republicans and an owner of multiple convenience stores.263, 264) Representatives 
then voted 74-26 to approve the bill and send it to the Senate. Harris, who voted to approve HB 
14, told the Baton Rouge Advocate, “I voted for it [HB 14] because there wasn’t industry 
opposition.”263 
 
HB 14 passed through the rest of the legislature with minimal debate and no 
amendments. The bill passed the Senate Committee on Revenue and Fiscal Affairs and on March 
4, 2016 and the Senate in a 33-2 vote on March 5, 2016.262 Despite public pressure from Invest 
in a Healthy Louisiana for a $1.25 increase per pack to the cigarette tax, the legislature stuck 
with a 22¢ increase. Governor Edwards signed HB 14 into law on March 8, 2016, increasing the 
cigarette tax to $1.08 per pack. 
 
Following the passage of HB 14, Invest in a Healthy Louisiana followed its strategy from 
the 2015 tax battle and urged Louisianans to “send a message of disappointment to the governor” 
through its campaign website.266 The Invest in a Healthy Louisiana Coalition publicly stated that 
the 22¢ cigarette tax increase was not enough to protect public health. In an interview with The 
Advocate, Coalition spokesman T. Bradley Keith stated, “You would have to see a 50-cent per 
pack increase to get any appreciable change.”263 Although the Coalition failed to convince 
lawmakers to raise the cigarette excise tax by $1.25 per pack, pressure from its campaign helped 
pass a 22¢ increase that improved Louisiana’s cigarette tax rate from 36th highest in the country 
to 33rd the year it passed.4 However, Louisiana’s cigarette tax per pack would drop to the 37th 
highest in the United States by 2020.267 
 
Conclusion  
 
Table 11.23: Amendments Proposed to HB 14 on the House Floor262 
Sponsor Amendment Adopted 
Hunter Adds bidis and kreteks to legal definition of “cigarette”. Adds “tobacco 
and nicotine solution used in hookahs” to legal definition of “vapor 
products” 
Withdrawn 
Harris Prohibits HB 14 tax increase from applying to cigarettes purchased by 
retailers before April 1, 2016 implementation date. 
Adopted 
Johnson Dedicated revenue from the HB 14 tax increase to a newly created 
“Common Sense in Government Fund”. 33% of fund money was 
dedicated to classes and academic programs at colleges and 
universities 33% to the DHH for Medicaid payments to teaching 
hospitals, and 34% to the DHH for the New Opportunities Waiver 
Program, which provides services to the developmentally disabled.265 
Withdrawn 
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Despite recurring budget crises and high cancer mortality rates, Louisiana avoided 
tobacco tax increases from 1990 until 2000. That year, with assistance from health advocates, 
state lawmakers passed a 4¢ per pack increase to the cigarette tax to help address a state budget 
crisis. Health advocates subsequently used their re-formed Coalition for a Tobacco-Free 
Louisiana and collaborated with LSU, Tulane and other interests in 2002 to secure a cigarette tax 
increase of 12¢ per pack. The tax increase dedicated 2¢ towards tobacco control programming, 
its first recurring dedication. The revenue created and continues to fund the Louisiana Campaign 
for Tobacco-Free Living (Chapter 4), a nonprofit tobacco control program administered by the 
Louisiana Institute of Public Health that has improved tobacco control advocate capacity in 
Louisiana and helped secure state and local tobacco control legislation (Chapters 10, 11, 12).  
 
After securing a12¢ cigarette tax increase in 2002, health and tobacco control advocates 
struggled to raise tobacco taxes because of conservative fiscal attitudes and opposition from the 
State Republican Party. In 2005, health and education advocates failed to sell tobacco tax 
increase legislation as a vehicle to provide teachers a salary increase after an unexpected 
financial windfall alleviated state budget pressures and strengthened republican lawmakers’ calls 
to use existing funds to provide a pay raise instead. In 2009, Governor Bobby Jindal and the 
State Republican Party’s public opposition to tax increases, complemented by an anti-tax media 
campaign, prevented advocates from securing tobacco tax increases on multiple tobacco 
products.  
 
Despite a budget crisis, Jindal’s opposition to tax increases in 2011 prevented tobacco tax 
hikes and nearly led to the expiration of a temporary 4¢ cigarette tax that would have lowered 
Louisiana’s cigarette tax from 36¢ to 32¢ per pack. Representative Harold Ritchie, whose 4¢ 
cigarette tax renewal bill was vetoed by the governor, collaborated with other lawmakers to 
attach his legislation to a Jindal-sought constitutional amendment to fund the state’s popular 
scholarship program, TOPS. Louisianan’s ultimately approved the constitutional amendment, 
making the temporary cigarette tax permanent. 
 
Tobacco control proponents obtained later tax increases by utilizing a coalition strategy 
similar to their efforts to pass clean air legislation. In 2015, health and tobacco control 
organizations, mainly from the CTFLA, formed the Invest in a Healthy Louisiana Coalition to 
run a multifaceted campaign. Using lobbying, grassroots pressure, and paid and earned media, 
the coalition secured a 50¢ per pack cigarette tax increase that raised the state’s tax rate from the 
49th highest in the country to 36th in 2015. During an extraordinary session called by new 
Democratic Governor John Bel Edwards in 2016 to address a severe budget crisis in Louisiana, 
the Coalition generated public awareness and knowledge of a proposed tobacco tax increase to 
help secure a 22¢ hike and elevate Louisiana’s tax rate to $1.08 per cigarette pack. The increase 
brought Louisiana from having the 36th highest cigarette tax rate in the United States to the 33rd 
highest in 2016. Louisiana’s cigarette tax rate declined to the 37th highest by January 2020.267 
 
Efforts to secure tax increases in Louisiana indicate that health and tobacco control 
advocates need to form diverse and broad partnerships to pass legislation. In addition, tax 
increase proponents need to develop strong counter-messaging to anti-tax arguments used by 
opponents in order to generate enough public and political pressure to adopt tax hikes in hostile 
legislative environments. 
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Chapter 12: Clean Indoor Air Part 3: Protecting the Public 
from Gaps in the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act 2011-2019 
 
• 28 cities and parishes adopted comprehensive, 100% smokefree laws between 2012 and 
January 2020 to cover exemptions in the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act (2006). 
• Other than adopting a law in 2013 to prohibit smoking at post-secondary education campuses 
and facilities and a 2014 distance requirement law for state government buildings, progress 
on smokefree legislation stagnated at the state level. 
• Smokefree campaigns for local ordinances promoted comprehensive clean air policies as 
necessary to protect musicians, bar, and casino workers. 
•  The gaming and bar industries opposed local legislation by asserting it represented 
overregulation that would harm businesses economically. 
• Local, state, and national organizations used multilevel campaigns to secure major smokefree 
legislation in New Orleans in 2015 and Baton Rouge in 2017. 
 
After the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act  
 
 In 2006, the Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana (CTFLA) and Louisiana Campaign 
for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL) helped pass the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act. The law made 
most public places and restaurants smokefree but exempted some facilities, most notably bars 
and gaming establishments, from clean air restrictions (Chapter 10). The Louisiana Smoke-Free 
Air Act also lifted preemption over local clean air laws. Subsequent efforts by state legislators 
failed to pass additional state-level smoking restrictions, particularly for bars and casinos 
(Chapter 10). 
When efforts to secure comprehensive, 100% smokefree policies stalled at the state level, 
tobacco control advocacy groups and health organizations focused on securing strong local clean 
air laws to increase protections for Louisianans from secondhand smoke. Following preemption 
repeal, cities and parishes enacted additional smoking restrictions into law ranging from 
smokefree parks to 100% smokefree ordinances.1, 2 The more comprehensive ordinances closed 
exemptions in the state law for bars, gaming facilities, hotel/motel guest rooms, retail tobacco 
stores, common areas in multi-unit housing, nursing homes, public parks, and outdoor places of 
employment. Ordinances passed after 2013 began including electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes), 
battery-operated nicotine delivery devices that had started gaining popularity.3-5 By January 
2020, at least 28 localities including New Orleans and Baton Rouge prohibited smoking in 
restaurants, workplaces, bars, and gaming establishments2 and 26 prohibited e-cigarette use in 
those places (Table 12.32).6 
Advocates Unsuccessfully Pursue State Legislation to Prohibit Smoking in Bars in 2011 
  
In 2011, State Senator Rob Marionneaux introduced SB 133 (D-Livonia) to prohibit 
smoking in bars serving food.7 Marionneaux, who previously sponsored and helped CTFLA pass 
the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act in 2006, had tried unsuccessfully to pass bills prohibiting 
smoking in bars in 2008, 2009, and 2010 (Chapter 10). The Senate Health and Welfare 
Committee subsequently amended SB 133 to prohibit smoking in all bars.8 
 541 
 
 SB 133 received minimal assistance from health and tobacco control advocates because 
they were focusing on making an expiring 4 cent per pack cigarette tax permanent (Chapter 11).9 
However, hospital organizations and medical practitioners testified in favor of SB 133,10 arguing 
that smoking restrictions in bars were necessary to protect employees and the public from 
secondhand smoke. They cited findings that hundreds of Louisianans died annually from 
secondhand smoke exposure.9  
SB 133 faced heavy opposition from the bar industry as well as the gaming industry 
despite gambling establishments not being included in the bill’s restrictions.9 Louisiana 
Association of Beverage Licensees representative Chris Young, who had fought against clean air 
(Chapter 10) and tobacco tax legislation (Chapter 11), argued against SB 133 during the Senate 
Health and Welfare Committee hearing, testifying that smoking was a choice for businesses.10 
Louisiana Casino Association Executive Director Wade Duty, another consistent opponent of 
smokefree laws (Chapter 10), testified that SB 133 was 
economically harmful. During committee and Senate 
Floor debate, opponents generally argued SB 133 would 
reduce state tax revenue and economically harm 
businesses.9  
 SB 133 passed out of the Senate Health and 
Welfare Committee11 but was then killed by a 22-15 
vote on the Senate floor.9 After SB 133’s defeat, 
American Cancer Society representative Andrew Muhl 
published a letter calling for the protection of 
employees and musicians from secondhand smoke and for lawmakers to reconsider smoking 
restrictions in the future. While efforts to secure smoking restriction legislation struggled within 
the state legislature, policy battles at the local level secured comprehensive clean air laws for 
Louisianans. 
First comprehensive local clean air ordinance: Alexandria  
 
In 2011, Alexandria became the first city in Louisiana to pass a comprehensive clean air 
ordinance, prohibiting smoking in all bars, nursing homes, and gaming establishments.12 The 
ordinance also set a 25-foot distance requirement for smoking near sports facilities and city 
property. Shortly after preemption was repealed in 2006, TFL determined in a community 
assessment that Alexandria was a potential target for a smokefree ordinance. TFL launched a 
legislative campaign in 2011 after receiving positive reaction from its “Equal Air for All” media 
campaign (Chapter 4) and grassroots education efforts in the city.13 TFL’s efforts to pass 
Alexandria’s clean indoor air law received support from the Rapides Foundation, a regional 501 
(c)(3) health foundation active in tobacco control (Chapter 4).14 Alexandria City Council 
President and bill sponsor Roosevelt Johnson and Councilmember Harry Silver collaborated with 
TFL to secure the ordinance.12 Louisiana’s first comprehensive clean air ordinance passed 
despite resistance from the local bar owner community. 
Generating Public Support for a Future Ordinance 
 
To build support for a comprehensive clean air ordinance in Alexandria, TFL organized 
smokefree events throughout the city. Although the local bar community mostly opposed 
While efforts to secure 
smoking restriction legislation 
struggled within the state 
legislature, policy battles at 
the local level secured 
comprehensive clean air laws 
within certain municipalities. 
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smoking restrictions, TFL identified a few owners who supported a 100% smokefree ordinance 
in September 2010 and partnered with them to host "Let's be Totally Clear" events. The events 
were smokefree nights at participating bars that took place two to three times a month.13 Notably, 
TFL partnered with prominent musician, former smoker, and owner of G.G.'s Club (the largest 
nightclub in Alexandria at the time) G.G. Shinn to host multiple smokefree nights at his venue.13 
Smokefree nights were designed to increase public awareness that the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air 
Act did not protect service industry workers.13 In addition to on-site events, TFL  plastered itsr 
"Equal Air for All" messaging on billboards across Alexandria and on social media. These 
messages often featured smoking restriction supporters, including the city’s Office of Public 
Health director, United Way’s leader, two local cardiologists, and Alexandria City Council 
President Roosevelt Johnson and Councilmember Harry Silver.13  
TFL conducted air quality studies in Alexandria bars to pave the way for a 
comprehensive clean air ordinance. The results, evaluated by the Louisiana State University 
(LSU) Health Sciences Center in New Orleans, demonstrated that the air quality of bars in 
Alexandria were at hazardous levels for health.13 TFL hosted a joint press conference with 
Council President Roosevelt Johnson and Councilmember Harry Silver in February 2011 to 
release the study's results.13 TFL prepared packets with the bar study data and met individually 
with other council members to educate them and gain their support for a local smokefree law. 
The Alexandria Ordinance is Drafted 
 
While TFL cultivated public awareness and support for smokefree policies in Alexandria 
during 2010 and 2011, it found a willing legislative champion in City Council President 
Roosevelt Johnson. When he was serving as an Alexandria City Councilmember before adoption 
of the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act in 2006, Johnson had voted to pass a smoking restriction 
ordinance (limited in its strength and scope by state preemption at the time).13 TFL developed a 
rapport with Johnson after the statewide law passed and invited him to attend discussions it held 
in 2008 on the results of its Community Assessment and efforts to mobilize grassroots support.13 
Johnson signaled to TFL at the time that he supported securing greater smoking restrictions for 
Alexandria.13  
In 2011, Roosevelt Johnson tailored a comprehensive clean air measure for Alexandria 
with assistance from TFL. The legislation was based on Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights’ 
model ordinance to prohibit smoking in bars, gaming establishments, nursing homes, hotels and 
motels, and within 50 feet of public facilities.15  
Opposition from the City Attorney and Bar Owners 
 
 Initially, City Council President Roosevelt Johnson’s ordinance faced opposition from 
Charles "Chuck" Johnson, the City Attorney and a local business owner.13 When TFL, Roosevelt 
Johnson, and Silver held their press conference announcing the findings of the Alexandria air 
quality study and disseminated informational packets to officials about the results, they also 
provided one to city attorney Johnson. Council President Roosevelt Johnson met the city 
attorney, who opposed pursuing the ordinance before discussing potential smoking restrictions 
with local bar owners.13 According to TFL Regional Manager Gilchrist in a 2014 interview for 
this report:  
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Chuck [City Attorney Johnson] was the only 
one [to oppose smoking restrictions]. He said, 
"I know, I agree, I see it, but I can't support 
this because I'm a small businessman." So, he 
was the only one that told us out the gate 
when we shared air quality monitoring results 
with him that he was not going to -- he can't 
see that he would say yes to any kind of 
policy that would address that issue.13 
After speaking with City Council President Roosevelt Johnson, the city attorney sent a letter to 
“all the bar owners personally” inviting them to attend a public meeting on the anticipated 
smoking restrictions.13  
The town hall to discuss Council President Roosevelt’s pending smokefree ordinance 
occurred on July 15, 2011 in the Alexandria City Council chambers.15, 16 TFL officials were not 
initially invited to speak at the meeting, preventing them from sharing the results of their air 
quality surveys or information on secondhand smoke dangers to attendees. However, City 
Councilmember Harry Silver arranged for TFL to make a presentation on the consequences of 
tobacco smoke exposure with the caveat that TFL could not provide additional testimony.13 
According to TFL Regional Manager Jennifer Gilchrist in a 2014 interview for this report: 
So, I believe, and I'm saying this from not quite sure my memory, because I 
wasn't the one having direct conversations with him. I think Harry Silver 
negotiated for us to be on the agenda, to be able to present, and to speak to the 
issue of second-hand smoke and the dangers of tobacco smoke exposure. 
We were told, however, that that's all we're to say, and that we don't need to bring 
any kind of testimony or any kind of supportive discussions about that. In other 
words, present and be quiet, sit down and be quiet. And that [city attorney] Chuck 
[Johnson] was going to monitor me.13 
TFL subsequently alerted coalition members in Region 6 and encouraged them to participate in 
support of smoking restrictions. TFL brought information packets regarding secondhand smoke 
as well as its air quality monitoring results for bar owners to review.13  
At the meeting, Louisiana Office of Public Health Regional and Medical Director Dr. 
David Holcomb spoke about the harms of secondhand smoke exposure. His testimony drew 
negative reactions from those against smoking restrictions.  
  Around 25 bar owners and employees attended to oppose prohibiting smoking in bars.15 
According to Gilchrist in her 2014 interview for this report, opponents at the meeting displayed a 
strong resistance to smoking restrictions at the hearing: 
Dr. Holcomb, bless his heart, decided to stand up and speak from a public health 
issue stance, and he actually was yelled off the stage. It was not respectful 
dialogue at all. I was disappointed in how that turned out.13 
Chuck was the only one [to 
oppose smoking restrictions]. 
He said, "I know, I agree, I see it, 
but I can't support this because 
I'm a small businessman." 
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Those commenting against the smokefree ordinance argued it would adversely affect revenue, 
cause job loss, restrict personal freedom, and increased government intrusion into private 
affairs.13 
 Outside the meeting, TFL met resistance on social media. In a 2014 interview for this 
report, TFL’s Gilchrist mused that the tobacco industry might have been operating an opposition 
account on social media: 
There was one [social media] poster named "Harley Rider" something or other. 
And it would go on and on. We knew whoever this person was, they were 
scripted. And they'd monitor anything that came up about the issue. And it 
actually became a turnoff to people…that was the only real presence that I think 
we can say was the tobacco industry.13 
Despite opposition from City Attorney Chuck Johnson, bar owners and posters on social media 
platforms, plans to introduce the 100% smokefree ordinance in Alexandria remained. 
The Alexandria Clean Air Ordinance is Introduced 
 
After a year of efforts to promote smoking restrictions in Alexandria, on September 20, 
2011 City Council President Johnson introduced an ordinance prohibiting smoking in enclosed 
public places, workplaces, bars, gaming facilities, hotels and motels, retail tobacco businesses, 
common and outdoor areas of multi-unit housing, public transportation vehicles, city-owned 
public transportation stations, platforms, and shelters, and outdoor playgrounds. The legislation 
also restricted smoking within 50 feet from any entrance, window, or door.17 
 Despite efforts since September 2010 by TFL, health advocates and local lawmakers to 
generate support for comprehensive smoking restrictions, Johnson’s ordinance received a tepid 
reception from Mayor Jacques Roy and his administration. The Mayor and his administration 
avoided endorsing the legislation, stating that they had not been consulted before its drafting.18 
However, according to TFL’s Gilchrist, advocates had attempted to brief the mayor multiple 
times but were thwarted by political dynamics and racial tensions: 
The dynamics of this ordinance, our city, is that at the time, politically, there was 
division between black and white council members. It's racially divided. Not that 
it's sort of like that today, maybe still a little bit, but at that time there was a lot of 
racial division. 
And so, what happened was some of the waters parted, not necessarily based on 
the issue, but based on the politics that was going on within the city council and 
the mayor's office at the time. There was some conflict. So, we never received full 
backing by the mayor. We attempted several times to meet with him personally or 
go into his office. And we weren't able to do that.13 
The administration urged bar and hospitality owners as well as the public to provide comments at 
the initial City Council hearing for Johnson’s ordinance on October 4, 2010.18  
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The Economic Development and City Council Hearings for the Alexandria Ordinance 
 
The clean air ordinance was first heard 
before the City of Alexandria’s Economic 
Development Committee on October 4, 2011. If 
approved, the full city council would consider 
the legislation that same day. During  
consideration, TFL Regional Coordinator  and 
Policy and Advocacy Manager Carrie 
Broussard presented on the dangers of 
secondhand smoke exposure and Alexandria 
Air Quality Monitoring results in local bars.13 
Committee members subsequently passed an 
amendment making the ordinance follow the 
state’s smoking restrictions for hotels and motels, which permitted hospitality establishments to 
designate up to 50% of their rooms as smoking.13 Tobacco control advocates working to pass the 
ordinance sought to make the legislation more viable by supporting an amendment reducing the 
distance from building entrances from 50 feet to 25 feet. The Economic Development Committee 
approved the amended ordinance and sent it to the full City Council for a vote that evening. 
The City Council meeting that night had a maximum capacity audience as people came to 
support the smokefree ordinance.13 According to a 2014 interview for this report: 
We [TFL] had great grassroots support. The chambers were overflowing. They 
had to have security not let anyone come in. The testimony going on inside was 
put on the TV monitors outside, and the crowd overflowed to the outside of the 
building.13 
TFL had recruited local medical doctors, health advocates, an owner of a local bingo hall, and 
bar patrons to speak in support of the ordinance.13 Cardiologist Gary Jones, hematologist Ulla 
Ule, oncologist Larry Menache, bar patrons and cancer survivors testified.13, 19   In addition, 
Central Louisiana Area Health Education Center (CLAHEC) Healthy Communities Coordinator 
Christi Mabou read a letter to the council penned by13, 19 prominent musician and Alexandria 
nightclub owner G.G. Shin that supported the ordinance. According to Gilchrist in a 2014 
interview for this report, the "letter coming from him [G.G.] was very compelling testimony and 
it helped a whole lot in our efforts."13 Gilchrist credited testimony from cancer survivors in 
particular for the outcome of the clean air ordinance. 
Prior to the October 4 hearings, tobacco control advocates did not expect a unanimous 
vote because of opposition from Councilmember Charles Fowler stated as a business owner that 
businesses should be allowed to decide whether to adopt smokefree restrictions.13 However, on 
the day of the hearings Fowler lost a friend to cancer, earning the clean air ordinance an 
unexpected vote. In a 2014 interview for this report Gilchrist observed: 
Unfortunately, on the day of the vote, they had a friend that was suffering from 
cancer, and he died… And because of that and the testimony that he was hearing 
from cancer survivors and all of that emotional stuff that was happening in the 
“We had great grassroots support. 
The chambers were overflowing. 
They had to have security not let 
anyone come in. The testimony 
going on inside was put on the TV 
monitors outside, and the crowd 
overflowed to the outside of the 
building.” 
 546 
 
room at the moment, his vote was first, and he cast it as a yes in the name of his 
friend he just lost.13  
After Fowler, the six other councilmembers voted for the clean air ordinance (Table 12.1),20 each 
dedicating their vote to friends and family lost to cancer.13 
Although Mayor Jacques did not endorse the legislation before the Council’s vote, he 
praised Council President Roosevelt Johnson and Councilmember Silver after the ordinance 
passed.12 
TFL remained involved in Alexandria as the city’s ordinance neared effect on January 2, 
2012. To maintain public awareness of the newly adopted smoking restrictions and facilitate 
implementation, TFL continued to host smokefree events, including one at G.G.’s nightclub, and 
disseminated informational materials on the new local law.13 TFL provided free packages to bars 
and bingo halls, describing Alexandria’s ordinance together with promotional materials 
including bingo cards and bar napkins featuring clean air messaging. The persistent advocacy 
efforts by TFL before and after adoption of Alexandria’s ordinance marked the start of effective 
local smokefree policy campaigns across Louisiana.  
In the end, the Alexandria ordinance prohibited smoking in enclosed public places, 
workplaces including bars, gaming facilities, retail tobacco businesses, common and outdoor 
areas of multiunit housing, public transportation vehicles, city-owned public transportation 
stations, platforms, and shelters, and outdoor playgrounds. The ordinance also established a 25-
foot distance requirement from entrances. It allowed Alexandria hotels and motels to follow state 
smoking restrictions.17 Infractions faced $100 fines for first violation, $250 for second violation, 
and $500 for any subsequent violations within a year. Alexandria’s ordinance became the 
strongest smokefree law in Louisiana, and Advocates would use it as a model legislation for 
future local level campaigns across the state. 
Woodworth Secures Louisiana’s Second Comprehensive Clean Air Ordinance  
 
Only 3 months after TFL’s successful Alexandria smokefree campaign, Woodworth, a 
town of 2024 people, became the second Louisiana community to adopt a comprehensive 
smokefree ordinance. Mayor David Butler and Woodworth’s city council approved an ordinance 
on April 15, 2012 making all enclosed workplaces 100% smokefree. 21 The ordinance included 
bars and gaming facilities (despite there being none in the town) as well as public transit and 
outdoor workplaces in its smoking restrictions.21 The law established a 25-foot distance 
requirement from building windows and entrances, seating and serving areas at restaurants and 
bars, playgrounds, and public transit structures, and mandated that no-smoking signs be posted 
Table 12.1: Alexandria City Council Vote to Adopt Smokefree Ordinance20 
Councilmember Vote 
Roosevelt Johnson Yes 
Harry Silver Yes 
Ed Larvadain Yes 
Charles Fowler Yes 
Mitzi Gibson Yes 
Jim Villard Yes 
Jonathan Goins Yes 
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where smoking was outlawed.21 Any noncompliance was a misdemeanor that incurred up to 60 
days in jail and or a fine ranging between $100 to $500.21 
Although we did not find evidence that TFL was directly involved in efforts to pass 
Woodworth’s ordinance, it’s "Equal Air for All" media campaign (Chapter 4) had run across 
Louisiana in 201122 and 2012. It is possible the advertisements, intended to inform public 
opinion on smoking in bars and gaming facilities, contributed to support for smoking restrictions 
in Woodworth.  
Tri-Area Effort: The City of Monroe, West Monroe, and Ouachita Parish Ordinances   
 
After Alexandria and Woodworth adopted comprehensive smoking restrictions, Monroe, 
West Monroe, and their parish Ouachita simultaneously secured robust smokefree laws in 2013. 
Monroe passed a comprehensive ordinance on September 24, 2013 to prohibit smoking and 
vaping in indoor workplaces, restaurants, bars, gaming facilities, common areas in multiunit 
housing, and private clubs. Similar smokefree laws that excluded distance requirements passed 
for Ouachita Parish on October 7, 2013 and West Monroe on October 8, 2013. All three 
ordinances took effect January 2, 2014.  
Origins of the Tri-Area Ordinance Campaigns 
 
The adoption of smoking restrictions in Monroe, 
West Monroe, and Ouachita Parish resulted from TFL 
Region VIII manager Jennifer Haneline’s assessment of 
the community’s readiness and desire for 100% 
smokefree workplaces and indoor spaces. After Haneline joined TFL as the Monroe area 
Regional Coordinator in June 2011, she initially assisted schools with adopting tobacco-free 
policies. After a year, Haneline determined that school policies in the region were already 
effective and wanted to move on to smokefree workplaces.23 Her interest in pursuing clean air 
legislation developed as she conversed with members of the public. According to Haneline in a 
2014 interview for this report:  
I had already been having conversations with people about what I do and talking 
about smokefree bars and stuff and people had already said to me, "You know, 
that's great. I hope you do that." And the bar owners, a couple that I knew, said, 
"Oh, we know it's coming, it'll be here one day soon." So there was kind of this 
sense that people were open to it here.23 
Haneline stated that she ultimately decided to pursue smoking restrictions after a local reporter 
indicated the media supported such policies: 
I was talking to a reporter and I was telling her about what I do. And she goes 
“When are you going to make the bars smokefree?” That was the starting point. I 
said, “Okay. I’ve got media who wants it, I’m going to do it. Let’s go.”23 
Organizational developments at TFL in 2012 subsequently enabled Haneline to orchestrate a 
smokefree legislative campaign within the Ouachita area. 
“When are you going to make 
the bars smokefree?” 
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Staff restructuring and position changes at TFL in 2012 promoted regional 
coordinators, giving them greater control and decision-making over their areas (Chapter 
4). As positions were combined at TFL headquarters in New Orleans, newly appointed 
TFL Associate Director Tonia Moore proposed that regional coordinators be promoted 
and awarded greater autonomy over tobacco control efforts within their areas. TFL 
leadership accepted the proposal, appointing Haneline and other coordinators regional 
managers and giving them greater authority. Following the promotions, TFL Regional 
Managers were required to develop three-year action plans for their regions.23 In her plan, 
Haneline proposed promoting smokefree workplaces in the city of Monroe.23  
 
Haneline believed she had connections with local decision-makers and influencers as 
well as the name recognition necessary to secure a clean air ordinance in Monroe, a small city 
where community ties and visibility held significant influence.23 She participated in the Garden 
District Neighborhood Alliance, a politically active neighborhood group that enabled 
relationships between her, the Monroe Mayor and some City Council members. In addition, 
Haneline’s married name came from a family of local business owners, increasing her visibility 
and presence in Monroe. 
 
Surveilling Political and Business Community Attitudes towards Smoking Restrictions 
 
Gauging Local Lawmakers’ Interest in Smokefree Legislation 
 
Haneline started by probing local lawmakers in West Monroe on their receptiveness 
towards passing various tobacco control legislation. She discussed point of sale restrictions, 
tobacco taxes and smoking restrictions with West Monroe Mayor Dave Norris.23 According to 
Haneline in a 2014 interview for this report, her conversation with the mayor led to the pursuit of 
smokefree ordinances for Monroe, West Monroe, and Ouachita Parish in tandem: 
 
That came out of a conversation with the West Monroe mayor who's really the 
first one I had a conversation with about this. He said, "You've really got to do all 
three," and he said, "We've done things like that [pass policies jointly] before. 
Like if there's a tax for a major employer -- we're trying to do some tax incentive 
and we're taxing the community to get somebody to come in who's going to bring 
a lot of jobs -- we do all three because all three are going to benefit. So we pass 
things saying it only passes if it passes here and here so that way it's an even 
playing field.23 
 
During their meeting, West Monroe Mayor Norris supported the tobacco control policies and 
told Haneline to discuss point of sale restrictions, tax increases, and smoking restrictions with 
West Monroe Alderperson Stacy Albritton. 
 
Surveying Lawmakers Provides an Early Smokefree Legislative Win 
 
As directed, Haneline met with Alderperson Albritton to discuss point of sale restrictions 
for tobacco products, tobacco tax increases, and clean air laws for workplaces and parks. The 
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meeting inspired Albritton to introduce a smokefree ordinance in 2012 for West Monroe Parks.23 
Haneline recalled in a 2014 interview for this report: 
 
I went and sat down with Stacy and I went through….this one-pager that said this 
is how you make a healthy community and listed these four different things.  And 
she said, “Parks, I want to do parks.” She ran with it, she proposed it, it got a little 
fuss about it but passed. It was like boom, boom, boom, done.23 
 
Alderman Albritton’s ordinance, approved on October 9, 2012 by the West Monroe board 
of Alderman,24 prohibited any combustible tobacco use in parks and recreation areas. First 
offenses faced $50 fines, followed by $100 fines and a potential year-long ban from using parks 
and recreation areas for additional violations.25  
 
Determining Bar Owner Views on Smoking Restrictions 
 
While she was conducting air quality studies in September and October 2012, Haneline 
talked privately with Ouachita Parish’s bar community to determine their attitudes towards 
smoking restrictions. She found that bar owners in Ouachita Parish secretly supported smoking 
restrictions but avoided taking a public position. Upon learning their stance, Haneline connected 
local politicians to bar owners to quell politicians’ concerns and possibly earn their backing for 
smoking restrictions. According to Haneline, her conversations led to only newer bar owners in 
the area (two in Monroe, one of three in west Monroe) opposing the clean air ordinances.23 The 
majority of bar owners did not oppose the smoking restriction legislation, lowering resistance 
from that community at town halls and hearings.  
 
Changing Public Awareness and Opinion for Ordinances in Monroe, West Monroe, and 
Ouachita Parish  
 
Promotional efforts to generate awareness of and support for smoking restrictions 
began in 2012 and lasted through the passage of Monroe, West Monroe, and Ouachita 
Parish’ ordinances in 2013. TFL sponsored a boat race team in the Bayou Desiard 
Dragon Boat Festival, an annual fundraiser for the Children’s Coalition for Northeast 
Louisiana,26 in May 2012.23 Haneline organized two smokefree nights to promote clean 
air policies, one at a bar and another at a restaurant promoting itself as a bar. In addition, 
health and tobacco control advocates participated in Kick Butts Day and the Great 
American Smokeout in 2013, generating media coverage. Haneline also met with people 
and attended nonprofit events to garner supporters and spread knowledge of impending 
clean air legislation.23  
 
TFL used paid and earned media to build momentum for a smokefree ordinance. 
Smokefree proponents generated earned media by participating in interviews with local 
news media. Smokefree proponents frequently spoke on behalf of the smokefree 
campaign instead of TFL officials, to make the effort community based. Haneline 
leveraged her local media contacts to keep the press engaged. She also joined the Monroe 
News-Star editorial board, hoping it would help maintain coverage of the smokefree 
effort. The newspaper had recruited Haneline to serve on the board because of her 
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outspoken 2013 service on a local school committee to find a new superintendent. 
According to Haneline, the Monroe News-Star provided ample coverage of the smokefree 
campaign in its normal reporting but unrelated state politics distracted the editorial board 
from taking a position on the smokefree campaign 
 
TFL also used social media to promote smoking restrictions and counter 
arguments from opponents in the Ouachita area. Around mid-2013, members of the 
public opposed to smoking restrictions wrote comments on news articles and made 
comments on social media complaining about civil liberties being infringed. 23 TFL 
countered these negative social media claims by developing and using canned posts to 
respond. 
 
Operating Without Major Support from Health Voluntaries 
TFL initially pursued comprehensive smokefree laws in West Monroe, Monroe, and 
Ouachita Parish with local assistance. As Haneline readied for the policy campaigns, she did not 
reach out to national health organizations fearing she lacked the authority to do so.23 Instead, she 
only contacted local representatives of ACS, AHA and other voluntaries. Realizing Haneline was 
preparing to launch a policy campaign, TFL Associate Director Tonia Moore contacted regional 
officials of national health and tobacco control organizations to assist the Monroe, West Monroe, 
and Ouachita Parish effort.23 Moore engaged Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights, the American 
Cancer Society, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, and the American Heart Association towards 
the end of Spring 2013.23 
 
The health voluntaries held a phone conference with Haneline to discuss the impending 
campaigns and help guide “direct-action organizing.”23 Haneline had already started organizing 
in the summer of 2012. In a 2014 interview for this report, she said incorporating national health 
voluntaries into an active campaign proved difficult: 
 
So part of that ended up being difficult because them coming in so late, I was 
spending a lot of time trying to catch them up and help them understand what we 
were doing. That kind of ended up being more of a burden. And I know it was 
frustrating for them because they could really only help so much and I could only 
articulate so much because a lot had happened in that time when you're talking on 
the phone. It was really complicated.23 
 
Instead, health voluntaries provided significant technical assistance to the campaign. Haneline 
also recalled in her interview: 
 
I had no local or state-level support from those organizations. American Cancer 
Society, anybody in that organization that would have been doing help locally, we 
didn't have them. As far as I can tell the folks who work here do fundraising, they 
don't do any policy work. They were not involved. I tried, I reached out, I spoke 
to them face to face and just could not get them to show up to any meetings, do 
anything. They said they sent out some action alerts and maybe we got some 
responses from that and that's great. But in terms of physical bodies, we didn't get 
that.23 
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As a result, TFL continued to pursue clean air ordinances in Monroe, West Monroe and Ouachita 
Parish with limited assistance from national health and tobacco control organizations. National 
voluntaries became critical to later local campaigns for comprehensive smokefree policies. 
 
Determining Political Support for Smoking Restrictions 
 
Haneline began probing local officials in 
Monroe and Ouachita Parish to determine their attitudes 
towards smoking restrictions in 2012. She brought 
signed petitions to meetings to prove public support for 
smokefree workplaces existed in Ouachita Parish. In 
addition, she brought revenue studies showing 
smokefree policies did not have a negative economic 
impact. In a 2014 interview for this report, Haneline 
observed that most councilmembers and jurors were 
concerned about smokefree policies lowering tax 
revenue or harming their chances at reelection: 
 
So [I] had all the revenue studies, took them with me to every single meeting I 
had, told them I had it. Not one person asked to see it, they just kind of 
trusted…I’ve got it. [I] took the petitions that I had been gathering over the last 
year…said I had them [and] not one person looked at them, not one person cared. 
And that goes through the whole campaign to this day. Nobody's wanted that 
information, looked at it, cared about it. Nobody cared about our smokefree night, 
how many people showed up and how much revenue was done. 
 
They cared about is our city going to lose tax money. That was really bottom line 
for them. And is this going to hurt our reelection was secondary.23 
 
Haneline discussed smokefree park policies with Monroe Mayor James Mayo and the 
Ouachita Parish Police Jury (the Louisiana equivalent of a county board) Attorney Jay Mitchell27 
in 2012.23 She also discussed pursuing comprehensive smoking restrictions for Ouachita Parish 
with Police Jury member Pat Moore, after Mitchell recommended Moore because of her previous 
health policy work. During a local election in Monroe City, Haneline discussed smokefree 
workplaces with Monroe City Council candidates in 2012. 
 
After elections for Monroe City Council in late 2012, Haneline individually discussed 
smokefree workplaces with all five Councilmembers to determine their support (Table 12.2). She 
started with Councilmembers Ray Armstrong and Gretchen Ezernack, who had constituents 
living in the Garden District. Haneline already knew both through her work with the Garden 
District Neighborhood Alliance. Both Armstrong and Ezernak told Haneline they supported 
smokefree workplaces for Monroe. Haneline also discussed smokefree workplaces with 
Councilmembers Kenny Wilson and Betty Blakes, who both expressed interest in a 
comprehensive smokefree ordinance. Haneline, accompanied by former Richwood (a 
neighboring community) Police Chief and nonprofit Empowering Communities employee 
“So [I] had all the revenue 
studies, took them with me 
to every single meeting I had, 
told them I had it, not one 
person asked to see it, they 
just kind of trusted, okay, 
you've got it.” 
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Reverend Cliff Thomas, discussed smokefree 
workplaces for Monroe with Councilmember Eddie 
Clark. Clark claimed to support smokefree 
workplaces restrictions but asked Haneline to host a 
town hall meeting to determine his constituents’ 
sentiments towards smoking restrictions. 
 
 To address Clark’s concerns, TFL held a town hall on clean air policies for 
Councilmember Clark’s constituents in September 2013. Councilman Clark did not attend the 
meeting, but Councilmembers Armstrong and Ezernak, as well as Ouachita Police Jury member 
Pat Moore did and publicly supported smokefree workplaces. 
 
Choosing Legislative Sponsors 
 
After discussing smoking restrictions with Councilmembers and Parish Police Jurors in 
Monroe, West Monroe, and Ouachita Parish, Haneline began approaching individual lawmakers 
to find sponsors for smokefree legislation. 
 
For Monroe, Haneline first approached City Councilmember Ray Armstrong because of 
his adamant support for smokefree workplaces at town hall meetings. However, Haneline feared 
that Armstrong’s contentious relationship with Monroe Mayor James Mayo could kill an 
ordinance sponsored by him.23 Instead, Haneline secured Councilmember Gretchen Ezernak to 
sponsor the smokefree ordinance for Monroe City, believing her length of service on the Monroe 
City Council and her good relationship with Mayor Mayo increased the chances of winning a 
comprehensive ordinance.23 
 
In Ouachita Parish, Haneline first recruited Ouachita Parish Police Jury Member Pat 
Moore to introduce a comprehensive ordinance. However, Moore had promoted multiple health 
issues over the prior two years, creating concern that public support for her efforts had 
weakened. In a 2014 interview for this report, Haneline believed that Moore’s past health policy 
work had negatively typecast the Councilmember: 
 
Pat Moore had been working on some other health-related stuff and was just 
really getting targeted. Someone had commented in one of the News-Star articles 
that they printed about this [smoking restrictions], that "Jennifer Haneline and Pat 
Moore are just busybodies, always telling people what to do with their lives," or 
something to that effect. And I went, "Uh-oh, we've got an issue here."23 
 
To reduce opposition to Ouachita’s impending ordinance, Haneline recruited Councilmember 
Scotty Robinson to sponsor legislation after learning he supported smoking restrictions.23 
 
In West Monroe, Alderperson Staci Albritton, who previously worked with Haneline to 
pass an ordinance prohibiting smoking in West Monroe parks during 2012 and assisted with air 
quality monitoring in October and September of that year, sponsored the ordinance. Support 
from West Monroe Alderperson Albritton and Mayor Norris led Haneline to focus her advocacy 
efforts in Monroe and Ouachita Parish over West Monroe. She was confident the comprehensive 
Table 12.2: Monroe City 
Councilmembers 
Ray Armstrong 
Gretchen Ezernack 
Kenny Wilson 
Betty Blakes 
Eddie Clark 
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ordinance would pass in West Monroe because of Norris’ powerful influence,23 who was serving 
his ninth term.28  
 
Drafting Legislation for Monroe, Ouachita Parish, and West Monroe 
 
After Haneline recruited legislative champions, she met with Monroe City 
Councilmember Gretchen Ezernak, Ouachita Parish Police Juror Pat Moore, and West Monroe 
City Attorney Doug Caldwell to develop smokefree legislation for their constituents.23 She 
provided an Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights (ANR) model ordinance that included e-
cigarettes to guide the drafting process.23 
 
Distance requirements inspired the most disagreement, with some lawmakers arguing that 
smokers and e-cigarette users would be forced into unsafe areas or pushed away from 
neighborhood bars.23 
 
As adopted, the Monroe, Ouachita Parish, and West Monroe ordinances prohibited 
smoking and vaping in bars and bingo halls (Table 12.3). Monroe’s ordinance also prohibited 
smoking in workplaces, public places, and private clubs. The West Monroe and Ouachita Parish 
ordinances did not include distance requirements (they originally had 5 foot distance 
requirements).29, 30 However, they prohibited smoking and e-cigarette use on outdoor patios 
where food and drink were served.23, 29, 30 The Monroe ordinance originally established a 15-foot 
distance requirement from entrances (reduced to 5 feet during the legislative process), windows, 
and vents, but allowed smoking on outdoor patios with food and beverage service unless the area 
had stationary employees.31 
 
Monroe City, Ouachita Parish, and West Monroe introduced ordinances in quick 
succession in September 2013. Prior to voting on the legislation, lawmakers in Monroe, Ouachita 
Parish, and West Monroe agreed not to implement smokefree workplaces unless all three 
localities adopted similar legislation simultaneously, because of concerns about creating 
competitive disadvantages between businesses in the region.32  
 
Monroe Passes 
 
Councilmember Gretchen Ezernack introduced Monroe’s ordinance to its City Council 
on September 10, 2013. As submitted, the ordinance prohibited smoking and vaping in bars, 
gambling establishments, public transit vehicles and facilities, playgrounds, health care facilities, 
and public areas and outdoor spaces of residential facilities.33 At the hearing, TFL staff called for 
Monroe, neighboring West Monroe and Ouachita Parish lawmakers to hear smoking restriction 
legislation.34 
 
The Monroe ordinance received mixed reactions from community bar owners. The 
legislation’s distance requirement generated opposition from at least one bar owner at the 
hearing. The legislation established a distance requirement of 15 feet from entrances, windows, 
and ventilation outlets. Unlike Monroe’s ordinance, the West Monroe and Ouachita Parish 
ordinances would have no distance requirements at their introduction. At the hearing, local bar 
owner Doyle Jeter expressed support for smoking restrictions, but claimed the distance  
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Table 12.3: Monroe, West Monroe and Ouachita Parish Final Smoking Restrictions in 201423, 29-31 
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Penalties Enforcement 
Monroe + + + + + -* + 5 ft from 
building 
entrances and 
airways.* 
 
5 ft from outdoor 
serving areas. 15 
ft from 
bleachers, 
playgrounds, 
public transit 
facilities, and 
lines. 
+ Smoker Any offence $50 fine Law Enforcement 
Establishment 1st offence 
(within 1 year) 
$25 fine Health Department and 
Fire Department  
2nd offence 
(within 1 year) 
$50 fine 
Additional 
(within 1 year) 
$100 fine 
West 
Monroe 
  + +  +  None + Smoker or 
Establishment 
1st offence $25 West Monroe Police 
Department 2nd offence 
(within 5 years) 
$50 
Additional 
(within 5 years) 
$100 
Ouachita 
Parish 
  + +  +  None + Smoker or 
Establishment 
1st offence $25 fine Administrative 
Adjudication 2nd offence 
(within 5 years) 
$50 fine 
Additional 
(within 5 years) 
$100 fine 
*Smoking allowed unless there are stationed employees in that area 
** Ordinance passed with 15-foot distance requirement. Amended to 5 feet by subsequent legislation. 
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requirement harmed businesses and endangered people by pushing them into unsafe areas such 
as parking areas and streets.34 Councilwoman Ezernack subsequently asked the City Council to 
amend the ordinance if it passed to match any smoking restrictions adopted by West Monroe and 
Ouachita parish.34 The Council did not vote on the ordinance at the hearing. 
 
The Monroe City Council considered 
Ezernack’s comprehensive ordinance again on 
September 24, 2013.35 TFL Associate Director Tonia 
Moore, TFL Regional Manager Jennifer Haneline, 
other TFL officials, and Reverend Cliff Thomas 
attended to support the legislation. At least one person 
attended to complain that the footage requirement 
would harm bars because it would not allow outdoor 
smoking on patios.23 
 
Although Councilmember Ezernack previously called for the Monroe City Council to 
adapt her legislation to the ordinances being considered for West Monroe and Ouachita Parish, 
its 15 foot distance requirement was left unaltered at the hearing because of difficulties preparing 
an amendment in time. Immediately before the meeting, Haneline, sick and recently discharged 
from the hospital, asked Councilmember Ezernack to propose an amendment reducing the 
distance requirement to match Ouachita Parish and West Monroe. Haneline and Ezernack crafted 
an amendment to change the distance requirement to 5 feet, but the Council rejected the 
change.23 
  
 Although the 15-foot distance requirement remained, 
the Monroe City Council voted 3-2 to adopt the legislation at 
the September 24 hearing (Table 12.4) (It was subsequently 
reduced to 5 feet by different legislation.). Haneline reasoned 
in a 2014 interview for this report that Councilmember Eddie 
Clark voted against the ordinance because of his friendship 
with one of his district’s bar owners.23 Haneline also 
ruminated during that interview that Betty Blake objected to 
the legislation because of the strong distance requirement, and testimony from a bar at the 
hearing claiming the distance requirement would harm it. 
 
After the Monroe City Council adopted the smokefree ordinance on September 24, 
Haneline indicated she wanted the Monroe City Council to reconsider the smokefree ordinance 
to lower its distance requirement to 5 feet,36 to honor an earlier agreement to lower the distance. 
According to Haneline in a 2013 interview with the Associated Press: 
 
It [Monroe’s smoking distance requirement] was supposed to be five feet just 
from the main entrance of a bar, and revisions were made, but on Tuesday that 
was not what they (City Council) had in front of them. So the plan is to go back 
and amend it to what was the agreed upon footage. The intent is to keep smoke 
out of the workplace. That’s the bottom line.36 
 
Table 12.4: Monroe City Council 
Vote on Smokefree Ordinance  
Councilmember No Yes 
Ray Armstrong  X 
Gretchen Ezernak  X 
Betty Blake X  
Kenneth Wilson  X 
Eddie Clark X  
At least one person attended 
to complain that the footage 
requirement would harm bars 
because it would not allow 
outdoor smoking on patios. 
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At a Monroe City Council meeting on December 26, 2013, Councilmember Ezernak 
introduced legislation to lower the smoking distance requirement to 5 feet, which the Council 
approved unanimously. As a result, Monroe’s restrictions prohibited smoking in all workplaces 
and public places, including bars and gaming establishments (Table 12.3). The law permitted 
smoking on outdoor patios with food and drink service unless two stationary employees were 
present. The ordinance set a 5-foot distance requirement from building entrances, airways, and 
outdoor patios, and a 15-foot distance requirement from parks, stadiums and transit facilities. 
The Monroe ordinance entered effect January 2, 2014.23, 37 
 
The Ouachita Parish Ordinance 
 
Police Juror Scotty Robinson introduced his comprehensive smokefree ordinance for 
Ouachita Parish at a meeting of the Ouachita Police Jury on September 16, 2013.30 Haneline 
testified for the ordinance; no other provided comments at the initial hearing.30 As introduced, 
the ordinance prohibited smoking and e-cigarette use in bars, gambling establishments, and on 
outdoor patios featuring beverage and food service.38 There was no distance requirement. 
Violations carried an initial $25 fine, followed by a $50 fine for second offenses within 5 years, 
and a $100 fine for any additional offenses within 5 years. Enforcement of smoking restrictions 
would be conducted through the Ouachita Parish’s Administrative Adjudication function. The 
ordinance did not have a distance requirement. The Police Jury debated the ordinance again the 
month after. 
 
The Ouachita Parish Police Jury considered the ordinance again on October 7, 2013.35, 39, 
40 Before Jurors voted, seven supporters consisting of Haneline, community advocates, health 
advocates and officials, politicians, medical professionals, and citizens testified for the ordinance 
(Table 12.5).39 Proponents argued smoking incurs higher medical costs, that exposure to  
secondhand smoke is harmful and lethal, and that breathing clean air is a right.39 Besides 
speaking at the hearing, Haneline provided Jurors the results of a study on secondhand smoke 
and air quality in Ouachita Parish.39  Five people testified against the ordinance, arguing that 
smoking restrictions were government overreach and infringed on personal and business 
freedoms (Table 12.5).39  
 
Police Juror Caldwell, who would be the lone vote against the ordinance, spoke against it 
using civil liberty claims. Prior to the hearing, he published an article in local newspaper the 
Ouachita Citizen highlighting these arguments.23 We do not know the exact assertions Caldwell 
made. 
 
After hearing public comment, the Ouachita Parish Police Jury voted 5-1 to adopt the 
ordinance (Table 12.6).35, 39, 40 The final ordinance prohibited smoking in bars, gaming 
establishments, and on outdoor patios with foodservice.30 The ordinance took effect on January 
2, 2014, the same day as the Monroe ordinance.30, 41, 42 
 
The ordinance carried a provision that allowed the law to enter effect only if Monroe and 
West Monroe passed similar legislation.39 Any provisions that weren’t mutual between the 
municipalities would also become null in the Ouachita Parish.39 
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The West Monroe Ordinance 
 
West Monroe Alderperson Staci Albritton Mitchell 
introduced her ordinance at an Alderman board meeting on 
September 10, 2013, the same date the Monroe Ordinance 
was introduced, with a public hearing set for September 26, 
2013.43 At the introductory hearing, approximately 20 
proponents,23 (including TFL Associate Director Tonia 
Moore44 and Haneline,23) and opponents attended the hearing.23  
 
TFL representatives testified about the harms of tobacco, citing that tobacco smoke 
contained 7000 chemicals and that 30 minutes of exposure to secondhand smoke equated to 
smoking a cigarette.44 They also testified that 75% of Louisianans opposed smoking indoors and 
that 74% of state residents were non-smokers. TFL also provided air monitoring data that found 
81% of establishments evaluated in the state had harmful air quality.44 Opponents consisted of 
smokers and one of West Monroe’s bar owners (there were only 3 bars in West Monroe at the 
Table 12.5: Public Comments in Favor of Ouachita Smokefree Ordinance39 
Speaker Affiliation Position Statements 
Jennifer Haneline Tobacco-Free Living Regional Manager • Provided information on secondhand smoke 
and the impact to air quality in Ouachita 
Parish.  
Michael DeVault   • Secondhand smoke killed 690 Louisianans in 
2012. 
Roosevelt 
Johnson 
City of Alexandria Former 
Councilmember 
• Alexandria ordinance did not economically 
harm businesses.  
• Ordinance will improve public health. 
Dr. Shelley Jones Ouachita Parish 
Health Unit 
Region 8 Director 
for Public Health 
• Smoking-induced medical costs. 
Jennifer Wick  Former smoker and 
bar employee 
• Suffers from COPD after smoking and 
exposure to secondhand smoke. 
Dr. Mark Napoli   • Businesses can adjust to smoking 
restrictions.  
• Smokefree areas lower heart attacks. 
Reverend Clifford 
Thomas 
Empowering 
Communities 
 • Clean air is a right. 
Public Comments against the Ouachita Smokefree Ordinance 
Nell Bradley   • Ordinance is government overreach. 
• Tobacco tax provides only funding for the 
Louisiana Children’s Health Insurance 
Program. 
• Ordinance should be decided by public vote. 
Ron Murphy   • Ordinance infringes on personal rights. 
• Ordinance should be decided by public vote. 
Keith Norris   • Business and property owners have right to 
set smoking policies. 
Wayne Hackney   • People should have right to choose. 
• Ordinance will not cause cessation. 
Walt Caldwell Ouachita Parish Police Juror • Referenced past statements in local media 
against ordinance, reiterated position. 
Table 12.6: Ouachita Parish Police 
Jury Vote on Smokefree Ordinance41 
Juror Vote 
Scotty Robinson Yes 
Mack Calhoun Yes 
Ollibeth Reddix Yes 
Shane Smiley Yes 
Pat Moore Yes 
Walt Caldwell No 
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time or the hearing), who argued that 
smoking restrictions infringed on civil 
liberties23 and would hurt the bar 
businesses.44 At the hearing, West Monroe 
City Councilmembers indicated they felt the 
smoking restrictions would protect residents, 
musicians, and bar employees’ health.44 The 
West Monroe City Council considered 
Alderman Albritton’s ordinance on October 
8, 2013.45 Nearly identical to the Ouachita 
ordinance, the law prohibited smoking and e-
cigarette use in bars, gambling 
establishments, and on outdoor patios with 
food and drink service.29 The legislation did 
not establish a distance requirement for smoking. Penalties for violating smoking restrictions 
were an initial $25 fine, followed by a $50 fine for second offenses within 5 years and a $100 
fine for any additional offenses within 5 years. The ordinance assigned enforcement to the West 
Monroe Police Department.29 
 
  Albritton’s ordinance passed without 
amendments. Before the Board voted, Councilmember 
Fred Ragland proposed an amendment to exempt e-
cigarettes that died for lack of a second.45 The Board of 
Aldermen then unanimously adopted the  ordinance 
(Table 12.7).29, 35  Mayor Dave Norris signed it into law 
the same day, with it taking effect on January 2, 2014. 
The law entered effect the same day as the Monroe and 
Ouachita ordinances.29, 35  
 
Cheneyville Adopts a Comprehensive Smokefree Ordinance  
  
Cheneyville was the sixth Louisiana town to adopt a comprehensive smokefree 
ordinance46 as part of statewide efforts by TFL. The law was passed with support from the 
Louisiana Healthy Communities Coalition (LHCC) Central region chapter.47 LHCC is a 
statewide group focused on improving human health that consists of regional chapters guided 
and supported by TFL, the Louisiana Cancer Prevention and Control Programs, and the 
Louisiana Department of Health to promote healthy lifestyles and combat obesity and tobacco 
use in Louisiana via local legislation and infrastructure (Chapter 4).48 The coalition effort in 
Cheneyville was led by TFL Regional Manager Jennifer Gilchrist.47  
 
The Cheneyville ordinance prohibited smoking and vaping in all workplaces and public 
places, including bars, gambling establishments,  tobacco retailers as well as outdoor stadiums, 
arenas, and amphitheaters.46 A distance requirement of 20 feet was established from building 
entrances and airways, event stands, playgrounds, public transit structures, and from drive-thru 
point of sales.46 Penalties for violating the smokefree ordinance by users or business owners 
were a maximum $100 fine for first offenses, $250 for second offenses within a year, and $500 
Table 12.7: West Monroe Board of Alders 
Vote on Smokefree Ordinance29 
Alderman Vote 
Staci Albritton Mitchell Yes 
James W. “Sonny” Bennett Yes 
Alice Pearson Yes 
James Brian Yes 
Fred Ragland Yes 
TFL representatives testified about the 
harms of tobacco, citing that tobacco 
smoke contained 7000 chemicals and 
that 30 minutes of exposure to 
secondhand smoke equated to 
smoking a cigarette. They also 
testified that 75% of Louisianans 
opposed smoking indoors and 74% of 
residents were non-smokers. 
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for any additional offenses within a year of last violation. Business owners also faced 
permit/license loss or suspension for violating smoking restrictions.46 The ordinance became 
effective June 8, 2014.46 
 
The Louisiana State Legislature Considers Two Smoking Restriction Bills 
 
Lawmakers Consider Smoking Distance Requirements Legislation in 2012 
 
 In 2012, State Representative Frank Hoffmann (R-West Monroe) introduced HB 378 to 
prohibit smoking within 25 feet of building entrances, handicap accessibility ramps, and airways 
at places where smoking was already prohibited by state law.49, 50 The bill exempted places 
where smoking was legally allowed such as bars and gaming establishments.49 
 HB 378 passed the House but failed to pass the Senate.49 We did not find evidence that 
health or tobacco control advocates supported the bill. Nor did we find evidence of  the tobacco 
industry or its allies opposing the legislation. 
The Legislature Prohibits Smoking in Health Department Psychiatric Hospitals  
  
On February 7, 2012, Representative Tim Burns (R-Mandeville) introduced HB 80 to 
prohibit smoking in psychiatric hospitals run by the Louisiana Department of Health and 
Hospitals (DHH).51 The bill worked by eliminating DHH psychiatric hospitals from an existing 
legal requirement (and exemption from a law making Louisiana hospitals smokefree) that 
required the agency and private psychiatric hospitals accommodate smokers.51 The bill did not 
pertain to private institutions and affected only two hospitals.52 
 Representatives strengthened HB 80 in its committee of origin and then passed it into law 
without resistance.51 The House Health and Welfare Committee proposed and adopted 
amendments requiring the DHH to screen, offer and provide smoking and smokeless tobacco 
cessation services such as counseling and nicotine replacement therapy to patients at its 
psychiatric hospitals and forensic facilities. The Committee then passed HB 80 in a 17-1 vote. 
The House and Senate subsequently approved HB 80 in unanimous votes, and Governor Bobby 
Jindal signed it into law on May 31, 2012. The bill took effect immediately. 
A Bill Passes Prohibiting Smoking on College Campuses in 2013 
 
On March 19, 2013, State Senator David Heitmeier (D-Algiers) prefiled SB 36 to 
prohibit smoking at public university, college, and technical school facilities and campuses.53 
The bill sought to lower smoking rates and health costs, and to improve public health in 
Louisiana.54  
Although TFL pursued tobacco-free policies on 
school campuses in 2013 and prior years, we did not 
find evidence that the tobacco control program assisted 
efforts to pass SB 36. TFL had run its Fresh Campus 
Campaign program since 2008 to create grassroots 
student groups at higher education institutions that push 
for smokefree campus policies and promote campus 
TFL helped six colleges and 
universities implement 
tobacco-free policies in 2013. 
In total, 14 of Louisiana’s 40 
universities had tobacco-free 
policies by that year’s end. 
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cessation services to students (Chapter 4). TFL helped six colleges and universities implement 
tobacco-free policies in 2013.55 In total, 14 of Louisiana’s 40 universities had tobacco-free 
policies by that year’s end.55 
SB 36 was directed to the Senate Health and Welfare Committee for initial consideration 
on April 17, 2013.53 SB 36’s sponsor, David Heitmeier, served as Committee Chairman. The 
Committee voted to report SB 36 to the Senate Floor without amendments. We could not locate 
any active support or opposition.   
 Senators debated SB 36 on April 30, 2013 and made minor changes to the bill. Heitmeier 
proposed two amendments to the bill during consideration. The first amendment, which he 
withdrew, permitted smoking on campuses of the University of Louisiana System on football 
game days.53 His second amendment eliminated SB 36’s smoking prohibition over all college 
campuses and facilities and instead required universities, colleges, and trade schools to develop 
and implement smokefree policies by August 1, 2014.53 Senators adopted the amendment, 
allowing higher education institutions to establish weaker smoking restrictions than SB 36 
originally set.53 After amending SB 36, senators voted 31 to 3 to send the bill to the House, 
where it was routed to the Committee on Education.   
SB 36 passed through the House without changes. After leaving the House Committee on 
Education, representatives unanimously approved the bill on May 30, 2013. Governor Bobby 
Jindal signed SB 36 into law on June 10, 2013 as Act 211.53  
TFL celebrated SB 36’s passage and assisted implementation efforts across the state. 
After the law passed, Louisiana Public Health Institute (which administers TFL, Chapter 4) 
Community Health Director Torrie Harris published a letter in the New Orleans Times-Picayune 
praising Senator Heitmeier for passing the bill. 56 She promised TFL and its partners that SB 36 
would help Louisiana colleges and universities implement 100% tobacco-free policies.56 
TFL developed and provided “Make Your Campus Tobacco-Free” toolkits to higher 
education institutions to assist them with compliance.55 TFL also organized trainings for colleges 
and universities with the same branding.55 
Bills to Establish Distance Requirements for Smoking around State Government Owned and 
Funded Buildings in 2013 and 2014 
 
Louisiana State Representative Frank Hoffmann (R-West Monroe) prefiled HB 111 
during the 2013 legislative session to restrict tobacco smoking near government buildings and 
buildings constructed or altered using state funding.57 The bill intended to protect the public from 
secondhand smoke.58 HB 111 was a weaker version of his bill HB 378, , which would have 
prohibited smoking within 25 feet of any building entrance or handicap ramp at an establishment 
where smoking was forbidden, that failed to pass in 2012.50, 59 
We do not know if health or tobacco control advocates helped create HB 111 or act to 
support it. We also did not find opposition to the legislation. After HB 111 passed the House and 
Senate, Representatives rejected the bill because of a Senate amendment that incorporated 
marijuana use57 into distance requirements.60 HB 111 subsequently died upon adjournment. 
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Representative Hoffmann ultimately got HB 168, weaker distance requirement 
legislation, passed in 2014 with minimal resistance from the legislature.61 As adopted, the bill 
prohibited smoking within 25 feet of public entrances of state office buildings.61 HB 168 was 
weaker that Hoffmann’s 2013 bill HB 111, which would have prohibited smoking within 25 feet 
of entrances and airways to all government buildings. HB 168 also established a 25-foot distance 
requirement from handicap accessibility platforms at state office buildings. The law levied a $25 
fine for first infractions, a $50 fine for second violations, and a $100 for each additional 
offense.61 The bill entered effect January 1, 2015. We do not know if health or tobacco control 
advocates helped pass HB 168. 
TFL Continues Pursuing Comprehensive Local Ordinances 
 
New Orleans Passes a Comprehensive Ordinance in 2015  
 
In January 2015, the City of New Orleans passed a new smokefree ordinance to prohibit 
smoking in all public places, workplaces, restaurants, bars, gaming establishments, hotels, and 
private clubs, including e-cigarettes and marijuana.62, 63 The legislation established the strongest 
smokefree law in Louisiana. Work by tobacco control advocates to secure a clean air ordinance 
in New Orleans began in the mid-2000s, following the partial repeal of preemption over local 
control in Louisiana in 2003 (Preemption was fully repealed to allow local smoking restrictions 
over bars and gaming establishments in 2006 (Chapter 10). TFL and national advocacy group 
Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights (ANR) collaborated to build support for smoking restrictions 
in the city, but plans stalled when Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005 and caused extreme damage, 
loss of life, and displacement of Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living staff from New 
Orleans to other areas.64 The campaign restarted in 2010, leading to the 2015 ordinance. 
Initial Consideration of a Comprehensive Smokefree Ordinance  
 
Efforts to secure a comprehensive, 100% smokefree ordinance for New Orleans started in 
2010, when TFL was working to secure comprehensive local laws throughout Louisiana. TFL 
Associate Director Tonia Moore and other advocates approached City Councilwoman Susan 
Guidry about sponsoring an ordinance, who agreed to do so.65  
At a meeting in 2010 with ANR President Cynthia Hallett and Policy Analyst Onjewel 
Smith, Louisiana Public Health Institute (LPHI) officials reported that they had secured 
Councilwoman Guidry’s commitment to introduce legislation similar to that TFL was supporting 
in Alexandria (described above). Hallett questioned whether the planned legislation for New 
Orleans included casinos; LPHI officials reported that Councilwoman Guidry did not intend to 
prohibit smoking in casinos, fearing opposition from the gaming industry.64 According to Hallett, 
the lack of smoking restrictions for casinos posed a problem for a collaborative smokfree 
campaign and long term tobacco control efforts in Louisiana if it passed: 
The sort of typical approach [building on incremental policy gains] isn’t 
necessarily the right thing to do anymore because once you adopt a law it can take 
a very long time to… replace it. So that’s why partial laws, whether it’s 50 
percent of the restaurant, or it’s restaurants only and not bars, or we keep it bars 
 562 
 
and casinos, it’s just the bars and not the casinos. It’s not acceptable for us 
[ANR]. It’s now a deal breaker. Even in 2010 it was a deal breaker.64 
Objections from ANR’s Hallett and Smith that excluding gaming employees from secondhand 
smoke protections was “unfair” contributed to TFL and LPHI’s decision not to pursue a law only 
covering bars.64 Opposition from City Councilmembers also contributed to this decision.65 As a 
result, tobacco control advocates shifted their energies away from directly promoting legislation 
to building public support for smoking restrictions in New Orleans.  
Generating Public Awareness and Support for a Smokefree Law in New Orleans 
 
To increase support for a comprehensive smokefree ordinance in New Orleans, TFL 
began releasing research showing the effects of smoking restrictions on air quality, the economy, 
and health.65, 66 In 2011, TFL commissioned and published the New Orleans Air Quality 
Monitoring Survey, which showed the dangerous air quality in the city’s bars and casinos.66, 67 
TFL released two studies in December 2012 to dispel fears that smoking restrictions would 
inflict economic harm.68 One study was a survey of people attending Jazz Fest from outside 
Louisiana that determined tourism in New Orleans would not be harmed by a smokefree law 
covering bars and casinos.68 The other survey found that the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act had 
a negligible impact on the economy in both Orleans Parish and the state of Louisiana.66, 67, 69 To 
continue building support for smoking restrictions, TFL released a third study in 2013 showing 
that air quality in Alexandria bars was 36 times cleaner after the city implemented its 
comprehensive smokefree ordinance.68 In 2014, TFL released a fourth study showing New 
Orleans bar patrons were exposed to secondhand smoke, which caused harmful effects and 
impacted short-term lung function.70   
Besides disseminating research, TFL used its statewide “Let’s Be Totally Clear” media 
campaign (Chapter 4) to build support for comprehensive local smoking restrictions in New 
Orleans. Started in 2007 with a focus on the general public, TFL reoriented the campaign’s 
messaging in 2010 to emphasize the lack of smokefree protections for musicians and employees 
in the gaming and bar industries.71 Rebranded as the “Healthier Air for All” initiative in 2014, 
TFL’s media campaign generated public support for smoking restrictions in New Orleans, which 
has a large service sector and historic music culture.65 The SmokeFree NOLA Coalition adopted 
the “Healthier Air for All” messaging for its campaign to enact the ordinance.   
Efforts to enact a comprehensive smokefree ordinance in New Orleans restarted in late 
2013 or early 2014 after TFL Associate Director Tonia Moore discussed pursuing  legislation 
with City Councilmember Latoya Cantrell.72 The Councilmember was interested in pursuing a 
comprehensive ordinance to complement a Louisiana State University (LSU) Health Science 
Center medical complex under construction in New Orleans.72 According to LPHI’s Cessation 
Manager at the time,73 Alex Hurst, in a 2017 interview for this report: 
Latoya Cantrell did rise up as the champion at that time because she felt very 
strongly, mainly due to the fact that there was a large medical complex, the 
Louisiana State University Health Science Center, being built down the corridor. 
She felt as if it wasn't right to have a complex of this magnitude located in New 
Orleans and not be a smokefree city. She felt that two had to go together.72 
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At a Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana 
(CTFLA) meeting in late 2013 or early 2014 to discuss 
tobacco control objectives and policy in Louisiana, 
Moore alerted members that New Orleans may consider 
a smokefree ordinance in 2014. According to American 
Lung Association (ALA) Southeast Vice President of 
Public Policy and Health Promotions74 Jennifer Cofer in 
a 2017 interview for this report, the planning to pass a 
strong ordinance in New Orleans, a city of sin akin to 
Las Vegas, caught coalition partners off guard: 
So late 2013, early 2014, the coalition was just doing the normal routine check-in 
and going through a list of priorities and policy. At the point, we were discussing 
the possibility of a tobacco tax. And the Associate Director for TFL [Tonia 
Moore] mentioned the cities that were going to look at going smokefree in 2014. 
And New Orleans was on that list that she ran through. 
And that's when the partners alerted their eyes and looked at her and asked her to 
repeat her list, comically, and asked her to again repeat that she said New Orleans 
was on that list.72 
Moore told representatives from the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network (ACS-
CAN), American Heart Association (AHA), American Lung Association (ALA), and other 
organizations attending the meeting of  Councilwoman Cantrell’s interest in pursuing an 
ordinance.72 This information did not prompt immediate action by national or regional 
members.72 
Councilmember Cantrell and TFL subsequently began work to gauge and generate 
support for comprehensive smoking restrictions from the business community and the public.  
Councilwoman Cantrell contacted bar owners to determine their receptiveness to comprehensive 
smoking restrictions and found support for a local ordinance.75 In addition, TFL and 
Councilmember Cantrell’s Office organized a Smokefree Week in New Orleans from July 21 to 
July 25, 2014 that included a kickoff and closing celebration as well as a town hall meeting to 
discuss clean air laws.75, 76 Bars were encouraged to participate in Smokefree Week by hosting 
smokefree performances and nights, or by prohibiting smoking for the duration of the week.76 At 
a press conference on July 15, 2014 to announce the smokefree week starting on July 21, 
Councilmember Cantrell publicly declared her intention to introduce a clean air ordinance for 
New Orleans in Fall 2014.75  
Formation, Membership and Responsibilities of the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition 
 
In August 2014 Councilmember Cantrell told CTFLA that she planned to introduce a 
comprehensive smokefree law prohibiting smoking in bars and casinos.64 CTFLA members 
discussed mobilizing to help her. According to Louisiana Cultural Economy Foundation (LCEF) 
Healthcare Initiative Director Kathy Richard in a 2017 interview for this report, CTFLA 
members were concerned that Councilmember Cantrell would introduce legislation too early: 
“… the Associate Director for 
TFL mentioned the cities that 
were going to look at going 
smokefree in 2014. And New 
Orleans was on that list that 
she ran through.” 
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Cantrell wanted to move on New Orleans, like, already in July. She wanted to 
move in August, and I remember them all [CTFLA members] getting together and 
saying, no, no, no, we need to slow her down. And, in fact, they did. 77 
Despite this concern, CTFLA members decided to form a coalition with state and local 
groups to run a campaign in support of Councilmember Cantrell’s clean air ordinance (Table 
12.8). Named the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition, the group relied on the same multi-level design 
employed by CTFLA for past state-level policy campaigns. The SmokeFree NOLA Coalition 
operated on money provided from national, state, and local partners.78 The funding from these 
partners was partially used for lobbying efforts by the coalition. The ANR Foundation also 
provided a $143,000 Rapid Response Project grant to ALA to assist public education and 
outreach, as well as community partnerships, in support of the SmokeFree NOLA campaign.64, 78 
Representatives from SmokeFree NOLA’s major partners assumed different roles and 
responsibilities within the coalition. Jennifer Cofer, ALA Southeast Vice President of Public 
Policy and Health Promotions, was coordinator of the SmokeFree NOLA campaign, including 
grassroots outreach.72 ANR Southern States Regional Consultant Onjewel Smith and CTFK 
Southern Region Director Claudia Rodas helped Cofer lead coalition efforts and assisted with 
securing resources and funding for the campaign from national and local groups.72 ANR’s Smith 
led diversity and neighborhood outreach while Rodas collected polling and studies.72 AHA State 
Advocacy and Government Relations Director Stasha Rhodes performed lobbying and legislative 
outreach to the New Orleans City Council for the coalition.72 In a 2017 interview for this report, 
then-TFL Cessation Manager Alex Hurst identified Cofer, Smith, and Rodas as integral to the 
success of the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition and campaign, stating “The Three Musketeers, I like 
to think of them at play. They just all brought different assets to fill in the different gaps that 
were needed.”72 
As part of the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition, TFL and its Associate Director Tonia Moore 
recruited state and local 
organizations to support campaign 
efforts in New Orleans with 
assistance from the Louisiana 
Smoking Cessation Trust. Moore 
coordinated with the Communities 
of Color Network and Fresh 
Campus Campaign local chapters to 
hold events promoting smoking 
restrictions in New Orleans. 
Administered statewide by the 
Southern University Agricultural 
Research and Extension Center, the 
Communities of Color Network 
(CoC) had regularly coordinated 
with TFL to increase awareness of 
tobacco industry predation on 
minority communities and to 
educate the public against tobacco 
Table 12.8: Composition of the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition64, 67, 72 
National Health 
Voluntaries   
American Cancer Society Cancer Action 
Network 
American Heart Association 
American Lung Association 
Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids 
March of Dimes 
Louisiana 
Organizations 
Tobacco-Free Living / Louisiana Public 
Health Institute 
Louisiana Comprehensive Cancer Control 
Partnership 
Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free 
Living 
Oschner Health Systems 
 
Louisiana Cultural Economy Foundation 
LSU Tobacco Control Initiative 
Smoking Cessation Trust 
Local Organizations Communities of Color Network 
Fresh Campus Campaign 
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use (Chapter 4). The Fresh Campus Campaign was a statewide effort created and funded by TFL 
to form campus-based organizations at universities and technical schools dedicated to securing 
tobacco-free policies and promoting school cessation services (Chapter 4). Moore also engaged 
universities and colleges in the New Orleans area, providing information about the SmokeFree 
NOLA Campaign and securing campus efforts to promote the campaign. In addition to TFL’s 
recruitment and coordination of state and local organizations, the Smoking Cessation Trust, 
alerted and informed New Orleans area medical facilities to the SmokeFree NOLA Campaign.72  
Communications, marketing and social media messaging by TFL, ACS CAN, AHA, 
ALA, and other coalition members for the SmokeFree NOLA campaign were primarily led by 
TFL Communications/Tobacco Policy Manager Lauren Conrad and TFL 
Communications/Public Relations Manager Mary Fein, with TFL Cessation Program Manager 
Alex Hurst assisting with cessation messaging for the SmokeFree NOLA Campaign.72 Action 
alerts were handled by the major national and regional health organizations.72 
Managed by Jennifer Cofer, paid contractors conducted grassroots activities and 
promotions to bar patrons, the faith community, the LTBTQ community, and the music 
community.72  
As the SmokeFree NOLA coalition formed to support Cantrell’s ordinance, partners 
worked to establish unity and build trust between members. According to ANR Associate 
Director Bronson Frick in a 2016 interview for this report: 
It took some time to find ways for …the locals and the state and national partners 
to be [a] cohesive team together.  But once we finally got to that point, it was 
good.64 
To reduce the likelihood of future conflict between SmokeFree NOLA partners and maintain 
bonds, coalition members also determined deal breakers (policy positions taken by members that 
if not met, will cause them to no longer support passing legislation) before the start of the policy 
campaign. 
To strengthen bonds between SmokeFree NOLA coalition partners, ANR invited 
members to its Clearing the Air Conference held from September 28 to October 1, 2014 at South 
Lake Tahoe, California.64, 79 SmokeFree NOLA Coalition members Kathy Richard from the 
LCEF, Jennifer Cofer of ALA, Claudia Rodas of 
CTFK, Stasha Rhodes of AHA, Onjewel Smith 
of ANR, and LPHI officials attended.64 At the 
conference, ANR provided training for the 
Louisianan advocates as well as other southern 
states on how to mobilize public support for local 
ordinances, what to expect from the tobacco 
industry and its allies, and how to respond to 
those challenges. The training at the conference 
united coalition members behind securing a New 
Orleans ordinance making bars and gaming 
establishments smokefree.64 
“… the challenge was how to 
distinguish between what is special 
about a place like New Orleans 
versus let's say smoking and 
secondhand smoke and how that's 
not necessarily part of what's 
special. That's not part of the 
heritage people want to pass along 
to their kids.” 
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Campaign Branding and Message 
 
Developing a campaign theme and message for 
New Orleans, tobacco control advocates faced a 
challenge in separating the city’s “everything goes” 
culture from the ability to smoke cigarettes indoors. 
According to ANR Associate Director Bronson Frick in 
a 2016 interview for this report: 
Culturally, it's [New Orleans] kind of unique to 
nearby parishes in Louisiana. With that special 
culture, sometimes in unique places, Austin 
comes to mind, other places where sometimes 
the most important thing is never to change 
anything at all. You know, that's how you keep a 
place special, you keep the tradition to keep 
from turning into something else. 
And so the challenge was how to distinguish 
between what is special about a place like New 
Orleans versus let's say smoking and secondhand smoke and how that's not 
necessarily part of what's special. That's not part of the heritage people want to 
pass along to their kids.64 
National and regional health voluntaries sought a unique brand and theme for the 
SmokeFree NOLA Coalition that celebrated the culture of New Orleans and called for its 
protection from secondhand smoke.64 The coalition employed graphic designer Jason Thompson 
of Fahrenheit Creative to design the look and feel of the campaign,64 a minority-owned 
advertising agency that worked with small businesses, non-profits, and government agencies.80 
Fahrenheit Creative developed a campaign theme and messaging that highlighted the voices of 
musicians, casino employees, and bartenders.81 The coalition incorporated the fleur-de-lis, a 
symbol of New Orleans’ French origins, and a trumpet, representative of the city’s musical 
culture, in its logo and promotional material (Figure 12.1).   
The SmokeFree NOLA Coalition cobranded itself with the Healthier Air for All media 
campaign being run by TFL, a key partner. TFL’s Healthier Air for All Campaign (and the 
“Let’s Be Totally Clear” Campaign it descended from) had messaged about the lack of 
secondhand smoke protections for bar employees, casino workers, and musicians in Louisiana 
since 2010 (Chapter 4). According to ANR’s Hallett in a 2016 interview for this report, using 
TFL’s existing campaign branding benefitted the Coalition because it “was important for the 
visibility, the branding, it was a nice hook.”64 Cobranding tied the New Orleans campaign’s 
media, advertising, and promotional events into the statewide Healthier Air for All campaign. As 
a result, the Healthier Air for All logo and associated “Join the Movement” slogan appeared in 
SmokeFree NOLA messaging and promotional materials. 
 
 
Figure 12.1: SmokeFree NOLA 
Campaign Logo82 
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Developing the Ordinance 
 
Councilmember Cantrell and her office sought to have a “people-driven process” for 
developing her comprehensive smokefree ordinance.83 They held multiple meetings with 
proponents, opponents, and the public before introducing specific legislation.83 Cantrell and her 
office drafted the measure based on ANR’s model ordinance and language developed by the 
New Orleans Department of Health to ensure that New Orleans was complying with the 
Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act.83 In a 2017 interview for this report, Cantrell’s Chief of Staff 
John Pourciau reported that the Councilmember and her office drafted comprehensive legislation 
from the start to increase bargaining power over provisions of the ordinance:  
There was an important perspective from the councilmember to not negotiate 
against herself in regards to the legislation. So she put a lot in that front-end 
ordinance as far as distances and as far as where things would be banned or not 
banned, with the understanding there would be some specific pushback about 
certain specific aspects of the ordinance, uh, so that when you had conversations 
with folks in regards to what they wanted or they didn't want in there, or what 
they had issues with, there was a willingness to work with folks to give something 
people were comfortable with.83 
While Cantrell and her office developed the ordinance, they also discussed deal breakers 
with ACS CAN, AHA, ALA, ANR, and CFL.64, 72, 83, 84  To maintain unity and consensus on deal 
breakers, national, state, and local members of the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition participated in 
weekly conference calls.64 According to Jennifer Cofer in a 2017 interview for this report, 
legislation passed in New Orleans would influence future smokefree ordinance campaigns 
throughout the South, making deal breaker choices critical to advocates preparing for the effort: 
…we knew that the impact of what New Orleans did would impact Louisiana, it 
would impact the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Due to the fact that it had a casino that 
was land-based, now located in New Orleans, it was also heavy in bars. There 
were 517 bars in New Orleans at the time. It was also a huge tourist attraction in 
the southeast. 
So we knew that this was not just an ordinary conversation for smokefree 
[policies], but it was a smokefree conversation that had set high standards.72 
SmokeFree NOLA members agreed that e-cigarettes must be included in the ordinance.72 
Cantrell and her staff incorporated e-cigarettes into her legislation although they were less 
dedicated to retaining them if it jeopardized passing the law.83  
 Whether to include casinos as a deal breaker proved a source of contention among health 
advocates.64 Exempting casinos would leave approximately 3,000 employees at the Harrah’s 
casino in New Orleans without protection from secondhand smoke.72 Research later conducted 
by TFL for the SmokeFree NOLA campaign found that casino workers composed 52% of those 
in New Orleans not protected by Louisiana’s statewide smokefree law. The number of workers 
exposed to smoke in Harrah’s convinced Councilmember Cantrell and the SmokeFree NOLA 
Coalition to include casinos in the law. The adoption of a smokefree casinos policy position by 
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the national ALA, a major participant in the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition, also helped secure 
member consensus to include casinos as a deal breaker.64, 72  
Launching the Ordinance during Smoke-Free Week 2.0 
 
Councilmember Cantrell introduced a comprehensive smokefree ordinance to the New 
Orleans City Council on the last day of  “Smoke-Free Week 2.0.” 85 The weeklong action  
featured smokefree events and smokefree nights designed to generate public support for smoking 
restrictions and encourage businesses to go smokefree from November 12 to November 20, 
2014.85 Smoke-Free Week 2.0 coincided with a national meeting of the American Public Health 
Association (APHA) in New Orleans from November 15 to November 19, 2014.86  The week 
started on November 12, 2014 with a press conference by Councilmember Cantrell where she 
announced the start of the smokefree week and declared that she would introduce a smokefree 
ordinance to the New Orleans City Council later that month.85, 87.  
On November 17, 2014, SmokeFree NOLA held a second line parade as part of Smoke-
Free Week 2.0 that marched to the APHA annual meeting for a rally calling for a smokefree 
law.88, 89 Second line parades are marches featuring live jazz music that are culturally and 
historically significant to New Orleans and originate from the city’s funeral processions and 
social organizations.90   
Tobacco control advocates leveraged the APHA Annual Meeting to demonstrate the 
economic opportunity costs the city faced if the City Council failed to adopt Councilmember 
Cantrell’s ordinance.64, 67 APHA had planned to hold its 2005 conference in New Orleans, but 
changed locations following Hurricane Katrina.91 APHA held its 2014 conference in New 
Orleans to honor a promise it made after the disaster to return, despite the fact that New Orleans 
did not comply with APHA’s 2004 policy of only holding its annual conference in smokefree 
cities.64, 92 
The APHA Conference brought 12,740 attendees to New Orleans.93, 94 ANR’s Hallett and 
ALA’s Cofer asked APHA to issue a statement that the conference would not return to New 
Orleans unless the city was smokefree.64, 72 According to Hallett in a 2016 interview for this 
report, the Coalition used the APHA to show the economic costs of not becoming a smokefree 
city: 
New Orleans relies so heavily on tourism, with business… I raised the issue with 
the Executive Director of APHA…saying, "Hey, I love New Orleans, but [that 
city isn’t smokefree], would you be willing to, as an entity,  make a statement 
saying you’re coming back because [you were supposed to be here] before 
Katrina hit, you promised you would come back, you’re now back, but we won't 
do that [host another conference in New Orleans] unless it goes smokefree.64 
APHA Executive Director Georges Benjamin accepted Cofer and Hallett’s request and 
announced at the opening session of the APHA meeting on November 15, 2014 that APHA 
would not return to New Orleans unless the city adopted a comprehensive smokefree 
ordinance.64, 91, 95, 96   
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According to Councilmember Cantrell in a 2017 interview for this report, the statement 
from APHA significantly influenced the debate surrounding the smokefree ordinance among 
local lawmakers and hospitality industry members: 
It [the APHA statement] had a huge impact on, not only council members, but just 
the industry, in and of itself. Them saying, “Hey, I'm not coming back to New 
Orleans,” that was a big deal. We're a hospitality city in terms of our industry. 
We're a destination city and it made a huge impact.84 
In addition to APHA, AHA 
threatened to stop holding meetings 
in New Orleans until a 
comprehensive smokefree law was 
in place.65, 89 AHA had adopted a 
nationwide policy in 2014 to only 
hold meetings in cities with 
comprehensive smoking 
restrictions.97 The voluntary 
informed New Orleans City 
Councilmembers and the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce that it would not host meetings in 
New Orleans until the city became smokefree.97 The specter of APHA and AHA not holding 
major national meetings in New Orleans meant a loss of over 20,000 visitors to the city, 
establishing economic and tourism costs if the City Council failed to adopt Cantrell’s 
ordinance.65 To further emphasize the economic consequences of not adopting a comprehensive 
smokefree ordinance, SmokeFree NOLA Coalition circulated a list from ANR of business and 
organizations that had smokefree meeting policies.  
On November 20, 2014, SmokeFree NOLA concluded Smoke-Free Week 2.0 by 
celebrating the American Cancer Society’s Great American Smokeout day. That same day 
Councilmember Latoya Cantrell officially introduced her ordinance.98 
As introduced, the New Orleans clean air ordinance prohibited smoking and vaping in all 
public and private workplaces, including bars and casinos.98 It exempted tobacco retailers, 
tobacco manufacturers, wholesaler, storage, importer, and processor facilities, semiprivate and 
private rooms in assisted living facilities, and up to 50% of guest rooms in hotels and motels 
(matching state law for hospitality establishments). The ordinance prohibited smoking and 
vaping in outdoor parks, public transit facilities, outdoor areas next to buildings operated or 
owned by the City of New Orleans, parking structures, outdoor malls, outdoor recreation areas, 
sports and performing arts facilities, and outdoor workplaces with two or more staff. Smoking in 
common areas of apartment and multi-unit housing was allowed in designated smoking areas 
that consisted of no more than 25% of outdoor common area space and were located 25 feet 
away from facility entrances, windows, and ventilation outlets. Distance requirements prohibited 
smoking and vaping within 25 feet of parks, public transit facilities, building entrances and 
windows, the point of sale of any outdoor line, outdoor public events, bleachers and grandstands. 
A 200-foot distance requirement prohibited smoking near schools.   
 
“It had a huge impact on, not only council 
members, but just the industry, in and of 
itself. Them saying, ‘Hey, I'm not coming back 
to New Orleans,’ that was a big deal. We're a 
hospitality city in terms of our industry. We're 
a destination city and it made a huge impact.” 
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SmokeFree NOLA Campaign Incorporates Musicians and Casino Employees 
 
The SmokeFree NOLA Coalition 
incorporated musicians into campaign events and 
activities to bolster its messaging that smoking 
restrictions were needed to protect New Orleans’ 
musical culture and heritage. Musicians were 
recruited for the campaign by LCEF Healthcare 
Initiative Director Kathy Richard. LCEF was a 
nonprofit formed in 2005 (that ceased operations 
in 2019) to help performance artists obtain 
economic assistance and access to healthcare 
services.99 Richard had worked with TFL since 
2011 to hold smokefree music events across the 
state.77  
In August 2014, TFL Director Tonia Moore directed Richard to focus her New Orleans 
work on recruiting musicians for smokefree efforts.77 According to Bronson Frick of ANR in a 
2016 interview for this report, LCEF was critical to the success of the New Orleans ordinance 
campaign:  
They [the LCEF] became a core partner, and that changed everything because 
they were able to bring forward not just one or two musicians, but dozens of 
musicians, hundreds of musicians. They became the face of the effort in many 
ways because of the culture of New Orleans being so closely tied to music.64 
Musicians recruited by LCEF served as powerful spokespersons for the SmokeFree NOLA 
Coalition. Prominent Louisiana jazz musicians included Deacon John Moore, Paul Sanchez, 
Craig Klein, and Irvin Mayfield.65, 100-102 They and other musicians Richard recruited participated 
in letter writing campaigns, campaign announcements, city council meetings, smokefree concerts 
and performances, as well as smokefree nights and events.65 The strong support from musicians 
provided a powerful voice that could testify on behalf of workers unable to speak in favor of 
smoking restrictions for fear of losing employment, mainly casino workers.  
Casino employees lacked union protection, muting their public support for the ordinance 
because they feared employer retaliation.65 As a result, tobacco control advocates collected 
anonymous testimony from casino employees via website form or email.72 The SmokeFree 
NOLA Coalition shared the statements. 
Campaign Activities after Smoke-Free Week 2.0 and Ordinance Introduction  
  
After Smoke-Free Week 2.0 and the introduction of Cantrell’s ordinance, SmokeFree 
NOLA hosted additional smokefree happy hours, nights and performances at bars to generate 
public support for smoking restrictions. To generate media coverage supporting the ordinance 
before its first hearing TFL and SmokeFree NOLA promoted smokefree events on the Healthier 
Air for All website, drawing customers and media attention to participating establishments.65, 67 
“They became a core partner, and 
that changed everything because 
they were able to bring forward 
not just one or two musicians, but 
dozens of musicians, hundreds of 
musicians. They became the face 
of the effort in many ways because 
of the culture of New Orleans 
being so closely tied to music.” 
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Besides hosting events to generate support from the public, the SmokeFree NOLA 
Coalition worked to secure support from the bar and service industry employees that Cantrell’s 
ordinance sought to protect. The Coalition hosted smokefree service industry nights after 
operating hours for bar and nightlife employees to attend.72 According to former TFL Cessation 
Programming Manager Alex Hurst in a 2017 interview for this report, the “events were 
something that generated engagement and support from some of those service industry 
workers.”72 
The SmokeFree NOLA Coalition also conducted outreach to disparate populations 
adversely affected by tobacco use by holding smokefree nights at bars catering to the LGBT 
community and African Americans.72  
Tobacco control advocates also conducted outreach to the New Orleans religious 
community. SmokeFree NOLA employed a “faith-based outreach coordinator” to work with the 
New Orleans religious community, which secured announcements and bulletins about the 
smokefree campaign in churches with significant congregation sizes.72 Smokefree NOLA also 
held faith-based events at churches.72 
By February 2015, the coalition managed to secure approximately $2.8 million in earned 
media,103 generating approximately 1000 mentions in news programming regarding smoking 
restrictions and Cantrell’s ordinance.104 In addition, newspapers printed 75 letters to the editor 
supporting the ordinance.104 SmokeFree NOLA also ran traditional advertising via television, 
radio, print, and outdoor methods, as well as social media advertising to supplement promotional 
events and subsequent earned media it generated.67  
 Prior to the initial committee hearing for Cantrell’s ordinance, Coalition member CTFK 
launched an online petition calling for smoking to be prohibited in bars, casinos, and all public 
places.105 CTFK planned to deliver the petition to New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu and New 
Orleans City Councilmembers.105 CTFK periodically posted action alerts to the petition asking 
followers to contact City Councilmembers in support of smokefree policies and to attend events 
and city council meetings for the ordinance.105 The petition collected 1,905 signatures and was 
delivered by CTFK to the New Orleans Mayor and Councilmembers at an unspecified point.105  
Opposition to the Ordinance 
  
Opposition to the New Orleans ordinance arose from the bar, gambling, and restaurant 
industries as well as the vaping community (both users and industry members). Bar, gambling, 
restaurant and wholesale industries opposed the adoption of a comprehensive smokefree law that 
prohibited smoking in bars and casinos, while the vaping community sought to exempt e-
cigarettes, leading the two groups to operate as separate factions (Table 12.9). 
Bar, Gambling, Restaurant, and Wholesale Industries and the Freedom to Choose Coalition 
  
Bar, gambling, and restaurant industry members against smoking restrictions organized 
as the Freedom to Choose Coalition to oppose the ordinance (Table 12.9). The Freedom to 
Choose Coalition was partially created by Harrah’s, which operated Louisiana’s only land-based 
casino, in New Orleans.106 Other casinos must be on water in the state. It was a subsidiary of 
Caesars Entertainment Corporation, a multinational gambling and entertainment company.107  
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Founding  gambling industry members of the Freedom to Choose Coalition included the 
Louisiana Amusement and Music Operators Association (LAMOA), the Louisiana Video 
Gaming Association (which represents video gambling industry and device owners) and the 
Louisiana Casino Association.108 (Churchill Downs, a gaming company with an establishment in 
New Orleans, did not participate.)  LAMOA had historical ties to the tobacco industry, and its 
former executive director Sarah Whalen 109 was a key ally and lobbyist for the tobacco industry 
before joining the casino association (Chapters 2, 5, 6, 7, 11). Although we did not find evidence 
that Sarah Whalen served as executive director of LAMOA to influence gaming operations on 
behalf of the tobacco industry, tobacco companies have a history of using members of gaming 
and air quality organizations to convince casinos to avoid and resist smoking restrictions.110  
Founding members of the Freedom to Choose Coalition from the bar and restaurant 
industries were The French Quarter Business League, the Louisiana Restaurant Association and 
a number of independent businesses. The French Quarter Business League (FQBL), a New 
Orleans-based business association composed primarily of restaurants and bars took a prominent 
role in the coalition. FQBL President and restaurant owner Alex Fine acted as Coalition 
spokesperson during efforts to defeat the ordinance. Although already prohibited from allowing 
indoor smoking by the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act, the Louisiana Restaurant Association 
(LRA) and individual restaurants joined the Freedom to Choose Coalition to oppose the 
ordinance.108 Individual businesses also joined the coalition. LRA was a historic tobacco industry 
ally that repeatedly fought smoking restriction 
legislation (Chapters 4, 5, 10). Tobacco industry 
ally the Louisiana Association of Wholesalers 
(LAW) was also a founding member of the 
Freedom to Choose Coalition.108 LAW had 
strong ties to the tobacco industry, having 
opposed state tobacco tax increases in 2009 and 
2011114, 115 and received multiple annual 
contributions greater than $5000 from Altria 
Table 12.9: Key Opponents of the New Orleans Clean Air Ordinance100-102, 109, 111-113   
 Group Organization Position within Organization 
Logan Gaskill Freedom to 
Choose 
Coalition 
Harrah’s Vice President of Human 
Resources and Community 
Relations 
Wade Duty Louisiana Casino Association Executive Director 
Mona LaCombe Louisiana Amusement and Music 
Operators Association 
Executive Director 
Matt Wellman Louisiana Amusement and Music 
Operators Association 
Vice President 
Alex Fine* French Quarter Business League President 
Chris Young French Quarter Business League  
Danielle Lejer Louisiana Restaurant Association Director of Local Advocacy 
Chris Flowers Vaping 
Community 
Louisiana Association of Electronic 
Cigarette Retailers 
President 
Anthony Kolesa Louisiana Association of Electronic 
Cigarette Retailers 
 
Brian Verarty Louisiana Association of Electronic 
Cigarette Retailers 
 
*Spokesperson for the Freedom to Choose Coalition. 
… tobacco companies have a 
history of using members of 
gaming and air quality 
organizations to convince casinos 
to avoid and resist smoking 
restrictions. 
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(Chapter 2).116 LAW Executive Director David Tatman served as a State Coordinator for the 
Philip Morris Field Action Team 117 and as a lobbyist for Philip Morris. As of 2017, David 
Tatman and his lobbying firm The Tatman Group retained Altria as a client (Chapter 2). We do 
not know if Altria remains a client. However, Altria, RJ Reynolds and Swedish Match were 
listed as LAW’s only annual sponsors in 2018, and Altria and RJR were its largest donors.118 
The Vaping Community 
 
 The vaping community opposed including e-cigarettes in the ordinance and worked to 
exempt them. Louisianan e-cigarette users and retailers first testified and pressed for the 
exclusion of electronic smoking devices from Cantrell’s ordinance to New Orleans lawmakers at 
a Community Development Committee hearing on January 7, 2017. New Orleans e-cigarette 
retailers then formed the Louisiana Association of Electronic Cigarette Retailers (LAECR) after 
the hearing in January 2014 to lobby against including e-cigarettes in the ordinance.72 The 
national e-cigarette advocacy organization Consumer Advocates for Smoke-Free Alternatives 
Association (CASAA) and out-of-state e-cigarette retailers such as Mountain Vapor issued 
action alerts.119, 120 CASAA was formed in 2009 to oppose legislation that placed restrictions on 
electronic smoking devices.121 Initially formed as a grassroots group, CASAA had a board 
member performing research on e-cigarettes and harm reduction with funding from Altria, 
Swedish Match, the US Smokeless Tobacco Company, British American Tobacco, and RJ 
Reynolds.121 The organization has shared staff and partnered with conservative think tanks allied 
with the tobacco industry. CASAA has opposed numerous local ordinances restricting e-cigarette 
use. 
The Battle Begins: The Community Development Committee Hearing   
 
The New Orleans Community 
Development Committee first considered 
Cantrell’s ordinance on January 7, 2015 (Table 
12.10). Cantrell chaired the committee, which 
also included Councilmembers James Gray, 
Susan Guidry, Stacy Head, and Jason 
Williams.122 Councilmembers Nadine Ramsey 
and Jared Brossett also attended.102, 122 
Tobacco control advocates and supporters of 
the SmokeFree NOLA campaign, the Freedom 
to Choose Coalition and its supporters, and the 
vaping community filled the Committee meeting to capacity.102  
The vaping community bussed in supporters,64 yielding larger than expected numbers at 
the hearing. According to ANR’s Cynthia Hallett in a 2016 interview for this report, the strong 
attendance by the vaping community caught Cantrell off guard: 
They [Guidry and Cantrell] were really worried about who was made to put 
testimony…Some of the organizations on the ground had not necessarily taken 
the position on whether or not electronic cigarettes should be prohibited from 
these smokefree environments. And some of our very good partners weren’t on 
“Some of the organizations on the 
ground had not necessarily taken the 
position on whether or not electronic 
cigarettes should be prohibited from 
these smokefree environments. And 
some of our very good partners 
weren’t on the record yet …” 
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the record yet so they didn’t feel confident in what they could say and they didn’t 
know exactly what to say.64 
Before the committee started the hearing, Cantrell called Hallett, who was on her way to attend 
the meeting, to alert her to the e-cigarette advocates’ stronger than expected presence.64 In a 
2016 interview for this report, Hallett indicated that Cantrell was willing to sacrifice e-cigarette 
restrictions to pass the legislation.64, 83   
 
 The hearing started with a panel of public health experts invited by Councilwoman 
Cantrell to testify on the health and economic impacts of smokefree policies (Table 12.11). The 
panel consisted predominantly of SmokeFree NOLA representatives and reflected the diversity 
of the tobacco control coalition. They testified on the dangers of secondhand smoke and the 
damage caused to the general public through regular exposure.102 In addition, panel members 
provided research and polling results contradicting the claims that businesses, casinos, tourism 
and the state suffered economic harm because of smoking restrictions. To reinforce testimony 
from the panel, the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living distributed data briefs composed of 
studies on air quality, secondhand smoke exposure, secondhand smoke health effects, and the 
economic impact of smokefree policies to councilmembers.102, 125  
Table 12.10: New Orleans Smokefree Ordinance as it Developed98, 102, 123, 124 
 Bars Casinos Hotel and 
Motel Rooms 
Cigar/Hookah Bars Footage 
Requirements 
ENDS 
Introduced 
(November 20, 
2014) 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Community 
Development 
Committee Hearing 
(January 7, 2015) 
Yes Yes Yes Partial* Yes Yes 
City Council 
Hearing (January 
22, 2015) 
Yes Yes Yes Partial* No Yes 
Adopted Yes Yes Yes Partial* No Yes 
* Grandfathers cigar and hookah bars in operation before December 31, 2014.72, 124 
Table 12.11: Public Health Expert Panel at the Community Development Committee 102 
 Organization Position 
Jennifer Cofer American Lung Association of the 
Southeast 
Vice President of Public Policy and Health 
Promotions 
Cynthia Hallet Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights Chief Executive Officer 
Dr. Kyle Happel126 Louisiana State University Associate Professor of Medicine  
Bill Oliver Oschner Health System  
Joe Kimbrell Louisiana Public Health Institute / 
Tobacco-Free Living 
Chief Executive Officer 
Tonia Moore Louisiana Public Health Institute / 
Tobacco-Free Living 
TFL Associate Director 
Dr. Tom Carton Louisiana Public Health Institute / 
Tobacco-Free Living 
 
Paul Sanchez  Musician 
Robert McMillen Mississippi State University Tobacco 
Data Center 
 
Greg Jones Oz Bar Club Owner 
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Nearing the end of the expert panel, New Orleans club manager Greg Jones described his 
experience with the implementation of a comprehensive smokefree law at a night club he was 
operating in New York City. Panel member Jones testified that his New York nightclub was not 
affected by the smokefree law despite initial fears his establishment would lose 25% of its 
business.102 The testimony countered traditional tobacco industry claims127 by opponents that 
smoking restrictions economically harmed bars and clubs. 
 Musician Paul Sanchez was the last panelist to speak during open testimony. Sanchez 
implored the Council to follow the lead of other major cities known for their smoking culture 
that had gone smokefree such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, London, and Paris.102 He 
testified on behalf of performance artists as well as service industry (bar and casino) employees, 
stating that they lacked the choice not to work in establishments with secondhand smoke.102 In 
addition, he commented on how young entrepreneurs moving to New Orleans found the lack of 
smoking restrictions in the city displeasing.102  
Amendments 
  
After the panel presentation at the hearing, Cantrell introduced a package of amendments 
to the ordinance to eliminate smoking restrictions in outdoor courtyards, malls, recreation 
centers, and outdoor patios at bars, restaurants, and casinos while exempting cigar and hookah 
bars that were in operation before January 8, 2015.102, 128 Cantrell was apprehensive about 
exempting cigar and hookah bars from smoking restrictions, but proposed the amendment to 
appease New Orleans’ State Senator Edwin Murray, who regularly patronized a cigar bar in the 
city.72 SmokeFree NOLA legislative point person, and AHA State Director of Advocacy and 
Government Relations Stasha Rhodes provided Cantrell’s office example language for 
exempting cigar bars in comprehensive smokefree ordinances to help write the amendment.83 In 
addition to changes weakening her ordinance, she proposed an amendment to prohibit smoking 
in all hotel and motel rooms.102, 128 
After informing the Community Development Committee of her proposed amendments, 
Cantrell initiated a public comment period before calling for a vote. 
Public Comment 
  
During public comment 38 individuals spoke, equally divided between proponents and 
opponents.102 Commenters speaking in favor of the ordinance came from health voluntaries, 
state-based organizations, religious institutions, were bar owners, or were musicians recruited by 
SmokeFree NOLA (Table 12.12).  Opponents came from the gaming and service industries, both 
traditional tobacco industry allies, as well as the vaping community (Table 12.13). 
 Testimony from tobacco control advocates sought to refute gaming and service industry 
claims of economic harm and demonstrate public support for adopting comprehensive smoking 
restrictions.102 Before the hearing, SmokeFree NOLA had held a war room to prepare supporters 
for their testimony with pointers and parameters for discussion topics.72 Advocates for the 
ordinance argued that comprehensive smoking laws are necessary for protecting vital service and 
gaming industry workers as well as performers and their cultural contributions.102  Addressing 
concerns regarding overregulation of e-cigarettes, Hallett testified about e-cigarettes on behalf of 
the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition after the vaping industry appeared in stronger than expected 
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numbers to oppose 
the ordinance. She 
argued for their 
continued inclusion 
in the ordinance 
because of a lack of 
existing regulation, 
in addition to 
research indicating 
the presence of 
harmful 
components in e-
cigarette aerosol.102 
 Opponents’ 
arguments differed 
between the 
Freedom to Choose 
Coalition and 
vaping advocates. 
Following well-
established tobacco industry arguments against clean air regulation,127 gaming and service 
industry representatives in the Freedom to Choose Coalition asserted that the ordinance would 
inflict economic harm and rob people of freedom of choice.102 In addition to standard economic 
arguments, FQBL President and Freedom to Choose Coalition spokesperson Alex Fein argued 
that lost revenue from smoking restrictions would harm French Quarter businesses already 
suffering business loss from a crime wave New Orleans was experiencing.102, 129 Logan Gaskill, 
Harrah’s Vice President of Human Resources and Community Relations,111 asserted that 
smoking restrictions would harm state revenue and economically harm the New Orleans’ casino. 
Table 12.12: Proponents Testifying for the NOLA Ordinance at the January 7, 2015 
Hearing of the Community Development Committee102 
Affiliation Commenter Organization 
Health Voluntaries Robert Morris American Cancer Society Cancer 
Action Network 
Jennifer Cofer American Lung Association 
Cynthia Hallet Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights 
State and local 
organizations 
Dr. Corey Abair NOLA Jazz Orchestra 
-- Missing one -- 
Bethany Boltman New Orleans Musician Clinic 
Kathy Richaud Louisiana Cultural Economy 
Foundation 
Ronald Markham NOLA Jazz Orchestra 
Musicians Deacon John Moore Performer/ President of New Orleans 
Musicians Union 
Irvin Mayfield Performer 
Craig Klein Performer 
Service Industry Kim Perez Business Owner  
Leora Madden Business Owner 
Religion Reverend Willie 
Gable 
Interdenominational Ministerial 
Alliance 
Miscellaneous Lacy Sanchez Miss Louisiana 
Carolyn Gill-Jefferson Former Judge 
Table 12.13: Opponents Testifying Against NOLA Ordinance102 
Affiliation Commenter Organization  
Freedom to 
Choose 
Coalition 
Mona LaCombe Louisiana Amusement and Music Operators Association 
Matt Wellman Louisiana Amusement and Music Operators Association 
Wade Duty Louisiana Casino Association 
Logan Gaskill Harrah’s 
Alex Fine French Quarter Business League 
Danielle Lejay Louisiana Restaurant Association 
Chris Young French Quarter Business League 
Vaping 
Industry 
Chris Flowers Louisiana Association of Electronic Cigarette Retailers 
Benjamin Verarty Louisiana Association of Electronic Cigarette Retailers 
Labor Union Marlene Patrick 
Cooper 
 
Miscellaneous Elizabeth Stella None 
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He also claimed that employees faced lower tips from reduced business and potential reduction 
in work hours because of lost business from smoking restrictions.102  
Councilmember Cantrell countered Gaskill’s arguments by revealing that Harrah’s 
desired to reduce its employment numbers, which had a minimum amount set by law. According 
to ANR’s Hallett in a 2016 interview for this report: 
It’s by law how many employees they [Harrah’s] have. Harrah’s came in and said, 
"Well, if only we could reduce the number of employees and this and that because 
we're going to lose business, and Councilwoman Cantrell was just masterful 
because she knew…they were trying to reduce the number of employees well 
before this law came to get proposed. And she was just, “so is this what you 
proposed 18 month now ago?” Yeah. She was just able to neutralize all those 
arguments and counter them so that we could get back to the real issue at hand 
which was, you know, secondhand smoke, employee exposure, and so on.64 
Since 2001, Harrah’s contract with the 
State of Louisiana required it to employ 
over 2400 people at all times,130, 131 a 
number the casino had been seeking to 
lower since 2007.130, 131 Cantrell’s 
rebuke of Gaskill revealed that Harrah’s 
saw the smokefree ordinance as an 
opportunity to reduce employment, 
weakening the casino’s arguments and 
pressure on the City Council.  
Arguments from vaping 
advocates were narrowly focused on 
keeping e-cigarettes out of the 
ordinance. Commenters argued that vapor products are better for health than conventional 
cigarettes and helped smokers quit cigarettes.102 They also questioned the research tobacco 
control advocates cited to justify including e-cigarettes in Cantrell’s ordinance.102 Studies by 
tobacco industry-funded third party think tanks and scientists had led to research that vaping 
community advocates use to contest findings by independent and public health researchers.121 
Members of the vaping community also cited statements from public health officials that 
supported legal access to e-cigarettes or their potential value as harm reduction devices. During 
his testimony, LAECR President Chris Flowers referenced a letter by World Health Organization 
officials recommending the organization not pursue prohibition of electronic smoking devices.102 
(We could not locate any such letter from WHO.) Vaping community advocates also referenced 
statements supporting e-cigarettes as harm reduction devices from FDA Center for Tobacco 
Products Director Mitch Zeller and Royal College of Physicians Tobacco Advisory Group Chair 
John Britton.102 
Motion to Recommend Amendments  
  
After public comment concluded, the Community Development Committee voted on 
Councilmember Cantrell’s amendments. Councilmembers Gray and Williams wanted to defer 
“Harrah’s came in and said, "Well, if only 
we could reduce the number of employees 
and this and that because we're going to 
lose business, and Councilwoman Cantrell 
was just masterful because she knew … 
they were trying to reduce the number of 
employees well before this law came to 
get proposed. And she was just, ‘so is this 
what you proposed 18 month now ago?’” 
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voting, with Gray believing there should be more time to review the changes and Williams 
feeling more research was needed on the potential economic impacts and the possible health 
benefits of electronic cigarettes. The Committee Chair, Cantrell refused to defer committee vote 
to a later date, arguing that accepting the amendments and approving the legislation in committee 
would allow the ordinance to be presented the New Orleans City Council as a whole package for 
the public to review.102  Cantrell noted that additional amendments to the ordinance could be 
made in the future. The committee voted 3-2 (Cantrell, Guidry, and Head voting in support and 
Gray and Williams voting against) to recommend Cantrell’s amendments and advanced the 
ordinance to the full City Council.102  
SmokeFree NOLA and Legislative Champions Prepare for the City Council Hearing 
  
Following the first committee hearing, Councilmembers Cantrell and Susan Guidry  held 
a town hall meeting with SmokeFree NOLA to generate political and public support for the 
smokefree ordinance.72, 132 The high attendance at the Community Development Committee 
hearing had caused concern among members of the New Orleans City Council that public 
opinion was not being fully heard, causing  Cantrell to hold the town hall to assuage them and 
further engage the public.72 According to Councilmember Cantrell in a 2017 interview for this 
report, her plan to hold a town hall initially met resistance from the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition: 
I mean, the [coalition] partners at the time didn't want me to have another 
meeting, but I said, hey, I'm going to have another meeting, because it's [the 
ordinance] not ready yet. People still want to be engaged, and I'm going to allow 
them to be engaged, and that's what we did.84 
Councilmembers Cantrell and Guidry held the town hall with assistance from the SmokeFree 
NOLA Coalition on January 14, 2015 in the New Orleans City Council chambers.84, 132 There, 
members of the public spoke for and against the ordinance.84 The SmokeFree NOLA Coalition 
brought experts to the town hall to inform attendees how smokefree laws benefitted public health 
without economically harming casinos.84 
 Between the Community Development Committee and City Council hearings for 
Cantrell’s ordinance, SmokeFree NOLA members organized campaign events, administered a 
survey on public opinion towards smoking restrictions and conducted further public outreach in 
New Orleans to generate and maintain support for the smokefree ordinance. In addition, ACS-
CAN conducted a poll in New Orleans that it released in December 2014 reporting that 56% of 
participants “strongly favor” prohibiting indoor smoking.133 The poll received coverage in 
Gambit, a New Orleans periodical and website.133  
As part of their outreach efforts to the religious community, on January 21, 2015132 
SmokeFree NOLA hosted a Churches for NOLA Prayer Breakfast for approximately 50 faith 
leaders.65, 72, 132 Attended by Councilmember Cantrell and other representatives from SmokeFree 
NOLA, the event informed the religious community about the need for securing smoking 
restrictions to protect people. They also reminded attendees of the impending vote on the 
smokefree ordinance by the City Council scheduled for the next day, January 22, 2015.72 The 
Coalition used the prayer breakfast to encourage faith leaders to contact councilmembers and 
announce their support for the ordinance.72 
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 On January 21, 2014, the same day as the prayer breakfast, SmokeFree NOLA held a 
rally to maintain public awareness and engagement towards the smokefree ordinance battle.132 
The rally was held at a local bar and provided food as well as a free music performance to 
attendees.  
Opponents Prepare for the City Council Hearing 
 
We did not locate any public activity conducted by the Freedom to Choose Coalition 
between the Community Development Committee hearing and the full Council meeting. 
Immediately after the Community Development Committee hearing, New Orleans e-
cigarette retailers formed the Louisiana Association of Electronic Cigarette Retailers (LAERC) 
to oppose including e-cigarettes in Cantrell’s ordinance.72 Between the Committee and City 
Council hearings, LAERC issued action alerts on Facebook to the Louisiana Vaping 
Community134 and lobbied City Councilmembers to remove e-cigarettes from the ordinance.135  
LAERC and e-cigarette retailers met with Councilmember Cantrell’s office on January 12, 
2015135 to discuss removing e-cigarettes from the legislation. Although LAERC did not secure 
removal of e-cigarettes from the ordinance, Cantrell would propose an amendment to exempt 
vaping inside of e-cigarette retailers.  
 As the New Orleans vaping community organized, the national e-cigarette advocacy 
group Consumer Advocates for Smoke-Free Alternatives Association (CASAA) published action 
alerts encouraging people to oppose Cantrell’s 
ordinance by attending town halls and 
contacting their New Orleans lawmakers. 
CASAA provided pre-made talking points 
alongside action alerts and published contact 
information for New Orleans City 
Councilmembers and Mayor Mitch Landrieu.119 
The Louisiana Association of Electronic 
Cigarette Retailers issued a press release on 
January 20, 2015 opposing including e-
cigarettes in the ordinance.136 The press release 
accused smokefree proponents of not 
considering information on e-cigarettes’ 
economic and health effects, and instead trying to regulate them unfairly since they had a similar 
appearance to cigarettes.136 The press release attempted to delegitimize the tobacco control 
advocates supporting Cantrell’s ordinance, stating that three of four speakers supporting 
including e-cigarettes into restrictions at the town hall were not New Orleans residents but “paid 
activists from the American Heart and American Lung Association.”136  
The City Council Hearing  
  
The New Orleans City Council considered Councilmember Cantrell’s ordinance on 
January 22, 2015, with supporters and opponents of the ordinance filling the chamber.101 At the 
hearing, Councilmembers started by considering changes to the smokefree ordinance. 
Councilmember Cantrell introduced her package of amendments, previously introduced before 
The press release also attempted to 
delegitimize the tobacco control 
advocates ... stating that three of 
four speakers supporting including 
e-cigarettes into restrictions at the 
town hall were not New Orleans 
residents but “paid activists from 
the American Heart and American 
Lung Association.” 
 580 
 
the Community Development Committee and recommended by them for addition to the New 
Orleans Ordinance, with minor changes and additions. Cantrell proposed a package of 72 
amendments that overall weakened the legislation and increased exemptions from smoking 
restrictions (Table 12.14).  
Table 12.14: Amendments in Councilmember Cantrell’s Ordinance Package 124 
1. Eliminates paragraph from legislation stating that nonsmokers spending six hours in outdoor smoking 
sections of bars and restaurants experience increased cotinine levels. 
2. Eliminates paragraph from legislation stating justifications for including e-cigarettes. 
3. Deletes language stating that employers have a “common law duty” to provide employees a “workplace that 
is not unreasonably dangerous.” 
4. Adds municipal corporations and non-profits to definition of “business establishment” in ordinance 
5. Adds Cigar Bar definition to ordinance. Cigar bars are defined as generating 10% or greater of annual gross 
income from cigar sales and humidor rentals conducted on the premises not through a vending machine. 
Must have been in operation by December 31, 2014. 
6. Amends definition of Electronic Smoking Devices to not include devices that are doctor-prescribed 
7. Adds definition for Electronic Smoking Device Business. ESD Businesses are defined as mainly selling, 
producing, or promoting ESD and ESD accessories at retail or wholesale level.  
8. Simplifies definition of Employer to be a person or business that employs one or more workers. 
9. Changes technical language for Health care facility definition. Changes language to define facilities as 
including waiting rooms, hallways, private rooms, semiprivate rooms, and wards within healthcare facilities 
unless stated differently elsewhere in the ordinance. 
10. Adds Hookah Bar definition to ordinance. Hookah bars are defined as generating 10% or greater of annual 
gross income from sales of shisha and related accessories for on-premises consumption before December 31, 
2014. May only allow patrons 21 years or older in age and cannot allow cigarette smoking. 
11. Refines ordinance language. Does not make technical changes. 
12. Amends public property definition to exclude outdoor property adjacent to municipal and state buildings. 
Limits buildings, vehicles, locations, sites, and buildings “within the city of New Orleans.” 
13. Eliminates definition for Recreational Area from ordinance. 
14. Eliminates definition for Retail Tobacco Business from ordinance. 
15. Eliminates definition for Shopping Mall from ordinance. 
16. Eliminates electronic smoking device use from definition of smoking. 
17. Alters definition of sports arenas to not include facilities that host cultural or similar events.  Redefines sports 
arenas to include when facilities are being used for exercise, athletic competition, or for viewing sports. 
18. Eliminates first portion of original Tobacco Business definition from ordinance. 
19. Eliminates second portion of original Tobacco Business definition from ordinance. Reinserts new Tobacco 
Business definition defining said businesses as those that engage in the sale, production and promotion of 
tobacco, tobacco products, and tobacco accessories as their main activity. 
20. Eliminates rolling papers and pipes from definition of Tobacco Product in ordinance. 
21. Adds definition for Vaping into ordinance. Vaping is the use of an ESD that creates any type of aerosol or 
vapor. 
22. Changes requirement that employees, managers, owners, and operators notify those smoking or vaping in 
violation of the ordinance to stop and provides responsibility to employers. 
23.  Adds term “vaping” to language covering smoking.  
24-25. Requires that owners, managers, and employers refuse service to violators on their premises that fail to 
comply with requests to stop smoking or vaping. Removes responsibility from standard employees. 
26. Requires employer to contact New Orleans Police Department if violator refuses to leave premises after 
being asked. Removes requirement that standard employees contact the New Orleans Police Department. 
27. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
28. Includes vaping into language covering smoking.  
29. Changes language stating that “This article shall be liberally construed so as to further its purposes” to meet 
the purposes of the article and its provisions. 
30. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
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31. Deletes language stating smoking is unlawful in prohibited places. Adds language making smoking and 
vaping unlawful in places prohibited by law. 
32. Adds seven-hour community service requirement for every $50 an offender is unable to pay for ordinance 
violations. 
33. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
34. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
35. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
36. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
37. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
38. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
39. Removes “private and semi-private rooms in nursing homes” from list of places where smoking is 
prohibited. 
40. Technical revision (renumbering). 
41. Technical revision (renumbering). 
42. Technical revision (renumbering). 
43. Technical revision (renumbering). 
44. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
45. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
46.  Eliminates parks from list of open-air places where smoking is prohibited. 
47. Eliminates 25-foot distance requirement for parks. 
48. Technical revision (renumbering). 
49. Technical revision (renumbering). 
50. Changes distance requirement for outdoor public transit structures and facilities from 25 feet to 5 feet. 
51. Eliminates 25-foot distance requirement for smoking from building entrances and windows and replaces it 
with five-foot distance requirement for smoking and vaping. Adds exemption from distance requirement for 
“outdoor seating or serving areas of bars, restaurants, and casinos.” 
52.  Technical revision (renumbering). 
53. Removes language covering outdoor property adjacent to publicly owned and operated buildings. 
- Establishes 25-foot distance requirement for smoking and vaping from entrances on public property 
- Prohibits smoking inside of Richard and Annette Bloch Cancer Survivors Plaza. Establishes 5-foot distance 
requirement for smoking from the plaza. 
- Prohibits smoking inside of Lafayette Square. Establishes 5-foot distance requirement for smoking from the 
square. 
54. Eliminates language prohibiting smoking in arenas, stadiums, and amphitheaters. Prohibits smoking inside 
and within 25 feet of stands at events. Replaces with language prohibiting smoking and vaping in sports 
arenas, stadiums, recreational areas, playgrounds, and amphitheaters except during fairs, farmer’s markets, 
parades, festivals, and concerts. Establishes 5-foot distance requirement for smoking from stands at events. 
55.  Removes language prohibiting smoking at outdoor recreational areas. Removes language prohibiting 
smoking inside and within 25 feet of public events occurring outside. 
56. Technical revision (renumbering). 
57. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
58. Changes distance requirement for smoking in lines from 25 feet from point of sale to 5 feet from point of 
sale. 
59. Technical revision. 
60. Eliminates language prohibiting smoking in outdoor common areas of condominiums, trailer parks, 
apartment buildings, multi-unit residential facilities, and nursing homes. Removes language that allows 
outdoor smoking sections in said areas and establishes distance requirements. 
61. Amends language to prohibit smoking in all places of employment instead of places of employment with two 
or more workers employed. 
62. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
63. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
64. Removes language allowing for up to 50% of rooms at hospitality establishments to be designated smoking 
rooms. Prohibits smoking in 100% of rooms at hospitality establishments. 
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The amendments were designed to appease city councilmembers, politicians and 
advocates concerned about different provisions. One amendment reduced the distance 
requirement for smoking and vaping from 25 feet from building entrances and windows to 5 
feet,137 to assuage fellow councilmembers’ fears that people would be forced to smoke in 
unreasonable locations (middle of the road) or not at all in the narrow streets of New Orleans.64, 
72 Cantrell also offered the amendment to appease the concerns of Councilmember James Gray,83 
who feared the distance requirement enabled the New Orleans Police Department to engage in 
discriminatory policing.64 
The package also included amendments to grandfather in cigar and hookah bars in 
operation before December 31, 2014.72 As promised to e-cigarette retailers, Cantrell added an 
exemption for vaping at e-cigarette device retailers.136, 138 In addition, exemptions from smoking 
and vaping restrictions for private and public events, outdoor areas at bars, restaurants, and 
casinos, as well as for private and semi-private rooms in long term care facilities and nursing 
homes were proposed.124 One amendment strengthened the ordinance by prohibiting smoking in 
all guest rooms at hospitality establishments in New Orleans.124 After discussing the changes 
proposed by Councilmember Cantrell, the City Council voted 5 (Brossett, Cantrell, Guidry, 
Head, Williams) to 2 (Gray, Ramsey) to adopt the entire package of amendments. 
After the City Council voted to adopt Cantrell’s amendments, Councilmembers Jason 
Williams and James Gray secured amendments weakening the ordinance’s enforcement and 
penalties. Council Vice President Jason Williams introduced an amendment to remove the New 
Orleans Police Department (NOPD) as an enforcement agency.139 The New Orleans Health 
Department would field complaints and create enforcement regulations with public input if the 
legislation passed.138 Cantrell had shared the ordinance with Williams before the hearing, and 
65. Technical language change (removes term “tobacco retail business” and replaces with “any tobacco 
business.” 
66.  Removes language allowing smoking in private and semi-private rooms at assisted living facilities in rooms 
where inhabitants requested a smoking room and are all smokers. Replaces with language allowing smoking 
and vaping in semi-private and private rooms at assisted living facilities in rooms where inhabitants 
requested a smoking room. 
67. Technical revision (renumbering). 
68. Amendment allows smoking and vaping at cigar bars, hookah bars. Permits smoking or vaping in private and 
semi-private rooms at nursing homes and long-term care facilities when all inhabitants requested a smoking 
room.  
-Allows smoking and vaping in appointed smoking and vaping areas of outdoor seating and service areas, 
balconies, and courtyards, of bars, restaurants, and casinos.  
-Allows smoking and vaping on Bourbon Street from Canal Street to Esplanade Ave. 
-Allows smoking and vaping in Electronic Smoking Device businesses. 
-Allows smoking and vaping in convention facilities during private meetings and trade shows for tobacco 
businesses, ESD businesses, and convenience store associations. 
-Allows for smoking at Mardi Gras Balls held in convention facilities.  
- Allows smoking and vaping in hospitality establishments for events tied to private meetings and trade shows for 
tobacco businesses, ESD businesses, and convenience store associations (Does not allow smoking or vaping 
in guest rooms). 
69. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
70. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
71. Includes vaping into language covering smoking. 
72. Changes implementation date from 30 days to 90 days after ordinance adoption.  
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during discussions welcomed the change and asked to be included as a cosponsor.101 At a press 
conference the day before on January 21, 2014, Williams had revealed the amendment and stated 
its purpose was to avoid increasing the responsibilities of the NOPD while it had a reduced 
workforce and faced high crime rates in the city. He also wanted to prevent law enforcement 
officers from using smoking restrictions to engage in discriminatory policing.140 The City 
Council voted unanimously to adopt this amendment.101  
 Councilmembers James Gray and Nadine Ramsay then proposed an amendment to allow 
smoking and vaping at outdoor public transit facilities, outdoor shopping malls, and associated 
parking structures.123 Despite Cantrell reducing distance requirements in the ordinance, this 
amendment eliminated distance requirements from the legislation entirely.101, 137 Gray initially 
wanted to eliminate distance requirements from the ordinance out of fear they enabled the NOPD 
to racially profile and target African American smokers.64, 83After Williams’ amendment passed 
to remove the NOPD as an enforcement agency, Gray still wanted the amendment believing that 
distance requirements unfairly made people smoking or vaping outside targets for 
confrontation.101 Ramsey, who later introduced additional amendments to weaken Cantrell’s 
legislation, did not state the motivation behind her support for eliminating the distance 
requirement.101 The Council voted 4 (Brossett, Gray, Ramsey, Williams) to 3 (Cantrell, Guidry, 
Head) to adopt the amendment.  
Although NOLA members wanted distance requirements for smoking and vaping, they 
continued to support ordinance after their removal. According to ALA’s Cofer in a 2017 
interview for this report: 
Neighborhood bars are big in New 
Orleans. So 7 feet from a bar's entrance 
could be across the street or it could be in 
the middle of the road. There were lots of 
scenarios played out. The lobby team 
ultimately had to choose to have a zero-
distance rule to get the support we 
needed. And our [the SmokeFree NOLA 
Coalition] focus was again on public 
health and employees and tourists and 
patrons indoors, and so therefore [it was] 
one of the hard things we had to 
negotiate.72 
Councilwoman Nadine Ramsey proposed another amendment to eliminate the 
ordinance’s grandfather clause  allowing smoking in existing cigar bars and instead completely 
exempt those businesses from smoking restrictions.141 She argued that New Orleans should not 
prohibit the legal operation of cigar bars, which were legal businesses before the ordinance.101 
She represented the French Quarter, a heavy tourism area with a high concentration of bars and 
nightlife venues. Councilmembers voted 4-3 against the amendment, with Councilmembers 
LaToya Cantrell, Susan Guidry, Stacy Head, and Jason Williams voting against, and James Gray, 
Nadine Ramsey, and Jared Brossett voting in favor.101 Ramsey offered another amendment to 
exempt outdoor historic areas from ordinance signage requirements but withdrew it after her first 
proposal failed.101 
“The lobby team ultimately had to 
choose to have a zero-distance rule 
to get the support we needed. And 
our focus was again on public 
health and employees and tourists 
and patrons indoors, and so 
therefore [it was] one of the hard 
things we had to negotiate.” 
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 Following Ramsey, Vice Council President Williams requested that fellow 
Councilmembers reconsider an earlier change from Cantrell’s amendment package mandating 
community service for ordinance violators unable to pay penalty fines.101 Cantrell's previously 
adopted amendment package established a penalty of seven hours of community service in place 
of every fifty dollars of a fine a violator could not pay.101 Fearing that the community service 
requirement would negatively impact disadvantaged people, Williams offered an amendment, 
cosponsored by himself and James Gray, eliminating the community service requirement.142  If 
adopted, the amendment would  assign judges greater freedom to decide penalties.101 Gray 
voiced the same concern about the community service requirement, in that it removed judicial 
discretion and could negatively affect disadvantaged populations.101 The Council adopted the 
amendment142 4 to 3, with Councilmembers Brossett, Gray, Ramsey, and Williams voting in 
favor and Councilmembers Cantrell, Guidry, and Head voting against.101 This amendment 
allowed judges greater control over penalties on a case-by-case basis. After finalizing 
amendments, Cantrell moved the hearing to the public comment phase. 
Public Comment at NOLA Smokefree Ordinance Hearing 
 
Opponent Testimony 
  
During public comment, opponents received the first fifteen minutes to testify, followed 
by fifteen minutes for supporters.101 Nine opponents, predominantly from the Freedom to Choose 
Coalition and the vaping community, testified against the ordinance (Table 12.15). Five 
proponents consisting of medical and public health officials, a concerned citizen, a musician, as 
well as a former casino employee testified for Cantrell’s ordinance (Table 12.15).  
 The Freedom to Choose Coalition’s first witnesses were from the gambling industry who 
argued that casinos and the City of New Orleans would lose money if the City Council adopted 
the ordinance, a traditional tobacco industry argument.110, 127, 143  
 Harrah’s Vice President of Human Resources and Community Relations Logan 
Gaskill111 asserted that the ordinance put Harrah’s at a competitive disadvantage with gaming 
establishments outside New Orleans and would negatively impact revenue and harm casino 
employees.101 Gaskill also argued that smoking restrictions would reduce tourism and further 
contribute to a loss in revenue for Harrah’s and the city and that less revenue for the city meant 
less revenue to fund law enforcement in New Orleans, which was experiencing a crime wave. 
Based on expected economic harm, Gaskill requested that Harrah’s be allowed to discuss the 
ordinance’s effects on its lease with the city, which required the casino to have a certain amount 
of staff (Harrah’s wanted to reduce its staffing levels).     
 After Gaskill spoke, Louisiana Casino Association Executive Director Wade Duty 
testified that the gaming industry expected negative economic impacts if Councilors adopted the 
ordinance,101 referencing studies claiming smoking bans economically harmed gambling 
establishments. He emphasized a government study that showed a smoking ban in Illinois 
Casinos caused a decline in gaming industry revenues there while its neighboring state Indiana, 
which allowed smoking in casinos, experienced increased revenue during the preceding two 
years.144 Duty requested that the City Council delay adopting the ordinance to look at it “in 
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globo” (as a whole), and not in its current state (with numerous amendments shown separately) 
because of the potential economic impacts. 
 Next, Louisiana Amusement and Music Operators Association Vice President Matt 
Wellman testified that the Video Poker Industry expected a 20% drop in revenue because of 
smoking restrictions, translating to at least a $0.5 million loss in tax earnings to the city.101 
Wellman said councilmembers needed to explain how New Orleans would replace lost revenue 
and establish an alternative funding source to cover the loss.101 
Spokespersons from the vaping community were representatives from the newly formed 
Louisiana Association of Electronic Cigarette Retailers. LAECR representatives provided 
emotional pleas or accusations against SmokeFree NOLA members. Similar to the Community 
Development Committee Meeting, vaping representatives also accused tobacco control 
advocates of acting deceptively to pass the ordinance.   
LAECR President Chris Flowers asked the 
Council to explain its reasoning for including e-
cigarettes in the ordinance.101 He asserted that no 
response indicated Councilmembers lacked a good 
reason to include them.101 Following Flowers, 
LAECR Vice President and Media Relations head 
Anthony Kolesa testified that the vaping community 
had presented scientific arguments justifying 
excluding e-cigarettes from the ordinance. Kolesa 
complained that tobacco control advocates provided 
information on electronic smoking devices that exaggerated their threat to health.101 Kolesa 
accused the Council of reverting to “politics of New Orleans old” by succumbing to ALA’s 
Table 12.15: Speakers at NOLA City Council Meeting101 
Opponents 
Affiliation Commenter Organization 
Freedom to 
Choose 
Coalition 
Logan Gaskill Harrah’s 
Wade Duty Louisiana Casino Association 
Matt Wellman Louisiana Amusement and Music Operators Association 
Danielle Leger Louisiana Restaurant Association 
Alex Fein French Quarter Business League 
Vaping 
Community 
Chris Flowers Louisiana Association of Electronic Cigarette Retailers / Business 
Owner 
Anthony Kolesa Louisiana Association of Electronic Cigarette Retailers / Business 
Owner 
Benjamin Varadi Louisiana Association of Electronic Cigarette Retailers representative 
None Elizabeth Stella Independent 
Proponents 
 Dr. Patrick Quinlan Ochsner Health System 
 Dr. Brian King CDC Office on Smoking and Health  
 Paul Sanchez Musician 
 Albin Guillot French Quarter resident 
 Mervin Lewis Former Harrah’s employee 
Kolesa accused the Council of 
reverting to “politics of New 
Orleans old” by succumbing to 
the ALA’s threats not to hold 
future conferences in New 
Orleans. 
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threats not to hold future conferences in New Orleans. APHA and AHA had already publicly 
announced their intention to no longer hold conferences in New Orleans until the city enacted a 
comprehensive smokefree ordinance. LAECR representative Benjamin Varadi testified last in 
opposition to the ordinance for the vaping community. He claimed that little relationship existed 
between e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes. Varadi asserted that including electronic smoking 
devices in smoking restrictions without the vapor emitted having a substantive relationship to 
traditional tobacco smoke was erroneous.101 Varadi requested postponing consideration of the 
ordinance because of the large number of amendments that were made immediately before the 
final vote.101 He concluded his testimony by lambasting tobacco control advocates for privately 
providing reports and data to the Council  instead of publicly releasing them, claiming it 
prevented the vaping industry from publishing rebuttals  
 Following testimony from members of the gambling industry and vaping community, 
concerned citizen and smoker Elizabeth Stella provided a variety of personal complaints and 
traditional tobacco industry arguments against the ordinance. She complained that outdoor 
distancing requirements were being debated instead of measures to fix the crime wave impacting 
New Orleans.101 Stella suggested the City Council permit smoking in bars and casinos with air 
and ventilation systems, similar to accommodation measures pushed by the tobacco industry in 
the past to avoid stricter smoking restrictions.144, 145 She argued that both New Orleans and 
Louisiana faced a revenue loss of approximately $17-18 million in an “era” because of smoking 
restrictions. Stella also asserted that New Orleans was a party town, and while it was reasonable 
for New York and Seattle to have bans, it was against the nature of the city and in reality nothing 
more than a law meant to control people. While not tied to the tobacco companies, Stella relied 
heavily on their traditional arguments to oppose the smokefree ordinance. 
Alex Fein, Freedom to Choose Coalition spokesperson and French Quarter Business 
League President, closed comments against the ordinance. He argued that the ordinance was 
unfair since the city requested the French Quarter Business League pay for private security at a 
total cost of $50,000 a month. He also asserted it was unfair to force French Quarter 
establishments to take another revenue loss because of smoking restrictions. Fein implored 
Councilmembers to continue evaluating whether New Orleans would benefit from adopting a 
smokefree ordinance.  
Proponent Testimony 
  
Five individuals, two from the health community, a French Quarter resident, a musician, 
and a former casino employee, testified in support of the ordinance. Prior to the New Orleans 
City Council hearing, SmokeFree NOLA held another “war room” to help speakers prepare and 
deliver testimony in support of the ordinance.72 
 Dr. Patrick Quinlan, CEO of the Ochsner Clinic Foundation and International Services, 
as well as the Executive Director for the Ochsner Center for Community Wellness and Health 
Policy,145 began testimony in support of the ordinance. He highlighted RJ Reynolds adopting a 
smokefree workplace policy because the company  felt it was standard in workplaces and 
expected by employees.101 (RJR had decided to begin implementing a weak smokefree policy in 
2015 that prohibited smoking at work spaces, elevators, and conference rooms.146) Quinlan 
likened secondhand smoke to other avoidable workplace hazards subject to government 
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regulation, and cited loss of life as reason to act and restrict indoor smoking. He reminded the 
Council that cigarettes had been found to be harmful products in the class action lawsuit Scott v. 
American Tobacco Company. That lawsuit, filed in Louisiana during 1996147 and settled in 2010 
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in the state, found the major tobacco companies liable for 
defrauding smokers because they obscured the harmful and addictive nature of tobacco 
products.148 The judge penalized defendants in the case by requiring them to fund a $241 million, 
10 year smoking cessation program148 for Louisiana smokers who had started use by September 
1, 1988149 that became the Smoking Cessation Trust (Chapter 4).149  
After referencing the Scott case, Quinlan rebuked claims that smoking restrictions come 
at a cost of freedom, stating they were needed to control an addictive and life-shortening product 
marketed to children. Quinlan closed by informing the audience that 15 minutes of exposure to 
secondhand smoke was equivalent to a cigarette, which takes several minutes off one’s life. 
 Dr. Brian King, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Office on Smoking 
and Health’s Deputy Director for Research Translation, next addressed the dangers of 
secondhand smoke. King refuted arguments that air filtration systems were a viable alternative to 
smoking restrictions, stating that comprehensive smokefree laws best protect public health.101 
King argued for inclusion of e-cigarettes in the ordinance, informing Councilmembers that the 
market lacked regulation and that vapor aerosol is not as safe as clean air. King recommended 
including e-cigarettes to prevent tobacco use normalization and potential negative health impacts 
to the public. Responding to a councilmember’s question as to why designated smoking areas 
and air filtration measures are inadequate for protecting the public, King stated that particles that 
cigarettes and e-cigarettes expel into the air are not completely removed from indoor air by 
ventilation systems and easily seep into adjoining areas. Besides public comments, Dr. King 
provided formal written testimony to the 
City Council supporting the ordinance. 
 Musician Paul Sanchez next spoke in 
support of the ordinance. A powerful 
spokesperson for SmokeFree NOLA 
throughout the ordinance campaign, 
Sanchez discussed watching other global 
cities adopt smokefree laws and asserted 
that New Orleans must now embrace its 
own law.101 Sanchez requested the Council 
adopt the ordinance, in particular to protect 
children and provide a safe work 
environment for musicians and service 
workers.  
 Following Sanchez, French Quarter 
resident Albin Guillot testified that claims 
of revenue loss by opponents were 
unfounded and insignificant compared to protecting service employees and musicians. He 
asserted that service employees and musicians were essential to New Orleans and acted as a 
significant money generator for the economy and city. Guillot expressed that anti-ordinance 
arguments stating that employees had a choice to work in smoke-filled establishments were false.  
… Mervin Lewis testified last, sharing 
his experience battling lung cancer. 
Never having smoked, Lewis was 
diagnosed with lung cancer in 2014 
after constant exposure to secondhand 
smoke while working at Harrah’s … 
Harrah’s New Orleans fired him for 
performance issues while in the 
hospital and denied him workman’s 
compensation to pay for cancer 
treatments after working at the casino 
for 15 years. 
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 Former Harrah’s card dealer Mervin Lewis testified last and shared his experience 
battling lung cancer.101 Never having smoked, Lewis was diagnosed with lung cancer in 2014 
after constant exposure to secondhand smoke while working at Harrah’s. Lewis revealed that 
Harrah’s New Orleans fired him for performance issues while in the hospital and denied him 
workman’s compensation to pay for cancer treatments after working at the casino for 15 years. 
After Lewis ended his testimony, Councilwoman Cantrell ended public comment and called for a 
vote on the ordinance. 
The Ordinance Passes Unanimously    
 
 Before voting, each Councilmember 
provided a statement on their feelings towards 
the smokefree ordinance. Some councilmembers 
complained they lacked proper information to 
make a decision, and voiced concerns that the 
ordinance might result in overregulation and 
economic harm to New Orleans. However, they 
also asserted public health or protecting the 
public was the primary consideration in casting a 
vote on the ordinance.101 Councilwoman 
Ramsey, who had offered multiple amendments 
to weaken the law, suggested she would pursue 
amendments to the ordinance if it passed, in 
particular to address the fiscal effect of the law 
on the city.101  
After councilmembers finished commenting, Councilwoman Cantrell thanked her 
colleagues, the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition and its member organizations, and city staff and 
officials for assisting her efforts to attain the smokefree ordinance.101 Realizing the ordinance 
was going to pass, Cantrell relayed the significance of the moment to the audience:  
For generations New Orleans was known as the city that care forgot, and it was 
known for that for good reason, meaning that we had a history, not only in the city 
but at the state level of not taking care of the most vulnerable citizens in the city 
of New Orleans. And soon it changed to the Big Easy, to somehow overshadow 
the pain of the most vulnerable. But today we’re making history; we’re doing it 
together, not as one, but as a council and as a community. We can no longer talk 
about initiatives in our city without walking it as well. So when we talk about 
NOLA for life, this is NOLA for life, public health is the most important thing.101 
The Council then voted 7 to 0 to adopt Cantrell’s comprehensive smokefree ordinance.101 
Proponents were unsure whether Mayor Mitch Landrieu would sign the ordinance into 
law according to ANR Associate Director Bronson Frick in a 2016 interview for this report: 
He [[Mayor Landrieu] was a little bit of an unknown factor. There was some 
concern about whether or not he would veto the law, sign the law, just let the law 
go into effect without signature. To his credit the law passed unanimously, the 
“… today we’re making history; 
we’re doing it together, not as 
one, but as a council and as a 
community. We can no longer talk 
about initiatives in our city 
without walking it as well. So 
when we talk about NOLA for life, 
this is NOLA for life, public health 
is the most important thing.” 
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mayor signed it. There was some concern he would try to lead an effort to roll 
back the law on the casino part, and he never did.64 
Despite these worries, Landrieu signed the ordinance into law on January 30, 2015, which would 
take effect on April 22, 2015.137  
After the ordinance was signed, SmokeFree NOLA Coalition members focused on 
defending the law against attacks and preparing New Orleans for its implementation.  
Business Community Opposition to the New Smokefree Law 
 
After the ordinance passed, Harrah’s and bar owners sought to weaken or be exempted 
from it. In March 2015, a month after the ordinance was adopted, Harrah’s announced it wanted 
the City Council to exempt it from the ordinance because of an expected 20% revenue loss 
caused by smoking restrictions, and asked the Council to allow smoking sections in gaming 
areas.150, 151 Harrah’s officials offered to provide tobacco cessation services as well as education 
programs for customers and employees on the hazards of smoking in exchange for smoking 
sections.151 The casino claimed that the city suffered a $500,000 decrease in annual sales tax 
revenue because of the ordinance151 and announced that failure to compromise allowed for 
renegotiation of its lease with the city.150 In an interview with The New Orleans Advocate, 
Harrah’s official Jade Russell announced Harrah’s planned to try and reduce leasing fees 
anywhere from $3.5-$13.5 million annually.150  
The New Orleans city administration contested Harrah’s claims it could renegotiate its 
lease terms, stating that the new ordinance created no such permission.150The threat of a forced 
lease renegotiation from Harrah’s never materialized. At a April 9, 2015 City Council meeting, 
where local lawmakers considered changes to the smoking restrictions they adopted in January, a 
Harrah’s lawyer and a few employees asked that the April 22, 2015 implementation date be 
pushed back to allow the casino and its customers more time to prepare for smoking 
restrictions.152 The Council rejected the request, with Councilmember Cantrell castigating the 
casino for providing employees an unsafe workspace.  
Amendments to Weaken the Smokefree Ordinance  
 
 Despite their earlier unanimous vote, New Orleans City Councilmembers proposed six 
amendments to New Orleans’ new smoking restrictions (Table 12.16) before their 
implementation on April 22, 2015. Two were withdrawn and Councilmembers adopted the 
remaining four on April 9, 2015. These changes weakened and eliminated distance requirements, 
permitted outdoor smoking areas at bars and gaming establishments, and extended the 
grandfather clause for cigar bars. One amendment eliminated fines for smokers caught violating 
smoking restrictions and instead levied penalties on offending businesses, which in effect 
strengthens enforcement by placing the onus on businesses to ensure their establishment remains 
smoke free. 
After concluding amendments at the City Council meeting on April 9, 2015, no further 
changes were made to New Orleans’ new smoking restrictions. Altogether, the amendments 
eliminated most distance requirements for smoking from buildings, property and facilities, 
extended the grandfather clause for cigar bars, permitted outdoor smoking areas at bars and 
 590 
 
gaming establishments, and narrowed smoking restriction exemptions for cigar and hookah bars 
(Table 12.16). 
Harrah’s Response: A Lawsuit and Efforts to Cut Employment 
 
On April 17, 2015, Harrah’s filed a class 
action lawsuit with numerous additional plaintiffs 
composed mainly of bars and restaurants that 
named the Mayor, City Councilmembers and the 
city itself as defendants.160, 161 The class argued 
that the “vague and overbroad” wording in the 
ordinance was illegal.160 In addition, the lawsuit 
claimed that the City Council failed to release a 
fiscal note on potential economic damage the 
ordinance could cause in adequate time before its 
adoption.160 (The fiscal note was delivered to 
councilmembers the day they passed Cantrell’s 
ordinance, January 22, 2015.162) The plaintiffs also 
requested but failed to secure a restraining order to block implementation of the ordinance on 
April 22, 2015.160, 163 Harrah’s ultimately requested to be dropped from the lawsuit at an 
unknown date, with a casino official stating it needed to focus on implementation of the 
ordinance.162, 164 On June 3, 2015 Judge Robin Giarruso of the New Orleans Civil District 
dismissed the lawsuit.165  
 As the implementation date for the ordinance drew near, Harrah’s continued to argue that 
the mandated employment requirement set in their contract with the Louisiana State Legislature 
should be reduced. Harrah’s argued that economic harm resulting from the ordinance justified 
reducing employment and announced its desire to cut approximately 400 positions.130, 131 
Harrah’s partnered with State Senator Ed Murray (D-New Orleans) to introduce SB 236, which 
would have allowed Harrah’s to reduce the number of employees it must retain under its contract 
with the state by 400 people.130 In election years between 1999-2015, Murray had received 
$13,300 in contributions from the gaming industry (although none from Harrah’s).166 He had 
also received $3,525 from the tobacco industry total for election years between 1999 and 
2003.167 Murray frequented cigar bars, partially resulting in the grandfathering of cigar bars into 
Cantrell’s ordinance.72 
Senator Murray prefiled SB 236 on April 3, 2015 to require participants in the state lease 
with Harrah’s to renegotiate the contract’s terms.168 At a Senate Committee on Judiciary hearing 
on May 5, 2015, Murray added an amendment dropping the mandated employment level in the 
state contract with Harrah’s from 2,436 people to 2000 through attrition, catching New Orleans 
Mayor Mitch Landrieu and the City Council by surprise.130, 131, 169, 170 Discovering at the hearing  
that New Orleans city officials were unaware of SB 236, Senator Karen Carter Peterson (D-New 
Orleans), who had sponsored tobacco tax increase legislation in the past (Chapter 11), convinced 
the Committee to postpone consideration for a week so city officials could meet with Harrah’s 
representatives.175 Peterson also called out Harrah’s for portraying New Orleans’s smokefree 
ordinance as the reason for desired employment cuts when a representative at the hearing could 
not confirm that employees at the hearing would get the hours they wanted if an employment  
…Harrah’s filed a class action 
lawsuit with numerous additional 
plaintiffs composed mainly of 
bars and restaurants that named 
the Mayor, City Council members 
and the city itself as defendants. 
The class argued that the “vague 
and overbroad” wording in the 
ordinance were illegal. 
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Table 12.16: Amendments Proposed in Spring 2015 to the Comprehensive Smokefree Ordinance153-159 
Ordinance  Introduced Sponsor Changes Outcome 
Ord. 30520 January 8, 2015 Ramsey, Brossett Establishes tobacco retail business classification. Businesses must 
make 70% of gross revenue from sale of tobacco products and 
accessories for on-site consumption. Prohibits live entertainment and 
gambling but allows sale of food and beverage (including alcohol). 
Withdrawn (March 
12, 2015) 
Ord. 30552 January 22, 2015 Williams, Brossett, 
Gray, Ramsey 
Eliminates penalties for smoke and vape free violations by those 
consuming tobacco, e-cigarette, and other combustible products. 
Establishes penalties for establishments that violate smoking 
restrictions: 1st Violations - $100 maximum, 2nd violations within a 
year- $200 maximum, 3rd and additional violations within a year - $500 
maximum. Businesses also faced license suspension and revocation. 
Withdrawn (March 
12, 2015) 
Ord. 30578 February 5, 2015 Cantrell, Gray Corrective amendment. Eliminates 5 ft distance requirement from 
enclosed places, 5 ft distance requirement from sports stands, and 25 ft 
distance requirement for enclosed public property. Prohibits smoking 
and vaping within 5 ft of Richard and Annette Bloch Cancer Survivors 
Plaza and Lafayette Square. Prohibits smoking and vaping within 
amphitheaters, outdoor sports facilities, sports stands, “recreational 
areas with playground equipment.” Allows smoking in prohibited areas 
during events. Also prohibits smoking in outdoor workplaces, 
including vehicles. 
Adopted (April 9, 
2015) 
Ord. 30611 February 26, 
2015  
Ramsey Redefines cigar bar classification. Bars must make 10% of total gross 
income annually from cigar sales and humidor rentals in-store. 
Excludes vending machine sales. Grandfathers in establishments with 
an application to be a cigar bar by March 6, 2015. 
Adopted (April 9, 
2015) 
Ord. 30619 February 26, 
2015 
Guidry Allows for outdoor smoking sections at gambling, bar, and restaurant 
establishments. Includes off-track betting parlors, slot machine halls, 
and pari-mutuel wagering venues originally excluded from the 
definition of casinos in the smokefree ordinance.   
Adopted (April 9, 
2015) 
Ord. 30679 March 26, 2015 Cantrell Allows use of cigars in cigar bars and hookah in hookah bars only. 
Prohibits smoking of cigarettes and vaping within cigar bars and 
hookah bars.  
Adopted (April 9, 
2015) 
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reduction was allowed.169, 170 While the Committee waited to consider SB 236, Mayor Landrieu 
and the City Council wrote Committee members to voice their opposition to the bill.130  The 
Committee voted 4-3 against SB 236 at a hearing on May 12, 2015.130  
Harrah’s immediately complied with smoking restrictions, promoting itself as 
Louisiana’s best smokefree casino and removing ash trays from its facilities at midnight on April 
22, 2015.171 Despite embracing the New Orleans’ smokefree law in their marketing, Harrah’s 
would blame the smoking restrictions for its subsequent poor economic performance and 
continue efforts to weaken the ordinance. 
To increase public opposition to the ordinance, Harrah’s publicly blamed smoking 
restrictions for financial losses it suffered in monthly revenues for May, June, and August after 
implementation.172-175 A year after implementation of the smokefree ordinance, Harrah’s would 
again blame smoking restrictions for decreased revenue.176  
 As a result of Harrah’s efforts to blame the smokefree ordinance for its declines in profit 
in May and June, in July 2015 TFL released a study and factsheet on the company’s overall 
performance and reasons for its decline in revenue.177 The fact sheet used data from the 
Louisiana Gaming Control Board to show that Harrah’s had experienced an overall decline in 
revenue totals for the last ten years, indicating multiple factors that had nothing to do with the 
smokefree ordinance as the cause of declining business.177, 178 As Harrah’s continued to accuse 
the smokefree ordinance for its financial woes throughout the year, tobacco control advocates 
took to news and media outlets to publicly contest Harrah’s assertions that the ordinance had 
negatively impacted their profits.176, 178  
  To circumvent the ordinance, Harrah’s sought city approval to build outdoor gambling 
courtyards where smoking would be permitted. Casino officials submitted a land use request and 
design concept to the New Orleans Planning Commission and City Council on September 1, 
2015175, 179 to create an additional 2,650 square feet of semi-enclosed space containing 
approximately 87 slot machines. The City Council took no action on the request by Harrah’s; the 
Planning Commission meeting to discuss the courtyards in October 2015 was postponed175 and 
the formal request to build the courtyards expired.180 
To counter general claims of economic harm after the ordinance was implemented, 
tobacco control advocates released a study showing the positive impacts to air quality and health 
outcomes the law had created. Tobacco control advocates’ vocal presence and assertiveness 
proved effective in thwarting efforts by opponents to curry public support against the new 
smoking restrictions.  
State Legislature Attempts to Weaken the New Orleans Smokefree Law 
 
 Lawmakers in the state legislature attempted to punish New Orleanais politicians for 
passing the smokefree ordinance by delaying guaranteed funds for the city from Harrah’s 
contract with the state. Before the ordinance became effective, the Louisiana Legislature’s Joint 
Legislative Committee on the Budget twice refused to renew the Louisiana Gaming Control 
Board’s contract with New Orleans,181, 182 delaying $3.6 million in guaranteed funds meant to 
mitigate costs the city incurred for housing the casino (such as additional policing).181 Before 
April 23, Altria and Harrah’s lobbyist Randy Haynie had contacted Committee members about 
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the New Orleans smokefree ordinance, telling the New Orleans Advocate, that he “educated the 
committee members on the impact of the smoking ban.”181 Despite financial and political 
pressure from state lawmakers, local lawmakers in New Orleans resisted amending the 
smokefree ordinance and the contract was eventually renewed.  
Implementation of the New Orleans Ordinance 
 
 As opponents tried to weaken and prevent implementation of the ordinance, SmokeFree 
NOLA worked to ensure proper implementation. Bronson Frick of ANR planned an inter-agency 
meeting to assist the New Orleans Health Department in preparing to carry out ordinance 
requirements.64 Officials from public health agencies in Austin Texas, Savannah Georgia, and 
North Carolina participated in the meeting, providing insight on their implementation experience 
and strategies to New Orleans’ public health officials.64 
ANR also provided funding for the New Orleans Health Department to develop a website 
on ordinance implementation and to develop implementation toolkits.64  SmokeFree NOLA 
worked with the New Orleans Department of Health to provide implementation kits for the 
ordinance to all businesses in the city.65, 72According to then-ALA lobbyist Jennifer Cofer in a 
2015 presentation: 
We printed toolkits for every business in the 
city of New Orleans. Hotels, restaurants, bars, 
the casino as well as just law offices, other 
businesses, everyone got a toolkit. Whether 
they actually read it we don’t know. But they 
did get a toolkit so everyone was educated 
tangibly.65 
A dedicated SmokeFree NOLA outreach team 
distributed the implementation toolkits to businesses 
throughout New Orleans to prepare them for the start of smoking restrictions.72 SmokeFree 
NOLA also distributed promotional material to bars and casinos to increase awareness and 
understanding of the law before its implementation.65  
 To maintain public awareness and support for the newly-adopted law, SmokeFree NOLA 
continued its media campaign, running billboard and other physical advertisements, including a 
major display next to the New Orleans Superdome.65 It also hired college students to go out in 
“street teams” at events and festivals such as Jazzfest, Mardi Gras, and the French Quarter 
Festival to distribute information on the impending implementation of smoking restrictions.64, 65 
A year after ordinance passage, SmokeFree NOLA sponsored the Jackson Square stage at the 
2016 French Quarter Festival, making that area of the festival smokefree and promoting clean air 
policies.183   
 The New Orleans Department of Health primarily enforces the ordinance.184 Code 
enforcement, the New Orleans Department of Safety and Permits, the city Fire department, and 
the New Orleans Recreation Development Commission may also enforce it.184   
“We printed toolkits for every 
business in the city of New 
Orleans. Hotels, restaurants, 
bars, the casino as well as just 
law offices, other businesses, 
everyone got a toolkit.” 
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These efforts to generate continued public awareness and support for the new smokefree 
law in New Orleans by tobacco control advocates ensured its implementation and effectiveness 
at protecting public health. 
Pursuing a Comprehensive Ordinance in Baton Rouge 
 
On January 27, 2015, shortly after the SmokeFree NOLA campaign, Baton Rouge’s 
medical community and Mayor-President Kip Holden launched the Breathe Free Baton Rouge 
initiative to promote smoking restrictions in the city185, 186 As part of the campaign, six Baton 
Rouge hospitals, the Baton Rouge General Medical Center, Woman’s Hospital, St. Elizabeth 
hospital, Lane Regional Medical Center, and Ochsner Medical Center – Baton Rouge, pledged to 
implement tobacco-free campuses.186, 187 Although we did not find TFL participation in the 
Breathe Free Baton Rouge initiative, TFL’s executive director Tonia Moore told the Baton 
Rouge Advocate that TFL wanted Baton Rouge to become the next city to adopt a 
comprehensive smokefree ordinance.188  
National voluntaries as well as state and local organizations formed the Smoke-Free East 
Baton Rouge Coalition (Smoke-Free EBR)189 in 2016 to pursue smoking restrictions in East 
Baton Rouge (Table 12.17). East Baton Rouge is the parish housing Louisiana’s capitol, Baton 
Rouge.190 The parish and city have a consolidated, city-parish government that dictates laws for 
both areas.190 Former AHA lobbyist and SmokeFree NOLA legislative liaison, Stasha Rhodes, 
acted as campaign manager for Smoke-Free EBR.191 Following the Smoke-Free NOLA 
Campaign, Rhodes left AHA to establish her own advocacy and lobbying organization called 
The Red Team (where she was when she began working for the Baton Rouge campaign).192 
On January 26, 2016, the Smoke-Free EBR coalition held a community meeting to 
discuss smokefree workplaces at the Shiloh Missionary Baptist Church.193 At the meeting, 
tobacco control advocates publicly announced the Smoke-Free EBR campaign and its goal to 
obtain a comprehensive local smokefree law covering bars and casinos. Speaking in support of 
smokefree policies for the Coalition at the gathering were public health officials, medical 
professionals, musicians, as well as bar owners (Table 12.18). Councilmembers Tara Wicker and 
Chauna Banks-Daniel from the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council announced their 
intention to introduce the ordinance at the meeting.  
Table 12.17: Member Organizations of Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge Coalition189 
National Health Organizations American Nonsmokers’ Rights Foundation 
American Lung Association 
American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network 
Red Team 
March of Dimes 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids 
State Organizations Healthier Air for All 
Musicians for a Smoke-Free LA 
Louisiana Budget Project 
National Association of Social Workers Louisiana Chapter 
Local SEIU Local 21 LA 
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During the gathering, the Coalition released results of a survey commissioned by TFL 
and ACS-CAN194 and conducted from December 10-13, 2015. The survey found 70% of Baton 
Rouge residents supported an ordinance to prohibit smoking in bars, casinos, and all other 
workplaces.193, 195 TFL later published a press release on its website announcing the findings on 
January 27, 2016.196 The Smoke-Free EBR Community Meeting generated significant local 
media attention, with at least 5 Louisiana-based news outlets publishing stories on the event and 
launch of the ordinance campaign.193, 197-200  
 After the launch of the Smoke-Free EBR Campaign, councilmembers from the Parish 
Metropolitan Council took differing stances towards smoking restrictions (Table 12.19). Some 
expressed skepticism about the need for smoking restrictions and highlighted their potential 
negative impacts on casinos. Councilmember John Delgado, a bar owner,201 supported 
prohibiting smoking in bars but was against legislation eliminating smoking in casinos out of 
fear that Baton Rouge gambling establishments would lose customers.191 Councilmember 
Delgado cited the struggles of Harrah’s New Orleans, which had publicly blamed the 2015 New 
Orleans smokefree ordinance for declining revenue.191 Mayor-President Kip Holden, who hosted 
a small smokefree awareness campaign in 
2015, avoided taking a position on the 
anticipated smoking restrictions.191 
However, he asserted (without evidence) 
that casinos in Baton Rouge had less smoke 
compared to the Harrah’s in New Orleans 
(before the city adopted a smokefree law).191 
During his 2015 Breathe Easy Baton Rouge 
initiative, Mayor-President Holden avoided 
taking a position on prohibiting smoking in 
bars and casinos.186 
Table: 12.18: Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge Speakers at the Shiloh Baptist Church Community Meeting, January 26, 2016193 
Supporter Organization Position Message 
Jule Assercq  Physician People need to be more upset about exposure. 
Lydia Kuykendal American Cancer 
Society Cancer 
Action Network 
Louisiana Government 
Relations Director 
Smokefree policies reduce health care costs 
for employers, improve worker health. 
Stasha Rhodes The Red Team Founder Employees should not be exposed to 
secondhand smoke. 
Joe Hall Phil Brady’s Bar 
and Grill 
Owner Over time made business more smokefree. 
Baton Rouge is behind other cities in adopting 
Smokefree policies. 
Betsy Braud Hodnett Woman’s 
Hospital 
Nurse/ musician Smoking causes pre-term births. 
Rick Andrus St. Paul the 
Apostle Church 
Reverend  Smoking is also a moral and religious 
problem. Associates smoking to being pro-
life. Accuses supporters of smoking in bars 
and casinos of lacking morals. 
Tara Wicker East Baton Rouge 
Parish 
Metropolitan 
Council 
Councilmember Need to protect casino employees. 
Following the launch of the Smoke-
Free East Baton Rouge campaign, The 
Belle of Baton Rouge, Hollywood 
Casino and L’Auberge did not publicly 
argue against adopting smoking 
restrictions and instead waited to 
attack the ordinance after it was 
officially introduced. 
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 Local gaming establishments The Belle of Baton Rouge Casino and Hotel, Hollywood 
Casino, and L’Auberge Casino and Hotel had contracts with the Baton Rouge City-Parish to 
provide the local government a percentage of their revenue from gambling, totaling 
approximately $9.8 million in 2015.202, 203 Following the launch of the Smoke-Free East Baton 
Rouge campaign, The Belle of Baton Rouge, Hollywood Casino and L’Auberge did not publicly 
argue against adopting smoking restrictions and instead waited to attack the ordinance after it 
was officially introduced.203 
Other East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan councilmembers initially opposed a 
smokefree ordinance because they considered it government overregulation. Councilmember 
Trae Welch opposed the idea, feeling it was general governmental overreach and 
Councilmembers Scott Wilson and Ryan Heck opposed it believing businesses should be 
allowed to make their own decisions.191, 201 
Councilmembers Tara Wicker, Chauna Banks-Daniel, Donna Collin-Lewis and Joel Boe 
announced their support of a comprehensive ordinance.191 By the time the ordinance was 
introduced on March 23, 2015, six of 12 Parish Metro councilmembers co-sponsored it (Table 
12.20).204 
Campaign Efforts to Generate Public Awareness and Support for the Smokefree Law  
 
 The Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge Coalition held discussions and press conferences to 
increase public awareness and support for smoking restrictions. On February 9, 2016201 Smoke-
Free EBR representative Lydia Kuykendal gave a talk to the Baton Rouge Rotary Club about the 
need for passing an ordinance to protect bar and casino employees from secondhand smoke. The 
Coalition also held a press conference on April 9, 2015 where endorsements were announced 
from the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) Louisiana Chapter206 as well as 
Baton Rouge-area musicians Kenny Neal and Michael Foster.201, 207-209 2015 Miss Louisiana 
April Nelson also endorsed the campaign, possibly at the same press conference.209 The Smoke-
Free EBR Coalition subsequently received endorsements from the Baton Rouge medical 
community in mid-February, with Ochsner Medical Center-Baton Rouge, Baton Rouge General, 
Our Lady of the Lake hospital, Woman’s, Lane Regional Medical Center, and the Mary Bird 
Perkins Cancer Center releasing a joint letter of support for the campaign.209, 210 
Table 12.19: EBR Parish Metro Councilmember Positions Towards Smokefree Legislation Following the Smoke-
Free East Baton Rouge Campaign Launch 191, 201 
Councilmember Position 
Chauna Banks-Daniel For 
Tara Wicker For 
Buddy Amoroso Undecided 
Erika Green Undecided 
LaMont Cole Undecided 
Donna Collins-Lewis For 
Joel Boe For 
Trae Welch Against 
Scott Wilson Against 
John Delgado Against (for prohibition in bars, not casinos) 
Ryan Heck Against   
Chandler Loupe Unknown 
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 The coalition hosted three smokefree events to generate public attention and support for 
smoking restrictions before and immediately around the introduction of the ordinance 
(introduced in late March 2016).211 They recruited local bar and club owners to speak in support 
of smokefree laws and provide statements against claims that smoking restrictions harmed 
business. On February 19, 2016 Smoke-Free EBR held a smokefree night at Allure Night Club 
and Ultra Lounge featuring live musical performances.211 The Coalition also organized a comedy 
show and karaoke night at Ruffins Downtown Daiquiri Lounge on March 23, 2016 as well as a 
smokefree social for young professionals on March 24, 2016 at City Bar.211 Smoke-Free East 
Baton Rouge circulated digital flyers and posted announcements on Facebook and Twitter to 
spread awareness of the events.211, 212 
Smoke-Free EBR conducted public outreach via posts on social media platforms 
Facebook and Twitter. They used the sites to distribute articles that supported adopting 
smokefree laws and defended prohibiting smoking in casinos.211, 212 The Coalition also posted 
action alerts to Facebook and Twitter encouraging supporters to contact lawmakers, attend 
smokefree events, attend council hearings, and participate in informal polls being posted by local 
news outlets. Videos featuring testimonials from casino employees about how secondhand 
smoke negatively impacted their health or lives were disseminated through social media. Smoke-
Free EBR also circulated photos on Facebook and Twitter of medical doctors, public health 
representatives, policy wonks, and faith leaders holding figures and statistics related to 
secondhand smoke.  
Besides social media, Smoke-Free EBR member organizations and coalition supporters 
spent approximately $300,000 on an advertising campaign in its first six months,206 placing 
radio, billboards, social media and television ads.203, 206 
Introducing the Ordinance 
 
On March 23, 2016, Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge held a rally at the Baton Rouge City 
Hall before a council meeting began that day.213-215 Four unspecified councilmembers  attended 
and supported smoking restrictions they would introduce during the meeting.215 To counter 
claims that smoking restrictions harmed businesses, the coalition had The Bulldog bar’s general 
manager Remi DeMatteo and Phil Brady’s bar owner Joe Hall speak at the rally in support of 
smoking restrictions.214, 215 Together Baton Rouge (a coalition of local community and religious 
Table 12.20: East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Councilmember Sponsorship of 2015 Smokefree 
Ordinance204, 205 
Buddy Amoroso -- 
Joel Boe Cosponsor 
Chauna Banks-Daniel Cosponsor 
LaMont Cole Cosponsor 
Donna Collins-Lewis Cosponsor 
John Delgado -- 
Erika Green Cosponsor 
Ryan Heck -- 
Chandler Loupe -- 
Trae Welch  
Tara Wicker Cosponsor 
Scott Wilson -- 
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organizations dedicated to bettering the Baton Rouge area)216 official Edgar Cage, Together 
Baton Rouge Executive Committee member and faith leader Father Rick Andrus,217 musicians 
Henry Turner, Kenny Neal, and Michael Foster, and medical doctor Jay Brooks also spoke at the 
event.215  
At the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council meeting on March 23, 2016, 
Councilmembers Chauna Banks-Daniel, Tara Wicker, Joel Boe, Donna Collins-Lewis, Erika 
Green, and LaMont Cole introduced a comprehensive smokefree ordinance.218, 219  Their co-
sponsorship guaranteed the legislation six of the 7 votes it needed  to pass (the Council has 12 
members).203, 220  
As introduced, the ordinance eliminated smoking and vaping in places not covered by 
state law or a 2005 local law establishing smokefree parks and distance requirements (Chapter 
10). The existing local law explicitly exempted gaming establishments, bars, tobacco retailers, 
and hospitality guest rooms from smoking restrictions.204, 214, 221 The ordinance prohibited the use 
of tobacco, marijuana, “plant product intended for inhalation,” and electronic smoking devices222 
in all bars, casinos, and workplaces within East Baton Rouge and the City of Baton Rouge.   
Opposition  
 
Opposition to smoking restrictions began to manifest from the casino industry in late 
March, around the ordinance’s introduction to the East Baton Rouge Parish Metro Council. 
Pinnacle Entertainment, the company that owned L’Auberge Casino and Hotel, took the first 
public stance against the ordinance.218 In late March 2016, Pinnacle Entertainment’s Executive 
Vice President of Governmental Relations and Public Affairs Troy Stremming told the magazine 
Greater Baton Rouge Business Report that the ordinance would cause L’Auberge to lose 
customers and income.218 He also claimed that Baton Rouge would receive less tax revenue from 
the casino as a result.218 By March 30, 2016, Stremming publicly claimed L’Auberge was 
expected to suffer a 20% decline in casino winnings (and tax revenue for Baton Rouge) if the 
ordinance was adopted.223 Stremming cited fallen revenue at casinos affected by smoking bans in 
other states and cities, most notably New Orleans, to support his claim that the ordinance would 
harm Baton Rouge gambling establishments.223 It appears The Belle of Baton Rouge and the 
Hollywood Casino avoided taking public positions on the ordinance until April 12, 2016, the day 
before the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council considered the ordinance 
legislation.224 
Although only Pinnacle Entertainment took a public stance against the smokefree 
ordinance by late march, all three Baton Rouge Casinos and their parent companies had been 
lobbying Councilmembers to oppose clean air legislation.  
In April, immediately before the council hearing on the ordinance, owners and 
representatives from the three Baton Rouge casinos publicly opposed smoking restrictions with 
claims of expected economic harm.220, 224 Pinnacle Entertainment representatives claimed 
smoking restrictions might harm local businesses by reducing the goods and services the 
L’Auberge purchased in Baton Rouge. Pinnacle representatives also stated that employees at 
L’Auberge did not list secondhand smoke as an issue in internal surveys.224 L’Auberge’s parent 
company framed the smokefree ordinance as harmful to casino employees, asserting that 
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smoking restrictions could reduce business and 
lower tips received by workers.224 Hollywood 
Casino spokesman Joel Loots argued against the 
ordinance before it was considered, claiming that 
adopting smoking restrictions would place Baton 
Rouge gaming establishments at a competitive 
disadvantage with casinos in neighboring areas.224 
Tony Rodio, the President and CEO of Tropicana 
Entertainment, the Belle of Baton Rouge’s parent 
company, issued a statement on April 12, 2016 that 
the ordinance would harm the casino and its 
workers while lowering tax revenue.224 The Baton Rouge casinos also relied on economic harm 
arguments during the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council hearing on the ordinance.  
The EBR Parish Metropolitan Council Considers the Smokefree Ordinance 
 
The East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council considered the ordinance at a 
meeting on April 14, 2016.225 Before taking action, the Council noted public opinion towards the 
smoking restrictions. 21 people provided cards to the Council endorsing the smokefree 
ordinance, while 37 filed cards or stated their name to register opposition.222 Those filing cards 
in support of the ordinance from Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge member organizations were TFL 
Communications and Tobacco Policy Manager Lauren Conrad, LCEF Healthcare Initiative 
Director Kathy Richard, CTFK Southern Region Director Claudia Rodas, and TFL Regional 
Manager Jennifer Gilchrist.222 After the Council acknowledged each card filed, the Council 
heard public comments.222 25 testified for the ordinance and 14 spoke against it.222  
Supporters, consisting of representatives from national and state health and tobacco 
control organizations, doctors and nurses, entertainers, faith leaders, and casino employees 
affiliated with, recruited by, or supportive of Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge, testified first.222 
They argued the ordinance protected personal rights, the public’s health, and employee health. 
Proponents also argued that smokefree laws did not economically harm businesses, in particular 
gambling establishments222(Table 12.21). Of the proponents testifying, ANR Associate Director 
Bronson Frick received additional time to speak on how smokefree laws did not cause revenue 
declines at gambling establishments.222 Faith leader and Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge advocate 
Father Richard Andrus also received extra time to discuss the moral necessity of adopting the 
ordinance.222  
Opponents consisted predominantly of gambling industry representatives, officials, and 
employees (Table 12.22).222 Tobacconists, bar owners, and political conservatives also testified 
against the ordinance. 
Gaming industry representatives argued smoking restrictions economically harmed 
casinos, resulting in lower tax revenue and reduced purchases from local vendors by 
companies.222 They repeatedly referred to the revenue decline Harrah’s New Orleans 
experienced following implementation of that city’s smokefree ordinance in April 2015.222 
Casino representatives and employees also argued that workers and customers decided to 
frequent places with smoking and could choose to work or take their business elsewhere.222  
L’Auberge’s parent company 
framed the smoke-free 
ordinance as harmful to casino 
employees, asserting that 
smoking restrictions could 
reduce business and lower tips 
received by workers. 
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Repeating a well-worn tobacco industry argument,110, 226 members of the gambling 
industry claimed ventilation systems used at Baton Rouge casinos filtered secondhand smoke, 
partially negating any need for smoking restrictions.222  
Tobacconists, bar owners, and political conservatives argued that smoking restrictions 
harmed businesses, lowered tax revenue, were a form of overregulation, and a decision for 
private businesses to make.222 Non-casino opponents also argued that employee and public 
exposure to smoking was a personal choice.222 
After public comments concluded, Councilmember Joel Boe offered two amendments 
that weakened distance requirements for sales and lowered requirements for classification as a 
cigar or hookah bar.222 The first amendment eliminated a 300-foot distance requirement for 
tobacco and electronic smoking device sales near churches and other unspecified locations. The 
second amendment lowered requirements to become classified as a cigar or hookah bar in the 
ordinance, redefining cigar and hookah bars as businesses making 10% of sales from tobacco 
products instead of 60 percent as the legislation proposed.222 Boe’s proposed changes also 
permitted cigarette and e-cigarette use in cigar and hookah bars, which was prohibited in the 
original legislation.222 Councilmember Boe requested the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan 
Council consider the ordinance with the proposed amendments instead of in its original form. 
Seconded by Councilmember Banks-Daniel, Boe’s request was approved.222 
Before voting on the amended ordinance, supportive councilmembers challenged casino 
industry talking points and cited the importance of smoking restrictions to protect public health. 
Councilmember Lamont Cole asked casino industry 
representatives if Harrah’s New Orleans was 
experiencing a revenue decline before 
implementation of the New Orleans ordinance.222 
According to Cole, a report provided to him and 
other Councilmembers by Smoke-Free EBR found 
the New Orleans smokefree ordinance had no effect 
on the revenue decline being experienced by 
Harrah’s.222 Louisiana Casino Association 
Executive Director Wade Duty stated that Louisiana 
Gaming Control Board data showed revenue decline 
worsened in 2015 compared to 2014 for Harrah’s 
New Orleans.222 Duty questioned the validity of the report provided by Smoke-Free EBR, which 
also relied on data from the Louisiana Gaming Control Board.  
Councilmember Cole next asked gambling industry officials about how Baton Rouge 
casinos handle employees complaining about working in environments with secondhand 
smoke.222 Troy Stremming, Pinnacles Entertainment Vice President of Government Relations 
and Public Affairs, stated L’Auberge would accommodate employees and place them in 
nonsmoking positions.222 After questioned by Cole if pregnant employees would be 
accommodated as well, Stremming affirmed they would also be relocated to a nonsmoking area, 
with no adverse effect on wages besides potential loss of tips.222 
 
According to Cole, a report 
provided to him and other 
Councilmembers by Smoke-Free 
EBR found the New Orleans 
smokefree ordinance had no 
effect on the revenue decline 
being experienced by Harrah’s. 
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Table 12.21: Testimony in Support of Adopting the East Baton Rouge Smokefree Ordinance222 
Person Organization Position Testimony 
Advocacy Organizations 
Lydia Kuykendal American Cancer Society 
Cancer Action Network 
Director of 
Government 
Relations for 
Louisiana 
• Secondhand smoke is health hazard. 
• Clean air is a right.  
• Bar and casino employees have right to smokefree workplace. 
•  Freedom to choose ends at harming others. 
Bronson Frick (extra 
time) 
Americans for Nonsmokers’ 
Rights 
Associate Director • Secondhand smoke is a health hazard.  
• Not a smoking ban.  
• Smokefree casinos exist and perform well. 
• Industry has invested billions in smokefree casinos in the US.  
• Casino revenue declines not related to smokefree laws. 
• Ventilation systems do not prevent secondhand smoke exposure.  
• Worker health. 
Tonia Moore* TFL/LPHI Associate Director • Smokefree policies do not affect tourism or business.   
• Louisiana has high lung cancer rates, partly attributable to smoking. 
• Smokefree policies improve air quality. 
• Secondhand smoke has immediate, negative short-term health effects. 
Onjewel Smith Americans for Nonsmokers’ 
Rights 
Southern States 
Regional Consultant 
• Harrah’s New Orleans claims of revenue loss from smokefree policy are 
incorrect. 
• New Orleans smokefree policy had revenue neutral effect on casinos.  
• Casinos continue to generate millions regardless of smokefree policies.  
• Public health over choice or profits. 
• People are not able to find alternative employment. 
Edgar Cage Together Baton Rouge Member / Leader • Together Baton Rouge endorses legislation. 
• Other professions protect against health hazards.  
• Secondhand smoke is a health hazard. 
• Business may improve. 
• Regulations protect people. 
Father Richard Andrus 
(extra time) 
St. Paul the Apostle 
Catholic Church/ Together 
Baton Rouge 
Pastor • Allowing secondhand smoke exposure is immoral.  
• Smokefree policies are pro-life. 
•  Right to smokefree workplaces.  
• Clean air is a right. 
• Moral responsibility to adopt ordinance. 
• Public health is more important than business interests. 
Father Dan Krutz  Priest/ Executive 
Director of 
Louisiana 
• Secondhand smoke is harmful to employees. 
• Other workplaces require protection from toxic hazards. 
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Interchurch 
Conference 
Jan Moller Louisiana Budget Project Director • Smoking costs taxpayers. 
•  Secondhand smoke generates significant medical costs. 
• People are not able to find alternative employment. 
• Louisiana’s poor health ranking partly attributed to smoking. 
• Smokefree policies enable quitting. 
Medical Community 
Dr. Jay Brooks Oschner Health System Oncologist •  Baton Rouge health care CEOs endorse legislation 
• Secondhand smoke kills.  
• Smokefree policies reduce area health problems.  
• Right to clean air. 
• Council lost member to tobacco related illness. 
Dr. Jane Peek Baton Rouge General 
Hospital 
OB/GYN 
 
• Cigarette smoke is a health hazard. 
• Cigarette smoke is harmful to unborn infants.  
• Reduces medical costs. American Cancer Society 
(Local Chapter) 
Volunteer board 
member 
Dr. Cory Abair Dillard University Chief Medical 
Officer 
• People will smoke outside and continue to attend establishments. 
• Regulations protect people.  
• Freedom of choice is not always an option. 
• City council needs to protect workers, city and state. 
Louisiana Recovery School 
District 
Chief Medical 
Officer 
Orleans Parish Schoolboard  Chief Medical 
Officer 
Betsy Broe  Registered Nurse / 
musician 
• Secondhand smoke is harmful.  
• Affects unborn infants. 
•  Protect children who will become musicians. 
•   Lost relatives to secondhand smoke related illness. 
Dr. Jule Assercq Louisiana State University Family practice 
physician 
• Secondhand smoke is hazardous to health. 
• Secondhand smoke is particularly hazardous to asthmatics and those with 
COPD or lung failure.  
• Secondhand smoke results in harm or fatality to unborn infants. 
• No safe amount of exposure to secondhand smoke. 
• Prioritize public health over finances. 
Bar Industry 
Remy Demattio The Bulldog bar General Manager • Business increased after adopting smokefree policy.  
• People will smoke outside and continue to attend establishments. 
Joe Hall Phil Brady’s bar Owner • Smokefree events increase business. 
• Partial smokefree policy has not harmed business. 
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Performance Industry 
Tiffany Dickerson  Comedian and 
entertainer 
• Secondhand smoke kills.  
• Right to clean air. 
• City is behind on protecting public health. 
April Nelson  Miss Louisiana • Performers should have smokefree environments. 
• Promote clean air for all Louisianans.  
• Lost relative to smoking-related illness. 
Henry Turner  Entertainer • Lost fellow performers to smoking related illnesses. 
• Businesses adapt to smokefree policies, potentially see growth. 
Michael Foster  Professional 
musician, art 
counselor 
• Smokefree laws don’t harm business. 
• People should not have to work in smoke to take care of family. 
• Protect children who will become musicians. 
Kenny Neal  Musician • Secondhand smoke is harmful. 
Johnny Palizotto  Music 
publisher/producer 
• Secondhand smoke is hazardous to health.  
• Baton Rouge is behind in protecting public health. 
Politicians 
Roosevelt Johnson Alexandria City Council Former president • Advance health of city. 
Antoine Pierce  Parish Metro 
Council Candidate 
• Prioritize public health over ideology, finances, special interests. 
Gambling Industry 
Jade Alexander Unknown Former Casino 
employee 
• Employees lack options to work elsewhere. 
• Employees sacrifice to provide for family. 
• Secondhand smoke is harmful. 
 
Taiwan Tompkins** Unknown Former casino 
employee 
• Freedom to choose ends at harming others. 
*Provided data briefs to councilmembers at hearing. 
**Name possibly spelled incorrectly.  
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Table 12.22: Testimony Against Adopting the East Baton Rouge Smokefree Ordinance222 
Person Organization Position Testimony 
Gambling Industry 
Mickey Parenton L’Auberge Casino and 
Hotel 
 General Manager • Majority of establishment is non-smoking. 
• Employees accept working in secondhand smoke. 
Troy Stremming (extra time) Pinnacle Entertainment 
(parent company of 
L’Auberge) 
Executive Vice President of 
Government Relations and Public 
Affairs 
• Smokefree ordinance destabilizes business environment. 
• Smokefree ordinance creates competitive disadvantage 
with casinos in neighboring areas. 
• Owner should decide smokefree policies. 
• Customers can choose to attend smokefree 
establishments.  
• Ventilation system cleans air. 
•  Limited smoking area accessible only to adults (21+). 
•  Smokefree policy economically harms casino, state and 
local government, as well as local vendors. 
•  Economically harms employees (lowers tips received by 
employees).  
• Smokefree laws economically harm gaming 
establishments (New Orleans one example used). 
Wade Duty Louisiana Casino 
Association 
Executive Director 
 
• Smokefree laws economically harm gaming 
establishments.   
• Claims of casinos seeing increased business after 
smokefree policies are invalid assertions by advocates. 
• New Orleans Harrah’s saw revenue decline after going 
smokefree, neighboring smokefree casinos saw increased 
business. 
• Casino revenue affects job levels, tax revenues, and 
procurement amount from local vendors. 
Anthony Verbeil Hollywood Casino and 
Leisure Gaming 
Properties inc. (parent 
company) 
Vice President and General 
Manager of Hollywood casino  
• Smokefree laws economically harm casinos. 
• Smokefree law will reduce tax revenues. 
• Smokefree law will impact jobs. 
• Other states have successfully implemented partial 
smokefree laws for casinos. 
• Creates competitive disadvantage with casinos in 
neighboring areas. 
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Patrick Brown Belle of Baton Rouge 
Casino and Hotel 
General Manager 
 
• Smokefree laws economically harm casinos.  
• Smokefree laws reduce tax revenue. 
• Smokefree law will reduce procurement from local 
vendors. 
• Smokefree law might cause job loss. 
• Smokefree law will affect investments made by company 
into Baton Rouge casino. 
• Property is smokefree except for gaming area. 
• Puts casinos at competitive disadvantage with casinos in 
neighboring areas.  
• Difference between state and local smokefree laws on 
competition. 
Richard Meadows Casino (unknown) Employee • Casino industry creates jobs in Louisiana and allows 
people to stay, come to the state. 
• Employees have choice to work elsewhere. 
• Employees are adults (21+) able to make choices.  
• Secondhand smoke studies are not good quality and are 
questionable. 
• Could reduce employee hours or lead to job loss if 
casinos are economically harmed. 
 
Anna Caffrey L’Auberge Casino and 
Hotel 
Employee • Customers can choose to attend smokefree environments. 
• The casino accommodates employees. 
• Protect company that helps community and gives 
employees good benefits. 
• Employees have choice to work elsewhere. 
 
Trivia Weatherspoon L’Auberge Casino and 
Hotel 
Employee 
 
• Allow employees to make choice. 
• Great company. 
Daniel L’Auberge Casino and 
Hotel 
Employee • Regulations hurt economy. 
•  Employees make choice to work in smoke-filled 
environment.  
• Ventilation system cleans air.  
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• Company provides benefits.  
• If casino loses revenue, tax revenue lowers and job loss  
occurs. 
Bar and Tobacconist Industries 
Alice Estel Unknown bar Attorney • Smokefree law creates economic burden on business by 
forcing accommodation of smoking workers and 
customers. 
Anthony Gallo Cadillac Cafe Owner • Employees have choice to work elsewhere. 
• Customers can choose to attend smokefree 
establishments. 
• Musicians receive limited exposure to secondhand 
smoke, work few hours.  
• Businesses will be economically harmed, in particular 
small business. 
Sarah McCauley Louisiana Independent 
Tobacconist Association  
 
  
President • Tobacconists will be economically harmed by smokefree 
law.  
• Smokefree law will reduce tax revenue. 
Bayou Tobacco Owner 
Luis Molina Habana Port Cigar 
Merchants 
General Manager • Smokefree law economically harms businesses. 
• Smokefree law will reduce tax revenue. 
• People choose to engage in business activity. 
• Customers can choose to attend smokefree environments.  
• Other air pollutants are created by businesses and are not 
prohibited (references Dow Chemical plant). 
• Smokefree law is unnecessary as most people attend 
smokefree establishments. 
• Smokefree law is regulatory overreach. 
• Smokefree law economically harms casinos. 
• Smokefree law reduces tax revenue. 
•  Allow business owners to decide smoking policy. 
•  Smokefree law prohibits delivery of tobacco products in 
certain areas. 
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Miscellaneous 
Matthew Allen East Baton Rouge 
Libertarian Party Parish 
Executive Committee 
Member • Criminalizes smoking on private property. 
• Business owners should be allowed to set smoking 
policies.  
• Secondhand smoke is only proven to harm people 
residing with smokers. Exposure at private 
establishments has negligible or unproven effect. 
• Nonsmokers can choose not to attend businesses allowing 
smoking. 
• Employees have choice to work elsewhere. 
 608 
 
 Following Cole’s questions to the gaming industry, Councilmember Collins-Lewis asked 
for a medical worker to explain air ventilation systems and their effect on secondhand smoke 
residue and carcinogens in the air.222 Lake Hospital Pediatrician Hitesh Shirama told the Council 
that multiple studies determined that ventilation systems failed to remove small particles from 
the air and that numerous particles in cigarettes were carcinogenic. After Pediatrician Hitesh 
Shirama concluded his answer, Councilmember Collins-Lewis reaffirmed her support for the 
ordinance.222 
 Councilmember Banks-Daniel then asked L’Auberge representatives if employee surveys 
included questions on secondhand smoke.222 Pinnacle’s Troy Stremming stated their surveys did 
not include questions on secondhand smoke, but added that employees had never complained 
about secondhand smoke in the generalized questions in the survey.222 Asked by Banks-Daniel if 
all employees received the survey, Stremming claimed more than 90% of workers participated 
and that the surveys were anonymous.222 Banks-Daniel asked if questions regarding secondhand 
smoke could be added to the survey, and Stremming replied L’Auberge might be receptive to 
doing so.222 Banks-Daniel also asked Stremming if casino employees were educated on the 
dangers of secondhand smoke and the inability of ventilation systems to protect people from 
harmful health consequences, and if he felt personally responsible that they be informed;  
Stremming did not answer.222 He responded to another question from Banks-Daniel stating that 
L’Auberge was willing to address secondhand smoke exposure and improve employee 
protections.222 
 Councilmember Tara Wicker spoke last, asking for a casino industry representative to 
explain why a majority of a casino and hotel could be smokefree without suffering adverse 
economic effects, but expect a total prohibition on smoking to be harmful.222 Pinnacle’s  
Stremming asserted a total smoking prohibition would reduce revenue and harm employees 
dependent upon tips, and that a competitive disadvantage caused by a local smoking ban in 
Baton Rouge could increasingly harm L’Auberge and its employees.222 After Stremming 
answered her question, Councilmember Wicker stated L’Auberge recognized secondhand smoke 
was “an issue” by having smokefree areas.222 She stated her concern for the health of employees 
at the casino.222 Wicker concluded that employees lacked the ability to find alternative work in 
Baton Rouge that allowed them to provide for their families, causing them to continue working 
in secondhand smoke despite the negative health effects.222 
 After Wicker finished speaking, the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council voted 
6 to 6 on the ordinance, failing to pass it (Table 12.23).222 Only the councilmembers that had 
sponsored the legislation voted for it.  
In interviews with the Greater Baton Rouge Business Report and The Advocate following 
the vote, Councilmembers John Delgado, Ryan Heck, Trae Welch, and Buddy Amoroso credited 
fears of overregulation and negative economic impacts on businesses as reasons they voted 
against the smoking restrictions.227 Councilman John Delgado opposed the ordinance believing 
business and tax revenue would decline because of smoking restrictions, partially because of 
claims that Harrah’s New Orleans had suffered a 20% drop in revenue after smoking restrictions 
were implemented.227 Councilmembers Trae Welch and Ryan Heck claimed the ordinance was 
poorly constructed and a regulatory overreach.225, 227 Councilmember Buddy Amoroso voted 
against the ordinance believing it infringed on freedom of choice for people and businesses.227 
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After the defeat, Smoke-Free East 
Baton Rouge continued advocating for 
smoking restrictions. Immediately 
following the EBR Parish Metropolitan 
Council’s vote, Smoke-Free East Baton 
Rouge Campaign Manager Stasha Rhodes 
asserted that the coalition would continue 
to advocate for smoking restrictions in the 
city and parish.205 The coalition continued 
to disseminate information on Facebook 
and Twitter until the end of June 2016.211, 
212  
Health and tobacco control 
advocates would pursue another comprehensive smokefree ordinance in Baton Rouge as the 
Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge coalition in 2017. 
Town of Hammond Adopts a Comprehensive Ordinance 
 
A small town of approximately 20,000 people,228 Hammond considered adopting a 
comprehensive smokefree ordinance in 2015. Sponsored by Hammond City Councilmember 
Lemar Marshall, the ordinance, modeled after the New Orleans ordinance,229 prohibited smoking 
and e-cigarette use in all indoor workplaces with no exemptions for bars, hospitality 
establishments, nursing homes, or gaming facilities.230 Smoking and vaping at outdoor recreation 
areas and outdoor shopping malls was also prohibited. The ordinance established a 5-foot 
distance requirement from public owned, leased, or operated buildings and a 5-foot distance 
requirement from all building entrances, air filtration systems, and windows. The ordinance also 
established a 5-foot distance requirement around playgrounds, event stands, public transit 
structures, and from a point of sales area for a line. Smoking or vaping where tobacco or 
electronic smoking device use was prohibited 
incurred $50 fines.230 Business fines were no greater 
than $100 for first offenses, $200 for second offenses 
within a year, and $500 for any additional offenses 
within a year.230 Businesses offending smoking 
restrictions faced potential permit or license loss.230 
The ordinance designated the Hammond Police 
Department or an official appointed by the Mayor 
with enforcement.230 
TFL employees supported the ordinance as part of statewide efforts to secure 
comprehensive local smoking laws.231 TFL’s state and local allies, including the Louisiana 
Healthy Communities Coalition, supported the smokefree ordinance effort in Hammond.231  
Councilmember Marshall introduced Hammond’s ordinance on April 7, 2015232 and the 
Council considered it on April 21, 2015.228, 233 Business owners and a gambling industry 
representative opposing the ordinance argued smoking restrictions created competitive 
disadvantages, inflicted economic harm, and were a decision that businesses could choose to 
Table 12.23: April 14 Parish Metro Council Vote on East 
Baton Rouge Ordinance 222, 225  
Chandler Loupe No 
Ryan Heck No 
Scott Wilson No 
Trae Welch No 
Buddy Amoroso No 
John Delgado No 
Tara Wicker Yes 
Donna Collins-Lewis Yes 
Erika Green Yes 
Chauna Banks-Daniel Yes 
LaMont Cole Yes 
Joel Boe Yes 
TFL’s state and local allies, 
including the Louisiana Healthy 
Communities Coalition, 
supported the smokefree 
ordinance effort in Hammond. 
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implement.233, 234 In contrast, a bar owner and musician 
supporting the ordinance argued smoking restrictions 
protected people from secondhand smoke and saved lives.233, 
234 
At the April 21, 2015 meeting the Council voted 4 to 
1 to adopt the smokefree ordinance (Table 12.24), with only 
Councilmember Jason Hood voting against it because he 
thought smoking should remain a business decision.234 
Bogalusa Adopts a Comprehensive Ordinance  
 
In 2016, Bogalusa City Councilmember Gloria Kates introduced a comprehensive 
smokefree ordinance236 for her town. The legislation prohibited smoking in indoor workplaces, 
bars, and gambling establishments, but exempted guest rooms dedicated for smoking at 
hospitality establishments and tobacco retailers from smoking restrictions.237 
Some community and business outreach occurred for the Bogalusa ordinance. A week 
before the Bogalusa City Council considered the ordinance, a public meeting was held to discuss 
the legislation.236 In addition, Kates and tobacco control advocates administered surveys on 
smoking restrictions to bar owners.236 We do not know the findings from the surveys. 
 The City Council considered Councilmember Kate’s ordinance on December 20, 2016. 
Health advocates including TFL Executive Director Tonia Moore, the Washington Parish Youth 
Council, and former Bogalusa Councilmember Marvin Austin attended to support the 
ordinance.238 Before the meeting started, the Washington Parish Youth Council asked the 
Council to adopt the ordinance to improve public health in Washington Parish (where Bogalusa 
is located).238  
Prompted to give testimony by Councilmember Kates during the meeting, TFL Associate 
Director Tonia Moore discussed the poor health status of Louisiana.236 She informed the Council 
that smoking restrictions reduced exposure to harmful secondhand smoke particles and improved 
air quality, and that smokefree policies protected public health.236  
 After Moore testified, Councilmember Kates moved to table the ordinance because 
Councilmember Doug Ritchie was absent, and Kates wanted the full vote of the Council. Before 
Kates’ motion to table the ordinance was approved, however, Adapt: Washington Parish 
Coalition against Drugs representative238 Charlotte Fornea, and former Bogalusa Councilmember 
Marvin Austin, interrupted with testimony supporting the legislation. Fornea asked the Council 
to protect younger generations from harm and adopt smoking restrictions. Austin shared his 
experience with nicotine addiction, the health consequences he suffered from smoking tobacco, 
and his loss of friends and acquaintances to tobacco use. Having voted against a past smokefree 
ordinance during his service on the Bogalusa City Council,238 Austin implored Kates to call a 
vote on the smokefree ordinance instead of tabling it. After Austin testified, no other supporters 
or opponents of the ordinance spoke. 
 Encouraged by testimony, Councilmember Kates called for a vote on the ordinance238 
which the Bogalusa City Council then passed unanimously.236  
Table 12.24: Hammond City Council 
Vote on Smokefree Ordinance234, 235 
Councilmember Vote 
Johnny Blount Yes 
Jason Hood No 
Janice Carter-Beard Yes 
Lemar Marshall Yes 
Michael Williams Yes 
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Calcasieu Parish Adopts a Weak Ordinance  
  
The Calcasieu Parish Police Jury adopted a clean air ordinance introduced by Assistant 
Parish Administrator Dane Bolin on November 17, 2016.239 The legislation prohibited all 
tobacco use and electronic smoking device use in public parks, publicly-owned facilities, and at 
the parish government’s Health Unit Complex.240, 241 The ordinance permitted the establishment 
of designated smoking areas at Police Jury facilities and exempted tobacco use or vaping at park 
campsites and RV sites.239-241 It also did not prohibit smoking in bars or gambling 
establishments.239-241 The ordinance entered effect March 1, 2017.240 
Glenmora Adopts a Comprehensive Smokefree Ordinance 
 
 Glenmora, a town of less than 1,500 people, adopted a comprehensive smokefree 
ordinance on March 2017.242 The legislation prohibited smoking and vaping in all indoor 
workplaces and public places, including bars, gambling establishments, and tobacco retailers, as 
well as outdoors at workplaces with two or more workers, stadiums, amphitheaters, and arenas. 
A 20-foot distance requirement was set from building entrances and airways, event stands, 
playgrounds, public transit structures, and the point of sale in drive-thru lines. Users and 
businesses violating smoking restrictions faced an initial fine no greater than $100, followed by 
$250 for second offenses within a year and $500 for additional failures to comply. Business 
establishments in violation of smoking restrictions also faced permit/license suspension or loss.  
Lafayette and the Long Journey to a Comprehensive Ordinance 
 
The city and parish of Lafayette, the fourth most populous metropolitan area of 
Louisiana,243 adopted a comprehensive ordinance prohibiting smoking and vaping in bars, 
gaming establishments, and most workplaces in 2017. TFL had been working to generate public 
and political support for a local clean air law since 2012. Passage of the comprehensive 
ordinance resulted from repeated attempts by TFL and Lafayette City-Parish Councilmember 
Kenneth Boudreaux to increase public demand for smoking restrictions and pass legislation.  
Early Discussions on Smoking Restrictions 
 
Passage of Alexandria’s comprehensive smokefree ordinance in October 2011 stimulated 
a debate about smoking restrictions in Lafayette.244 In a November 2011 Associated Press story 
following passage of the Alexandria ordinance, Tobacco-Free Living officials and allies publicly 
called for Lafayette to pursue a comprehensive smokefree ordinance. Alexandria City Council 
President and TFL legislative champion Roosevelt Johnson also encouraged Lafayette’s city 
government to adopt a comprehensive smokefree ordinance.  
In the same 2011 Associated Press story, Lafayette City-Parish Councilmembers were 
queried regarding their positions on smokefree laws. Councilmembers mainly argued against the 
need for a law or took no position.244 Councilmember and future legislative champion Kenneth 
Boudreaux also doubted the need for a clean air law, but voiced willingness to debate its merits. 
Although noncommittal about pursuing a comprehensive ordinance, in 2008 Boudreaux was one 
of two councilmembers to vote for failed legislation to prohibit smoking at Lafayette-area 
healthcare facilities.244, 245   
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 Councilmember Boudreaux increasingly became involved in Lafayette’s smoking 
restriction debate. During a Lafayette City-Parish Council meeting on February 22, 2012, 
Boudreaux shared a press release asking the bar community to help develop an award for 
businesses that implemented smoking restrictions246 and proposed a city-wide program for the 
awards.245 The proposed program, which would be run by the city-parish, did not generate any 
interest or lead any bars to adopt voluntary smokefree policies.247, 245 
Clean air policies remained an active political topic in Lafayette, prompting 
Councilmember Boudreaux to arrange a town hall to discuss smoking restrictions on June 12, 
2012.247 He held the forum to gauge public sentiment on smoking restrictions after the Lafayette 
bar community’s disinterest and inaction on his voluntary smokefree award program, but did not 
plan to propose an ordinance because he feared residents would view the legislation as a 
violation of business owners’ rights.245, 247, 248 Although Boudreaux insisted there was not an 
impending ordinance, tobacco control advocates, musicians, and bar industry representatives 
attended the meeting to make statements for and against smoking restrictions. 
At the town hall, TFL-affiliated public health advocates and local musicians argued 
smoking restrictions were needed to protect bar employees and musicians.249 Let’s Be Totally 
Clear Initiative Region IV Coordinator Kelley Anderson stated that secondhand smoke made 
bars hazardous workplaces, that smokefree laws did not economically harm businesses, and 
described TFL studies finding air quality in Alexandria improved following adoption of their 
comprehensive ordinance.249 Musician Bernard Pearce argued people had a right to not breathe 
secondhand smoke and musician David Egan stated bar employees and performers were unable 
to find work only at smokefree establishments.249 The performers were recruited to speak at the 
town hall by LCEF’s Kathy Richard.77 
Representing several Lafayette bars during the 
public forum, lawyer Steven Durio argued smokefree 
laws infringed on freedom of choice.249 In particular, he 
asserted that bar workers and musicians had the choice 
to work in smokefree establishments.249  
 Councilmember Boudreaux did not pursue a smokefree ordinance in 2012 after the town 
halls.248 He decided against introducing an ordinance because some Lafayette residents believed 
it violated business owners’ rights. In a 2015 interview with local periodical the Acadiana 
Advocate, LCEF Healthcare Initiative Director Kathy Richard stated that, “We pulled back in 
Lafayette [in 2012] because we just weren’t getting much headway.”248  Continued public input 
to Councilmember Boudreaux in support of smoking restrictions ultimately caused him to 
propose a clean air ordinance for Lafayette in 2015. 
2015 Campaign Fails  
 
The smoking restriction debate in Lafayette rekindled in 2014 when famed Louisiana jazz 
musician and Grammy Winner Chubby Carrier250 called Lafayette City-Parish Councilmember 
Kenneth Boudreaux and asked him to take action on smoking restrictions.251 Carrier had started 
advocating to prohibit smoking in bars several years before the Lafayette ordinance 
campaign.252The musician had partnered with TFL’s “Let’s Be Totally Clear” campaign 
(Chapter 4) in because his father had died from lung cancer.250 
“We pulled back in Lafayette 
because we just weren’t 
getting much headway.” 
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Councilmember Boudreaux and his office began writing the ordinance at an unknown 
time with assistance from Tobacco-Free Living and Chubby Carrier.253, 254 Boudreaux announced 
he would propose a comprehensive ordinance to the Lafayette City-Parish Council at a press 
conference on January 28, 2015.255 
 After Boudreaux announced his intention to pursue an ordinance, three of the nine 
Lafayette City-Parish Councilmembers publicly opposed it. Councilmembers Jared Bellard, 
Andy Naquin and William Theriot248 expressed that businesses should have the choice to set 
their own smoking policy and that employees and customers could choose where to frequent or 
work.255 Five other councilmembers, Don Bertrand, Jay Castille, Kevin Naquin, Keith Patin, and 
Brandon Shelvin, did not take a stance on the ordinance although Bertrand and Castille 
supported smoking restrictions in principle.255 
 Health and tobacco control advocates began publicly lobbying the Lafayette City Council 
in Spring. TFL Regional Coordinator Rene Stansbury, healthcare worker Africa Dauphiny, 
Musician Marty Christian, Southern University Agricultural Center Regional Coordinator256 
Troy Kennedy, Rose Hoffman Cormier and Jan Swift appeared at a Council meeting on April 24, 
2015 to discuss the health hazards as well as disparate impact of tobacco use on minorities and 
call for legislation.257 
 At a Council meeting on May 5, 2015, Councilmember Boudreaux introduced his 
comprehensive ordinance for the city of Lafayette and unincorporated areas of Lafayette 
Parish.254, 258 The legislation prohibited smoking and vaping in most public places and 
businesses, including bars and gambling establishments.258 Guest rooms at hospitality 
establishments, tobacco businesses, private residences not in use as a healthcare facility, child 
care or adult day care, semiprivate and private rooms at care facilities or nursing homes, outdoor 
areas at businesses, and e-cigarette businesses were exempted from restrictions. The ordinance 
established a 25-foot distance requirement for smoking and vaping from building entrances, 
windows, and ventilation systems, with exemptions for bars, alcoholic beverage establishments 
and expanded service restaurants.  
The ordinance retained existing penalties for smoking restriction violations from 
Lafayette’s 2005 law (passed after partial preemption repeal in 2003 (Chapter 10) and 
established new penalties for offending businesses.258  Any smoking restriction violation resulted 
in a maximum $100 fine, a second violation within a year a $200 fine, and any additional 
violations a $500 fine.258 Three violations by a business resulted in permit or license loss unless 
an establishment wrote, adopted and implemented a corrective smokefree policy approved by an 
enforcement officer.258 Enforcement remained unchanged from the 2005 ordinance, with the 
Lafayette Fire Department Chief, their designee, and other law enforcement personnel given the 
authority to enforce smoking restrictions (Chapter 10).259, 260 
The Downtown Lafayette Restaurant and Bar Association did not take a position on the 
bill at the time.261  
On May 17, 2015, two days prior to the city-parish council vote on smoking restrictions, 
e-cigarette advocacy group CASAA issued an action alert to the vaping community to oppose the 
Lafayette ordinance.262 CASAA asked vaping enthusiasts to appear at the hearing to oppose the 
legislation, provided them contact information for Lafayette City-Parish Councilmembers, and 
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gave talking points. Most opposition at the Lafayette City-Parish Council Meeting came from the 
vape community.262 
The Council considered the ordinance on May 19, 2015. Four of the nine 
councilmembers, Kenneth Boudreaux, Kevin Naquin, Jay Castille, and Brandon Shelvin, 
announced their support for the ordinance before the meeting, one less than needed for 
passage.263 Councilmembers Theriot, Naquin, and Bellard publicly opposed the ordinance and 
Councilmembers Keith Patin and Don Bertrand remained undecided.263 However, TFL and other 
tobacco control advocates believed they had secured an additional vote to pass the legislation.77 
 Tobacco-Free Living, local musicians, bar owners, and the Downtown Lafayette 
Restaurant and Bar Association supported the ordinance at the Council meeting.264 The 
association backed the smoking restrictions believing they were unavoidable and also benefitted 
their members’ customers.264 The association’s support of smoking restrictions in Lafayette was 
the first instance we found of a restaurant and bar organization endorsing a smokefree law in 
Louisiana. 
Opponents at the hearing consisted mostly of the Louisiana Association of Electronic 
Cigarette Retailers and individual electronic smoking device businesses.264 LAECR Secretary 
Heather Hutton argued to the committee that including vaping in smoking restrictions unfairly 
stigmatized electronic smoking devices, which she claimed saved lives as they were safer than 
cigarettes and worked as cessation aids.264 
After hearing public comment, the Lafayette City-Parish Council voted 4 to 5 against 
adopting the ordinance (Table 12.25).  
 
According to LCEF Healthcare Initiative 
Director Kathy Richard in a 2017 interview for this 
report, the fifth vote expected by health and tobacco 
control advocates changed sides, defeating the 
ordinance:  
We were betrayed by one of the council 
members that night. And he swung another 
vote. He was supposed to vote yes, and he 
swung, he said no, and another guy he swung. 
And so we…were unsuccessful.77 
Table 12.25: 2015 Lafayette City-Parish Council Vote on Smokefree Ordinance263 
Kenneth Boudreaux Yes 
Kevin Naquin Yes 
Jay Castille Yes 
Brandon Shelvin Yes 
Andy Naquin No 
Keith Patin No 
Don Bertrand No 
Jared Bellard No 
William Theriot No 
“We were betrayed by one of 
the council members that night. 
And he swung another vote. He 
was supposed to vote yes, and 
he swung, he said no, and 
another guy he swung. And so 
we … were unsuccessful.” 
 615 
 
Lafayette City-Parish Councilmembers voted against the ordinance on the grounds that it 
infringed on the freedom of individuals and private establishments. Following the vote, formerly 
undecided councilmember Keith Patin said in an interview with Lafayette newspaper Acadiana 
Advocate that loss of choice outweighed public health concerns in his decision to vote against the 
ordinance: 
If you go to smoky bars, secondhand smoke is going to hurt you in the long run, 
but everybody has a choice. You don’t have to smoke. You don’t have to go to 
those locations. Cigarettes are horrible. We would be better without them. But 
cigarettes are legal, and we have a choice.263 
On August 18, 2015 Councilmembers Don Bertrand and Kevin Naquin introduced a 
weaker version of Boudreaux’s ordinance that prohibited smoking at bars featuring live 
entertainment.265, 266 Under the revised ordinance, alcoholic beverage establishments, bars, and 
expanded service restaurants operating before the ordinance’s adoption could allow smoking by 
not hosting live entertainment and registering with the City of Lafayette as a smoking 
establishment.265, 266 The proposed ordinance also added new distance requirements that 
prohibited smoking or vaping within 25 feet of event stands or recreational facilities and 
fields.265, 266  Before the Council considered the revised  ordinance, sponsors Naquin and 
Bertrand pulled the bill because of opposition from TFL and unspecified smokefree 
proponents.267 TFL Regional Manager Rene Stansbury publicly opposed the revised ordinance 
because it failed to protect all workers from secondhand smoke.267 After efforts to pass 
legislation faltered in 2015, the Lafayette City-Parish Council waited to reconsider smoking 
restrictions until 2017. 
State Legislation to Further Restrict Smoking in Louisiana Schools Fails in 2016 
  
In 2016, State Representative Frank Hoffmann (R-West Monroe) introduced HB 218 to 
expand smoking restrictions in schools to include all tobacco products.268 HB 218 expanded the 
definition of schools to cover all school property and vehicles, as well as specialty schools the 
Louisiana School for the Visually Impaired, the Louisiana Special Education Center, the 
Louisiana School for the Deaf, and others in the Special School District. (The Special School 
District consists of the Louisiana School for the Deaf, the Louisiana School for the Visually 
Impaired, and educational programs at alternative, behavioral, and correctional institutions269). 
HB 218 required school authorities to fine offenders a maximum $200, penalize them, or both. 
Hoffmann introduced HB 218 on behalf of the Louisiana Department of Health.270, 271 We did 
not find evidence that TFL endorsed or advocated for HB 218. 
 Lawmakers primarily attached amendments to expand and further strengthen smoking 
restrictions in HB 218 before approving it in each chamber. Hoffmann, the bill’s sponsor, 
attached changes to HB 218 on the House Floor that incorporated electronic cigarettes and any 
buildings operated or owned by local school boards into restrictions. He also exempted FDA 
approved tobacco cessation items. The Senate amended HB 218 to expand the tobacco product 
prohibition on school property to vapor and alternative nicotine products (noncombustible 
tobacco products). Senators also created a fine scale of $25 for initial offenses, $100 for second 
violations, and $250 for additional infractions. However, the Senate also weakened HB 218 by 
exempting school property being rented or used for non-teaching purposes and by permitting 
“nonpublic school CEO” to define their school property.” 
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 Although HB 218 initially passed both chambers, it failed to become law. The House 
rejected Senate amendments and forced the bill into conference committee.270  
Despite earlier support from both chambers for HB 218, representatives subsequently 
voted 81-17 to reject the committee’s compromise version of the bill.270 Jointly developed by 
State Senators and Representatives, HB 218’s conference version only differed from the 
original’s House and Senate amended version by limiting the complete prohibition on tobacco, 
vaping, and alternative nicotine product use on buses to when students were on vehicles. 
Representatives supposedly defeated HB 218’s conference version because they required school 
authorities to ensure compliance via discipline,272 or through mechanisms apparently unknown to 
lawmakers, levy fines on violators.270, 272  
Hoffmann Passes Legislation in 2017 to Prohibit Electronic Nicotine Products in Schools 
and Eliminate Designated Smoking Areas 
  
After failing to secure school smoking restriction legislation in 2016, Representative 
Frank Hoffmann introduced HB 531 on March 31, 2017 to prohibit possession of electronic 
cigarette and vaping devices on Louisiana public elementary and primary school property, at the 
Louisiana Special Education Center, and Special School District property.273 The bill also 
prohibited smoking on school vehicles transporting primary and secondary students. However, 
HB 531 allowed smoking on school property being rented, leased or utilized for reasons 
unrelated to education. 
 Lawmakers passed HB 531 after weakening its smoking restrictions. Following technical 
revisions to HB 531 in the House, the Senate Committee on Education attached an amendment to 
revise the legal definition of smoking to include electronic cigarette devices.273 Committee 
members also amended the bill to allow individuals that were not school staff or students to 
smoke on school property, but still prohibited them from smoking in school buildings. Following 
amendments, the Louisiana State Legislature easily passed HB 531, and Governor John Bel 
Edwards signed it into law on June 22, 2017. The law took effect that day. 
Efforts to Secure an Ordinance in Lafayette Begin Anew in 2017 
 
On April 4, 2017, Councilmember Kenneth Boudreaux introduced a comprehensive 
smokefree ordinance to the Lafayette City-Parish Council.274 The legislation was cosponsored by 
Councilmembers Bruce Conque, Nanette Cook, Pat Lewis, and Kevin Naquin, which guaranteed 
enough votes for passage.274   
 
Nearly identical to Councilmember Boudreaux’s 2015 legislation, the ordinance 
eliminated exemptions allowing smoking in bars, alcoholic beverage facilities, restaurants, and 
gambling establishments.275 It exempted electronic smoking device businesses and hookah 
businesses, defined as establishments in which sales of electronic smoking devices or tobacco 
products comprised 50% or more of their annual revenue.274, 275 The ordinance left exemptions in 
place from the 2005 law for guest rooms at hospitality establishments, tobacco retailers, private 
residences not used for child care, adult day care or as healthcare facilities, outdoor areas at 
businesses, as well as private and semi-private nursing home and care facilities. The ordinance 
established a 25-foot distance requirement for smoking and vaping from entrances to enclosed 
areas where smoking and vaping were prohibited, playgrounds, event stands, as well as 
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recreational fields and facilities.275 Smaller 5-foot distance requirements for smoking and vaping 
from building entrances were established for expanded service restaurants and bars.275, 276 The 
ordinance retained existing penalties for smoking restriction violations and once again 
established penalties for non-compliant businesses. First violations by businesses resulted in a 
maximum $100 fine, second offenses within a year a $200 fine, and three or more offenses a 
$500 fine. Businesses committing three violations 
lost their permit or license unless they wrote, 
adopted, and implemented a corrective smokefree 
policy approved by an enforcement officer.275 
Lafayette’s Fire Department Chief, their designee, and other law enforcement officials enforced 
smoking restrictions.260 
To generate public awareness and support for the ordinance, TFL released results from a 
survey of 500 registered voters on April 4 showing that 68% of Lafayette Parish wanted smoking 
prohibited in bars and bingo halls while 29% opposed prohibiting smoking in bars and 
casinos.277, 278 The survey caused TFL Executive Director Tonia Moore to tell the press 
“Lafayette is definitely prime. They are ready to go smokefree.”278 
 The Lafayette City-Parish Council considered the ordinance at its April 18, 2017 
meeting.279 To apply pressure on the council to pass the law, TFL organized a rally at city hall 
with Musicians for a Smoke-Free Louisiana (formed in 2014 during the SmokeFree NOLA 
campaign280), LCEF, as well as individual musicians and backers in support of the smokefree 
ordinance.279   
The Council voted 7 to 2 to adopt the ordinance (Table 12.26).281, 282 Councilmembers 
Bellard and Theriot, who had opposed smoking restrictions in Lafayette since discussions began 
around 2012, voted against the ordinance.  
Mayor-President Joel Robideaux signed the ordinance into law, which became effective 
in Lafayette and unincorporated portions of Lafayette Parish immediately.284, 285 Enforcement of 
smoking restrictions started on August 1, 2017.284 Lafayette’s Fire Department Chief, their 
designee, and other law enforcement officials ensured compliance.260  
Tobacco Control Advocates Pursue a Local Ordinance in Baton Rouge in 2017 
  
On May 31, 2017, World No-Tobacco Day,211 the Smoke-Free EBR coalition revealed 
that it would again pursue a comprehensive smokefree ordinance in East Baton Rouge Parish that 
prohibited smoking in both bars and casinos.286 National members of the coalition in 2017 
Table 12.26: Lafayette City-Parish Council Vote on 2017 Smokefree Ordinance282, 283 
Kenneth Boudreaux Yes 
Kevin Naquin Yes 
Liz Webb Hebert Yes 
Pat Lewis Yes 
Nanette Cook Yes 
Jay Castile Yes 
Bruce Conque Yes 
Jared Bellard No 
William Theriot No 
“Lafayette is definitely prime. 
They are ready to go smokefree.” 
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included AHA, ACS-CAN, ANR, and  CTFK.286, 287 State partners (including state chapters of 
national organizations) consisted of LPHI, its tobacco control program TFL, ALA of Louisiana, 
National Association of Social Workers Louisiana Chapter, Musicians for a Smoke-Free LA, the 
Local 21 LA SEIU union, and the Louisiana Budget Project.286, 287 The 2017 effort was endorsed 
by Baton Rouge Mayor-President Sharon Weston Broome, who had won an election286 in Fall 
2016 to replace the term-limited Kip Holden.288 Broome had supported the Smoke-Free East 
Baton Rouge’s 2015 ordinance drive while campaigning to become mayor-president.  
On June 7, 2017, Baton Rouge’s new smokefree ordinance was publicly revealed.290 As 
proposed, the ordinance prohibited smoking in bars and casinos.290 The legislation exempted 
cigar and hookah bars, courtyards and patios at bars and casinos, outdoor seating, and private 
clubs from restrictions.290 Smokers faced a $50 penalty per offense. Establishments faced a $500 
penalty for initial offenses, a $700 penalty for their second violation in a year, and a $900 
penalty for additional infractions within a year. Businesses that offended smoking restrictions 
five times in one year faced possible occupancy permit revocation. The ordinance tasked the 
Baton Rouge Fire Department with enforcement.  
Seven of the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council’s 12 members sponsored the 
ordinance by the time of its reveal, likely ensuring its passage (Table 12.27). Former 
Councilmembers John Delgado and Ryan Heck, who had voted against the previous ordinance, 
were replaced by Barbara Freiberg and Matt Watson, who were elected to officec in 2016.290 
 The ordinance faced opposition from some Parish Metro Council members as well as the 
gaming community. Councilmember Buddy Amoroso, who voted against the 2016 ordinance, 
expressed concern that gaming profits could decline similarly to Harrah’s in New Orleans.290 
(Harrah’s claimed to suffer a 20% decline in profits after the 2015 smokefree ordinance passed 
there, which TFL contested.290) He also feared Baton Rouge would lose tax revenue from 
declining business at casinos. After the ordinance was announced in late May but before its 
provisions were revealed on June 7, Councilmember Trae Welch, who also rejected the 2015 
ordinance, indicated he would vote against smoking restrictions believing it was wrong to 
prohibit the use of legal substances.286 In late May 2017, the Louisiana Casino Association 
claimed that smoking restrictions caused business to decline at casinos and asserted the public 
can choose what areas to frequent. The L’Auberge casino reiterated its opposition to smoking 
restrictions, which it fought the previous 
year.286, 290 
Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge Builds Support 
for 2017 Ordinance 
  
To generate support for the smokefree 
ordinance before the East Baton Rouge Parish 
Metropolitan Council considered the legislation 
on June 28, 2017, Smoke-Free EBR released a 
poll in mid-June showing that Baton Rouge’s 
public favored prohibiting smoking in bars and 
casinos.292 The survey found that most people, 
in particular women, supported restricting 
Table 12.27: East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan 
Council Membership and Sponsorship of 2017 
Smokefree Ordinance290, 291 
Councilmember Ordinance Sponsor 
Buddy Amoroso No 
Chauna Banks Yes 
LaMont Cole Yes 
Donna Collins-Lewis Yes 
Barbara Freiberg Yes 
Erika Green Yes 
Dwight Hudson No 
Chandler Loupe No 
Matt Watson  Yes 
Trae Welch No 
Tara Wicker Yes 
Scott Wilson No 
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smoking in those venues. 50% of smokers that responded to the survey also supported smoking 
restrictions. 
 Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge 
partnered with Miss Black Louisiana US 
Ambassador LeighAnna Kingvalsky to 
promote smoking restrictions. She 
participated in a question and answer session 
with the Smoke-Free EBR Coalition on 
Facebook live.211 Having previously worked 
in Baton Rouge casinos, she shared her 
experience working in secondhand smoke. 
Kingvalsky had a letter published on June 23, 
2017 by the Baton Rouge Advocate recalling 
her experience working in secondhand smoke 
at a casino and her ultimately leaving to find 
a smokefree workplace, a luxury she claimed 
many of her coworkers did not have.293 She highlighted that 7,300 nonsmokers die in the United 
States every year from secondhand smoke, and pushed the people of Baton Rouge to pressure 
their councilmembers to back the ordinance. 
 Smoke-Free EBR organized events and used Faceb ook and Twitter to conduct outreach 
before the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council considered the smokefree 
ordinance.211, 212 The Coalition organized two smokefree nights at bars to promote clean air 
policies before the hearing. In addition, Smoke-Free EBR disseminate digital flyers, 
informational videos, tobacco health statistics, news and blog posts, and local radio interviews 
with bill sponsors Matt Watson and Barbara Freiberg where they discussed the smokefree 
ordinance.211, 294, 295 The Coalition also promoted its smokefree events using Facebook and 
Twitter, and used the social media platforms to share action alerts and an event invite296 for the 
June 28, 2017 East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council hearing. Smoke-Free East Baton 
Rouge also asked its Facebook followers to pressure Councilmembers to support the smokefree 
ordinance and provided contact information to reach them.211 
The First Baton Rouge Hearing: A Seemingly Sure Bet Narrowly Avoids Disaster 
 
The East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council considered the ordinance on June 28, 
2017. Health voluntaries, tobacco control advocates, and members of the bar, gaming, and music 
communities testified in support of smoking restrictions (Table 12.28). Opposition to the 
smokefree ordinance primarily came from the gaming industry. 
After testimony, Councilmember Buddy Amoroso motioned for the East Baton Rouge 
Parish Metropolitan Council to defer consideration of the ordinance for 30 days, primarily 
because of its enforcement provisions. Following the motion, Councilmember Trae Welch 
questioned if the Baton Rouge City Fire Department had jurisdiction to enforce smoking 
restrictions in unincorporated areas of the parish, and if fire departments in those areas had to 
carry out the law. Welch also took issue with the bill stating that smoking restriction violations 
would be reported through the Parish’s 311 line. He believed another agency could provide 
better enforcement.  
Kingvalsky had a letter published … by 
the Baton Rouge Advocate recalling 
her experience working in secondhand 
smoke at a casino and her ultimately 
leaving to find a smokefree workplace, 
a luxury she claimed many of her 
coworkers did not have. She 
highlighted that 7,300 nonsmokers die 
in the United States every year from 
secondhand smoke …. 
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Welch’s concerns sparked debate and confusion over who should enforce smoking 
restrictions. The issue led two of the ordinance’s sponsors, Barbara Freiberg and Matt Watson, to 
support a deferral. While debate over the ordinance’s fate continued, Councilmembers Lamont 
Cole, Tara Wicker, and Donna Collins-Lewis advocated for the bill’s passage to protect public 
health.  
Cole argued that the council should protect 
public health and save lives, and that the city-parish 
government would assist any job training for casino 
employees that lost employment. He had TFL 
Executive Director Tonia Moore explain that casino 
revenue had declined in Baton Rouge at two casinos 
over five years because of the arrival of a new casino 
in 2012. Next, Cole highlighted that casino 
management did not work in smoking environments 
while casino employees needed to take breaks to 
avoid smoke exposure.  
Councilmember Wicker asked L’Auberge staff about the effectiveness of their air 
ventilation systems, which they claimed effectively scrubbed the air of odor and toxins. Their 
assertion was later rebuked by Councilmember Donna Collins-Lewis. Wicker indicated that 
casinos could easily enforce smoking restrictions on their own, countered assertions by opposing 
councilmembers that the ordinance was government overregulation, and reminded attendees that 
research proved secondhand smoke was harmful. 
Councilmember Donna Collins-Lewis asked LeighAnna Kingvalsky, Miss Black 
Louisiana, a former casino employee, and spokesperson for Smoke-Free EBR how close smokers 
sat next to gaming staff. She asked the question to highlight that ventilation systems did not 
prevent secondhand smoke exposure. Collins-Lewis asserted that smokers could step outside to 
smoke if they felt inclined and rebuffed a request from a Pinnacle Entertainment representative  
to allow for a 1 year implementation period to mitigate revenue declines at the L’Auberge if the 
ordinance passed (the legislation had a six month implementation timeline).299 
Opposition from councilmembers came from Trae Welch, Buddy Amoroso, and Scott 
Wilson. Welch, generally opposed to adopting smoking restrictions, took issue with the 
ordinance’s enforcement provisions. Amoroso worried that riverboat casinos might relocate to 
avoid smoking restrictions. In response to questions from Amoroso, Louisiana Casino 
Association President Wade Duty said no instance of relocation had happened in Louisiana but 
claimed companies might react to lost revenue. He added that only New Orleans, and Baton 
Rouge if the ordinance passed, would have active smoking restrictions on casinos in the state. 
Councilmember Wilson voiced concern that smoking restrictions were government overreach 
that could lead to restrictions on other products like fast food.  
The East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council ultimately deferred consideration of 
the smokefree ordinance to August 9, 2017, primarily to determine how to enforce the 
legislation. The Council initially failed to approve the motion in a split vote. Councilmembers 
subsequently failed to pass the ordinance in another split vote. Councilmember Trae Welch, who 
voted against the ordinance, motioned to reconsider the bill and allow another deferral vote for  
Cole argued that the council 
should protect public health 
and save lives, and that the 
city-parish government would 
assist any job training for 
casino employees that lost 
employment. 
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Table 12.28: Testimony at June 28, 2017 Hearing on East Baton Rouge Smokefree Ordinance*297, 298 
Person Organization Position Testimony 
Proponents 
Raegan Carter211 Louisiana Public Health 
Institute 
Senior 
Manager 
Unknown* 
Onjewel Smith Americans For 
Nonsmokers’ Rights 
Southern 
States 
Strategist 
• According to gaming industry, Regional competition has major impact on gaming 
revenue, economy has impact, market saturation has impact. Not smoking policies.  
• Need for new players has industry looking at millennials, of which 78% of millennial 
gamers want smokefree environments. 
• Lost mom a few years before to secondhand smoke-caused lung cancer. 
Renee Chatelain Arts Council of Greater 
Baton Rouge 
President 
and CEO 
• Represents arts and entertainers effected by bill. 
• Artists and entertainers are special to city and help make it unique. 
• Protect artists and entertainers. 
Tonia Moore Tobacco-Free Living Executive 
Director 
• Air quality in Baton Rouge is awful according to study. 
• Secondhand smoke has negative health effects. 
• Baton Rouge customers are exposed to unhealthy air quality in smoking bars. Patrons of 
smokefree bars exposed to healthy air similar to outdoors. 
• Comprehensive smokefree policy only proven way to limit harmful exposure to 
secondhand smoke. 
• 97% decrease in air quality unhealthiness and other Louisiana locations after smokefree 
laws. 
• According to Louisiana gaming commission, since 2007, gross gaming revenue for 
Harrah’s and boomtown casinos have tremendously declined over ten years. Not from 
smokefree air policies. 
• Other casinos in other parishes remain stable.  
• Harrah’s reported 10% decline, not the 20-30% the industry claims will happen. 
Misleading to claim smoking part of decline. 
• Baton Rouge casinos also have general declines. 
Suzy Sonnier Baton Rouge Health 
District 
Executive 
Director 
• Smoking is leading cause of preventable death. 
• Secondhand smoke is harmful. 
• Health community supports ordinance. 
• Consider costs in lives and healthcare expenses to community from smoke exposure. 
Remi DeMatteo Bulldog Baton Rouge (beer 
garden) 
Manager • Bar went voluntarily smokefree in 2015. 
• Partly done out of solidarity with sister stores in New Orleans. 
• Mostly done because it was right thing to do. 
• Fears of lost guests and revenues were unfounded. 
• Maternal secondhand smoke exposure increased miscarriage risk by 11% according to 
2014 study (Speaker’s wife was pregnant when bars went smokefree). 
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• 2006 Surgeon General Report found causal relationship between secondhand smoke and 
SIDS. 
• Government tells businesses what to do all the time. 
• Cannot serve military members under 21, so he does not. 
• Year over year revenue increased 17 percent year after bar went smokefree. 
 
Henry Turner  Musician • Smoking restrictions are a small thing, should be done for health. 
• Why are we protecting tobacco companies and preserving money despite health? 
• What is more important, health or economics? 
Ashley Bridges American Heart 
Association 
State 
Government 
Relations 
Director 
• Secondhand smoke exposure immediately and negatively impacts the cardiovascular 
system. 
• Can cause coronary heart disease and stroke. 
• Can cause heart attacks. 
• Can cause lung cancer in adults that have not smoked. 
• Secondhand smoke exposure at work or at home can increase lung cancer risk 20-30%. 
• Increases risk of stroke and heart disease 2-4 times. 
• Tobacco use leading preventable cause of death in US. 
• In 2014 Louisiana had 7th highest death rate from cardiovascular disease in US. 
• Cardiovascular disease leading cause of death in Louisiana by 30%. 
• Protecting all workers in this parish is role of government. 
• Why should rights of one person infringe on another’s? 
• Government regulates all aspect of life, why not air quality. 
Peter Simon  Musician • Musicians need money and cannot always choose the air they breathe. 
 
LeighAnna Kingvalsky  Former 
casino 
worker / 
Miss Black 
Louisiana 
• Air filtration systems fail to prevent secondhand smoke exposure. 
• Knew that secondhand smoke exposure put her at risk of tobacco-related illnesses but 
needed to earn a living, work other jobs, and get into physical therapy school. 
• Employees exposed to secondhand smoke for hours. 
• Smoking restrictions will save lives. 
• Make Louisiana a healthier state. 
Lydia Kuykendal American Cancer Society Louisiana 
Director of 
Government 
Relations 
• If I was a restaurant owner and told you that I could increase profits by selling rotten 
meats, how would you react? 
• These people will come to you and say I can make 20% more profits you just need to let 
me have toxic air. 
• Secondhand smoke harms and kills people. 
• Right to smoke ends when it infringes my rights. 
• Ordinance regards public safety, not government intrusion. 
• Government’s function is primarily to protect public safety. 
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• Closest smoking casinos will be three-hour roundtrip from Baton Rouge if ordinance 
passes. 
• People willing to drive three hours for another casino instead of step outside for five 
minutes probably did not like their casino. 
• Workers do not have choice to work in secondhand smoke. They need an income. 
 
Claudia Rodas  Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids 
Southern 
Region 
Director 
• Organization seeks to create a future free of tobacco illness and death. Works at all levels 
of government. 
• Smokefree ordinance will save lives. 
• Tobacco advocates have debunked casino industry claims around smoking restrictions. 
• Wants to create safe environment for her kids. 
• Council has opportunity to protect children of these families that work in secondhand 
smoke. 
• Not a lot of smokers in casinos, but many employees in secondhand smoke every day. 
• Protect citizens. 
 
Greg Gormanis  Psychologist • Participated in smokefree efforts at state level and in Alexandria. 
• Smokers want to quit, and ordinance may assist them. 
• Citations are not really issue, since the laws are usually self-enforcing. 
• Prominent musicians oppose secondhand smoke exposure. 
• Catch up to Alexandria and other places. 
Taylor Caffrey   • Served in Vietnam between 1968 and 1969. Americans suffered about 7000 deaths. 
• Get that amount from secondhand smoke- induced lung cancer deaths. 
• Healthcare issue is America’s Vietnam. 
• Government can protect public from known health risks. 
• Great step to protect public health, not complicated like fixing insurance. 
 
Roosevelt Johnson Alexandria City Council President • Important for economic growth and development. 
• Alexandria became healthier community and city after passing smokefree ordinance. 
• No businesses closed because of smokefree ordinance in Alexandria. 
• Follow other Louisiana cities and demonstrate that you care about workplaces, people, 
economic development. 
• Means a lot for people when city council chooses to be smokefree. 
Opponents 
Matthew Allen East Baton Rouge 
Libertarian Party 
Treasurer • Laws carry inherent violence with necessity of enforcement and compliance. 
• Entering bar with smoking allowed is entirely consensual. 
• Law threatens violence to consenting adults. 
• Casinos are not at fault for paying better or being source of work. 
 624 
 
• Cannot induce others to change. 
• Issue should be handled by boycott, not government. 
Trivia Witherspoon L’Auberge Casino / 
Pinnacle Entertainment 
Supervisor • Understood the job she was taking and the environmental conditions when she applied. 
• Working in smoke is a choice for employees. 
• Workplace is not a necessity to public like Walmart or other stores. 
• Smoking existed in workplace before employees started. 
• Company has excellent ventilation system. 
• Workplace accommodates employees. 
• Has had no health problems with smoke in five years. Will have to pay for medical issues 
on her own. 
• Working in smoke affects her body and is her choice. 
Ryan Hernandez L’Auberge Casino / 
Pinnacle Entertainment 
Casino Host • Workplace cares about employees. 
• If revenue decreases there could be loss of jobs. 
• Workplace provides tuition reimbursement. 
• Employees could face lost pay because 70% work off tips. Could also see decrease in 
wages with reduced revenue. 
• Revenue allows casino to invest in community. 
• Company contributed to community after natural disaster. 
• Company uses local vendors.  
Anna Caffrey L’Auberge Casino / 
Pinnacle Entertainment 
Employee • Company cares about and is involved in community. 
• Company provided over 2000 volunteer hours to community since opening 5 years ago. 
• Company provided over $400k to employees after natural disaster. 
• Company has state of the art ventilation. 
• Company cares about employees and provides great benefits. 
• Customers make choice to go to casino. 
• Other people cannot afford to go to casinos, but they pay taxes, etc. 
Mickey Parington L’Auberge Casino / 
Pinnacle Entertainment 
General 
Manager 
• Provide opportunities to employees and customers. 
• Casino has state of art ventilation system. 
• People have choice to work or visit casino. 
• Employ over 1,044 workers, 30% in the casino. In the casino, only a small portion are 
smoking areas. 
• 160,000 sq. ft in casino area, only 30k sq. feet are smoking areas. 
• 70% of team members rely on tips. Less business harms income of 70%. 
• Casino will lose revenue because of ordinance. 
• Please afford time to mitigate business drop if the ordinance is passed. 
Wade Duty Louisiana Casino 
Association 
Executive 
Director 
Testimony not captured* 
*Portion of recorded testimony partially or totally missing. 
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August 9. Councilmembers subsequently approved his motion in a 7-6 vote, then approved 
deferring consideration of the ordinance until August 9.  
Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge Continues to Push the Bill 
  
After the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council delayed consideration of the 
ordinance, Smoke-Free EBR continued promoting the legislation using social media. The 
coalition circulated articles, facts, videos, and action alerts on Facebook and Twitter to maintain 
awareness and pressure for smoking restrictions.211 On July 1, the coalition also shared a link on 
its Facebook profile to an online poll hosted by the Greater Baton Rouge Business Report asking 
if prohibiting smoking in casinos would increase, decrease, or have no effect on people’s desire 
to visit casinos. Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge also shared the Facebook profiles of Councilman 
Buddy Amoroso, Barbara Freiberg, Trae Welch, and Matt Watson and asked its supporters to 
contact their Council representatives in support of the smokefree ordinance.211 The Coalition also 
directed its Facebook followers to Parish Metro Councilmember contact information on its 
campaign website. 
Smokefree ordinance sponsor Donna Collins-Lewis generated earned media for the 
smokefree ordinance by participating in a local radio interview on July 6, 2017.300 In the 
interview, she reaffirmed her support for the legislation and expressed that secondhand smoke 
was harmful. She argued that gamblers would go to Baton Rouge casinos regardless of smoking 
restrictions. 
 The Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge coalition generated earned media by publishing 
letters in Baton Rouge’s newspaper of record, The Advocate. In early July, tobacco control 
advocates wrote letters to The Advocate promoting clean air restrictions.301 Peter Simon, a Baton 
Rouge musician that testified in support of smoking restrictions at the June 26 hearing, published 
a letter on July 2 highlighting his early years performing when he had to take gigs regardless of a 
place’s smoking policy.301 Simon recalled the harmful effects he and his colleagues felt from 
secondhand smoke exposure. Simon stated he became able to turn down smoking venues, 
depriving fans of performances. He said that 21 states had smokefree laws and that 48 of the 60 
major American music performance markets were smokefree, and that Baton Rouge needed to 
enact a clean air policy to stop harming performers and “become one of America’s great 
cities.”301 Shortly after Simon, Matthew Wallace, a board member of Smoke-Free East Baton 
Rouge coalition partner March of Dimes, published a letter on July 4 in The Advocate calling for 
the East Baton Rouge Parish Metro Council to adopt smoking restrictions.302 He asserted 
secondhand smoke is harmful to pregnant women, women of child bearing age, infants and 
youth. Wallace also stated the harmful side effects of secondhand smoke on fetuses and infants, 
including birth defects, allergies and asthma, sudden infant death syndrome, and preterm birth 
among others. He revealed that East Baton Rouge Parish had the highest infant mortality rate in 
Louisiana and the second most preterm births, which he claimed could be alleviated by reducing 
exposure to secondhand smoke via a comprehensive clean air law. He asserted that workers 
should not have to decide between providing for their families or the health of themselves and 
their offspring.  
 The Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge Coalition released an air quality survey of Baton 
Rouge Bars and Casinos on August 4, 2017303 to inform the public about their exposure to 
harmful secondhand smoke and maintain awareness of the Baton Rouge ordinance. The study, 
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conducted by the Roswell Park Cancer Institute, evaluated the number of cigarettes consumed at 
20 bars and casinos in East Baton Rouge Parish. According to an August 4 article in the Greater 
Baton Rouge Business Report, Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge spokesperson and LPHI Regional 
Manager Raegan Carter declared “‘We’ve known the air quality was unhealthy in bars and 
casinos that allow smoking but haven’t have the hard data to prove the case in Baton Rouge. This 
study shows, without a doubt, that employees in these workplaces are at a significantly greater 
risk of cancer, heart disease and other tobacco-related illnesses.’”303 The air quality survey found 
that Baton Rouge bars and casinos had harmful air quality due to secondhand smoke. 
The Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge organized smokefree events to build support for the 
ordinance before the East Baton Rouge Parish 
Metropolitan Council vote on August 9.211 The coalition 
sponsored at least two smokefree nights at bars during 
July and three in August to promote clean air policies 
and maintain public awareness and support of the area’s 
pending smokefree legislation. 
The East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council 
Passes the Smokefree Ordinance 
 
The East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan 
Council considered the smokefree ordinance at a 
hearing on August 9, 2017. Smoke-Free East Baton 
Rouge coalition members, tobacco control and health 
voluntary representatives, city government employees, performers, a bar owner, and Baton 
Rouge residents testified in support of the ordinance (Table 12.29). Only Louisiana Casino 
Association Executive Director Wade Duty and Baton Rouge Libertarian Party member Matthew 
Allen testified against the ordinance (Table 12.29). 
After testimony concluded, Councilmember Watson offered amendments to the 
ordinance that assuaged concerns from the previous hearing and moved to adopt the legislation 
with his changes.304 The amendments redefined the definition of enclosed spaces to be areas with 
a floor and ceiling with over two walls (including movable dividers), reassigned enforcement 
responsibility from the Baton Rouge Fire Department to the police, stipulated the citation and 
judicial process for violations, required businesses to ask smoking restriction offenders to stop 
smoking and remove them from their premises if they continued violating the law, permitted 
smoking in courtyards without roofs, and extend the implementation date to June 1, 2018.304 
Following Watson’s motion, Councilmember Trae Welch introduced a substitute motion 
to amend Watson’s amendments to define enclosed areas as more than three walls.304 He also 
moved for implementation to start one year from date of adoption instead of June 1, to allow 
small businesses to adjust to smoking restrictions and become compliant with them.304  
Before voting on Councilmember Welch’s substitute motion, Councilmember Scott 
Wilson declared his opposition to the ordinance.304 He said it should be the right of businesses to 
set their own smoking policies. He added that people do not have to frequent places with smoke, 
and countered claims that people working in smoking workplaces needed protection by 
reasoning that some employees are smokers. He argued the free market should be allowed to  
… East Baton Rouge Parish 
had the highest infant 
mortality rate in Louisiana 
and the second most preterm 
births, which he claimed 
could be alleviated by 
reducing exposure to 
secondhand smoke via a 
comprehensive clean air law. 
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Table 12.29: Testimony at August 9, 2017 Hearing on East Baton Rouge Smokefree Ordinance304, 305 
Person Organization Position Testimony 
Raegan Carter* TFL / Smoke-Free 
East Baton Rouge 
Regional Manager 
/Spokesperson 
• Ordinance is reasonable legislation to protect bar and gaming employees, as well as the public. 
• Government’s primary responsibility is to protect public health and safety. 
• Provide equal treatment to bar and gaming employees. 
• Air quality in Baton Rouge bars and casinos are hazardous and can lead to numerous tobacco-
related illnesses. 
• Smoking restrictions would immediately improve public health.  
• Any exposure to secondhand smoke unsafe. 
• Secondhand smoke exposure is linked to multiple diseases. 
• Ventilation systems do not prevent secondhand smoke exposure or make it safe. 
• Smoking restrictions in New Orleans did not cause revenue declines in New Orleans casinos. 
• Casinos operate in an unstable industry influenced by regional competition and the economy. 
• Baton Rouge’s Belle and Hollywood Casinos saw significant declines because of the 
L’Auberge opening. 
• People attend casinos to enjoy gaming and services, not to smoke. 
• 70% of East Baton Rouge residents support proposed smoking restrictions. 
• 49% of voters plan to visit smokefree bars and casinos. 
Cynthia Hallett Americans for 
Nonsmokers’ Rights 
President and CEO • More than 800 smokefree gambling facilities in the United States. 
• 20 states prohibit smoking in gaming establishments. 
• Localities are prohibiting smoking in gaming establishments. 
• Smoking restrictions better the economy and public health. 
• Casinos claim smoking restrictions harm profits. 
• Industry profits mainly impacted by market saturation, regional competition, and the economy. 
• Gaming industry seeking customers. More than 85% of United States population does not 
smoke. 
• 68% of millennial gaming customers prefer smokefree venues according to gaming industry 
research. 
Michael Foster Michael Foster 
Project (band) 
Musician • Honored to represent Baton Rouge at performances around the country and world. 
• Performing in places that prioritize health and then performing in Baton Rouge, where 
smoking is allowed, is disappointing. 
• Sad that Louisiana youth that will grow up and become performers will work in smoke-filled 
environments. 
• Hopes his children will be able to perform in smokefree environments. 
• Students graduate from public school system each year and enter jobs that expose them to 
secondhand smoke. 
Tony King  Comedian • Work requires him to be in smoke-filled environments. 
• Never smoked in his life. 
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• He should not be impacted by secondhand smoke when he does not smoke.  
• He should be able to entertain the public and provide for his family without secondhand smoke 
exposure. 
• Think about families impacted by harmful effects of secondhand smoke. 
Taylor Caffrey   • Council is meant to protect the public. 
• Prohibited smoking in bars and pubs in England ten years ago. America has not followed suit. 
• England experienced 20% reduction in heart attack deaths and 15% less strokes after 
prohibiting smoking in bars and pubs. 
• Employees exposed to secondhand smoke create economic costs for gaming establishments. 
• Gaming establishments want more, not less patrons.  
• Council should protect public health. 
Suzy Sonnier Baton Rouge Health 
District 
 • Peoples’ environment impacts their health. 
• Ordinance can impact health wellbeing of Baton Rouge. 
• Cancer is far too wide reaching and impactful. 
• Although Baton Rouge has great healthcare, prevention is the best strategy for protecting 
public health.  
Randy Hayden306  Lobbyist • Read end portion of March of Dimes letter urging Metro Council to protect women and 
children by passing comprehensive smokefree ordinance.** 
• Lost family friend to lung cancer the night before. 
George Newman   • Not affiliated with Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge. 
• Suffered operations for lung and throat cancer. 
• Strongly enforce smoking restrictions. 
• Has to carry device around to evacuate phlegm from lungs. 
• Went to casinos regularly when he settled in Baton Rouge after over 27 years in military. He 
no longer can game because his lungs are compromised by smoke. 
• People can be harmed by smoke exposure at any age. 
• Louisville Kentucky implemented smoking restrictions and found from a study that revenue 
increased instead of decreased. 
• Adopt and enforce smoking restrictions. 
Matthew Allen East Baton Rouge 
Libertarian Party 
Parish Executive 
Committee 
Treasurer • Creates opposition between consenting adults on private property with law enforcement and 
Metro Council. 
• Fines unfair to levy on consenting and peaceful citizens. 
• Law enforcement carries implicit threat of violence if people refuse to pay fines. 
• Communication is right way to change behavior, not compulsion. 
Wade Duty Louisiana Casino 
Association 
Executive Director • People that are not in the casino industry claim smoking restrictions do not negatively impact 
industry. 
• Would gaming establishments oppose smoking restrictions if they were not economically 
harmful. 
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• Gaming establishments do not acquire new customers after smoking restrictions, like smoking 
restriction opponents claim. 
• Jobs and taxes impacted by revenue. 
• Smoking restrictions will reduce riverboat fees and revenue 10-15%. 
• Waiting for the state government to pass a law clarifying outdoor smoking areas for casinos 
would make smokefree policy implementation easier and less damaging. 
Jared Hymowitz Mayor’s Healthy 
City Initiative 
(Healthy BR) 
Director • Program aims to improve health and wellbeing of East Baton Rouge Parish and the City of 
Baton Rouge. 
• 88% of voters consider it somewhat or very dangerous for employees to work in secondhand 
smoke. 
• CDC causes over 7,300 nonsmokers in the US to die from lung cancer. 
•  Smoke is primary cause of Louisiana lung cancer deaths. 
• Nonsmokers that encounter secondhand smoke at their workplaces or in their residences face 
25-30% increased risk of heart disease. 
• Heart Disease is greatest cause of death in Louisiana. 
• Stroke risk increased 20-30% by secondhand smoke exposure, which causes 8000 deaths a 
year. 
• 70% of East Baton Rouge Parish residents support proposed smoking restrictions. 
Jennifer Carwile Self-employed Artist • Lafayette approved smokefree ordinance before Baton Rouge, and Baton Rouge should have 
adopted law before that city. 
Joe Hall Phil Brady’s Bar 
and Grill 
Owner • Bar has been nonsmoking for most weekend events for ten years.  
• Revenue improves during smokefree times. 
• More people are nonsmokers than smokers. 
• Employees do not need to be exposed to secondhand smoke. 
• Secondhand smoke causes cancer. 
• Understands time is needed to build outside smoking areas. 
• Double the amount of people go to smokefree performances. 
• People come to bars to drink, not to smoke. 
• People go to casinos to gamble, not smoke. 
• People will smoke outside. 
*Provided hundreds of supporter cards to council. 
**Provided March of Dimes letter copies to councilmembers. 
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operate and asserted smokefree legislation should be pursed at the state level to provide 
businesses a “level playing field.”304 
The East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council first voted on Welch’s substitute 
motion and then Watson’s. The Council rejected Welch’s proposal 3-9. The Council 
subsequently passed the ordinance with Councilmember Watson’s amendments in a 7-5 vote 
(Table 12.30). All seven original sponsors voted for the legislation. 
 After the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council approved the ordinance on 
August 9, Mayor-President Sharon Weston 
Broome signed it into law on November 16, 
2017,307 the American Cancer Society’s Great 
American Smokeout Day.308 As she signed the 
ordinance, Broome remarked that “Before this 
ordinance, Baton Rouge was one of the largest 
cities in the country that still allowed smoking in 
bars and casinos.”307 Smoke-Free East Baton 
Rouge representatives as well as East Baton Rouge Parish Metro Councilmembers and 
smokefree ordinance sponsors Banks, Cole, Collins-Lewis, Freiberg, Green, Watson, and Wicker 
attended the signing. The Smoke-Free EBR Coalition commemorated the signing by holding a 
“Great American Smokeout Celebration” at the Cadillac Café.309 
As adopted, the ordinance prohibited smoking and vaping in enclosed workplaces 
including bars and casinos, child care establishments, parks, playgrounds and healthcare 
facilities.310 The ordinance also set a 25-foot distance requirement for smoking or vaping from 
any entryway or exit at a facility or building hosting or operated by the city-parish.310 Tobacco 
product sales were prohibited within 300 feet of schools, churches, parks, childcare 
establishments, and public libraries unless tobacco retailers had been operating in that location 
before December 31, 2017.310 The sales distance did not apply to electronic smoking device 
retailers and those devices. The legislation exempted tobacco sector businesses and tobacco 
retailers, electronic smoking device retailers, and cigar and hookah bars (to qualify to be a cigar 
or hookah bar, businesses had to have 20% or more of annual gross income come from in-store 
purchases of those products or related rental or sale of accessories in calendar year 2016, or by 6 
months of opening if they were not active December 31, 2016310) from smoking and vaping 
Table 12.30: East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council Votes on 2017 Smokefree Ordinance304 
Councilmember Substitute Motion Vote Ordinance Vote (Combined with Matt 
Watson’s amendments) 
Buddy Amoroso No No 
Chauna Banks No Yes 
LaMont Cole No Yes 
Donna Collins-Lewis No Yes 
Barbara Freiberg No Yes 
Erika Green No Yes 
Dwight Hudson No No 
Chandler Loupe Yes No 
Matt Watson  Yes Yes 
Trae Welch Yes No 
Tara Wicker No Yes 
Scott Wilson No No 
“Before this ordinance, Baton 
Rouge was one of the largest cities 
in the country that still allowed 
smoking in bars and casinos.” 
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restrictions.310 The ordinance also allowed smoking and vaping in outdoor, unroofed spaces at 
bars, casinos and restaurants, as well as convention centers when hosting events related to 
convenience store associations, tobacco, or electronic cigarettes.310 Vehicles were also exempted 
from smoking and vaping restrictions unless they were used for healthcare, childcare, daycare, or 
group home transportation.310 Smokefree and vaping restriction infractions by businesses 
resulted in a maximum $500 fine for first offenses, a maximum $700 fine for second offenses 
within 12 months, and maximum $900 fines for subsequent offenses within 12 months.310 
Businesses faced possible occupancy permit revocation if five infractions occurred within 12 
months.310 Smokers and electronic smoking device users faced $50 fines for every infraction of 
smoking restrictions.310 Places where smoking and vaping were allowed, restricted or prohibited 
were required to post relevant signage at entrances and at “appropriate locations within” their 
establishment.310 
Maintaining Momentum for Implementation of Baton Rouge Ordinance 
 
The Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge Coalition maintained public outreach after the Baton 
Rouge ordinance passed to sustain awareness and support for the new smoking restrictions until 
their implementation on June 1, 2018. The Coalition posted about Baton Rouge’s impending 
smoking restrictions, smokefree policies, the negative impacts of secondhand smoke, tobacco 
cessation services and the benefits of quitting smoking, general health information, and 
disseminated pro-clean air messages and smokefree event information on their Facebook and 
Twitter pages. As the ordinance’s date of effect neared, the Coalition made posts counting down 
to implementation.  
The Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge Coalition hosted multiple events to promote smoking 
restrictions and maintain public attention on Baton Rouge’s smokefree ordinance. The Coalition 
served as the major sponsor of Baton Rouge’s 24th annual Baton Rouge Blues Festival held on 
April 14-15, 2018.311 The Coalition operated an informational booth at the event where it 
provided promotional materials bearing smokefree messaging.211 In addition, the Coalition 
sponsored the Changing and Advancing Nutrition Now – CANN 5K race on May 3, 2018, The 
Futures Fund Spring Student Showcase and Healthy BR Family Fit Day on May 19, 2018, and a 
music event at the bar Spanish Moon on May 26, 2018.211  
To assist implementation of Baton Rouge’s ordinance, Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge 
produced a toolkit explaining smoking restrictions, how businesses and the public could comply 
with the new law, and penalties for violations.312 
The Baton Rouge ordinance was implemented on June 1, 2018, as scheduled. Smoke-
Free EBR hosted an event to announce implementation of the Baton Rouge smokefree ordinance 
at a bar named The Bulldog.312 The event featured speeches by East Baton Rouge Parish 
Metropolitan Councilmember Donna Collins-Lewis, s Director of the Mayor’s Healthy City 
Initiative  Jared Hymowitz, ACS Government Relations Director Ashley Hebert, bar owner Remi 
DeMatteo, and musician Henry Turner supporting smokefree policies and the clean air law 
entering effect that day. The law’s implementation provided Baton Rouge with comprehensive 
smoking restrictions that prohibited smoking in most workplaces, including bars and casinos. 
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TFL Launches Campaign to Secure a Comprehensive Statewide Smokefree Law in 2018 
 
 On April 3, 2018, Representative Dustin Miller (D-Opelousas) introduced HB 881313 to 
expand state smoking restrictions beyond those established by the 2006 Louisiana Smoke-Free 
Air Act (Chapter 10).314 Cosponsored by Representative Julie Stokes (R-Kenner),315 HB 881 
prohibited smoking in most public places and workplaces including bars, convention centers, 
gaming establishments, places licensed to have video poker or slot machines, common areas (i.e. 
hallways and bathrooms), hotels and motels, theaters, museums, day cares for adults and youth, 
public and private educational facilities, elevators, parking structures, healthcare facilities, 
service lines, public transit, taxis, voting places, schools, private clubs, sports facilities, retailers, 
restaurants, correctional facilities, as well as semi-private and private rooms occupied by one or 
more individuals at long term care and assisted living facilities.313 The bill exempted private cars 
and residences, outdoor areas at workplaces (although owners could make outdoor areas 
smokefree with the effect of law by posting no smoking signage in said place), and designated 
outdoor smoking areas at bars, gaming establishments 
(casinos and establishments dedicated to off-track 
betting, pari-mutuel wagers, or slot machines). HB 881 
maintained enforcement and penalties for smoking 
restriction violations established by the 2006 smokefree 
law (Chapter 10). 
 The Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana 
(CTFLA) held a press conference with HB 881 sponsor 
Dustin Miller that same day to announce the launch of 
its Smoke-Free Louisiana Campaign315 to pressure state 
lawmakers to pass comprehensive smokefree legislation 
covering bars, gaming establishments, and all other workplaces.316 Primary CTFLA members for 
the 2018 campaign were TFL, ACS-CAN, AHA, ALA of Louisiana, LCEF, ANR, and CTFK. 
According to an LPHI article about the event, Representative Miller declared\: 
Today’s campaign announcement is the first step in moving Louisiana to be a 
healthier state. We are losing too many loved ones to diseases that are largely 
preventable. Now is the time for changes that can save lives and create better 
places to work, live and play.316 
TFL Regional Manager and CTFLA spokesperson Raegan Carter also spoke at the event, 
praising local governments for passing comprehensive smokefree ordinances while asserting 
more action was needed to protect workers in Louisiana. 
Despite support from CTFLA, HB 881 failed to pass out of its initial committee. The 
House Health and Welfare Committee first considered HB 881 on April 12, 2018.317 During the 
hearing, opponents testified that profits, particularly those of gaming establishments, would be 
harmed by the bill’s smoking restrictions. A cigar bar owner also testified that HB 881 would 
cause his business to close. Lawmakers ultimately deferred consideration, fearing the bill might 
lead to store closures. After the postponement, HB 881 sponsor Dustin Miller developed 
amendments with committee assistance to exempt cigar bars and outdoor meetings from smoking 
restrictions, to make the bill more viable.318 
“We are losing too many 
loved ones to diseases that 
are largely preventable. Now 
is the time for changes that 
can save lives and create 
better places to work, live 
and play.” 
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 CTFLA members expressed disappointment at the Committee’s decision to defer HB 
881. AHA Government Relations Director Ashley Hebert issued a statement after the hearing 
asserting that the committee’s decision left people exposed to secondhand smoke and avoided a 
chance to make Louisiana a smoking restriction leader in the South. 317 TFL Regional Manager 
and Smoke-Free Louisiana Campaign spokesperson Raegan Carter told the media that HB 881 
sought to protect employee health and did not seek to harm businesses.317  
 Ultimately, Representative Miller withdrew HB 881 from consideration and instead 
proposed House Concurrent Resolution 76 to form a committee to study secondhand smoke’s 
impacts.319 He explained his decision to withdraw HB 881 and submit HCR 76 according to 
Baton Rouge newspaper The Advocate, stating “Not that there’s not a ton of information out 
there [regarding secondhand smoke’s effects], I felt as if Louisiana businesses and legislators 
needed to go to the table and talk some more.”319 The panel would evaluate the economic effects 
of smoking restrictions in other states and parishes. If passed, the committee would also collect 
data on illnesses and medical expenses caused as a result of nonsmokers’ exposure to 
secondhand smoke. As introduced on April 27, 2018, HCR 76 designated 17 members from the 
state government, municipalities, the health community, as well as business and gaming sectors 
to the panel (Table 12.31). The House Health and Welfare Committee amended the resolution to 
add five more members, bringing the total on the panel to 22 members.  
HCR 76 passed the legislature with minimal resistance. The Resolution’s adoption 
required a study committee’s formation by August 1, 2018, and the production of its findings to 
Louisiana’s state legislature by March 8, 2019.319 
 The Secondhand Smoke Study Committee met throughout the remainder of 2018 and 
early 2019. The Louisiana Department of Health’s Office of Public Health (OPH), the State 
Department of Insurance, and tobacco control advocates presented to the committee. During a 
December 18, 2018 hearing OPH presented information that smoking restrictions protect and 
improve public health and would save the state millions in healthcare costs.324 OPH claimed it 
could not research health outcomes between parishes because of limited research resources and 
other factors. OPH conducted a review that found comprehensive smoking restrictions improve 
public health and reduce smoking prevalence, consumption, secondhand smoke exposure, 
asthma deaths as well as cardiovascular problems and various heart diseases. The review also 
found that comprehensive restrictions reduced hospital admissions, emergency medical calls 
from casinos, and lowered healthcare expenses. OPH stated it could not conduct a 30-year 
comparative analysis. However, OPH reported that smoking-related illnesses annually cost the 
United States $300 billion, and Louisiana over $4 billion, in productivity and healthcare 
expenses. At the same hearing, Department of Insurance official and Smoke Study Committee 
Member Patrick Bell presented minimal information on the impact of secondhand smoke on 
insurance costs.324 At a February 27, 2019 meeting, CTFK Southern Region Director Claudia 
Rodas and Raegan Carter, consulting for ANR, presented on the negative health and economic 
impacts of secondhand smoke exposure in Louisiana to committee members.325We did not find 
evidence that gaming, bar, or tobacco industry representatives presented to the committee. 
The committee approved its final report and sent it to the Louisiana Legislature on April 
1, 2019.323, 326 The report determined that 23% of Louisianans smoked, above the national 
average of 14%, and that tobacco use was the main cause of preventable death in the state.323 The 
report highlighted that secondhand smoke disproportionately impacted minorities, in particular  
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Table 12.31: HCR 76 Secondhand Smoke Study Committee Membership320-322 323 
 Original Final (House 
Health and Welfare 
Committee 
Amendment) 
Representative 
Selected 
Actual position within organization 
Louisiana Department of 
Health - Office of Public 
Health  
+ + Robin Rhodes Health Community Manager 
Louisiana Department of 
Revenue Secretary* 
+ + Shanda 
McClain+ 
Policy Services Division 
Commissioner of Insurance* + + Patrick Bell+ Assistant Commissioner 
Department of Culture, 
Recreation and Tourism 
official 
+ + Dee Scallan Education Coordinator 
Louisiana Public Health 
Institute CEO* 
+ + Tonia Moore 
(Chair)+ 
Director (TFL) 
Louisiana Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Living 
+ + Shawna Shields Associate Director 
Louisiana Association of 
Business and Industry  
+ + Randy Hayden Designee 
American Heart Association of 
Louisiana  
+ + Ashley Hebert Government Relations Director 
American Cancer Society-
Cancer Action Network 
+ + Lance Barbour Government Relations Director 
Cardiovascular Institute of the 
South CEO* 
+ + Amanda 
Lapeyrouse+ 
Tobacco Treatment Team Leader 
Louisiana State University 
School of Public Health 
+ + Donna 
Williams^^^ 
Director, Associate Dean for Public 
Health Practice and Community 
Engagement 
Tulane University School of 
Public Health and Tropical 
Medicine 
+ + Carolyn C 
Johnson 
Tulane Prevention Research Center 
Director 
Southern University 
Agricultural Center 
+ + Linda Brown Communities of Color Network 
Director 
Louisiana Cultural Economy 
Foundation 
+ + Kathy Richard Healthcare Initiative Director 
Louisiana Cancer Research 
Center 
+ + Sven Davisson CEO 
Louisiana Budget Project 
Director* 
+ + Stacey 
Roussel+ 
Policy Director 
Louisiana Municipal 
Association Director* 
 + John Gallagher Executive Director 
Police Jury Association of 
Louisiana President 
 + Guy Cormier+ Assistant Director 
Office of Alcohol and Tobacco 
Control Commissioner 
 + Ernest Legier+ Senior Attorney 
License holder to operate a 
maximum of three video poker 
devices at places with alcohol 
sales 
 + Donovan 
Fremin^^ 
Video gaming operator 
License holder to operate 50 
video poker machines at truck 
stops** 
 + Stan Guidroz^ Southern Operations VP, Jacobs 
Entertainment, inc. 
*Or their designee. 
**Required approval from Louisiana Video Gaming Association. 
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African Americans. The report also referenced a study finding that the second-most negative 
issue for problem gamblers was smoking, behind depression. 
The report reaffirmed the harmful effects 
of secondhand smoke exposure, that the only way 
to eliminate harmful exposure to secondhand 
smoke is through smokefree policies, and that 
millions of the US public remained exposed to 
secondhand smoke. The report also cited findings 
that local smokefree policies do not harm bar, 
bingo hall or restaurant revenue and that the 2006 
Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act had not affected 
tourism in the state.  
 To protect the public, the report advised 
lawmakers to eliminate statewide smokefree 
exceptions permitting indoor smoking at tobacco industry conventions, Mardis Gras balls, 
nursing homes, bars and gaming establishments, as well as hotel and motel rooms. The report 
also called for incorporating “e-cigarettes and vaping in[to] a comprehensive statewide 
policy.”323 Additionally, the committee recommended increasing tobacco taxes and tobacco 
control spending in the report, asserting that combining those policies with their suggested 
smoking restrictions could save Louisiana $1.89 billion in annual tobacco-related healthcare 
expenses and reduce overall smoking rates in the state. The report suggested state lawmakers 
continue to support municipalities’ rights to pass comprehensive smokefree ordinances. 
Local Smokefree Ordinances as of 2020 
 
Dedicated work by health voluntaries, tobacco control advocates and local elected 
officials in Louisiana led to the adoption of 28 comprehensive smokefree ordinances by January 
2020 that were stronger than the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act passed in 2006 (Chapter 10) 
(Table 12.32). Smokefree ordinances safeguard 27.9% of Louisianans from secondhand smoke 
exposure.327, 328 
Table 12.32: Localities in Louisiana with 100% Smokefree Venues2, 6, 21, 327, 329-335 
City Year 100% 
Smokefree 
Workplaces  
100% 
Smokefree Bars  
100% Gaming 
Establishments 
Inclusion of E-
Cigarettes into 
Smoking 
Restrictions 
Alexandria 2012 X X X  
Woodworth 2012 X X X  
Cheneyville 2014 X X X X 
Monroe 2014 X X X X 
Ouachita Parish 2014 X X X X 
+Designee. 
^President of Louisiana Gaming Association. 
^^Past president of Louisiana and national Amusement and Music Operators Associations. Owns and operates video gaming 
machines, as well as bars and restaurants. 
^^^Represented by proxy at least at first meeting. 
The report reaffirmed the harmful 
effects of secondhand smoke 
exposure, that the only way to 
eliminate harmful exposure to 
secondhand smoke is through 
smokefree policies, and that 
millions of the US public remain 
exposed to secondhand smoke. 
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West Monroe 2014 X X X X 
Hammond 2015 X X X X 
New Orleans 2015 X X X X 
Abbeville 2015 X X X X 
Bogalusa 2016 X X X X 
Glenmora  2017 X X X X 
Lafayette Parish 2017 X (2005) X X X 
Town of Lecompte 2017 X X X X 
Baton Rouge / East 
Baton Rouge Parish 
2017 X X X X 
Colfax 2017 X X X X 
Roseland 2018 X X X X 
Village of McNary 2018 X X X X 
Fenton 2019 X X X X 
Boyce 2019 X X X X 
Cullen 2019 X X X X 
Ruston 2019 X X X X 
Pineville 2019 X X X X 
Ponchatoula 2019 X X X X 
Haynesville 2019 X X X X 
Natchez 2019 X X X X 
Reeves 2019 X X X X 
Oak Grove 2019 X X X X 
Athens 2019 X X X X 
 
Conclusion  
 
Between 2012 and December 2019, health and tobacco control organizations made little 
progress on smoking restrictions at the state level. Turning away from a hostile political 
environment at the state level to the local level, where constituents have more influence with 
their representatives, these same health and tobacco control organizations helped secure a 
majority of the 28 comprehensive local smokefree ordinances passed in Louisiana during that 
time. TFL first obtained a smokefree ordinance covering bars and gaming establishments in 
Alexandria during 2012, after determining the city positively received its Healthier Air For All 
media campaign calling for protecting employees in those workplaces from secondhand smoke 
(Chapter 4). Healthier Air for All served as the general theme of smokefree ordinance efforts 
across the state, most notably in the cities of New Orleans and Baton Rouge.  
In 2015, health and tobacco control advocates formed the SmokeFree NOLA Coalition to 
wage a multilevel campaign with state and national partners similar to the CTFLA Coalition in 
2006 that secured a statewide smoking restriction law and fully repealed preemption (Chapter 
10). SmokeFree NOLA used paid and earned media, smokefree events, and spokespersons from 
music, bar, and other communities to generate public awareness and support for a clean air 
ordinance. The Coalition promoted service workers, gaming employees and musicians, as the 
lifeblood of New Orleans because of its status as a tourist destination and as a jazz music capital. 
The coalition aggressively countered freedom of choice, harm reduction, and economic harm 
claims from bar, gaming, and electronic cigarette industry opponents seeking to defeat the 
ordinance. As a result, health and tobacco control advocates secured a clean air law prohibiting 
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smoking and vaping in bars and casinos in New Orleans, which is notorious for its unfettered, 
freewheeling attitudes.  
Public health groups subsequently formed the Smoke-Free EBR Coalition and replicated 
their strategy in that parish and its major city, Baton Rouge. After an initial stumble in 2016, the 
Smoke-Free EBR Coalition obtained comprehensive smoking and vaping restrictions covering 
bars and gaming establishments in the city and parish the following year. Besides Baton Rouge, 
between 2017 and December 2019, 16 more local governments adopted comprehensive clean air 
laws prohibiting smoking and vaping in bars and gaming establishments despite some not having 
any existing bingo halls or casinos.  
Louisiana’s smokefree struggle shows the advocacy power generated when health and 
tobacco control programs form coalitions and employ multifaceted campaigns with messaging 
targeted at the specific locality, even within cities that have a strong, anti-tobacco control 
presence and lax attitudes toward regulation. Smokefree efforts in Louisiana from 2012 to 
December 2019 indicate that tobacco control advocates can further protect the public from 
secondhand smoke by securing comprehensive restrictions at the local level when state 
legislatures are opposed to or apathetic about passing strict smokefree laws.   
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Chapter 13: Summary and Conclusions 
 
• The tobacco industry dominated Louisiana tobacco control policy outcomes between the 
1970s and 1990s using its lobbyists, campaign contributions, and allies. 
• The tobacco industry secured weak youth access and smoking accommodation laws to 
prevent stronger public health legislation, prevented tax increases, and won tort reform 
laws to protect the industry from products liability litigation between the 1970s and 
1990s. 
• Tobacco control advocates lacked a powerful presence in Louisiana until the 1990s and 
2000s, with the formation of the Louisiana Tobacco Control Program in the Department 
of Health and Hospitals in 1993, the Coalition for a Tobacco-Free Louisiana in 2001 and 
Tobacco-Free Living in 2004. 
• Tobacco control advocates formed multilevel coalitions to overturn pro-tobacco industry 
laws and secure legislation establishing effective statewide smoking restrictions and 
comprehensive local smokefree laws despite strong opposition. 
• Tobacco control advocates utilized their smokefree coalition model to end years of 
stagnation and bring Louisiana’s tobacco taxes from 49th highest nationwide to 33rd in 
2015 and 2016. 
 
 The tobacco industry dominated Louisiana’s political landscape and health for decades 
until the early 2000s, when tobacco control advocates developed the resources and capacity to 
counter the industry’s influence and enact tobacco control laws and policies favorable to public 
health.  
 
Tobacco Industry Influence Dominates Louisiana 1970s-1990s 
 
Beginning in the 1970s, the tobacco 
industry made significant efforts to influence 
state legislation in Louisiana. The tobacco 
companies and their political arm, the 
Tobacco Institute, activated their employee 
advocacy program the Tobacco Action 
Network to track and oppose legislation in 
Louisiana that negatively affected industry 
interests. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s the 
tobacco industry contracted prominent 
lobbyists with powerful ties to Louisiana’s 
business community to represent it in the state. Using shared policy goals and their lobbyists’ 
connections, the tobacco industry formed strong relationships and coalitions with the Louisiana 
Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributor’s Association, the Louisiana Hotel-Motel 
Association, Louisiana Restaurant Association, the Louisiana Association of Business and 
Industry, and others to block unfavorable legislation and enact laws harmful to public health.  
 
Besides lobbying and coalition building, the tobacco industry used campaign 
contributions to influence the Louisiana State Legislature to support its policy agenda. Through 
the 1983 and 1995 election cycles, the Tobacco Institute made most contributions to Louisiana 
Strong lobbyists and business 
community connections, coupled with 
campaign contributions, enabled the 
tobacco industry to significantly 
influence political outcomes in 
Louisiana towards its favor during the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
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lawmakers and elected officials among the tobacco industry, followed by Philip Morris (Chapter 
3). Philip Morris provided the greatest contributions among tobacco companies to Louisiana 
lawmakers and elected officials through the 1999 and 2015 election cycles. The tobacco industry 
initiated contributions in the state during 1982, to sway lawmakers on committees handling 
smokefree and tobacco tax legislation in its favor on legislation expected in future sessions. 
From the 1983 to 2015 election cycles, the tobacco industry contributed nearly $2.2 million in 
2019 dollars ($1.6 million in current dollars) to state and local candidates in Louisiana.  Between 
the 1983 and 1999 election cycles, Democrats, who then controlled the state legislature, received 
the most contributions from the tobacco industry. Republicans received more donations than 
Democrats beginning in 2003, as the State GOP gathered strength to take over the state 
legislature, which it did in 2011 (Chapter 3). The tobacco industry continued providing more 
donations to Republicans when and after they seized the legislature. Tobacco industry campaign 
contributions peaked during the 1999 election cycle, when state lawmakers prepared to allocate 
funds from the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). Tobacco industry contributions reached 
their second highest during the 2007 election cycle, when tobacco control advocates successfully 
pursued a statewide smokefree law that prohibited smoking in public places, government 
buildings, restaurants, public schools and correctional facilities, and repealed local smoking 
restriction preemption (Chapter 10). Tobacco contributions subsequently reached their third 
highest during the 2011 election cycle, when the industry rebuffed most attempts to increase 
tobacco taxes (Chapter 3).  
 
Strong lobbyists and business community connections, coupled with campaign 
contributions, enabled the tobacco industry to significantly influence political outcomes in 
Louisiana. The tobacco industry and its allies prevented meaningful tobacco tax increases 
(Chapter 6), obtained laws limiting its liability for harm caused by tobacco products (Chapter 8), 
secured smoker accommodation laws that preempted local smoking restrictions (Chapter 5), and 
passed and promoted weak youth access restrictions pushed by the tobacco companies (Chapter 
7).Although not always successful, lobbying, relationship building, and contributions advanced 
the tobacco industry’s interests in Louisiana during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Industry Smoking Restrictions 
 
From 1970 to 1993, the tobacco industry utilized its lobbyists, business allies, and 
campaign contributions to block 61 smoking restriction bills at the state level. Most smoking 
restriction bills during that period sought to limit smoking in certain places (in particular 
workplaces, schools, healthcare facilities, and government property and facilities, Chapter 5), 
permitted smoking areas or required accommodation policies for smokers and nonsmokers (an 
industry policy1), rendering them ineffective and uncomprehensive. Similarly, local smoking 
restriction ordinances pursued between 1978 and 1993 (the year local preemption of smoking 
restrictions was implemented) were limited in scope and effect, prohibiting or restricting 
smoking on government property, in restaurants, public places and workplaces. By the late 1980s 
and early 1990s the tobacco industry, facing growing criticism and resistance across the United 
States, sought to pass weak, preemptive smoking restriction legislation across the country and in 
Louisiana. The tobacco industry subsequently helped secure three weak smoking restriction bills 
instituting smoker accommodation in 1992 as well as two accommodation bills preempting local 
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control in 1993. Tobacco industry interference resulted in 10 years of complete preemption of 
local smoking laws and 13 years of ineffective state-level smoking restrictions. 
 
Low Tobacco Taxes 
 
Similar to legislative efforts around smoking restrictions, the tobacco industry dominated 
tobacco tax policy battles in the 1980s and 1990s using campaign contributions as well as its 
connected lobbyists and business community allies. Louisiana was among 9 states to first pass a 
tobacco tax (doing so in 1926). However, starting in 1980, the tobacco industry aggressively 
fought tax increases on its products after Louisiana lawmakers created the Louisiana Cancer and 
Lung Trust Fund and unsuccessfully attempted to support the trust using a cigarette tax increase. 
Between 1980 and 1994, state lawmakers only passed incremental tobacco tax increases in 1984 
and 1990 despite a recurring state budget crisis. The tobacco industry partnered with allied 
businesses to stymie major tobacco tax increase legislation multiple times at the state level, and 
dedicated significant resources to overturning a local tobacco tax in New Orleans. The tobacco 
industry repealed the New Orleans local tax, first passed in 1984, in 1992 after years of work to 
remove the increase. Partly because of tobacco industry interference, Louisiana’s tobacco tax 
rates would stagnate and not increase again until 2000. 
 
Weak Youth Access Laws  
 
The tobacco industry heavily affected youth access policy in Louisiana, helping secure 
weak legislation that promoted ineffective industry voluntary programs. The first modern youth 
access legislation adopted by Louisiana lawmakers was a bill passed in 1988 prohibiting 
sampling to minors (Chapter 7). While prohibiting sampling protects minors, the bill failed to 
safeguard youth since Louisiana law still allowed tobacco product sales to people of any age. 
Louisiana remained one of five states lacking a minimum age of sale until 1991, when the 
Tobacco Institute (TI) helped pass a law setting the age at 18 years. TI tied the law into its 
nationwide, “It’s the Law” youth access program that was designed to head off meaningful 
government regulation and enforcement of tobacco product sales by promoting weak 
unenforceable legislation that codified voluntary industry self-regulation.  
 
Subsequent adoption of the Synar Amendment at the federal level in 1992, which 
required states to demonstrably reduce sales of tobacco to youth under 18, prompted state 
lawmakers in Louisiana to pass legislation in 1994 providing the Office of Alcohol and Beverage 
Control enforcement over youth tobacco sales restrictions and preempt local youth access 
ordinances (Chapter 7). However, in 1995 lawmakers adopted a bill rendering enforcement 
ineffective, resulting in a 73% retailer violation rate of youth access laws by 1997. That year, the 
state legislature adopted a bill to establish a tobacco product licensing system for tobacco 
product sales that re-enabled effective enforcement of retail restrictions. Although the legislation 
included weak, tobacco industry-desired penalties for retailer infractions, Louisiana’s youth 
access violation rates improved to one of the best in the United States by 1999. Later, in 2014, 
state lawmakers passed legislation prohibiting the sale of electronic cigarettes to minors under 
18. The bill was developed with tobacco industry input and contained pro-industry language that 
defined electronic cigarettes separately from tobacco products, requiring extra legislation to 
include electronic cigarettes in existing tobacco control restrictions. Health advocates supported 
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the 1997 and 2014 bills despite them containing industry-favorable language and provisions to 
secure more youth access restrictions in Louisiana. However, health advocates rejected Tobacco 
21 legislation proposed in 2019 because of weak enforcement provisions that only held retailers 
accountable for selling products to minors if they knowingly sold them products illegally. The 
ineffective language caused health advocates to attack the legislation as an industry bill.  
 
Tort Reform 
 
The tobacco industry’s work on “tort reform” in 
Louisiana during the 1980s and 1990s effectively 
eliminated its liability for harm caused by tobacco 
products and highlighted the power of the tobacco 
companies’ coalition building abilities in the state. In 
1986, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in Halphen v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. that companies were liable 
for inherently dangerous products, drawing tobacco 
industry interest and kickstarting state business 
community efforts led by the Louisiana Association of 
Business and Industry (LABI) to nullify the court’s 
decision (Chapter 8). The tobacco industry helped the 
state business community pass legislation in 1988 that 
overturned the Halphen ruling and virtually eliminated 
liability for harm caused by inherently dangerous products, including tobacco.  
 
The tobacco industry joined and supported LABI’s Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse 
Coalition, created in 1992 to defend favorable tort reform laws and pursue desired tort reform 
legislation. CALA served as the grassroots face of business community tort reform efforts in 
Louisiana but was heavily controlled and influenced by the tobacco industry, which had 
members and allies serving on CALA’s steering committee (Chapter 8). The tobacco industry 
used CALA for years to demonize its tort opponent, the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association 
(LTLA), and defend against adverse legislation backed by LTLA. LTLA had successfully 
influenced 1991 state elections, changing the Louisiana Legislature’s composition to make it 
hostile to tort reform. Although the tobacco industry and its allies failed to obtain bills to kill 
ongoing product liability lawsuits after 1991, they defeated adverse legislation and managed to 
secure laws making it harder to file and sustain product liability cases. We did not find evidence 
that health advocates countered tobacco industry tort reform efforts. Tobacco industry tort 
reform activities mostly protected it from being held responsible for harm caused by tobacco 
products in Louisiana.  
 
Tobacco Control Builds its Presence in Louisiana 1990s-2000s 
 
Formation of the Louisiana Tobacco Control Program and Health Advocate Coalition 
 
While the tobacco industry dominated political efforts in Louisiana during the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s, tobacco control programming remained limited in presence and capacity 
despite high cancer mortality rates in the state. Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals 
The tobacco industry’s work 
on “tort reform” in Louisiana 
during the 1980s and 1990s 
effectively eliminated its 
liability for harm caused by 
tobacco products and 
highlighted the power of the 
tobacco companies’ coalition 
building abilities in the state. 
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did not establish the Louisiana Tobacco Control Program (LCTP) until 1993, which received 
virtually no state funding and instead relied instead on federal grants (Chapter 4). LTCP 
deployed mini grants throughout Louisiana to develop community tobacco control programs and 
generate public support for tobacco control policies, creating a base for future state and local 
tobacco control legislative campaigns. While LTCP engaged in community building as well as 
general tobacco prevention and cessation, health advocates formed the Coalition for a Tobacco-
Free Louisiana (CTFLA) in 1999 to lobby for tobacco control policies (Chapters 4). Animosity 
that developed between members of LTCP and CTFLA partially led to the formation of a state-
funded nonprofit tobacco control program. 
 
Louisiana Joins State Litigation Against the Tobacco Industry 
 
As evidence of the harms caused by tobacco products and the tobacco companies’ 
deceptive practices mounted in the 1990s, the Attorney General of Louisiana joined nascent 
litigation to hold the industry accountable that ultimately resulted in the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA) (Chapter 9). Louisiana became the sixth state (after Mississippi, Florida, 
West Virginia, Texas, and Minnesota) to file a lawsuit seeking to recoup Medicaid funds lost to 
treating tobacco-related illnesses. Louisiana Attorney General Richard Ieyoub joined the lawsuits 
in 1996, which began in 1993, after being recruited to replace Minnesota in a settlement with 
tobacco company Liggett. Liggett demanded that five states participate in a deal to settle, but 
Minnesota refused to join the settlement believing its terms were too lenient on the company. 
Louisiana’s participation secured the Liggett settlement, providing State Attorneys General 
access to information and internal documents crucial to their lawsuits against the tobacco 
companies.  
 
The lawsuits, which grew to have over 40 plaintiffs, culminated in the MSA. The deal 
restricted tobacco industry marketing practices and provided billions in funds to participating 
states and territories. Louisiana lawmakers struggled to allocate their state’s windfall from the 
settlement. Rather than using MSA funds for health and tobacco control programming, the 
Louisiana State Legislature dedicated nearly all of its initial $199 million in payments to 
addressing a budget shortfall in 1999 (Chapter 9). State lawmakers initially dedicated 70% of the 
state’s settlement reward anticipated over 25 years into trusts dedicated to education and health 
initiatives. 
 
MSA Provides Louisiana Limited Tobacco Control Funding 
 
The State of Louisiana began to provide minimal funding for tobacco control in Fiscal 
year 2001 when lawmakers started allocating approximately $500,000 in funds from the MSA 
annually (compared to the $137 million in settlement money paid to Louisiana in calendar year 
20012). Significant funding for tobacco control materialized in 2002, when health and tobacco 
control advocates secured annual revenue from 2 cents of a 12 cent per pack cigarette tax 
increase for tobacco control programming. The yearly dedication resulted in the formation of the 
Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL). TFL, a tobacco control program 
administered by the Louisiana Public Health Institute, was able to conduct policy advocacy and 
operate with minimal political restrictions because it was a nonprofit and not overseen by the 
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state government (Chapter 4). In contrast, LTCP could not engage in policy advocacy and was 
subject to limitations placed on it by Louisiana administrations. 
 
Louisiana’s MSA payments were repeatedly targeted for securitization or to fund 
programs amid budget crises. The State subsequently reduced future settlement moneys available 
for annual appropriations by securitizing $2.4 billion of the $4 billion in anticipated MSA funds 
expected over the deal’s first 25 years for $1.2 billion in immediate funds in 2001 (Chapter 9).3 
The sale, 60% of MSA funds expected by Louisiana over the next 25 years, cut that portion of 
the fund’s value in half. Democratic Governor Kathleen Blanco’s Administration later attempted 
to securitize remaining funds from the first 25 years of MSA payments for coastal restoration in 
in 2007 but failed because of health advocate and Republican resistance. Republican Governor 
Bobby Jindal successfully redirected some annual MSA money to fund Louisiana’s TOPS 
scholarship program in 2011. He also attempted to securitize remaining funds expected from the 
first 25 years of MSA payments in 2015 to ensure funding for TOPS for 8 years amid a budget 
crisis. Despite a lack of health advocate opposition, Jindal failed to get approval for 
securitization, leaving the funds in place for health and education programming. Securitization 
and reallocation of MSA payments did not affect the annual $500,000 dedication to tobacco 
control established by state lawmakers in FY 2001. 
 
A 2002 Tobacco Tax Increase Leads to a Second Tobacco Control Program 
 
Health advocates pursed smoking 
restrictions and other tobacco control legislation 
with increased capacity partly because of their 
simultaneous efforts to increase tobacco taxes. 
In 2000, health advocates testified in support of 
the first tobacco tax hike to pass since 1990, HB 
117. The bill increased the cigarette tax by 4 
cents per pack (and established a 20% of invoice 
price tax for smokeless tobacco) but did not 
provide revenue for tobacco control. Using their 
re-formed CTFLA coalition, health advocates 
collaborated with Tulane, Louisiana State University (LSU) and others to pass the Tobacco Tax 
Healthcare Act in 2002 to secure a 12 cent increase per pack to the cigarette tax. The law 
annually dedicated revenue from 2 cents per pack towards tobacco control programming by the 
new Louisiana Cancer Research Consortium (LCRC), a new medical research center jointly 
administered by LSU and Tulane that the bill was originally created to fund. LCRC contracted 
with the Louisiana Public Health Institute, a state-based public health nonprofit, to create and 
annually fund the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living (TFL) with revenue from the 
2cent dedication (Chapters 4 and 11).  
 
TFL’s Nonprofit Status Provides Insulation from Political and Industry Interference 
 
TFL’s formation provided Louisiana a state-funded tobacco control program that could 
operate with greater freedom than standard, state-administered programs. Although TFL relied 
on state monies, it could engage in policy campaigns and community building without specific 
Using their re-formed CTFLA 
coalition, health advocates 
collaborated with Tulane, Louisiana 
State University (LSU) and others to 
pass the Tobacco Tax Healthcare Act 
in 2002 to secure a 12 cent increase 
per pack to the cigarette tax. 
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authorization by Louisiana’s legislative or executive branches because of its independent 
nonprofit status. For example, TFL created its “Let’s Be Totally Clear” and “Healthier Air for 
All” media campaigns to develop support for comprehensive smokefree policies across the state, 
helping secure ordinances in New Orleans in 2015 and in Baton Rouge during 2017 (Chapter 
12). TFL also participated in legislative advocacy campaigns that secured tax increases (Chapter 
11). 
 
Tobacco control programs, particularly state-administered, are susceptible to political and 
industry interference. For example, state-run media campaigns, which are effective at preventing 
tobacco use, have been repeatedly attacked by the tobacco industry.4 After California ran an 
aggressive media campaign targeting the tobacco industry for five years, in 1996 the industry 
used its relationship with California Governor Pete Wilson (R) to make it difficult for the 
California Tobacco Control Program to educate the public about industry behavior and the 
addictiveness of nicotine.4, 5 Another example was when Minnesota Governor Arne Carlson (R) 
and state lawmakers reduced funding for their state tobacco control program’s media campaign 
from $1.5 million to $1 million in 1990 ostensibly to alleviate a budget crisis that did not exist.4 
Similarly, Louisiana’s official state tobacco control program LTCP, which faced interference 
from state administrations (Chapter 4), did not run advocacy-oriented media and did not 
participate in legislative campaigns because the agency was prohibited from advocating for 
policies. After LTCP sponsored “Let’s Be Totally Clear” with TFL in its first iteration (when it 
was not a media campaign focused on policy advocacy), TFL rebooted the campaign without 
LTCP and used it to advocate for legislative changes (Chapter 4). LTCP also could not 
participate in policy coalitions while TFL could. 
 
While TFL’s nonprofit status has insulated it from political and industry interference, 
independent, state-funded tobacco control programs are still vulnerable to sabotage. Minnesota’s 
nonprofit tobacco control program, the Minnesota Partnership for Action Against Tobacco, was 
attacked by its state attorney general in 2001 and 2002.6 The pressure caused the program to drop 
smokefree-oriented community intervention programming for less effective cessation 
interventions.6 The initial media attacks were fostered by information generated by tobacco-
industry linked organizations, and the attorney general  had multiple connections to the tobacco 
industry. In 2011, Indiana’s state-funded independent tobacco control agency was ended and 
transferred to the control of that state’s health department with reduced funding via an 
amendment to budget legislation.7 Elimination of the program occurred despite the Indiana 
agency provably lowering youth smoking in the state. In 2006 and 2007 a state funded tobacco 
control nonprofit in Ohio did not receive expected MSA funds for its tobacco control 
programming, constraining the program’s growth.8 Still, Ohio’s nonprofit tobacco control 
program managed to forge a statewide network of tobacco control community partners. In 
contrast to the experiences of other independent tobacco control programs, Louisiana’s TFL has 
not had its funding cut and we did not discover attempts to silence or dismantle the nonprofit 
program.  
 
Possible reasons for TFL experiencing less political and industry interference than other 
state-run and state-funded nonprofit programs vary. TFL’s annual revenue comes from a 
permanent tax increase in 2002 (Chapter 11) that is not subject to the general budget and that 
lawmakers have not attempted to reduce or eliminate. In addition, the tax dedication is awarded 
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to Louisiana State University and Tulane University’s Louisiana Cancer Research Center 
(LCRC) for it to conduct tobacco control programming. LCRC provides the money to TFL’s 
administrator, independent nonprofit LPHI, through a contract to perform tobacco control 
programming on LCRC’s behalf, further insulating the tobacco control program from political 
pressure (Chapter 4). Another reason TFL may have avoided attacks is because TFL’s media 
campaigns have not made explicitly attacking the tobacco industry a major messaging 
component, instead focusing on promoting smoking restrictions using social justice themes. 
However, media campaigns that did not target the tobacco industry in other states, such as state 
programs in Minnesota during the 1980s and early 1990s, and Arizona, Oregon and 
Massachusetts in the early 2000s, were still attacked by the tobacco industry and its allies.4 
TFL’s nonprofit status has allowed it to pursue a more aggressive media and policy agenda with 
less interference from unsupportive or hostile state administrations (Chapters 4, 10, 11, 12).  
 
Hurricane Katrina Foments Cooperation between Louisiana’s Tobacco Control Programs 
 
Despite sharing similar objectives, LTCP and TFL initially did not coordinate their 
activities. Strained ties formed among the programs because of discord between LTCP and 
tobacco control advocate leadership, the awarding of recurring state funds to non-LTCP tobacco 
control programming, and racial tensions (Chapter 4). The devastation wrought by Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, combined with strained resources, led LTCP and TFL to align their 
programming from 2006-2010 with assistance from Emory University’s Tobacco Technical 
Assistance Consortium.  
 
The guided alignment allowed LTCP and TFL to develop complimentary programming 
that played to each’s strengths, and enabled LTCP and TFL to promote and jointly administer 
cessation services in Louisiana. Separately, LTCP engaged in public education and promoting 
tobacco-free policies for certain places, while TFL undertook tobacco control policy advocacy, 
community engagement and policy advocacy 
programming, and statewide initiatives (Chapter 4). 
Both programs collaborated and had their own efforts 
regarding youth tobacco control prevention and 
advocacy (Chapter 4).  
 
Overall funding remained well below 2014 CDC 
Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control 
Programs.9 In FY 2020, Louisiana spent $5.2 million on 
tobacco prevention, only 8.6% of the amount that the 
CDC recommended the state expend.10 Louisiana’s tobacco control expenditures are bested by 
two of its three neighbors, with Mississippi spending $8.4 million (23.1%) and Arkansas $11.1 
million (30.4%) and Texas only allocating $4.1 million (1.8%) in FY 2020.10 Louisiana’s 
tobacco control spending compares poorly to the rest of the nation as well, since the national 
average for state spending according to CDC best practices recommendations in FY 2020 was 
22.4%.10  
 
Despite low funding, LTCP and TFL effectively combined their resources to improve 
tobacco-related health and use outcomes and obtain regulation beneficial to public health. They 
In FY 2020, Louisiana spent 
$5.2 million on tobacco 
prevention, only 8.6% of the 
amount that the CDC 
recommended the state 
expend. 
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expanded cessation services across Louisiana and improving cessation assistance at healthcare 
providers in the state. TFL promoted smokefree restrictions via strong media campaigns such as 
“Healthier Air for All.” In addition, TFL collaborated with state and national partners to secure a 
statewide clean air law in 2006 (Chapter 10), as well as numerous comprehensive local 
smokefree policies (Chapter 12) and statewide tobacco tax increases (Chapter 11) in the 2010s.   
 
Improved Health Community Capacity Enables Public Health Policy Victories 
 
Tobacco control and health advocates started to develop enough capacity to counter 
industry influence and obtain smoking restriction laws that protected public health in the 2000s. 
Tobacco control advocates built a sustained coalition in 2001 by reforming CTFLA, reorganizing 
it under LPHI using a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant that year. The CTFLA enabled 
health and tobacco control advocates to form consensus goals, leverage grassroots networks, 
generate earned and paid media, and conduct outreach to state and local lawmakers to build 
support and agency for local preemption repeal in Louisiana.  
 
Health Interests Overturn Tobacco Industry Accommodation and Preemption Laws 
 
Health and tobacco control advocates used their increased capacity and coalition building 
to overturn tobacco industry accommodation laws and secure statewide smoking restriction 
legislation that protected public health. CTFLA managed to partially repeal state preemption of 
local smoking restrictions in 2003 (Chapter 10). Tobacco control and health advocates then 
passed 14 local smoking restriction ordinances between 2003 and June 2006 to build support for 
total preemption repeal and a statewide smokefree law. A multifaceted campaign by CTFLA 
(including TFL) in 2006 that consisted of paid and earned media, lobbying, and grassroots 
outreach enabled the coalition to secure the Louisiana Smoke-Free Air Act that year, replacing 
the accommodation bills the tobacco industry helped secure in 1992 and 1993 with a prohibition 
on smoking in most workplaces and public places besides bars and gaming establishments. The 
Act also eliminated all preemption over local smoking restrictions, allowing health and tobacco 
control advocates to later obtain comprehensive smokefree policies at the local level when 
pursuing state smoking restriction legislation became politically unfeasible. The Louisiana 
Smoke-Free Air Act made Louisiana one of 35 states to prohibit smoking in non-hospitality 
workplaces and one of 39 states to prohibit smoking in restaurants by January 2019.11 However, 
Louisiana remained one of 17 states that permitted smoking in bars as of January 201911 and one 
of 30 that permitted smoking in gaming establishments as of January 2, 2020.12 
 
Health Advocates Obtain Tobacco Tax Increases despite Fierce Political Opposition 
 
Despite obtaining tobacco control funds and further increasing their capacity, health 
advocates failed to obtain tobacco tax increases during the rest of the 2000’s and early 2010’s 
because of resistance from Louisiana’s political establishment. Health advocates, partnering with 
education advocates, unsuccessfully pursued a tobacco tax increase in 2005 to provide salary 
increases to public educators amidst resistance from Republican lawmakers (Chapter 11). In 
2009 and 2011, health advocates failed to secure tobacco tax increases against opposition from 
Republican Governor Bobby Jindal and the Louisiana GOP, which vehemently opposed tax 
hikes and actively campaigned against the adoption of proposed tobacco tax increases. 
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Louisiana’s experience under Jindal, particularly in 2011 when he vetoed tobacco tax increase 
bill HB 591, was similar to South Carolina’s experience in 2008, when that state’s governor 
successfully vetoed a tobacco tax hike.13 However, that year Louisiana health advocates saved a 
temporary 4-cent cigarette tax from expiring by attaching a rider to permanently renew it to a 
constitutional amendment desired by the Jindal Administration, preventing the rate from 
dropping from 36 cents per pack to 32 cents. Louisiana’s cigarette tax then stagnated until it 
became the 49th lowest in the United States by 2015. 
 
After earlier unsuccessful attempts to raise taxes, state and national health advocates in 
Louisiana employed the multilevel coalition and campaign model they used to secure statewide 
smoking restrictions and local comprehensive smokefree ordinances to secure tobacco tax 
increases in 2015 and 2016. National and state partners created the Invest in a Healthy Louisiana 
Coalition in 2015 and utilized grassroots networks, paid and earned media, and lobbying to 
obtain a 50-cent increase that year (from 36 cents to 86 cents per pack, Chapter 11). The 
coalition subsequently advocated for a cigarette tax increase in 2016 and helped secure an 
additional 22cent cigarette tax increase, bringing the total rate per pack to $1.08 cents. As a 
result, Louisiana climbed from the 49th highest cigarette tax to the 33rd highest in two years.  
 
Health Advocates Secure Comprehensive Smokefree Ordinances During 2010s 
 
Health advocates utilized their 
coalition and campaign model developed for 
statewide smokefree policy campaigns to 
circumvent opposition from Louisiana’s 
state government and obtain numerous 
comprehensive local smokefree ordinances 
that prohibited smoking in bars and casinos. 
TFL led initial efforts, first securing a 
comprehensive smokefree ordinance for the 
City of Alexandria in 2012 and for the cities 
of Monroe, West Monroe and their Parish, 
Ouachita, in 2013 (Chapter 12). Utilizing this model, national, state and local health 
organizations and advocates created the SmokeFree NOLA (New Orleans) Coalition to pursue a 
comprehensive smokefree ordinance for New Orleans in 2014.  
 
The SmokeFree NOLA coalition utilized musicians as well as bar and gaming 
establishment workers, people whose industries were not protected by smoking restrictions, as 
spokespersons for the ordinance battle. Coalition messaging promoted them as integral to New 
Orleans because of its status as a jazz and tourist destination. The SmokeFree NOLA Coalition 
employed smokefree events, generated paid and earned media, and convinced the American 
Lung Association and the American Public Health Association (during its 2014 annual meeting 
in New Orleans) to announce a moratorium on conventions in the city until smoking restrictions 
were strengthened, creating public support and political pressure for a smokefree ordinance. 
Coalition members aggressively countered economic harm, freedom of choice, and harm 
reduction claims from opponents in the bar, gaming, and electronic cigarette industries. A well-
coordinated coalition, complimented by a strong legislative champion, enabled health and 
Health advocates utilized their coalition 
and campaign model developed for 
statewide smokefree policy campaigns 
to circumvent opposition from 
Louisiana’s state government and 
obtain numerous comprehensive local 
smokefree ordinances 
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tobacco control advocates to secure a comprehensive smokefree ordinance that prohibited 
smoking in bars, casinos, and all hotel and motel guest rooms in New Orleans by early 2015.  
 
National, state and local health organizations and advocates subsequently formed the 
Smoke-Free East Baton Rouge Coalition and pursued a similarly comprehensive ordinance in 
Louisiana’s capital during 2016. After an unsuccessful initial campaign, the coalition obtained a 
comprehensive law in 2017. In total, from 2012 through January 2020 at least 28 comprehensive 
local smokefree ordinances passed in Louisiana, much legislation with advocate assistance, as 
most state-level smoking restrictions stagnated.  
 
Even with these successes, as of 2020 comprehensive local ordinances (defined as 
covering workplaces, bars and restaurants) only covered 27.9% of Louisiana’s population.14 The 
percentage covered in Louisiana is lower than the 45%  average as of June 2019 for the 13 states 
(including Louisiana) designated “Tobacco Nation” by the Truth Initiative, which have the 
highest smoking rates in the US.15 As of 2020, 8 States have more citizens protected by 
comprehensive local smokefree laws than Louisiana, and 27 have comprehensive statewide 
smokefree laws safeguarding all of their residents.14 
 
 The local policy campaigns in Louisiana demonstrate that local legislative battles are a 
successful means to protect public health when health advocates face resistance from state 
governments, but there is more work needed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Louisiana’s tobacco control history demonstrates the power the tobacco industry has to 
influence and corrupt the democratic political process with power and money, but also shows 
that dedicated and determined health and tobacco control advocates can counter this interference 
via capacity and coalition building. Using lobbying, campaign contributions, and extensive ties 
to the business community, the tobacco industry advanced its policy agenda on smoking 
accommodation, tobacco taxes, youth access, and tort reform with minimal resistance from the 
health community during the 1980s and 1990s. However, relying on substantially less resources, 
health and tobacco control advocates developed their presence in Louisiana during the 1990s and 
early 2000s, forming tobacco control programs LTCP and TFL as well as a network of regional 
allies and local grassroots activists. This web of state, regional, and local grassroots advocates, 
complimented by strong relationships and collaborations with national health voluntaries, 
enabled coalition-led policy campaigns that secured effective, public health-oriented legislation 
in Louisiana. Advocates passed meaningful state-level smoking restrictions that overturned 
harmful tobacco industry accommodation laws and fully repealed preemption over local smoking 
policies in 2006, which subsequently led to numerous comprehensive smokefree ordinances in 
small towns and major cities. In addition, advocates raised Louisiana’s cigarette tax from the 49th 
highest in the country to 33rd between 2015 and 2016 after years of legislative stagnation.  
 
Despite health and tobacco control advocates’ progress on tobacco control policy in 
Louisiana, the state continues to struggle with health and tobacco outcomes compared to the rest 
of the United States. The state ranked 49th in overall health and 43rd for smoking in the country 
according to United Health Foundation’s 2019 America’s Health Rankings.16 As of 2020, 
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Louisiana had the 6th highest smoking prevalence among states17 with 20.5% of the public 
smoking according to the last BRFSS data available from 2018.18 Louisiana’s adult smoker rate 
is similar to Tobacco Nation’s 21% and worse compared to the national average of 16.1%.15 
While Louisiana’s adult smoking prevalence has declined, it has grown farther apart from the 
faster declining US rate (Figure 13.1).  
 
 
 
Figure 13.1: (top) Current Cigarette and E-Cigarette Prevalence in Louisiana and the United States.18   (bottom) The difference 
between Louisiana and the US average grew over time for cigarettes. (There was a methods change to BRFSS in 2010 that 
created a new baseline for BRFSS results 2011-2018 that cannot be compared to previous BRFSS results.19) (Reproduction of 
Figure 1.1) 
 
Louisiana’s E-cigarette prevalence is only 4.5% according to BRFSS data from 2018, similar to 
the national average.18 The state’s youth smoking rate also remains worse than the US average, 
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with 12.3% of Louisiana high school students smoking compared to 8.8% according to 2017 
high school YRBS data.20 12.2% Louisiana high school students used e-cigarettes, similar to the 
national average.20  
 
Failure to reduce Louisiana’s smoking 
prevalence carries significant consequences for the 
state. Smoking kills 7,200 people annually in 
Louisiana21, 22 and accounts for 32.6% of cancer 
deaths.22 If smoking prevalence was reduced by 
just 1% in absolute prevalence in Louisiana, the 
state would save $31.7 million in Medicaid funds 
the following year. In 2009, the last year of data 
available, Louisiana’s high smoking prevalence 
cost the state $1.9 billion treating smoking-linked 
illnesses.21, 22 Although health and tobacco control 
advocates, programs, and organizations have 
secured greater resources, implemented more prevention and cessation programming, 
significantly raised taxes and brought comprehensive smokefree protections to 27.9% of 
Louisianans15 by 2020, they need to continue aggressively pursuing additional smokefree 
legislation and programming to lower smoking as quickly or faster than the national average. 
Lowering Louisiana’s smoking prevalence among adults and youth is necessary to curb the 
health and economic costs inflicted by tobacco on the state and improve the quality of life of all 
Louisianans. 
 
While Louisiana’s overall health and smoking outcomes need further improvement, 
health and tobacco control advocates have established a network in the state more than apt for 
the challenge. In fact, the tactics utilized by health partners operating in Louisiana serve as a 
model for advocates in all states seeking to advance public health policy in the face of a 
powerful, entrenched tobacco industry and a business-friendly state government.  
  
… the tactics utilized by health 
partners operating in Louisiana 
serve as a model for advocates in 
all states seeking to advance 
public health policy in the face of 
a powerful, entrenched tobacco 
industry and a business-friendly 
state government. 
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